PSYCHOTHERAPY: THEORY, RESEARCH AND PRACTICEVOLUME 15, # 1 , SPRING, 1978

LEARNED HELPLESSNESS AND LEARNED RESTLESSNESS

DALE O. FOGLEDepartment of Human Relations and Counselling Studies

University of Waterloo, Ontario, Canada

ABSTRACT: Over generalization of the learned-helplessness model could encourage the assumptionthat instrumental coping behavior (voluntaryescape/avoidance) is always the most adaptive re-sponse to threat. Clients in psychotherapy are oftenmost threatened by their own unwanted responses,many of which normally elude voluntary self-control.Indeed, anxious efforts to avoid, escape, or other-wise control such responses sometimes have theself-defeating effect of producing them, as seen insuch diverse conditions as stuttering, insomnia, sex-ual dysfunction, and even some depression. Suchconditions have an experimental analogue in thepersistence of punished escape /avoidance responsesin vicious-circle learning. The persistence of instru-mentally ineffective coping behavior is seen to be theconverse of learned helplessness and is here termed"learned restlessness." In contrast to learnedhelplessness, learned restlessness calls for aparadoxical treatment strategy of response preven-tion or instructed helplessness, whereby the client ispersuaded to give up any deliberate escape/avoidance efforts, risking or accepting the fearedeventuality. Problems in diagnosing helplessness andrestlessness, as well as possible sources of client andtherapist resistance to a treatment strategy of givingup, are also considered briefly here.

The concept of "learned helplessness" ispopular today in many circles, both clinical andexperimental. The concept was first used todescribe the failure of some laboratory animalsto escape or avoid shock, when given theopportunity, after previous exposure to ines-capable shock (Overmier & Seligman, 1967;Seligman & Maier, 1967). The term has sincebeen applied to the failure of human beings toseek, utilize, or learn adaptive instrumentalresponses, as seen most dramatically in thedepressed person who seems to have given uphope that effective voluntary control over im-portant environmental events is possible

(Seligman, 1975). Some of the notion's currentappeal lies precisely in the apparent clinicalrelevance of this experimentally derivedparadigm.

The typical laboratory demonstration oflearned helplessness has utilized an experimen-tal design in which two of three groups of dogs(or other animals) are first exposed to a series ofshocks while confined in a harness or hammock.Subjects in one of these groups are allowed tolearn an instrumental escape response, whilethose in the second, yoked group have noinstrumental control over the shock. Naivesubjects in the third group receive no shock atthis stage. When all animals are then given theopportunity to learn the usual escape/avoidresponse in a shuttle box, those in the naive andescape-conditioned groups readily learn to jumpthe barrier to safety, while many of those fromthe previous yoked condition fail to learn theavailable response. The latter, learned-helplessanimals quickly cease running about in the newsituation and simply lie passive, whiningquietly, as they receive continued shocks. Evenif they accidentally make an occasional escaperesponse at first, they fail to repeat and learnthis response.

This effect is by no means universal across allsubjects or variations of procedure, but it doeshave some degree of generality across speciesand situations. With human subjects, exposureto aversive and uncontrollable noise has sub-sequently interfered with anagram solving,while experience with insoluble discriminationproblems has likewise interfered with learningto control noise (Hiroto & Seligman, 1975).

Some naturally occurring forms of learnedhelplessness in humans could be of more directclinical interest. Reactive depression, in par-ticular, has recently been reinterpreted as the

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outcome of a perception or belief that sig-nificant life events, both aversive and gratify-ing, are beyond the individual's control (Selig-man, 1975). Hence the familiar pattern of"depressed" responding, of giving up evenwhen adaptive responses would seem (toothers) to be available. Of course, somegiving-up reactions are not as global orgeneralized as in depression. Take, for exam-ple, children who react to failure in an academicor achievement context by giving up furthereffort, thus feeding a vicious circle of under-achievement if not the broader pattern of de-pression (Dweck, 1975).

The therapeutic implications derived fromthe learned-helplessness model have thus farbeen less than dramatic. Predictions that timeand ECT may both help in cases of learnedhelplessness or depression, though based onlaboratory results, are not unique to the model(Seligman, 1973, 1975). Perhaps more specificto the model is the suggestion of forciblyexposing a victim of learned helplessness tosuccessful control experiences, as when help-less dogs have been dragged across the shuttlebox until they finally learn that they can escapeshock on their own (Seligman, Maier, & Geer,1968). The more general suggestion is beingmade that early experiences with effective vol-untary control over events may help immunizehumans, as well as other animals, against laterlearned helplessness when various trauma areencountered (Seligman & Maier, 1967; Selig-man, Rosellini, & Kozak, 1975).

Also of some interest here is Dweck's (1975)reattribution training approach with learned-helpless school children. In persuading suchchildren to attribute their failures to their own(correctable) lack of effort, Dweck was able toimprove their overall performance by gettingthem to try harder. In contrast, a group oflearned-helpless students who were simplygiven a steady diet of success still overreactedto later failure.

Neither a detailed review of the rapidlygrowing learned-helplessness literature nor asystematic critique of the concept will be at-tempted here. Critical examination of the modelin terms of its learning rationale, the strength ofits clinical/experimental parallels, and itstherapeutic implications will no doubt be under-taken elsewhere. The present discussion fo-cuses instead on but one area in which the

overgeneralization or overselling of this other-wise valuable notion could obscure some im-portant clinical and experimental phenomena.

Already, the more general and popularstatements of the learned-helplessness model(Seligman, 1973, 1975) have seemed to suggestthat instrumental coping behavior is always themost adaptive response to threat. But adaptiveescape/avoidance responses are not alwaysavailable; for some kinds of aversive events,they may normally be unavailable. In the lattercase, as in the inescapable-shock condition oflearned-helplessness experiments, emotionalpassivity is in fact the most adaptive course.This point is acknowledged by Seligman (1975)and well stated by Kimmel (1971):

Since proprioceptive feedback from the fear reaction isitself aversive to the organism, the persistence of learnedfear reactions in unavoidable-inescapable pain situationswould be biologically wasteful, if not downright self-punitive . . .The only adaptive response option avail-able to a dog which is forced to receive a series ofsignaled or unsignaled inescapable-unavoidable shocksis to relax, or to inhibit the aversive fear response, (pp.167, 172; emphasis in the original)

Here, too, attempts to avoid or otherwise con-trol the aversive event instrumentally would beuseless, if not counterproductive.

Of course, human beings are generally moreable to control external sources of threat thanare dogs administered inescapable shock in thelaboratory; at least we like to hope so. Individu-als may also hope to exercise voluntary controlover their own responses—physiological, emo-tional, cognitive, and behavioral — since thesebecome sources of threat or gratification in theirown right. Clients in psychotherapy, for exam-ple, often respond as much to their own un-wanted responses as to external threats, andthey seek to control and change themselves asmuch or more than external events, or as ameans to achieve control over external events.However, it will be suggested here that volun-tary self-controlling responses in particular arenot always available or may have their ownaversive consequences. The work of Seligmanand his colleagues does not speak to this clini-cally salient possibility, partly because theirwork is based on laboratory studies of theresponse to externally administered stimuli.

If instrumentally effective coping responsesare sometimes not available, especially forpurposes of voluntary self-control, then learned

LEARNED HELPLESSNESS & LEARNED RESTLESSNESS 41

helplessness may indeed have its place as anadaptive reaction to uncontrollable events. It isthus clearly necessary to place the concept oflearned helplessness in a broader context byclarifying the circumstances in which it is anadaptive condition, not a pathological state. Butin such circumstances we also find a maladap-tive condition that is more or less directlyopposed to learned helplessness.

THE EXPERIMENTAL CONCEPT AND CLINICAL

SIGNIFICANCE OF LEARNED RESTLESSNESS

It is certainly not the case that all clients intherapy present a pattern of learned helpless-ness. Many are actively casting about for effec-tive coping responses to deal with external orinternal events. Indeed, some clients seem toexhibit not a giving-up syndrome but a trying-too-hard syndrome, often in an effort to escapeor avoid their own undesired reactions in certainsituations.

There are many common clinical patterns ofobjectively unnecessary and maladaptiveavoidance behavior. The classical phobias fol-low this pattern; so do some drug dependenceand social withdrawal problems. Consider, forexample, the male client who avoids urinatingin public restrooms for fear of being seen if hefails to perform. Here, of course, as with mostphobias, the avoidance behavior may be suc-cessful in minimizing embarrassment or anxi-ety. But this behavior is not only unnecessary,logically speaking, but also unpleasant or aver-sive in its own right.

In the case of chronic insomnia, on the otherhand, the search for effective coping mecha-nisms may well continue even without notablesuccess in escaping the feared event. Here theindividual's anxiety persists and feeds a self-exacerbating condition, but the victim almostnever gives up and relaxes (Storms & Nisbett,1970). A similar "exacerbation cycle" plays aprominent role in many other psychosomaticconditions, from angina pectoris to gastric ulcer(Beck, 1972; Lachman, 1972). Stuttering pro-vides another example where the victim's anxi-ety and even his very coping efforts maintainthe speech difficulty (Bloodstein, 1958).

Do such examples point to a clinical converseof learned helplessness? If so, they should alsoprove to have their own experimentalanalogues, which could be directly contrasted

with the experimental paradigm of learnedhelplessness. Fortunately, such analogues canalready be found in the conditioning literature.

The case of unnecessary avoidance respond-ing in the laboratory is best known from dem-onstrations of the resistance of avoidance re-sponding to normal extinction procedures (Sol-omon & Wynne, 1954). Just as the learned-helpless animal fails to learn that a copingresponse is now available, because it does nottry hard enough to respond, the persistent avoid-er fails to learn that such a response is nolonger necessary, for this animal never gives upresponding or tries not responding. But thisparadigm is too familiar to require furtherdiscussion here.

Less familiar but even more clearly opposedto the learned-helplessness model are studies inwhich animals learn some response to escape oravoid shock but are later exposed to shockcontingent upon that same response. Here theoriginal shock contingency is removed but cop-ing responses are now punished instead. This isthe paradigm of "vicious-circle learning," inwhich punished escape or avoidance responsesare maintained by at least some subjects in a"superstitious" fashion long after they havebecome directly counterproductive (Brown,1969; Fowler, 1971; Melvin, 1971; Migler,1963; Mowrer, 1947; Solomon, Kamin, &Wynne, 1953). Here the animal gets the worstof both worlds; he not only suffers the primary,punishing stimulation (shock), but his emo-tional arousal (fear, frustration) is maintained aswell, instead of being given up or inhibited as inlearned helplessness. The animal in this posi-tion may even suffer pathological psychosomat-ic effects, such as ulcers, as a result (Weiss,1971).

In any case, the unusual persistence ofpunished avoidance behavior looks as strange tothe observer who does not know the animal'sprior reinforcement history as does learned-helpless behavior. Bandura (1969) made thefollowing observation regarding an unpublishedstudy by Sandier and Quagliano in which mon-keys first learned to avoid shock by leverpressing but were later punished with shock fordoing so.

After the avoided shock was completely discontinuedbut lever-pressing responses (which had now becomeobjectively functionless) still produced painful conse-sequences, the animals continued to punish themselves

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unnecessarily with shock intensities that they had previ-ously worked hard to avoid. Anyone observing theneedless self-injurious behavior of these animals withoutknowledge of their prior learning history wouldundoubtedly be baffled by their tenacious "maso-chism." (p. 297)

Kimmel (1971) has noted the parallel ofvicious-circle learning with the learned-helplessness paradigm insofar as both involvetrapping the animal in a change of environmen-tal contingencies that is not discriminated by thevictim. The animal that has learned helpless-ness fails to try when the situation now dictatesthat he should, and the animal that has learnedto try often fails to give up when that becomesthe more adaptive course.

The persistence of instrumentally ineffectivecoping behavior thus constitutes an experimen-tal converse of learned helplessness and mayperhaps be termed "learned restlessness." Inthese terms, a learned-restless individual is onewho persists in futile if not self-defeating at-tempts to escape a feared event. Emotionalarousal in the form of anxiety and/or frustrationis naturally prominent in learned restlessness,just as low arousal and depression are emotionalconcomitants of learned helplessness. Literally,the victim of learned restlessness gets no rest,not even the rest of resignation.

The connotations of "learned restlessness"also fit the clinical picture of many clients whoin different ways are trying too hard to escape oravoid some aversive condition through volun-tary, instrumental behavior. In such cases,some degree of learned helplessness might ac-tually prove more adaptive in the long run.

TREATMENT IMPLICATIONS: THE VIRTUES OFGIVING UP

Virtually every client comes to therapy seek-ing to escape or avoid some aversive condition.If the condition is not literally painful, as it is inmany psychosomatic problems, it is psycholog-ically distressing, as with anxiety problems,depression, insomnia, stuttering, sexual dys-function, and many other difficulties. Occa-sionally, a presenting problem may be phrasedin terms of positive goals to be achieved,though even here a formulation of escape fromthe present, undesired condition could equallywell apply. The client may have come to feelmore or less helpless insofar as he is now

unable to control the aversive situation. Butchances are that he has previously tried severalcoping devices or responses, and seekingtherapeutic help is another such response.

It seems unlikely that a professional helperwould encourage this person to give up thesearch for help, or the search for an effectivecoping strategy. But if the therapist believedthat a perfectly and permanently effective cop-ing strategy of instrumental response was sim-ply not available in this case, or that theproblem was being maintained by the client'sown emotional and instrumental reactions to thecondition itself, then a strategy of encouragingthe client to give up deliberate responding inthis respect might seem more plausible.

Sternbach and Rusk (1973) have used anapproach of this kind in their clinical work withpsychosomatic pain patients. Sternbach andRusk simply refused to focus their therapeuticefforts on pain complaints or pain relief per se,refocusing their patients' attention instead onformulating and working toward positive so-cial, vocational, or avocational goals that didnot in fact have to be contingent on prior painrelief. In a sense, this approach encouraged thepatient to become less restless regarding hispain and less helpless regarding externalsources of potential gratification.

This approach has much in common withFrankl's (1975) dereflection. Here too attentionis refocused away from goals that often defydeliberate attainment, such as sexual fulfill-ment, in the belief that not trying so hard maybe the surer path to such ends. Masters andJohnson's (1970) sensate focus exercise alsoencourages sexually dysfunctional couples totemporarily give up their efforts to achieveorgasmic success (or avoid failure) while focus-ing on other aspects of sexual pleasure instead.

This might be a fairly obvious clinical coursewhen the client is escaping or seeking to escapea condition that is intrinsically not so aversiveas the client believes it to be. Rational-emotivetherapists (Ellis, 1962) often deal with exagger-ated social fears by using logical argument toundercut or "decatastrophize" them. Counter-productive efforts to avoid such experiencesmay then be given up. For example, the victimof "shy penis" may be convinced that failure toperform at a urinal will meet with no greataversive consequences and can thus be riskedwithout the usual avoidance behavior.

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Indeed, it might sometimes be appropriate toassure the client that he will experience thefeared failure, at least for some time, and thathe should learn to accept that eventuality withless anxiety or struggle. Reduced anticipatoryanxiety may, of course, be a necessary steptoward later being able to perform the desiredresponse. A similar approach might be adoptedtoward insomnia and many other conditionswhere a giving up of all hope of voluntarycontrol might undercut anticipatory anxiety andsoon permit more normal, albeit "involuntary"functioning to occur. It is easy to see whyexplicit instruction in learned helplessness hasrarely been attempted or even considered, but itwould surely warrant further clinical test.

More commonly employed are variousparadoxical techniques which actually prescribethe feared or unwanted condition. These in-clude negative practice, paradoxical intention,implosion, flooding, and several others (Raskin& Klein, 1976). These techniques all have theirown theoretical rationales, but they have onething in common: They force the client toapproach or produce the feared event, in fantasyor in vivo. As Haley (1963) has suggested, aparadoxical acceptance of symptoms may alsooccur, although less explicitly, in more conven-tional therapies, including psychoanalysis,client-centered therapy, and some directiveapproaches.

Perhaps the key element in all such paradoxi-cal approaches is that the client may give up hisprevious, counterproductive struggle to escapethe undesired condition. The effort to actuallyproduce the feared event or fantasy, as inparadoxical intention or flooding, may not bethe active ingredient in such treatments, exceptinsofar as trying to approach is one way ofgiving up the counterproductive effort to avoid.But if this is true, simple "giving-up" ap-proaches might prove to be as effective withsome problems as prescriptive, "trying-the-opposite" methods. Such giving-up approacheswould include Frankl's dereflection and theother previously mentioned strategies that di-vert the client's attention and effort from afeared or avoided event.

Whatever the specific approach, a voluntarychoice to relinquish any deliberate escape/avoidance efforts and to produce or at least riskthe aversive event instead may itself encouragea perception of the event as less catastrophic

than previously assumed: "I wouldn't choose torisk this event if it were really so terrible."After all, the opposite choice to avoid or escapea painful condition is likely to increase itsperceived aversiveness: "I wouldn't choose toavoid this event if it weren't pretty terrible."Bandler, Madaras, and Bern (1968) and Corahand Boffa (1970) have actually confirmed ex-perimentally that an aversive stimulus is per-ceived to be less unpleasant when it is voluntar-ily endured than when it is voluntarily termi-nated. Of course, direct experience with apreviously avoided but now permitted event, ifindeed it occurs, may further disconfirm anyunduly catastrophic expectations regarding theconsequences of accepting it.

The experimental analogue of this treatmentapproach in the case of a learned-restless animalwould probably be forcible response preven-tion. Here again, the parallel contrast withlearned helplessness is clear and illuminating.The learned-helpless animal is forcibly draggedto the safe side of a shuttle box until it finallylearns to escape or avoid shock by respondingon its own (Seligman, Maier, & Geer, 1968);the learned-restless animal may have to berestrained in the original shock compartmentuntil it learns that avoidance responding is nolonger functional (Solomon, Kamin, & Wynne,1953).

DIAGNOSTIC IMPLICATIONS: DIFFERENTIATINGHELPLESSNESS AND RESTLESSNESS

If diametrically opposed treatment ap-proaches are appropriate for the two kinds ofmaladaptive behavior discussed here, the clini-cal diagnosis of any presented problem be-comes critical in this respect. Has a given clientgiven up where he should try, or is he trying toohard where he should give up? Giving up theanxious effort to sleep might be a solution for aninsomniac, but giving up any hope of persuad-ing a roommate to turn down the stereo aftermidnight might be part of a problem for anunassertive individual. So where is trying nor-mally more adaptive than not trying, and viceversa?

The answer to this question is not easilyestablished. A first approximation would be tofollow traditional voluntary/involuntary orcentral/autonomic distinctions. Adaptive con-trol of the external environment is most often

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accomplished through muscular (skeletal) re-sponses under voluntary control. On the otherhand, many internal, autonomically mediatedfunctions are generally not under voluntarycontrol, certainly not under complete consciousor deliberate control. Thus, many emotionaland psychophysiological problems, such asanxiety, depression, insomnia, tension head-ache, and sexual dysfunction, are aberrationsof normally involuntary processes.

It might be argued that the solution to suchproblems lies in extending the individual's vol-untary self-control to encompass them, usingnovel therapeutic means if necessary to do so.In many situations, deliberate relaxation is usedas an antidote for anxiety, and thus an involun-tary emotional reaction is supposedly displacedby voluntary physical responses. But then notall clients can relax in this manner, perhapsespecially if they try anxiously to do so, as inthe following example attributed to David L.Norris by Frankl (1975):

Steve S. was actively trying to relax. The electromyo-graph meter which I use in my reserach read constantly ata high level (50 micro-amperes) until I told him that heprobably would never be able to learn to relax andshould resign himself to the fact that he would always betense. A few minutes later Steve S. stated, "Oh hell, Igive up," at which time the meter reading immediatelydropped to a low level (10 micro-amperes) with suchspeed that I thought the unit had become disconnected.For the succeeding sessions Steve S. was successfulbecause he was not trying to relax, (p. 236; emphasis inthe original)

Of course, methods such as Jacobson's (1938)progressive relaxation sometimes circumventthis problem by incorporating their ownparadoxical elements: Relaxation is notachieved by simple command or direct effort,but by deliberately tensing muscle groups (anavailable voluntary response) and then "lettinggo" of that muscle tension.

Biofeedback is assumed to offer a furtherextension of voluntary self-control over nor-mally involuntary responses, but here againovermotivated individuals are unlikely to learnhow to reliably produce responses generallyassociated with a state of low effort or relaxa-tion. It is not surprising, then, that even assubjects learn to deliberately increase theiralpha levels over several feedback sessions,these alpha levels may remain below thoserecorded in rest periods between feedback ses-sions (Lynch, Paskewitz, & Orne, 1974).

But the important question in choosing atreatment strategy may not be whether a re-sponse can theoretically be brought under vol-untary self-control, but whether it is normallyunder voluntary control. Falling asleep maysometimes be modified deliberately by the useof certain medications, but it is normally (andalways to some extent) an involuntary response.When such responses go awry, the clinicianmust certainly consider whether deliberate cop-ing efforts are really a long-term solution, oronly part of the problem.

The trying-too-hard syndrome may also befound where complex motor coordination isrequired, as in athletic performance (Gallwey,1974). This behavior is a mix of voluntary andinvoluntary responding; some degree of effort isnaturally required. However, as the finely coor-dinated muscle responses demanded by thegame are learned, they become less deliberateand increasingly automatic. Then, like otherinvoluntary behaviors, performance may sufferif it is made overly self-conscious or deliberate(Kimble & Perlmuter, 1970). Thus, beginnersmay be more likely to suffer problems of givingup, while pros may be more vulnerable to tryingtoo hard.

Of more clinical relevance is the case ofstuttering. Adult speech is a complex butlargely automatic behavior that is naturallydisrupted by an excess of intention or delibera-tion. Most stuttering conforms quite clearly tothe learned-restlessness model, even if somestutterers exhibit learned helplessness ordepressive features in other areas of adjustment.Their continued struggle to speak fluently or toavoid dysfluency maintains the vicious circle ofdisordered speech (Bloodstein, 1958).

The pattern is not so clear in cognitive oracademic achievement problems. It may berecalled that Dweck (1975) selected a group ofyoung students identified as learned helpless,i.e., as prone to give up in the face of failure,and improved their performance by motivatingthem to try harder. Yet some students failthrough trying too hard, as seen in many olderstudents with test anxiety or study problems. Agiven student's achievement problem may actu-ally prove to be a rather complex mix or viciouscycle of trying too hard and giving up, or it maymove from a stage of anxiety and maladaptiveeffort to a later burned-out stage of exhaustionand depression (Thweatt, 1976).

LEARNED HELPLESSNESS & LEARNED RESTLESSNESS 45

These examples highlight the clinical carethat may be necessary if learned-helpless re-actions and learned-restless reactions are to bedifferentiated and diagnosed correctly. But thistask may be the most difficult where one patternis superimposed upon another in a compound-ing of ingrown, self-exacerbating reactions tothe initial difficulty. Conditions such as anxietyand depression are commonly viewed as rela-tively simple and unitary reactions to externalevents. For example, depression follows fromthe perception or belief that significant en-vironmental events are independent of volun-tary control (Seligman, 1975). But as Seligmanacknowledges in passing, depression itself is anaversive condition that the individual may (ormay not) try to escape.

Theoretically, the experience of depressionmay become the stimulus for either helpless orrestless reactions. If the otherwise helpless anddepressed individual is greatly ashamed orafraid of his depression, he may indeed castabout anxiously for relief from that condition.This is consistent with the observation thatdepression and anxiety are often entangled todifferent degrees (Miller, Seligman, & Kurlan-der, 1975). On the other hand, a person couldconceivably get (more) depressed that they aredepressed or (more) anxious that they are anx-ious. Evans (1972) and Eysenck (1968) haveboth offered theoretical models of how the lattercompounding of anxiety may occur.

Secondary reactions to the condition itselfhelp to explain why many anxiety and depres-sion states seem so loosely connected to pre-cipitating or controlling environmental events.Indeed, such reactions may be of no less impor-tance than the initial reaction, since they canmaintain or compound an otherwise relativelybenign condition. Furthermore, the nature ofthese secondary reactions may dictate the pointand direction of maximum therapeutic leverage,at least initially.

Take, for example, an individual who isanxious that he is depressed. A simple treat-ment to alleviate the individual's depressionwould tend to confirm the person's learned-restless response to the depression per se.Perhaps more appropriate, at least at first,would be a paradoxical technique prescribingdepression or otherwise undercutting the indi-vidual's anxious efforts to escape it. Thisstrategy appears all the more reasonable if

indeed much reactive depression tends to liftsimply with time—as long as secondary re-actions do not perpetuate it. Thus, even somedepressed patients might benefit from learningincreased helplessness, at least with regard totheir depression.

Sound treatment decisions therefore requirecareful clinical discrimination betweenhelplessness and restlessness, and between situ-ations where one or the other of these is themore adaptive or maladaptive response. But thetherapist may also need to help some clientsimprove their own discrimination of these dif-ferent kinds of reactions and situations. Other-wise, a successful experience with either re-action in one situation may encourage the clientto generalize the response indiscriminately andinappropriately to other situations. Seligman(1975) has actually recommended maximumexposure to controllable events as a preventa-tive measure to immunize individuals againstlater helplessness in different circumstances.This suggestion is clearly inappropriate if theindividual does not also learn to distinguishcircumstances where helplessness might be themore adaptive course.

CONCLUSION

The greatest value of the learned-helplessness model is not that it subsumes all ofthe most important clinical problems—it doesnot—but that its conceptual mapping of onearea provides a figure illuminating the groundof other problem areas, where contrasting form-ulations are more appropriate and badlyneeded. The concept of learned restlessnessshould in turn help to set boundaries preventingthe overextension of the earlier model. To-gether these two complementary notions shouldhelp to map a broad range of human behaviorproblems in theoretically, experimentally, andclinically useful terms.

The present discussion has probably raisedand left unanswered many questions as to howtherapeutic efforts should be guided in the caseof learned restlessness. A detailed discussion ofclinical practice in this area cannot be attemptedhere, though some suggestions follow directlyfrom the diagnostic and treatment examplescited earlier. One thing is clear: Any therapeuticapplication of instructed helplessness as anantidote for learned restlessness will have a

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paradoxical appearance, whatever specific formit takes.

Even where the clinical potential of giving upis apparent to the therapist in a given case, thebiggest difficulty may lie in how to present thisalternative to a client who is highly motivated toescape or otherwise control an unwanted condi-tion. The clinician will certainly have tominimize the likelihood of the client angrilyrejecting this course or, at the other extreme,overgeneralizing the hopelessness of the situa-tion and giving in to a genuinely depressivereaction.

Here another decision is critical: Should giv-ing up be presented as a course of genuineresignation or as a more subtle way to try toimprove the situation? This is the differencebetween "giving up trying" and "trying givingup," and most paradoxical treatments may bepresented to the client in either light. Of course,the second formulation would generally bemore palatable to the restless client. On theother hand, this does not really break the patternof restless responding, since even a response ofpassivity may be attempted actively and delib-erately as a coping device. The learned-restlessness model would tend to suggest thatgenuine resignation may often be more helpfulthan feigned resignation. But this critical pointcertainly requires clinical and experimental test.

Of course, the treatment strategy outlinedhere might also prove unpalatable to mostclinicians, at least at first glance. Cliniciansprefer to see and present themselves as helpersof the helpless and are unlikely to countenancegiving up, in themselves or their clients. But thetemptation to always try to fulfill the client'ssearch for an instrumental coping device is notonly built into the clinician's helping role; it isalso reinforced by the growing behavioral em-phasis on self-control technologies and treat-ments, some of which seek to extend theindividual's voluntary control over processeswhich are normally involuntary.

Sometimes this is clearly possible and eventhe best course. But the implicit or explicitassumption that this is always possible andalways the best course grows less from soundclinical observation than from a broader clinicaland cultural view of voluntary effort and controlas the solution to human problems. It is thisbroader bias that makes more and better copingthe appealing goal for clients and clinicians

alike and that also accounts, in part, for theimmediate appeal of the learned-helplessnessmodel and its therapeutic message that tryingharder helps.

The learned-restlessness model, on the otherhand, seems almost counterintuitive, at least toa work-oriented Western mind. In some Easterntraditions, especially Zen Buddhism, giving upis more readily recognized as an adaptivecourse in many situations (Watts, 1957). Afterall, even the ultimate "goal" of enlightenmentis said to elude deliberate striving—or deliber-ate nonstriving. But hopefully some clients andclinicians could escape the trap of trying toohard, with regard to some of their personal andclinical objectives, by selectively and appropri-ately giving up.

REFERENCES

BANDLER, R. J., MADARAS, G. R., & BEM, D. J. Self-observation as a source of pain perception. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 1968, 9, 205-209.

BANDURA, A. Principles of behavior modification. NewYork: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1969.

BECK, A. T. Cognition, anxiety, and psychophysiologicaldisorders. In C. D. Spielberger (Ed.), Anxiety: Currenttrends in theory and research (Vol. 2). New York:Academic Press, 1972.

BLOODSTEIN, O. Stuttering as an anticipatory strugglereaction. In J. Eisenson (Ed.), Stuttering: A symposium.New York: Harper & Row, 1958.

BROWN, J. S. Factors affecting self-punitive locomotorbehavior. In B. A. Campbell & R. M. Church (Eds.),Punishment and aversive behavior. New York:Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969.

CORAH, N. L. & BOFFA, J. Perceived control, self-observation, and response to aversive stimulation. Jour-nal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1970, 16, 1-4.

DWECK, C. S. The role of expectations and attributions inthe alleviation of learned helplessness. Journal of Per-sonality and Social Psychology, 1975, 31, 674-685.

ELLIS, A. Reason and emotion in psychotherapy. NewYork: Lyle Stuart, 1962.

EVANS, I. M. A conditioning model of a common neuroticpattern—fear of fear. Psychotherapy: Theory, Researchand Practice, 1972, 9, 238-241.

EYSENCK, H. J. A theory of the incubation of anxiety/fearresponses. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 1968, 6,309-321.

FOWLER, H. Suppression and facilitation by response con-tingent shock. In F. R. Brush (Ed.), Aversive condition-ing and learning. New York: Academic Press, 1971.

FRANKL, V. E. Paradoxical intention and dereflection.Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice, 1975,12, 226-237.

GALLWEY, W. T. The inner game of tennis. New York:Random House, 1974.

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