Learning & Innovations Component of the Local Government Support Projectin Ban Glades Hi Union Parishads

8/3/2019 Learning & Innovations Component of the Local Government Support Projectin Ban Glades Hi Union Parishads

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Local Governance Support Project-

Learning and Innovation Component (LGSP-LIC)Local Government Division

Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Co-operatives

Government of Peoples Republic of Bangladesh (GoB)

The Learning and InnovationsComponent of the Local Government

Support Project in Bangladeshi Union

Parishads - Lessons Learned

by

Simon De-Lay

Consultant, UNCDF

LGSP-LIC is implemented with support from

Copyright 2010 by Local Government Division

Disclaimer: Views expressed in this report are those of author/s and do not necessarily reflect the views of

Local Government Division (LGD), Ministry of Local Government Rural Development and Cooperatives,

Government of Bangladesh, any other ministry of GoB and UN agencies including UNDP and Local Governance

Cluster of UNDP Bangladesh.


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LIC-LGSP: Lessons Learned page 1

Contents

1 Background and objective ....................... .................. ......................... ......................... .. 2

2 Methodology and Evidence Base ......................... ......................... ......................... ........ 3

3 The Context ................................................................................................................. 4

3.1 Union Parishads and the Bangladesh Government Structure ......................................... 4

3.2 Distribution of functions and financing .......................................................................... 4

3.3 Local Governance and the history of reform initiatives .................................................. 5

4 What the LIC Project Did ......................... .................. .......................... ......................... . 6

4.1 Sirajganj and the wider Project influences...................................................................... 6

4.2 LIC and LGSP .................................................................................................................. 7

4.3 LIC Project Objectives and Coverage .............................................................................. 7

4.4 Key LIC activities ............................................................................................................ 8

5 Project Lessons .......................................................................................................... 11

5.1 The Grant System......................................................................................................... 11

5.2 Using Performance Conditions for Grants .................................................................... 12

5.3 Participation in Planning, Implementation and Review ................................................ 13

5.4 Spending Decisions ...................................................................................................... 15

5.5 LIC and Local Power ..................................................................................................... 19

5.6 LIC and Revenue Mobilisation ...................................................................................... 22

5.7 Project Facilitation and Support ................................................................................... 25

5.8 Information and Dissemination .................................................................................... 28

5.9 Learning in LIC .............................................................................................................. 28

6 Conclusions................................................................................................................ 31

Abbreviations and Terms......................... ........................ ......................... ...................... ... 32

References ....................................................................................................................... 33


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1 Background and objectiveThis study reviews the lessons of the Learning and Innovation Component (LIC) of the

Local Government Support Programme (LGSP) in Bangladesh from its inception in 2007 to

2010. It outlines best practices, learning and innovation for replication, up-scaling and

government mainstreaming.

Thus the study is not an evaluation of the project, nor a complete description of every

aspect of the projects design and implementation, but rather a selective study which

emphasises relevant lessons. Lessons considered include both positive lessons where

successful practices have been developed and negative lessons where approaches have

been unsuccessful.

The intended audience is both within Bangladesh (including those involved in developing

future phases of LGSP and LIC as well as other local governance projects) but also those

interested outside Bangladesh in the lessons of a project which has successfully improved

local governance in a difficult context.

The document outlines briefly the methodological approach and describes the approach

adopted by LIC, linking it to the earlier SLGDP project in Sirajganj and wider developments

internationally. It then goes on to analyse the key lessons in detail under a number of

headings:

The Grant System

Participation in Planning, Implementation and Review

Spending Decisions

Spending and the Allocation of Functions between tiers of government

LIC and Local Power

Project Facilitation and Support

Learning in LIC


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2 Methodology and Evidence BaseThe study relies on a number of sources. A survey done prior to this consultancy by

another group of some 1200 respondents in LIC and LGSP areas looked at effects of the

project (Dash and Ahmed, 2010). It also draws on survey results from a baseline survey on

revenue mobilisation, a survey of communication and information issues (DCGCI, 2010),

other project reports, other studies of local governance in Bangladesh plus the results ofinterviews with current and former project staff, senior policy makers, and stakeholders

in two districts and ten Union Parishads.

The nature of the project impact is hard to ascertain definitively for a number of reasons

Because the project was not the only change being undertaken in UPs at the time

Information on outcomes is not wholly reliable we rely on evidence from

interviews and subjective responses from survey data. There is comparatively

little hard evidence and most data relates to process changes rather than ultimate

policy objectives like reduced poverty.

Attribution of causality is especially hard given the multiplicity of otherdevelopments affecting local communities at the same time and the

comparatively limited control group data.

This leads to a particular lesson discussed at the end of the document on the value of

adopting a consciously more experimental design for future interventions. Nevertheless

the lessons described here have been distilled from a broad series of data sources and

carefully triangulated. We indicate where lessons are firmly established and where the

evidence is less well-established.


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3 The Context3.1 Union Parishads and the Bangladesh Government Structure

Union Parishads form the lowest tier of formal governance structures in rural Bangladesh.

The sub-national government system has strong elements of deconcentration with thefirst level below the central government being formed of 6 Administrative Divisions,

below which are 64 Zila Parsihads. In rural areas there is then a layer of around 500

Upazila Parishads. The approximately 5000 Union Parishads (UPs) lie below these (Fox

and Menon, 2008). UPs in turn are each subdivided into nine wards for electoral and

some administrative purposes.

UPs are quite sizeable in population terms by international standards ranging up to

40,000- 50,000 and covering usually a number of sizeable villages (literally a Union).

This current pattern of local governance reflects the outcome of a long history of change

in the governance structures but one in which the functions of government and the

resources to govern have remained heavily centrally controlled. Elected elements at tiers

above the UP have remained in abeyance for long periods. However the UPs have

survived as an elected element of governance, albeit one with limited functions and

resources.

3.2 Distribution of functions and financingThe provision of major government functions is heavily centralised with key sectors that

are frequently decentralised in developing countries such as primary healthcare andeducation remaining outside the control of local government. The Public Administration

Reforms Commissions of 1996 reporting in June 2000 observed that, although laws

passed in 1993 and 1997 earmarked 38 functions for UPs, in actual practice, their

functions remained very limited. This leaves UPs with poorly specified roles mainly

consisting of supporting the community, primarily through the provision and

maintenance of local infrastructure such as small markets, minor roads etc plus being the

local arm of governance for minor regulatory functions such as registration of citizens.

They have the power to undertake a range of functions such as economic development of

their residents although use of these powers is patchy

This lack of functions and especially of functions with significant recurrent expenditure

needs is reflected in very limited financing for UPs. Total government expenditure at UP

level is estimated at around 2% of GDP (Fox and Menon, 2008) and much of this is

channelled via specific grants over which UPs have very limited discretion.

The UP does have access to a range of local taxes including a property tax as well as a

series of miscellaneous minor tax sources but the revenue from these has historically


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been limited by a mixture of central restrictions (e.g. a cap on the maximum property tax

that can be levied); political concerns about raising taxes and the poverty of many

citizens. Charges for services are levied for some regulatory functions but are not at a

level where they can fund wider service provision.

3.3 Local Governance and the history of reform initiativesThe UPs have a relatively slim political formal administrative structure. An elected

chairman and nine elected members (one per ward) plus three elected women members

direct the policy of the UP. An appointed Secretary represents the only administrative

post in most UPs although there are also UP police who can support administrative

functions.

Government in Bangladesh has suffered from concerns over corruption and inefficiency

and UPs are not exempt from these problems. There are concerns over the extent to

which formal rules are followed, over the regularity of spending and over the influence of

elites in the areas (see e.g. Alim, 2007). Aminuzzaman (2009) quotes a section of UP

Chairmen agreeing that some UP projects are determined not by development need of

the area but on the political priority of the influencing political elite.

Decentralisation is frequently seen as a possible counter to such weak accountability and

poor governance (see e.g. Shah, 1997) and decentralisation reforms have been pursued in

Bangladesh with these sort of objectives. They have met with limited success however

(see for example Westergaard and Alam, 1995; Sarker, 2003; Fox and Menon 2008). As

Aminuzzaman notes:

Four different commissions/committees were constituted in 1993, 1997, 1999and 2008 respectively to reform/ reorganize and strengthen the role, structure

and functions of local government in Bangladesh. However, it was observed that

no significant attempt has subsequently been made to operationalize and/or

implement the major recommendations of these reform

commissions/committees.

Explanations for the lack of success with decentralisation initiatives tend to focus on

central politicians viewing local governments as part of a patron-client network rather

than as an autonomous provider of services. Thus reform initiatives are not accompanied

by significant transfers of services or of resources and there is limited attention tocreating genuine accountability at local level with local politicians who might rival in

legitimacy central politicians. This is not therefore a promising area for policy reform and

indeed governance reforms in Bangladesh in general have proved difficult (see for

example World Bank, 2000; Parnini, 2009).


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4 What the LIC Project Did4.1 Sirajganj and the wider Project influences

The project would not claim to be especially creative in terms of any one particular new

approach. Instead the project represents the adoption of a range of measures which havebeen tried elsewhere but in combination and with a serious and concerted effort at

facilitation within a level of Bangladeshi local government which had previously proved

somewhat difficult.

Thus the project can be seen as drawing on a number of reform initiatives which can be

seen in operation in other countries:

Participative budgeting

Rapid rural appraisal

Community based development

Social Funds

Community contracting

Open budgets

Community auditing

Womens empowerment

Inter-governmental grants

Performance based grants

Good revenue administration

A large part of the underlying reforms attempted in the LIC had already been attempted

in the smaller Sirajganj project (albeit with rather more intensive facilitation). LICextended these to a much wider area and reduced the intensity of facilitation support

reflecting concerns for the sustainability of such approaches once donor support had

ended. The Sirajganj project had four key objectives:

1. UPs supported to improve their performance & accountability

2. Participatory planning process at local level supported

3. Formation, Selection and Implementation of LDF schemes supported

4. Lessons learned analyzed and disseminated to key actors

The Project Completion Report for Sirajganj (UNDP/UNCDF, 2008) identified the following

lessons:

Direct fund allocation to the UP has proved to be feasible.

Community involvement in planning, implementation, supervision and monitoring

has ensured efficient use of resources and helped create ownership of the people.

Operation and maintenance of the implemented schemes by the community has

been effective and ensured sustainability.


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Ward level committees involving UP representatives and community have been

found to be effective in local level development.

Performance based fund allocation for UPs have proved to be effective and have

been welcomed by the stakeholders.

Eligibility criteria for access to Block Grants have ensured accountability of the

UPs.

Union Facilitation Team has revealed a sustainable human resource at local levelto facilitate local development.

Introduction of bidding process at the union level has been found to be

transparent and has made the UPs capable of efficient contract management.

Transparency and accountability in UP activities have been practiced.

Participatory assessment of UP performance has effective to enhance the capacity

of the UPs and established transparency and accountability as well

GoB commitment to expanding block grants across the country and support from other

donors led to the Local Government Support Project with LIC conceived as a component

of that project.

4.2 LIC and LGSPThe Local Government Support Programme is a reform program implemented by the

Local Government Division (LGD) of the Government of Bangladesh with financial support

of the World Bank, UNDP, UNCDF, EC and Danida. The initiative of the project is to

consolidate the first steps towards strengthening Union Parishads (UPs), through

expanding the size of the block grant and institutionalizing mechanisms of transparency

and accountability towards citizens. LIC represents one of six components and is

conceived as a learning component which provides a means of piloting initiatives, testingtheir value and feeding into wider application in LGSP which operates across all UPs

nationally.

4.3 LIC Project Objectives and CoverageThe project has 5 key desired outputs:

Output 1: Increased financial resources made available to UPs in equitable and

appropriate ways;

Output 2: Improved public expenditure systems for UPs are developed and used;

Output 3: Enhanced mechanisms for local accountability are established and

implemented;

Output 4: More effective framework for capacity development support is

established;

Output 5: Policy development is informed by lessons of program implementation.


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The Component is being piloted in six different districts, Barguna, Habiganj, Sirajganj,

Narsingdi, Feni and Satkhira, one from each of the six administrative divisions of the

country. 388 unions have been covered progressively over the five year duration of the

project. The total budget of the project is US$ 18.118 million and is being grant-funded by

UNDP, UNCDF, EC and Danida.

4.4 Key LIC activitiesThe key activities of the LIC involved the development of a participative planning and

implementation system with several formal elements:

The functions of the Ward Development Committee (WDC) is to organize ward

level participatory planning meetings, ensuring environmental sustainability of

schemes, prioritizing selected schemes and submitting to UPs, implementing

approved schemes, preparing three monthly report of ward level work, organizing

meetings for other matters

The functions of the Scheme Supervision Committee include supervision andmonitoring of ward level scheme implementation. It monitors the cost and quality

of implementation of approved schemes. The SSC advises the WDC on faulty

scheme implementation and informs the UP if WDC fails to address. In some areas

the SSC has been used to promote the involvement of younger members of the

community in UP and development work.

The Union Facilitation Team are formed to train the Union Parishad Planning

Committee (UPPC) for technical evaluation, prioritizing and recommending

schemes submitted by the WDCs; the WDC and SSC members, to assist the WDC

and the UP in participatory planning through training on the LIC and other UP

functions.

The Women Development Forum for the LIC districts is to facilitate the fullparticipation of the women members in the local government administration and

to assist the UPs in the work of socio-economic uplift of the hard core poor

women of the community.

District Facilitators (DFs) worked to support UPs in the process but with only one

facilitator covering each of the 6 districts involved this meant a significantly reduced

facilitation role. However other sources of facilitation were present drawing in Union

Facilitation Teams (UFTs) which involved local citizens who had been trained in relevant

skills along with further support provided from upazila level staff (UNOs - Upazila Nirbahi

Officers) and others at higher tiers of government such as Deputy Directors Local

Government (DDLGs).

DFs were also involved in coordinating a systematic process ofmonitoring and reporting

from individual UP. This reporting focused on basic elements of recording expenditure

and securing compliance with project rules


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These planning and implementation processes were conceived of as being capable of

generally managing UP projects but were inevitably focused on the management of the

grants provided by LIC which for example required their usage as a condition of the fund

disbursement. LIC provided a general block grant with deliberately few restrictions on

what it could be spent on allowing for example spending of capital or recurrent costs and

with no sectoral limitations.

The grant scheme did however have elements of a performance-based grant scheme

controlling access to grant funds under LIC with a number of relatively simple

performance criteria adopted consisting of, in summary:

Regular opening of the UP office

Village Court Operational

All the standing committees are established

UPs participation in BGCC meetings

Regular Monthly Meetings of UPs:

Women participation in UP Regular Monthly Meetings Tax assessment done

These criteria were specified with slightly more detail but were deliberately designed to

be relatively simple both to achieve and to measure and to reflect a mix of issues closely

related to LIC concerns (such as the establishment of the committees) and broader UP

issues (such as the village courts).

These were in addition to a broader set of criteria for access to LGSP consisting of initially:

1. No adverse or disclaimer audit opinion (i.e. no major financial irregularities)

2. Existence of an Official UP Bank Account3. Staff Capacity: Post of the UP Secretary filled and attendance in the financial

management/procurement training

4. Annual budget for the forthcoming financial year approved by UP in an open

meeting

5. Ones the list of eligible UPs is announced, the UPs must pass a resolution agreed

upon in a full UP meeting to accept the conditions of the LGSP (letter of

commitment).

In subsequent years LGSP grants (and therefore LIC grants) required the following criteria:

1. Hold quarterly open community meetings (at Ward and UP level) for participatory

planning and budgeting purposes

2. Publicity and regularly disclose UP level and scheme specific information and

display this on UP notice boards

3. Submit quarterly reports to community, UNO and LGD according to approved

formats


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4. Comply with the requirements in the Environmental and Social Management

Framework (incl. gender issues). All schemes have to be screened and it should be

ensured that all schemes funded by the grant are not on the LGSP negative list.

5. Comply with the procurement regulations of LGSP and guidelines

The project promoted transparency and disclosure through a combination of measures.In addition to the open budget meetings and the general access to UP processes

promoted there was an emphasis on publication of key data including notice boards

conveying details of project schemes both at the UP offices and at individual project sites.

Preparation of an annual budget book showing all funds received directly by the UP and

their uses was supported.

LIC work on revenue mobilisation in the early stages of the project has been largely

preparatory with activity to identify appropriate reform opportunities, build awareness,

develop draft manuals and do some training. Systematic work on extending revenue

bases, raising tax rates, improving valuation and making administration more effectiveare beginning in the latter stages of the project. Meanwhile individual developments by

particular UPs, encouraged by the benefits of the improved planning process for spending

have progressed supported by the local facilitation units.


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5 Project Lessons5.1 The Grant System

L1 Funds can be channelled to UP level successfully without significant leakage

demonstrating absorptive capacity

The project has disbursed funds successfully to a large number of UPs and has

documented evidence of these funds being spent on locally determined projects. The

disbursement systems work via higher tiers of local government. Concerns that there

might be leakage of the funds before they reach the UPs do not seem to be supported by

any evidence see the discussion on transparency below. This is important since

concerns over leakage have often led to suggestions that channelling of funds needs to

bypass intervening institutions and go direct to the target local government (UPs in this

case) perhaps via a direct bank transfer.

In this case that does not seem to be necessary. UP Chairmen, Secretaries and other local

stakeholders do not report delays in funds transfer or leakage of funds as a significant

issue. On the contrary, some stakeholders made a point of saying the opposite, that,

unlike other sources these funds were transferred without leakage.

Using existing disbursement channels seems to have provided a cost-effective solution to

disbursement especially in terms of local costs.

This may suggest that the bottom-up accountability mechanism emphasised within the

project may have equal or greater importance than conventional top-down controls for

ensuring secure funds flow.

L2 Local communities feel ownership over LIC funds thanks to the local discretion over

spending and the use of participatory methods in planning and management

The most striking comment from visits to the field was the frequency with which local

stakeholders beyond elected politicians or appointed officials referred to the improved

ownership of funds. This was normally expressed by means of contrasting the LIC project

activities with other activities spending money locally which were said to be lacking in

transparency or responsiveness to local needs.

Most frequently local respondents contrasted the role of UP Chairmen and Secretaries

under LIC and non-LIC projects. This frequently involved overt criticism of the

transparency and accountability of UP Chairmen and Secretaries for conventional

spending. The processes adopted under LIC had turned these processes around.


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L3 Funds have been transferred and managed in a highly transparent way.

Funds under LIC have been managed transparently with a variety of measures to achieve

this. Monies transferred are open and publicly known with each UP recording receipt of

funds in an annual budget book printed for public dissemination, the use of notice boards

both centrally and at project sites detailing agreed spending; control over the release of

funds for individual projects by the SSC and collation of reports by the LIC project office.

The result appears to be a channel which is low on leakage within the UP as well as in

higher tiers involved in disbursement. There have been discussions on what proportion of

funds should be allowed for administrative overheads but, unlike some other channels

where unofficial extraction of funds for overheads have taken place, this appears to be an

open discussion and subject to accountability

5.2 Using Performance Conditions for GrantsL4 Results of using simple performance criteria for grant distribution are positive butlimited.

The LIC grant distribution has been conditional on meeting a limited number of relatively

simple process-based performance indicators. These include factors closely related to the

project activities such as the conduct of a tax assessment in line with the legal

requirement (that it be done every 5 years) and indicators rather less closely related such

as the functioning of a village court. (Village courts represent a form of alternative dispute

resolution focusing on civil disputes.)

Performance criteria have two potential points at which they can take effect. The promise

of grants can motivate up-front activity to secure funding. Alternatively, after grants are

distributed, those who lose out can be motivated to do better next time. Also there is

some potential for difference in how the motivation is channelled. One possibility is that

senior decision-makers are the key channel in this case the UP Chairmen and Secretary

and perhaps elected members acting in their own incentives to improve funding. An

alternative is that the community hold senior decision-makers to account this is

probably more likely to work on an ex post basis where lack of the funds is revealed.

Ideally all these mechanism would operate to get the strongest effect.

In the case of LIC, ex ante awareness of performance conditions amongst stakeholders

appears to have been limited and the positive effects of performance improvement have

probably come more after initial grant distributions. This suggests greater potential for

up-front publicisation of the conditions to secure earlier compliance. Evidence on the

mechanism through which change happens is weak but the impression is that

accountability mechanism has been less important than UP Chairmen wanting to secure

better funding for their area. This again suggests more publicity both of disclosure and of

the receipt (and more importantly non-receipt) of funds could yield further benefits.


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The value of the underlying changes achieved through greater compliance could be

questioned. Conditions have been implemented with a light touch meaning that the

quality of changes or their real impact has not been probed. Thus the thoroughness of tax

assessments has not been pursued nor the underlying impact of the village courts. This is

arguably the correct approach in the early years of a performance condition system.

Evidence from elsewhere suggests that building up the intensity and focus of conditionsover time achieves better results than setting over-demanding conditions initially.

That however does suggest a need for a conscious move into more demanding

performance conditions in the next stages of the project. To some extent this is already in

hand with the next phase of LIC planning a more elaborate Performance Based Grant

Scheme. But care needs to be taken that that represents an appropriate step forward

and, for example, not merely a multiplication of the number of performance criteria.

Greater analysis of the upfront relevance of chosen conditions and ex post analysis within

the project of their value has significant value.

L5 Use of independent auditors to assess performance has worked well (but need to be

institutionalised)

The performance criteria were independently verified by external auditors contracted

from outside of government. This appears to have produced reliable and quick results

which are accepted as legitimate by UPs. Interestingly two UPs visited in the field made a

point of saying that these auditors (unlike other auditors with whom the UPs were used

to dealing) had not requested improper payments as part of their activity. This does raise

questions of the appropriate route to wider institutionalisation conventionalapproaches would say that this measure should be undertaken by government auditors.

However trust in current government audit control mechanisms is limited and it may be

too early to abandon the useful process pioneered within LIC.

5.3 Participation in Planning, Implementation and ReviewL6 Ownership is directly related to participation in planning, delivery and monitoring.

LIC grants are block grants with a large degree of freedom over their spending. This then

creates a meaningful role for local planning in the use of the funds. The mechanismemphasised is a bottom-up mechanism with considerable real influence over spending

from the bottom level rather than deciding on priorities purely at an overall UP level,

The participation in planning, delivery and monitoring expenditure are positively

commented on by local stakeholders. Understanding the complex process of participation

would require a much larger (and difficult) task of observing a significant number of such

participation processes in a number of areas and over time. It would have to be done in a


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way that did not itself distort the process. Limited resources meant that this extensive

observation could not be undertaken. Thus the spread of participation, whether there is

equal access for all groups (rich, poor, young/old, educated/uneducated etc) to such

activities could not definitively be confirmed. There is always a concern that such

participation is dominated by an elite (in terms of decision-making even if not in terms of

attendance). However the project did seem to have opened up access to decision-makingto people who were previously excluded.

L7 Ward Level Meetings and Open budget meetings do give an effective voice to local

participants

The particular measures of ward level meetings and open budget meetings have involved

large numbers of peoples and have received considerable positive comment. In some

forms of bottom-up planning eventual top-level decisions on spending neglect the

bottom-up voice but this does not appear to have happened in the LIC project.

The result is that there are a relatively large number of meetings to decide upon a

relatively small amount of resources. Whilst this might be criticised in terms of the

relative value of the process in fact the participants d seem to value the process and it

does have potential to be expanded to cover greater volumes of resources

Evidence from the survey conducted on dissemination and information (DCGCI, 2010)

found that 25.6% of respondents said they had been called to open budget meetings and

around 7% had participated.

Use of the published budget books seemed patchier with high numbers being reported inthe DCGCI survey as being unaware of the budget book. This may suggest the face-to-face

meetings are more important than the printed documents although the latter are

perhaps more relevant for upward accountability.

L8 Improvements in accountability and transparency have spilled over from LIC-funded

projects into other UP-controlled spending but this effect is partial.

The intention of LIC is clearly not restricted to securing better governance only of those

funds provided by the LIC project itself. Evidence on how far improved accountability and

participation have spread from LIC funding to other sources of funding is not

systematically available. But evidence from field trips suggest that some areas have

moved to following LIC approaches for a large variety of miscellaneous funding sources.

Projects identified in the LIC process but for which insufficient funds were available have

been funded by other routes where the UP has some discretion. But in other UPs it

appears that LIC funding has become an enclave of good practice with little change for


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other funding sources. The underlying determinant may be the UP Chairman and

Secretary. Where these have bought into the LIC approach there has been fundamental

change but, for some, older patterns have remained. There is however bottom-up

pressure to change to LIC approaches and thus over time, perhaps supported by election

results, there might be a stronger spill-over effect but it appears that the value of LIC

processes may need some top-down pressure to achieve universal adoption quickly.

5.4 Spending DecisionsL9 Small capital schemes are the preferred use of the funds and are highly valued

The chosen expenditure locally has been heavily dominated by small physical capital

infrastructure schemes typically earthworks, short earth roads, culverts, small bridges

etc. The project itself has not specified such a focus its rules permit a very wide range of

spending with no restriction against recurrent spending or in favour of particular sectors.

(There are very limited numbers of exclusions such as religious buildings but these do notseem to have been a significant impediment to local planning. Additionally during one

period of the project limitations caused by donor funding conditions meant that there

was a requirement to spend overwhelmingly on capital. Whilst this was unhelpful in

terms of the long term development of the project, it seems to have confirmed an

existing tendency rather than being the primary cause of the problem.)

A number of reasons can be identified for why small capital schemes have dominated:

Uncertainty over whether funds (and limited existing own source revenues) will

continue in future years make committing to recurrent expenditure rather unwise

Recurrent expenditure needs in areas like education and healthcare are probablyviewed as the responsibility of higher levels of government There may be a sense

that spending on non-infrastructure items more closely related to sectoral areas

like education or healthcare may simply crowd-out spending that would have

happened form higher levels

Bottom-up planning processes are likely to identify very local needs which may be

dominated by local physical infrastructure

UPs tend to share money out equally between wards (see below)

Facilitation and training have focused on concrete processes for planning,

implementation and supervision of infrastructure rather than on recurrent costs

or on soft capital. It is not clear how far this is a cause or an effect however.

Some guidance provided by the project seems oriented to physical capital e.g. arequirement for schemes to be easily maintained

There may be a degree of path dependence an early focus on small capital

schemes has perhaps become locked in through custom and practice

A further conventional explanation of over-expenditure on capital schemes in other

contexts has been the greater salience of capital schemes they are more visible and


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more easily claimable by key decision-makers as being due to their efforts within, for

example, a patron client system. This explanation does not completely seem to fit the LIC

context where choice of schemes does seem to be genuinely driven bottom-up rather

than by elected politicians or by an elite. However the salience of capital projects in terms

of their immediate obvious benefits may have added to their attractiveness to the

community whereas other types of scheme (e.g. skills development programmes) mightbe rather hard to value in the absence of clear nearby examples that have worked.

Khan (2009) did note based on her study of women and LIC that issues of lack of proper

service in education, health etc are raised in WDC discussions with the community. There

seems to be a demand to design schemes for ensuring services but this does not seem to

have fed through into significant project proposals that are accepted. Similarly

Aminuzzaman(2009) quotes survey data suggesting that local citizens aspire to have social

services and economic development functions provide by UPs for example 74% of

respondents stating an expectation for the provision of income generating activities and

58% education functions.

Local stakeholders value the accepted small capital schemes highly. They are readily able

to recount benefits in terms of access to social facilities, improved economic

opportunities and so on. Thus there is considerable implied evidence that this spending

represent high value for money.

However the project has not been able to track these benefits in systematic ways and

indeed to do so would regard an enormous effort, probably out-of-scale with the

individual spending given the currently limited state of socio-economic data at UP and

ward level.

L10 Moving away from small capital schemes is hard without considerable effort

As suggested above there are a number of reasons why small physical capital schemes

make sense locally.

However there is perhaps potential for opening up decision-making more:

Spending on soft capital projects such as training and capacity building for

income generation. This was one area which was sometimes mentioned as a

possible area (and one which might specially benefit women - see below) but

only a small number of UPs seemed to be pursuing these

Capital items more directly related to sectoral areas. There were some limited

examples of spending on e.g. replacement furniture for classrooms

Spending on recurrent costs on sectoral areas e.g. on medical supplies or teaching

materials. This seems rare or non-existent.


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Given the effectiveness of the mechanism identified for funds channelling there does

seem to be unexploited potential here. The project could address some of the reason for

the bias towards small infrastructure projects e.g. in reorienting training and guidance.

But a more substantial effort depends on a reassessment of the role for UPs in service

delivery see below.

L12 Concern for local horizontal equity and short time horizons make fund usage less

strategic

L13 Equal distribution of resources between wards may be a poor reflection of inter-

ward needs

The de facto practice in most UPs to determine the final allocation of funds between

projects was to allocate funds equally or roughly equally between wards and then select

the highest ranking project(s) in each ward. This seemed to be driven by an admirable

concern to ensure demonstrable horizontal equity between wards. The unintended

consequence however is that LIC is dominated by small projects with very local impacts.

Many of these projects will be very desirable. However larger projects and ones which cut

across ward boundaries or which are UP-wide tend to be neglected. Also the simple

equivalence between wards may not reflect genuine horizontal equity different wards

might be rather different in terms of size or other measures of need.

In part this is the result of responding to a perceived inequity of other funding sources

with the need to pay heed (rather than lip-service) to bottom-up planning meaning that

small local projects win out. There is likely to be a limited voice for UP-wide projects in

ward meetings. There might for example be a thought that such things will occur any way

and the ward can free-ride on those projects whilst also getting projects of its own.

Thus a prisoners' dilemma effect may crowd out bigger projects. As such it is perhaps

unreasonable to be too critical. But it does limit the value of spending on projects.

This issue relates closely to the extent to which the UP and individual wards have a long-

term time horizon. LIC has promoted the idea of a 5 year socio-economic plan and the

results survey indicated that 67% of respondent were familiar with such a plan in their UP

in LIC areas (and higher at 78% for Sirajganj) compared with only 37% in non-LIC LGSP

areas. However the impact of this strategy on in-year planning appears to have been

limited. This is not surprising a dominance of short-term thinking is a common issue in

budgeting across many of not most countries and at central as well as local level.

However more effort to make a longer term vision real at both UP and ward level could

be a powerful assistance.


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Thus resolving the lack of a strategic view requires:

Over time, as confidence in the continuity of funds develops communities may be

more willing to accept that a strategic use of funds means that not all areas will

get equal amounts each year

Commitment by central government to continuity of funds over a medium term

period Adopting an approach which precedes the initial bottom-up planning process with

a stronger visioning exercise setting out a longer term plan for what the UP wants

to become may help encourage the adoption for a more strategic approach.

L14 Limited UP responsibilities within the overall LG system restrict the current value of

the grant mechanism

UPs currently have very limited responsibilities for service delivery functions. They do

have roles in regulatory functions like the confirmation of citizenship and they do have

some permissive powers but generally delivery of services, especially social services, islocated at higher levels. This is despite the fact that UPs represent, by international

standards, a reasonably sizeable unit in population terms with population ranging up to

40,000-50,000 in some cases.

De facto, many social services are delivered within the Union area and there are current

legislative proposals to increase the number of staff from higher tiers of government

posted to the UP office. This may well provide benefits in terms of policy cooperation and

service accessibility. But, until the UP has responsibility for some basic service provision,

there is a neglected opportunity for greater use of the effective LIC mechanism at lower

levels. As noted above, Aminuzzaman (2009) observes some degree of expectation bylocal citizens for the provision of such services but the current LIC and wider governance

structures do not promote this role.

L15 There is potential to secure greater community commitment to responsibility for

maintenance

In some other countries similar types of capital spending initiatives have been

accompanied by efforts to secure formal community commitment to assist in maintain

the assets. Given the well-known tendency in developing countries for under-spending on

maintenance; the exposure of works like earthwork roads to collapse and the basic

nature of the maintenance involved this does seem a possible fruitful area for LIC. It has

however not been followed in this project. An approach followed but with limited success

has been to encourage UPs to devote sums within their budget for use of grants to

recurrent expenditure on maintenance.


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One explanation may be that in many cases the community does autonomously engage in

repair work (the writer observed this happening in one spot-visit).

However the impression is that other assets do suffer from under-maintenance and this is

an area that can be explored. A commitment to maintenance could for example improve

a projects chances of being selected in the final budget allocation meeting and would

help cement agreement to further works being included as the UP monitors the

implementation of such works.

5.5 LIC and Local PowerL16 LIC has been an effective mechanism in supporting the empowerment of women

Khans (2009) study specifically of the impact of LIC on women found that there was a

gradual change identifiable in a number of aspects of womens role in the UP:

o Assumption of leadership roles in the UP planning, implementation andsupervision of developmental projects is leading to ownership of the

projects by the women members, thereby fostering greater individual and

collective responsibility. The women members have been reported to be

more punctual, informed and proactive in their activities in the UP.

o Greater interaction of the women UP members with the community

members including women and the male co-colleagues is changing the

perceptions of the women members and the community regarding their

public roles and responsibilities. The community people have been found

to be appreciative of the women members efforts. Importance of the

women in their families is also being enhanced.

o The open discussions regarding the schemes and the budgets promotingattentiveness towards accountability in delivery of services among the

female and male councillors. The perception that women cannot assume

roles of managing and leading activities and finances is gradually changing

LIC has promoted the role of women most notably by a requirement that 30% of spending

must be on projects that favour women and through the promotion of the Womens

Development Forums (WDFs).

Tracking the detailed impact of these measures is rather hard for the reasons stated

above about unpicking what actually happens in participatory planning meetings. Thereappears to a variety of practices in terms of the institutional arrangements. In some

areas, women have separate meetings and produce separate proposed project lists. They

may or may not take part in the general meeting in addition. In other areas they are part

of a broader meeting but some projects are somehow deemed to be women's projects

perhaps as part of a separate decision within the larger meeting.


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In the lessons survey 85% of respondents reported that at least 30%of projects were

favoured by women and this was a notably higher figure than in non-LIC LGSP areas

where the result was 50%. However the nature of the projects which are accepted

generally (small capital projects) in many ways appear to be overwhelmingly of general

benefit rather than of benefit specifically to women. That includes both projects which

are labelled as projects favouring women and others with little obvious variation betweenthe two. There does appear to be a genuine case however that many of these projects are

specifically of benefit to women more than men. One type of example frequently quoted

was the building of access roads where otherwise access routes would be flooded.

Because women typically would find it more difficult to wade through water this was

seem as especially important for women both in going about their daily activities and for

accessing services such as healthcare or taking children to schools.

Nevertheless there remains a suspicion that in some areas there is a more general

prioritising of projects and that there is then is a labelling of some of these projects as

womens projects. This not the same as alleging that womens interest are neglected as

noted above, the projects mostly favour the community broadly without discriminating

between men and women. Khan (2009) put this more positively stating:

The provision of 30% women prioritized schemes is being accepted by the UPs

and the community. This may be taken as an indication that the women are listing

schemes that not only benefit women but the entire community. This is an

innovative way of integrating grassroots level women in the planning process but

also of establishing the credibility of women UP members as responsible leaders

in such activity.

Thus the degree of change in terms of womens empowerment achieved by the project is

hard to pin down and will vary between areas. Also this theme is one pursued by a

number of other initiatives, both government and NGO-supported, and hence it is hard to

attribute all of the gains to the LIC project.

The LIC project does however seem to have had a signalling or demonstration function

here which appears to be important at least in some areas. It has signalled and

legitimated the rightful roles of women in decision-making and demonstrated how that

can proceed to the benefit of the community as a whole. In this respect the WDFs have

played a role in giving additional opportunities for womans representation and

contribution. There is some evidence that in Sirajganj, where there has been longer timefor evolution of womens role, that they have found greater opportunities with, for

example, greater likelihood that the char of the Ward Development Committee will be a

woman.

Similarly there is quite strong evidence of the substantial role of women in the

participatory meetings. This suggests that in Sirajganj substantial participation by women

is the norm with 71% of respondents reporting that more than 30% of participants are


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women whilst the equivalent figure in other LIC areas is a more modest 32% but still

substantially higher than in non-LIC LGSP areas where the figure is only 13%.

Evidence from the DCGCI study (2010) suggested that around 37% of respondents

specifically said that womens contributions to the planning process were valued with

13% only saying it was not valued

On the back of this development some women seem to have been empowered to

develop broader roles going beyond the narrow limits of the LIC functions. For example

there are frequent anecdotes about women members taking action to deal with dowry

issues or female abuse issues. Khan (2009) noted that:

The leadership roles and authority of women in the LIC processes have increased

their confidence in interacting with offices of authority at the UPZ and districts as

well as with the Chairman and male councillors of their own UPs. This is enabling

them to be a part of the delivery that is effective in satisfying the local

community.

o The UP women members are found to be regularly visiting and interacting

with the UPZ officials as WDC and WDF committee members for

clarification of rules and procedures and information.

o Many of the UP women members particularly those in the WDF (Tarash

UPZ in Sirajganj and Belabo UPZ in Norshingdhi) have reported to monitor

schools in the unions, interacting with the school authorities to retrieve

drop outs of girls and improving attendance of students and teachers.

o Many are monitoring and intervening in the union health centres and are

effectively doing similar work in the area of motivating families to install

sanitary latrines.

These observations are real and not uncommon. It is however very hard to be sure that

they can be completely attributed to LIC without careful study of control groups from

non-LIC areas. A number of projects have sought to develop womens roles in UPs for

example. However the signalling role noted above and the experience provided by LIC in

participating in committee work over real resource allocation seems to have provided a

positive contribution.

L17 LIC has developed countervailing power sources within the UP

The LIC project can be argued to have developed countervailing centres of power within

the UP including but extending well beyond women. Government is often seen as a set of

checks and balances on power and setting up a series of committees with power or

influence over spending has made it harder for a narrow elite to control spending

providing a series of checks to improper spending.


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The countervailing forces come from a variety of institutional mechanisms promoted by

the project the Scheme Supervision Committees, the Ward Development Committees,

the District Facilitators and the Union Facilitation Teams. Khans (2009) study found that

the project had led to the UPs functioning as a parishad of all the members and not just

that of the chairman reflecting the prior perception of UPs as being identical with the

Chairman.

Hossein (2009) develops the idea of rude accountability: strong social and local

political pressures go some way towards supplying a rough responsiveness to demands

for service. These work through shame and embarrassment, pressures to maintain

reputation and status, and the threat of violence and sees this as one way for poor

people, especially women to secure some representation in governance where otherwise

decision would be wholly dominated by an elite. To some extent the LIC project has

enabled a slightly politer form of accountability, providing low-level formal institutions

which give the weak a place to apply their pressure.

L18 Relatively over-structured systems have probably been helpful in the early stages of

LIC

Viewed from the outside, the LIC structure of committees can appear overly elaborate. In

conventional approaches there might be greater reliance on committees of UP members

and on single community-level structures covering for example both resource allocation

and implementation. LIC instead has proposed a series of committees. These have some

benefits in that they perhaps collectively give a greater strength to oppose dominance by

UP chairmen and secretaries and also avoid simply replacing one centre of power with anew centre of power by diversifying responsibilities and avoiding conflicts of interest

between e.g. committing resources and supervising spending.

5.6 LIC and Revenue MobilisationL19 Linking between spending and improved willingness to pay have been

disappointingly patchy

One hope for involving the community in planning, implementing and monitoring

expenditure is that it can give them increased willingness to pay taxes which can then inturn be spent through the enhanced planning mechanism producing a virtuous circle

confirming a simple but effective form of social contract between local government and

people.

In discussions with local stakeholder this appears as an important effect and is frequently

claimed by stakeholders at both local and central level. There are anecdotal stories of

individual UP chairmen seeking substantial increases in revenue collected e.g. through a


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commitment to collect 100% of tax due and the limited statistics from UP in the revenue

mobilisation study do show some significant increases in actual revenue raised over short

term periods as much as 500% in some areas.

However the size of the effect on willingness to pay and how distinct it is from non-LIC

areas remains in some doubt. Available statistics suggest the average effect is small. The

revenue survey found that around 78% of respondents reported a willingness to pay

more tax. However the percentage is identical in the non-LIC LGSP areas suggesting the

more intensive LIC work has not produced a greater willingness to pay. The typical

amounts suggested as extra tax to be paid is rather limited around 90 Taka

(approximately US$13) per household per year.

There are question marks over the validity of hypothetical survey questions on willingness

to pay but these numbers are disappointing. It may be that the relative youth of the

project means that substantial commitment to pay extra revenues is still developing. The

limited roles of the UP and the modest scope of LIC grant funding may restrict the

imagination of householders in responding to this question. However the willingness does

appear to exist to be exploited and, as the project moves further into revenue

mobilisation as an explicit focus, this can be tested further.

L20 Support to Revenue Mobilisation requires considerable effort and cannot rely on

bottom-up pressure alone

As noted above increased evidence for increased willingness to pay is patchy but there

does appear to be potential to improve revenue collection. Given the opportunities

identified for spending on high value projects and the low starting base of revenue

collected it would appear that improved policy and practice on revenue collection

represent important potential within the project.

However progress to date has been limited. There are multiple examples of individual

good practice in particular areas such as better organised tax assessments, use of tax pass

books to record taxes paid better and link access to service provision to tax payment but

these have not been spread widely.

A number of reasons can be identified for this

There is reluctance from elected politicians to raising tax rates, applying new

taxes or significantly changing tax systems in ways that change the burden of

taxes and some reluctance to enforce the existing system

The nationally-specified tax system itself sets very low tax rates (for example an

absolute maximum of 500 taka for property taxes per household which

represents the broadest tax source for UPs currently that equates to a

maximum of around US$7 per year with, of course, the vast majority of


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household paying considerably less. Changing the details of tax bases and tax

rates in many cases needs central government support.

The administrative system is rather complex given the sums that can be raised

e.g. a relatively complex method of appraisal for property given the low rates that

are then produced

There is a lack of clarity about UP powers in some respects e.g. whether a

community can voluntarily breach the normal property tax cap in specialcircumstances

UP resources are constrained although a number of tax related functions have

been effectively contracted out in many areas especially assessment and

collection

Thus, although there has been considerable discussion about revenue mobilisation and

some local initiatives, the level of support from the project to systematic reform has been

limited until recently when there has been conscious effort to embark on a formal

revenue mobilisation strategy with appropriate support.

One area where the project has focused some systematic attention has been the tax

assessment where conducting the five-yearly assessment was made part of the conditions

for accessing LIC grants. How far this has improved tax collection rates however remains

unclear. Evidence from the revenue mobilisation survey indicated that most UPs

continued to operate an ad hoc scheme of assessing property taxes which seems unlikely

to produce substantial increases.

Hopes for improved revenue mobilisation lie in several areas but can be summarised as

Better assessment systems for the current primary revenue source of the

property tax

Better collection and administration processes

Expanded revenue sources

L21 Improving Revenue Mobilisation requires effective resources at the national level in

support of the project as well as the local facilitation skills.

Many of the improvements in collection and administration are relatively non-technical

and often do not require substantial legislative change. Thus the project is well placed to

increase its support in this field through existing mechanisms of, for example, DFs and

UFTs.

However some aspects of improvement in revenue policy and administration are in need

of central direction. Development of training materials, administration manuals etc are

already underway. But behind this lies a prior series of questions about what tax bases to

allow to UPs and what tax rates to allow them to collect. This is normally regarded as a

question for central government in a unitary state like Bangladesh. The nature of the LIC


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project means that its mode of development is essentially as a pilot project. This does

present some particular technical problems for improvement in revenue mobilisation:

There may be central unwillingness to allow UPs in a pilot access to a different

range of revenue sources than the rest of the country perhaps on grounds of

equity

Where tax bases being considered for UPs are already in use at a higher tier ofgovernment then a non-uniform system may be difficult to manage

Where new sources of revenue are envisaged or significant increases in rates

considered, there may be problems of tax avoidance by shifting resources e.g. if

say vehicles were newly taxed in LIC UPs it is likely that vehicle-owners might

attempt to avoid tax by shifting their registration to non-LIC areas.

Thus there are practical difficulties and problems of distortion involved in LIC UPs

pioneering completely new sources of revenue and, perhaps to a lesser extent,

pioneering significantly higher tax rates. These might be overcome with strong levels of

central support for such initiatives and with demonstrated local backing. To date central

support has actually been patchy reflecting the general problems of securing

commitment to policy reform in Bangladesh. Local support has been rather more

forthcoming especially with regard to new tax bases. But this often appears to be a rather

simplistic desire to tax those perceived as able to pay, often outsiders such as large

businesses (e.g. mobile telephone companies) or NGOs. That is not surprising but may

reflect a limited understanding of the technical or broader political issues e.g.

discouraging the spread of mobile telephone masts or of local NGO offices might be

counter-productive in terms of the broader socio-economic development of the area. The

local appetite for significantly higher local tax rates does not seem to be strong.

Developing a sound technical basis for an enlarged revenue base and getting commitmentto it from central government requires a type of resource which has not been the main

focus of the project to date.

Thus the nature of the project as a pilot and the current state of political commitment to

revenue mobilisation suggest that the most fruitful areas for this project to focus on are

improvements in the tax administration system (including valuation, assessment, billing,

collection, recording banking etc). These generally do not require significant legislative

change (valuation may be an exception) and can proceed using the resources already

available to the project.

5.7 Project Facilitation and SupportL22 facilitation from within the project has been an important but underused resource

Sirajganj was widely viewed as depending on the strength of facilitators. In LIC there has

been one District Facilitator supporting a number of UPs. This has inevitably diluted the

time they can spend with each UP. The role of the facilitator is in practice much wider


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than the name implies. In part they have a controlling function enforcing project rules and

ensuring the monitoring of spending. This is conducted in a manner which is facilitative

but is nevertheless ultimately a part of control. The DFs appear to be widely respected

and to be successful relationship with UP stakeholders although Khan (2009) noted that

"[i]n some cases the project District Facilitators are less proactive in providing advice,

inspiration and motivation to women members.

The DFs have also been a key training resources disseminating knowledge and skills

downwards to UP level. Other training, facilitating and capacity building resources used in

the project have been the Union Facilitation Teams using educated local young people to

fulfil a range of training and facilitation support and Upazila Cooperation Officers who

have also contributed to the project. Both of these latter resources do appear to have

been useful but their role has varied between areas reflecting different levels of ability

and commitment amongst those involved. Again, it is quite hard to track their effect but it

seems likely that in some areas they have been very useful especially in strengthening the

roles of the local committees but in other areas they appear to have had rather less

impact.

In summary the District Facilitators appear to the strongest feature of the facilitation but

their effort is spread rather thinly and this remains a question mark over future adoption

of LIC-like funding across the country. Dedicated DFs existing outside normal civil service

systems and incentives appear valuable but whether civil servants will be appointed to do

the same role and whether they can cope with other competing demands on their time

remains uncertain.

L23 Project design has emphasised top-down facilitation and under-emphasised

horizontal sharing

The style of facilitation as noted above appears to be often a rather top-down approach

emphasising correct processes and what to do to stay within the project rules and access

funds. This has produced benefits but means that other methods of learning and sharing

have perhaps been relatively neglected. In particular explicit mechanisms to identify

innovative practice being developed locally and share it horizontally have been under-

emphasised. There is some parallel experience here from the ESP-supported Horizontal

Learning project (Horizontal Learning Project, 2009) which has in part worked in relatedfields such as planning and revenue mobilisation suggesting this can be a powerful

mechanism. In their case, there is a reliance on NGOs to lead the process and generally

their emphasis is on learning from the bottom up. In the LIC context a mixture of top-

down guidance based on good international practice allied to horizontal learning would

appear to be a powerful tool.


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For example, field studies found a variety of ways of contracting for essentially similar

types of project like earthworks. In some cases the relevant UP committee effectively

managed the process and employed individual workers on a daily basis. In other cases

they employed a foreman type worker on a higher wage to supervise their workers, in

other cases there was something akin to a contracting out of the work to a community

group. Payment of workers was sometimes a daily rate (perhaps subject to some controlover satisfactory performance) and in other cases was based on work done e.g. earth

shifted. Interestingly each area had their idea on which was best and there did not appear

to have been any interchange to explore the different merits of these different

approaches. A greater emphasis on horizontal earning opportunities (perhaps in some

cases facilitated by special staff with expert relevant knowledge) could pay off in term so

effectiveness of expenditure.

L24 The project has relied on local knowledge and perhaps missed opportunities to

examine better technical approaches and deploy outside technical expertise

The limited scale of the facilitation resources and the nature of the facilitators expertise

have meant that the emphasis on their facilitation has been on process issues. Decisions

on what projects to fund and on implementation and monitoring of individual projects

are effectively left to the local stakeholder bodies. This of course rightfully reflects the

overall aim of LIC to develop and demonstrate a capacity for participatory planning.

However the schemes being chosen (and in fact the ones not chosen) are frequently

schemes which involve the potential to deploy a degree of expert knowledge. For

example the widespread use of earthworks roads suffers from the fact that many suchroads are frequently washed away within a few years raising the question of whether a

more expensive and more permanent solution might be more cost effective in the long

run.

Similarly, appropriate quality of building materials is a matter of expert knowledge. Local

communities sometimes claimed this expertise through experience but in other cases

they appeared to be doing what had always been done. UPs were very reliant on getting

limited technical assistance from LGED specialists locally (located in higher tiers of

government) but this appeared to be rather restricted to costing and specifying a project

once it had already been identified rather than on saying whether that was the rightsolution to begin with.

Khan (2009) notes the technical issues surrounding the validity of market rates quoted by

officials from higher tiers in costing projects suggesting that more training is needed here

to allow local stakeholders (particularly women) greater access to key technical planning

issues.


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Given the predominance of certain types of spending it does raise the issue of whether

the project could contribute to expenditure effectiveness but deploying selective

specialist expertise (manly engineering probably) to assist in developing best practice

guidance which could then be disseminated. There is a risk here however that

inappropriate deployment of expertise could undermine the bottom-up virtues of LIC so

interventions here need to be designed with care.

5.8 Information and DisseminationL25 A variety of broader information and dissemination channels to promote the

approach have benefited the project but dissemination could be broadened.

The project has invested considerable resources in dissemination within Bangladesh both

within LIC areas and in the wider country. These have used a range of attractive methods

including materials produced in local languages, materials like calendars which are likely

to find wide distribution and display and modes other than printed materials such asvideos which give good popular access. These methods have played a role in awareness

building but in also in capacity building. Videos of bottom-up participative meetings for

example have been useful in making participants understand what is meant by these

concepts and seeing that it is a real process which can be accessible to all.

Knowledge of the earlier Sirajganj project appears to be quite well spread both within

Bangladesh and beyond (e.g. Sirker and Cosic, 2007; Deles et al, 2010). Knowledge of the

LIC project is however less well developed despite the potential offered by new

technology such as video since the Sirajganj project. Dissemination of products like the

video records of community meetings would allow greater insight into how these

methods work and act as a counterweight to the scepticism that sometimes (often quite

properly) surrounds the claims for such approaches. Potential to use new channels such

as video sharing websites like YouTube could be exploited more.

5.9 Learning in LICL26 There is potential for use of a more experimental design for future interventions.

LIC is explicitly a learning-focused project with the intention of its lessons being applied

nationally across all UPs, not least via the national LGSP. In general public policyinterventions are known to be difficult to learn from because typically it is hard to run the

equivalent of a laboratory experiment in the field of governance. Such experiments

require holding other factors constant, repeating experiments and running well-

structured control groups. Such approaches are typically not possible in, for example

projects affecting central governments since there is only one experimental subject and

no ability to hold all relevant factors constant. Without this quasi-experimental approach


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it is hard to be sure about what the effects of specific interventions have been and hence

to know for sure what the lessons are that are to be learned.

However local governance offers an opportunity to conduct studies which are closer to

experiments since within a country there are multiple local governments. Thus initiatives

can be attempted in a selected group and effects measured against a control group (see

Humphreys and Weinstein, 2009 and for a specific example, Olken, 2005). This does

however require careful initial design on the interventions and awareness that, unlike in a

laboratory experiment, not every other relevant factor can be held constant. Use of a

strong representative control group can reduce the latter problem however.

LIC has not consciously adopted an experimental approach. A number of reasons can be

identified for this. The Bangladesh public policy reform context is difficult. Securing

agreement to new reforms and gaining commitment to their implementation is hard.

Arguably that is more so in local governance given the highly centralized nature of much

of Bangladeshi government. Thus the project has moved relatively fluidly with some

broad overall emphases like the bottom-up planning within the context of a discretionary

grant.

This effect has been strengthened by the desire to give space to local preferences. A

strongly disciplined structured approach requires top down controls which could easily

undermine the spirit of the bottom-up planning. Arguably many of the projects which

have adopted an experimental approach have been much narrower in scope than LIC

which has sought improvements across a wide range of governance processes and

utilised a discretionary grant in contrast to funding for specific initiatives like roadwork in

some other projects.

L27 Effects are hard to demonstrate definitively because of a fluid project

design/management reflecting national policy styles and local variety

Nevertheless this does make demonstrating LICs results convincingly more challenging

that it might be. There are multiple initiatives in the field of local governance in

Bangladesh the broader including the broader LGSP programme, other work by UNDP

such as the REOPA project; work by multiple international donors (see for example

support by the SDC to local capacity building) and by NGOs like CARE (see for example

their owrk in slected UPs on local governance). In addition there are broader political and

economic developments in the country.

The consequence of this is that isolating the impact of LIC initiatives is already difficult.

Where there has not been a consistent uniform intervention then convincing empirical

demonstration of a causal effect is very hard.


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To some extent this is unavoidable given that the project has had to be opportunistic in

its approach to what can be progressed. For examples developments in areas such as tax

administration have been held up because of concerns over the need for central changes

in law to permit pilots to go ahead. In the face of these obstacles the project has sought

to proceed where possible and sometimes this has varied between areas.

L28 Learning effects have been slow because of the slow cycle of policy development

nationally

LIC was conceived as a component of LGSP with a role of feeding into national decisions

on funding local governments. In practice this requires entry points in terms of project

design and national policy. However in practice the national LGSP policy has proved to be

hard to adjust mid-cycle. This reflects the relatively slow pace of change generally within

the country for policy reform where a critical mass of support for developments needs to

be assembled against a complex national political structure. This has meant that,

although lessons of the project in terms of the value of block grants, the need for

facilitation etc have been well understood by those close to the project, translating this

into an evolved LGSP project has had to wait until the second LGSP project rather than

being able to take place within the existing LGSP programme.

The message here is that ambitions about learning from projects need to be set

realistically. The well-known difficulties of securing administrative reform in Bangladesh

require considerable time scales to achieve change where the drivers of reform in a

range of parts of society need to develop (see for example Duncan et al, 2002).


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6 ConclusionsThe LIC is clearly the descendent of the earlier SLGDP project in Sirajganj. The core

reforms promoted within LIC bear a close resemblance to those pursued in the earlier

project. Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is a close similarity between the lessons identified

here from LIC and the lessons identified earlier at the completion of SLGDP and quoted at

the beginning of this study.

In a sense this could be interpreted negatively. In fact LIC has expanded the range of

interventions and refined them. More importantly though, it has demonstrated the

relevance of these lessons across a broad range of UPs showing for example that

absorptive capacity is high across the country. It has also demonstrated that the relatively

intensive facilitation inputs adopted in Sirajganj (which were probably unrealistic at a

national level) are not required to get significant achievements.

LIC is not the only project working in these areas and reaching a robust understanding of

the attribution of different effects is probably impossible in the fluid context of

Bangladesh governance. But, subject to this caveat, LIC does appear to have produced

significant gains in accountability and transparency and to have made modest but

important improvements to the welfare of local citizens.

These gains are transferable and there are already clear signs of lessons from LIC being

transmitted to national policy through the planning for the next stage of the LGSP.

However the scale of local grants remains limited with a policy dialogue on governance at

UP level remaining one focused on a narrow set of functions to be delivered by UPs

themselves. LIC has demonstrated a mechanism for determining and implementing local

spending that appears capable of dealing with much larger responsibilities and of doing it

in a way which is much more effective and accountable than at higher levels of

government where ownership of resource allocation and management remains low.

Ultimately the value of lessons from learning projects depends as much on the audience

for those lessons as on those directly involved in the reforms being tested. In this case the

key domestic audience in the GoB national policy community for whom LIC provides

lessons which challenge the conventional centralist domination of Ba

Documents

Learning & Innovations Component of the Local Government Support Projectin Ban Glades Hi Union Parishads