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Learning lessons from the 2007 floodsAn independent review by Sir Michael Pitt

Interim Report

Decem

ber 2007

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Publication date: December 2007

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Prepared for the Cabinet Office by COI Communications

Learning lessons from the 2007 floods

An independent review

by Sir Michael Pitt

Average daily rainfall (mm) over England, June and July 2007

1JULY

Forecasters warn oftreacherous weather forthe rest of July.

WEATHER REPORT

Environment SecretaryHilary Benn announcesan increase in funds, forflood protection to £800mby 2010/11.

NEWS REPORT

Severe thunderstormsand the resulting floodsleave parts of thecountry under water.

WEATHER REPORT

Met Office issues aSevere Weather Warningfor 50mm of rain in someparts of the country forthe day.

WEATHER REPORT

Met Office predicts heavyrain, thunderstorms andeven tornadoes, as strongwinds and low pressuresweeps across England.The EA issues severeweather warnings in thenorth-east. Much ofYorkshire and parts ofnorth-east England arealready saturated fromthe previous rain in June.

WEATHER REPORT

Tropical storms, minitornadoes and torrentialrain hit parts of Englandcausing flooding andleave hundreds of peoplestranded.

WEATHER REPORT WEATHER REPORT

NEWS REPORT

Some parts of Yorkshire receive over four times theaverage monthly rainfall. Severe rain in Hull causessurface water floods.

The Environment Agency (EA) has 26 severe floodwarnings in place, as well as further warnings affectingmore than 200 rivers across England.

WEATHER REPORT

Mythe water treatment works floods, leaving over350,000 people without clean water for up to 17 days.The lack of water for drinking, cooking, washing andsanitation causes severe distress to thousands of people,despite efforts to distribute bottled water and bowsers.

There are fears that Walham electricity switching station,which serves over half a million homes acrossGloucestershire and South Wales, may fail, leading topower cuts. Temporary defences are mobilised atWalham and additional pumping equipment brought in.

NEWS REPORT

Prime Minister GordonBrown visits flood victimsin Yorkshire. A £14msupport package for floodzones is announced forareas affected by therecent floods.

NEWS REPORT

One man dies afterbeing swept away bya bursting river, inNorth Yorkshire.

Evacuations under wayfrom homes and schoolsbut blocked roads anddisrupted rail servicesleave people stranded andhamper rescue efforts.

NEWS REPORT

A month’s rain fallsin one hour in Kent.Residents of Folkestonealso have to contendwith thunderstormsand lightning.

WEATHER REPORT

Overnight rain causesfloods in Boscastle,three years after recordfloods hit the village.

NEWS REPORT

Multiple lightning strikeshit an oil refinery atFawley, Southampton.Fortunately there are noreports of fire or damage.

NEWS REPORT

Environment SecretaryHilary Benn announcesa further £10m tosupplement the existingflood recovery grantmade available to localauthorities.

NEWS REPORT

Floods hit the Thamesregion as evacuationstake place in Oxford, whileother areas around theRiver Thames are warnedof heavy rain and risk offlooding. The EA has sixsevere flood warnings forRiver Severn, RiverThames and River Ock.

NEWS REPORT

A father and son arefound dead at TewkesburyRugby Club. They wereattempting to pump waterout of premises, but wereovercome by fumes froma pump.

NEWS REPORT

Another heavy downpourof rain falls acrossEngland, causing localisedflooding in Gloucestershire.

WEATHER REPORT

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30JUNE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31June

mm

05

10152025

July

Summer 2007Floods Timeline

Home Office figures showthat 3,500 people havebeen rescued from floodedhomes and a further 4,000call-outs were made bythe fire, ambulance andpolice services.

The Association of BritishInsurers estimates damagefrom the floods at £1.5bn.

Areas of Lincolnshire and East Yorkshire,which supply about 40% of British produce,see thousands of tonnes of vegetables ruined.

Experts predict that floods will cost an extra£1bn a year by 2075.

Over 1 million litres ofbottled water have beendistributed inGloucestershire. A further700 bowsers are alsoplaced in priority areasin the county.

A further 2.5 million litresof bottled water aredistributed, with over1,000 bowsers now put outacross Gloucestershire.Water distributionMythe water treatment works

Flooding in Tewkesburytown centre Walham switching station

Ulley Reservoir

Severe flooding across Gloucestershire, includingTewkesbury, Cheltenham and Gloucester. A teenageris feared dead in Tewkesbury.

Millions of travellers face disruption to their travelplans by road, rail and air, as the school holidaysbegin. Up to 10,000 people are left stranded on theM5 as drivers are forced to abandon cars. 500 peopleare stranded at Gloucester railway station as therailway network fails. Rest centres are set up for2,000 people unable to get home.

Over 3 inches of rain fall in just 12 hours over muchof south and south-west England.

One man dies while attempting to clear debris from amanhole in Hessle. Elsewhere, there were another threeflood-related fatalities. More than 30,000 people are lefthomeless in Hull.

Over 700 people are evacuated from villages near UlleyReservoir near Rotherham. The M1 is closed as a precaution.

The fire brigade launch the ‘biggest rescue effort inpeacetime Britain’.

Neepsend electricity sub-station is inundated affectingalmost 40,000 people around Sheffield.

NEWS REPORT

ContentsForeword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Chapter 1: The events of June and July – a summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Chapter 2: The effect of the summer 2007 floods on individuals

and communities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Chapter 3: Building a better understanding of the risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Chapter 4: Managing flood risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Chapter 5: The emergency response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

Chapter 6: Critical infrastructure: keeping our essential

services going . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

Chapter 7: Engaging the public . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

Chapter 8: Next steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

Annexes and Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

Contents

1

Foreword

Floods Review: Independent Chair’sopening letterDear Secretaries of State,

This is the first of two reports on the lessons to be learned from the severeflooding which took place during June and July 2007.

In preparing this Report, members of the Review Team and I have examinedevidence from all concerned, including over 600 written submissions from thepublic and a wide variety of organisations. We have also visited many partsof the country affected by the emergencies, spoken to people involved andinspected damage to homes and businesses.

The scale of flood damage to property is shocking, but above all we havebeen moved and troubled by the first-hand accounts of people. It is difficultto fully capture in words the sense of loss and outrage associated with ahome or business being flooded, and the prospect of it happening all overagain at some unknown future date. We saw businesses that had beenruined and met many people who face the prospect of Christmas and Easterin a caravan or some other form of temporary accommodation. It is for thisreason that we have chosen to write this Report from the viewpoint of theflood victims and why those in a position of influence should do all they canto reduce the risk and impact of flooding in the future.

We also want to pay tribute to the very many people who worked tirelesslyduring the floods, saving lives and doing what they could to help peopledirectly affected. There may be questions about multi-agency states ofreadiness, but once the level of risk became known, all of the relevantorganisations acted with considerable force, compassion and effectiveness.

Despite the impressive efforts of emergency responders, much work needsto be done to avoid emergencies of the scale we witnessed this summerhappening again. Our emerging conclusions are wide-ranging and willrequire a determined effort on the part of central government and otherrelevant organisations to see them through. In some instances, we have

made urgent recommendations which have already been the subject ofintensive study and discussion and should be progressed and implementedimmediately. In others, the position is less clear-cut and in these cases, wewould like readers to regard this first Report as a consultation document. Oursecond and final Report will be published next summer and will firm up areasof uncertainty.

Finally, I would like to thank everyone who has given so generously of theirtime and, in particular, those members of the public who showed suchfortitude at a difficult time in their lives. I am also grateful to the Review Teamfor their considerable efforts over the last few months. We reachedagreement on all matters, although, of course, the ultimate responsibility forthe contents of this report rests entirely with me.

Yours sincerely,

Sir Michael PittIndependent Chair


2

Executive SummaryBackgroundDuring August 2007, Sir Michael Pitt was asked by ministers to carry out a review of theflood-related emergencies which occurred during the summer of 2007. This is the interimreport of the Review. It is being published now to achieve three objectives:

• to identify issues which need urgent action;

• to set out the direction for the remainder of the Review; and

• to provide a document for consultation before the final report is published next summer.

The floods during June and July 2007 were a wake-up call. The three months from May toJuly were the wettest since records began and the events that followed have been linkedto the deaths of 13 people. They also resulted in damage to approximately 48,000 homesand 7,000 businesses. Power and water supplies were lost, railway lines, eight motorwaysand many other roads were closed and large parts of five counties and four cities werebrought to a standstill. From an emergency response standpoint, this was a new level ofchallenge. The flooding triggered a series of emergencies which stretched local resourcesto the limit.

Conversations with victims illustrated the scale of distress and human misery experiencedby many people. Even considering the extraordinary degree of disruption caused by thefloods, the country was fortunate that the impact was not much more severe. There wereseveral near disasters of an even greater magnitude. While the scale of loss and damagewas massive, the crisis would have been worse had it not been for the dedication, quickthinking and effective action of those involved in the rescue and recovery operation.

Flood risk is here to stay. The Review recognises the findings of other reports, such asStern and Foresight, which predict climatic change and state that this country can expectmore extreme weather, with periods of intensive rainfall. The Review proposes that thecountry should confront these mounting challenges and adapt accordingly, recognisingthat this process of adaptation will take place over a generation. The impact of the floodsand the high level of risk involved could have been significantly reduced with strongerlocal leadership of flood risk management, clarification of roles, more effectivecooperation between responsible organisations, better protection of infrastructure andwider and deeper public engagement.

Given the severity of the emergencies this summer and the risks we face in future,the over-riding purpose of the Pitt Review is to learn lessons from the floods of2007 and to bring forward recommendations that will help the country adapt anddeal more effectively with future flooding incidents.

3

Executive Summary

The findingsThe Report contains a total of 15 recommendations and 72 interim conclusions. They arestrategic in nature but with implications for every locality in the country. The Report alsoconsiders one or two of the ‘myths’ surrounding flooding. These include strongly heldviews about standards of waterway maintenance and the belief that some communitieswere deliberately allowed to flood to reduce the impact on places further downstream.

Chapters 1 and 2 provide the context for the Review, describing the severity of theemergencies and their wider social and economic impacts. They summarise the events ofJune and July and the effects the floods had on individuals, their families, businesses andcommunities. They are drawn from social research commissioned specifically for theReview, published in full as a supporting document to this Interim Report.

Climate change and the risk of flooding are discussed in Chapter 3. Ideally, expertswould be able to accurately forecast bad weather and predict well in advance whichproperties will flood even more effectively than they already do. Doing so would give theemergency services and others more time to respond and to make the right decisions in acrisis. In practice the distribution, timing and intensity of rainfall and the dynamics ofwater flow once rain hits the ground are notoriously complex to model. Also, the nature offlooding is changing. In the past, considerable attention has been paid to the risks ofcoastal and river flooding. However, the greater intensity of rainfall and increasingurbanisation are leading to more flash floods caused by water running off the surface ofthe land. River, surface water and groundwater flooding all took place this summer, addingto the complications.

During the emergencies, the Met Office and the Environment Agency worked welltogether, but the limitations of some existing processes, together with technical limitationsof flood prediction, meant that many property owners received warnings after theirproperty had already flooded or not at all. Research into flood prediction is advancing andwe believe this should be a priority subject to feasability and cost effectiveness. Rapidprogress must be made over the next few years to ensure that flood risk planning andmanagement, including public warnings and emergency response, is underpinned by animproved understanding of when and where flooding will occur.

There are obvious concerns about the large number of properties currently at risk offlooding and the likelihood of further significant development in flood risk areas.Chapter 4 discusses the need to strengthen and enforce the provisions of PPS 25and Building Regulations to ensure that flood resistance and resilience measures arefully built into all new development where necessary.

The law relating to drainage systems is complex and numerous bodies are involvedincluding the Environment Agency, water companies, local authorities, internal drainageboards and private owners. It is not surprising that the public are confused and that theywonder who is accountable. There is room for improved inter-agency cooperation. ThisReview recommends that the Environment Agency should take strategic direction ofmanaging inland flood risks, while local authorities should adopt a new leadership andscrutiny role overseeing flood risk management within their local area.


4

In general, insurance companies responded quickly and effectively to the emergenciesdespite the vast number of claims they received from residents and businesses. However,some were less efficient than others and some people have received an unsatisfactorylevel of service. The Review is discussing with the insurance industry ways of achievinguniformly high standards and this subject will be reviewed again next year.

Chapter 5 deals with the calling of Gold, Silver and Bronze Commands and the responseto the flooding emergencies. Relevant aspects of the Civil Contingencies Act were put intopractice effectively and there is admiration for the way in which the emergency servicesand other responders worked tirelessly throughout one of the most complex, challengingand lengthy series of emergencies for many years. However, the Review also believesthat the country was not as well prepared as it should have been.

Responders were surprised by the scale and duration of the emergencies and they oftenfound themselves reacting to unexpected events. Sometimes basic information aboutoperation and characteristics of the local drainage systems was unavailable whenneeded. The vulnerability of critical infrastructure and consequences of its failure werenot fully appreciated in advance. The country must be better prepared and the Reviewmakes a series of recommendations about national and local leadership, emergencyplanning, protection of local emergency facilities, water supplies, rescue and fundingmechanisms.

In Chapter 6 the Review is concerned about the major loss of essential services duringthe floods. Sites containing critical infrastructure were poorly protected. For example, tensof thousands of people found themselves without tap water and power, 10,000 werestranded on the M5 motorway overnight and 500 were left stranded at Gloucester RailwayStation. Even greater loss of essential services was only narrowly avoided and there weremajor concerns about the complete failure of Ulley Reservoir. The Review makesrecommendations on sharing information, building greater standards of protection and thecloser involvement in preparedness planning of essential service providers, such as thewater and power companies.

People depend on warnings and advice during an emergency. They will have importantdecisions to make about their safety and that of others, and about the risk of damage totheir property. Chapter 7 describes the efforts made by responders to keep the publicinformed and the contribution of local media – especially the ability of local radio totransmit up-to-the-minute broadcasts. The public appreciated the efforts of localauthorities and other organisations which systematically knocked on doors and checkedon the well-being of residents and businesses. The Report sets out proposals forensuring that advice and warnings from various agencies are better coordinated, thatcouncils play their full part in reassuring the public and that people are made fully awareof any flood risk when they buy or rent property. It also makes clear that individuals andcommunities must share responsibility for actions to deal with flooding.

Next stepsThis first Report sets out the Pitt Review’s initial thinking and proposals after just fourmonths’ work. The Review has benefited from the extensive evidence already submitted,but much more needs to be considered before the final Report will be ready next summer.

5

Executive Summary

In particular, further work needs to be done to consider the costs, benefits and feasibilityof the interim conclusions.

Interested individuals and organisations should let us have their views and join in adiscussion over the coming months. You can find different ways to contact theReview Team set out in Chapter 8. The deadline for comments and further evidence is31 March 2008.


6

9

Chapter 1: The events of June and July – a summary

Chapter 1:The events ofJune and July –a summary

Summary• This chapter describes the

exceptional events that tookplace during summer 2007,when 13 people lost their livesand about 48,000 houses and7,000 businesses wereflooded.1

It is divided into three sections:

• The Weather – This sectiondescribes the weatherconditions and the record-breaking rainfall. Informationhas been provided by the MetOffice.

• The Flooding – This sectionexplores the effects of therainfall once it reached theground, including theexceptional amount of surfacewater flooding that occurred.

• The Impacts – This sectioncovers the destructive impactof the floods during and afterthe event.

A timeline of events can befound at the front of this Report.

1.1 The rainfall during June and July 2007was unprecedented. Data on rainfall andriver levels shows that the summer 2007floods were extreme, with only a 1-in-150chance of this level of flooding occurring inany one year. The sheer volume andintensity of the water meant that drainagesystems and flood defences were unable tocope, resulting in devastating floodsaffecting tens of thousands of people.

The Weather1.2 The severe flooding which affectedmuch of the country during June and July2007 followed the wettest-ever May to Julyperiod since national records began in1766. Met Office records show that anaverage of 414.1mm of rain fell acrossEngland and Wales – well over doubleusual levels (see Table 1). The additionalvolume of rain which fell from May to Julywas 31,140 million cubic metres – morethan four times the amount of water in allthe lakes in England and Wales combined.The sheer volume and intensity of thewater overwhelmed many drainage systemsand a number of defences.

1.3 The exceptionally heavy rain resulted intwo severe and disruptive flooding events.Figure 1 (below) shows that the rainfallpeaks for the worst affected areas(Midlands, North East and South West)occurred during the week of 13 June(which did not result in serious flooding butdid saturate the ground), the week of 20June and the week of 18 July.

Weather patterns for summer 20071.4 The heavy rainfall was the result of anunusual weather pattern. The jet streamwas stronger and further south than normaland the North Atlantic Ocean was warmerthan usual in the vicinity of the UK.

1 Department for Communities and Local Government


10

AreaMay – July

2007rainfall

May – July1971 – 2000

average

Previous wettestMay – July in

series Additional information

NE England 379 mm 170 mm Wettest sincerecords began

Previous wettest was308mm in 1879

NWEngland &NorthWales

387 mm 198 mm Wettest sincerecords began


CentralEngland



SE England 315 mm 153 mm Wettest sincerecords began


SWEngland &SouthWales



England &Wales



Table 1 – May – July rainfall totals for England and Wales

Note: England and Wales record starts in 1766, other regions in 1873.Source: Met Office – Submission to EFRA Select Committee 2007

Figure 1 – Rainfall totals for regions in England in June and July 2007

Rainfall in England (June–July 2007)

Week Commencing

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

30/05

/2007

06/06

/2007

13/06

/2007

20/06

/2007

27/06

/2007

04/07

/2007

11/07

/2007

18/07

/2007

25/07

/2007

Rai

nfa

ll(m

m)

Anglian

Midlands

North East

North West

South west

Southern

Thames

Source: Environment Agency Weekly Rainfall and River Flow Summaries

Weather Station

Rainfall (mm)

June 2007 Anomaly against 1971 – 2000 average

Emley Moor, West Yorkshire 294 4.35 times the average

Bingley, West Yorkshire 283 4.01 times the average

Fylingdales, North Yorkshire 269 4.06 times the average

Table 2 – Wettest locations in England during June 2007

The jet stream 1.5 The jet stream is a key factor incontrolling the UK’s weather. Jet streamsare ribbons of very strong winds formed bytemperature differences in the upperatmosphere between cold polar air to thenorth, and warm tropical air to the south.The abrupt change in temperature resultsin a large pressure difference which forcesthe air to flow rapidly, usually in a west toeast direction due to the rotation of theEarth. Jet streams are typically thousandsof miles long, hundreds of miles wide anda few miles deep and can reach speeds of300 miles per hour. At the latitude of theUK, the jet stream is generally found ataround 35,000 feet and is called the PolarFront Jet Stream. Because the jet streamfollows the boundary between the coldpolar air and the warm tropical air, it canmove in a north-south direction. At thisboundary, weather fronts develop which

can bring heavy rain and strong winds. Thelocation of the jet stream has a stronginfluence on the movement of depressionsbringing unsettled weather to westernEurope.

1.6 For much of summer 2007, the jetstream was stronger in force and positionedfurther south for longer than usual. Thisresulted in many heavy rain-producingweather systems crossing southern andcentral areas of the UK. Figure 2 showsthe relative positions of the jet stream inJune 2006 and July 2007 for comparison.

North Atlantic sea surfacetemperatures1.7 The temperatures of the North WestAtlantic Ocean waters were above normalfor much of the spring and early summer of2007. The air mass above the oceanheated up more than normal and held more

Figure 2 – Relative positions of the jet stream in June 2006 and July 2007

Jetstream – July 2006

High

HighLow

Jetstream – July 2007High

Low

Source: Met Office 2007

Source: Met Office – Submission to EFRA Select Committee 2007

11



12

moisture. When this air mass was forced torise, either as a result of convection orfrontal activity (see below), more rainfallformed.

Types of rainfall events1.8 There are two main types of rainfallevent. The first is convective rain – slowmoving heavy showers or thunderstormsthat usually cover areas of up to around50 square miles, which can result insurface water (or pluvial) flooding. Thesecond is frontal rain – much larger in scaleand associated with depressions movingclose to or over the UK. This is the sort ofrain which is presented as bands acrossthe weather map. Frontal rainfall events aremore easily tracked and predicted bycurrent weather forecasting models, whileconvective events are more difficult topredict because they are smaller and drivenby localised circumstances.

1.9 The rainfall events on 24–25 June and19–20 July were frontal, but with embeddedconvective elements. By way ofcomparison, the rain which caused theflood in Boscastle in August 2004 wasconvective in nature, while the Carlisleflooding in January 2005 was caused byfrontal rain.

The June event1.10 Heavy rainfall first affected much ofnorthern England on 14–15 June due to acomplex and slow-moving area of lowpressure. While this rainfall did not itselfcause much flooding, it did saturate theground over much of northern England.This amplified the impact of the heavyrainfall on 24–25 June, after which theweather remained unsettled and wet untilthe end of the month. The highest rainfalltotal recorded on 25 June was atFylingdales in North Yorkshire, with 111mmof rain. Table 2 gives the highest Junerainfall totals for the wettest areas. Someplaces received over four times the averagemonthly rainfall.

1.11 Figure 3 provides a snapshot of themeteorological conditions on 25 June 2007.An area of low pressure (depression) overthe UK remained static for a prolongedperiod of time. The rainfall corresponding tothe conditions is shown in the bottom right-hand corner, with the brighter coloursindicating more rain.

The July event1.12 The second main flooding event wasdue to exceptionally heavy rainfall on19–20 July. This was caused by a slow-

Weather Station

Rainfall (mm)

July 2007 Anomaly against 1971 – 2000 average

Pershore College, Worcestershire 252 5.88 times the average

Great Malvern, Worcestershire 189 4.48 times the average

Little Rissington, Gloucestershire 189 3.78 times the average

Brize Norton, Oxfordshire 178 4.38 times the average

Table 3 – Wettest locations in England during July 2007


moving depression centred over south-eastEngland. Heavy rainfall moved northwardsduring the day. The heaviest rainfallrecorded was at Pershore College inWorcestershire with 157.4mm recorded inthe 48 hour period 19–20 July 2007. Table3 gives the highest July rainfall totals for thewettest areas. Some places received nearlysix times the average monthly rainfall. Table4 shows that for the worst affectedcounties, the monthly rainfall was around3–4 times the average.

1.13 Figure 4 is a snapshot of themeteorological conditions on 19 July 2007showing an area of low pressure(depression) over the UK.

The Flooding1.14 The events of the summer werecharacterised by two types of flooding:

rivers overtopping to flood surroundingareas (river or fluvial flooding) and directflooding of areas with insufficient drainagecapacity (surface water or pluvial flooding)following exceptionally high rainfall.

1.15 During the summer, and in particularJune, there was surface water flooding onan unprecedented scale. This type offlooding is more difficult to predict andprovides limited opportunity for warning. Italso tends to result in significant amountsof flooding in areas that have not previouslyflooded.

Types of floodingRiver (fluvial) flooding

1.16 River flooding occurs as a result ofwater overflowing from river channels.There are two key factors – the volume ofrainfall and the capacity of the ground and

Figure 3 – Synoptic situation on 25 June 2007


13



14

County

Rainfall (mm)

July 2007 Anomaly against 1971 – 2000 average

Gloucestershire 197 4.11 times the average

Herefordshire 189 4.27 times the average

Oxfordshire 150 3.39 times the average

Shropshire 165 3.30 times the average

Warwickshire 208 4.53 times the average

Worcestershire 201 4.17 times the average

Table 4 – July rainfall totals for counties across England

Figure 4 – Synoptic situation on 19 July 2007



rivers to absorb and transport the water.River levels, groundwater levels and soilmoisture are usually low following a typicalsummer. This provides capacity to absorbheavy rainfall during the winter and reducesthe likelihood of flooding. However, Mayand early June this year were particularlywet, so river, groundwater and soil moisturelevels were already high. This exacerbatedthe problem when the intense rain fell atthe end of June and in July. Figure 5 showsthat in the worst-affected areas of theNorth East and the Midlands, river levelsduring the July flooding were up to sixtimes higher than the long-term average.

Surface water (pluvial) flooding

1.17 Surface water flooding happensquickly and is hard to predict. It occurswhen natural and man-made drainagesystems have insufficient capacity to dealwith the volume of rainfall. The criticalfactors for surface water flooding are thevolume of rainfall, where it falls and itsintensity. In urban areas sudden andintense rainfall cannot drain away asquickly as it can in rural areas where thesoil is exposed. Around two-thirds of the

flooding in summer 2007 was due tosurface water and this was a particularproblem during June.

Groundwater flooding

1.18 Groundwater flooding occurs whenthe level of water underground (the ‘watertable’) rises and water emerges above thenatural surface. It generally happens inlow-lying areas, particularly those whichsit above layers of permeable rock suchas chalk.

Coastal flooding

1.19 Coastal flooding occurs when thesea level rises above the level of coastalland. Although this type of flooding wasnot a part of the serious summerflooding, the East Coast storm surge inNovember this year shows the very realrisk that it presents. Indeed, the potentialimpact of coastal flooding is significantlyhigher than for other types of flooding,with a greater probability of loss of lifeand inundation – especially if larger-scalecoastal defences fail.

Figure 5 – River levels in June and July 2007 by EA Region

Regional River Levels (June–July 2007)

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

30/5

/07

7/6/

07

15/6

/07

23/6

/07

1/7/

07

9/7/

07

17/7

/07

25/7

/07

Week Commencing

Per

cen

tag

eo

fL

on

gTe

rmA

vera

ge

Anglian

Midlands

North East

North West

South West

Southern

Thames

England

Source: Environment Agency Weekly Rainfall and River Flow Summaries

15



16

Figure 6 – Types of flooding Properties flooded across England1.20 Figure 7 displays the widespread anddestructive nature of the summer 2007floods, giving details of the number ofresidential properties affected. Thegeographical distribution of affectedproperty can be compared withprecipitation levels shown in Figure 8.

River Coastal

Groundwater

Heavy Rain =Surface water

The Impacts

Case Study – Personal Experience of FloodingTim Aston lives in Newton, Tewkesbury, in Gloucestershire. Hishouse is not on the Environment Agency’s floodplain map –something he had checked before the flooding. Tim described thetorrential rain that fell all day on Friday 20 July as unbelievable andunlike anything he had experienced previously.

“It was like it was the end of the world”

As a photographer, Tim was at a wedding that Friday and by the time he had left thereception at around 10pm, the water level in places was up to his waist as he wadedagainst a strong current to get home. Tim’s house had not yet been affected by the floodswhen he returned as it was on higher ground, and he believed he would be safe as therain had started to ease off.

After reaching home, Tim noticed a patch of water on the floor near the patio doors andwithin a minute, the downstairs carpet was floating in an inch of water. Tim grabbed anumber of essential items, while his wife turned off the power before the water reachedthe sockets. By the time he had returned downstairs for a second load of belongings, thewater was shin-deep and much of what had been downstairs, including many preciouspersonal items, was destroyed. Tim’s neighbour called to tell him to move his car to higherground, but unfortunately it was too late as both the car and his motorbike were flooded.While talking to his neighbour, Tim was able to look at his surroundings and it was onlythen that the enormity of the event struck him.

“Water was everywhere and it’d all happened within a couple of hours.”

The water levels started to recede at around 9am on Saturday and most of the water wasout of the house by midday. However, by that evening, Tim noticed a perceptible rise in thewater levels again and by Sunday morning, it was rising at a rate of around 1 inch per hour.

“The worrying thing was that we just didn’t know when it was going to stop rising.”

It took until Monday morning for the water levels to become static and until late Mondayafternoon for it to recede, leaving Tim and his family with the inevitable but distressing job ofstarting the clean-up. Although the whole event was a devastating experience for Tim andhis family, he believed that there were a number of positives. Community spirit in his areaimproved and the experience encouraged Tim to look differently at the priorities in his life.

“It was a life changing experience.”

Impact on critical infrastructure1.21 The widespread nature of the floodinghad startling, major and unexpectedimpacts on infrastructure leading to the lossof essential services.

1.22 Gloucestershire County Council’sreport on the July floods sums up some ofthe effects. On Sunday 22 July, SevernTrent Water’s Mythe water treatment worksin Tewkesbury was flooded. This left350,000 people across Gloucestershirewithout water – the most significant loss of

essential services since the Second WorldWar. On Monday 23 July, Central Networks’Castle Meads electricity sub-station wasshut down, leaving 42,000 people withoutpower. Only a concerted effort involving thefire and rescue service, the Armed Forces,the Environment Agency and the NationalGrid prevented the loss of Walhamelectricity switching-station. The extent ofthe flooding left many people stranded ascritical elements of the transport networkground to a halt. Some 10,000 people wereleft stranded on the M5 motorway and other

Figure 7 – Effects of flooding on residential properties, by Local Authority2

Source: Department for Communities and Local Government 2007

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2 The figures used to produce these maps include only residential properties where the habitableaccommodation has been affected (it excludes those where, for example, only garages and/or outbuildingswere flooded) and they are the latest estimate as at 29 October 2007. The figures are based on theindividual local authority assessment of affected homes in their areas; this will have included anassessment of those presenting themselves as homeless, those seeking council tax exemptions and othersupport, as well as other measures. However, these figures may not include all households, particularlythose who made private arrangements.


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roads overnight on 20 July, while anestimated 500 people were left stranded atGloucester Railway Station as the railnetwork failed. The infrastructure failuresand loss of essential services affectedmany people outside the flooded areas andincreased the demand for emergencyresponses.

1.23 There were also substantial losses ofassets and disruption to essential servicesin other parts of the country and othersectors. In Yorkshire, four major electricalsub-stations and 55 secondary sub-stationswere flooded, affecting the supply to130,000 people. Hundreds of sewagetreatment works and pumping stationsfailed, causing local pollution in floodedareas. The dam at Ulley reservoir, nearRotherham, very nearly failed, putting atrisk the local population and a number ofother infrastructure assets. Oil distributionwas affected by rail suspensions which

prevented bulk fuel supplies reachingterminals and other storage facilities. Therewere also local failures intelecommunications networks that leftpeople feeling vulnerable and isolated.

Impact on local areas1.24 Annex D of this report explains howthese national events impacted on someof the most heavily-affected local areas –Thames Valley, Gloucestershire,Humberside and South Yorkshire. Manymore areas were affected to a lesser butstill significant degree. Considered together,it is clear that the impact on all the peopleand communities affected has been bothsevere and long-lasting.

Figure 8 – Precipitation levels for England and Wales during 24 – 25 Juneand 19 – 20 July 2007


Flood Report pp008_019 19/12/07 10:35 am Page 18

Chapter 2:The effect of thesummer 2007floods onindividuals andcommunitiesSummaryThis chapter describes theexperience of the floods fromperspective of the individuals,businesses, farmers andcommunities affected.It covers;

• The initial shock as the floodingbegan;

• The clean-up and aftermath;• The on-going effects; and• The public response.

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Chapter 2: The effect of the summer 2007 floods on individuals and communities

Introduction 2.1 This chapter describes the exceptionaland devastating effects of the 2007summer floods on individuals, families,communities and businesses – effectswhich are still being felt today. It alsodescribes some of the most visible positivestories that emerged – individuals andorganisations going beyond expectations tohelp others and a genuine sense ofcommunity spirit and cooperation. Thesepersonal experiences form one part of theevidence base for recommendations later inthis report.

2.2 The evidence for this chapter comesprimarily from qualitative researchcommissioned by the Review, carried out inOctober 2007 by the independent researchagency GfK NOP Social Research. The fullreport is available for download from theReview website www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/thepittreview.

2.3 The chapter also draws on evidencefrom research commissioned by TheConsumer Council for Water to understandpeople’s experience of the loss of water.The full report can be downloaded fromwww.ccwater.org.uk/upload/doc/Final.doc.

2.4 Also, we have used evidence submittedby members of the general public to thePitt Review website,2 comments sent to usby email and post and evidence gatheredduring visits to many parts of the country.

The initial shock 2.5 The scale and speed of the floods thataffected people in summer 2007 came as ashock. In many cases, this reflects people’slimited awareness of risk, especially ofsurface water flooding, and limitedengagement in preparedness planning.Even if people were aware that heavy rain

was forecast, they did not expect it to affectthem, and certainly not so seriously.

2.6 For some, the first sign of the floodingwas water running down the street towardsthem. For others, it was water seeping upthrough their floors or their toilets backingup, rendering their attempts to block waterby sealing doors and windows useless.Many people at work or away from home,despite warning calls from neighbours, didnot grasp the full magnitude of the floodsuntil they returned home and saw thedamage for themselves.

2.7 Most people had never experiencedflooding like this before, and they did notknow how to react – what preventativesteps to take, who to call for help, whetherto turn the power off. Many felt helpless andisolated and found that panic and distressimmobilised them – they just watchedhelplessly as the water seeped throughtheir homes and waterlogged theirpossessions. This was particularly the casefor some vulnerable people who wereunable to protect themselves or theirpossessions.

“It happened really quickly. It just came…like a river coming down the street.”

Householder, West Berkshire

“We were sat at the end of our drivewatching... and all of a sudden it cameup through the grate…. 10 seconds laterJane’s house were gone.”

Householder, Barnsley

“You just think, oh, it’ll never happen tome.”


2 www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/thepittreview

Flooding at Botley, Oxford © Rex Features

2.8 Others took steps to protect theirproperty, either moving items upstairs ortrying to prevent water ingress. Farmersand businesses were more likely to fall intothis category, often because they hadappropriate equipment on hand such aspumps or generators. Some farmers hadthe additional worry of rescuing theiranimals from drowning or from drinkingcontaminated water.

2.9 Feelings of fear and helplessness wereexacerbated if people lost their watersupply. Although bowsers and bottled waterwere available in various locations, it wasdifficult for vulnerable people, those withouttransport or those without much physicalstrength to collect the water to take it backto their homes unless they had help fromneighbours. People appreciated the workcarried out by those who provided themwith water, but there were also reports ofthe scarcity of water causing argumentsand tension in local communities.

2.10 Loss of power caused similar fear anddistress. It meant that people could not getinformation from the television, radio andinternet, and it also prevented people fromcommunicating with others, as manymodern landline and mobile telephonesrequire power to charge batteries.Businesses could not communicate withcustomers or suppliers, leading in somecases to orders being cancelled. Loss ofpower could also cause serious healthconsequences – as in the case of onehouseholder in Gloucestershire who reliedon mains power for his oxygen source.

2.11 Many people were forced to evacuatetheir homes, either staying with friends orrelatives or sleeping in rest centres or

“You got 4 litres per person per day… butthere were people abusing it. (Peoplewith) shopping trolleys trying to flog it.”

Householder, Upton

“There was a band of young peopleaged anything from 15 to 25 offering toput (water) in the car for you... they weretop notch.”

Householder, Cheltenham

“(The experience) was terrifying… I reallythought we might get washed away atone point.”

Householder, North East Lincolnshire


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temporary accommodation. This in itselfcaused worry – fears that their homeswould be looted in their absence, fears ofcontinuing damage to their possessionswhich they had been unable to take withthem, and concerns about when they wouldbe able to return home.

Evacuation centre at Dinnington Comprehensive,South Yorkshire © Empics

The clean-up and theaftermath2.12 When the floods began to recede, thefull extent of the damage became obvious.Many felt overwhelmed by the scale of theclean-up and uncertain how to go about it.Those who stayed in their homes often hadto live amongst the effects of the floods –mud, silt and sewage, in addition to wetfloors and plaster hanging off wet walls.There were reports that this resulted in acontinuous bad odour and infestations ofrats, mosquitoes and flies.

2.13 Disrupted living patterns also led tofamily and personal stress. In some cases,different members of the same family hadto live apart. When families went to live withrelatives, the arrangements increased thepotential for family arguments. For thosewho stayed at home using only the upperfloors, cramped living conditions added tofamily tensions. Those with continuing lossof power were unable to cook or storechilled food.

2.14 Many people talked about emotionalhealth problems, and attributed these to thestress that the floods had caused.

2.15 Some people also reported physicalhealth problems, including sickness,diarrhoea, asthma, sore throats, cold soresand bad chests, which many attributed tothe damp living conditions and continuingcontamination of their homes.

“..tired and stressed and obviously youare depressed and you are run downbecause you just walk down the stairsand your house is a complete shit holeand you have just had .. it redecorated”

Householder, Toll Bar, Doncaster

“Every time you try and relax youenvisage (the water) coming down thestreet again... it’s scary.”


“My wife will be fine one day, and she’llbe in tears the next”

Business, West Berkshire

“We all live upstairs and everyone is ateach other’s throat all the time now”.

Householder, Hull

“It didn’t even look like flood water. Whenyou looked at it, it looked thick and soupyand grimy and horrible. When youwalked into the water, if you held yourhand an inch under the top.. you wouldn’tbe able to see your hand... sludgy andslimy”.

Householder, Sheffield

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2.16 Almost all businesses affectedsuffered stock and equipment losses, andwere unable to operate normally due toflooded sales premises or loss of powerand communications resulting in lost ordersor enquiries. Where businesses were out ofaction for some time, there was a seriouseffect on trade – particularly smallbusinesses. Delays were increased bypaperwork which had been lost ordamaged in the flooding, resulting inproblems making insurance claims, tracingorders and filling in tax returns. Manybusinesses struggled to make payments forutility bills, bank loans and other expenses.

The effects of flooding on consumers alsohad an impact, with fewer customers andreduced spending, especially in the tourismand leisure industries. For other sectorssuch as building, hotels and takeawayrestaurants, there was a reverse effect, withincreased demand from customers.

2.17 Farmers faced many of the samedifficulties as other businesses, but theyalso had their own particular problems. Forcattle and dairy farmers, barn floodingcaused destruction of stored feed, anddamage and contamination of grassland.

2.18 Risk of contamination had aparticularly serious effect on dairy farmers,as contaminated feed or water couldpermanently damage the animals’ milkingproductivity. Milking cows must drink 15 –20 gallons of water a day, so loss of watersupply was a huge challenge. Animals hadto be rescued from the flood water andtemporarily housed, and a reliablealternative water source identified. Inaddition, heavy milking machines could notbe moved to higher ground, and weretherefore damaged and contaminated bythe flood water.

2.19 For crop farmers, the type of cropdetermined the level of damage caused byflood water. Peas and potatoes, some ofthe UK’s most important crops, are

“The aftermath and the clean-up? Thepoint is that the community and thechurch did it. We cleared our street. Wemoved perhaps two tons of mud off thestreet. Five lads with hose pipes and jetwashes and we cleared our own streetbecause we were traipsing sewage intothe house. That was after everybody hadrung the council and said 'look, we've gotour own skips, we've got rid of the stuff.Can you just send somebody down toclean the street, a road sweeper?' Theywouldn't even send that. So we had to dothat ourselves, because otherwise you'retrailing crap back into your house thatyou've just cleaned out.”

Householder, Chesterfield

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Case study – Emma Dickens, Female Householder, Hull Emma Dickens is a young mother from Hull whose family home was flooded this summer.At the time her baby was nine weeks old.

Soon after her home was flooded, Emma noticed that her breathing was becomingincreasingly difficult, and she started to feel pain in her chest and back. She wasdiagnosed with pneumonia, which, according to her doctor, was brought on by breathingin mould spores. She was admitted to an acute hospital ward with her baby. However,as doctors were anxious about the baby’s exposure to germs in the acute ward she wasadvised to leave the following day and move to a domestic location with a dryatmosphere, and not return home for the good of her own health and that of the baby.

Emma and her baby eventually moved in with relatives and stayed there for some weeks,before she felt well enough to return to her own home and the rest of her family.

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destroyed after just 24 hours in water.Wheat, sugar and rapeseed survived, butwith poorer yields.

A bridge emerges from flood water nearTewkesbury, Gloucestershire © Empics

2.20 In the aftermath of the flooding, thosewho were insured had a very differentexperience from those uninsured. As wellas financial compensation, insurersprovided invaluable advice about how toproceed with each stage of drying out andcleaning up.

2.21 There were highly variableexperiences of insurers’ responsiveness.Most received an immediate response,though some tried for several days to reachtheir insurer before being able to makecontact. The timing of visits from lossadjustors was also crucial as it representedthe first step in the claim process, andmeant that cleaning up could begin. Manyreceived visits very quickly, while otherswere forced to wait due to a lack ofavailable loss adjustors, with resultanthardship for businesses and householders.

Advice was less easily available to thosewho were not insured. They also had tospend money hiring drying out equipment,and replacing damaged items such aswhite goods. Farmers were unable toinsure growing crops, but most of those notinsured were council tenants, and thereforereceived help with building repairs, and alsofinancial support from the council andsometimes from community organisationssuch as parish councils and churches.Financial support from the Council was akey source of tension in somecommunities, as there was a perceptionthat council tenants were given unduepriority over both insured and uninsuredprivate tenants.

“I was one of the idiots who wasn’tinsured. I had to do it on my own but Ididn’t get enough information about whatto do. I bought meters, I boughthumidifiers. You spend all that money,but it’s damp again later.”

Householder, Berkshire

“My mum has sent me her wages, that’sthe only way I’m surviving because I’vegot no income. I can’t get a job because Iam still classed as having my ownbusiness. I can’t get any benefitsbecause I am classed as having my ownbusiness. It just seems like a road blockdead end … I’ve got cover that only paysat the end. I’ve got my building cover thatpays at the end. I’ve got stock coverwhich pays at the end. Content coverwhich pays at the end… my loss adjustorsaid well we can’t do any kind of decentinterim payment until you get thesedocuments to me, these papers which Iam scrabbling with my accountant to getbecause obviously I haven’t paid himeither.”

Business, Doncaster

“Personally I haven’t a problem with theinsurance companies, it’s the lossadjusters.”

Business, Rotherham

Ongoing effects 2.22 The floods continue to havedetrimental emotional, health and financialeffects. Many people still cannot return totheir own homes – or if they can, areforced to live in cramped conditionsamongst rubble, dirt and ongoing repairs aswinter approaches. In addition to theobvious costs of repairs, there are hiddencosts which add an extra burden. Theseinclude having to rely on takeawaysbecause the kitchen is not yet in use, orpaying for expensive crèche facilitiesbecause homes are unfit for small childrento play in during the day.

2.23 Businesses and farmers also faceongoing emotional and financial difficultiesas they try to rebuild their businesses, oftencrippled by rising expenditure coupled withreduced income.

The public response to thefloods 2.24 Whilst the emotional and financial tollof the floods is undisputable, one positive

“It’s four or five month now, isn’t it? It’dbe six or seven month before we getopen and then we’ve got to rebuild,business plan back again and start fromscratch. It’s going to be a massive job.”

Business, Sheffield

“Not having had a kitchen to work in untillast week from June, Morrison’s hasbeen second home and I know all thetransport cafes around Chesterfield! Youdon’t get that back do you? It costs a lotmore than catering for yourself at home.”


“Winter’s coming. And you’re living on aconcrete floor with no doors.”

Householder, Berkshire

“Those who were insured and not withthe council didn’t get no help from thecouncil because the council prioritisepeople who weren’t insured.”

Business, Hull


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Case Study – Neil Robinson. Dairy Farmer, Gloucestershire Neil Robinson had 200 milking cows in his herd, each consuming around 15-20 gallons ofwater a day. When the flood struck, the cows were not unduly affected as they weremoved to higher ground. However, a few days into the flood, the farmer heard on theradio that the water was going to be cut off in a matter of hours. He had very little time toput in place an alternative source.

First, he explored the idea of getting water from an old well on the farm, but it had notbeen used for years and the water was stagnant. Second, he bought some water pipingand tried to relay water from a borehole in an adjoining farm. This scheme also failed.Time was running out. With no fresh water to drink, the cows would become dehydratedand distressed. Option three was to investigate the suitability of using the water from aduck pond on the farm. This turned out to have fresh enough water for the cows to drink,so water from the pond was pumped into troughs in the farmyard until the mains waterwas restored.

Neil has yet to discover the long-term effects on the herd’s milk yield.

aspect of the flooding was a heightenedsense of community camaraderie. Therewere some reports of community division,with resentments arising over perceiveddisparities in the level of support providedby the authorities. But overall, the need forthe community to pull together resulted innew relationships forged with neighbours.People, especially those who werevulnerable, often relied on neighbours forhelp and support during the flood andclean-up phase, whether in the form ofcups of tea, hot meals, loans of equipment,help with cleaning or emotional support. Asone householder summed up, “you realisehow good people are”.

Residents of Abingdon, Oxfordshire prepare for thefloods © Rex Features

“A lot of people struggled but thecommunity spirit on this estate then wasabsolutely unbelievable. Everybodypulled together, no matter what, nomatter who was there.There are somekids on there that are ruffians and theywere the ones wading through the watergiving people, who couldn’t get out, aloaf of bread or whatever you could getto them.”


“There is one thing that is good, if thereare elements of good, that it has broughta lot of people together.”

Business, Barnsley

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Case Study – Elderly woman from Wychavon areaThis elderly woman was on holiday when the floods hit. She was told not to attempt toreturn home until the water subsided, and remained with friends for a month.

When friends took her to view the damage to her property, it greatly upset her. She wasnot able to return there, even to look, for some time, but relied on friends to do what wasnecessary to organise insurance and repairs.

After a month, the insurance company delivered a caravan to her drive so she couldreturn home and be closer to the property while works were carried out. However, beingsmall of stature, she found it impossible to reach the light switches which were on theceiling, or comfortably use the work surfaces without standing on a stool. She simplyburst into tears.

Her neighbours, she said, were wonderful – caring, supportive and always on hand tohelp. They were staying in a caravan on the adjoining drive and theirs was more compact.A solution was found – the neighbours and the elderly lady exchanged caravans.


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Case study – Coppertops Pub, WorcesterOn Friday 20 July, Coppertops pub in Oldbury Road, Worcester flooded when, with nowarning, a small brook nearby burst its banks. The landlady, Jenny Wilkes, was extremelyshocked by the speed with which her pub flooded. Within a very short space of time, thewater was halfway up the outside door, leaving little time to salvage anything from thecellars or ground floor of the property. By the evening, the entire ground floor had floodedright up to the ceiling and the pub had lost its power supply.

It took a week for the floodwaters to subside and, since then, Jenny has been trying toget her business fully up and running. Determined not to be beaten by the flood, Jennyquickly opened the upstairs bar, the only area not to be flooded, lighting it with candlesand offering bottled drinks only as the cellars were contaminated. Her regular customershave been very supportive and have helped her business to continue to run.

In October, Jenny was still running her business from the upstairs bar, serving bottles andcans only, while work continued on the rest of the pub. There was power to work thelights and fridges using a generator but still no mains electricity. The ground floor wasbeing refitted, but due to the time it took to dry out and for fixtures and fittings to bestripped out, the contractors were still working on the job. Coppertops Pub did not expectto be back to normal until January. Coppertops Pub is only open for business todaybecause of the resolve of the landlady and the support of the customers.

We rediscovered community spirit, found what I thought was missing, had gone away”

“People come to our community centre, and want to have a hot drink, sit in a soft chairand just be dry.”

Residents, Barnsley


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Chapter 3: Building a better understanding of the risk

Chapter 3:Building a betterunderstanding ofthe risk

SummaryThis chapter explores thechallenges society faces inrelation to climate change. Itidentifies the need forGovernment policy to prioritiseadaptation to climate change,particularly in relation toflooding, where we may alreadybe experiencing the impact.To help us understand howclimate change affects us, thechapter explores what furtherinformation and risk tools arerequired so that those on theground at the local level canmanage the change. It sets outsome steps which can be takenquickly to address some of themost vital needs.

A changing climate3.1 The summer 2007 floods cannot beattributed directly to climate change, butthey do provide a clear indication of thescale and nature of the severe weatherevents we may experience as a result. Thecivil emergencies which followed the floodsdemonstrate that to minimise the impact ofthese events, we need to change the waywe live our lives – and in particular how weorganise our built and rural environments.

3.2 As the world climate warms up, therewill be more extreme weather events. Thelatest report from the United NationsIntergovernmental Panel on ClimateChange (IPCC) suggests that globaltemperatures are likely to rise between 1.1and 6.4°C above 1990 levels by the end ofthis century, depending on world emissions.This will result in a significant sea level riseand changes in rainfall patterns. For theUK, some element of climate change isalready inevitable.

3.3 The IPCC report makes it clear thateven if current policies to slow the pace ofclimate change succeed, we will still feelthe effects of climate changes well into themiddle of the next century. To minimise theimpact of those changes, we need to adaptour way of life now.

3.4 In 2003, the Government commissionedthe Foresight3 report from independentscientists. The report investigated how risksof flooding and coastal erosion in the UKmight change over the next 100 years, andwhat options the Government and privatesector could adopt in response. Foresightidentified that the results of climate change,including changing rainfall patterns, risingsea levels and stronger storm surges, couldgreatly increase the risk of inland andcoastal flooding. It used a number of

3 Foresight: Future Flooding, Office of Science &Technology, 2004


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scenarios to model projected changes inprecipitation, temperature and sea levelsassociated with a range of greenhouse gasemission levels. From those models, itidentified the following major impacts:

• Precipitation changes could cause a two-to four-fold rise in the risk of floodingacross the country, with a heavily-increased probability of river flooding insome areas, especially the North andWest.

• The risk of coastal flooding could risebetween four and ten times over the next100 years, particularly in the South Eastdue to the combined effects of rising sealevels, surges and storms.

3.5 Foresight also identified other factorswhich could have a major impact onflooding levels, such as continued urbandevelopment. The annual cost of floodevents in the UK could increase fromaround £1 billion today to £2 billion (attoday’s prices) by the end of the century, ifflood management programmes were to beincreased in line with the rising risk – butup to £27 billion if they were not. Itconcluded that the best and most cost-effective approach to managing flood riskwould combine a range of engineering andnon-engineering methods. To meet floodmanagement needs, between £22 billionand £75 billion of new engineering mightbe needed by the 2080s.

3.6 The IPCC, Stern4 and Foresight reportshelped increase our understanding of thechanging world. We now need as a societyto face up to the challenge of adapting toclimate change. We need to put in placethe measures that will allow us to mitigatethe effects of climate change and to beready for the consequences, includingflooding.

3.7 Our understanding of our climate willdevelop further when the UK 21st CenturyClimate Scenarios (UKCIP08) arepublished in October 2008. Thesescenarios are expected to be the mostcomprehensive package of climateinformation ever launched in the UK andwill be of interest to anyone who needs toconsider future climate in order to adapt tothe risks.

The need for strongGovernment leadership3.8 Adapting to climate change will be achallenge for more than just our generation.Logic suggests that the earlier it is started,the easier the job will be and the lower theoverall cost. Timely decisions will alloworganisations the flexibility to choose themost cost-effective measures, rather thanbeing forced to act urgently and reactively.Early action will also avoid lock-in to long-lived assets such as buildings andinfrastructure which are not resilient to thechanging climate.

3.9 The Government has a powerfulopportunity to influence the way in whichour society adapts to a changing climate. Ithas shown through its actions on theinternational stage and here through theintroduction of the Climate Change Bill toParliament that it is prepared to take aleadership role on action to tackle climatechange.

3.10 The Review welcomes the inclusion inthe Bill of duties covering adaptation toclimate change, and the Government’s planto publish its strategy for adaptation inspring 2008. The Review trusts thatlessons from the summer 2007 floods andrecommendations in this Interim Report willbe reflected in the development of the Billand the ensuing strategy.

4 Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change, Sir Nicholas Stern, 2007, Cambridge University Press.

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The contribution of science tobuilding better understanding3.11 Scientific and engineering techniqueswill play a crucial role in the adaptationstrategy we put in place. If flood riskmanagers and emergency planners andresponders are to prevent or reduce theimpact of flooding, they must havedependable information on when andwhere it might flood, and what will happenif it does.

3.12 As Chapter 5 describes, current toolswere used well, within their limitations,during the July fluvial flooding. However,scientific developments mean there isalready room for improvement. The Junefloods indicated that the absence orlimitations of some current information-gathering tools meant there wereweaknesses in the information available toresponders. The Review believes thatmodelling and risk tools can besubstantially improved.

Modelling and mapping 3.13 Flood risk maps are used to indicatewhich areas are at risk from flooding. Toproduce a flood map, detailed aerial surveyinformation about the height of the land iscombined with data on river flows (or, forcoastal areas, sea and wave data). Manyflood maps and models use historic records

of flows or levels from a network ofgauging stations, others use rainfall run-offmodels. During the summer, manyresponders used maps based on historicflooding events.

3.14 The Environment Agency has over theyears made good progress with its partnersin modelling and mapping river and coastalfloods. However during the summer, someof its models did not forecast the extent orspeed of the flooding, leading in somecases to inaccurate forecasting and latewarnings, as with Mythe water treatmentworks.

3.15 The Review believes that there is aclear need to extend the models for riverand coastal flooding, drawing on data fromthe summer’s floods, to analyse differentextreme scenarios (including multipleflooding events occurring simultaneously orwithin overlapping time periods) and tocapture the impact of saturated ground onflooding risk.

3.16 In contrast, flood risk maps for surfacewater flooding simply do not exist. As aresult, those responding to surface waterflooding in the summer were often dealingwith the unpredicted and unexpected. Thetechnical and practical challenges ofmapping surface water flooding are clearlymuch greater than for coastal and riverflooding and information needs to becollated from a range of different sources.Even small variations in the builtenvironment such as the height of kerbsand location of street furniture can have asignificant impact on water flow and thusthe likelihood and scale of flooding. If floodrisk modelling for surface water is to beeffective, models need to incorporatedetailed information on drainageinfrastructure and other routes which waterwill take during a flood.

3.17 The Review recognises thesecomplexities. Nevertheless, the scale of thesurface water flooding problem faced in

IC 2 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Government developsa clear strategy and action plan to deliverthe provisions of the Climate Change Billto support adaptation to increasingimpacts from flooding.

IC 1 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that Government takes thelead in making the case for the need foradaptation to climate change andparticularly in mitigating the potentialimpacts on communities.


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summer 2007, and the growing likelihood ofsimilar flooding in the future means there isa clear need for action.

3.18 Whilst most of the summer floodswere not of the high velocity experienced inBoscastle in 2004, in many areas theyreached a significant depth. Some areas,such as Coalbrookdale in Ironbridge,flooded very quickly. The EnvironmentAgency has identified catchments thatcould have a rapid response to rainfall as aresult of their topography (for example,steep and narrow catchments) and willshortly be disseminating information aboutthem to emergency planners. The Reviewwelcomes this and considers mapping ofdepth and velocity in high risk areas to be avital tool for emergency responders andplanners to allow them to identify areaswhere rapid evacuation may be necessaryor where certain rescue methods may notbe practical.

Visualisation and real-time tools3.19 The events of summer 2007 alsodemonstrated how important it is foremergency responders to receive flood riskinformation with a practical, real-timeapplication. Forecasting, modelling andwarning systems could be linked togetherto give responders information that will helpthem manage fast-moving events moreeffectively. This is particularly importantwhere the onset of flooding is rapid and theevent does not follow historic patterns.

3.20 A number of submissions have beenmade to the Review about the value ofvisual, map-based tools that allow betterspatial assessment of what is happeningon the ground. These could potentially havepre-identified hot spots, drainageinformation or vulnerabilities at groundlevel. These tools could be used in floodplanning exercises to run a range ofscenarios to help local responders betterprepare, and they could be used duringflooding events to assess potential impacts.

3.21 One example of work underway toimprove the forecasting and modelling of alltypes of flooding is the AtlantisProgramme5. This brings together datasetsfrom different organisations including rivernetwork data, flood models, and geologicaland topographical data. Figure 9 shows anexample of a visualisation map that couldbe produced to aid flood risk managementand response.

IC 5 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Environment Agencyworks more closely with Local ResilienceForums to provide information drawnfrom flood risk modelling and mappingtools to improve the accuracy andconsistency of flood risk information inCommunity Risk Registers.

IC 4 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Environment Agencyrevises its flood maps to identify areaswhere there is a risk of significant depthsand velocity of water, to improve theeffectiveness of emergency planning.

IC 3 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Environment Agencyfurther develops its tools and techniquesfor predicting and modelling riverflooding, especially to take account ofextreme and multiple events; and takesforward work to develop similar tools andtechniques to model surface waterflooding.

5 The Atlantis Programme is being delivered through a partnership between Ordnance Survey, BritishGeological Survey, the Centre for Ecology and Hydrology, the Environment Agency, the Met Office and theUK Hydrographic Office.

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3.22 The Review recognises thatdeveloping visualisation tools that can copewith the required volume and complexity ofdata may take some time and it will beimportant that such tools are cost-effectiveand easy to use. However, we believe thatthe Environment Agency and its partnersshould work to develop and bring suchtools into use, and where necessary usingsimpler versions of these tools until morecomplex ones become available.

3.23 None of the advances in modellingand mapping described above will be ofvalue if they are not designed to the needsof those who will use them. The Reviewbelieves that research into these toolsshould focus on how flood risk managers,emergency planners and responders coulduse them.

Forecasting3.24 Developing the tools described abovewill substantially help in flood riskmanagement and emergency planning andcould also support emergency responders.However the quality of data output in therun-up to a severe weather event will begreatly enhanced by more accurate inputforecasts of where the rain will fall.

3.25 The Met Office already provides arange of weather forecasting services,

IC 6 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Environment Agencyprogressively develops and brings intouse flood visualisation tools, designed tomeet the needs of flood risk managers,emergency planners and responders.

Figure 9 – Impact of the Carlisle January 2005 flooding on the builtenvironment

Source: Ordnance Survey – Strategic Flooding Document 2007 © Environment Agency Licence A809


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including a severe weather warning6 servicefor emergency responders and the public.However, at a resolution of around 5km, itsmodels cannot accurately assess thelikelihood of heavy rain falling on particularurban areas.

3.26 The Met Office has indicated thatgreater accuracy in precipitation forecastingmay be achieved soon. During summer2007, a higher resolution model at 1.5kmwas run for short periods to test itscapabilities. The potential improvement inaccuracy is demonstrated in Figure 10,which uses rainfall data for 25 June for Hulland Sheffield. If this higher resolutionforecasting capability had been fullyavailable in summer 2007, the accuracy ofrainfall prediction would have been greatlyimproved and more specific warnings couldhave been made in areas like Sheffield andHull. This would have allowed emergency

services and local authorities to positiontheir resources in the highest risk areasand focus their support more effectively.

3.27 Limitations in the capacity of the MetOffice’s IT systems mean that thesemodels cannot be run routinely until a newsupercomputer is purchased in 2009. TheReview hopes that this purchase will goahead as planned, and that superiorforecasting capabilities can be introducedto emergency responders as soon aspossible.

Short term action3.28 The improvements described abovewill inevitably take time to implement.However, the events of the summer put apremium on more rapid action. The Reviewhas identified some useful measures whichcan be put into place quickly in two areas.

6 The threshold for a severe weather warning to be issued for heavy rain is that with a greater than 50 percent chance of probability, it is expected to persist for at least two hours and to give at least 15mm ofrainfall within a three hour period, or a period of rainfall of sufficient intensity to cause flooding on alreadysaturated ground.

Figure 10 – Met Office forecast models of the rainfall on 25 June 2007over Hull and Sheffield using different resolutions


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Groundwater Flooding3.29 Groundwater flooding generally occursin low-lying areas underlain by permeablelayers. This type of flooding is easier topredict as water can build up over anumber of months before flooding occurs.However, there is currently no organisationwith responsibility to respond togroundwater flooding, although theEnvironment Agency does monitor andwarn in some areas. This gap needs to beaddressed.

3.30 Following the summer 2007 floods, theEnvironment Agency commissioned areport from the Centre for Ecology andHydrology and the British GeologicalSociety into the possibility of groundwaterflooding this winter. The most recent updateof this study has shown that some risk ofgroundwater flooding remains in areassuch as the Chilterns, and parts ofYorkshire and Lincolnshire if winter rainfallis significant. The study’s conclusionsdemonstrate that the risk of groundwaterflooding should continue to be monitored.

Surface water ‘hot spots’3.31 The Review has noted that theEnvironment Agency is assessing thefeasibility of developing a rapid, nationaltopographic screening technique to showareas which are susceptible to surfacewater flooding from heavy rainfall. Thisinformation would not be sufficientlydetailed or specific for it to be of practicaluse to the public, but it could help forecastthe risk of surface water flooding untilhigher resolution forecasting is available. In

the interim, even data on surface waterflooding ‘hot spots’ will be of value to localresponders.

REC 2 – The Review recommends thatthe Environment Agency supported bylocal authorities and water companies,should urgently identify areas at highestrisk from surface water flooding whereknown, inform Local Resilience Forumsand take steps to identify remaining highrisk areas over the coming months.

IC 7 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Met Office and theEnvironment Agency produce an earlyassessment of the costs, benefits andfeasibility of techniques which canpredict where rain will fall and wheresurface water flooding will occur.

REC 1 – The Review recommends thatmore frequent and systematic monitoringof groundwater levels at times of highrisk should be undertaken by theEnvironment Agency, which should beginas soon as possible to predict andmitigate further serious groundwaterflooding from this winter onwards.


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Chapter 4: Managing flood risk

Chapter 4:Managing floodriskSummaryThis chapter of the Report looksat the various approaches thatcan be taken to managing floodrisk.

It is divided into sections lookingat:

• building and planning;• surface water flooding and

drainage issues;• flood defence; and• insurance.

A Risk-Based Approach4.1 The events of the summer would havebeen significantly more devastating hadmeasures not been in place to preventflooding and mitigate its impact. The rangeof measures was tested to the full, andthere are important lessons to be learnedabout which work best, especially given theincreased risk of flooding described inChapter 3. All those responsible formanaging the risk of flooding, or thosepersonally at risk, need to be clear aboutwhat can be done to manage riskeffectively – measures ranging from large-scale defences for communities toindividual measures such as property-leveladaptation.

4.2 Figure 11 below shows the complicatedinteraction of different types of flooding andrisk management approaches. At the largerscale, these can include physical defences,flood storage, farming practices anddevelopment control, and at the individualand property level they can includeproperty resilience and insurance.

4.3 Historically, flood risk management hasmainly concentrated on river and coastalflooding. A high proportion of this summer’sfloods involved surface water flooding,alerting us as a society to the need toadopt an approach to managing risk thatconsiders all sources of flooding equally.That said, the policies adopted and themeasures put in place need to recognisethat the greatest risk in terms of impact stillcomes from coastal flooding, where thepotential for loss of life is significant. Thesurge events of early November on theEast Coast were a reminder of that risk.

Building And PlanningDevelopment control4.4 In responses to the Review and duringour visits, attention was drawn to examplesof good and bad design of newdevelopment.


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4.5 Development control is a central part ofthe process of managing flood risk, byavoiding development in risk areas wherepossible and, where such developmentdoes take place, by ensuring that risk ismitigated both for the development itselfand for those living next to it. Manysubmissions to the Review have highlightedthe issue of building on the floodplain andthe importance of strong developmentcontrol, with examples from both June andJuly’s floods of recent developments whereflooding occurred. While the Reviewrecognises that it is not possible to preventall development on the floodplain, plannersand developers must pay proper regard tothe risks, as should those purchasingproperties.

4.6 The Government has sought tostrengthen planning guidance on flood riskover the last five years, culminating inPlanning Policy Statement 25 (PPS25),

published in December 2006. PPS251

promotes a strategic approach, ensuringthat flood risk is considered at all stages ofthe planning process and strengthening theimportance of flood risk assessments insupporting that analysis (includingconsideration of climate change). It alsoreminds planners and developers of theneed to consider all sources of flooding,including surface water flooding.

4.7 PPS25 introduces an exception test forthose areas of flood risk where it is felt thatdevelopment ought nevertheless to takeplace for exceptional reasons. Somerespondents felt that the introduction of thistest could be interpreted as a ‘get-outclause’ for local authorities. Localauthorities must ensure that, whenweighing up all development options, dueconsideration is given to flood risk. Adecision to permit development should notbe taken lightly by the planning authority,

Figure 11 – Types of flooding and risk management approaches

1 More detail is provided in the Practice Guide Companion, which is currently available on the Communitiesand Local Government website as a ‘living draft.’www.communities.gov.uk/publications/planningandbuilding/developmentflood

Source: Foresight Future Flooding 2004

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not least because a prospective purchaserwill generally assume that the granting ofplanning permission signals that the localauthority does not perceive there to be aproblem with flood risk.

4.8 When a new development is permittedto go ahead, the developer is responsiblefor the provision of any necessary flooddefences. The local authority must makesure that the developer funds not only thedefences themselves but also their ongoingmaintenance costs. Once defences havebeen built, they are likely to be in place forat least 50 years and there is anexpectation that they will be maintained

during that lifetime. It is therefore importantthat an additional burden is not placedunnecessarily on either the local authority’sor the Environment Agency’s budgetthrough a failure to adequately assessongoing maintenance costs.

IC 8 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that PPS25 should berigorously applied by local planningauthorities, including giving considerationto all sources of flood risk and ensuringthat developers make a full contributionto the costs both of building andmaintaining any necessary defences.

Case study – Flooding at Cypress Gardens, Longlevens in GloucesterCypress Gardens is an estate in Longlevens,Gloucester, built within the last ten years on low-lying land adjacent to a brook. It was severelyaffected by both the June and July events, withflood water from both the brook and overflowingsewers causing water levels to reach four feet insome properties. In contrast, the surrounding areaseemed to cope. There has been criticism thatinsufficient attention had been paid to the drainage

of the estate and to maintenance of the brook and flood defences. However, thedevelopers counter that all relevant planning and building approvals were granted.

Case study – Innovative planning: public park acts as valuable flood storageFor over 200 years the public water supply for Worcester came from a waterworks on a four-hectare site on the banks of the River Severn in the urban area. The site was within thefunctional floodplain but a flood defence was in place, consisting of a high concrete wall.

When the waterworks was decommissioned the owners, Severn Trent Water, inpartnership with the City Council planning department and the Environment Agency,agreed a scheme to restore the land to a public park, Gheluvelt Park. Majorimprovements to flood management were achieved by removing the flood wall, removingthe 17 brick and concrete tanks, recontouring the site and restoring the active floodplain.The spoil was used to fill the deeper tanks and housing was developed on an adjoiningsite, not at risk of flooding. A local river (Barbourne Brook) was also broken out of itsculvert and allowed to flow freely through the park and into the river.

Worcester was flooded during the summer and the design worked. The park kept floodlevels down in the city by providing a much-needed extra four hectares of flood storagecapacity (and throughflow of flood water) and the new housing on its edge did not flood.The park was back in use shortly after the floods, hosting a folk festival and craft fair.

Cypress Gardens, Longlevens, Gloucester


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Urban creep

4.9 Under natural conditions, a proportionof rainfall infiltrates into the ground but, inurban areas, properties and roads affectnatural drainage. The permitteddevelopment right is an aspect of the Townand Country Planning (General PermittedDevelopment) Order 1995 which allowsprivate individuals and property developersin certain circumstances to carry out workswithout planning permission. It covers smalldevelopments such as the paving ofdriveways or gardens and the erecting ofgarden sheds. The cumulative impact ofpermitted development on the drainage ofsurface water is significant and theGovernment has already announced itsplans to look at this issue in its forthcomingWater Strategy. The Review welcomes this.

Drainage systems – the right to connect

4.10 Section 106 of the Water Industry Act1991 provides an automatic right for newdevelopments to connect to public sewersonce planning permission has beengranted. This places an additional strain onexisting sewerage and drainage networks,exacerbating the problems of flooding.Defra is currently considering whether thisright should be removed in relation tosurface water drainage so that developersof all new developments will have toconsider their impact on the sewerage anddrainage networks, and make greater useof sustainable drainage systems. A numberof drainage systems were clearly understrain during the recent floods and theReview does not consider it sensible to

“You see they are building new housesbut they aren’t actually updating theexisting drains, they are not improvingthem that were there.”

Householder, Darfield, Barnsley

IC 9 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that householders andbusiness owners should no longer beable to lay impermeable surfaces as ofright.

Old waterworks providing valuable storage of flood water for Worcester. Some properties in the adjacent un-flooded new development can also be seen

allow new connections of surface waterdrainage to the sewerage system to takeplace unchecked.

Property-level resistance and resilience

4.11 This summer’s flooding demonstratedthe devastating impact that floods can haveon homes and businesses, with somepeople expected to be out of their homesfor almost a year. In Hull, for example,31 per cent of those households affectedby flooding had to move into temporaryaccommodation. In Tewkesbury, at the end

of November there were still 1,800 peopleout of their homes, with 200 familiesexpected to be living in caravans over theChristmas period and into early 2008.

4.12 Property-level resistance andresilience can help minimise the damagefrom floodwaters and greatly reduce thetimescale for recovery of a property.Resistance measures are aimed at keepingwater out of buildings, or at leastminimising the amount that enters by theuse of barriers such as door guards to sealentry points. Resilience measures areaimed at minimising the damage when abuilding is flooded, thereby facilitating thequickest possible recovery.

4.13 Despite the evident benefits of thesemeasures, their uptake is not high. TheAssociation of British Insurers (ABI)recently commissioned a survey of publicattitudes to climate change risk, includingflooding.2 The overwhelming majority of the2012 respondents (85 per cent) identifiedflooding as a risk affecting the UK, but only16 per cent considered themselves at risk.While 57 per cent believed that individualshad a key role in protecting against theeffects of climate change, only six per centsaid they would use resistant or resilientmaterials and products.

“When the flooding first happened, I wishI’d known the full long-term effects, likehow long before the flooding recededand how long it would be before I couldmove back into my house. If I’d knownthat I could have prepared myself betterand I wouldn’t be in the situation I am innow.”

Householder, Hull

IC 10 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that the automatic right toconnect surface water drainage of newdevelopments to the sewerage systemshould be removed.

Case study – Resilience measures: “It has made a huge difference to me”A householder’s home near Worcester flooded both in 2000 and in the summer 2007floods. Following the flooding of her lower ground floor in 2000, she had resiliencemeasures installed. These included lightweight doors which could be removed to anupper floor, electricity sockets sited high up on the walls, concrete floors, cement-typeplaster on the walls, and wooden skirting boards made water-resistant with many coats ofyacht varnish. These measures meant that after the lower ground floor flooded in summer2007, the householder was able to disinfect the affected rooms, let them dry out andmove back in once a builder had repaired a breach in the concrete floor. The only losswas a carpet. When the rooms flooded in 2000, they were unusable for seven months,but their refurbishment with simple resilience measures meant that after the 2007 floodsthey were out of use for only four weeks and no insurance claim was made. Thehouseholder says “It has made a huge difference to me – coupled with the no insuranceclaim. And yes, I am a huge convert!”

2 YouGov survey for ABI, August 2007, 2012 respondents.

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4.14 The Review received evidence of aDefra programme of pilot resistance andresilience grant schemes to test differentapproaches to reducing the impacts offlooding damage on householders, and tosee how such grants could best be madeavailable. Together with a parallel researchproject looking at which barriers to uptake,this will help inform long-term decisionsover the feasibility of a grant scheme andother approaches. The Review will explorewith Defra the emerging conclusions of itspilot schemes and consider the issuefurther in its final report.

New buildings4.15 Where development (following thestrict application of planning guidance) isallowed on the floodplain, buildings shouldbe made flood resilient. The Governmenthas recently produced guidance todevelopers on flood-resilient construction.3

Developers and architects should beincorporating such measures into designsfor the future. The simplest way of ensuringthat new buildings do incorporateappropriate measures would be to includea requirement in Building Regulations. TheGovernment has indicated that it aims to dothis when they are next revised in 2010.The Review welcomes this intention.

Existing buildings4.16 With some 10 per cent of propertiessituated in flood risk areas, and some500,000 houses at greater than 1.3 percent probability of being flooded in any oneyear,4 adapting the existing housing stockpresents a big challenge. A recent reportcommissioned by Defra indicates that thecost of properly applying resistance andresilience measures can typically rangefrom £3,000 to £10,000 for a singleproperty.5 While such expenditure issignificant, some measures may not costmore than standard repairs and could payfor themselves in a single flood event.

4.17 There is, however, currently littleincentive to repair flood-damagedproperties with resilient materials, asinsurers will generally not pay forbetterment of a property but only for like-for-like repairs. In one case after the recentfloods, simply moving a fuse box higherwas considered to be betterment and wastherefore not covered. Some insurancecompanies will, however, allow payment upto the like-for-like amount, with thepolicyholder paying the extra cost of aresilient repair.

“Well, it happened 110 years ago andnow, so by the time it happens again weare not going to be here.”


IC 12 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Government shouldincorporate flood resistance andresilience requirements for newproperties in flood risk areas intoBuilding Regulations as part of thecurrent process of revision.

IC 11 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that no new building should beallowed in a flood risk area that is notflood-resilient, and that the Governmentshould work with organisations such asthe Royal Institute of British Architectsand the building industry to encourageflood-resilient building and developmentdesign.

3 Improving the Flood Performance of New Buildings – Flood Resilient Construction, CLG, 20074 Sustainable Development Indicators, 2006, www.sustainable-development.gov.uk5 Bowker P, 2007, Flood Resistance and Resilience Solutions: An R&D scoping study, R&D Technical Report

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6 Direct Line Business Owners’ Survey, November 2007

4.18 The Review considers that, in view ofthe obvious benefits, Building Regulationsshould be extended to ensure that where aproperty in a high flood risk area isundergoing major refurbishment, that it isrefurbished using flood-resilient or resistantmaterials. Such an approach to floodresilience is consistent with the approachcurrently in place within BuildingRegulations in relation to energy efficiency:when replacing windows, the new onesmust be double-glazed, and when a boileris replaced, the new one must be energy-efficient. The suggested approach shouldalso ensure that the issue of betterment inrelation to insurance is addressed, asinsurers will normally pay for improvementsif they are part of a legal requirement.

4.19 The Review recognises that it will takesome time to incorporate resistance andresilience requirements into BuildingRegulations for properties in flood riskareas, and would like to see localauthorities and social housing organisationstake a leading role in increasing uptake. Intheir evidence to the Environment, Foodand Rural Affairs (EFRA) SelectCommittee, Hull and Sheffield City Councilsboth expressed an interest in refurbishingbuildings with resilient materials. TheReview welcomes this initiative. Localauthorities in affected areas could alsomake use of their powers under theRegulatory Reform (Housing Assistance)(England & Wales) Order (July 2002) toextend home improvement grants andloans to householders and businesses that

wish to reinstate their properties withresistant or resilient materials.

4.20 There are clear benefits to installingflood resistance or resilience measures inbusiness premises as well. Such measuresshould ensure a swifter reoccupation of abuilding and reduce the amount of time thebusiness is out of operation. A recentsurvey of businesses6 indicated that, ofthose affected by the summer 2007flooding, nearly a third experienced floodingat their premises and 18 per cent saw adrop in income. Installation of floodresilience and flood resistance measurescould represent a sound businessinvestment and should be encouraged.There is evidence of some businesses

“We have had all the electrics done;we’ve had to take out two central officesin the building and we are building a newreception office; the fencing around theproperty has had to come down; wehave erected new fencing; and we arehaving a new brick wall and iron gate atthe front of the premises.”

Business, Toll Bar, Doncaster

IC 15 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that local authorities in highflood risk areas should extend eligibilityfor home improvement grants and loansto encompass flood resistance andresilience products.

IC 14 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that local authorities andhousing associations should take a moreactive role in increasing the uptake offlood resistance and resiliencemeasures, leading by example byrepairing their properties with appropriatematerials where it is cost-effective.

IC 13 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Government shouldincorporate requirements for resistant orresilient refurbishment of floodedproperties in high flood risk areas intoBuilding Regulations as part of thecurrent process of revision.


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introducing such measures following thefloods, including the relocating of certainservices away from the ground floor. Localauthorities, in carrying out theirresponsibilities to promote businesscontinuity, should be encouraging theinstallation of flood resilience andresistance measures and businesscontinuity guidance should reflect thebenefits of such measures.

Surface Water Flooding AndDrainage

Stronger leadership4.21 As Chapter 1 describes, a muchhigher proportion of the flooding during thesummer was a result of poor surface waterdrainage rather than flooding from rivers.Many of the responses to the Reviewhighlighted the current unsatisfactoryarrangements for managing surface waterflooding. In addition to the lack ofinformation on surface water flood risk (asset out in Chapter 3), the range ofresponsibilities and lack of any overarchingleadership have resulted in poor co-ordination and ownership of the issues thatneed to be tackled. The EFRA SelectCommittee recently noted with

astonishment that it was only following thesummer 2007 floods that those withresponsibilities in relation to surface waterflooding in Hull got together to discussdrainage issues. However, Hull is unlikely tobe alone in leaving these issuesunaddressed.

4.22 The Review has been told that theGovernment had been looking at this issuebefore the summer 2007 floods and wasadvocating a joined-up approach todrainage management – especially in high-risk urban areas – which would bringtogether the various bodies concerned withdrainage (including the EnvironmentAgency, local authorities, water companies,internal drainage boards, the HighwaysAgency and British Waterways). In light ofthis summer’s events, the Review believesthat this work should now be speeded up.

4.23 The weight of evidence suggests thata partnership approach is the best wayforward given the range of interestsinvolved – it would not be practical, forexample, to move responsibility for allassets to one body. Nevertheless, apartnership will need strong leadership, atboth local and national levels, if it is to beeffective. At the local level, the Reviewbelieves that local authorities are bestplaced to take a stronger role in managinglocal flood risk, particularly in relation tosurface water flooding. Local authorities actas local planning authorities, with asubstantial role in risk management, andare heavily engaged in the Local ResilienceForums which undertake emergencyplanning. Moreover, as part of their ‘place-shaping’ role, they are well positioned tolaunch dialogues with their localcommunities and other partners about therisks of flooding and possible responses.

“They’re all pointing the finger at eachother, saying you’re responsible – oneparty’s blaming another.”

Business, Sheffield

IC 16 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that local authorities, as theydischarge their responsibilities under theCivil Contingencies Act 2004 to promotebusiness continuity, should encouragethe uptake of property-level floodresistance and resilience measures. Thisshould be reflected in guidance from theGovernment.

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4.24 In delivering their local leadership role,local authorities will require a range ofcapabilities including technical, analytical,communication and influencing skills.However, many local authorities have seensome relevant services (such as engineeringdepartments) shrink with the move togreater outsourcing. While it may not benecessary to have full expertise in-house,the Review believes that authorities shouldat least have staff who can perform an‘intelligent customer’ role, for exampleknowing when to challenge contractors andconsultants and what modelling tocommission to aid decision-making. TheReview is encouraged that, in higher-riskareas, the capability should in many casesalready be there. In Leeds, for example,which saw flooding of 250 properties in Juneand July 2007, the council has recognisedthat flood risk is a significant issue and hasdeveloped strategies to address this andtaken on more technical staff. This kind ofupskilling might have implications for theoverall supply of technical experts,something which the Review will consider intime for its final report.

4.25 This enhanced local leadership rolefor local authorities will work best within a

broader framework which provides themwith relevant advice and guidance. TheReview considers that the EnvironmentAgency is best placed to deliver thenational, strategic role in relation to surfacewater flooding, which will involve developingmaps, warning systems, options formodelling and the standard analyticalframework around which the risks areunderstood. This will be consistent with theAgency’s national role in relation to coastaland river flooding. Such an approach hasbeen suggested both by a number ofsubmissions received by the Review and aspart of Defra’s Making Space for Waterprogramme. The Agency would accordinglyneed to provide a toolkit to local authoritiesto enable them to work to a consistentstandard and deliver an effective approachto managing and understanding local floodrisk.

Better co-ordination and information

4.26 PPS25 and other recent changes tothe planning system should provide aneffective approach to managing surfacewater risk through the requirement forStrategic Flood Risk Assessments andSurface Water Management Plans(SWMPs). Planning guidance states thatSWMPs should focus on flood riskmanagement and the optimisation ofsustainable drainage infrastructure. Theyshould also take account of the risks ofsurface water and sewer flooding and howthese might affect an area in combinationwith flooding from rivers and (whererelevant) canals, reservoirs, the sea orgroundwater. Under recent planning

IC 19 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Environment Agencyshould have a national overview of allflood risk and that, Defra’s work on thedevelopment of a national overview rolefor the Agency in relation to surfacewater flooding should be progressed.

IC 18 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that local authorities in floodrisk areas should assess theircapabilities to deliver their wide range ofresponsibilities in relation to local floodrisk management.

IC 17 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that local authorities shouldlead on the management of surfacewater flooding and drainage at the locallevel with the support of all responsibleorganisations including the EnvironmentAgency, water companies and internaldrainage boards, the Highways Agencyand British Waterways.


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changes the Environment Agency has arole in scrutinising Strategic Flood RiskAssessments, which will inform SWMPs, toensure that they adequately address allflood risk issues.

4.27 By considering both underground andoverland systems, these plans should helplocal authorities and their partners tomanage surface water flood risk moreeffectively, including reducing the potentialfor surface water run-off and overloading ofthe underground system. They shouldthereby ensure that the drainage system asa whole is able to cope with a bigger eventthan any individual part of the systemalone. Figure 12 below demonstrates howunderstanding of the whole urban systemis important for managing the risk.

4.28 Plans should also be used to improveflood risk management, inform CommunityRisk Registers and aid emergency plannersin identifying high-risk areas. They shouldalso be used to inform land-use planning

for both new and existing development,including identifying options for floodstorage and sustainable drainage systems,and to provide an overall framework fordirecting resources in terms of both newassets and prioritisation of maintenance onthe basis of risk.

4.29 The production of SWMPs should becoordinated by the local authority with dataprovided by all those organisations withassets within the drainage area in question.

4.30 One of the concerns raised during thefloods was the lack of overall knowledge of

IC 20 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that local Surface WaterManagement Plans, as set out underPPS25, should provide the basis formanaging surface water flood risk. Theseplans should be coordinated by the localauthority and be risk-based, consideringall sources of flooding.

Figure 12 – Flood risk management in an urban system

Source: Foresight Future Flooding 2004

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the location and condition of flood defenceand drainage assets and who wasresponsible for their maintenance. At themain river and coastal level, theEnvironment Agency has the NationalFlood and Coastal Defence Database inwhich details of all known river and coastalflood defences, Environment Agency-owned or otherwise, are held. During thesummer 2007 floods, British Waterways(see case study below) was able to use itscanal system to assist in lowering waterlevels. If information on its systems were tobe made part of an overall register andplan, identification of important assets forflood risk management and decisions onwhen it would be appropriate to use thoseassets would be facilitated.

4.31 Following the floods in Harlow in 2006,the local authority scrutiny committeerecognised the value of sharing informationbetween partners and the need to create aregister of drainage assets. Leeds CityCouncil has also developed an asset registerto ensure more effective management of thedrainage system. Moreover, a number ofsubmissions to the Review have continuedto raise the issue of who is responsible forwhat within a given area.

4.32 To support the production of SWMPs,the Review considers that, local authorities

should lead and co-ordinate thedevelopment of a register providinginformation on local drainage systems. Thisregister should include all watercourses,culverts, drains and gullies, and any otherrelevant assets such as pumping stations,sewerage infrastructure, canals and flooddefences, with an assessment of theircondition and ownership. Such a registerwill be a vital first step in addressing thecurrent fragmented understanding of localdrainage systems.

4.33 Each SWMP should be accompaniedby an action plan setting out the actions tobe taken by all those engaged in flood riskmanagement and with responsibilities inthis area, which may often include theEnvironment Agency in its local capacity.These action plans should be developed inpartnership with the relevant organisationsand led by the local authority.

IC 21 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that a local register of all themain flood risk management anddrainage assets (overland andunderground) should be compiled by therelevant local authority, including anassessment of their condition and detailsof the responsible owners.

Case study – British WaterwaysBritish Waterways manages and operates the inland waterways system of canals anddischarge structures which are intrinsically linked with the UK’s land drainage and riversystems. During the summer 2007 floods, British Waterways played an important role in anumber of different ways, including:

• managing canal levels to create extra capacity to help cope with the flood volume. Themost significant case was the lowering of the Gloucester and Sharpness Canal, whichcreated sufficient capacity to enable the emergency services to pump water fromWalham electricity switching-station in Gloucester in order to prevent it from flooding;

• helping to source water for a number of boat-dwellers in Gloucester; and

• assisting the emergency services and residents in areas such as Yorkshire and theEast Midlands by supplying sandbags and other flood materials.


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4.34 Water companies will have a crucialrole in the development of effectiveregisters and action plans, providinginformation relating to the location andcondition of their drainage infrastructure.They should also be able to provide basicmodelling of the flows of water throughtheir networks and what would happen ifthese were exceeded. Other organisations,such as the Highways Agency and BritishWaterways, will also need to provide similarinformation on their assets.

4.35 The resulting actions should be risk-based and form part of a coherent strategyfor managing the local risk of flooding; sucha strategy should in the longer run bringbenefits for all parties, as the impact andcost of flooding are reduced. Governmentguidance should be developed thatestablishes clear roles and responsibilitiesso that organisations can be heldaccountable, and the benefits ofcooperation be clearly understood.

Tools for surface water flood riskmanagement – slower water and betterdrainage

4.36 The Review has taken evidence onsome of the practical ways in which localplanning might tackle surface waterflooding risk. The events of summer 2007exposed certain limitations and showedthat certain kinds of approach wereparticularly effective.

4.37 Management of surface water throughthe overland system is generally consideredmore effective and efficient than relyingsolely on the capacity of undergroundsystems. Slowing down the water andstoring it before it reaches the piped systemcan greatly reduce the potential impact ofsurface water flooding. In less extremecircumstances than summer 2007, thisapproach should be able to preventflooding.

4.38 Sustainable drainage systems mimicnatural drainage patterns and help to dealwith ‘exceedance’ water from existingdrainage and sewerage systems. Theycover a wide range of structures andtechniques for surface water drainage,which are considered to be moresustainable than conventional pipedsystems. Figure 13 illustrates some ofthese systems which can, and have been,incorporated into new housingdevelopments.

4.39 The major obstacles to the wideruptake and implementation of suchsystems revolve around arrangements fortheir ownership, maintenance and funding.The barriers to uptake have beenconsidered by the Government andstakeholders for several years. Manysubmissions to the Review have indicatedthat decisions now need to be made toremove these barriers.

IC 23 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Government, as partof its Water Strategy, should resolve theissue of which organisations should beresponsible for the ownership andmaintenance of sustainable drainagesystems.

IC 22 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that Defra should issueguidance on how all organisations canbe brought together to work with localauthorities on surface water flood riskmanagement, sharing information,modelling and expertise on a consistentbasis.

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4.40 A number of submissions to theReview raised concerns about the ability ofdrainage systems to cope with the volumeof rain that fell during June and July 2007.It is generally accepted that there were

multiple causes of flooding and that thesummer’s flooding was extreme. However, anumber of people believe that poormaintenance of drainage systems was theprimary cause. The main issues raised bythose who provided evidence was that localauthorities no longer cleared drains, thatsome drains were visibly blocked and that,even when these had been reported therehad been no response.

4.41 There are currently no mandatorystandards for flood protection in drainagesystems. Water companies and developersare commonly installing sewers to copewith events that have a 1-in-30 chance ofoccurring in one year. This is in accordancewith Sewers for Adoption guidance issuedby Water UK, but it is not a mandatoryrequirement. The network also includes alegacy of older sewers which still function

“I don’t know when they [drains] gotcleaned last. They stopped maintenancea few years ago.”

Business, East Riding of Yorkshire

When Sheffield County Council carriedout a survey among people who hadbeen flooded in the area, the mostcommon issue mentioned in relation toprevention of and protection againstfloods was that drains need to becleaned on a regular basis (35 per centof respondents).

1 2

5

4

6

3

Key1) Permeable paving2) Green roofs3) Water butt4) Swales5) Detention basin6) Watercourse

This diagram is based on the Lamb Drove sustainable drainage scheme in Cambourne, further details of which can be found atwww.ciria.org/suds/cs_lamb_drove

Figure 13 – Diagram of how SuDS can be used on a local scale

Source: Diagram based on CIRIA Website – Lamb Drove Case Study (www.ciria.org/suds/) – Photos by Royal Haskoning and Cambridgeshire County Council


52

well in general but operate at lowerstandards.

4.42 The Review found that the issue ofsewer capacity was often dismissed as areason for urban flooding in the June 2007emergency because the rainfall in one dayappeared much more severe than a 1-in-30chance event.

4.43 However, the Review also found otherevidence that sewer systems in manyurban areas should have coped better. Theflooding in Hull illustrates this andunderlines the importance of the design,operation and maintenance of the drainagesystem as a whole. The recent final reportof the Independent Review Body into thesummer 2007 floods in Hull7 found thatYorkshire Water’s 2001 Humbercaremodernisation works had significantlyreduced the capacity of drainage systemsin east and west Hull from an ability to copewith a 1-in-30 chance storm event toaround a 1-in-2 chance event. Permanentsolutions had been suggested in 2004 and2006, but a temporary solution wasimplemented instead which resulted inserious operational difficulties during thesummer 2007 floods. The Hull report foundthat, although the summer storm event wassevere, many properties were flooded withonly a few centimetres of water. Itconcluded that, had earlierrecommendations been followed tomaintain the standard of flood protection ofthe drainage system, some of the floodingwould not have occurred.

4.44 This Review found that there alsoseemed to be wide-spread confusion aboutwhat standards for protection against sewerflooding actually means. The IndependentReview Body report into the Hull floods andsubmissions to the Review highlighted theapparent large difference in the standardsof protection offered by flood defence

schemes (typically a 1-in-100 chanceevent, or worse) and drainage systems (1-in-30 chance event at best) and that thisdiscrepancy was unreasonable. However,other evidence indicates that the differenceis less than it might appear because whilstrainfall over a one-day period or longer maybe a 1-in-100 chance rainfall event whichflood defences have to cope with, it is notnecessarily more severe than a 1-in-30sewer design flow, which is based on amuch shorter rainfall duration. Whilst thismay be true, it is clear that there is largevariability in the standards of drainagesystems, with confusion over what thestandards actually mean in reality and thatthere is a need for more consistent, higherstandards for drainage systems.

4.45 Implementation of therecommendation above will, however, onlyimprove the capacity of drainage systemsover time. It would clearly be prohibitivelyexpensive to replace the entire network in ashort period of time. In the interim,increasing the capacity in one place whilerestrictions remain elsewhere in the systemmay result in the transfer of flooding andpollution further downstream. Considerationtherefore needs to be given to how best toimprove the existing network withoutadversely affecting other areas.

4.46 There are a number of other measuresthat water companies could take to assist inthe mitigation of surface water and sewerflooding. These measures could beimplemented and encouraged throughOfwat’s 2009 Price Review (PR09). The

IC 24 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that Defra should work withOfwat and the water industry to explorehow appropriate risk-based standards fordrainage systems (including pumpingstations) can be achieved.

7 The June 2007 Floods in Hull, Final Report by the Independent Review Body, November 2007

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Review will be putting forward theserecommendations to Ofwat before it finalisesits approach to PR09 in March 2008:

• Charging for surface water run-off –Currently, four water companies chargebusinesses for surface water run-off onthe basis of the area of impermeableland surface at their site. Severn TrentWater charges for surface water drainageby type of property.

• Rebates for not requiring surfacewater drainage – The current waterservice charge includes the collectionand treatment of surface water drainagefrom run-off. If customers candemonstrate that they do not receive orrequire this service then they should beentitled to a rebate. This policy could beextended to provide customers with arebate if they take measures to reducethe amount of run-off going into thedrainage network.

• 25-year Strategic Direction Statements– At Ofwat’s instigation, each watercompany is preparing, and will publish, a25-year statement which will describehow it plans to run its business in a moresustainable way and how it proposes totackle the challenges that climate changewill bring. These statements should belinked into the SWMPs described above.

Effective scrutiny

4.47 A number of local authority scrutinycommittee hearings were held following thesummer 2007 floods, including in the EastRiding of Yorkshire, Gloucestershire,Doncaster and Berkshire. These focusedon the lessons to be learned for the futureand provided useful information for thisReview. The Review considers that holdingscrutiny meetings in flood risk areas as amatter of routine would send a powerfulleadership message. Such an approachwould give locally elected members theopportunity to ask questions aboutdecisions concerning the management of

The role of Drain Maintenance“Two days after the flooding the councilsent out drain cleaning teams in our area– I believe most residents would considerthis a little late.”

Householder, Humberside

Many responses to the Review felt thatpoor maintenance of drains was a majorreason for the extensive surface waterflooding. In extreme events such as thoseseen in the summer, drain maintenance isnot thought to be a significant factor.Firstly, with very intense, prolongedrainfall, the water will not channel quicklyenough down the drains and will findalternative routes; secondly, even if thedrains were totally clear to begin with,they can very quickly become filled withdebris swept in by the floods; thirdly, if theoutfall area, for example the river, is high,water may not be able to drain out of thesystem; and fouthly, some of the drainagesystem can simply be overwhelmed bythe sheer volume of water.

However, drains do play a significant rolein preventing flooding from the vastmajority of events, which are lessextreme, and operators should ensurethat an appropriate maintenance regimeis in place.

IC 25 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that, as part of theforthcoming water industry pricingreview, the water companies, inconjunction with local authorities andother partners, should develop proposalsfor investment in the existing drainagenetwork to deal with increasing flood risk.

Figure 14 – A model of how different authorities could work together todeal with surface water flooding

Environment AgencyStrategic Overview Role

SurfaceWater

ManagementPlans

Informationon canals

anddischargestructures

CoastalFlooding

RiverFlooding

InternalDrainageBoards

BritishWaterways

SURFACEWATER

FLOODING

Advice on maps, modelling and plan templates and

local information on flood defence assets

Currentresponsibility

Informationon drainage/

sewerageassets andmodelling

WaterCompanies

Met Office

Informationon severeweather

forecastingmodels

Informationon internaldrainage

board districtassets Information on local planning

and development and other infrastructure including defence and drainage assets

Lead on the collation of source information and production

LocalAuthorityScrutiny

Committees

EnvironmentAgency

Ensure thatactions withinthe plan arecarried out

Qualityassurance

role to ensureaccuracy andconsistency

LocalAuthorities

Currentresponsibility


54

local flood risk, based upon actions within anumber of public documents such as theSWMPs, Local Development Frameworksand Community Risk Registers.

4.48 If all those with responsibilities wereasked to attend, including representativesfrom water companies, local authoritydrainage officers and the local EnvironmentAgency, scrutiny meetings would alsoprovide local authority members with theopportunity to engage with all relevantparties and monitor progress. Localauthority scrutiny has the benefit of givinggreater impetus to ensuring that risk-basedactions, once decided, actually take place.It should also ensure a greaterunderstanding of both local issues and thenational context. Scrutiny should lead togreater transparency for the public,including better understanding of localmaintenance regimes, risk and options for

managing risk. Finally, it should establishwhether proposed local schemes are likelyto proceed and, if not, the reasons for this.A possible partnership model to achievethese ambitions is set out at figure 14below. In order to deliver this scrutiny roleeffectively, the Review will consider whethera duty on responsible bodies to co-operatewith and have regard to the policies andscrutiny of local authorities is needed, andwill return to this issue in the final report.

IC 26 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that local authority scrutinycommittees should review SWMPs andother linked plans, such as LocalDevelopment Frameworks andCommunity Risk Registers, to ensurethat flood risk is adequately consideredand to ensure greater transparency andprogress in the management of that risk.

Flood Defence4.49 The most direct and well-understoodmodel for managing flood risk is flooddefence. In deciding where river andcoastal defence schemes should be built,the Government has developedprioritisation approaches that aim toprovide a fair and transparent means ofdistributing investment to get best valueacross a wide range of projects. Thatanalysis is done on a national basis, usingan objective system based on the benefiteach proposal is likely to provide comparedto its cost. It reflects the fact that it is notpossible to justify defending all locations tothe same standard – or even at all.

4.50 One consequence of the events ofsummer 2007 has been a substantialincrease in the demand for flood defenceworks, particularly for those areas mostdirectly affected. However, not all areas canbe protected, and the Review is of theopinion that a risk-based approach has to betaken. The infrequency and uncertainty offlooding means that decision-making has tobe based on estimates of future risk. Asignificant number of river flood defenceswere overtopped during this summer’sevents. This has led to some submissionsquerying whether recommended standardsof protection for flood defences should bereviewed by Government; the Review willconsider this issue in time for the final report.

4.51 As set out in Chapter 3, adaptation toflood risk will take a generation.Government and society need to managerisk within a framework that encourages thedevelopment and implementation of a range

of measures, rather than simply the buildingof individual flood defences, and that setsout a roadmap of how risk management willbe funded over a greater time period thancurrent Government three-year spendingcycles. Defra and the Environment Agencyare developing proposals for a Long-TermInvestment Strategy, which is likely toinclude proposals for a long-term capitalinvestment programme.

4.52 The Review recognises that creating along-term investment programme will givegreater certainty as to which strategies willbe delivered and enable fuller considerationof longer-term options and outcomes. Itshould also encourage local authorities andother partners to think across the longerterm and consider what further adaptationand resilience strategies are required fortheir communities.

Maintenance of defences andwatercourses

Dredging and clearing riverchannels

“I asked the workers ‘are you clearingthe silt?’ and they said ‘no’ which I thinkis quite monstrous because homes arebeing flooded over and over again, somesix times, some eight times in the lastseven years”

Landowner, Gloucestershire

“I don’t think they (the EA) count it asflooding if farmland is flooded – they justsee it as a reserve to be flooded – andquite rightly to save towns from beingflooded.”

Farmer, East Riding of Yorkshire

IC 28 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Government shouldcommit to a strategic long-term approachto its investment in flood risk management,planning up to 25 years ahead.

IC 27 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that it is appropriate for theEnvironment Agency and other localorganisations to continue to focusinvestment on areas of highest assessedlong-term risk, whether or not they havebeen recently flooded.

55



56

4.53 Concerns have been raised in ruralareas that poor maintenance may havecontributed to the severity of the floods,with properties and land flooding morequickly than expected; and thatwatercourses and ditches were not beingcleared as a result of environmental and/orfinancial factors. Submissions to theReview have also suggested that theundervaluing of agricultural land meansthat much land is either undefended or,where there are defences, thatmaintenance is being reduced.

4.54 The Review has received informationon the risk-based system by which theEnvironment Agency decides where tofocus maintenance, which can lead todecisions in some low-risk areas towithdraw from maintenance or reducemaintenance significantly. This approachwas recently supported by the NationalAudit Office in its report to the PublicAccounts Committee.8 In some caseswhere decisions to reduce maintenance aremade (such as in Kent), the EnvironmentAgency discusses its proposals with keystakeholders such as landowners. But thisis not the case everywhere.

4.55 By contrast, where the Agencydecides to withdraw from maintenance, itmust give adequate notice to thelandowner. In some cases the landownercan take over the maintenance task.Guidance on this process has recentlybeen produced by the Agency, aimed atboth river and coastal maintenance. TheReview welcomes this guidance, whichneeds to be effectively disseminated toenable an open dialogue with thoseaffected. However, the Review is concernedthat where maintenance is beingsignificantly reduced, but not stopped, asimilar dialogue may be necessary. Thosein affected areas should be made aware ofincreasing risk and landowners should be

The Review found through panelresearch and other evidence that thepublic were often concerned about anapparent lack of channel maintenanceand its possible role in making floodingworse.

Channel maintenance involves: dredging(mechanical removal of earth and siltfrom the river bottom); removal of aquaticweeds; and clearing of blockages fromthe river. The Environment Agencyspends around £3 million a year ondredging and £8 million on weed controlof its “main” rivers.

The Agency considers such measures tohave limited benefit. This is because:

a. river channels generally convey waterwithin their banks only at low tomedium flows. Above these flows theriver will spread onto the floodplain,which is a part of the river. So clearingthe channel adds only a smallproportion to the flow capacity; and

b. widening and deepening channelsbeyond their profile encourageserosion and deposition, by which theriver seeks to return to its naturalprofile. Dredging only increasescapacity for a short period and alsoadds to downstream flood risk.

The Agency normally clear weeds frommid-June to mid-March to avoiddisturbing nesting birds. Before thesummer floods, they had cut weeds ononly a few watercourses. Although theAgency believes this had only a minoreffect on overall flooding, many farmersand rural communities do not agree.With an increasing risk of summerflooding, the Agency has said it willreconsider the timing and frequency ofcertain maintenance works.

8 Environment Agency: Building and maintaining river and coastal flood defences in England, NAO, June 2007

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given opportunities to carry out enhancedmaintenance themselves.

Temporary and demountable defences

4.56 Following the floods of 2000, theEnvironment Agency began a trial toevaluate different types of temporary anddemountable defences in a number ofareas which have historically suffered fromfrequent flooding but where a fullpermanent defence could not be justified,including Carlisle, Upton-on-Severn andWorcester. During the summer 2007 floods,plans to deploy some of these defenceshad mixed results. Temporary barriers weredeployed on the waterside at Upton-on-Severn in June and successfully held back1.15m of water. During the July floods,however, the workforce, plant and materialswere deployed to Upton-on-Severn andWorcester but, despite a police escort,severe disruption to transport infrastructurecaused by surface water flooding preventedtheir arrival. The Agency is currentlyreviewing its deployment procedures.

4.57 The Agency has told the Review that ithas concluded from its trials that temporaryand demountable defences do not atpresent offer a large-scale alternative topermanent defences. The significant leadtime involved in deploying and buildingtemporary defences, especially at a timewhen resources will inevitably be stretched,coupled with the increased potential fordisruption to transport infrastructure duringflooding events, means that there is asignificant risk of such defences not beingdeployed. That risk compares unfavourablywith general public expectations. TheAgency is therefore currently considering

that temporary defences should not beused except in the short term, in suitablelocations, while permanent schemes arebuilt or repaired or where a permanentbarrier is not justified. However, this doesnot preclude other organisations oragencies from using them.

4.58 Responses received by the Reviewindicate that the pilot nature of some of thetemporary defence schemes is not wellunderstood, so that the Agency’s withdrawalfrom the provision of temporary defenceswould in many cases be a cause for localconcern. It is therefore important that theAgency engages with those currentlybenefiting from or partnering in the schemes,including discussion of alternative means bywhich they might be taken forward.

4.59 During the summer 2007 floods,temporary barriers were successfully usedin more novel ways to protect criticalinfrastructure, including at Walhamswitching-station in Gloucester. They wereused again to protect electricityinfrastructure during the East Coast stormsurge event in November. The Review willconsider the role that temporary defencescould play, including the case for regionalor national strategic reserves, in order tomake a recommendation in its final report.

The role of sandbags

“It really was a joke. We did get somesandbags in the end but only after thefloods had arrived. They were anightmare to get hold of. We got our ownsand and mud and filled up plastic bagsto use like sandbags.”

Householder, North East Lincolnshire

REC 3 – The Review recommends thatthe Environment Agency should urgentlydevelop and implement a clear policy onthe use of temporary and demountabledefences.

IC 29 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Environment Agencyshould open dialogue with all thoselandowners who will be affected by eithera withdrawal from or significant reductionin maintenance of rural watercourses.


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Sandbags being deployed in preparation for flooding

4.60 The Review found extensive evidenceof public over-reliance on sandbags, whichoften proved to be of little value inprotecting against flooding. Indeed, manyhouseholders and business owners put timeand energy into obtaining and installingsandbags which would have been betterspent on other activity such as movingpossessions to safety and deploying doorboards. While it is clear that sandbags havea useful role in certain types of flood whenused strategically, their benefits are lessclear when they are used by householdersto protect individual properties. Thisweakness is further heightened by theirrelative inefficiency and ineffectivenesswhen compared with alternative dedicatedflood defence products that have beendeveloped in recent years, such asfloodgates and airbrick covers. Despitethese developments, some evidencesuggests that at present only the sandbagseems to have an established place in thepublic’s mind as an effective flood protectionmeasure.9

Temporary defences set up to protect Walham electricity switching station – preventing around 450,000domestic and commercial customers losing power

9 Can people learn to live with flood risk?, Harries, T. (Flood Hazard Research Centre) and Borrows, P.(University of Middlesex), paper tabled for the 42nd Defra and Environment Agency Flood and CoastalManagement Conference, July 2007

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4.61 The Environment Agency has anagreed framework with the LocalGovernment Association covering jointworking in flood incidents. This includes apolicy on the provision of sandbags. TheAgency does not as a matter of courseprovide sandbags and, under this policy, it isup to individual local authorities whetherthey provide sandbags to the public, andwhether they charge for them. As a result ofthe confusion and mixed performance inrelation to sandbags during the summer2007 floods, the Review believes it is timefor an update of this policy. The governmentpublication Preparing for floods10 should beamended to provide further guidance onthe use and effectiveness of sandbags.

Working with natural processes

4.62 It is generally recognised that it is notsustainable from an economic,environmental or engineering perspective to

manage all risk through the building ofbigger and more extensive flood defences.Hard flood defences clearly have a role toplay in protecting homes and businessesbut complementary natural solutions in thewider catchment must also be used to takethe pressure off flood defences. In manylocations, working with natural processesthrough better land-use planning andmanagement – for example creatingwashlands and wetlands – can also reducethe need for extensive, costly hard flooddefences, offering a more sustained, long-term solution to flooding problems.

4.63 Greater use of washlands andwetlands, realignment of river channels andreconnection of rivers with their floodplaincan all help store and slow water to reduceflooding downstream and mitigate peakflows. The Government’s Making Space forWater strategy recognises the value of thisapproach, as did several submissions tothe Review. Natural England noted that “re-creation of wetlands can, if properlydesigned, provide increased capacity attimes of peak floods and help protect urbanareas.” At the same time, more can bedone in urban areas to encourage ‘greencorridors’ and flood storage. Currentplanning guidance (PPS25) identifies activefloodplains as a land-use category, whichshould make it easier to identify sites forflood storage.

4.64 Many of the responses to the Reviewwere supportive of the Government’sgeneral approach to managing risk, but feltthat this was not being translated intoresults on the ground. Several submissionssuggested that more effort was needed toencourage and incentivise theirimplementation, both in relation to designingschemes in the first instance and thenfinding and obtaining the use of the landneeded to make them a reality. Submissions

IC 30 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Government shoulddevelop a single national set of guidancefor local authorities and the public on theuse and usefulness of sandbags andother alternatives, rather than leaving thematter wholly to local discretion.

“But we had the warning again for theSaturday after and we phoned up askingfor sandbags, saying we were highpriority, and they wouldn’t bring us anysandbags.”


“The distribution of sandbags is costly,fraught with difficulties and largelyineffective.”

District council officer, Oxfordshire

10 Preparing for floods: interim guidance for improving the flood resistance of domestic and small businessproperties, London: Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2003.


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Case study – Washlands preventing major flooding from rivers at LincolnThe flood washlands upstream of Lincoln, along with associated defences, provide floodprotection from the rivers Witham, Brant and Till to approximately 7,000 residential,commercial and industrial properties. During the June 2007 event they were operatedsuccessfully to avoid major flooding from these rivers. The flooding which did occur inLincoln was from surface water and highway sources.

The Lincoln scheme comprises two washland areas to the south (Witham/Brant) andnorth-west (Till) of the city. The defences within Lincoln can safely protect against anevent that has a 1-in-10 annual chance of happening. However, by using the washlandsto store water, the risk of flooding is reduced to approximately 1-in-100.

Critical to success is timing the use of the washlands. If they are employed too early, theirstorage capacity can be used up, leaving no capacity for flows that follow. If they are usedtoo late, the safe flow through Lincoln may be exceeded and flooding will occur. Duringthe summer 2007 floods, the Environment Agency had a team forecasting and monitoringthe conditions in order to determine the optimum time for operation of the various controlstructures. This included raising gates in the rivers themselves to control how much waterpassed downstream and opening gates in the riverbanks to fill the washlands. The RiverTill washland stores up to 3.2 million cubic metres of water and was filled to 80 per centcapacity in June 2007. The combined Witham/Brant washlands have a larger capacity of6.3 million cubic metres and were filled to 12 per cent capacity.

Till washland in flood – the embankment and control sluice (foreground) hold back the water from passing downstream to Lincoln.

from rural and farming groups felt that ruralareas had a big role to play, but thatincentives to landowners were currentlyinadequate. It has been suggested that insome areas farmland was being floodeddeliberately to manage the event withoutfinancial support being given. However, theReview found no evidence of deliberateflooding of land that had not previouslybeen designated for flood storage.

Land management measures

4.65 The way in which rural land is usedand managed can reduce rural and urbanflooding at the local level. Relevant factorsinclude better soil management andcropping and livestock practices at farmlevel, which can all help retain water in thesoil and slow down water flow and reducerun-off. Some submissions to the Reviewidentified extensive drainage in both uplandand lowland areas, along with other farmingpractices, as leading to a reduction in theability of the land to store water.

4.66 There are a number of researchprogrammes looking at the value of landmanagement practices in managing flood

risk. Research currently suggests thatthese measures can have an impact at thelocal level but not at the wider catchmentscale; but further study is needed beforedefinitive conclusions can be drawn. Therecent move to the Single Farm Paymentscheme has brought an additional focus ongood agricultural and environmentalpractices, some of which may have floodrisk management benefits.

Modernising responsibilities for floodrisk management

4.67 Changing risk levels mean that societywill face choices about flood riskmanagement which will have to be properlyco-ordinated. The foundation for this co-ordination has to be the range of powersthat relate to flooding and watermanagement.

4.68 Flood risk management is a complexarea and the lack of clarity of responsibilitiesis equally challenging. Defra has policyresponsibility for flood risk management inEngland, while Communities and LocalGovernment (CLG) has policy responsibilityfor land-use planning. Delivery on theground in relation to river and coastalflooding is the responsibility of operatingauthorities – the Environment Agency, localauthorities and internal drainage boards.Once responsibilities for surface water andsewer flooding are brought in, organisationsinclude local authorities and the HighwaysAgency (as highway authorities), watercompanies (as sewerage undertakers) andBritish Waterways (canals). In addition,private landowners have duties in relation toriparian ownership. Submissions to theReview have suggested that this complexity

IC 32 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Environment Agencyshould provide an analysis of the effectthat land management practices had orwould have had on the impact of floodingduring the summer 2007 floods.

IC 31 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that Defra, the EnvironmentAgency and Natural England shouldwork with partners to establish aprogramme and framework to achievegreater working with natural processes,including the identification of appropriatesites and the development of moreincentives for creating water storage,restoring the natural course of rivers andestablishing green corridors.

“We’ve got the feeling the powers that bedon’t seem to mind flooding us – it’s a bitdiscriminatory, because we can’t getanything back.”

Farmer, East Riding of Yorkshire

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Figure 15 – The Complex Landscape of Flood Risk ManagementResponsibilities

Defra

EnvironmentAgencyFlood risk

management formain rivers and

the sea

LocalAuthoritiesFlood defence

for minorwatercourses not

inDrainage Board

areas

InternalDrainageBoards

Flood & waterlevel

management inInternal drainage

districts

Water Companies

Installation &maintenance of

public sewers

Operations &Incident Response

FloodWarning

RiskAssessment &

Strategic PlanningNew &

ImprovedInfrastructure

Infrastructuremaintenance

ContingencyPlanning

DevelopmentControl

Environment AgencyStrategic overview & general supervision for main river and coastal flooding

DCLG

BritishWaterwaysManage some

canals and rivers

Privatewatercourse

owners

HighwaysAgency

Drainage ofmotorways &

major trunk roads

Flood grant, outcome targetsand policy guidance

Flood

scheme

approval

Fundingand

PlanningPolicy

guidance

Levies

Funding/approval of coastal capitalschemes


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can be unhelpful, for example in terms ofunderstanding who is responsible for whatduring an actual event, or in relation toidentifying maintenance responsibilities for agiven stretch of drainage asset orwatercourse. Figure 15 sets out the range ofresponsibilities for flooding and drainage inEngland.

4.69 A range of legislation governs floodrisk management, most of which comesunder permissive powers (i.e. there is noobligation to provide defences). The mainlegislation includes the Land Drainage Act1991, the Water Resources Act 1991, theWater Industry Act 2003 and theEnvironment Act 1995. The emphasiswithin this legislation is on flood defenceand drainage rather than flood riskmanagement, whereas the recent EUFloods Directive promotes a risk-basedapproach. EU legislation such as the WaterFramework Directive 2000 brings in various

environmental duties and considerations.The Civil Contingencies Act also bringsduties in relation to emergency response(as set out in Chapter 5). This patchwork oflegislation and responsibilities is not helpfuland needs addressing.

Insurance

“You just think ‘When we’ve got someextra cash, I’ll get it sorted. Next year, orthe year after.’”


IC 33 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that flooding legislation shouldbe updated and streamlined under asingle unifying Act that among otheroutcomes addresses all sources offlooding, clarifies responsibilities andfacilitates flood risk management.

4.70 Insurance is the system through whichrisk is shared. The UK is in an unusualposition in that flood risk is usually coveredas a standard part of business andhousehold insurance and the UKGovernment is not the insurer of last resort,unlike in many other countries. Continuedprovision of flood insurance is based on avoluntary agreement between members ofthe Association of British Insurers (ABI)(comprising around 400 companies) andGovernment, known as the Statement ofPrinciples.11 Under this agreement, ABImembers will continue to offer insurancecover to existing customers where the risk oftheir properties being flooded in any singleyear is 1-in-70 or less, or for thoseproperties where flood defences are plannedin the next five years to bring the probabilitydown to that level. The Review welcomesthis partnership approach between theinsurance industry and the Government.

4.71 While risk in the UK is in part shared,it is not currently fully shared by all those atrisk. The ABI estimates that around 78 percent of households nationwide havecontents insurance, but that in some of theareas affected by the summer 2007 floodsthe figure is barely over a quarter. A furtherissue is that those who have insurance areoften underinsured. A number of the majorinsurers have reported underinsurance ofhome contents in particular.12

4.72 Underinsurance appears to have beena major problem for businesses, especiallysmall businesses, affected by the summer2007 floods, many of which apparentlylacked business continuity insurance. Asurvey conducted by AXA Insurance13 in2006 indicated that 90 per cent of small

businesses were underinsured for buildingscover and 41 per cent had no businesscontinuity or loss of earning insurance.

4.73 For some households the decision notto have insurance will simply have been amatter of affordability. Some councils, inassociation with insurance companies, runlow-cost insurance schemes for low-incomehouseholds. In Wigan, for example, thelocal council has teamed up with aninsurance company and a local housingassociation to provide a tenants’ andleaseholders’ insurance scheme. TheReview saw other examples of similarschemes when visiting areas of the countryaffected by the 2007 floods, such asDoncaster. Tenants generally pay for theselow-cost schemes through their rent bills,making it simple and effective process.

4.74 The insurance industry and theGovernment’s Financial InclusionTaskforce14 are also looking at the issue ofinsurance for low-income households. Arecent ABI report15 suggests that 35 percent of people in very low-incomehouseholds (less than £10,000 per year) donot have any insurance at all and only 44per cent have contents insurance. TheReview welcomes the ABI’s plans toencourage awareness of affordableinsurance schemes, such as insurance-with-rent schemes.

IC 34 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Government and theinsurance industry should work togetherto deliver a public education programmesetting out the benefits of insurance inthe context of flooding.

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11 ABI Statement of Principles on the provision of insurance, ABI, November 2007 12 Research by Zurich insurance company in 2005 revealed that one in five households was at risk of being

underinsured because they were unsure of the value of their home contents(www.uk.biz.yahoo.com/moneyweekly/underinsurance.html, 2 March 2005)

13 Preparing for climate change. A practical guide for small businesses”, September 2006, AXA Insurance UK14 www.financialinclusion-taskforce.org.uk/15 Access for all: extending the reach of insurance protection, ABI, October 2007


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4.75 As a consequence of the 2007 floods,insurers received around 165,000 claimsacross the UK (120,000 household, 27,000commercial and 18,000 motor claims),equivalent to four years’ claims in normalcircumstances.16 The overall cost toinsurers is expected to be around £3 billion– the largest single claims event in UKhistory. As of mid-November, 40 per cent ofhousehold and over 25 per cent ofcommercial claims had been settled.

4.76 In general, the Review considers thatthe insurance industry has responded wellto the summer 2007 floods, with manycompanies bringing in staff from outside

the region, and in some cases fromoverseas, to ensure that claims are dealtwith promptly. However, while the claimsexperience was generally positive for many,the service received by some claimantswas less impressive. During visits to theaffected areas, the Review came acrossmany households and businesses that hadexperienced or were still experiencingdifficulties. Some complaints were theresult of comparisons with neighbours andreflected the individual services offered.However, some related more to poorgeneral standards of claims handlingservice, such as length of time before firstvisit by a loss adjustor, length of time forclaims to be dealt with and advice on whatcould be done with damaged goods.

4.77 The aftermath of flooding can be asstressful as the event itself. During eventsas severe as those experienced duringsummer 2007, there will inevitably bestrains on companies dealing with a largenumber of claims. There is a range ofoptions that could be developed to ensurethat the good service experienced by manyis received by all in the future. Theinsurance industry could, for example, putplans in place to speed up the technicalassessment of claims, by allocating lossadjustors to affected areas rather than bypolicyholder.

4.78 The Review also saw a number ofexamples of neighbours receivingconflicting advice from their insurers. Acommon set of guidelines for people whoare affected and insured could bedeveloped, to be followed by all insurancecompanies after a flood, and covering suchissues as waste disposal and levels ofevidence required for a claim. There mayalso be scope for the development of avoluntary industry code alongside theStatement of Principles, setting outminimum standards of service that all

“What annoys me is that it’s been, whatis it now, 118 days, something like that,since the first flood came – and we stillhaven’t had anything from the insurance.We’ve had all the schedules andeverything, but we’ve had no responsefrom that at all.”


“My insurance have been fantastic,absolutely fantastic. All my work isfinished and I have paid out foreverything I’ve put down – they havenever said they needed proof oranything.”


IC 35 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Government and theinsurance industry should work togetherto develop options to improve theavailability and uptake of flood riskinsurance by low-income households,and assess the costs, benefits andfeasibility of these options, before theReview’s final report.

16 Summer floods 2007: Learning the lessons, ABI, November 2007

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insured individuals and organisationsshould expect to receive in the event offlooding. Or companies may begin toinclude information about their performanceduring large-scale events like the summer2007 floods to attract customers, so dealingwith the issue through competition. TheReview will work with the insuranceindustry to consider how the prompt andefficient handling of floods claimsexperienced by many after the summer2007 floods can be ensured for allpolicyholders. The Review will develop arange of options with the ABI with theintention of providing a recommendation forits final report.

4.79 Most insurance companies haveaccess to flood risk information. Theprovision of information by the EnvironmentAgency is covered under the Statement ofPrinciples and must be kept up-to-date. It isused to inform the pricing of insurancepremiums and in determining otherelements such as excesses. It is thisprocess which can often represent the firstor most detailed point at which a businessowner or householder considers flood risk.The Review considers that this provides anopportunity to increase the understandingof flood risk among householders andbusinesses and that this should bedeveloped further.

IC 36 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that, in flood risk areas, a noteon flood risk and the simple steps thatcould be taken to mitigate it should beincluded with all insurance renewalnotices. Moreover, if Flood WarningDirect is available in a customer’s area,one of the conditions of renewal couldbe sign-up to this service.

Chapter 5:The EmergencyResponse

SummaryThis chapter examines:

• the performance of weatherforecasts, flood warnings andflood defences;

• the local, regional and nationalresponse;and

• the transition to recovery.

5.1 From the first flooding in mid-June 2007to the restoration of drinking water suppliesin Gloucestershire in mid-August,responders were faced with a string ofmajor emergencies, many of them goingwell beyond all previous experience.As Chapter 1 has noted, these includedthe largest surface water flooding eventever experienced in the UK; record levelsof flooding along the River Severn; and,with the loss of Mythe water treatmentworks in Gloucestershire, the most seriousloss of essential services since the SecondWorld War.

5.2 Despite the UK’s well-developedemergency planning frameworks,emergency plans and procedures weretested to their limits and beyond. Inevitably,the events exposed weaknesses and areasthat need improvement. These are identifiedin this chapter. But the Review considers itappropriate to pay tribute at the outset tothe dedication and commitment of allorganisations involved in the response.In extremely testing situations, respondersincluding the police, the fire and rescueservices, ambulance and health services,the Armed Forces, local authorities, theMaritime and Coastguard Agency and awide range of voluntary organisations,including the Red Cross, St JohnAmbulance, the RNLI, Search and RescueAssistance in Disasters (SARAID) andRotary International in Great Britain andIreland, were highly effective in offeringpractical help, support and reassurance toaffected communities.

Met Office forecasts5.3 Generally, the exceptional levels ofrainfall in summer 2007 were well predicted,with the weather forecasts preceding themajor July flooding in particular being themost detailed and accurate provided for anymajor flooding event in the UK.

5.4 Early severe weather warnings weredistributed direct to emergency response

organisations via email and fax, and MetOffice advisors located around the countryworked with responders to manage theimpact of the severe weather, with sufficientlead time for some mitigation plans to beput in place.

5.5 The forecasts followed the timelinebelow:

• 17–20 June – There were a number oflocalised torrential downpours with manyflash warnings issued.

• 22 June – An early warning was issuedto National Severe Weather WarningService (NSWWS) recipients and thepublic, giving three days’ notice of severerainfall.

• 23 June – Further warnings were issued,with an update to the early warning givenon 22 June.

• 24 June – A further update correctlyfocused on the worst-hit areas andaccurately estimated the rainfall totals.

• 27 June – Another early warning wasissued, giving three to four days’ noticeof potential further disruption over theweekend due to slow-moving rain bands.

• 16 July – Medium-range forecast modeloutput suggested that a potentially severeweather system was developing, butconfidence was only consideredmoderate at this stage.

• 18 July – Confidence in the likelihood ofthe event increased as the weekprogressed and a NSWWS early warningwas issued in the morning.

• 19 July – Confidence was nowsufficiently high to focus warnings aboutthe area of greatest risk of disruption onthe south-west Midlands, Gloucestershireand Oxfordshire.

• 20 July – NSWWS flash warnings wereissued widely for southern and centralEngland.

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Chapter 5: The Emergency Response


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5.6 Although the summer’s rainfall wasgenerally well forecast, a number ofsubmissions to the Review have suggestedthat more use should be made ofprobabilistic forecasting (based on thelikelihood of weather change rather thanactual rainfall levels). With the developmentof higher-resolution models, this wouldallow forecasts to be given with moreconfidence and greater precision.Submissions also suggest the issuing ofearly warnings at defined – and possiblylower – levels of probability. Such a stepcould be of potential value, especially forextreme weather events, in givingemergency responders more time toprepare. However, it will inevitably result inmore false alarms. Nevertheless, theReview considers that the idea hassufficient potential to merit furtherexamination. Chapter 3 describes theabsence of an effective warning system forsurface water flooding, the prevalent form offlooding in June, with the result thatresponders had to deal with unexpectedflooding. It also makes recommendations forthe development of tools and techniqueswhich will allow that gap to be closed.

Flood Warnings5.7 For each type of flood warning (FloodWatch, Flood Warning, Severe FloodWarning), the Environment Agency has apredetermined activation threshold, basedfor example on river depths and rainfalllevels over a catchment area. Lowerthresholds are used to initiate supportingactions, such as the staffing of incident

rooms, increased monitoring of rivergauges and enhanced flood forecastingactivities. The trigger for issuing a FloodWarning or Severe Flood Warning is basedon the Agency’s assessment of whetherany watercourse or part of a watercoursewill reach a level at which the Agencyjudges that significant property flooding willtake place. Since the trigger is usuallycalculated by the use of flood modellingstudies or by looking at the behaviour ofpast floods, unexpected behaviour ofrainfall or river water can lower theaccuracy of warnings.

5.8 The Environment Agency’s floodwarning system has service standardswhich aim to issue warnings more than twohours ahead of potential flooding and todeliver them to the public through its FloodWarnings Direct system by a number ofdifferent media (in several languages).Warnings are also issued to the emergencyresponder community and the broadcastmedia. The lead time available is almostentirely dependent on the type andbehaviour of a river and the location of theflood warning area on that river (more timemay be available to issue warnings todownstream areas than those upstreamnear the headwaters of rivers). It isdependent on the type and location of therainfall that will lead to flooding. For coastsand tidal rivers it will also be dependent onthe accuracy of sea surge and waveforecasting.

5.9 The Environment Agency provided theReview with an initial assessment of morethan 500 flood warnings issued during Juneand July 2007. This shows that:

• around 80 per cent were issued to target– that is more than two hours before thethreshold was reached.

• around 20 per cent were not issued totarget – that is, they were issued eitherless than two hours before, or after thethreshold was reached.

IC 37 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Met Office and theEnvironment Agency should produce anassessment of the options for issuingwarnings against a lower threshold ofprobability, including costs, benefits andfeasibility; this will be considered further inthe final report.

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• In about 20 per cent of cases the riverconcerned did not in the event reach thethreshold level.

5.10 The Review is aware that thegeneration of flood warnings cannot be anexact science. As assessments will alwaysbe affected by variations in rainfall forecasts,data from river telemetry and groundsaturation levels. However, there is scope fora higher percentage of warnings to meet thetarget. As noted in Chapter 3, revised floodrisk maps are vital to improve the accuracyof risk registers and the effectiveness ofemergency planning, and the Review makesa recommendation in this respect.

Flood Defences5.11 The majority of flood defences andother flood risk management assets – boththose on rivers and those which defendagainst coastal surges – are maintained bythe Environment Agency, with others beingmaintained by local authorities, InternalDrainage Boards, businesses andindividuals. The Agency has investigatedthe performance of all these assets duringthe summer 2007 floods to check thatthey operated to their design standard,which is typically to withstand a 1-in-100-chance event.

5.12 This investigation found that in Englandand Wales during June and July 2007:

• 9 per cent (1,016 kilometres) of man-made raised flood defences were testedby the summer floods.

• About 50 per cent (525 kilometres) of theraised flood defences tested wereoverwhelmed.

• Less than 0.2 per cent of the defencesfailed physically (nine sites) or suffered abreakdown or power failure which meantthat they did not operate as expected(six sites):

• – There were four sites whose physicalfailure led to an earlier onset of

flooding: these were flood walls atWorksop, Chesterfield and Sheffieldand an embankment at Auckley.However, the same level of floodingwould have occurred anyway due to theextent of the flooding.

• – There were five sites which failedphysically after being overwhelmed:these cases were all embankmentbreaches in the north of the Anglianregion; at North Kelsey Beck,Waddingham Catchwater, Barlings Eau,Stainfield Beck and Winterton Beck.Flooding was already significant at thetime of failure.

• – The six sites that did not operate asexpected due to a loss of power (whichoccurred after they were overwhelmed)comprised a flood gate at Canklow(Rotherham), pumping stations atGreat Clough (North Yorkshire),Winestead (Hull) and Hempholme(Humberside) and two pumpingstations in Doncaster. Flooding wassevere when power was lost and wastherefore not made worse.

• – In addition, a sea gate at Goxhill Haven(Humberside) could not close properlydue to a blockage, and agricultural landwas flooded leading to several hundredpigs being killed. Trash screens (whichprevent culverts and pump stationsfrom blocking) at Cox’s Meadow,(Cheltenham) and Paradise Road(Boscastle) did not function properly.Flood defence improvement work wasunderway in Tirymynach (Pool Quay,Welshpool) and defences could not berestored effectively. As a result up toten properties may have flooded.

5.13 The Review, on occasion, heardsuggestions that individual communitieswere deliberately allowed to flood to protectother communities. The Review found nodirect evidence of this happening. The factthat 50 per cent of the raised flooddefences were overwhelmed illustrates the


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extreme nature of the summer’s events.The number of assets physically failing orsuffering a breakdown or power failure isencouragingly low, and the EnvironmentAgency judges that in none of these caseswas the flooding made worse as a result.However, these assets should be examinedto establish why these failures occurred tosee if lessons can be learnt.

The Local ResponseReadiness and alerting5.14 The scale of the 2007 floods stretchedresources to the limit and beyond, andresponders in some areas were not asready as they might have been. In part, thiscan be explained by the unprecedentednature of the events, especially when setagainst a historic pattern of more localised,low-impact flooding events. The absence ofa warning system for surface water floodingcontributed. The frequency and volume ofsevere weather warnings received byresponders (including a number of falsealarms) will have played a part. But it isalso clear that, in some areas, there wereno agreed protocols between responders,setting out responsibilities for assessing thepotential impact of a specific severeweather event and triggering an appropriatemulti-agency response. This gap, crucial tothe initiation of an effective emergencyresponse, needs to be filled.

5.15 The Met Office has an improvingunderstanding of how its warnings are usedby the different members of the multi-agency responder community. Met Officeadvisors are the natural starting point for theimproved arrangements. The Review judgesthat, if Local Resilience Forums were todesignate the police and local authorities asthe primary points of contact for the MetOffice advisors before and during anemergency, this would ensure a focused useof this valuable resource at a critical time.

5.16 By extension, there would be a benefitin designating a single organisation as

being responsible for triggering emergencyresponse arrangements. In some areas,there was a degree of confusion betweenresponders about whose responsibility itwas to consult with partners and to advisewhether multi-agency responsearrangements should be triggered in lightof severe weather and flood warnings.While most Local Resilience Forums havegeneric plans in place to respond toemergencies, and some key responders inflood-prone areas have specific flood plansin place, few set out collectively agreedarrangements for assessing the impact ofan emergency such as flooding, where theeffects can be felt over a wide area andtake many forms.

5.17 ‘Upper tier’ local authorities are wellplaced to assess the potential impact offloods across their area, liaising withneighbouring local authorities asappropriate to gather input on the basis oflocal visual assessments and previousexperience. In light of this, the Reviewconsiders that ‘upper tier’ local authoritiesare best placed to be given ‘lead responder’status, with a duty to advise partners onwhether multi-agency responsearrangements should be triggered, perhapsinitially on a precautionary basis. Suchassessments would be carried out in closeconsultation with local partners, including‘other’ local authorities and the emergencyservices. The police, unless agreedotherwise locally, should then convene andlead the multi-agency response.

IC 38 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that unless agreed otherwiselocally, ‘upper tier’ local authoritiesshould be the lead organisation inrelation to multi-agency planning forsevere weather emergencies at the locallevel, and for triggering multi-agencyarrangements in response to severeweather warnings.

Advice5.18 A number of emergency responderstold the Review that the EnvironmentAgency’s flood warnings can be difficult tointerpret. They also noted that, in someareas, Environment Agency staff whoengaged with Gold Commands during the2007 floods had a limited understanding oftheir role and purpose, and in some caseswere unable to present their assessmentsclearly. Chapter 3 covers the developmentof visualisation tools which should helpsignificantly in providing emergencyresponders with a rapid summary of thelikely impact of forecast flooding. But theiruse, and the interpretation of underlyingdata, will clearly be aided if theEnvironment Agency commits staff to GoldCommands (and to prior work by LocalResilience Forums) who are knowledgeableabout their functions and able to explainscientific material lucidly.

Gold Commands 5.19 Gold Commands activated in thesummer were effective in co-ordinating thelocal response, often with reassuring andhigh-level visible leadership.

5.20 However, in some areas, someresponder organisations had difficulty inengaging effectively with the local responseeffort, possibly because Silver Commandswere activated instead of Gold. Althoughthese areas coped, the strategicperspective brought by Gold Commandwould have allowed more effectiveengagement by the full range of potentialresponders and hence the easierprocurement of external resources.

5.21 There is a clear benefit in GoldCommands being activated at an earlystage on a precautionary basis whenassessments indicate that significantdisruption is likely. Precautionary GoldCommands need not physically convene atthe outset: conference telephone calls, orother appropriate means of multi-agencycommunication, could be used to share andassess information on the extent of theemergency.

5.22 The Review has received positivefeedback from responder organisations onthe emergency facilities at GloucestershireConstabulary’s purpose-built headquartersin Gloucester, which can accommodate aGold Command at short notice in the eventof a major incident. The Gold Commandsuite’s IT and communications systems,including immediate Gold e-mail addressesfor all responders, were said to work well.The Gold suite was also complemented by

IC 39 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that where a Gold Commandis established, the police, unless agreedotherwise locally, should convene andlead the multi-agency response.

Case study – Warnings in GloucestershireIn the July floods, the main challenge proved to be river flooding, particularly on theRivers Severn, Thames and Avon and their tributaries. Following unprecedented levels ofrainfall, Gloucestershire Gold Command met at 6pm on Friday 20 July and was informedby the Environment Agency that no significant river flooding was expected. The sameevening the Met Office issued a weather warning stating that heavy rain would continueovernight in Gloucestershire. On Saturday 21 July at a 10.30am Gold teleconference, theEnvironment Agency said that there would be little or no serious flooding and Gold wasstood down following a further meeting at 6pm. Early on Sunday 22 July Mythe watertreatment works was submerged by rising flood water and shut down, affecting watersupplies to 350,000 people in Tewkesbury, Cheltenham and Gloucester. Serious urbanand rural flooding also occurred. Gold was reconvened.

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an adjacent flexible open-plan space toaccommodate agencies and Gold supportservices.

Involvement of Category 2responders5.23 A number of submissions to theReview drew out the way in whichinconsistencies in the level of engagementof Category 2 responders, particularlyutilities companies, in the work of LocalResilience Forums contributed to a lack ofpreparedness in some aspects of theresponse. This weakness was compoundedby the irregular level of engagement ofCategory 2 responders in Gold Commands.Moreover, some Category 2 responderswho attended Gold Command meetingswere clearly unfamiliar with emergencyresponse procedures, and unable toengage effectively. Chapter 6 returns tothese issues.

Flood rescue5.24 Organisations carrying out floodrescue, including the fire and rescueservices, the Maritime and CoastguardAgency, the RNLI, river police and SARAID,are highly valued by the public and weregenerally praised for their effectiveoperations over the summer. However, theReview notes that there is currently someambiguity as to which organisations have

responsibilities for flood rescue. The fire andrescue services usually attend to suchsituations, as all fire and rescue crews aretrained to work safely near water and areprovided with suitable equipment to assistpeople in difficulty in water. Selected stationshave also been trained to offer a full waterrescue capability, involving crew membersworking in water, using inflatable boats whenthe circumstances necessitate it.

5.25 However, the fire and rescue serviceshave no explicit statutory duties for floodrescue. Similarly, although the Maritime andCoastguard Agency is a Category 1responder for casualties at sea, on thecoast and in estuaries, and the RNLI has astatutory duty on the Thames, neitherorganisation has a legal responsibility forflood rescue. However, both organisationsplayed an active role in the response to thesummer 2007 floods and deployed crews toassist the local response in a number ofthe affected areas.

A Sea King helicopter from RAF Kinross searchersfor people in floods in Tewkesbury, Gloucestershire© Rex Features

REC 4 – The Review recommends thatall Local Resilience Forums urgentlyreview their current local arrangementsfor water rescue to consider whetherthey are adequate in light of thesummer’s events and their localcommunity risk registers.

IC 41 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that Local Resilience Forumsshould assess the effectiveness of theirGold facilities, including flexibleaccommodation, IT and communicationssystems.

IC 40 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that Gold Commands shouldbe established at an early stage on aprecautionary basis where there is a riskof serious flooding.

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5.26 The Review considers that thisperceived ambiguity should be addressed,although that does not mean that a specificstatutory duty is necessarily the appropriatesolution, particularly given the range oforganisations with experience andexpertise in this area. The issue to beconsidered is the provision of resourcesneeded specifically to undertake floodrescue, including personal protectiveequipment, pumps, rescue craft and,especially, trained personnel.

5.27 The Review is aware thatCommunities and Local Government (CLG)is considering flood rescue as part of thereview it is undertaking into the Fire andRescue Service’s response in the summer.The Review will consider CLG’s report indue course and will return to flood rescuein the final report. In doing so, it will also

examine whether there would beadvantages in establishing a single searchand rescue emergency response co-ordinating authority for land-basedemergencies, rather than the presentsystem co-ordinated by the Ministry ofDefence, the Maritime and CoastguardAgency and the police.

Mutual aid5.28 The Review is aware of manyexamples of effective mutual aid inresponse to the flooding events of Juneand July 2007 (see case studies below).Effective mutual aid arrangements enableorganisations engaged in the response toan emergency to request urgent supportfrom other parts of the country – aparticularly useful arrangement duringwide-area emergencies which can severelydeplete resources locally.

5.29 Mutual aid can come in many forms,including equipment (such as pumps orboats) and people. Well-established andeffective arrangements already exist for theprovision of mutual aid between policeforces, with all requests for assistancerouted through and co-ordinated by thePolice National Information Co-ordinationCentre in London. Arrangements also existin the fire and rescue services,administered through a nationalcoordination centre in West Yorkshire,

“The emergency services didn’t knowwho was in or out of the property, it wasa case of people opening their windowsand shouting to people. The people inthe rubber dinghies were brilliant. Theywere paddling up and down and evenwhen people had been moved out theykept an eye out to make sure propertieswere safe.”


Case study – Flood rescue of a carer and three men with learning disabilitiesMark Everall is responsible for the care of three men with learning disabilities, who, priorto the flood, lived in the property next door to the family’s home. When the waters rose,the men were brought into the house with the family while they waited to be rescued byboat. This was a very difficult time for everyone in the household, but especially for themen, who had difficulty coping with situations out of the ordinary. The rising floodwaterand its entry into the house upset them and they became agitated and anxious.

In the early afternoon a boat arrived at the house to rescue everyone and they managedto get two of the men into the boat with other family members and their pets. The thirdman was so distressed that it was decided that it was unsafe for him to go in the boat atthat time. Mark stayed with him until the boat returned to fetch them both in the lateafternoon, by which time the man was calmer and it was therefore safe to help him intothe boat and take him to safety.


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supplemented by an EmergencyInformation Support Group in London. Theprovision, mobilisation and effectiveness ofhigh-volume pumps during the 2007 floodswere widely praised by local fire and rescueservice officers.

5.30 Beyond the emergency services,however, there are few structuredarrangements for mutual aid. Where it doeshappen, it is usually ad hoc. Localauthorities generally rely on neighbouringauthorities to provide support withequipment and personnel in an emergency.The wide range of potential roles can makeit difficult to identify the right people with theright skills to assist during an emergency.Moreover, during summer 2007, many localauthorities found that they could not rely onassistance from neighbouring authoritieseither because they too were also affectedby floods or because they feared beingaffected. Furthermore, shared inventories ofequipment were not available, so that localauthorities were unaware what helpneighbouring authorities might provide.

5.31 In its submission to the Review, and insubsequent discussions, the LocalGovernment Association (LGA) hasacknowledged that national and cross-regional mutual aid arrangements betweenlocal authorities could be improved, forexample by the development of a registerof experts available to assist the response

to a future wide-area emergency. TheReview recommends that the LGA shouldtake forward work to address this issue assoon as possible.

Emergency accommodation5.32 Affected local authorities in severalareas set up rest centres to provide a rangeof humanitarian assistance to peopleaffected by the floods. These ranged fromdrop-in centres to overnight facilities invenues such as town halls catering forlarge numbers of evacuees.

Residents and council workers gather round thespecially installed Mobile Advice Centre © RexFeatures

IC 42 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Local GovernmentAssociation should consider how bestmutual support might be enhancedbetween local authorities in the event ofa future wide-area emergency.

Case studies – Examples of effective mutual aid1. When significant parts of Herefordshire and Worcestershire were badly affected byflooding in both June and July, in addition to local crews, the rescue effort involved fireand rescue teams from Buckinghamshire, Mid and West Wales, Greater Manchester,Cheshire and Merseyside.

2. During the June floods in South Yorkshire, a representative from Carlisle Councilcontacted Doncaster City Council to offer its assistance and the expertise gained from itsexperiences during the 2005 Carlisle flood. As a result, Carlisle loaned an experiencedmember of staff for the duration of the response phase, which Doncaster described asbeing invaluable. Afterwards, the Mayor of Doncaster suggested the compilation of anational register of people with expertise in handling similar events, which could bereferred to by responders during emergencies.

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5.33 These arrangements generally workedwell, although a number of designated restcentres could not be used because theywere flooded. So, too, were other importantsites, including police headquarters, countycouncil offices holding data on vulnerablepeople, and depots holding sand stocks.

5.34 There is a clear need to check thatthose sites which have an important rolein response to flooding (and other majoremergencies) have sufficient resilienceagainst flooding and the loss of electricityand water supplies to enable them tobe used.

“We were taken to a rest centre wherefour families were accommodated. I wasimpressed by the help that was given tous by the council – including a specialsleeping bag for myself and my baby.Please pass on our thanks to the manypeople who helped that night. Someonegenerously brought us more nappies,bowls and baby wipes. There were plentyof sandwiches and breakfast the nextmorning as well as hot tea and coffee.”

Householder, Pangbourne

Case study – The experiences of a young man and his familyMark Harris* had responsibility for three generations – his parents living elsewhere intown, as well as his own family. He first heard about the flooding via a call from his fatherwho called him to say “Get down here and help”, as his parent’s home was flooding. Halfan hour after he arrived at his parents’ house, he had a call from his wife, saying heshould get home because his own house was now flooding.

When Mark arrived, he saw that the water had smashed through the floor of his houseand there were fountains of water coming up through the floor. He phoned the council,who told him that they would send sandbags. These eventually arrived a week later. Healso called the fire and rescue service and got through to the service in another county,Hampshire, because the local one was so overloaded with calls. The Hampshire servicewas not able to respond. Because the location of his estate forms a natural basin, Markhad a metre of water sitting in the house for two days. He feels that new housing locallyhas meant that the old drains no longer work. He also claims that, because the waterflooding his house was contaminated, nobody would agree to take it away.

During those two days, Mark decided that enough was enough and that he had to get hisfamily out of the house. He called the council and was told that he could go to the localleisure centre with his family. He drove through the flood water with his family to get there,only to find that it was not being used as a rest centre and he had been given the wronginformation.

Mark feels that there was a real lack of co-ordination, and information, which left hisfamily feeling unsupported. He eventually received some financial help from the ParishCouncil, but states that they are the only organisation to have helped him at all.

*An alias has been used to protect the respondent’s identity


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Floods along Molly Millars Road, Wokingham © RexFeatures

5.35 There were many instances of peoplein transit being stranded away from theirhomes in both the June and July 2007flooding events. For example, about 500people were stranded at Gloucester railwaystation when the rail network failed.However, the largest single event occurredon Friday 20 July, when an estimated10,000 motorists in the South-West werestranded overnight between Junctions 10and 12 of the M5 and on some other roads.In this instance, rest centres were able toaccommodate around 2,000 peopleovernight, and only 80 people remained atthe centres the following day, testifying tothe effectiveness of the local authority inhelping people to resume their journeys.However, the consequences of a similarevent during the colder winter months couldbe much more serious (and have been onother occasions). This area merits better

preparedness planning at local, regionaland national levels.

5.36 In areas close to motorways, trunkroads and major transport hubs, planningfor rest centres must take account of theneed to cater for a potentially large numberof people left stranded. The Review notesthat, although the need to make provisionfor people stranded in road blockages isincluded in guidance issued by the CabinetOffice, it is not clear that this guidancecaters adequately for the range of needs oflarge numbers of people left stranded, asexemplified by the summer’s events. Thisshould be addressed.

5.37 That said, it is clearly better to preventpeople from being stranded in the firstplace, especially through the use of earlier,stronger, more specific warnings, orstrategic road clearance and closures,perhaps beginning a long way from theactual flooded areas.

5.38 The Review is aware that theHighways Agency, through its regionalcontrol centres, has contingency plans inplace to respond to serious blockages onthe motorways and trunk roads. However,

IC 44 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that, as part of theiremergency plans, Local ResilienceForums should consider the vulnerabilityof motorways and trunk roads toflooding, and consider the potential forearlier, stronger, more specific warnings,and strategic road clearance andclosures, to avoid people becomingstranded.

IC 43 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that Cabinet Office guidanceto local planners should specificallyinclude incidents which leave largenumbers of people stranded onmotorways and trunk roads.

REC 5 – The Review recommends thatall Local Resilience Forums shouldundertake an urgent review ofdesignated rest centres and other majorfacilities to ensure either that they havethe necessary levels of resilience toenable them to be used in the responseto flooding and other major emergencies,or that alternative arrangements are putin place.

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these plans are focused on risks such assnowfall, ice and accidents, rather thanflooding. The Review welcomes plans toenhance traffic clearance by theintroduction of more ‘cross-overs’(demountable central barriers), and thefurther development of the memorandumof understanding between the EnvironmentAgency and the Highways Agency, settingout communication arrangements forflooding events.

Flood victims at the Main Tesco store in the centreof Gloucester receiving bottle water supplies © RexFeatures

Emergency supplies5.39 Some private sector companies madea major contribution to the emergencyresponse through the provision of suppliesfor those affected, including food, waterand sanitation supplies, drawing on theirestablished and efficient distributionnetworks. But the response exposedweaknesses in arrangements for theprovision of logistical support to emergencyresponders.

5.40 The delivery of drinking water topeople in Gloucestershire who had lost

their mains supply generated an urgentneed for a range of vehicles. Smallervehicles were also required to navigatenarrow roads in some areas. These werenot easily found. Central Governmentdepartments also became engaged insourcing other supplies, including wetwipes and portable toilets. Thearrangements put in place to carry out thistask, although broadly successful, were adhoc, and consumables were sourced laterthan would have been desirable.

5.41 The Review is aware that the CabinetOffice is now examining how best toinstitute arrangements to source essentialsupplies in a major emergency, for examplethrough the establishment of stockpiles orthe provision of call-off contracts. ‘Virtualstockpiles’, whereby necessary productsand suppliers able to provide them in bulkare identified before an emergency, couldhave a significant role. This work should bepursued urgently.

Emergency water provision5.42 On Sunday 22 July 2007, the Mythewater treatment works in Gloucestershirewas submerged by rising flood water andshut down; water supplies to 140,000properties (some 350,000 people) werelost. The Armed Forces provided support toSevern Trent Water as part of the verysubstantial logistical operation that wasneeded in order to ensure emergencywater provision. After initial challengesresponders coped well with the difficult

REC 6 – The Review recommends thatthe Cabinet Office, with otherdepartments, should urgently considerthe costs, benefits and feasibility ofestablishing arrangements for the urgentacquisition of supplies during a majoremergency, including the use of call-offcontracts or the creation of national orregional stockpiles of equipment andconsumables.

“We had everybody that worked here inthe local charity office phoning Asda,Tesco, John Lewis – everybody you canthink of donated food, candles, towels,bedding and quilts.”



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circumstances they faced. Mains suppliesto all 140,000 properties were not fullyrestored until 2 August and not declared fitto drink until 7 August, 17 days aftersupplies were lost.

5.43 The Review will consider in its finalreport the lessons to be learned from thisepisode for building better preparednessplans for the loss of drinking water. In onearea, however, work needs to be takenforward as a matter of urgency.

Residents fill up their containers with drinking waterfrom a bowser in Langford © Rex Features

5.44 Regulations require water companiesto provide a minimum of 10 litres ofdrinking-quality water per person per daywhen mains supplies fail.1 Depending onthe size of the water company concernedand the total population it supplies, theguidance sets in place contingency plansto ensure that in smaller incidents 8,000 to50,000 people receive this 10-litre provisionfor durations of up to three days. For majorincidents, the requirement rises to 200,000people for a week.

5.45 With logistical support from the ArmedForces, Severn Trent Water provided therequired volume of water. But thecontingency plans were clearly notsufficient for the large population (350,000people) who had to be supplied, or for thelong period (17 days) for which supply wasrequired. And it is arguable whether 10litres per person per day is in any casesufficient. The World Health Organization,for example, recommends that a minimumof 15–20 litres per person per day be madeavailable as soon as possible, and thisfigure rises greatly once sanitation isfactored in; the generally quoted target is50 litres. Even this figure does not takeaccount of the increased needs ofvulnerable people such as the elderly andthose with small children.2

Science and Technical Advice Cells 5.46 Science and Technical Advice Cells(STACs) were established to support GoldCommands in Yorkshire and the Humber,the West Midlands and Gloucestershire

IC 45 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that Defra should review thecurrent requirement in emergencyregulations for the minimum amount ofwater to be provided in an emergency, toreflect reasonable needs during a longer-term loss of mains supply.

“I think the big picture response wasimpressive. The speed with which theymanaged to get the resource together, thedistribution going – the army were broughtin and people were advising on that aspect.But I mean it did happen fairly quickly, andwhen you look at the area on the groundwith the number of people that they weretrying to supply, it was a big area.”

Resident, Upton

1 www.ukresilience.info/upload/assets/www.ukresilience.info/water_guidance.pdf2 Technical Notes for Emergencies – Minimum water quantity needed for domestic use in emergencies,Technical Note No.9, WHO 07/01/05 – www.who.or.id/eng/contents/aceh/wsh/water-quantity.pdf

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during the 2007 floods. The conceptworked well, but a number of issues wereraised, not least in the area of public healthprotection where there was confusion overthe respective roles and accountabilities inlaw of staff of the Health ProtectionAgency (HPA), primary care trusts (PCTs),strategic health authorities (SHAs) and, inGloucestershire, the Drinking WaterInspectorate.

5.47 The fundamental value of a STAC –the provision for Gold Commanders of asingle point of advice on matters of publichealth – was reinforced by the events ofsummer 2007. But the current STACguidance is not sufficiently clear about howroles within the STAC should bedischarged, in large part because the law isnot clear in this area. There is an urgentneed to provide a clearer definition of theseroles. It has been proposed to the Reviewthat the HPA should have primaryresponsibility for the provision of healthprotection advice in an emergency, withPCTs and SHAs having lead responsibilityfor the direction of NHS services andresources; this proposal should beexamined urgently.

5.48 A ‘national STAC’ was also set upduring the floods to advise centralGovernment, especially debate in CabinetOffice Briefing Rooms (COBR). Someexperts were asked to attend both local andnational STACs, which led to competingdemands on their time and stretchedresources. It was unclear to some whetherthe role of the national STAC was to provideadvice on the same issues being consideredby the local STACs, or to provide support inareas that could not be handled by the localSTACs. Similarly, it was unclear whetherdecisions made at the local level had to besigned off by the national STAC.

5.49 The Review is aware that Departmentof Health guidance clarifying health roles inSTACs is due to be published by the end of

2007, and recommends that this should beimplemented as a matter of urgency. TheReview also welcomes development workat the Department of Health to examine theroles of national and local STACs and totest the effectiveness of the new guidancethrough an exercise.

Vulnerable people5.50 The Review has heard many accountsof humanitarian assistance offered by localauthorities and voluntary organisationsduring the 2007 floods in order to ensuresocial care support for vulnerable people.The Red Cross, for example, deployed staffand volunteers to assist with the evacuationof stranded people, the provision ofpractical and emotional support in restcentres and people’s homes, and thedelivery of humanitarian relief in the formof bottled water, food and hygiene items tothose most in need. St John Ambulanceprovided 24-hour support to affectedcommunities with volunteers and vehicles:some volunteers acted in support ofambulance services, responding toemergency calls, while others helped set upand staff rest centres.

5.51 Flooding events may place higherdemands on those dealing with vulnerable

“After five days the council had a wagonthat fetched sandwiches and water and aRed Cross van provided hotdogs andother food… but for five days it wasreally scary.”


REC 7 – The Review recommends thatDepartment of Health guidance clarifyingthe role and accountabilities oforganisations involved in providingscientific and technical advice during amajor incident should be implemented assoon as possible and understood byGold Commanders.


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people than other emergencies. Indeed, thedefinition of who is vulnerable may itself bewider. It will cover the elderly and sick anddisabled people as well as those with smallchildren. In addition, parents of dependentchildren may have the added problem ofcollecting their children from school ornursery. Other vulnerable groups mayinclude foreign language speakers whomight not understand or be aware of floodwarnings, and people who have recentlymoved to an area.

5.52 The Review heard that ‘door-knocking’to alert householders to imminent floodingrisks was widely welcomed. It also providedresponders with an early opportunity toidentify those needing help, including bycross-referencing house calls with recordsof vulnerable people. A relatedrecommendation is made in Chapter 7.

5.53 The Review is aware of work underway by the Cabinet Office to provide localresponders with advice on the definition of

vulnerable people, how best to identify themand planning to provide social care supportin an emergency. This advice should takeaccount of the lessons of the summer’sevents, and then be issued urgently.

5.54 It is evident that some responderswere reluctant to share personalinformation with each other for fear ofcontravening duties of confidence or theData Protection or Human Rights Acts. Ingeneral, emergency responders shouldbalance the potential damage to theindividual (and where appropriate the publicinterest in keeping the informationconfidential) against the public interest in

REC 8 – The Review recommends thatthe guidance currently under preparationby the Cabinet Office to provide localresponders with advice on the definitionand identification of vulnerable peopleand on planning to support them in anemergency should be issued urgently.

Case study – Communities helping each otherJack Dawson* lives with his with wife and children in West Oxfordshire. His family homewas not flooded but was at risk of being so. However, many of the people close to wherehe lives were flooded. He was aware that he lived in an area at risk of flooding butdescribed the “shock of seeing the damage and chaos caused by the floods” that he“couldn’t have ever contemplated”.

West Oxfordshire was “split in half by the floods”. Half were severely flooded, while theother half “got lucky”. Jack’s story sticks out because it exemplifies many of the otherpersonal stories of communities pulling together and people assisting the most vulnerablein their communities.

Like so many others, Jack’s immediate action was to protect his family. Early in themorning, he arranged for a family friend to take his family out of danger. Having done this,he stayed behind to help other local residents take care of elderly neighbours. Thisbecame a priority for him. He also helped people to move furniture upstairs contactedtheir relatives.

However, much of the help Jack provided for vulnerable neighbours affected by the floodscame in the days after the flooding. With three friends, he helped two elderly neighboursclear up the “mess and sludge” left by the floods in the downstairs and garden. Hedescribes himself as “having no choice… they needed help and I was able to give it”.


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sharing the information. In emergencies,the public interest consideration willgenerally be more significant than duringday-to-day business. But it is clear that thismessage has not yet been received by allemergency responders. It is also clear thata number of myths around data protectionstill remain.

5.55 The Cabinet Office has issuedguidance to the emergency respondercommunity to dispel some of the mythssurrounding data protection as an aid toemergency planning, response andrecovery3. One of the key principles in thatguidance is that data protection legislationis not a barrier to appropriate informationsharing. The guidance provides a frameworkwithin which personal information can beused with confidence that individuals’ rightsto privacy are respected.

5.56 The Review encourages responders tofamiliarise themselves with this guidance,and the Cabinet Office to continuepromoting it, in order to ensure that

appropriate relationships are establishedbetween bodies, such as social caredepartments, faith groups and voluntaryorganisations, which hold relevant data onvulnerable people.

5.57 Another issue brought to the attentionof the Review relates to animals, includinglivestock and domestic pets. The RSPCA iswidely recognised as an importantcontributor to the response effort, andcentral guidance encourages LocalResilience Forums to use its resources.Although animal rescue must be regardedas secondary to people’s safety, it has beenobserved that some people are reluctant tobe rescued or evacuated without their pets.RSPCA capabilities thus form a welcomeaddition to the resources available foremergency response.

“They tried to evacuate the street, butthere was me and two other housesstayed because we’d got pets, basically.”


Case study – Evacuation and petsMartin Brody* lives in a rented house in Chesterfield, which he shares with his partnerand their cat. At the time of the floods, he and his partner initially stayed in their house,living in their upstairs bedroom for around three weeks. There was no suitable temporaryaccommodation for them to stay in with their cat, and they did not want to incur the costinvolved in sending the cat to a cattery. They therefore chose to stay in the house despitethe extensive damage and contamination that had been caused to the ground floor bythree feet of dirty flood water.

After some time living in this way, restricted to one room on the upper floor, Martin and hispartner had a bout of sickness and diarrhoea, stomach pains and loss of energy. Despitetheir best efforts to clean up the house, he feels that their illness must have resulted fromthe contamination caused by the flood water.

Martin is very resentful of the lack of support from the local council in cleaning up afterthe floods. He received a leaflet from the council several days after the flood, withinstructions on how to approach the clean-up. This was felt to be ‘too little too late’, andarrived at a time when practical help and support, such as equipment or help withcleaning, were required.


3 www.ukresilience.info/response/recovery-guidance.aspx


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The National And RegionalResponse 5.58 Although flooding is predominantly alocal emergency, larger-scale events, suchas those witnessed during the summer,often require support at regional andnational levels. The exceptionally largescale and variety of the summer 2007floods, coupled with the consequentwidespread disruption of essentialservices, made the regional and nationalefforts integral to the response.

5.59 Central government’s response to eachof the string of major emergencies followedthe guidance laid down in CentralGovernment Arrangements for Respondingto an Emergency.4 This distinguishesbetween incidents which are primarilymanaged locally, with little or no centralgovernment engagement, and those thatrequire closer working with centralgovernment, either primarily through theLead Government Department or, wherethere is a need for wider governmentinvolvement, through the activation of centralcrisis arrangements and facilities (‘COBR’).In the summer 2007 floods, the centralgovernment response was led by Defra, thelead government department for flooding.

5.60 The Review considers that overallthere was strong collaborative working andco-operation between governmentdepartments and agencies during the 2007floods and that the central response waseffective and coordinated. Certaindepartments played a particularlyprominent role, notably Defra as the leadgovernment department, CLG as the leaddepartment for the recovery phase, and theCabinet Office.

Central government crisis machinery5.61 The flooding in June 2007, althoughundoubtedly serious, was judged on thebasis of initial reporting from the

Environment Agency to be within thecapacity of local responders to manage.COBR was not therefore formally activated,although consolidated briefing on thesituation was produced and circulated bythe Cabinet Office to all governmentdepartments, and Defra (with theEnvironment Agency) provided a continuedoversight of the response. There was,however, recognition, based on experiencefrom the flooding in Carlisle in 2005, thatthe major challenge was likely to be duringthe recovery phase. The centralgovernment focus was therefore placed onconfirming CLG’s leadership of cross-government activity to support recoveryefforts in the affected areas, and ensuringthat financial and other support was maderapidly available.

5.62 COBR was activated during the July2007 floods. The trigger was a forecast bythe Environment Agency – which turned outto be broadly accurate – that the scale ofthe flooding would be severe and on a parwith that in 1947. As well as the directflooding emergency, COBR was used forthe succeeding civil emergencies, includingthe prolonged interruption to water suppliesfollowing the loss of the Mythe watertreatment works and the threat to Walhamelectricity switching-station, as well as laterflooding events in the Thames Valley. Eachof these events was expected to requiresignificant central government support froma number of departments to the localmulti-agency response. This proved tobe the case.

5.63 The activation of COBR waswelcomed by Gold Commands, and playedan important role in the achievement ofimproved performance. Departments feltthat the response was better co-ordinatedand more focused than had been the casein June. While it would be wrong to say thatthe non-activation of COBR in June was a

4 www.ukresilience.gov.uk/upload/assets/www.ukresilience.info/conops.pdf

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failure, it is certainly right to say that itsactivation in July enhanced the overallresponse. This experience points to thedesirability of earlier activation of COBR ona precautionary basis in the future in theevent of serious flooding in order tofacilitate access by local responders tocentral government and to ensure a betterunderstanding of the evolving situation.

Information management 5.64 Although local responders generallyappreciated central government’s need forlocal information, the Review has learnedthat they were frustrated by the volume ofinformation requested and the time it tookto collate. On the other hand, centralgovernment was concerned by the lack ofagreement on the extent of the floodingand the scale of the damage. This wasexemplified by the range of informationsupplied on the number of propertiesaffected by the June floods. InitialEnvironment Agency reports were of3,000–4,000 properties affected, whileseveral days later the Government Officesand local authorities were reporting 30,000houses flooded from all sources, includingsurface water.5 It was subsequentlyestablished that the discrepancy arosebecause the Environment Agency wascounting only properties affected by riverflooding, excluding those in urban areasaffected by surface water flooding – themost significant impact in June.

5.65 These and similar discrepancies canbe partly explained by the differentlocations and timings of reporting and the

widespread nature of the flooding. Theymay also reflect instances where GoldCommands were not established to providethe strategic dimension. However, they doraise questions over the extent to whichthere was a coherent understanding on thescale and extent of the problems faced.While accurate figures will inevitably taketime to collect and data collection must takea lower priority to saving life, roughestimates of the scale of damage need tobe made available to allow scarceresources to be effectively prioritised. Thisdata should also be sufficient for centralgovernment’s immediate needs.

5.66 The confusion experienced in Junesuggests that for surface water floodingevents, central government should seekinformation via Government Offices fromlocal authorities in the first instance. Datafrom the Environment Agency and theAssociation of British Insurers (ABI) shouldbe used as supplementary evidence togauge the extent of potential damage.

5.67 It will also be helpful to be clearerabout what data is needed, who isresponsible for providing it and when. Thiscould be captured in pre-agreed templatesfor specific scenarios, reducing the amountof work needed at the local level during anevent. This model could be incorporatedinto central government’s usual template forsituation reports – referred to as a CommonRecognised Information Picture (CRIP).

5.68 One further issue is the handling ofinformation once it reaches centralgovernment’s crisis machinery. Informationpresented to ministers through CRIPs duringthe summer was on occasions inaccurate.This could be improved by simplifyinginformation content, or by establishing aDefra/Environment Agency situation room,as discussed later in this chapter.

IC 46 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that central government crisismachinery should always be activated ifsignificant wide-area flooding ofwhatever nature is expected or occurs.

5 CCWater report, Response to Loss of Water Supply, September 2007


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5.69 The Review considers that more workis needed on these issues and possiblesolutions and it will return to them in itsfinal report.

Defra – the role of the leadgovernment department5.70 As the designated lead governmentdepartment for flooding, Defra was at theheart of the Government’s response to theflooding. It discharged this role withcommitment, working with otherdepartments and the Environment Agency.

5.71 However, Defra’s response took timeto settle into an effective pattern. This wasessentially due to the unprecedentednature of the floods and the way in whichthe July flooding events rapidly led on to amuch more serious emergency, affectingessential services and critical infrastructure(and thus going well beyond Defra’s day-to-day responsibilities).

5.72 The careful and effective response tothe possibility of East Coast flooding inNovember shows that both Defra and theEnvironment Agency have already learntlessons and improved their level ofperformance. Defra also has importantemergency responsibilities in relation toanimal disease and other significant risksand there is now a significant body ofexpertise and experience within thedepartment which should be capturedand shared.

5.73 Defra’s position was furthercomplicated due to the split ofresponsibilities between it and theEnvironment Agency. However, therelationship was generally productive and

there is no evidence to support a need todraw the Environment Agency more closelyinto the department following the summer2007 events.

5.74 This split of responsibilities, along withthe very local nature of flooding impact,means that direct comparisons with othernational emergencies such as foot-and-mouth disease or pandemic influenza needto be made cautiously. Nevertheless, thereare some national-level planning andresponse techniques used in other areaswhich could have obvious benefits for theresponse to flooding events.

5.75 The fragmented, locally-focusednature of planning for the response tofloods is one such issue. While this did notmaterially affect the quality andeffectiveness of the local response, timewas spent dealing with issues which couldhave been pre-determined centrally. Inother areas (such as pandemic influenza),such issues are addressed within a singlenational framework – a model in which thelead government department bringstogether information, guidance and keypolicies in a single strand of planning, thusproviding a resource for all tiers ofgovernment and key external partners. It isnot an emergency plan, but it does bringcoherence and identify key prior decisions.The Review believes that capturing goodwork on emergencies across government inthis way would be sensible.

5.76 Management of the operational-policysplit between Defra and the EnvironmentAgency was achieved through very closeworking relationships. Nevertheless,

REC 9 – The Review recommends that,in order to effectively fulfil its LeadDepartment role for flood riskmanagement and emergency response,Defra needs to urgently develop andshare a national flood emergencyframework.

IC 47 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that Defra extends its currentdepartmental programme to share bestpractice and provide training inemergency response across theorganisation.

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experience from other emergencies showsthe efficiency benefits that come fromsingle site co-ordination of key informationgathering and decision-making. A separateEnvironment Agency control room andindividual policy teams in Defra had to workharder than necessary in order to delivercoherence. This could in future be betterachieved if staff representing key divisionsin Defra and the Environment Agency wereco-located together to support decision-making and work with ministers in theirrepresentative role. To succeed, thisenhanced co-ordination and communicationeffort would need to be supported directlyby the top management teams of bothorganisations. The Review drawsencouragement from analogous, veryeffective arrangements to bring togetherDefra and Animal Health in the response tomajor animal diseases.

Exercising

5.77 The improvements which Defra wasable to institute before the July floodsreflect the learning experience many ofthose involved went through. Thisdemonstrates the benefit of experiencewhen framing any response. Thisexperience can come in two ways –through dealing with actual emergencies orthrough exercises. Because relying onexperience of actual emergencies alonemay risk dissipation of experience andexpertise, the Government has a wide-ranging exercise programme to ensure thatexperience gained is then sustained.

5.78 The last national flooding exercise wasExercise Triton in 2004. The exercise

scenario covered an extreme event withextensive coastal flooding affecting nearlyhalf of England and Wales. The Reviewnotes that another national floodingexercise is not due until 2010 (althoughlocal flooding exercises do take place).The capability of central government in aserious flooding emergency would beenhanced if that exercise could be broughtforward, not least because departments willbe refining their arrangements in light ofboth their own learning and this Review.

Regional leadership

5.79 Regional Civil ContingenciesCommittees (RCCC) were activated in thesouth west region on 23 and 24 July as aprecaution against the potential wide-areaimpacts of power loss that would haveoccurred if Walham switching-station hadbeen flooded or closed down. These werethe first RCCCs activated since the CivilContingencies Act came into force in 2004.

5.80 The Review has heard evidence that,regionally, the reasons for activating theRCCC were not widely appreciated andthere was some uncertainty in responders’minds over the RCCC’s authority andrelationship with COBR. Some peoplewrongly believed that the RCCC had acommand and control function above GoldCommand rather than being a structure forcoordinating the regional picture andliaising with central Government. It appearsto have been sensible for the RCCC tomeet when it did and to step it down onceit was clear that widespread power loss hadbeen avoided. However, the Cabinet Office

IC 49 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that a national floodingexercise should take place at the earliestopportunity in order to test the newarrangements which central governmentdepartments are putting into place todeal with flooding and infrastructureemergencies.

IC 48 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that Defra and theEnvironment Agency work together toestablish a single London situation roomto coordinate flooding information, to actas a focal point for cross-Defra efforts,and to support Defra ministers.


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and CLG should explain the situation tolocal responders, drawing on the events ofthe summer and the role and purpose ofRCCCs.6

Financial assistance

5.81 During and after the floods, theGovernment made a number of grantawards to assist affected regions and helpthose in greatest need, totalling £63 millionin November 2007. The money was usedfor example to repair schools and roadsand to cover the replacement of essentialhousehold items for vulnerable individualsand their families. The Review has heardpraise for the Government’s swift award ofthese grants and the flexibility given to localauthorities in their allocation of the funds tothose in need; however, there have alsobeen concerns raised about differences inhow the schemes operated and uncertaintyas to whether they will apply in the future.

5.82 Government financial assistance wasprovided via four main schemes:

• the ‘Bellwin’ Scheme, through which CLGmade emergency financial assistanceavailable to local authorities to cover thecosts of the emergency response;7

• the Flood Recovery Grant, paid by CLG,which was mainly used by localauthorities to ease the plight of thoseaffected by the floods;

• a grant to help schools and young peoplepaid by the Department for Children,Schools and Families (DCSF); and

• a scheme to provide support for therepair of roads damaged in the floodsprovided by the Department forTransport (DfT).

5.83 The Bellwin scheme may be activatedwhere local authorities have spent moneyin taking immediate action to safeguard life

or property or to prevent suffering or severeinconvenience. As such, it applies to theresponse phase of an emergency ratherthan recovery activities such as repair andrestoration.

5.84 During the floods, the Governmentrevised the ‘Bellwin’ rules to assist localauthorities with 100 per cent (up from 85per cent) of their eligible emergency costsover a standard threshold. This waspraised, as was the scheme more generally.But the scheme has also been describedas limited in that it focuses exclusively onresponse, with no scope for fundingrecovery activities. It is clear that localauthorities in particular would like financialassistance to help their communitiesrecover from exceptional events.

5.85 The Flood Recovery Grant and thegrant paid by DCSF were created followingthe June floods. Although this assistancewas very much welcomed, local authoritieshave said that differences in the way theschemes operate have led to confusion.The Review has heard from a number oflocal authority Chief Executives whoallocated funds where the need was urgentwithout being sure that the money would bereimbursed by the Government. Thisreliance on trust left the Chief Executivespersonally – rather than institutionally –exposed. Furthermore, following messagesfrom government that the schemes shouldnot be regarded as setting a precedent,local authorities are uncertain whether theywill be available in future majoremergencies.

5.86 The British Chambers of Commerce(BCC) welcomed flood grants from theRegional Development Agencies (RDAs) tohelp businesses, but reported thatbusinesses were sometimes unaware ofthem. They also highlighted the impacts on

6 http://www.ukresilience.info/upload/assets/www.ukresilience.info/err_chap_08.pdf7 http://www.local.communities.gov.uk/finance/bellwin/bell078.pdf

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businesses which were not directly affectedby the floodwaters, but who had suffereddue to customers or staff being cut off byroad closures. Because they were notdirectly flooded, insurance did not covertheir losses and they were not eligible forRDA flood grants. The BCC has suggestedthat in such cases a contingency fundmight be considered which could offergrants or short-term loans.

5.87 Relief funds collected by voluntaryorganisations played an important role inhelping those most in need during and afterthe floods. £5 million was collected by theRed Cross UK Floods Appeal and at least£900,000 was raised through RotaryInternational in Great Britain and Ireland. Inaddition, 14 local appeal schemes were setup by local authorities. While the localappeal schemes raised large sums ofmoney and were of undoubted value, theReview has been advised that a singlenational fund might have gained moremedia coverage and raised more money.However, a possible counter-argument isthat donations were intentionally made tolocal schemes to provide local benefits andaccordingly might have been moregenerous. The Review does not make anyrecommendations in this respect, but thearguments might be considered by thosesetting up future appeals.

5.88 The question of financial assistance isa complex issue. Response and recoverymust be properly resourced but the rightsafeguards and incentive structures have tobe in place.The Review is aware offorthcoming studies and will consider thefindings of these and make firmrecommendations in its final report.Certainly, more can be done to streamlineexisting arrangements.

Transition to recovery5.89 The transition from response (theactions taken to deal with the immediateeffects of an emergency) to recovery (theprocess of rebuilding, restoring andrehabilitating the community following anemergency) flowed smoothly over thesummer in most areas. However,submissions to the Review have noted that,in some cases, separate recovery sub-groups were not set up from the outset andthat this led to confusion arising as to whoshould direct resources and negotiate withkey partners.

5.90 The Review therefore recommendsthat recovery sub-groups are set up fromthe outset. Submissions also highlight thevalue of a formal handover ofresponsibilities between Gold Command,usually chaired by the police, and theRecovery Co-ordinating Group (RCG),normally chaired by the Chief Executive ofthe Local Authority. The Reviewrecommends that this approach is followedin future.

5.91 These observations andrecommendations are reinforced byrecent Cabinet Office guidance8 and theReview recommends that awareness ofthe guidance is raised at Local ResilienceForums. One other concern raised bylocal authorities is the ‘dropping off’ ofsome responders once handover to theRCG has taken place. The value of acontinuing contribution by appropriateresponders to the recovery phase shouldnot be underestimated. The Review

IC 50 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that financial assistance forlocal responders in relation to emergencyresponse and recovery should be revisedto improve speed, simplicity and certainty.

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strongly endorses high-level representationon both Gold Command during theresponse phase and the RCG during therecovery phase. Local Resilience Forumsshould agree which responders areessential to both stages.

“The whole of the ground floor of ourhouse was damaged by the flooding.Almost nine weeks on now, and we areliving a nightmare day in day out. We livein the upstairs area of our house asdownstairs is ripped back to brick. Wehave no cooker, so live on takeaways andmicrowave food. The thought of sufferinga winter in this mess is unthinkable.”


“I lost all my Christmas decorations, kids’passports, birth certificates and photos.I have got no possible way now ofgetting them.”


IC 51 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that Local Resilience Forumsshould be made aware of recent CabinetOffice guidance setting out the transitionto recovery. Recovery sub-groups shouldbe established from the onset of majoremergencies and in due course thereshould be formal handover from GoldCommand to the local RecoveryCo-ordinating Group(s), normally chairedby the Chief Executive of the affectedlocal authority.

James Hooker, right, and his wife Liz, scrub the floor of his parent’s house which was damaged by floodwater in Tewkesbury, Gloucester © Empics

Chapter 6 – Critical Infrastructure: Keeping OurEssential Services Going

Chapter 6:CriticalInfrastructure:Keeping OurEssentialServices GoingSummaryThis chapter explores the issuesthat need to be considered toimprove the resilience of criticalinfrastructure.

It is divided into four sections:

• understanding criticalinfrastructure;

• impacts on criticalinfrastructure;

• protecting our infrastructure;and

• managing the risks from damsand reservoirs.

Introduction6.1 As Chapter 1 describes, the summerfloods of 2007 were unprecedented. Theywere the result of exceptional and record-breaking rainfall in many areas of England,which led to record levels of flooding in someparts of the Severn catchment in July andthe largest ever surface water flooding eventin South Yorkshire and Humberside in June.

6.2 Each of these events had a direct andimmediate impact on people’s lives. But itwas the loss of essential services such aselectricity and water that showed once againthat, in major emergencies, responders mustalso deal also with the indirect effects, whichcan be very much greater.

6.3 The summer’s events were a reminderof the need to pay greater attention toimproving the resilience of criticalinfrastructure against flooding if we are toavoid harm to people’s social and economicwell-being, not only in flooded areas butalso well away from them.

Emergency teams in Gloucester try to preventthe flood water rising any futher at the Walhamelectricity switching-station © Rex Features

People’s reactions to the loss of essentialservicesThe overall feeling can be summed up in thecomment from one person that the loss ofessential services was like a “return to the DarkAges”. Another interviewee, commenting on thedependency on technology and transport, said “thefloods completely overpowered everything”; othersthat the loss of electricity left people isolated –“We didn’t have anything, we didn’t have torches,we didn’t have candles.”

The loss of water was seen by some people as themost serious loss. People felt very strongly thatloss of the water supply should not have happenedand, more importantly, should never happen again.The loss led to panic buying and associated low-level public disorder. Other services and productswere affected: there was panic buying of bread –“You would have thought people were going tostarve” was one comment; petrol was in shortsupply; mobile telephones did not work andlandlines were down – “… so they said if youneed us ring 999, but what are we going to do,get a lighter and sit on the roof or something,it was absolutely impossible”. 91


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Understanding CriticalInfrastructureWhat is critical infrastructure?6.4 At the simplest level, infrastructureconsists of the basic facilities andinstallations needed to provide services forthe functioning of an advanced,industrialised society. There are manydefinitions, developed for specific purposes.For example, the final report by theIndependent Review Body on the Junefloods in Hull refers to ‘hard’ (basic utilities)and ‘soft’ (intangible) social infrastructureand the assets that support it such asschools. Other definitions are sector-specificand relate to activities such as planning anddevelopment.

6.5 Without wanting to downplay theimportance of ‘soft’ infrastructure, the mostrelevant definition for the purpose of thisReview is that developed to help direct theUK’s response to security threats. It isfocused around the concept of essentialservices – the things that matter most topeople for their well-being.

6.6 An important element of this definitionis the concept of ‘criticality’. Thus, whetherinfrastructure is ‘critical’ should bedetermined by the impact of its loss on the

delivery of essential services and hencepeople’s well-being. Distinguishing betweencritical and non-critical infrastructure in thisway enables a risk-based andproportionate approach to work to preventand prepare for emergencies, includingflooding.

6.7 By its very nature, this is a broaddefinition. For this Report, the Review hasused a narrower focus on the assets andservices that are provided by Category 2responders under the Civil ContingenciesAct 2004 (CCA). These include privately-owned fixed assets of companies (such aswater and sewerage undertakers, powersupply companies, telecommunicationsproviders and the railways) and the state-owned road network. These have beenchosen because they figured prominently inthe summer’s floods but also since it ismainly on these, in combination, thatmaintaining other essential services suchas the production and distribution of foodand medical supplies largely depends. As aresult, the failure of one part of the criticalinfrastructure can have severe knock-oneffects on other parts. For example,evidence from Yorkshire Water illustratesthat services outside the floodplain can bejeopardised if they have no contingency forthe loss of other essential services, suchas electricity, on which they rely but whichare produced by installations that are atrisk from flooding. An understanding ofsuch interdependencies betweeninfrastructure sectors is a key part ofidentifying what is ‘critical’.

6.8 That is not to downplay services at alocal level that are important for everydaylife, including schools and the local roadnetwork. But these assets typically eitherinclude a degree of resilience, or the lossof the services that they provide has amuch less immediate impact. Theseelements of the infrastructure need to betackled once the basic services have beenstabilised.

“The National Infrastructure comprisesthose sectors which supply essentialservices to the citizen on which normaldaily life in the UK depends. These areEnergy, Water, Communications,Transport, Finance, Government, Health,Food and Emergency Services. The mostimportant sites, physical assets andinformation or communication networkswithin these sectors whose loss wouldhave a major impact on the delivery ofessential services are deemed the CriticalNational Infrastructure.”

Centre for the Protection of NationalInfrastructure

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Chapter 6 – Critical Infrastructure: Keeping Our Essential Services Going

AnglianWater

YorkshireWater

ThamesWater

SevernTrent Water

Totalnumber of

assets

Watertreatmentworks#

1 1 1 2 5*

Populationaffected

2,500 losttheir supplyfor 2 hours

No loss ofsupply dueto re-zoning

No loss ofsupply dueto re-zoning

Mythe –350,000without

water for10–17 days

Sewagetreatmentworks#

63 90 56 113 322

Sewagepumpingstations

58 145 109 62 374

Table 5 – Number of water companies' assets affected by flooding,summer 2007

* This figure does not include one water treatment works operated by Dwr Cymru, which was flooded fortwo days, leaving 5,000 without water.

# Information on impact is being collated by Ofwat as part of the annual returns process for managingwater companies performance and will be available next year.

The Events Of Summer 2007And Their Impacts On CriticalInfrastructure 6.9 Tables 5 and 6 set out the number ofwater and electricity supply assets thatwere inundated during the summer floodsand, where they failed, the services lost.

6.10 The loss of services in these twosectors had an enormous effect onpeople’s lives, as evidence to the Reviewhas made clear. And it is now clear that theimpact could have been much worse:additional substantial disruption was onlynarrowly avoided in a number of cases.The particular case of Walham switching-station is considered below. In addition, thedam at Ulley Reservoir, near Rotherham,very nearly failed, putting in danger life anda number of other infrastructure assets,including the M1 motorway, a majorelectricity substation and the gas networkconnection for Sheffield. Power to theSheffield conurbation was also very nearlylost, which would have left 750,000 peoplewithout electricity.

“The main panic over essential servicesfocused on water. There were nearpunch-ups in the local Sainsbury’s overwater. It was pandemonium. People werejust terrified at being left without water.”

Householder, West Oxfordshire


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Other affected sectors6.11 The rail sector was also substantiallyhit by the floods and widespread damagewas caused. Several lines and stationswere closed for between two and sevendays, with some out of action for longerwhere significant repair work was needed.Lines affected included: Reading–Oxford;Cheltenham–Gloucester; CravenArms–Shrewsbury, including services toManchester; Oxford–Worcester;Birmingham New Street–Gloucester;Chester–Hooton; Sheffield–Doncaster;Sheffield–Leeds; Sheffield–Retford–Lincoln;Sheffield–Cleethorpes; Doncaster–Hull;and Knaresborough–York. Where possible,substitute road transport was provided,although this was limited by road closures.Network Rail estimates that the repairs,some of which have been completed, will

cost some £32 million. LondonUnderground was also severely disrupted,with 25 stations closed.

Due to the proximity of the M1 to the UlleyReservoir, traffic was diverted as aprecautionary measure. In July, the closureof the M5 in Gloucestershire on one of thebusiest days of the year left 10,000vehicles stranded, many of them holiday-makers travelling through the area.

“The floods showed us how dependentwe are on technology and the transportsystem. The floods completelyoverpowered everything.”


Affectedregion South Yorkshire and Humberside Gloucestershire and

surrounding area

Asset National GridTwo major substations– Neepsend and Thorpe Marsh

CE Electric UKYorkshire ElectricityDistribution plc

Four major substations and 55secondary substations

Gelderd Road YEDL control centreevacuated

Damage to low-voltage networkcables

National GridWalham switching-station requiredemergency flood defencereinforcement and pumping toavoid loss due to flooding

Central Networks Three bulk supply point substations– Warndon, Timberdine and CastleMeads

400 distribution substations

Damage to low-voltage networkcables

Customersaffected

35,000 customers initially lostsupply – most supplies quicklyrestored but some 9,000 customerswere on rota disconnection forseveral days

40,000 customers supplied byCastle Meads were cut off for up to24 hours

Table 6 – Number of electricity transmission and distribution assetsaffected by flooding, summer 2007

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Case study – Events at the Mythe water treatment works Mythe water treatment works is owned andrun by Severn Trent Water. It serves apopulation in excess of 350,000, providingwater to Cheltenham, Gloucester,Tewkesbury and a large part of ruralGloucestershire. It is one of five watertreatment works that are unable to receivewater from other parts of the Severn Trentnetwork, so their loss would result in acomplete loss of supply to a significantnumber of customers.

Mythe is constructed on artificially raisedground on the bank of the River Severn, close to its confluence with the River Avon.Water is abstracted from the River Severn for treatment. The wide floodplain providesextensive storage for floodwaters and reduces the rate at which they rise. Mythe hadbeen assessed as being at risk of flooding from approximately a 1-in-100 chance

per year event.

Early on Sunday 22 July 2007, Mytheworks flooded. Severn Trent undertook acontrolled shutdown to limit damage to theplant. This critical procedure preventedelectrical failure and saved several daysin re-commissioning the works once thefloodwaters had receded. By Monday23 July, there were 70,000 propertieswithout a piped water supply. Theshutdown of Mythe and the totaldrawdown of the connected servicereservoirs and distribution network left350,000 people without any piped waterfor up to 17 days.

Hesco Bastion in place at Mythe Water treatmentworks

The rivers Severn and Avon meeting at the Mythewater treatment works in Tewkesbury,Gloucestershire © TopFoto


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Case study – Walham switching-station and Castle Meads substation Walham switching-station is part of the UKhigh-voltage electricity transmission networkand is owned and operated by National Grid.The site supplies power to approximately500,000 customers across Gloucestershireand South Wales.

It is built on raised ground next to the RiverSevern. National Grid had previously carriedout risk assessment for flooding of thenetwork. This had concluded that Walhamswitching-station was at risk from events at

around a 1-in-1000 chance per year. A recent assessment carried out in 2005 put riskfrom flood events in the range 1-in-75 to 1-in-200 chance per year.

On Sunday 22 July 2007, water levels started to rise and threatened to inundate the site.Overnight, 1km of temporary flood barriers were erected around the site by the ArmedForces, Environment Agency, emergency services and National Grid. Although the sitewas inundated, the barriers, coupled with pumping, stopped the water from rising furtherwhen the water level peaked on 23 July. During this time, the site did not fail and theessential service continued.

Had the switching-station failed, there would have been a loss of electricity supply tosome 240,000 homes and businesses in the Gloucester area, and reduced the resiliencein the supply of electricity supply to South Wales. However, National Grid was able toanticipate and mitigate the risk by creating a circuit bypass arrangement around Walham.

National Grid has since installed a more permanent flood defence system at Walham.

The Castle Meads sub-station, which is part of the local distribution network, was shutdown and power to 40,000 homes was cut for 24 hours while temporary defences wereconstructed and the site pumped out to facilitate re-commissioning.

Drivers negotiate a flooded dual carriageway nearBrough, East Yorkshire © Rex Features

6.12 Despite the road network’s intrinsicflexibility, allowing drivers to reroute andcircumnavigate problem areas, the floodshad a significant local impact. For example,motorway closures affected the M1, M4,M5, M18, M25, M40, M50 and M54, andmany local and trunk roads were alsodisrupted. Repair costs have beenestimated at £40–60 million.

Flooding beside M1 motorway during the incident.Colouration of water is caused by shoulder materialfrom Ulley Dam

6.13 The oil industry was also affected bythe floods, resulting in some delay to thebulk supply of fuel products delivered byrail to terminals and other storage facilitieswhile rail services were suspended,although suppliers and distributors wereable to maintain deliveries from alternativeterminals. Distributors responded quickly tothe increased demand for back-upgeneration in Gloucester and thesurrounding areas as a result of the loss ofelectricity supply. The movement of oilproducts by pipeline was unaffected by theflooding, and road deliveries took placearound flooded areas. Filling stations wereclosed in the flooded areas where theywere not accessible or could not operate.

6.14 Flooding affected National Grid’s gasdistribution network in the Sheffield and TollBar areas. A number of measures were putin place by National Grid to ensurecontinuity of gas supply to the Sheffieldarea. A bridge collapsed on the main roadin Ludlow, severing a gas main and causingthe local area to be evacuated.

6.15 Telecommunication operators andproviders experienced a degradation oflocal access networks because offloodwater infiltration. But British Telecomnoted that they suffered less degradationand failure than they expected, partly as aconsequence of the increased use of glassfibre as a replacement for copper cabling.The interconnected nature of the networkprovided a degree of resilience and helpedprevent significant failures.Telecommunications companies believethat flooding has the capability to disablenetworks when coupled with power failure.The industry is currently consideringchanging the threshold at which networkcontrol centre managers become alerted topotential problems, so that they are warnedwhen a major incident has been declaredand a Gold Command is being established.

The legislative framework for criticalinfrastructure6.16 The Review has undertaken an initialanalysis of the legislative frameworkcurrently in place for emergency planningand response, within which infrastructureproviders operate. The key obligations areto be found in both the Civil ContingenciesAct and sector-specific legislation.

The Civil Contingencies Act 2004

6.17 The CCA places very few obligationson infrastructure providers, although theyare obliged, as Category 2 responders, toco-operate with Category 1 responders andassist them in fulfilling their obligations toassess risk, maintain plans and advise thepublic.

6.18 Section 2 of the CCA places arequirement on Category 1 responders toassess the risk of an emergency, maintain

“Most of the landlines went down.Everyone had to use their mobiles.”

Business owner, Hull

“I couldn’t get any petrol to go to workbecause there was so many peoplewaiting to fill up. There just wasn’tenough to go around.”


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plans to ensure that in an emergency theywill be able to perform their functions(business continuity plans) and undertaketo prevent or mitigate the effects of theemergency (emergency plans). It also setsout the role that Category 2 respondersshould play in that process.

6.19 Infrastructure providers are required toattend Local Resilience Forum meetings sofar as practicable, and to share informationwith requesting responders (subject toexemptions on the grounds of security andcommercial sensitivities). There are noparticular obligations on Category 2responders about their role in planning foremergencies.

Sector-specific legislation

6.20 Sector-specific legislation containssimilar sorts of obligations to plan for,prevent and respond to particular sector-specific eventualities (such ascontamination, loss of supply or loss ofservice). The most relevant provisions are:

• The power to direct water and sewerageproviders under the Water Industry Act1991. The Secretary of State is entitledto give directions in the interests ofnational security, or for the purpose ofmitigating the effects of civil emergency.The current direction is the Security andEmergency Measures (Water andSewerage Undertakers) Direction 1998. Itrequires providers to make and reviseplans to ensure the provision of essentialwater supplies or sewerage services.

• Obligations in the Electricity Safety,Quality and Continuity Regulations 2002.Electricity generators, distributors andmeter operators are required to construct,use and protect their equipment toprevent interruption of supply so far asreasonably practicable. Generators anddistributors are also required to preventdanger due to the influx of water into anyenclosed space arising from the

installation or operation of theirequipment.

• Obligations in the Gas Safety(Management) Regulations 1996. Aperson who conveys gas is required tomaintain a ‘safety case’ to plan how todeal with a gas escape, to demonstrateadequate arrangements to minimise therisk of a supply emergency, and to makearrangements to deal with dangerousincidents.

• Obligations in the Control of MajorAccident Hazards Regulations 1999.Operators of installations of dangeroussubstances in the oil industry arerequired to take all measures necessaryto prevent major accidents, and to limitthe consequences to people and theenvironment.

• The power contained in theCommunications Act 2003 to enableOfcom to impose conditions ontelecommunications providers regardingthe provision, availability and use of thecommunications network and services inthe event of a disaster and for thepurposes of emergency planning.General Licence Condition 3 requiresproviders to maintain, to the greatestextent possible, the proper and effectivefunctioning of the public telephonenetwork. General Licence Condition 5requires providers to restore servicewhere practicable.

• The power to direct rail operators underthe Railways Act 1993. The Secretary ofState is entitled to issue a broad range ofdirections to the Office of RailRegulation, owners or operators ofrailway assets, or people who providerailway services about the use,management or provision of assets orservices in the event of a majoremergency.

Protecting our infrastructure6.21 Clearly, in general it is better to seekto prevent critical infrastructure being lost,whether to flooding or other naturalhazards, than to have to respond to its loss.But, in contrast to the co-ordinated,systematic campaign led by the Centre forthe Protection of National Infrastructure toprotect critical infrastructure against acts ofterrorism, it is clear from evidencesubmitted to the Review that the approachtaken to mitigating the risk from naturalhazards has largely been uncoordinatedand reactive.

6.22 The Review welcomes the work nowbeing undertaken by industry andregulators to assess vulnerability to, andrisks from, flooding. For example, theEnergy Networks Association, Water UKand Ofwat all have reviews under way inthe wake of the summer 2007 floods. TheHighways Agency is also carrying out workto protect the motorway and trunk roadnetwork from natural hazards. These arewelcome initiatives in themselves and theywill provide valuable insight and potentialsolutions. But they are not sufficient inisolation. A key lesson of the summer isthat, especially given the growing risk ofsevere weather events described in

Chapter 3, the Government needs to put inplace a systematic campaign to reduce thevulnerability of critical infrastructure tonatural hazards.

A strategic framework to reducevulnerability to natural events6.23 As with the programme to enhancethe protective security of criticalinfrastructure, the Government has a keyrole in providing the framework for aconsistent, proportionate and risk-basedapproach across and within infrastructuresectors, designed to deliver a reduction invulnerability to natural hazards over anumber of years. That framework shouldbe rooted in central, common standards onthe level of protection that should beprovided – and hence the level of flood riskthat is acceptable. Any such standardsmust take account of the costs – what isaffordable in the prices charged for their

IC 52 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Government shouldestablish a systematic, coordinated,cross-sector campaign to reduce thedisruption caused by natural events tocritical infrastructure and essentialservices.

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Case study – United Utilities’ approach to criticality assessment Analysis carried out by United Utilities (UU) of the risk to its infrastructure has led to thedevelopment of a company policy that proposes that all new or critical existing facilities atrisk from flooding are to be designed to withstand a 1-in-1,000 chance flood event, whileall existing non-critical facilities at risk of flooding are to be designed to withstand a 1-in-100 chance flood event. A ‘critical’ facility has been defined as one that, if it failed, wouldhave an impact on over 25,000 customers.

UU is currently carrying out a study to assess the current levels of flood protection ateach of the facilities deemed to be at risk from flooding. This work will determine themost appropriate flood defences and the associated investment required.

UU is carrying out assessments of each of its facilities to determine the impact of thefailure of each facility as a result of flooding. UU will also carry out a cost-benefit analysisand make the case for adequate funding for flood defence work in the next Ofwat pricereview.


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services by the relevant industries – andthe impact of losing those services.Judgements in these areas will affectdecisions on the timetable for theimplementation of protection measures. Allof these are issues of public policy and arefor the Government.

6.24 A proportionate, risk-based frameworkwill encompass a range of options forreducing vulnerability, from a high level ofphysical protection for the most vital assetsdown to no protection at all for sites whereprotection would simply be uneconomic andwhere better contingency planning forfailure is the best option. It should be based

around three core functions: assessingcriticality; assessing vulnerability; andconsidering options for mitigation.

6.25 The first step should draw on therevised approach to assessing criticality setout in Lord West’s recent review.1 There aremany synergies between work to protectinfrastructure from threats from terrorismand from natural events such as flooding.For example, the impact of the loss ofessential services is the same regardless ofthe cause of the disruption. TheGovernment can therefore use the analysisof criticality that has been developed aspart of the framework to tackle securitythreats to inform the development ofnational guidance on protection againstnatural hazards, and this could then beapplied by infrastructure operators to theirspecific assets.

6.26 The next step should be to determinethe proximity of critical infrastructure assets

IC 53 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Government shoulddevelop and issue guidance onconsistent and proportionate minimumlevels of protection from flooding forcritical infrastructure.

Asset

Number of sites in flood zone (flood risk probability)

Significant (1 in 75)

Moderate (1 in 75 to 1 in 200)

Low (1 in 200or fewer)

Total in allthree zones

Water and sewerage 737 223 179 1,145

Electricity (generationand distribution)

2,215 2,263 3,818 8,423

Gas (works anddistribution)

5 8 10 23

Telephone exchanges 82 67 86 241

Motorways 139km 104km 132km 382km

A roads 884km 553km 809km 2,278km

Railway lines 1,470km 750km 948km 3,213km

Table 7 – EA study showing infrastructure overlain on flood risk maps(river and sea floodplains)

1 www.number10.gov.uk/output/page13757.asp

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Case study – Improving resilienceIt is clear that understanding potential flood risk and taking action to mitigate it has paidoff. The preparations that Yorkshire Electricity Distribution Ltd (YEDL) made as a result ofprevious experience of extreme natural events have resulted in its infrastructure beingmore resistant to flooding risks. YEDL had improved the defences at a number of itshighest risk electricity sub-stations in response to the 2000 flood events. YEDL believesthat this investment helped to reduce the impact of the flooding on its assets andmaintained essential services for customers in the North East.

Blackburn Meadows electricity substation protected by flood defences.

to the floodplain (or their exposure to othernatural hazards). The results of a recentEnvironment Agency project to identify thevulnerability to flooding of criticalinfrastructure are given in Table 7 above.

6.27 At this stage the Agency’s analysisdoes not take into account the degree ofresilience to flooding and the data may beincomplete. So the analysis can give only abroad understanding of the scale of thetask.

6.28 Once criticality and vulnerability areknown, there are a number of choices tobe made about how best to mitigate therisk of future flooding. The first stageshould be to consider whether vulnerabilityis likely to be reduced as a result of anexisting or future Environment Agency flooddefence scheme. If not, infrastructure

owners will need to consider a range ofpossible options, including:

• Relocation of the asset. This wouldinvolve moving high-criticality assets outof the floodplain altogether and into alow-risk area.

• Improving the robustness of flooddefences. This could include permanentdefences for high-risk sites through todemountable or temporary defences forsites at medium risk.

• Increasing resilience of the service orasset. This may involve making theservice more resilient by buildingadditional network connections and/ormaking the asset more resistant toflooding through waterproofing keycomponents or raising them out ofharm’s way.


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6.29 This section has focused on theprotection of existing assets. As thoseassets reach the end of their useful lives,resilience needs to be built in at theplanning stage for any replacement andnew assets. Guidance on standards shouldtherefore be framed in such a way that itcan be used to inform decisions about theappropriate level of protection for futurebuilding and take into account differencesbetween sectors. We consider that theguidance should also include allowancesfor predicted climate change impacts overthe life of new and replacement assets.

Costs and who bears them6.30 Cost-benefit analysis will be animportant element in assessing what isacceptable for both the private and thepublic sectors – the first important test iswhether the benefits of action outweigh thecosts. Not all measures that are identifiedto improve the resistance of particularinfrastructure assets or services fromflooding will pass such a test; as notedabove, different, lower cost options may bemore appropriate in some instances.

6.31 Even if the test is passed, questionsof affordability and prioritisation will alsoarise. The existing economic regulatoryframeworks provide the obvious route forfunding work to reduce the vulnerability ofinfrastructure assets owned by the privatesector. However, infrastructure operatorsmust be able to justify that work on thebasis of risks, costs and benefits, drawingon the standards set by the Governmentand within frameworks established by theeconomic regulators (including the extent towhich costs could be passed on toconsumers).

6.32 Figure 16 illustrates our vision for howa national framework for protecting criticalinfrastructure from flooding could becombined with strong local leadership. Itcomplements a number of structures and

IC 54 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that infrastructure operatingcompanies should present the casefor further investment in floodresilience through the appropriateregulatory process.

Figure 16 – Strategic framework for protecting critical infrastructure

Ministers National Level

Local Level

LocalAuthorities

LocalResilience

Forums

CounterTerrorismSecurityAdvisors

IntelligenceAgencies

New team(natural hazards)

Sponsorgovernmentdepartment

CRITICALINFRASTRUCTURE(e.g. Water, Electric

and TelephoneCompanies)

Centre for Protectionof National

Infrastructure(Terrorist threats)

EconomicRegulator

Met Office

EnvironmentAgency

Guidance

Guidance

Emergency plans

Business plan

Advice onimplementing

plansScrutiny of

plans

Sharing ofinformation oncritical sites toensure robust

emergencyplanning

Plans to protect vulnerablecritical infrastructure

developed in linewith guidance

Scrutiny of plan toensure cost

effectiveness andmonitor delivery ofcapital investments

Standards of protection

Local EARepresentatives

disciplines used by the Centre for theProtection of National Infrastructure toprotect critical infrastructure from securitythreats. This approach would allow theGovernment to identify priorities based ona common understanding of criticalityand would minimise burdens oninfrastructure operators.

The need for consistent businesscontinuity planning 6.33 It may not be possible on practical oreconomic grounds to provide protection forall assets. And no level of protection canever be complete – exceptional events canalways overwhelm defences. Socontingency planning for the loss ofservices is equally important.

6.34 The first step is business continuityplanning. Business continuity planning is aprocess developed to counteract systemsfailure and is essential to businessesregardless of size and sector. Ensuring thatthere is an effective business continuityplan in place is an invaluable step that canbe taken to make sure that the servicesthat infrastructure operators deliver aremaintained for as long as possible or that, ifthey are lost, there is sufficient contingencyin place and that the service is recoveredas quickly as possible. The BritishStandards Institute has recently published anew standard (BS 25999) for businesscontinuity management.

6.35 Evidence to the Review so farsuggests that planning for failures is patchyand inconsistent. The Hull IndependentReview concluded that Yorkshire Water didnot have a plan for failure of theBransholme pumping station, which plays akey role in draining Hull. Severn TrentWater notes that Mythe is one of five watertreatment works in its region that representa single point of failure resulting in acomplete loss of supply to a significantnumber of customers. Although some formof contingency plan exists for all the sites,

only one has been considered seriousenough to merit the development of aspecific scheme to ensure supplies in theevent of failure. These are two specificcase but they highlight a discrepancy that islikely to exist within this and otherinfrastructure sectors. The Reviewwelcomes Severn Trent Water’s analysisand the work that it has in hand to learnlessons from the summer, includingrevisiting its contingency plans.

6.36 The work proposed on businesscontinuity planning by Severn Trent Waterneeds to be undertaken consistently acrossrelevant sectors, in conjunction with thewider emergency planning community. TheReview believes that this is of sufficientimportance to merit making it a legal duty.

Emergency planning 6.37 If protective measures areoverwhelmed, and business continuityplans are insufficient, the final fallback isthe activation of emergency plans.

6.38 Information is the lifeblood of effectiveemergency planning. But it is clear fromevidence provided to the Review that theamount of information available to enableemergency planning for the loss ofemergency services has been insufficient.

6.39 The Review has identified from themany emergency responders consultedduring the course of the Review that theyhad an inadequate understanding of:

IC 55 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that a duty should beintroduced on critical infrastructureoperators to have business continuityplanning to BS 25999 in place to moreclosely reflect the duty on Category 1responders. This should includeminimising the loss of service as far aspracticable in the event of a seriousemergency resulting from flooding.

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• the location of critical sites;

• the mapping of their vulnerability toflooding;

• the consequences of their loss; and

• their dependencies on other criticalinfrastructure assets.

6.40 Responders considered these to befundamental weaknesses in localemergency response. Thus, from evidencesubmitted to the Review, it is clear that theLocal Resilience Forum and theGloucestershire Gold Commander wereinitially unaware of the vulnerability toflooding and the criticality of Mythe watertreatment works and Walham switching-station. Even at national level, centralgovernment did not initially have access toaccurate and up-to-date data.

6.41 The Review is concerned about thisfinding, not least because it is clear thatsome of the information is held by localpolice forces and some parts ofgovernment. The Review recognises thatthere will always be security concerns overmaking information on critical infrastructuresites too readily available. But experiencefrom summer 2007 suggests that a betterbalance needs to be struck between securityand sharing information so as to improvepreparedness at all levels in order to protectthe public. There is no reason whyinformation should not be shared with keyemergency planners as quickly as possibleon a secure basis. We acknowledge thework underway nationally to improve theavailability of information on Critical NationalInfrastructure during a crisis.

6.42 There is also a need for improvedinformation-sharing and knowledgeexchange on a routine basis betweeninfrastructure operators, in their roles asCategory 2 responders, and emergencyplanners in local authorities and otherCategory 1 bodies to better understand thevulnerability and consequences of failure,thus enabling effective planning foremergencies.

6.43 The CCA gives Category 1responders the right to request informationfrom Category 2 responders so thateffective plans can be put in place. SomeCategory 2 responders also have pre-existing requirements on them, for exampleunder their licence conditions fromregulators or by a direction from therelevant government minister, to assess riskand to prepare emergency plans.

6.44 However, experience suggests thatCategory 2 responders are likely to rely onexceptions that relate to, for example,commercial confidentiality. The Reviewrecognises that many of the Category 2responders are private sector bodies, whichmay be in competition with other Category2 responders within the same area. But,while it is important that these needs arerespected, it is clear that this issue shouldnot be allowed to impinge on the speed,effectiveness and co-ordination of theresponse.

6.45 The Review is aware that theCabinet Office is reviewing the operationof the CCA, including structures, dutiesand supporting guidance, to consolidatebest practice and to draw on lessonslearned from major emergencies andexercises since it came into effect. Thisissue is of such importance that it meritsparticular attention in that review, againstthe overall goal of achieving betterinformation-sharing.

REC 10 – The Review recommendsthat Category 1 responders should beurgently provided with a detailedassessment of critical infrastructure intheir areas to enable them to assess itsvulnerability to flooding.

Involvement of infrastructureoperators in Gold Command6.46 Evidence to the Review suggests thatthe involvement of Category 2 respondersin multi-agency emergency responseexercises has historically been patchy. As aresult, the integration of Category 2responders into Gold Commands set up tomanage the response to each emergencyas it arose was initially slow. Feedback fromCategory 2 responders who attended GoldCommands indicates that they were oftenunfamiliar with the Gold Commandstructure and attendance and arrivedwithout knowing what facilities to expect.

6.47 The Review has noted evidence fromresponders that Severn Trent Water mayhave been able to cope better in the earlystages of the loss of Mythe water treatmentworks had they been more closely involvedin multi-agency planning, and had both thecompany and its partners been better

informed about local circumstances andinfrastructure.

People queue outside the Town Hall at a watercollection point in Tewkesbury, Gloucestershire© Rex Features

6.48 The Gold Command held inGloucestershire proved the value of teammembers who were familiar with each otherfrom previous exercises and meetings.Getting to know potential members of GoldCommands before an emergency,especially through exercises, speeds upmulti-agency working during an incident.Training, such as the ‘Gold Standard’training provided by the Government’sEmergency Planning College, would ensurethat responders knew what to expect whenattending a real Gold Command situation.

Local leadership and scrutinyof emergency plans6.49 The recent Hull Independent Reviewidentified a number of serious issues withthe design, maintenance and operation ofthe pumped drainage system in Hull. Theseissues had been recognised and raised aslong ago as 1996, but were apparentlynever acted upon. The local authorityshould have understood the extent of

IC 59 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that Category 2 respondersshould be required to participate fully atGold and Silver Commands and that theGovernment should deliver this throughthe Civil Contingencies Act or otherregulatory regimes.

IC 58 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that Local Resilience Forumsshould ensure that Community RiskRegisters reflect risks to criticalinfrastructure from flooding andother hazards.

IC 57 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that single points of failure andthe complete loss of assets need to beexplicitly considered in the riskassessment and contingency planningundertaken by operators, emergencyplanners and responders.

IC 56 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that, in relation to information-sharing and cooperation, the CivilContingencies Act and Regulationsshould be extended to require Category2 responders to more formally contributeinformation on critical sites, theirvulnerability and the impact of their loss.

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vulnerability in order to ensure that this vitalservice was maintained for the good of thelocal community and that plans were put inplace for potential failure. Had there beeneffective information exchange, coupledwith local scrutiny, it would have provided abetter understanding of the risks and wouldhave promoted earlier action and thedevelopment of contingency plans. Thepeople of Hull would undoubtedly havebenefited.

6.50 The Government has set out its visionfor stronger governance and accountabilityat the local level in the Local GovernmentWhite Paper. The framework for this visionhas been embedded by the passage of theLocal Government and Public Involvementin Health Act in October 2007. The Actcontains provisions to enhance localauthority scrutiny and ensure closer workingthrough Local Area Agreements andtargeting to improve the economic, socialand environmental well-being of the area.

6.51 The Review notes the strengthenedplans proposed for scrutiny of local bodiesby local authority scrutiny committees. TheReview considers this to be a valuable toolin assuring people through their electedmembers that emergency plans are robustand reflect their concerns, and it should

assist elected members to demonstrateleadership. This will be a vital step inturning national advice into action on theground.

Local capability6.52 The Review considers that issuesaround infrastructure, requiring areasonable degree of technicalunderstanding of the sectors involved andthe need to maintain commercialconfidentiality, are not ones that are typicalof matters relating to emergency planning.Additionally, because of the wide potentialconsequences of infrastructure loss, it maybe necessary to work across LocalResilience Forum boundaries. We thereforethink that Local Resilience Forums willneed to consider new arrangements foraddressing infrastructure resilience. We areaware that the Sector Skills Councils haveasked the Skills for Justice Council todevelop National Occupational Standardsfor contingency planning. We would ask the

IC 60 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that the emergency plans andbusiness continuity plans of essentialservice providers should be reviewedannually by local authority scrutinycommittees.

Case study – Ulley and other incidentsBetween 24 and 25 June 2007, 90mm of rain fell in 18 hours. The subsequent overflow atUlley Reservoir caused failure of the masonry walls of the spillway and significant structuraldamage to the dam wall. It is to the great credit of the emergency services that action wastaken quickly, with the M1 closed and around 1,000 people in local villages evacuated as aprecaution in case the dam breached. The emergency services pumped millions of litres ofwater from the reservoir to ease the pressure on the damaged dam. The dam was finallydeclared safe some 40 hours later, after emergency works were completed.

In all, the Environment Agency recorded eight incidents at reservoirs registered under the Actover the summer period of high rainfall. In addition, although the Agency is aware of anotherten incidents at reservoirs that are outside the terms of the Act, more may have occurred.For the most part, these incidents involved overtopping of the dams due to inadequatespillway capacity for the exceptional amounts of rainfall that occurred. Not all of these mightbe regarded as significant, and, in the event, none had to be treated as emergencies.

Councils to consider including emergencyplanning for critical infrastructure.

Managing the Risks fromDams and Reservoirs6.53 Reservoirs are an important part ofour infrastructure and perform a range ofvaluable functions, including helping us tomaintain our water supplies. But they mayalso present serious risks in the event ofbreaches, related to the threat to humanlife, property and infrastructure assets frominundation as a result of catastrophicfailure of dam walls.

6.54 The last major breach that occurred inthis country was in 1925 and led to the lossof 21 lives. While there have beenbreaches and near misses since then,there has been no loss of life. This can beattributed to the effectiveness of theenforcement regime first introduced in the1930s and updated in the Reservoirs Act1975. Although the risk of reservoir failurecan therefore be regarded as less likely, theReview considers that there is no cause forcomplacency, particularly in the light ofevents during summer 2007.

Aerial view of Ulley Reservoir after heavy rain © Empics

6.55 At present there are over 2,000reservoirs registered under the ReservoirsAct 1975 in England and Wales. These areof three types:

• impounding, (a structure across a valley);• non-impounding (a wholly bunded

structure); and • service reservoirs (enclosed structures

for potable water storage).

6.56 The majority of reservoirs are of theimpounding type and are owned by theprivate sector, including water companies(which own 35 per cent of this stock).Water companies own reservoirs for bulkwater storage to feed water treatmentworks and provide flow compensation,together with service reservoirs fordistribution into the main water supply. Anumber of other organisations maintainreservoirs for water supply purposes,including farms for irrigation.

6.57 The average age of the reservoir stockis 110 years, and many reservoirs are nowused for purposes other than their originalintention. For example, in rationalising theirstock of reservoirs, water companies havesold off many of their smaller reservoirs,which are now used for recreation.In addition, industry maintains reservoirsassociated with mines and quarries, andmany of their older reservoirs built duringthe industrial revolution are also nowused for recreational uses such asboating and fishing.

6.58 The Reservoirs Act 1975, as amendedby the Water Act 2003, provides for asafety regime for any reservoir with acapacity of over 25,000 cubic metres abovenatural ground level. At the heart of theregime is the responsibility on the reservoirundertaker to ensure the safety of thereservoir. Since October 2004, theenforcement authority for England andWales has been the Environment Agency(enforcement was previously theresponsibility of 136 local authorities).

IC 61 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that critical infrastructureplanning should become a separatediscipline within civil protection at thelocal level.

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6.59 The Review has noted the latestbiennial report by the Environment Agencyon its enforcement of the Act in Englandand Wales. We commend the approach theAgency has taken, putting in considerableeffort to catch up on a significant backlogof under-enforcement and in its continuingwork to trace unregistered reservoirs. Indoing this, it is clear that the Agencyprioritised its resources by tackling thehigher-risk reservoirs first.

6.60 Nevertheless, the Reservoirs Act 1975is not a risk-based measure. The volumetriccriterion for inclusion in the Act’s controlsapplies to all reservoirs over the 25,000cubic metre capacity limit regardless of therisks they might pose to people andproperty. A number of reservoirs and damsexist to which the Act’s controls do notapply for that reason (reservoirs andlagoons associated with mine workings, forexample, are governed by the requirementsof the mines and quarries legislation, underwhich a structure that is capable of holding10,000 cubic metres of water and presentsa significant hazard is regulated). However,there is no reason in principle why any damor reservoir that falls below the volumetriccriterion should be assumed to posesignificantly less of a risk. What matters isthe potential risk to people and property,including essential services, in thesurrounding area. This situation has arisenfor historic reasons to do with the way inwhich legislation in various areas hasdeveloped separately. But the resultingposition is illogical and inconsistent. In itsbiennial report to the end of March 2007,the Environment Agency considers that amore risk-based approach to dams andreservoirs of all sizes and for all purposesshould be implemented. The Reviewconsiders that the summer’s events confirmthe soundness of the Agency’s view thatthe scope of the Reservoirs Act should bereviewed accordingly.

6.61 The Review also notes that theEnvironment Agency has called for otherchanges to the current legislation, alldesigned to modernise the currentenforcement regime. The Review believesthat it would be helpful if the Governmentwere to draw up such proposals inreadiness, and we will give furtherconsideration to the issues in the finalreport.

6.62 The Review has received commentsfrom one resident living near UlleyReservoir that knowledge of the risksshould have been more widely known.Local emergency planners should also beaware of and take action to plan for suchrisks. It is therefore encouraging that Defraand the Environment Agency are planningto require undertakers to prepare on-siteplans for reservoir incidents and for theseto be accompanied by off-site plans bylocal authorities and other emergencyplanners in the areas surrounding thereservoirs that could be affected.

IC 63 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that all reservoir undertakersshould be required by Defra to prepareinundation maps and share them withLocal Resilience Forums to improveCommunity Risk Registers andemergency planning.

IC 62 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Government shouldimplement the legislative changesproposed in the recently publishedEnvironment Agency biennial report ondam and reservoir safety.

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Chapter 7:Engaging thePublicSummaryThis chapter examines:

• raising awareness before theemergency;

• weather and flood warnings;• providing advice during the

emergency; and• the role of communities and

individuals.

The RNLI evacuate Francis Jarvis, 78, aresident from Abbeyfield House, Tewkesbury,Gloucestershire © Rex Features

7.1 The events of summer 2007 touchedmany lives. As Chapter 2 explains, theimpact on communities which sufferedflooding or the loss of essential serviceswas in many cases severe. The emergencyresponse described in Chapter 5 did muchto alleviate the impact, but the authoritieswere limited by the sheer scale of events.Communities, businesses and individualsneeded to take action themselves before,during and after the flooding in order toprotect people and possessions.

7.2 This chapter explores how the publicwere involved in the flood-relatedemergencies, what impact that had andwhat lessons can be drawn for the future.

Raising Awareness before theEmergency7.3 The public’s response to the summer2007 floods differed according to whetherpeople were aware of the risks and able totake action as a consequence. Peopleobviously need to be aware of a floodingrisk before they can act. But even this maynot be enough – of those we talked to whoactually knew prior to the floods that theywere at risk, relatively few had doneanything to prepare. This finding is backedup by evidence from other sources. Recentresearch1 suggests that while 60 per centof at-risk residents in England and Walesclaim to be aware that they live in a floodrisk area, only 39 per cent of those whohad previously been flooded have takenany action to prepare for floods, falling to6 per cent of those with no prior experienceof floods.

1 Harries, T. (2007) “Householder responses to floodrisk: The consequences of the search forontological security. PhD Thesis, Flood HazardResearch Centre, University of Middlesex

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7.4 The Environment Agency’s floodwarning system has limited levels of publicuptake. In the regions affected by thesummer 2007 floods, only around 20 percent of people invited had joined the FloodWarnings Direct service. The level ofuptake varies significantly: for the Midlandsand Thames Regions, only 35 per cent and28 per cent respectively of the peopleinvited to sign up to the service did so,while for the North East (includingYorkshire) and Anglian regions, the figuresare 17 per cent and 9 per cent. In addition,the Agency’s analysis shows that around27 per cent of telephone calls made underthe Flood Warnings Direct system were notpicked up by recipients. In England andWales overall, only around 41 per cent ofpeople for whom the Flood Warnings Directservice is available take up the service –approximately 276,000 properties. Take upmatters; research has shown that 75 percent of people who receive a warning goon to take some form of action.

7.5 The Review is aware of work theEnvironment Agency is doing to engagemembers of the public and reduce levels ofapparent indifference. This includestargeted awareness campaigns to gethouseholders and businesses to sign up tothe Agency’s Flood Warnings Direct serviceand, in high risk areas, to develop flood

plans and business continuity plans. TheAgency is now looking at alternativemarketing approaches that tailor messagesto a range of demographic groups by, forexample, offering prizes for the first peopleto sign up for warnings or raising initialinterest via puzzles in newspapers. Thisapproach is currently being trialled and theAgency hopes to have results back byearly 2008.

7.6 Other approaches could include makingthe public and businesses more aware ofthe impact of flooding using graphic imagesof flood damage, in a similar way to themethods used in anti-smoking and drink-driving campaigns. Signs about flood riskcould be placed on street furniture such asbus stops, lamp posts and benches, and inshared areas of buildings such as offices. Inwork premises, flood drills could be run in asimilar way to the more familiar fire drills.

Flood warnings

The Environment Agency’s flood warningsystem consists of four codes. Eachcode indicates the level of dangerassociated with the warning:

Flood Watch

Flooding of low-lying land and roads isexpected. Be aware, be prepared, watchout!

Flood Warning

Flooding of homes and businesses isexpected. Act now!

Severe Flood Warning

Severe flooding is expected. There isextreme danger to life and property. Actnow!

All Clear

Flood Watches or Warnings are nolonger in force for this area.

www.environment-agency.gov.uk

“We were shut for three weeks after thefirst flood. The second time, we weremore prepared and it didn’t come in. Ittook a week to get back (to opening) thattime. We had just re-laid carpets after thefirst one and we said we’re not losing allthat money so we took it up.”

(Business, East Lindsey)

“When I saw on the news that there werealerts and things, I didn’t take muchnotice of them.”

Business, Hull

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7.7 The Review has taken evidence thatthe current descriptions of areas at riskusing named stretches of watercourse – forexample, “between ‘x’ brook and ‘y’ stream”– are unhelpful, both to emergencyresponders and the public. Most people donot use watercourses as a reference pointand struggle to understand informationissued on that basis. Our research revealedthat many people felt that a reliable alertwas required that directly applied to theirstreet or neighbourhood. The Review isaware that the Environment Agency haswork underway to tailor information toindividual communities.

7.8 There is a demand for personalisedwarning information that is tailored in itstargeting, delivery method and detail. Itwould be helpful if these factors, could beconsidered and options drawn up beforethe Review’s final report.

7.9 Along with awareness campaigns, theEnvironment Agency has a pilot scheme toautomatically register eligible householdsand premises for flood warnings unlessthey opt out. The question has been raised

as to whether it is legally permitted for suchan ‘opt out’ scheme to be rolled out morewidely, for example to ex-directorytelephone numbers. This needs urgentclarification and the Review hopes asolution can be found.

Weather And Flood Warnings7.10 The Review has received largelypositive evidence from the public on theaccuracy and timeliness of the Met Office’sSevere Weather Warnings. As described inmore detail in Chapter 5, weather forecastspreceding the events of June and July 2007were generally detailed and accurate withinthe limitations of current technology. Thepublic were kept well informed, receivingwarnings via the media and the MetOffice’s website and Customer Centre. TheMet Office also held regular briefings withits customers, including the BBC, to sharethe most up-to-date information.

7.11 The Environment Agency’s FloodWarnings generally worked well in summer2007 for river flooding, and effective andtimely coastal flood warnings were issuedduring the East Coast surge in November.However, many of the summer’semergencies were caused by groundwaterand surface water flooding and thereforemany people affected were unaware of thesituation even as it unfolded.

REC 11 – The Review recommendsthat the Environment Agency shouldwork urgently with telecommunicationscompanies, consulting the InformationCommissioner as necessary, to facilitatethe roll-out of ‘opt out’ telephone floodwarning schemes to all homes andbusinesses liable to flooding, includinghomes with ex-directory numbers.

IC 64 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Environment Agencyshould produce a sliding scale of optionsfor greater personalisation of publicwarning information, including costs,benefits and feasibility, before theReview’s final report.

“The websites don’t actually say Tesco’scar park is going to flood – it’s thistributary and that confluence – and forpeople who don’t have a geographicalknowledge of the rivers and the waythey’re formed, it’s almost impossible toweigh what’s at threat and what’s not.”



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Methods of warning the public7.12 Flooding in summer 2007 disruptedelectricity supplies and led to poweroutages, disabling mains-powered radios,televisions and computers. Fixed linetelephones also failed. As a result, adiverse range of warning methods wasemployed to ensure warnings reached theirintended audience.

7.13 Warning methods used included:

• door-to-door calls, cross-referenced withrecords of vulnerable people;

• electronic message boards on majorarterial roads and motorways;

• mobile loudhailer announcements;

• PA announcements in public buildings;

• sirens;

• automated telephone, fax, email and textmessage services (Flood WarningsDirect); and

• broadcast media announcements ontelevision and radio.

7.14 Door-to-door calls were viewed asparticularly effective and were welcomed byresidents, as also witnessed during theflooding on the East Coast in November2007. This is a simple but effective method

which can be put into effect quickly whileadditional warning methods are explored.

7.15 The reported lack of public awarenessin many cases during the floods could bean indication that the full suite of warningmethods was not used in every area.Indeed, this might not have beenpracticable. Although some people mighthave received a number of overlappingwarnings by different methods, in othercases, individuals might have been missedaltogether. Even where warnings weregiven in good time in an area, someone nottuned in to the media and not signed up toreceive direct flood warnings might havebeen entirely unprepared when the floodshit. Raising awareness generally andsystematically assessing the feasibility ofall warning methods in each area couldhelp prevent such situations arising.

7.16 Members of the public can also takesteps to improve the means by which theycan access information during anemergency. For example, battery-poweredor wind-up radios can be invaluable in

IC 65 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Environment Agencyworks with local responders to raiseawareness in flood risk areas andidentify a range of mechanisms to warnthe public, particularly the vulnerable, inresponse to flooding.

REC 12 – The Review recommendsthat Local Resilience Forums urgentlydevelop plans to enhance flood warningsthrough ‘door-knocking’ by localauthorities based on an assessment ofthe post code areas likely to flood.

“If I had had a radio that worked, it wouldhave been on 24/7”.

(Householder, Sheffield)

“The first time we heard about the watercoming in we were having our tea andwater started coming in and we left it fora bit and then my wife was getting a bitpanicky so she phoned a social workerbecause my son has got special needsand she said phone the council and theytold us to stay in. I think we got out ofthe house about 8.30-9pm and we werestill waiting to be picked up at 12.30amand the police took us down to Bentleyand then the council took us to DonValley.”

(Householder, Toll Bar, Doncaster)

2 http://www.preparingforemergencies.gov.uk/gisiti.shtm

providing a resilient communication methodwhen conventional means are disrupted byfailed electricity supplies.

Providing Advice During TheEmergency7.17 Once flooding had occurred and onceessential services were lost, the publicneeded advice on what to do. In mostinstances, they turned to the authorities.People needed basic information on theextent of flooding, the implications forhealth and welfare and advice on issuessuch as transport options and whether toswitch off their electricity. In the absenceof specific advice, ‘Go in; Stay in; Tune in’is recognised as being the best generaladvice and should be incorporated inother flood-related communications asan initial message.2

Telephone information lines7.18 Telephone contact with the authoritieswas a key source of information for manyduring the flooding emergencies,particularly those directly affected. Butmany people commented that they were

passed from organisation to organisationwhen seeking advice. In some instances,the publicising of several differenttelephone lines left people confused aboutwhich one to ring.

7.19 In addition, there were instances of999 calls being made when, for example, agarden or unoccupied vehicle had beenaffected by flooding. Although clearlydistressing to the individuals affected, thesekinds of events are not consideredemergency situations by the police, fire andrescue services, and this contributed to thepressure on emergency call centres duringthe events of June and July.

7.20 Nevertheless, there were also successstories. Members of the public were able toget information on flooding via thetelephone from a variety of sources. Inaddition to Floodline – (0845 988 1188), theEnvironment Agency help-line whichprovides advice on flooding to the generalpublic there were a number of otherorganisations such as Hull and Barnsleycouncils which set up flood information linesfor the local community. These services

How did the public feel the authorities dealt with this summer’s floods?“…There were highly mixed reports of the efforts of the police and the fire and rescueservices, even from within the same immediate local area. Some described highlyresponsive and helpful emergency services, while others had felt isolated andunsupported. Many felt that the local community had borne a great deal of theresponsibility in assisting those who were more vulnerable.”

“Voluntary organisations such as the Salvation Army and parish councils provided highlyvalued practical and financial assistance. In contrast, many felt unsupported by their localcouncil…in helping with the clean-up operation.”

“Overall, there was a sense of a lack of preparedness on the part of the authorities fordealing with the advent of flooding. There was a desire for evidence of co-ordinatedoverseeing of any future event, with co-ordinated efforts at a national and also a locallevel.”

GfK NOP Qualitative research undertaken during October 2007 in areas affected by the summer floods.

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made use of local authority contact centres,which are now a regular part of servicedelivery for most local authorities.

7.21 In practice, information requestsgenerally fell into two distinct areas: adviceon the likelihood or scale of flooding; anddetails of local response and recoveryservices, including how to deal with theloss of essential services. This suggeststhat non-emergency advice by telephoneduring a flood emergency should comefrom just two sources – the EnvironmentAgency for flooding information and localauthority contact centres for local advice.(The provision of more specific advice, forexample on health or utilities, is discussedbelow.) Work is under way to raise publicawareness of the difference betweenemergency and non-emergency situations.This work could usefully draw onexperiences of the floods, and the finaloutput could include information onFloodline or details of local authority callcentre numbers.

Internet advice

7.22 Many people were frustrated at havingto access a number of websites to findinformation on different flood-related issuessuch as the disconnection or restoration ofelectricity and water supplies, healthnotices and flood warnings. Furthermore,some people could not find the informationthey needed as they did not know where tostart looking.

7.23 It would be of great value if a singlewebsite provided links to all the websitesneeded for a comprehensive set of adviceon flood-related matters. This could be thearea’s Local Resilience Forum website, withall Category 1 responders also linking backto this ‘hub’ website. Other usefulinformation could also be linked, forexample the guidance from the ElectricalSafety Council on actions to take oncefloodwater has subsided.1

7.24 The Review has also receivedevidence about public concern over thelack of information to customers about thewater supply position. This came throughboth our discussions with the public andsocial research carried out for theConsumer Council for Water. Goodengagement with the public helps to allayanxieties in an already stressfulenvironment.

“Advice is needed to tell you how to getrid of the water, how to switch theelectric off, how to stay safe.”

(Business, Sheffield)

IC 67 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that advice disseminated viathe internet should be coherent byensuring integration and consistencybetween local websites, including that ofthe Local Resilience Forum and those ofall Category 1 responders.

“Well if there is an advice line or internet,there are loads of ways of gettingmessages or being able to findinformation like a flood line. If there isone, I don’t know.”

(Business, Barnsley)

IC 66 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that advice by telephoneduring a flood emergency should comefrom just two sources – the EnvironmentAgency for flooding information and localauthority contact centres for local advice.

1 www.esc.org.uk/pdf/flood_advice.pdf

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Health advice

7.25 In many instances, consistent healthinformation was hard to find. In somecases, health advisors said it was safe to

stay in flooded properties, yet in others,families were told to leave their homesimmediately due to health risks from fungalspores. In the recovery phase, builderswere unable to find advice as to whetherrenovating damp properties posed healthrisks. Schools and householders were notconfident about using playing fields andgardens once the floodwater had receded.Television images of children playing infloodwater suggest that the dangers ofcontaminated water had not been widelyunderstood by the public.

7.26 There is a clear need for well-signposted, easily-accessible flood-relatedhealth advice. The Health ProtectionAgency (HPA) has suggested that it couldbe asked to lead this work, with supportfrom other partners such as theEnvironment Agency, the Food StandardsAgency, the Drinking Water Inspectorateand water companies. This should beconsidered. The use of a diverse range ofmedia would help to ensure that as manypeople as possible see this information.

“The thing that I found most difficult, as acompany trying to keep 34 people going,and in the end we relied on SevernSound and the website, was to find outwhat was the truth about water. Can youdrink it? Can you use it in thedishwasher? Can you boil it? They didn’tknow and they said first it wasn’tdrinkable.”

(Business, Tewkesbury)

IC 68 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that essential service providersshould maintain continuous provision ofpublic information during an emergency,through a website linked to otherresponders and local authority contactcentres.

Builders clear out debris in the Canterbury Arms in Tewkesbury, Gloucestershire © Getty Images


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The role of the media

7.27 Although media organisations have nostatutory responsibility under the CivilContingencies Act to communicate with thepublic, they do have a widely recognisedrole in providing information before, duringand after an emergency. Radio andtelevision organisations have a long-

standing agreement to interruptprogramming with public safety advice andinformation in the event of a majoremergency. They also support the sharingof information. Journalists and news crewsoften arrive early at an emergency scene,and the rolling news which follows is avaluable resource for the public andresponders alike. Every emergency controlcentre facility, from COBR outwards,watched live news feeds closely.

7.28 Many people interviewed for theReview highlighted the pivotal role of themedia, particularly local radio, in passingimportant information to the public duringthe floods. The information broadcast was

IC 69 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Government workstowards a single definitive set of flood-related health advice for householdersand businesses, which can be used bythe media and the authorities both locallyand nationally.

Case study: The provision of health advice When the floods struck, Cheryl Maddra, a registered child-minder, was looking after sixsmall children at her home. The logistics of reuniting the children with their parents werecomplicated, as the street was closed and virtually impassable. Cheryl had to rely on theparents finding a way to reach her house and then making their own arrangements to getthe children through the rising water in the street and back to the main road. Her housewas severely flooded, so she was unable to resume childminding for some weeks – thishad a knock-on effect on the families whose children were being cared for, as withoutchildcare, they could not return to work.

After the clear-up in her home, Cheryl resumed her childminding duties. However, shewas anxious about the state the garden had been left in following the floods. Althoughshe had cleared the debris from the garden, it still looked messy and dirty from the mudand silt left behind as the water subsided. She was anxious about allowing the childrenoutside to play. This was a real problem with six lively youngsters in the house all day, soCheryl decided to seek advice about this from the authorities. Despite all her efforts, shecould not find anyone who could, or would, give her a definitive answer, so she decidedthat the safest thing to do was to keep them indoors, despite the summer weather.

Subsequently, Cheryl had a follow-up visit from the assessors. During this visit, theychecked under the floorboards and found that the floodwater had risen up as far as thefloor joists and the entire ground floor was condemned due to contamination. Theassessors advised Cheryl and the children to leave the property as soon as possible, asthere was a health risk. In any event the entire ground floor would need to be removedand replaced, so the property would need to be vacated while this work was carried out.This made it impossible for Cheryl to continue working as a child-minder as she and herfamily had to move into rented accommodation, where they were still living at the time ofthe research in mid-October.

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often important local news, such as roadand school closures. In Gloucestershire, forexample, the local BBC radio stationreceived a large number of calls from thepublic giving live accounts of flooding ontheir streets and transmitting messages toconcerned listeners’ friends and relativeswhom they were otherwise unable tocontact. Staff from Severn Trent Water

came to the station to give specificinformation on water supplies.

"People can actually ring in and giveinformation and they relay that back tothe town, and that was working very well"

Householder, Cheltenham

Case study: Effects on a small business Timothy Bennett runs a small cake-making company in West Oxfordshire with his wifeand business partner and found his business severely affected by the floods. Talking ofhis life after the floods receded, he described it as: “a struggle to get set up and evenbigger struggle to keep your head above water.”

The impact of the flooding was both practical and emotional. The flooding destroyed thebusiness workshop and nearly all the machinery and equipment purchased over the pastdecade. The couple are still working, mainly from the back of their delivery van, in orderto meet previous orders and generate enough money to cover their overheads.

Timothy is extremely angry at the low levels of information and assistance he receivedbefore, during and after the floods. Most of his anger is directed at the local council whohe perceived to be responsible. Before the floods, he received no warning that hisbusiness was at risk. During the flooding Timothy says he felt completely isolated and hadno one to turn to. After the flooding, he expected to receive immediate advice from thecouncil about the temporary relocation of his business. Timothy did get some assistance,but only a month after he needed the help. Temporary premises were found, which werecompletely unsuitable. The business whose workspace Timothy borrowed was declaredbankrupt days after he relocated to it.

Months after the flooding, the business is still severely damaged by the floods. “Staffnumbers have had to be cut from nine people to just the wife and me.” Timothy doubtswhether things will ever be back to normal and is seriously considering packing thebusiness up. He is also seriously questioning the value of insurance. Because it is afamily business, Timothy describes the flooding as ‘breaking him and his family’.

A guide to working with the BBC in an emergency‘Connecting in a Crisis’ is an initiative by the BBC to help ensure the public has theinformation it needs during an emergency. It is designed to ensure that BBC local radiostation producers have established appropriate contacts with emergency planners, thepolice and other key organisations in their local area. The online guide explains how toaccess the range of communication outlets offered by the BBC at local, regional andnational level. Examples of information provided can include updates from theEnvironment Agency on river levels, from the police on roads and flooded areas and fromlocal authorities on school closures.

www.bbc.co.uk/connectinginacrisis


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7.29 Local media activity also worked wellin other respects. The Review notes thevalue of a high media profile for localleaders, as achieved by council leaders andGold Commanders in a number of areasaffected by the floods. For example, inDoncaster, the elected Mayor’s highvisibility provided reassurance to the publicduring the severe flooding which affectedthe city in June. In Gloucestershire, theGold Commander adopted a similarlysuccessful high profile, using the media asa way of communicating advice to thepublic and providing visible leadership atthe local level.

7.30 National television coverage,especially the rolling news channels, wasregarded more cautiously. The public feltthat reports tended to move away from thelocal level too quickly, focusing instead onthe regional or national picture andsometimes coming across assensationalist. A number of affected peoplewere dismayed by footage of ’reporters inWellington boots‘ standing in flood waterand regarded such reports as unhelpfulunless supported by local facts andpractical advice. But where that advice wasforthcoming, television was a powerfulmedium.

A local newspaper floats in flood waters at OtneyIsland near Oxford © Getty Images

7.31 However, the events of the summerhave highlighted inconsistencies andlimitations in the way in which the mediafulfil this public information role. Mediaorganisations struggled at times to engagewith emergency responders during thefloods. While they acknowledged the

“They wanted a sensational picture andyou slagging off the council basically –that’s news.”

(Business, Wakefield)

“I personally think the media have donequite a bit but unfortunately the nationalmedia forgot about us when Gloucesterwent.”

(Business, Rotherham)

IC 70 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that council leaders and chiefexecutives play a prominent role in publicreassurance and advice through the localmedia during a flooding emergency, aspart of a coordinated effort overseen byGold Commanders.

“The radio’s been absolutely invaluable –if they can get it all together why can’tothers?”

(Householder, East Riding)

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enormous strain on responders caused bythe unprecedented scale of the events,they were often unable to get theinformation they felt they needed to meetthe public’s concerns. This, in part,reflected genuine concern on the part oflocal responders that sensitive operationalmatters should be dealt with away from theglare of media coverage, as well asexperience of other emergencies duringwhich media coverage inhibited action ordecision-making.

7.32 The Review believes that in anyrealistic analysis of local media involvementduring emergencies, the benefits faroutweigh the costs if the involvement isproperly organised and structured. Localmedia should be supported in developing

their public information role at all stages ofan emergency. Reluctance to involve themedia is outdated, betraying a lack ofunderstanding of both modern newscoverage and the ability of newsorganisations to operate effective ‘Chinesewalls’ between production staff andjournalists. This relationship-building needsto happen at the local level, although theReview is aware of general work under wayby Regional Media Emergency Forums todevelop links between broadcasters andthe responder community, and this workshould also draw upon experiences of thefloods. Effective engagement with themedia in many areas needs to bereplicated in all, as do the opportunitiessuch engagement offers for stronger publicleadership.

A TV camera crew report in a flooded street © Getty Images


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The Role Of Communities AndIndividuals7.33 Much of this Report has been aboutthe roles of public and private bodies.However, the Review considers the actionsof the public to be just as important – andin some aspects more so – to effectivelycoping with emergencies like those ofsummer 2007. The Review has receivedmany comments demonstrating that inevery area affected, the extent to whichcommunities came together to respond tothe flooding events was both heart-warmingand commendable. We have collectedmany stories which illustrate how activelocal leadership and positive action, by bothindividuals and local organisations, helpedto minimise the extent of the damage tocommunities – and post-flood, have alsohelped to engender a sense of enhancedcommunity spirit and cooperation.

The RNLI evacuate Francis Jarvis, 78, a residentfrom Abbeyfield House, Tewkesbury, Gloucestershire© Rex Features

Actions the public should take7.34 So responsibility does not lie withGovernment or other authorities andorganisations alone. The response to amajor emergency is stronger if all partieswork together, including communities andindividuals. In major emergencies whereresponders are severely stretched,community resilience has an important partto play, both before, during and after theevent. In preparing for an emergency,communities have an important sharedlocal knowledge – for example, the locationof doctors, vulnerable people andtemporary shelter and where usefulequipment is stored.

“It was the community that came into itsown as everyone was looking aftereverybody else.”


“People in our community went roundevery home and collected medicationsand prescriptions and kept people up todate. But that’s from people in ourcommunity, no doctor came.”

(Householders, Toll Bar, Doncaster)

REC 13 – The Review recommendsthat Local Resilience Forums urgentlymake arrangements to involve localmedia representatives in localpreparedness and response to supporttheir public information role.

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7.35 The public need to educatethemselves about flood risk. As notedabove, the Environment Agency estimatesaround 75 per cent of people who receive aflood warning currently take some form ofaction. While this is encouraging, it alsoindicates that one in every four people

aware of the warning does not takeeffective action to limit the impact onthemselves and their families. With climatechange likely to lead to more variedweather patterns and a greater risk offlooding, householders and businessesneed to take greater ownership of the risksand take precautionary action in the sameway as they do against other hazards, forexample fire. However, the Reviewacknowledges that the actions people needto take in a flood are different to other risks.The Review will return to this matter in itsfinal report.

7.36 A large proportion of property ownersand tenants do not know if their property ison a floodplain and there is currently no

“When the flooding first happened, I wishI’d known more about how long beforethe flooding receded and how long itwould be before I could move back intomy house. If I’d know that I could haveprepared myself better and I wouldn’t bein the situation I am in now.”

(Householder, Hull)

Case study: Community assistance at the Holy Trinity Church, TewkesburyAs the water levels rose, bursting the banks of the local rivers and tributaries aroundTewkesbury in the early evening of Friday 20 July, members of Holy Trinity Churchrealised that they would have to cancel their planned barn dance. By 10pm, as the build-up of traffic coming into Tewkesbury trying to find a way around the congestion on the M5came to a standstill, church members were out on the streets encouraging drivers stillsitting in their cars to return the way they had come or find somewhere to spend thenight, (Council offices and Tewkesbury Abbey had opened up to take in strandedtravellers). By this time, the water level on the road towards the motorway wasapproximately 1 metre deep and was impassable to most vehicles.

The next morning, church members realised that many people had spent the night in theircars in the town centre car park and opened Holy Trinity Church for toilets, washroomfacilities, free food and hot drinks for anyone who needed them. They fortunately hadfood already in the church in preparation for the barn dance that had been cancelled thenight before.

Throughout that wet Saturday the church became used as a place of refuge andrefreshment for those who were trying to leave the town before the water levels cut offany exit. They set up TV and radio communications so that people could access the latestinformation through BBC and Radio Gloucester news bulletins. This was a vital means ofenabling people to decide whether to risk venturing out of the town or to stay put.

During the afternoon, films were put on the big screen in the church, giving strandedfamilies the opportunity to relax in some degree of comfort and provide someentertainment for their children. As evening approached, the Red Cross delivered beddingfor those unable to return to their homes. Over the next few days working in conjunctionwith the Town Council, the Salvation Army and the local Scout Troop, the church kept itsdoors open around the clock to provide food and overnight accommodation.


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requirement for people purchasing aproperty to be informed about flood risk byestate agents, lawyers or the previousowner. When purchasing a house orbusiness premises, prospective buyers ortheir conveyancers should find out whetherthe property is at risk of river or coastalflooding. If a survey is being carried out ona property, the surveyor should be askingwhether the house has ever been flooded,especially if the property is near a river orin a known flood risk area. With thisinformation, purchasers can ask moreinformed questions – not only of theproperty owner, but also of theEnvironment Agency or local authority –such as what flood defences exist locallyand whether flood warning is available.

7.37 The Government recently decided notto include flood risk as a mandatory searchin the new Home Information Packs (HIPs).This decision has been challenged byseveral submissions to the Review on thebasis that its inclusion could help boostawareness. The Review also sees merit inits inclusion. The Review understands thatthe Government plans to monitor this issueand look again at the decision once thesystem has been in operation for a year.

7.38 Property owners need to shareresponsibility for protecting their homes andbusinesses. As set out in Chapter 4,improving the resilience of property at riskfrom flooding would help reduce the impactof future flooding events. Immediateexamples of steps that members of thepublic could take to increase propertyresilience include greater uptake ofproducts such as door guards, air brickcovers and toilet non-return valves.

IC 71 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that flood risk should be madepart of the mandatory searchrequirements when people buy propertyand should form part of HomeImprovement Packs.

When we bought the house in 1999, thesolicitor didn’t tell me it was on afloodplain, but then you speak to peoplethat lived here years and know Catcliffe,and the worse thing they say to you is‘oh, I could have told you that’.”

(Householder, Rotherham)

How did the public respond? “…There was a great deal of confusion and uncertainty about what action totake….Some chose to contact emergency services, and were often unable to makecontact, or were told that they were a lesser priority. Many were engaged in procuringsandbags from the council, often with limited success…sandbags were seen as essentialin mitigating against the effects of the flooding.”

“There was a great deal of mutual support within communities… with neighboursassisting each other in the cleanup efforts.”2

2 Source: GfK NOP Qualitative research undertaken during October 2007 in areas affected by the 2007summer floods

7.39 Individuals and families also need tobe more personally resilient. There are anumber of practical measures whichmembers of the public, including businessowners, can and should consider taking toprepare for flooding. All of these requireonly minimal action yet can make a realdifference to the impact of flooding. Someof these practical measures are outlinedbelow and the Review recommends that

the Government consolidates these, withother measures, into a single definitive setof flood advice, which is then used tosupport a public information campaign.

REC 14 – The Review recommendsthat members of the public make up aflood kit – including key personaldocuments, insurance policy, emergencycontact numbers (including local council,emergency services and Floodline –0845 988 1188), torch, battery or wind-up radio, mobile phone, rubber gloves,wet wipes or antibacterial hand gel, firstaid kit and blankets.

IC 72 – The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Government launchesa public information campaign whichdraws on a single definitive set of floodprevention and mitigation advice forhouseholders and businesses, and whichcan be used by media and theauthorities locally and nationally.

“Quarter to 12 at night the policeknocked on my door to tell us toevacuate, we were out in 15 minutes,with nothing more than the clothes wewere stood in.”


“What I was waiting for was for someoneto knock on the door and say, can wehelp, here’s some information for you. Ididn’t have any of that and had to rely onneighbours.”

(Householder, Gloucester)

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To what extent was the public prepared for flooding? “There were very low levels of prior awareness of the risk of flooding amongst thoseaffected. With the exception of farmers and some rural businesses, there was a generallycomplacent attitude towards the risk of flooding. Responsibility for managing flood riskwas deferred to the authorities, and even those who had previously experienced floodinghad the expectation that some action would have been taken by the authorities to preventa recurrence. None had taken any action themselves in preparation for the advent offlooding.”

“In the hours and minutes before the flooding took place, there was a polarisation inawareness of the risk of flooding. Farmers and rural businesses were more likely tomonitor the state of the weather and of the land around them, and were most likely tohave been aware of the risk. Many others, often householders, were less aware. Therewere mixed experiences in relation to warnings. Some received flood warnings butdisregarded these. Others sought information, and were reassured that there was no riskof flooding. Others did not seek or receive warnings, and remained unaware of the risk.Few, except farmers and some businesses, took any action… For many, seeing thewater coming into their homes or businesses was the first awareness of the real riskof flooding.”3

3 Source: GfK NOP Qualitative research undertaken during October 2007 in areas affected by the 2007summer floods


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REC 15 – The interim conclusion of the Review is that members of the publicincrease their personal state of readiness and resilience to floods by following theEnvironment Agency’s practical advice, where appropriate, as summarised below:

• Make sure you have adequate insurance. Flood damage is included in most buildingsinsurance policies, but do check your home and contents are covered.

• Access the Environment Agency’s website to check flood risks to property (this canbe followed up by advice from the Agency, for example whether the property inquestion is protected to some degree by physical defences).

• Contact the Environment Agency to be registered on their Flood Warnings Directscheme (however, this does not apply to surface water or sewerage flooding andpeople should also make sure they remain alert to weather forecasts).

• Keep vital possessions, such as financial and legal documents and items ofsentimental value, upstairs or stored as high as possible in waterproof containersand have plans in place to move items at short notice.

• Make a list of other useful numbers you may need – your local council, theemergency services and your Floodline quick dial number.

• Make sure you know where to turn off your gas, electricity and water. If you are notsure, ask the person who checks your meter when they next visit. Mark the tap orswitch with a sticker to help you remember.

Case study: Raising awareness – individual preparednessGwyneth Oxley lives in Sheffield with her husband in the house they have owned formany years. They were severely affected by the floods. The downstairs of their home wassubmerged in two feet of water on Monday 25 June, and the practical and financialaffects of the floods were still being felt more than four months on.

The floodwater ruined all of the carpets downstairs, which needed replacing, and thekitchen had to be completely refurbished. Furthermore, the family’s cars were written offdue to flooding in the garage.

But the impact extends beyond financial and practical considerations. Gwyneth and herhusband left their home for a number of weeks to live with a relative. They did not want toface what they described as ‘the carnage’ left behind. Despite living in a location at risk offlooding, no preparation had been made for potential flooding and this exacerbated theimpact of the floods. Despite the damage caused by the flooding, no future plans are inplace or being considered in the event of future flooding.

For Gwyneth and her husband, nothing like this type of flooding has happened beforeand they feel it is very unlikely to ever occur again. Gwyneth feels that any preparationwould be both costly and ineffective. Both Gwyneth and her husband firmly believe thatthere is ‘nothing anyone can do to stop things like this…you just get on with it’.

Chapter 8:Next Steps

SummaryThe preceding chapters set outthe emerging conclusions of theReview to date. This chapterexplains what will happenbetween the publication of thisInterim Report and the finalreport of the Review.

It has three sections:

• urgent recommendations;• a description of how the

evidence and interimconclusions of the Review willbe developed, and how peoplecan comment and contribute;and

• a full list of all the interimconclusions.

Urgent Recommendations8.1 The first reason for publishing thisInterim Report was to identify those issueswhich required urgent action. During ourevidence collection period over the last fourmonths, we have received a great deal ofinformation, evidence and opinion. Some ofthis has enabled us to draw up robust, firmrecommendations.

8.2 The urgent recommendations are notjust for government – local organisations,the private sector and the public also needto take action. All the evidence we havereceived so far strongly indicates that theserecommendations should be implementedurgently in order to prevent or mitigateflooding which might occur this winter orspring. The 15 urgent recommendationsare listed below.

8.3 The Review will monitor work againstthese urgent recommendations and willpublish commentary on progress at the endof March.

People queue outside the Town Hall at awater collection point in Tewkesbury,Gloucestershire © Rex Features

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Chapter 8: Next Steps


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Urgent recommendationsREC 1 – The Review recommends that more frequent and systematic monitoring ofgroundwater levels at times of high risk should be undertaken by the EnvironmentAgency, which should begin as soon as possible to predict and mitigate further seriousground water flooding from this winter onwards.

REC 2 – The Review recommends that the Environment Agency, supported by localauthorities and water companies, should urgently identify areas at highest risk fromsurface water flooding where known, inform Local Resilience Forums and take steps toidentify remaining high risk areas over the coming months.

REC 3 – The Review recommends that the Environment Agency should urgently developand implement a clear policy on the use of temporary and demountable defences.

REC 4 – The Review recommends that all Local Resilience Forums urgently reviewtheir current local arrangements for water rescue to consider whether they areadequate in light of the summer’s events and their local community risk registers.

REC 5 – The Review recommends that all Local Resilience Forums should undertakean urgent review of designated rest centres and other major facilities to ensure eitherthat they have the necessary levels of resilience to enable them to be used in theresponse to flooding and other major emergencies, or that alternative arrangements areput in place.

REC 6 – The Review recommends that the Cabinet Office, with other departments,should urgently consider the costs, benefits and feasibility of establishing arrangementsfor the urgent acquisition of supplies during a major emergency, including the use ofcall-off contracts or the creation of national or regional stockpiles of equipment andconsumables.

REC 7 – The Review recommends that Department of Health guidance clarifying therole and accountabilities of organisations involved in providing scientific and technicaladvice during a major incident should be implemented as soon as possible andunderstood by Gold Commanders.

REC 8 – The Review recommends that the guidance currently under preparation byCabinet Office to provide local responders with advice on the definition andidentification of vulnerable people and on planning to support them in an emergencyshould be issued urgently.

REC 9 – The review recommends that, in order to effectively fulfil its Lead Departmentrole for flood risk management and emergency response, Defra needs to urgentlydevelop and share a national flood emergency framework.

REC 10 – The Review recommends that Category 1 responders should be urgentlyprovided with a detailed assessment of critical infrastructure in their areas to enablethem to assess its vulnerability to flooding.

REC 11 – The Review recommends that the Environment Agency should workurgently with telecommunications companies, consulting the Information Commissioneras necessary to facilitate the roll-out of ‘opt-out’ telephone flood warning schemes to allhomes and businesses liable to flooding, including homes with ex-directory numbers.

REC 12 – The Review recommends that Local Resilience Forums urgently developplans to enhance flood warnings through ‘door-knocking’ by local authorities based onan assessment of the post code areas likely to flood.

REC 13 – The Review recommends that Local Resilience Forums urgently makearrangements to involve local media representatives in the local preparedness andresponse to support their public information role.

REC 14 – The Review recommends that members of the public make up a flood kit –including key personal documents, insurance policy, emergency contact numbers(including local council, emergency services and Floodline – 0845 988 1188), torch,battery or wind-up radio, mobile phone, rubber gloves, wet wipes or antibacterial handgel, first aid kit and blankets.

REC 15 – The Review recommends that members of the public increase theirpersonal state of readiness and resilience to floods by following the EnvironmentAgency’s practical advice, where appropriate, as summarised below:

• Make sure you have adequate insurance. Flood damage is included in mostbuildings insurance policies but do check your home and contents are covered.

• Access the Environment Agency’s website to check flood risks to property (this canbe followed up by advice from the Agency, for example whether the property inquestion is protected to some degree by physical defences.

• Contact the Environment Agency to be registered on their Flood Warnings Directscheme (however, this does not apply to surface water flooding or sewerage floodingand people should also make sure they remain alert to weather forecasts).

• Keep vital possessions, such as financial and legal documents and items ofsentimental value, upstairs or stored as high as possible in waterproof containersand have plans in place to move items at short notice.

• Make a list of other useful numbers you may need – your local council, theemergency services and your Floodline quick dial number.

• Make sure you know where to turn off your gas, electricity and water. If you are notsure, ask the person who checks your meter when they next visit. Mark the tap orswitch with a sticker to help you remember.

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Working Towards the Final

Report

8.3. The other reasons for publishing thisReport were to set the direction for theremainder of the Review, and to support aprocess of consultation on our emergingviews.

8.4. We need to gather more information inorder to reach firm recommendations onthe majority of issues which fall within theReview’s Terms of Reference. This is forvarious reasons. In some places we havereceived contradictory information, or theavailable evidence to date has been limitedby the time available for collection. Otherspecific reviews, by particular organisationsor in relation to specific sectors, are yet toreport. It is important that we fullyunderstand the full range of options,including costs, benefits and regulatoryimpacts.

8.5. The Review Team has worked closelywith government organisations andrepresentative bodies from outsidegovernment. Visits to affected areas haveproved invaluable, providing an opportunityto talk directly to local people. But theseprocesses need to continue to add depth tothe evidence base.

How people and contribute andcomment8.6. We are particularly keen to hear theviews of those affected by therecommendations as well as all otherinterested parties. We would welcome anycontributions to our evidence base.

8.7. In order to allow proper considerationand discussion of further evidence inadvance of the planned publication of thefinal report in summer 2008, contributionsshould be sent to the Review Team before31 March 2008.

• Written consultation: We invite allstakeholders to comment on the InterimConclusions. Please send all writtencomments to The Pitt Review, 2nd Floor,22 Whitehall, London , SW1A 2WH.

• E-consultation: We also invite people tocomment electronically on the InterimConclusions via the Pitt Review website.The website address iswww.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/thepittreview.Comments can be emailed [email protected]

8.8. To support this process of additionalevidence gathering, the Review will alsocarry out a number of activities to gathercomments. These are likely to include:

• Public meetings: Public meetings will beheld in affected areas. All meetings willbe advertised on the Pitt Review websitein advance. If you don’t have internetaccess, please call on 0207 276 5300 fordetails.

• Practitioner panels and industry-

government forums: We will inviterelevant experts and academics to ‘topicforums’ to discuss specific specialisttopics. Our aim will be to invite peoplewith a range of differing views, from arange of backgrounds and perspectives.We will be writing to invite individuals ortheir organisations to take part.

• National and regional conferences:

The Pitt Review Team members willpresent the Interim Report and the initialrecommendations at relevant industryconferences and events. We will list theseconferences and events on the PittReview website.

Full List Of Interim

Conclusions

8.9. A full list of the interim conclusionswhich appear in the earlier chapters of thisdocument follows below. Many stakeholderswill choose to use these as the basis for

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comment, but we would welcome allthoughts on our proposals and omissions.

IC 1 The interim conclusion of the Reviewis that Government takes the lead inmaking the case for the need for adaptationto climate change and particularly inmitigating the potential impacts oncommunities.

IC 2 The interim conclusion of the Reviewis that the Government develops a clearstrategy and action plan to deliver theprovisions of the Climate Change Bill tosupport adaptation to increasing impactsfrom flooding.

IC 3 The interim conclusion of the Reviewis that the Environment Agency furtherdevelops its tools and techniques forpredicting and modelling river flooding,especially to take account of extreme andmultiple events; and takes forward urgentlywork to develop similar tools andtechniques to model surface water flooding.

IC 4 The interim conclusion of the Reviewis that the Environment Agency revises itsflood maps to identify areas where there isa risk of significant depths and velocity ofwater, to improve the effectiveness ofemergency planning.

IC 5 The interim conclusion of the Reviewis that the Environment Agency works moreclosely with Local Resilience Forums toprovide information drawn from flood riskmodelling and mapping tools to improve theaccuracy and consistency of flood riskinformation in Community Risk Registers.

IC 6 The interim conclusion of the Reviewis that the Environment Agencyprogressively develops and brings into useflood visualisation tools, designed to meetthe needs of flood risk managers,emergency planners and responders.

IC 7 The interim conclusion of the Reviewis that the Met Office and the Environment

Agency produce an early assessment of thecosts, benefits and feasibility of techniqueswhich can predict where rain will fall andwhere surface water flooding will occur.

IC 8 The interim conclusion of the Reviewis that PPS25 should be rigorously appliedby local planning authorities, includinggiving consideration to all sources of floodrisk and ensuring that developers make afull contribution to the costs both of buildingand maintaining any necessary defences.

IC 9 The interim conclusion of the Reviewis that householders and business ownersshould no longer be able to layimpermeable surfaces as of right.

IC 10 The interim conclusion of theReview is that the automatic right toconnect surface water drainage of newdevelopments to the sewerage systemshould be removed.

IC 11 The interim conclusion of theReview is that no new building should beallowed in a flood risk area that is not flood-resilient, and that the Government shouldwork with organisations such as the RoyalInstitute of British Architects and thebuilding industry to encourage flood-resilient building and development design.

IC 12 The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Government shouldincorporate flood resistance and resiliencerequirements for new properties in floodrisk areas into Building Regulations as partof the current process of revision.

IC 13 The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Government shouldincorporate requirements for for resistant orresilient refurbishment of flooded propertiesin high flood risk areas into BuildingRegulations as part of the current processof revision.

IC 14 The interim conclusion of theReview is that local authorities and housing


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associations should take a more active rolein increasing the uptake of flood resistanceand resilience measures, leading byexample by repairing their properties withappropriate materials where it is cost-effective.

IC 15 The interim conclusion of theReview is that local authorities in high floodrisk areas should extend eligibility for homeimprovement grants and loans toencompass flood protection and resilienceproducts.

IC 16 The interim conclusion of theReview is that local authorities, as theydischarge their responsibilities under theCivil Contingencies Act 2004 to promotebusiness continuity, should encourage theuptake of property-level flood resistanceand resilience measures. This should bereflected in guidance from the Government.

IC 17 The interim conclusion of theReview is that local authorities should leadon the management of surface waterflooding and drainage at the local level withthe support of all responsible organisationsincluding the Environment Agency, watercompanies and internal drainage boards,the Highways Agency and BritishWaterways.

IC 18 The interim conclusion of theReview is that local authorities in flood riskareas should assess their capabilities todeliver the wide range of responsibilities inrelation to local flood risk management.

IC 19 The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Environment Agencyshould have a national overview of all floodrisk and that, Defra’s work on thedevelopment of a national overview role forthe Agency in relation to surface waterflooding should be progressed.

IC 20 The interim conclusion of theReview is that local Surface WaterManagement Plans, as set out under

PPS25, should provide the basis formanaging surface water flood risk. Theseplans should be coordinated by the localauthority and be risk-based, considering allsources of flooding.

IC 21 The interim conclusion of theReview is that a local register of all themain flood risk management and drainageassets (overland and underground) shouldbe compiled by the relevant local authority,including an assessment of their conditionand details of the responsible owners.

IC 22 The interim conclusion of theReview is that Defra should issue guidanceon how all organisations can be broughttogether to work with local authorities onsurface water flood risk management,sharing information, modelling andexpertise on a consistent basis.

IC 23 The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Government, as part ofits Water Strategy, should resolve the issueof which organisations should beresponsible for the ownership andmaintenance of sustainable drainagesystems.

IC 24 The interim conclusion of theReview is that Defra should work withOfwat and the water industry to explorehow appropriate risk-based standards fordrainage systems (including pumpingstations) can be achieved.

IC 25 The interim conclusion of theReview is that, as part of the forthcomingwater industry pricing review, the watercompanies, in conjunction with localauthorities and other partners, shoulddevelop proposals for investment in theexisting drainage network to deal withincreasing flood risk.

IC 26 The interim conclusion of theReview is that local authority scrutinycommittees review SWMPs and otherlinked plans, such as Local Development

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Frameworks and Community RiskRegisters, to ensure that flood risk isadequately considered and to ensuregreater transparency and progress in themanagement of that risk.

IC 27 The interim conclusion of theReview is that it is appropriate for theEnvironment Agency and other localorganisations to continue to focusinvestment on areas of highest assessedlong-term risk, whether or not they havebeen recently flooded

IC 28 The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Government shouldcommit to a strategic long-term approach toits investment in flood risk management,planning up to 25 years ahead.

IC 29 The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Environment Agencyshould open dialogue with all thoselandowners who will be affected by either awithdrawal from or significant reduction inmaintenance of rural watercourses.

IC 30 The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Government shoulddevelop a single national set of guidancefor local authorities and the public on theuse and usefulness of sandbags and otheralternatives, rather than leaving the matterwholly to local discretion.

IC 31 The interim conclusion of theReview is that Defra, the EnvironmentAgency and Natural England should workwith partners to establish a programme andframework to achieve greater working withnatural processes, including theidentification of appropriate sites and thedevelopment of more incentives for creatingwater storage, restoring the natural courseof rivers and establishing green corridors.

IC 32 The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Environment Agencyshould provide an analysis of the effectthat land management practices had or

would have had on the impact of floodingduring the summer 2007 floods.

IC 33 The interim conclusion of theReview is that flooding legislation should beupdated and streamlined under a singleunifying Act that amongst other outcomesaddresses all sources of flooding, clarifiesresponsibilities and facilitates flood riskmanagement.

IC 34 The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Government and theinsurance industry should work together todeliver a public education programmesetting out the benefits of insurance in thecontext of flooding.

IC 35 The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Government and theinsurance industry work together to developoptions to improve the availability anduptake of flood risk insurance by low-income households and assess the costs,benefits and feasibility of these options,before the Review’s final report.

IC 36 The interim conclusion of theReview is that, in flood risk areas, a noteon flood risk and the simple steps thatcould be taken to mitigate it should beincluded with all insurance renewal notices.Moreover, if Flood Warning Direct isavailable in a customer’s area, one of theconditions of renewal could be sign-up tothis service.

IC 37 The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Met Office and theEnvironment Agency should produce anassessment of the options for issuingwarnings against a lower threshold ofprobability, including costs, benefits andfeasibility; this will be considered further inthe final report.

IC 38 The interim conclusion of theReview is that unless agreed otherwiselocally, ‘upper tier’ local authorities shouldbe the lead organisation in relation to multi-

agency planning for severe weatheremergencies at the local level, and fortriggering multi-agency arrangements inresponse to severe weather warnings.

IC 39 The interim conclusion of theReview is that where a Gold Command isestablished, the police, unless agreedotherwise locally, should convene and leadthe multi-agency response.

IC 40 The interim conclusion of theReview is that Gold Commands should beestablished at an early stage on aprecautionary basis where there is a risk ofserious flooding.

IC 41 The interim conclusion of theReview is that Local Resilience Forumsshould assess the effectiveness of theirGold facilities, including flexibleaccommodation, IT and communicationssystems.

IC 42 The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Local GovernmentAssociation should consider how bestmutual support might be enhancedbetween local authorities in the event of afuture wide-area emergency.

IC 43 The interim conclusion of theReview is that Cabinet Office guidance tolocal planners should specifically includeincidents which leave large numbers ofpeople stranded on motorways and trunkroads.

IC 44 The interim conclusion of theReview is that, as part of their emergencyplans, Local Resilience Forums shouldconsider the vulnerability of motorways andtrunk roads to flooding, and consider thepotential for earlier, stronger, more specificwarnings, and strategic road clearance andclosures, to avoid people becomingstranded.

IC 45 The interim conclusion of theReview is that Defra should review the

current requirement in emergencyregulations for the minimum amount ofwater to be provided in an emergency, toreflect reasonable needs during a longer-term loss of mains supply.

IC 46 The interim conclusion of theReview is that central government crisismachinery should always be activated ifsignificant wide-area flooding of whatevernature is expected or occurs.

IC 47 The interim conclusion of theReview is that Defra extends its currentdepartmental programme to share bestpractice and provide training in emergencyresponse across the organisation.

IC 48 The interim conclusion of theReview is that Defra and the EnvironmentAgency work together to establish a singleLondon situation room to coordinateflooding information, to act as a focal pointfor cross-Defra efforts, and to supportDefra Ministers.

IC 49 The interim conclusion of theReview is that a national flooding exerciseshould take place at the earliest opportunityin order to test the new arrangementswhich central government departments areputting into place to deal with flooding andinfrastructure emergencies.

IC 50 The interim conclusion of theReview is that financial assistance for localresponders in relation to emergencyresponse and recovery should be revised toimprove speed, simplicity and certainty.

IC 51 The interim conclusion of theReview is that Local Resilience Forumsshould be made aware of recent CabinetOffice guidance setting out the transition torecovery. Recovery sub-groups should beestablished from the onset of majoremergencies and in due course thereshould be formal handover from GoldCommand to the local RecoveryCoordinating Group(s), normally chaired by


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the Chief Executive of the affected localauthority.

IC 52 The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Government shouldestablish a systematic, coordinated, cross-sector campaign to reduce the disruptioncaused by natural events to criticalinfrastructure and essential services.

IC 53 The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Government shoulddevelop and issue guidance on consistentand proportionate minimum levels ofprotection from flooding for criticalinfrastructure.

IC 54 The interim conclusion of theReview is that infrastructure operatingcompanies should present the case forfurther investment in flood resiliencethrough the appropriate regulatory process.

IC 55 The interim conclusion of theReview is that a duty should be introducedon critical infrastructure operators to havebusiness continuity planning to BS 25999 inplace to more closely reflect the duty onCategory 1 responders. This should includeminimising the loss of supply as far aspracticable in the event of a seriousemergency resulting from flooding.

IC 56 The interim conclusion of theReview is that, in relation to information-sharing and cooperation, the CivilContingencies Act and Regulations shouldbe extended to require Category 2responders to more formally contributeinformation on critical sites, theirvulnerability and the impact of their loss.

IC 57 The interim conclusion of theReview is that single points of failure andthe complete loss of assets need to beexplicitly considered in the risk assessmentand contingency planning undertaken byoperators, emergency planners andresponders.

IC 58 The interim conclusion of theReview is that Local Resilience Forumsshould ensure that Community RiskRegisters reflect risks to criticalinfrastructure from flooding and otherhazards.

IC 59 The interim conclusion of theReview is that Category 2 respondersshould be required to participate fully atGold and Silver Commands and that theGovernment should deliver this through theCivil Contingencies Act or other regulatoryregimes.

IC 60 The interim conclusion of theReview is that the emergency plans andbusiness continuity plans of essentialservice providers should be reviewedannually by local authority scrutinycommittees.

IC 61 The interim conclusion of theReview is that critical infrastructureplanning should become a separatediscipline within civil protection at the locallevel.

IC 62 The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Government shouldimplement the legislative changes proposedin the recently published EnvironmentAgency biennial report on dam andreservoir safety.

IC 63 The interim conclusion of theReview is that all reservoir undertakersshould be required by Defra to prepareinundation maps and share them with LocalResilience Forums to improve CommunityRisk Registers and emergency planning.

IC 64 The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Environment Agencyshould produce a sliding scale of optionsfor greater personalisation of publicwarning information, including costs,benefits and feasibility, before the finalreport.

IC 65 The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Environment Agencyworks with local responders to raiseawareness in flood risk areas and identify arange of mechanisms to warn the public,particularly the vulnerable, in response toflooding.

IC 66 The interim conclusion of theReview is that advice by telephone during aflood emergency should come from just twosources – the Environment Agency forflooding information and local authoritycontact centres for local advice.

IC 67 The interim conclusion of theReview is that advice disseminated via theinternet should be coherent by ensuringintegration and consistency between localwebsites, including that of the LocalResilience Forum and those of all category1 responders.

IC 68 The interim conclusion of theReview is that essential service providersshould maintain continuous provision ofpublic information during an emergency,through a website linked to otherresponders and local authority contactcentres.

IC 69 The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Government workstowards a single definitive set of flood-related health advice for householders andbusinesses, which can be used by mediaand the authorities locally and nationally.

IC 70 The interim conclusion of theReview is that council leaders and chiefexecutives play a prominent role in publicreassurance and advice through the localmedia during a flooding emergency as partof a coordinated effort overseen by GoldCommanders.

IC 71 The interim conclusion of theReview is that flood risk should be madepart of the mandatory search requirementswhen people buy property and should formpart of Home Improvement Packs.

IC 72 The interim conclusion of theReview is that the Government launches anpublic information campaign which drawson a single definitive set of flood preventionand mitigation advice for householders andbusinesses, and which can be used bymedia and the authorities locally andnationally.


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Sir Michael Pitt hears Chief Constable Timothy Brain’s views on the loss of critical infrastructure at Mythe,Gloucestershire.

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Annexes andGlossary

Annex A Biography of SirMichael PittSir Michael Pitt is the current Chair of NHSSouth West, the strategic health authorityfor the South West region. He holds arange of other appointments, including:chairing two companies (SolaceEnterprises Ltd and Swindon CommercialServices); and providing consultancyadvice to a variety of organisations. He wasformally the national President of theSociety of Local Authority Chief Executivesand Senior Managers.

Sir Michael graduated from UniversityCollege London in 1970 with a first-classhonours degree in civil engineering. He is aFellow of the Institution of Civil Engineers.He has worked for the Civil Service, in theprivate sector and for local government,with the majority of his career being spentin county council technical departments. Hewas appointed Chief Executive of CheshireCounty Council in 1990 and of Kent CountyCouncil in 1997. He was knighted in theQueen’s Birthday Honours in 2005.

Sir Michael lives near Malmesbury inWiltshire, and is married with twodaughters.

Residents and council workers gather round thespecially installed Mobile Advice Centre © RexFeatures

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Annexes and Glossary


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Annex B Terms of referenceand scope of the ReviewThe terms of reference for the Review are:

a. flood risk management, including therisk posed by surface water floodingand the way in which the public andprivate sectors might adapt to futurerisks;

b. vulnerability of critical infrastructure,including:

i. the ability of critical infrastructureto withstand flooding, and whatimprovements might be made

ii. the resilience of dams andassociated structures and whatimprovements might be made;

c. the emergency response to theflooding, including social and welfareissues;

d. issues for wider emergency planningarising from the actual or potential lossof essential infrastructure; and

e. issues arising during the transitionperiod from the response to recoveryphases.

The specific objectives for the Review are:

a. to understand why the flooding was soextensive;

b. to learn lessons on how in future wecan best predict, prevent or mitigatethe scale and impact of floodingincidents in a potentially changingenvironment;

c. to look at how best to co-ordinate theresponse to flooding in future, includingthe significant social implications forcommunities;

d. to establish what access to support,equipment, facilities and information isneeded by those involved in theresponse at local, regional and nationallevels;

e. to ensure the public has as muchaccess as possible to information onthe risk of flooding to allow them totake appropriate precautions, beadequately informed on developmentsas an emergency unfolds, and belooked after properly in the immediateaftermath;

f. to establish how the transition fromresponse to recovery is best managed;

g. to identify those aspects of theresponse that worked well and shouldbe promoted and reinforced;

h. to make recommendations in each ofthese areas to improve the UK’spreparedness for flooding events in thefuture; and

i. to make recommendations, drawing onthe experience of the floodingincidents, to improve the UK’s broaderability to manage the loss of essentialservices in any future emergencies.

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Annex C Organisations andindividuals from the generalpublic who have contributedto this report

Organisations

Central government

Cabinet OfficeCentre for the Protection of NationalInfrastructureChief Fire and Rescue Adviser’s UnitCommunities and Local GovernmentDepartment for Business, Enterprise andRegulatory ReformDepartment for Children, Schools andFamiliesDepartment for Culture, Media and SportDepartment for Environment, Food andRural AffairsDepartment for TransportDepartment for Work and PensionsDepartment of HealthEnvironment AgencyGovernment CommunicationsHeadquarters (GCHQ)Health Protection AgencyHM TreasuryHome OfficeMaritime and Coastguard AgencyMet OfficeMinistry of DefenceNational Health ServiceNo. 10Ordnance SurveyUK Climate Impacts Programme

Government Offices

GO ScienceGO East MidlandsGO LondonGO South EastGO South WestGO West MidlandsGO Yorkshire and Humberside

Local government

Local Government AssociationBarnsley Metropolitan Borough Council

Doncaster Metropolitan Borough CouncilEast Riding of Yorkshire CouncilFlood Defence Group of Local AuthoritiesGloucester City CouncilHedon Town CouncilHull City CouncilLeeds City CouncilNorthampton Borough CouncilOxford City CouncilOxfordshire County CouncilRotherham Metropolitan Borough CouncilSheffield City CouncilSouth Norfolk CouncilTewkesbury Borough CouncilWest Berkshire CouncilWest Midlands Local GovernmentAssociationWest Midlands Regional AssemblyWeston-Sub-Edge Parish CouncilYorkshire Regional Flood DefenceCommittee

Business organisations and insurers

Association of British InsurersBritish Chambers of CommerceBritish Insurance Brokers' AssociationBusiness Continuity InstituteCouncil of Mortgage LendersNational Farmers’ UnionRotherham Chambers of Commerce

Emergency services

Association of Chief Police OfficersChief Fire Officers’ AssociationGloucestershire ConstabularySearch and Rescue Assistance in Disasters(SARAID)Wiltshire Police

Media

BBC NewsBBC Radio HumbersideBBC TV Look NorthEast Riding MailGloucestershire EchoHull Daily MailITNITV WestITV Yorkshire


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KC FMSheffield StarSky NewsSociety of Editors

The Citizen (Gloucester)Viking FMYorkshire Post

Science and engineering

Association of Drainage AuthoritiesBritish WaterwaysHadley Centre for Climate Change (MetOffice)HR Wallingford LtdInstitution of Civil EngineersNational Flood ForumRoyal Academy of EngineeringRoyal Institution of Chartered Surveyors

Universities

Centre for Ecology and HydrologyImperial College LondonUniversity of BirminghamUniversity of BristolUniversity of DundeeUniversity of East AngliaUniversity of HullUniversity of ManchesterUniversity of MiddlesexUniversity of Newcastle-upon-TyneUniversity of NottinghamUniversity of Oxford (New College)University of SheffieldUniversity of SouthamptonUniversity of Strathclyde

Utilities and critical infrastructure

Beverley and North Holderness InternalDrainage BoardBritish EnergyChartered Institution of Water andEnvironmental ManagementConsumer Council for WaterDrinking Water InspectorateEnergy Networks AssociationNational GridOfwat

Severn Trent WaterUnited UtilitiesWater UKYorkshire Water

Voluntary organisations

Help the AgedRotary International in Great Britain andIrelandWRVSWomen’s Institute:• Filkins and Broughton Poggs

(Oxfordshire)

• Hampton Bishop (Herefordshire)

• Hundleby (Lincolnshire)

• Sinnington (Yorkshire)

• South Elkington (Lincolnshire)

• South Yorkshire

• Thorpe St Peter (Lincolnshire)

• Washingborough (Lincolnshire)

• Worcestershire Federation

Cross-cutting organisations and interestgroups

Association of Directors of Adult SocialServicesAudit CommissionBritish Red CrossCommission for Rural CommunitiesCountry Land and Business AssociationForestry CommissionNational Planning Forum for EnglandNational TrustNatural EnglandPowysland Internal Drainage BoardPublic Weather Service Customer GroupRoyal Society for the Protection of BirdsSt John AmbulanceWildlife and Countryside LinkWildlife TrustsWWF

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Individuals from thegeneral public The Review Team received238 contributions frommembers of the public, notall of whom wished to benamed. Those who gavepermission were:

C AdamsonRay ArmishawW J BacchusThomas BaileyRobin BaldwinNicki BarryEmma BeaumontTim BeckettR M BennettE J BirtRoger BlackJames R BlakeGillie BoltonColin BowerRobert E BridgesHoward BrierLes BritzmanLeon BrocardNick BrockKeith BrowningRoger BrutonMarina BryantRichard BurkeTony CableChris CallaghanAnn CalverFrances CartwrightKevin Ceaser Arthur ChampionNatalie ClarkRichard ClarkRobert F Cre David CrichtonRobert DaleJack DavenportBev DayMary DhonauJohn DixonBarbara Donovan

David EdgeBrian EllisH A ElwellPeter FarleyRoger FellDerek FootChris FordAndrew FraserLisa FrostAndrew GarfinkelDavid GirtchenMike GlanvilleBeatrice GreenfieldMick GudgeonSimon HaddrellPhil HallNigel HamiltonWayne HardmanLiz HicksGerry HobbsSimon HogfressJohn HopfGeoff HowesAndy HughesEmma HughesJames HuntC H HutchinsonKen HydeKeith JacklinDawn JacklinJohn JamesDilys JonesJohn JonesJohn KaneJohn KellyMervyn KettleColin LambertEwan LarcombeArthur LawrenceCaroline MacklinRachael MaherK MaloneJeff MartinPeter MartinMichael Mcellin Terry Mcquaid Edwin MillerBev Milner-Simonds

Stephen MitchellAnil NairR K OwenAndrew ParrisPaul PartingtonMarie PeacockRichard PerryGill PillarM J PotterAnn-Marie PowellKevin PowellLinda PrestonGraham PriceArthur RabjohnLeanne RaperDavid ReadAndy ReeleyCharlie RickardMary RileyAnn RobinsonMichael RobinsonNicholas RobinsonSteve RobsonBrian RodgersDoug RodwellSarah RogersTom RollinsDavid RoyffeLesley RussellJayne SaltClive SavageGerald SavageJoe SciannaAdrian ShawDavid SheldonJane SircombeGez SmithHoward SmithKath SmithPeter SmithPhilip SmithJoe SnypeGary SoneJackie SurteesDavid ThomasGareth ThomasRichard ThomasRyan Thomas


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Eleanor ThorneycroftRichard TilbrookPatricia ToddPeter TomesJohn TonksRichard TrimmerVincent TullyD S TurnerJack TurtonTim TwomeyMr & Mrs WakefieldEdward WalkerTimothy WalkerMark WallaceChristopher WallerRichard WardPauline WashingtonR M WatsonV WatsonJonathan WeadenNigel WelbournSharon WheelerJohn WhiteheadPaul WhittleMartin WiggMike WilliamsTony WilliamsAlbert WilliamsonAnn WilsonDavid WilsonS WoolleyTimothy Wyatt

Members of Parliament

Rt Hon Hilary Benn MPRt Hon Hazel Blears MPRt Hon David Blunkett MPRt Hon John Healey MPRt Hon Charles Kennedy MPRt Hon Ian Mccartney MPRt Hon Ed Miliband MPRt Hon John Redwood MP

Norman Baker MPTim Boswell MPColin Burgon MPParmjit Dhanda MPPhilip Dunne MPCaroline Flint MP

Paul Goodman MPDiana Johnson MPJohn Mann MPAnne McIntosh MPShona McIsaac MPAnne Milton MPOwen Paterson MPLaurence Robertson MP

The area sits on a chalk formation thatextends from the Humber estuary to theYorkshire Wolds. Erosion from the NorthSea is a major concern for the region, andthe coastline is continually changing as aresult. Much of the area is low-lying (90 percent of Hull is below high tide level) andthe drainage system for Hull is entirelypumped, which means it is particularlyvulnerable to flooding. The higher groundsurrounding Hull causes a ‘basin effect’, asthe region mostly drains into the Humber.Other key rivers in the region are the RiverHull and the River Ouse.

Weather conditions and floodingBetween 14 and 25 June, a large amount ofrain fell across Humberside, causingwidespread surface water flooding. Intenserainfall on 14–15 June saturated the area,and another bout of intense rainfall on24–25 June then quickly overwhelmed thedrainage systems. Between these twoperiods, there were a number of other

localised floods, June 2007 being thewettest on record in Yorkshire since 1882.

Impact on communitiesThe sheer scale and speed of the floodscaught many local residents andbusinesses by surprise. Almost 15,500properties were affected in the Humberarea, including an estimated 2,336 councilproperties. There were also a significantnumber – over 3,000 – of uninsuredproperties. About 400 households requiredalternative accommodation for up to a week– and over 200 households will needalternative accommodation for more thansix months.

The emergency responseThe Environment Agency used advancedtechnology to monitor rainfall, river levelsand sea conditions and collated the data toissue flood warnings through its floodwarning system. The Agency issued anearly warning on 22 June and repeat

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Annex D Regional summaries

Keyaffectedpoliceareas

HumbersideLincolnshire

Keyaffectedlocalauthorities

East RidingHull CCNorth East LincolnshireCouncilNorth Lincolnshire Council

Area 2,479km2

Population 587,100

Housesflooded

Approx. 15,500

Businessesflooded

Over 650

East Riding of Yorkshire and Kingston upon Hull

warnings on the following few days. AFlood Watch was issued on 24 Junefollowed by a Flood Warning, but this wasnot escalated to a Severe Flood Warning.By 25 June, a major incident was declaredby Hull City Council, and later that day thePolice set up Silver Command.

The effect on critical infrastructureand essential servicesThe area experienced extensive surfacewater flooding which caused widespreaddisruption to roads and essential services.The estimated cost of damage to regionalroads stands at £28 million and there arefurther costs associated with damage tobridges (£4–5 million) and street lighting(£500,000).

More than 90 schools were damaged andover 650 businesses were affected,disrupting food supplies and other aspectsof daily life for many residents.


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South Yorkshire is a region with a majorindustrial history, from the coal industry tothe steel industry concentrated in Sheffield.The region’s principal towns and cities areBarnsley, Doncaster, Rotherham andSheffield, and its two main rivers are theDon and the Dearne. There is also anextensive network of canals, which werebuilt to help navigate and transport goodsbetween the major cities.

Weather conditions and floodingIntense rainfall between 14 and 16 Juneand between 24 and 25 June resulted intwo serious floods in the region. Twopeople died and approximately 6,000homes and businesses were flooded.

The first flood was due to heavy rain fallingover a period of three days. Many locationsreceived one to two months’ rainfall in thespace of just 48 hours.

The rainfall which caused the second floodwas less widespread than the first andmainly affected South and West Yorkshire,

Hull and East Yorkshire. Although 48-hourrainfall totals were similar to the first flood,the majority of the rain in the second floodfell in one particularly intense 12-hourperiod on 25 June.

In addition to the two major floods, therewere a number of localised storm floodsbetween 14 June and 23 July across NorthYorkshire and North East England.Together, these events made June thewettest on record in Yorkshire since 1882.Surface drains and sewers becameoverwhelmed and rivers rose to recordlevels, overtopping their banks and flooddefences.

Impact on communitiesIn Doncaster, 50 caravans were sited at TollBar caravan park, and may be needed forup to 18 months. Some authorities offeredto waive social housing rents and counciltaxes for those affected by the floods. InBarnsley, Doncaster and Rotherham, theauthorities waived both rents and counciltax. In Sheffield, council tax was waived,

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South and West Yorkshire


Barnsley MBCDoncaster MBCLeeds CCRotherham MBCSheffield CC

Area 1,552km2

Population 1,292,000

Housesflooded

Approx. 4,000

Businessesflooded

Approx. 1,800

South Yorkshire

and a £100 payment given to affectedhouseholds for social housing rents.

The emergency responseTwo Silver Commands were called inSheffield and Rotherham in the first floodson 14 June. During the second flood, SilverCommands were set up in Doncaster andBarnsley, and Gold Commands in SouthYorkshire and Sheffield.

The effect on critical infrastructureand essential servicesThe effects of the second flood werecompounded by the fact that the first floodhad not drained sufficiently, causingsaturated grounds and high water levels.

During the evening of 25 June, concernsgrew about the condition of the UlleyReservoir after reports of problems with thedam wall. The spillway through which waterescapes from the dam had been damagedand the dam wall was eroding. This couldhave led to a catastrophic failure of thedam wall and put lives, property and otherinfrastructure assets at risk. A major effortby the emergency services and others wasmounted to reduce the water levels in thereservoir and shore up the dam wall.

Elsewhere, Neepsend electricity sub-stationwas shut down with a loss of power to40,000 people and there was further powerfailures in Hillsborough.

The floods caused significant damage tothe local highway infrastructure. Severalarterial roads to Sheffield were closed dueto flooding, several bridges were washedaway and a culvert collapsed on a minorroad between Arnold and Swine.

Rotherham train station was closed on 25June for almost a month, and areplacement bus service was provided.


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The county of Gloucestershire lies betweenthe Cotswold Hills, the Severn Valley andthe Forest of Dean. The county is largelyrural – the principal towns are Cheltenham,Cirencester, Gloucester, Stroud andTewkesbury. The region has an extensivenetwork of rivers, the principal waterwaysbeing the Severn, the Frome, the Teme andthe Avon.

Weather conditions and floodingThe days of 24 to 25 June saw heavy,persistent and frequent thundery rain inGloucestershire, with almost a wholemonth’s rainfall in two days. Flooding waspredominantly caused by smallerwatercourses which reacted quickly to localrun-off – flooding from the River Severnwas not significant at this stage.

A deluge of heavy and persistent rain on20 July caused extensive flooding acrossthe lower Severn catchment – in manyplaces, river levels were the highest everrecorded. Gloucester recorded record floodlevels as a result of the exceptional flows inthe Teme and Avon rivers and heavy rainfallacross Worcestershire and Gloucestershire.

River levels at the Gloucester Docks gaugereached a peak of 4.92m on 23 July. Thiswas only 1 cm lower than the highestrecorded level in 1947. Normal summerlevels are around 0.6m.

Impact on communitiesOver 6,000 properties were affected by theJuly floods, many of which were firstflooded by surface water or bywatercourses which reacted quickly to localrun-off. The same properties were thenflooded by the River Severn a few dayslater. Roads and transport links wereaffected by the floods and seriouslyhampered people’s travel plans. The M5flooded and left some 10,000 vehicles andtheir occupants stranded on the motorway.Over 30 schools were damaged.

The emergency responseGold Command was set up in Gloucester tocoordinate the emergency response. Somelocal authorities offered to waive socialhousing rents and council taxes for thoseaffected by the floods.

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Gloucestershire


Cheltenham BCGloucester CCTewkesbury BC

Area 3,150km2

Population 833,100

Housesflooded

Approx. 6,000

Businessesflooded

Over 1,000

Gloucestershire

The Environment Agency monitored rainfall,river levels and sea conditions and collatedthe data to issue flood warnings.

There was some criticism of the Agency’swarning system. In particular, there wasconcern that warning of flooding at theMythe water treatment works was very late.

The effect on critical infrastructureand essential servicesMythe water treatment works nearTewkesbury was flooded and had to beshut down on 22 July. Mythe represented asingle point of failure, as the householdssupplied by the works could not receive apiped water supply from any other source.This left 350,000 people acrossGloucestershire without drinking water forup to 17 days – the largest loss of essentialservices since the Second World War.Severn Trent Water, assisted by the ArmedForces, responded with a massive effort toprovide water through bottles and bowsersto numerous locations across the county.

Electricity supplies were also threatened,as Walham switching station and CastleMeads electricity sub-station becamevulnerable to rising floodwater. TheEnvironment Agency worked with theArmed Forces, fire and rescue services andthe police to protect Walham switching-station. Castle Meads was shut downbefore it flooded, leaving over 40,000people without electricity. The jointresponse from emergency responders andthe Environment Agency meant that manytens of thousands of people acrossGloucestershire and South Wales did notsuffer from loss of power supplies.

Rough estimates suggest about 1 per centof the road infrastructure was damaged,with a potential cost in the order of £20–30million.


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The Thames Valley covers the countiessurrounding the River Thames, includingparts of Berkshire, Buckinghamshire,Oxfordshire and beyond. The Cotswold hillstypically mark the general landscape of theregion, with steep escarpments down to theSevern Valley and Warwickshire Avon. Theprincipal towns affected by the summerfloods are Reading, Oxford and Abingdon,and the region’s principal rivers include theThames, the Cherwell and the Avon.

Weather conditions and floodingThe Thames region experienced greaterthan average rainfall for most of May andJune, but the majority of the rain fell on 19and 20 July. Extremely high rainfall andalready saturated ground meant that drainswere overwhelmed which led to a largeamount of surface water flooding. Therewas also fluvial flooding along the RiverThames and its tributaries, which affected

Wiltshire, Oxfordshire, Berkshire andSurrey.

Impact on communitiesFlooding occurred across the ThamesValley. However, the impacts were lesssevere than in other parts of the country.Approximately 5,700 properties wereflooded – more than half of these were dueto surface water flooding rather than riverflooding, with the majority of river-floodedhouses to be found in the Oxfordshire andWest Berkshire areas.

The emergency responseSilver Commands were put in place inseveral locations including Windsor,Abingdon and Reading. A Gold Commandoperated for the Thames Valley region. Theauthorities in West Berkshire used a leafletcampaign to give advice to the public.

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Thames ValleyWarwickshireWiltshireSurrey


Oxford CCWest Oxfordshire DCVale of White Horse DCWest Berkshire CouncilRoyal Borough of Windsorand MaidenheadWokingham BC

Area 12,800km2

Population 4,300,000

Housesflooded

Approx. 5,700

Businessesflooded

Approx 80

Thames Valley

The effect on critical infrastructureand essential servicesMany arterial roads into major towns wereaffected, including a number of A-roadsleading into Oxford. Rail lines were closedas a result of flooding or the risk offlooding, and the major route betweenDidcot and Oxford was suspended.

Utilities infrastructure was also affected,including an electricity sub-station inOxford, and a sewage treatment works andseveral sewage pumping stations in or nearOxford and Abingdon.


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Annex E GlossaryBronze – operational level at which themanagement of ‘hands-on’ work isundertaken at the incident site or ataffected areas.

Building Regulations – the UK BuildingRegulations are rules of a statutory natureto set standards for the design andconstruction of buildings, primarily toensure the safety and health for people inor around those buildings, but also forenergy conservation and access to andabout buildings.

Business continuity management (BCM)– a management process that helpsmanage the risks to the smooth running ofan organisation or delivery of a service,ensuring that it can operate to the extentrequired in the event of a disruption.

Business continuity plan (BCP) – adocumented set of procedures andinformation intended to deliver continuity ofcritical functions in the event of adisruption.

Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) –government’s dedicated crisis managementfacilities activated in the event of a majornational emergency. Key meetings areusually chaired by the Prime Minister orsenior ministers covering strategic aspectsof the response and recovery effort,bringing together relevant departmentsand/or external parties.

Capabilities Programme – the UKCapabilities Programme comprises a rangeof capabilities that underpin the UK’sresilience to disruptive challenges. Thesecapabilities are either structural (e.g.regional response), functional (e.g.decontamination) or concerned with themaintenance of essential services (e.g.financial services).

Capability – a demonstrable capacity orability to respond to, and recover from, aparticular threat or hazard. Originally amilitary term, it includes personnel,equipment, training and such matters asplans, doctrine and the concept ofoperations.

Catchment – a geographical area in whichwater collects.

Category 1 responder – a person or bodylisted in Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the CivilContingencies Act 2004. These bodies arelikely to be at the core of the response tomost emergencies. As such, they aresubject to the full range of civil protectionduties in the Act.

Category 2 responder – a person or bodylisted in Part 3 of Schedule 1 to the CivilContingencies Act 2004. These are co-operating responders who are less likely tobe involved in the heart of multi-agencyplanning work, but will be heavily involvedin preparing for incidents affecting theirsectors. The Act requires them to co-operate and share information with otherCategory 1 and 2 responders.

Climate change – the change in averageconditions of the atmosphere near theearth's surface over a long period of time.

Coastal erosion – the wearing away of thecoastline, usually by wind and/or waveaction.

Coastal flooding – occurs when coastaldefences are unable to contain the normalpredicted high tides which can causeflooding, usually when a high tide combineswith a storm surge (created by high windsor a deep depression).

Common Recognised InformationPicture (CRIP) – an amalgamation of allfacts known at a point in time regarding adeveloping situation, into a single, coherent


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document. It is usually produced by theCivil Contingencies Secretariat or theDefence and Overseas Secretariat in theCabinet Office to inform the centralGovernment response.

Community resilience – the ability of alocal community to respond to and recoverfrom emergencies.

Convective rain – occurs mainly inequatorial and tropical regions where therate of evaporation is very high. Theevaporated moisture rises along with hot airand expands due to a decrease in airpressure as altitude is gained. The windtemperature decreases, resulting in anincrease in humidity levels that causecondensation of water vapour. This thenfalls as rain.

Cost-benefit analysis – a decision makingtechnique that analyses and evaluates theimplications of alternative courses of actionby assigning a quantified monetary valuefor each positive criterion (benefits) andnegative criterion (costs).

Critical National Infrastructure – the‘National Infrastructure’ comprises thosesectors which supply essential services tothe citizen on which normal daily life in theUK depends. These are energy, water,communications, transport, finance,government, health, food and emergencyservices. The most important sites withinthese sectors whose loss would have amajor impact on the delivery of essentialservices are deemed the ‘Critical NationalInfrastructure’.

Criticality – a relative measure thatcombines the consequences of a particularfailure mode and its frequency ofoccurrence.

Culvert – a sewer or drain crossing undera road or embankment.

Deep depression – an area of lowpressure in the atmosphere.

Detention Basin – depressions in openspaces help to slow down the run-off rateand store water on a temporary short-termbasis during extreme events.

Emergency – an event or situation thatthreatens serious damage to humanwelfare in a place in the UK or to theenvironment of a place in the UK, or war orterrorism which threatens serious damageto the security of the UK. To constitute anemergency, this event or situation mustrequire the implementation of specialarrangements by one or more Category 1responders.

Emergency planning – development andmaintenance of agreed procedures toprevent, reduce, control, mitigate and takeother actions in the event of an emergency.

Exercise – a simulation to validate anemergency or business continuity plan,rehearse key staff or test systems andprocedures.

Floodplain – low-lying area adjacent to awatercourse and prone to flooding.

Flood risk – product of the probability offlooding occurring and the consequences ofwhen it does.

Flood Warning – one of the classificationsof the Environment Agency’s flood warningsystem: flooding of homes and businessesis expected.

Flood Warning Codes – the EnvironmentAgency’s flood warning system, whichconsists of codes: Flood Watch; FloodWarning; Severe Weather Warning; and AllClear.

Flood Watch – one of the classifications ofthe Environment Agency’s flood warningsystem: flooding of low-lying land (but not

homes and businesses) and roads isexpected.

Fluvial flooding – same as river/coastalflooding.

Focus group – a qualitative researchtechnique in which a small cross-section ofpeople are brought together to discussissues or views on a particular topic,through unstructured but guided discussionby a moderator.

Frontal rain – (also known as frontalprecipitation) is formed when two airmasses of differing temperatures, humidityand density levels meet, with a layerseparating them called the ‘front’,consisting of two parts – a warm and coldfront. A warm front occurs when the warm,lighter air rises over the cold, heavier air,which cools causing moisture to condenseand form clouds. The resulting rainfall issteady, lasting from hours to days. A coldfront occurs when the cold air forces thewarm air to rise rapidly, causing moisture tocondense quickly. The rainfall is usuallyheavy and lasts for a short period of time.

Generic plan – a single plan designed tocope with a wide range of emergencies.

Geographic information system (GIS) –a computer mapping system that usescomputer software, hardware, geographicdata, and personnel to efficiently capture,store, update, analyse and displaygeographic information.

Gold – strategic decision makers andgroups at the local level. They establish theframework within which operational andtactical managers work in responding to,and recovering from, emergencies.

Government Offices – represent centralgovernment in the regions. They consist ofnine regional offices across England andrepresent 11 Whitehall departments.

Green roof – a roof purposely covered invegetation to reduce and treat water run-off.

Greenhouse gas – a gas that absorbsinfrared radiation in the atmosphere.

Groundwater flooding – occurs whenwater levels in the ground rise above thenatural surface. Low-lying areas underlainby permeable strata are particularlysusceptible.

Hesco Bastions – welded mesh, multi-cellular baskets filled with aggregate stonesto form a barrier against flood water.

Hydrology – the scientific study of water,including its properties, movement andeffects on the Earth’s surface, undergroundand in the atmosphere.

Jet stream – relatively strong, high-speedwinds concentrated within a narrow currentin the atmosphere; they mark the boundarythat separates two global air masses withsignificant differences in temperature. Thislargely determines where weather systemswill develop.

Inundation – an overflow of water.

Land management – This includes theway land is drained, used and farmed inthe rural environment.

Land use planning – branch of publicpolicy encompassing many/variousdisciplines seeking to order and regulatethe use of land.

Lead government department (LGD) –government department which, in the eventof an emergency, co-ordinates centralgovernment activity. The department whichwill take the lead varies, depending on thenature of the emergency. The Governmentregularly publishes a full list of LGDs.

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Lead responder – a Category 1 respondercharged with carrying out a duty under theCivil Contingencies Act 2004 on behalf of anumber of responder organisations, so asto co-ordinate its delivery and to avoidunnecessary duplication.

Lead time – the amount of time needed toevaluate and prepare for a change. This ismeasured from the time the change issubmitted to when it is actuallyimplemented.

Local resilience forums – a process forbringing together all the Category 1 and 2responders within a local police area for thepurpose of facilitating co-operation infulfilment of their duties under the CivilContingencies Act 2004.

Media emergency forum (MEF) – group ofrepresentatives from the media (editors,journalists), government, emergencyservices and other organisations involved indealing with an emergency, meeting to planand discuss communications challengesand common interests in planning for, andresponding to, emergencies.

Meteorology – the scientific study ofweather-related phenomena, includingstudy of the atmosphere and a focus onforecasting observable weather events.

Multi-agency plan – a plan, usuallyprepared and maintained by a leadresponder, on behalf of a number oforganisations that need to co-ordinate andintegrate their preparations for anemergency.

Mutual aid – an agreement betweenCategory 1 and 2 responders and otherorganisations not covered by the CivilContingencies Act 2004, within the samesector or across sectors and acrossboundaries, to provide assistance withadditional resource during an emergencythat may go beyond the resources of anindividual organisation.

National Grid – a network of supply lineswhich provide electricity generated atpower stations, to places where theelectricity is used.

National Severe Weather WarningService – part of the Met Office’s PublicWeather Service Programme, establishedas part of their requirement to provide earlywarnings of potentially severe weather withsufficient lead time for mitigation plans tobe put in place.

Planning assumptions – descriptions ofthe types and scales of consequences forwhich organisations should be prepared torespond. These will be informed by the riskassessment process.

Planning Policy Statement 25 (PPS25) –government planning statement relating todevelopment and flood risk.

Pluvial flooding – same as surfacewater/run-off flooding.

Precipitation – for example, rain, snow,hail and sleet.

Primary care trust – primary care is thecare provided by those professionals thepublic normally see when they have ahealth problem (eg doctor, dentist, optician,pharmacist). These services are managedby primary care trusts (PCTs).

Probabilistic forecasting – a weatherforecasting technique which relies ondifferent methods to establish theprobability of an event’s occurrence and/ormagnitude.

Probability – the chance, or likelihood, of acertain/particular event occurring which canbe expressed as a quantitative description,often ranging from 0 (rare event) to 1(common event).

Public weather service advisors – liaisedirectly with responders, relaying earlywarnings of potentially severe weather fromthe Met Office.

Qualitative research – research thatderives data from observation, interviews orverbal interactions and focuses on themeanings and interpretations of theparticipants.

Recovery – the process of rebuilding,restoring and rehabilitating the communityfollowing an emergency.

Recovery working group – sub-group ofthe strategic co-ordination group (SCG).

Regional civil contingencies committee(RCCC) – a committee which meets duringan emergency when a regional response orother action at regional level is required.

Regional media emergency forum(RMEF) – a group of representatives fromthe media (editors, journalists),government, emergency services and otherorganisations involved in dealing with anemergency, meeting to plan and discusscommunications challenges and commoninterests in planning for, and responding to,emergencies. The forum sits as a sub-group on every regional resilience forum.

Regional resilience forum (RRF) – aforum established by a Government Officeto discuss civil protection issues from theregional perspective and to create astronger link between local and centralgovernment on resilience issues. RRFshave no role in responding to emergencies,instead focusing on driving forward thedevelopment and co-ordination of planningfor emergencies within each region.

Reservoirs – a natural or artificial lakewhere water is collected and stored untilneeded. Reservoirs can be used forirrigation, recreation, providing water supply

for municipal needs, hydroelectric power orcontrolling water flow.

Resilience – the ability of the community,services, area or infrastructure to withstandthe consequences of an incident.

Rest centre – premises used for temporaryaccommodation of evacuees from anincident.

Return period – this is the measure of therarity of a flood event and is the averagetime interval between occurances of a floodevent of a similar magnitude.

Riparian ownership – owning shorelineland or land on the boundary of a river orwatercourse.

Risk – risk measures the significance of apotential event in terms of likelihood andimpact. In the context of the CivilContingencies Act 2004, the events inquestion are emergencies.

Risk assessment – a structured andauditable process of identifying potentiallysignificant events, assessing their likelihoodand impacts, and then combining these toprovide an overall assessment of risk, as abasis for further decisions and action.

River flooding – occurs as a result of highwater levels in a river channel which iscaused when the volume of rainfall or wateroverwhelms the capacity of the ground andrivers to absorb it.

Run-off – water that is not absorbed intothe ground and drains or flows off the land,often appearing in surface water bodies.

Science and technical advice cell (STAC)– brings together technical experts from theagencies involved in the response, whoadvise the multi-agency strategic co-ordination group (SCG).

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Severe Weather Warning – one of theclassifications of the Environment Agency’sflood warning system: severe flooding isexpected. There is extreme danger to lifeand property.

Silver – tactical level of managementintroduced to provide overall managementof the response.

Single point of failure – the part orlocation in a system which, if it fails, willcause the whole system to fail.

Standard of Protection – the flood eventreturn period above which significantdamage and possible failure of the flooddefences could occur.

Statutory duty – an action required by law.

Storm surge – abnormal rise in sea levelalong the shore, usually caused by strongwinds and/or reduced atmosphericpressure, often resulting from storms.

Strategic co-ordination group (SCG) – amulti-agency group which sets the policyand strategic framework for emergencyresponse and recovery work at local level(see also Gold).

Sub-catchment – a sub-section of acatchment.

Surface water/run-off flooding – occurswhen the level of rainfall overwhelms thecapacity of the drainage system to cope.

Sustainable Drainage Systems – help todeal with excesses of water by mimickingnatural drainage patterns.

Swales – a shallow, trough-like depressionthat carries water mainly during rainstorms.

Topographic – a map showing the physicalfeatures of a geographical area. It caninclude contours, types of water, vegetationand also man-made features, such asroads, utilities and structures.

Trunk main – large-diameter water pipe

Urban creep – this refers to the effect ofpaving over green areas (such as gardens)with impermeable materials.

Urbanisation – the progressive expansionof cities.

Utilities – companies providing essentialservices, for example water, energy andtelecommunications.

Voluntary sector – bodies, other thanpublic authorities or local authorities, thatcarry out not-for-profit activities.

Watercourses – a channel (natural orartificial) along which water flows.

Water table – the upper surface ofgroundwater; the boundary betweensaturated and unsaturated soil conditions.

Learning lessons from the 2007 floodsAn independent review by Sir Michael Pitt

Interim Report

Decem

ber 2007

The Pitt Review Cabinet Office 22 Whitehall London SW1A 2WH

Tel: 020 7276 5300 Fax: 020 7276 5012

E-mail: [email protected] www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/thepittreview

Publication date: December 2007

© Crown copyright 2007

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An independent review

by Sir Michael Pitt

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