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Lecture 10:

Geopolitics of the Silk Road:

New Economic and Strategic Opportunities

Topics: -

1. Introduction: The Geo-political Context

2. Explorers and Traders

3. Buddhism on the Silk Road

4. The Eurasian Super-Region

5. Beyond the Geopolitics of Mahan and MacKinder

6. The Inter-Region Perspective

7. Bibliography and Further Reading

1. Introduction: The Geopolitical Context

When the cartographers of 17th century Lisbon or Paris or London were faced with thetask of how to fill in the blank parts of their maps, they relied on one oftwo principles -theprinciple of land, or theprinciple of ocean. If they assumed the world was ocean itwas easy enough to leave the blue of the huge encompassing sea as dominant,

surrounding the continents as if islands. Alternatively, the principle of land ensured thatall the unknown areas must be unknown extensions of the continents, linking in unknowncoasts which would one day be encountered by hapless mariners.

We can see two important examples of this. Using the principles of land, navigators whofirst touched the coasts of Western Australia, New Guinea and New Zealand weretempted to assume a huge Great Southern Land, which in reality turned out to be asomewhat smaller Australia. Another crucial example was whether Siberia and NorthAmerica were joined by a land bridge or not. Those using the principle of sea assumedthat there must be a navigable passage which would separate the two lands, and a llow thepossibility of a northeast summer passage from Russia down to Japan and China (see

Bobrick 1992). This latter hypothesis turned out to be true, but due to the icebound natureof the Arctic Seas, the passage is only partly useable for a short time of the year. TheSoviet Union for a time invested considerable effort in trying to develop this naval routeand its coastlines, at one stage even envisaging a Arctic Sea coast railway that would helpdevelop the Siberian north (Bobrick 1992). This proved to be impractical, while thedevelopment of fleets of icebreakers, including nuclear powered ones, made this north-eastern passage only partly useable for high volume trade. The strategic implications ofthis limited passage remained serious, in that the Soviet Union (and Russia) were still

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forced to maintain separate fleets with little ability to bring them together (in theBaltic/Atlantic, Black Sea/Mediterranean, Caspian, and Pacific). It was precisely thislimitation which allowed the US and its allies to conceive of a policy of globalcontainment for Soviet forces during the Cold War.

In the 19-20th centuries, with the seas covering more area than the land, sea power(combined with air power in the 20th century) became dominant in generating largeempires. Sea power was important in the ancient Greek, Carthaginian and Roman spheresof influence, but became crucial as the European powers spilled out of Europe todominate the globe. It was at first a central aspect in the integration of the Mediterraneaneconomies from the 15-17th centuries, then created Atlantic and Pacific empires whichwere the source of much of the wealth of industrialised Europe. The classic analysis ofsea power remains Alfred Mayer Mahan's The Influence of Sea Power Upon History,originally published from 1890-1893, but a number of other major works have shown theeconomic and military significance of sea power in several crucial phases of history(Braudel 1984; Hanks 1985; Ross 1990; Staley 1992). In the negative sense, of course,

such navies can be used for gun-boat diplomacy, as they were often used by Europeancolonial powers in Africa and Asia.

In both World Wars there were decisive battles for the control of the oceans, the Atlanticbeing crucial in both conflicts, with control of the Mediterranean and Pacific being ofmajor significance in the Second World War. In the Cold War, control of the seas, thedevelopment of airpower(see Ball 1988; Mason 1987; Quester 1986), and finally controlof orbital space (implied through the development of satellites and through research onmissile defence technology) became crucial aspects of global dominance. This has nowbeen merged with a 'revolution in military affairs' based on the control of informationwithin a conflict or battlefield. Indeed, the Soviets during the period from the sixties

through to the eighties pushed their entire technological base to extreme degrees to beable to challenge the US at sea throughout most of the world's oceans. Even today, withRussia in relative decline, the US still wields enormous influence through its ability tosend massive carrier groups to any region it wishes to impress with its power; whether offthe coast of Libya, Syria, in the Persian Gulf, or in Northeast Asian waters. As late as1994, a major carrier group off the coast of China, engaging in war-games, found itself inan almost hot confrontation with Chinese naval and air units (Bearman 1995, p165). Thiswas only dress rehearsal for the deployment of two-carrier groups off Taiwan in March1996 in response to Chinese missile tests and exercises designed to influence Taiwan'sforeign policy in the lead up to their presidential elections. In the American case inparticular, at least parity at sea has been crucial in maintaining her NATO alliance, in herindirect dominance of Latin and South America, and her ability to 'hold the ring' ininfluencing all of East and Southeast Asia (Pollack 1993). Air and sea power remaincrucial in US policy towards Iraq, and towards the Middle East in general. Air power,likewise, was crucial in the strikes on Afghanistan through late 2001 and early 2002, andindeed tilted the balance of forces towards the Northern Alliance much more effectivelythan the infiltration by small numbers of U.S., British and Australian special forcestroops.

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Likewise, in trade terms, oceanic trade has been a crucial basis of economic wealth forBritain, Japan and America. Even in Europe, the cost of longer sea-routes is often lowerthan road, rail or even barge transport costs, e.g. most freight from the Danube basin stillpasses by sea through the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and Atlantic Ocean into northernEurope, in spite of the new canal joining the Danube and Rhine River basins.

Approximately half the goods sent from Siberia back to European Russia go byextremely long sea routes rather than by over-crowded rail routes. In fact, only highlydeveloped and efficient rail networks can even begin to compare with the bulk handlingcapacity of naval bulk transport. To date, even with the development of extensive railnetworks in Europe, North America, and very long lines in China, Central Asia, andRussia, such networks are far from fully developed. Likewise, extensive canal systemslinking the Danube and Rhine River basins, as well as river canals interlinking the Baltic,Arctic, Black Sea and Volga river systems are still unable to provide the volume ofthrough trade to compare with ocean-going transport. This emphasis on sea-going tradehas also heightened the strategic of certain parts of the world, especially on 'choke points'along sea-lanes-of-communication (SLOCs), e.g. in the Sea of Japan, in the south China

Sea, the Malacca Straight, the Persian Gulf, the rock of Gibraltar at the southern tip ofSpain, the entrance to the Black Sea, and the Suez and Panama Canals.

However, this was not always the case. Once one of the main economic and culturalroutes passed over thousands of kilometres of mountains, deserts and steppes to connectdistant civilisations. For almost four thousand years, though most notably from the 3rdcentury B.C. onwards, the old Silk Roadconnected a dozen cultures on the swayingbacks of camels carrying silk, incense, gold and rumours between China, Central Asia,the Middle East and the Levant (see Franck & Brownstone 1986). The term 'Silk Road'itself (die Seidenstrassen) was first used by the German geographer, Baron Ferdinand vonRichthofen (d. 1905), due to fact that silk was one of the main products that travelled thefull length of the route (Christian 2000, p1). Down this road alsoflowed religious ideas:Gnosticism, Manicheanism, Nestorian Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam allflowed along this route, influencing major civilisations including Persia, India and China(Franck & Brownstone 1986; Puri 1987; Wallis 1928; Klimkeit 1993).

Power and wealth in Eurasia was often related to an ability to control at least part ofthe Silk Road, which was important to Persians, Parthians, the Kushans, and to TangChina. The open access to the road depended in part on the stability and policies of keypowers along the route: from about 100 B.C. - 100 A.D., during the second and thirdcenturies A.D., during the Tang period and the early Islamic era (7th-8th centuries), and inthe Mongol period trade flourished (Christian 2000, p3). For the Mongols control of theseroutes helped the creation of their empire, and for central Asia it created an oikoumene (aunified cultural world) more extensive than the Mediterranean civilisation of the Romansand Christendom (see MacNeill 1963; MacNeill 1986). Indeed, for a short time theMongols controlled the heartland of Eurasia, giving them privileged strategic access intoEast Asia, Eastern Europe and South Asia.

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For a time (circa 1300-1405), the Mongols controlled the heartland of Eurasia, giving them control over

adjacent regions. (Map courtesy of PCL Map Library)

The traffic on the road was lessenedby two trends - the conflict which developedbetween Islam and Christendom, and then the cheaper, alternative sea route aroundAfrica which brought ships from Portugal, Spain, then Holland and England around the

Cape of Good Hope then into the Indian and Pacific Oceans. By the 18th century the SilkRoad had been reduced to secondary important, with more significance for regional traderather than the exchange between Europe and Asia. It was this intrusion of Europeannaval powers into Arabic, Indian and Asian waters which destroyed sophisticated existingtrade networks and an international system which was relatively stable (Amin 1992;Chaudhuri 1990; Frank 1994). The re-emergence of piracy in the 18-19th centuries, inparticular, in the Indian ocean and Southeast Asian region in fact has been linked to thedestabilisation of indigenous kingdoms by repeated European interventions.

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The dominance of the sea routes, first because of their load carrying capacity, then as astrategic doctrine, means that sea-power came to dominate the world-view of theEuropean conquerors, then of the nation-states of the modern world (Li 1990). With theunderstanding of the need to dominate the air, which largely emerged from World War II,the doctrine was reborn as a combined air-sea power strategy. Reaffirmed in the Gulf

War against Iraq, this doctrine has remains with us in the 21

st

century as a rarelychallenged dogma. However, as we shall see, there are rather different ways toconceptualise economic and military power. The heartland, world-island and associatedrim-land concepts developed by H.J. MacKinder and others reacting to him have a posedan addition to these air-sea power approaches.

With the 1990s eclipse of the Cold War, with renewed economic growth in East Asia,and a transformed political landscape in Central Asia, the time seems ripe to reconsiderthese doctrines. This remains true in spite of the breakup of the Soviet 'Empire' (contrathe view expressed in Hauner 1992, pp253-254, originally formulated in 1990). TheSoviet Union was once held together by centralised authoritarian government, by

concerns for a central administration of resources, and secured by military forcesguaranteeing internal and external security throughout the region. As a result, the CentralAsia region was artificially linked into the Soviet economy, and cut off from eastern andsouthern trade routes.

Today, instead, we have in Central Asia a region that is allowed to pursue more realisticeconomic policies, to try fulfil indigenous nationalistic and religious expectations, and tobegin to engage in trade and cultural exchange with naturally adjacent sectors to the

south, west, and east. While the borders with Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and China remainedclosed, Central Asia could be nothing more than a periphery to Moscow. True economicefficiency remained difficult, as did the development of sympathetic cultural and social

resources. Today, this trend is slowly being reversed. With trade to these adjacent regionsjust beginning, as well as potential access to the Black and Mediterranean Seas, and southto the Persian Gulf, there is a real prospect for a revitalised regional economy. Thepotential for resource development, more balanced agricultural planning, and industrialdevelopment is so high that some commentators have spoken of a new Silk Road(Jones1995; Ma 1984). It must be stressed, however, that this new regional development cannotbe entirely based east-west inter-linkages. To date the Russians have found that even withthe re-development of the trans-Siberian railway and the recent completion of the BAMlinkup, this is too weak a trend to create a unified economic and cultural space. New east-west and north-south connectivities, both in terms of trade and culture, is needed tocreate a powerful focus of interactions between Central Asia, the Middle East, Turkey,Iran, Pakistan and India, as well as to China and the Pacific Ocean. As we have seen,such economic and cultural interactions have already begun, e.g. Turkish trade intoCentral Asia and Iran and Kazakhstan relations with China, but have yet to be deeplyentrenched (see Henze 2001). The rebuilding of Afghanistan through 2002 may also offeropportunities for new north-south linkages through Pakistan and westwards through Iran.

We can now turn around the sea and heartland doctrines to suggest that the doctrine ofland, (continental integration) combined with suitable air-power and communication

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technologies, can once again play a significant role for the future of Europe and Asia.The issue here is of complementarity. This means that the region of Greater Central Asiawill remain crucial for Eurasia as a whole, with a continued strategic significance (ineconomic, cultural and security terms) for Europe, Russia, the Middle East and China.Indeed, only if Central Asia develops adequately, will Eurasia become a genuine super-

region with a high level of positive interaction, as distinct from a loose historical andgeographical unit.

In order to clarify this trend it will be helpful to look at the way the modern-nation statehas operated amid the parallel trends of regionalism (see Ohmae 1993; Rubenstein &Smolansky 1995) and incomplete or uneven globalisation (Holm 1995). Alongside thenewly independent states of the region, the policies of several key international playersare very important in stabilising world affairs. The US, Russia, Turkey (a member ofNATO and aspirant to the EU), Iran, and China all play an important role in the future ofEurasia as a whole. Furthermore, Central Asia and Siberia are two of the few resource-rich regions that have not been heavily exploited by the world economy , and represent a

reserve which may become even more strategically significant in the twenty-first century.Likewise, the trade potential and cultural resources of Greater Central Asia are onlynow becoming widely recognised, with particular concern from UNESCO, the EU andChina that these resources be protected and developed. UNESCO in particular hassponsored research and public awareness programs designed to enhance and protect thecultural legacies of Greater Central Asia. UNESCO also hopes to promote responsibletourism in the region, and has helped provided guidelines and funding in repairinghistoric buildings, recognising tourism in countries such as Uzbekistan have been littledeveloped (Rao 2001). To understand the full drift towards a re-balanced world system,we will need to examine the interaction between the 'principle of land' and the 'principleof ocean' in more detail.

A parallel question is the relationship of sea-power (Mahan) to the theories concerningthe heartland and rimland (as developed by MacKinder). It turns out that these theoriesare not so much in opposition as complementary (as noted by Hauner 1992; see more onthis below), and are crucial for the future of Eurasia. What role this Eurasian region willplay in reacting with the emergingPacific-Rim dominant economic structure, and theexistingAtlantic cultural-military-economic structure, also needs to be considered.Before proceeding further, however, a brief discussion of the explorers, traders andreligions of the old Silk Road will be undertaken.

2. Explorers and Traders

The several linked trade routes that crossed Central Asia, along with related routes acrosssouthern Russia and branching lines, can be called theSilk Roads and Steppe Roads. Thesteppe roads (also called the Sable Road) were slightly more north of the Silk Road,pasting north of the Caspian Sea, and trading expensive furs into Russia, Byzantium andEurope (Christian 2000, p7; Brobrick 1992, p68). These routes predated historical recordsand probably from as early as 2000 B.C.E. had begun to link the Afro-Eurasian regioninto one 'world system', in part based on the movements and trade needs of pastoral

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peoples in the heart of Eurasia (Christian 2000, p1, p4). Aside from silk and otherprecious trade goods, livestock, human populations, 'disease vectors, languages,technologies, styles, religions and genes' followed this route from pre-historic times(Christian 2000, p1). Technologies that passed along these routes included the compoundbow, crossbows, the stirrup, gunpowder, printing and papermaking (Christian 2000, p10).

Early explorers along the Silk Road region included Chinese, Indians, and as latecomers, Europeans such as Marco Polo (circa 1254-1324 AD). A recent controversy hasraged over whether Marco Polo really did reach China, or simply collected inaccuratehearsay and combined it with earlier Arabic sources. We can test this in one descriptionmade by Marco Polo of an important city in China. Marco Polo recorded a vividimpression of the city of 'Su-chau' (Suzhou) in the province of 'Manzi' during thethirteenth century: -

Moving on from here we shall tell you next of a large and splendid city called Su-chau. The people here are idolaters, subject to the Great Khan and using papermoney. They live by trade and industry, having silk in great quantity and make

much silken cloth for their clothing. There are merchants here of great wealth andconsequence. The city is so large that it measures about forty miles incircumference. It has so many inhabitants that no one could reckon their number.I give you my word that the men of the province of Manzi, if they were a war-likenation, would conquer all the rest of the world. But they are not war-like. I canassure you rather that they are capable merchants and skilled practitioners ofevery craft, and among them are wise philosophers and natural physicians with agreat knowledge of nature.

Let me tell that in this city there are fully 6,000 stone bridges, such that one ortwo galleys could readily pass beneath them. In the adjacent mountains rhubarband ginger grow in great profusion, so that one Venetian groat would buy fortypounds of ginger, of excellent quality. The city exercises authority over sixteen

others, all large and busy centres of trade and industry. (Polo 1972, p212)

This description of the bridges (though their number is exaggerated), the silk industry,and general wealth of Suzhou seem generally accurate. Frances Wood, however, hasargued that there are no mountains near Suzhou, that ginger is usually grown furtherwest, and that rhubarb never has been produced there.(Wood 1995, p90) The pointconcerning rhubarb can be conceded, but the hills near the adjacent Lake Taihu are fertileand today produce a range of agriculture products, including citrus and stone fruits. Onthis basis, it would be possible for Suzhou to have been a local market for a wide range ofagricultural products, perhaps vaguely sketched, though not accurate in all details, byMarco Polo'sDescription of the World. (Wood 1995, pp140-151) Frances Wood's thesis

that Marco Polo did not reach China is rejected by other writers, who argue that MarcoPolo was influenced by the fantastic elements found in the travel genre of the time (Hall1996, pp43-48).

The long route between East and West was in sections extremely difficult: the Gobi andTaklamakan Deserts, the Karakum and Kyzyl Kum (Uzbekistan) Deserts (Rashid 2001,p34), and the mountain heights of the Tien-shan and Pamirs make the route both difficultand dangerous. However, the route itself was not a continuous one, but was established

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through flows of silk from China to Rome via different groups that controlled sections ofthe road. The Huns, followed by the Turks and then the Persians controlled key sectors ofthe trade route, followed by the Mongols and the Mongol-Turkish empire of Timur (Puri1987, pp11-16). China reasserted strong control of the eastern section of the routebetween A.D. 630 and A.D. 658 with the defeat of various Turkish tribes and renewed

control over the Tarim Basin and Eastern Turkestan (Puri 1987, p48). This, of course,later on in part would become the strategic region of Xinjiang, which today remains aproblematic area for Chinese political and economic governance. From the seventhcentury onwards the Chinese had to face two powerful enemies in this region: theTibetans from the south and Persians from the west, and for a time in the late 9 th centurya locally powerful Uighur kingdom (Puri 1987, pp49-50).

Diverse trade goods, ideas and religions flowed down this road in both directions.Artistic and musical influence were also diffused, with Indian, Persian, Chinese, Tibetanand Uighur influences detectable in Central Asian paintings (Puri 1987, p258).

However, only high prestige physical goods would be traded at great distances betweeneast and west: -

The most important product was silk from China which was exported through tworoutes in Central Asia - the northern one passing through Turfan, Karashahr (old

Agnidesa) and Kucha, and the southern one through Miran, Niya, Khotan andYarkand. The terminal points of the two routes at the eastern end wereTunhuang and at the western one Kashgar. Trade provided stimulus andincentive to the merchants of different personalities for participation in it andsettling down at various points on the trade routes. (Puri 1987, p226).

Silk, though the most valuable of items, especially when it reached the West (Rome andConstantinople), was in fact one among many items: 'Silk actually composed a relativelysmall portion of the trade along the Silk Road: eastbound caravans brought gold, preciousmetals and stones, textiles, ivory and coral, while westbound caravans transported furs,ceramics, cinnamon bark and rhubarb as well as bronze weapons.' (1)

In the long run, of course, the secret of silk production from silk worms could not be keptwithin China, in spite of severe decrees against the export of worms or cocoons.Sericulture eventually spread, at first in Khotan, according to legend smuggled secretlyout of China by a princess (Puri 1987, p246), and then further east into Byzantium at alater date (Ma 1984). However, for many centuries, and even today, Chinese remainedamong the main suppliers of high quality silk.

The oasis cities of Central Asia flourishedwhen engaged heavily in this local andinternational trade. One of the centres that flourished from the 16 th century onwards wasBukhara: -

From as early as the sixteenth century, Bukharan merchants, who had longexperience of trading with Inner Eurasia, played a critical role in the trade routeslinking Muscovy, Siberia, and China. Central Asian traders had traded into thelands along the Volga River and west of the Urals from the earliest days of Rus'

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statehood. And they were active in the region when it was dominated by theMuslim rulers of the Golden Horde and the successor states of Kazan and

Astrakhan. After the conquest of these states by Muscovy in 1552 and 1556,respectively, Bukharan traders began to deal more directly with Muscovy. Fromthe late sixteenth century delegations of traders regularly travelled from central

Asia to Muscovy and also, though less often, in the opposite direction. Bukharaninterest in trade with western Siberia dates from at least the late sixteenthcentury, when the region was dominated by Tsar Kuchum, but it continued afterthe occupation of the region by Muscovite forces early in the seventeenthcentury. By the late seventeenth century Muscovy was trading with China itself,often with the mediation of Bukharan traders who were familiar with all the majorroutes between Muscovy and China. Some of these routes followed traditionalitineraries, leading down the Volga to central Asia and then on to Xinjiang andChina. Some rejoined the old Silk Roads in east-central Asia, after passingthrough western Siberia and down the river Irtysh. Others bypassed thetraditional routes entirely, travelling either through Mongolia to Urga, or entirelythrough Siberia to Nerchinsk, and then through Mongolia. (Christian 2000, p9)

Lastly, it has been suggested by Andre Frank that what we call 'modernism' was

generated out of millennia of interaction among Afro-Eurasian civilisations,interacting along the Silk and Steppe Roads (Christian 2000, p11). If so, then futureintegration of Eurasia in the 21st century may have a significant impact on the currentworld system and globalisation processes today (see below).

3. Buddhism on the Silk Road

The Silk Road not only connected East Asia with Central Asia and then to the Westernworld. It also, via branch roads, opened up communication among China, India andPersia (Puri 1987, p3), and later on via northern routes trade and cultural contacts withRussia. As we have seen, Buddhist culture had a key role to play in unifying Tibet, and in

providing a key cultural influence on Mongolia. Buddhism ultimately came fromnorthern India, but 'Central Asia was the earliest and, on the whole, the principal sourceof Chinese Buddhism' (Puri 1987, p147).

However, it seems likely thatKhotan in Central Asia was one of the key transmitters ofBuddhism into both Tibet and China (Puri 1987, p13). By the second half of the thirdcentury monks and scholars such as Chu-she-hing and Moksala were busy compilingBuddhist texts, translating them into Chinese, and sending them on into China (Puri 1987,p61). Khotan for a time was a centre of Buddhist learning: -

Khotan figures prominently in ancient records and was known to the Chinesewriters as Yu-tien, colonised in the time of Asoka with the blind prince Kunala

being set up as a ruler of this newly founded kingdom. The Gomati vihara here -the premier Buddhist establishment - was noted for its learned savants who alsowrote canonical texts, thus contributing to the development of Buddhist literature.(Puri 1987, p20).

Such centres also became key staging posts in the transmission of ideas from India intoChina, with the idea of the itinerant monk bring back Buddhist texts becoming one of thestandard types in Chinese literature: -

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The first Chinese pilgrim to actually reach India and return with a knowledge ofBuddhism was Fa Xi'an (337-422), a monk who travelled the southern route in399, through Dunhuang and Khotan and over the Himalayas to India. He studiedBuddhism under various Indian masters in Benares, Gandhara and Ceylon (SriLanka), and went as far as Sumatra and Java in Indonesia; altogether he visitedover 30 countries, returning to China in 414 via the sea route. The Buddhistmonk, Xuan Zang (600-664), is perhaps the most well-known of all Chinesetravellers on the Silk Road, and one of the four great translators of Buddhisttexts. His lasting fame is primarily due to the humorous 16th-century novel,Pilgrimage to the West (also known as Monkey), a fictional account of hispilgrimage that includes and odd assortment of the characters who accompanythe monk on his journey, along with their various escapades. (2)

The Chinese traveller, Fa-Hien (Fa Xi'an), visited Khotan around A.D. 400. Even bythen the small city was worthy of note: -

The Chinese pilgrim found Buddhism in Khotan in a very flourishing conditionand describes the glories of its monastic establishments in some detail. Themonks numbered several thousands, most of them being students of Mahayana.

There were hospitable arrangements in the Sangharamas for the reception oftravelling monks, and he notices the custom of erecting small stupas in front ofeach dwelling family. The Gotami monastery, the residence of the pilgrim and hiscompanions, alone contained 3000 monks of the Mahayana school. He alsorefers to Buddhist celebrations with the taking out of images in the fourteen greatmonasteries, more than thirty cubits high. (Puri 1987, p55).

Other cities in Central Asia were also involved in the transmission and adoption of

various forms of Buddhism, including centres such as Kashgar, Osh, Kucha, Yarkand,Balkh and Bamiyan (Puri 1987, p85). Other exponents such as Kumarajiva wereimportant in introducing key Buddhist texts into the Tarim Basin, and over fifty oftranslations became important classical texts in China (Puri 1987, p121). Chinese control

of Khotan lapsed around 791, and around 1000 A.D. Muslim rule took over the city (Puri1987, p57).

EXTERNAL RESOURCE

For Buddhist Art in Dunhuang Grottoes, Western China, go to

http://www.chinapage.com/dunhuan.html

Within China itself, theSilk Road itself continued eastward from the three branchingpaths near Tarim Basin, leading to one of the most important artistic centres for

Buddhism in the world. The Grottoes of Dunhuang, which have hundreds of paintings onreligious and secular themes, are internationally famous. From here the main trade routecontinued eastwards to Chang'an (modern Xi'an).

AlthoughBuddhism was largely pushed out by the arrival of Islam in Central Asia,with small pockets existing Russia and Siberia, we know of the vigorous spread ofBuddhism in the region due to the large number of literary texts, monuments and artworks that testify to the saturation of the eastern end of the Silk Road with Buddhist

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influences. This influences also spread into current-dayAfghanistan, after beinginfluenced by patterns of Indian and Greek artistic styles (Gandhara art). One of themajor centres for Buddhist statuary and paintings is found in central Afghanistan atBamiyan: -

The typical example of this culture is represented by Bamiyan, situated in thevalley between the Hindukush and the Kohi-Baba ranges. It occupied in itsheyday an important position on the trade route from Bactria to Taxila. The twoimmense statues of Buddha represented as Lokottara, the Lord of the World, cutin the rock at the eastern and western approaches of the town dominate theBuddhist complex in the region. The cliff between them covering about akilometre in circuit is honeycombed with a conglomeration of caves, chapels,assembly halls and cells for the Buddhist monks. Some of these grottoes areconnected by galleries within along the front of the precipice forcircumambulation. The fifty-three metre Buddha, like the smaller colossus, hasprovided access to its summit through a system of stairways . . . (Puri 1987,p298)

As we have seen, in March 2001, an extremist form of Islam as developed under theTaliban has led to the intentional destruction of these Buddhist statues and much otherrepresentational art in Afghanistan, in spite of world wide protests, including efforts byPakistan, Iran, Turkey, Egypt and the OIC to stop this 'cultural terrorism' (Moore &Constable 2001; Menon 2001). The United Nations General Assembly, the UNSecretary-General Kofi Annan, delegations from Japan, and protests from the RussianForeign Ministry and Russian Buddhist groups have had little effect in stopping thisdestruction. (3) In fact, this has been part of a much larger problem of neglect,destruction and illegal sales of artefacts out of war-torn Afghanistan for more than twodecades (Lewis 2000).

The Silk Road was never fully destroyed but came under specific pressures . The routearound the south of the Tarim Basin was eventually partially lost due to shifting riversthat led to the abandonment of centres such as Miran, Endere, Niya and areas aroundKhotan (Puri 1987, p259). Likewise, once Islam displaced Buddhism in the region, thiswould change the orientation and art of the region. Economic forces would also weakenthe long-distance trade along the route as the Ottoman Turks took control of the westernend of the route and as Portuguese and then the Spanish began extending ocean traderoutes between Europe and Asia. After World War II, of course, the region was largelydivided under the fracture lines created by the Cold War, with armed borders restrictingtrade and influence along both east-west and north-south axes. Today, however, it ispossible that new initiatives will begin to re-integrate these regions again.Integrationalong these 'new Silk-Roads' is crucial for the future of Eurasia.

4. The Eurasian Super-Region

As long ago as the early twentieth century work of the Sir Halford Mackinder (seeMackinder 1904; Mackinder 1962), it was realised that theEurasian heartland had greatsignificance in world affairs. His ideas were paraphrased by the geo-politician NicholasSpykman as the idea that whoever controls the Rimland (the peripheral areas of the

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Eurasian continent) rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world.(4) Likewise, the academic and US government adviser Owen Lattimore in the 1930s and40s had an intense interest in Asian frontier nationalism, and argued that strategic andeconomic geography can become political geography, i.e. transform political realities(see Cotton 1989, p59). This trend remained especially significant while imperial powers

fought for extended continental territories. In the 19th century Russian, Chinese andBritish contests over control of Tibet, Persian and Central Asia became known as theGreat Game (Meyer & Brysac 1999). The main British aim was to stop Russianextension of power in the east and especially in the south towards the Persian Gulf - fromthe perspective of the British Empire, this would have allowed the Russian (heartland) tointerfere with their naval empire which effectively controlled a number of zones alongthe rim of Eurasia. Today, some writers would suggest that a new 'great game' is afoot,with the major players for influence including Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan,China and India (Rashid 2001; Malik 1992c, p36). As we saw in lecture 9, this analogy isriddled with threat perceptions, and according to Roland Dannreuther is a false analogywhich does not adequately take into account Russia's determination to be a major

influence, and the fact that the new states have themselves entered the internationaldiplomacy arena with a certain skill (Dannreuther 1994, p5).

However, with the development of sea lanes and the Suez and Panama Canals, thisEurasian continental zone lost some of its strategic significance except for those statescontiguous to Europe or its sea routes, e.g. powerful regional states such as Russia, Iran,Turkey and China (all of whom have at times placed major military forces along theirinternal land borders). The significance of this Eurasia has once again increased, if placedin the wider social, economic and cultural aspects of strategic thought. Although apotential area of instability, Central Asia also represents a major economic and culturalopportunity for new positive relations to extend beyond European's border. Once dividedby the Cold War and by Soviet-Chinese confrontations,Eurasia now has the potential tobecome more interconnected in the future as a zone of relative integration for securityand economic affairs. Whether it does depends on a number of major factors, includingthe impact of Russian, Chinese and American policies, as well the way regional andcultural interests are developed.

With the new strategic partnership between China and Russia, along with accordsthey hold with most of the Central Asian states, it is already clear that these two greatpowers already hold considerable leverage on Eurasian development. At present, tensionsexperienced by China and Pakistan with India continue to limit how far the southern zoneof Eurasia can become integrated into new trade routes - the old route to the northeast outof India into China remains a militarised area, while Pakistan-Afghanistan trade routeshave not yet really stabilised for access into Central Asia, though this may changethrough 2003. The questions remains open as to whether the U.S. and the EU willsustained a long term interest in Eurasia that goes beyond the reconstruction ofAfghanistan. One major sign of western Eurasian integration has been a major transportproject to connect Europe, the Caucasus Region, and Asia. Called the TransportCorridor Europe-Causasus-Asia (TRACECA), it has received serious support from theEuropean Union in an effort to rebuild sea, road and railway links. Traffic across this

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'new' Silk Road has grown 60% between 1996 and 1998, with up a $1 billion ofinfrastructure investment and loans eventually being needed (largely to be drawn fromthe EU and from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development). (5)

This Eurasian centre can be contrasted to a formal Atlantic-based maritime sphere

based on North America and its interconnections with Western Europe (Fitzpatrick1992, p18, p27), i.e. NATO 'plus'. This pattern had been modified by the followingprocess during the Cold War: 'The incorporation of key fringe areas of the Eurasianlandmass within the American hegemonic sphere produced a new 'bipolar' geopoliticalconfiguration which may broadly be described in terms of an opposition between aEurasian 'heartland' sphere and an expanded maritime-cum 'rimland' sphere.' (Fitzpatrick1992, p21). Now that the USSR has broken apart, and the main phase of the Cold War isover, a host of newly independent states (NIS) have emerged in the region . Theseinclude Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan in CentralAsia, as well as Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan between the Caspian and Black Seas.All these states are searching for modernisation, for improved standards of living, and

improved communications with the outside world. In this context, although the reality ofRussian influence remains strong, there has also been a marked increase in Chinese,Turkish, Iranian, Pakistani and Saudi Arabian influence in certain areas. Likewise, theUS, European states and to a lesser extent, Japan (Yamamoto 1995) and South Korea,have tried to offer their services in a host of economic and political projects which willchange the future of Central Asia and Siberia (see lecture 7). It is also possible to arguethat the hegemonic Atlantic grouping (North America, plus Western Europe) is nowbeing rather dissipated by differing economic and political interests as the EU becomesmore independent, and as the defensive reasons for coherence in the face of the SovietUnion declines. Both the EU-US and Japan-US relationship have come under a certainlevel of pressure due to trade frictions. The US made strenuous efforts during 1996-2002to ensure that their alliances with Japan and through NATO remain vigorous andeffective (e.g. note various concessions to bring France back into NATO, the plan toexpand NATO into Eastern Europe, and efforts to deepen military cooperation withJapan).

Furthermore, the region of Central Asia brings together the broader concerns of Eurasia.In a world where regional significances have increased since the end of the Cold War(see Chubin 1989; Cintra 1989), this super-region, often broken in two due to traditionalconceptions of 'Asia' and 'Europe', needs to be reconsidered. This super-region has mostof the features of a 'security complex'(see Fitzpatrick 1 992, p4; Buzan 1983, pp105-106). In other words, changes and impacts on one side of the super-region have directeffects on not only the centre, but also on the remote border. This was certainly trueduring the Cold War. For example, the whole doctrine of a US strategic attack on theSiberian coast of the USSR was based on the way this would reduce the willingness ofthe Soviets to engage in a fast drive through Northern Europe. Likewise, force levels onthe Chinese border had a direct impact on modern forces which could be deployed inCentral Asia and in the Warsaw Pact region. In the late 1980's, likewise, reduced tensionsin Europe allowed the USSR to redeploy and modernise its divisions on its easternborders, causing a short period of anxiety in both China and the West (Tai Ming Cheung

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shaping the destinies of nations and of the world, had received little or noparticular attention. (Mahan, I, 1892, ppiii-iv)

Mahan thought his views gained especial verification from the outcome of theNapoleonic wars, in which the Continental system set up by Napoleon to try to isolateBritain from European markets, i.e. 'the Continental System' of the early 19th century

(Mahan, II, 1892, p54, p897), in fact failed precisely because of British naval power, andin particular, the inability of the French and her allies to control Atlantic coasts and theMediterranean (Mahan, II, 1892, p59, p69, p366, p372, pp394-5). The ability of theBritish to close most European ports and seriously inhibit coast trade also wasdemonstrated clearly by 1801 (Mahan, II, 1892, p66). France in particular, with morethan a million men under arms, would find this blockade to have serious economicimpacts on her ability to effectively wage war (Mahan, II, 1892, pp376-377). Ironically,the British navy would be expanded and her overall dominance of the sea increased bythe French challenge, as indeed would her role as a trade entrepot for non-Europeangoods to Europe (Mahan, II, 1892, pp73-74, p374, p380). The possession by the BritishIsles ofa great navy also offered the ability to project power at great distances, and to

keep much of the negative affects of war removed from her homeland. This alsosuggested a policy in relation to 19th century European wars: -

. . .great operations on land, or a conspicuous share in the continentalcampaigns became, if not absolutely impossible to Great Britain, at least clearlyunadvisable. It was economically wiser, for the purposes of the coalitions, thatshe should be controlling the sea, supporting the commerce of the world, makingmoney and managing the finances, while other states, whose industries wereexposed to the blast of war and who had not the same commercial aptitudes, didthe fighting on land. (Mahan, II, 1892, p386).

This policy involved the setting up a world-scale empire with dominions and colonies,

with massive penetration of trade and access to 'third world' resources which were thendenied other powers. This was backed up by a strong merchant marine, a sizeable armyand dominant navy, and formed the basis of Britain's power in the 19th century (Mahan,II, 1892, p389). Although Britain would not be able to sustain such a powerful role afterWorld War II, this approach reveals several important correlations of attitudes. Theseinclude a correlation between commercial and naval power, and the tendency to link theability to project power with proxy wars fought by allies.

Several parallels suggest themselves. In World War II, as well, the 'Fortress Europe'conception of the German military command could never be fully maintained whileBritish and American fleets fought and won the 'battle of the Atlantic'. In the Pacific,

during World War II the Japanese needed decisive naval victories to ensure the survivalof the 'co-prosperity sphere' (see Barnhart 1987) her military planners wished to set up inEast and South-East Asia. It was the lack oftotalvictories at Pearl Harbour and Midwaywhich prevented her from securing needed economic resources and keeping the war awayfrom her vulnerable island homeland. In the Cold War, American also combineddominance in trade and huge naval forces to project power globally and to aid herinvolvement in a number of proxy hot wars (Korean, Vietnam, Cambodian conflicts).Although the U.S. has not had colonies as such in this period, she had set up a close

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network of allies and economic dependencies which gave her some of the same strategicadvantage: hence some writers have viewed the Pacific as an American Lake. It wasprecisely this policy which the Soviets could only partially emulate.

These historical trends have resulted in a huge literature emphasizing the dominance of

sea-air powerbased on carrier groups, or at least strong defensive groupings, e.g.effective submarine and air forces (see Neilson & Errington 1995; Mason 1987; Ball1988; Hanks 1985; Babbage 1988). In the post-Cold War period, there have also beenefforts to re-conceptualise positive roles for these huge forces, including involvement inpeace-keeping activities (Staley 1992; Ross 1990). These trends have also been supportedby the fact that in the late 20th century considerable portions of the world's trade (18%)flowed across the Pacific and Atlantic (see Miall 1993, p31).

If we now turn to the theories ofMacKinder, we can see how his ideas in some waysforce a rethinking the dominance of this 'principle of ocean'. MacKinder's startling ideason the way geography affected political life and world history were publicly announced

in a now famous address to the British Royal Geographical Society in 1904, and gainedfurther refinement in an article "The Round World and the Wining of the Peace" (ForeignAffairs, July 1943). They received their most complete treatment by him in hisDemocratic Ideals and Reality (1962). Although there were slight modifications in hisideas during this time, they focused on several key ideas: -

* The 'the unequal growth of nations is in large measure the result of theuneven distribution of fertility and strategic opportunityupon the face ofthe globe' (Pearce 1962, pxviii). Human societies, furthermore, as 'GoingConcerns' with institutional momentum are now faced for the first time witha closed system (Pearce 1962, pxviii) where any expansions impinges onother societies.

* That societies which used sea power successfully for any length of time didso by enclosing their regions of operation by bases and colonies, turningthese regions into virtual 'inland' seas. In other words, sea and land powerwas requiredto create lasting political empires. MacKinder supported thisidea by looking at the way the Romans in the Punic Wars against Carthageused naval power to invade north Africa and Spain to stop Carthaginiancontrol of the Western Mediterranean, and the way the U.S. build up islandbases across the Pacific and into Asia to defeat Japan in World War II

* The one region which cannot be communicated to by sea and encircled in

this way (combined sea and land operations), is the heartland of Eurasia,comprising Central Asia and much of the Urals and Siberia. This region hasrivers that drain either into inland seas or into the frozen Arctic. The regionis protected frozen seas to the north, and in large measure by mountains anddeserts to the south.

* That this heartland operates as a crucial geographical and strategic pivotwhich can aid control of the 'World Island' of Eurasia. Combined with its

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mineral and population resources, control of the heartland would give amajor world power, e.g. Germany, Russia or China, a significantglobalpower advantage. It was for this reason that Germany's attempt to controlthis region (in World War II), and the Soviet Union's control of it down to1991, made them major challenges to any notion of 'balance of power'.

* That the ferocity of the Cold War was largely related to the fact that Sovietcontrol of the heartland forced the U.S. (and its allies) to engage in a policyofglobal containmentagainst this threat, with forces and alliancesstationed along the entire land border and in the sea accesses to Sovietterritory. Ironically, the strategic 'balance of terror' achieved by nucleararsenals of the Soviets and the Americans meant that such weapons arelocked in a 'non-use stalemate' (deterrence) where the strategic significance ofMacKinder's thought has remained valuable. Efforts to achieve strategicadvantage have often been played out on the Peninsulas of this 'WorldIsland' (Pearce 1962, pxi), e.g. Korea, southeast Asia, or in Africa.

Criticisms and adaptions of Mackinder's position include:

* R.S. Amery has suggested that nations with the greatest industrial andtechnological base, regardless of location geographically, will tend todominate world affairs(in Pearce 1962, pxxiii). This would seem to havebeen true of Britain in the 19th century, and Japan in the economic senseover the last two decades. It must be remembered, however, that Britainneeded a large navy and empire to access resources and markets to ensureher power. Likewise, modern Japan's prosperity has been based on access toworld resources and markets in a period of relative peace partly enforced byU.S. power in the Pacific and in Asia. Japan has also utilised the concept of

'comprehensive security' to help ensure access to materials and energyresources from a wide range of countries and to develop competitiveadvantages in world markets (Akaha 1991; Wong 1991; Chapman et al 1983;Comprehensive National Security Study Group 1980).

* If Eurasia fails to integrate economically, it will in fact remain a net-drainon technological resources and investment, and thereby fail to be theeconomic basis for a global power. It could remain weak and embattled in itscore areas.

* Ifpolitical and social insecurity erupt in central Eurasia, the region

may well suffer from 'containment' policiesfrom the EU, the U.S., andperipheral powers such as Japan. This policy would definitely limit growth inthe world economy, but might be preferred to deep entanglements if regionalor ethnic wars expand into larger areas of Central Asia or Russia (to dateTajikistan and Afghanistan show the very negative impacts of such wars onmost economic activity).

6. The Inter-Region Perspective

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If one wishes to retain the separate regions of Europe, South Asia, and North-East Asia,then Central Asia becomes a crucial linkage areaof interregional contact, which caneither result in division and conflict, as in the Cold War and the very hot conflicts inAfghanistan, or in a new series of connections which allow more positive relationships.Here the long, 1,700 kilometre eastern frontier of Kazakhstan with China is a case in

point - if viewed in a negative sense, the frontier is wide, porous, and a extremelyexpensive defence liability. It is also important to note that China's Xinjiang provinceconsists of 60% of ethnic groups who have major connections with cross-borderpopulations, including Uighurs, Kazakhs, and Uzbeks (D'Antoine 1992, p36). In March1992 there was already one call for an Uighur struggle for independence in China(Dannreuther 1994, p63), causing a tightening of security along borders and in Xinjiang.Through 1995-1998 incidents of riots, calls for independence, terrorism, and a harshsecurity crack down by China have made Xinjiang province once again an area ofinstability (see Raczka 1998). Likewise, China has pressured Kyrgyztan to take a strongerline in controlling Uighur minorities within their territory (Rashid 2001). However, takenas a whole from 1996 onwards, the borders between China and its eastern neighbours are

now much more stable and open than before, a trend only temporarily interrupted withthe intervention in Afghanistan through 2001-2002.

The region as a whole has not succumbed to the kind of fragmentation and destructionfound in Afghanistan. The question is not so much one of direct threats, as ofcomplexity

and uncertain prospects. As noted by Ahmed Rashid: -

Central Asia has become a region of stark military contrasts. One state,Kazakhstan, became a de facto nuclear power, affecting the world's nuclearbalance. In another, Tajikistan, the growth of medieval-style warlords and localmilitias led to a bloody civil war. A third, Uzbekistan, projected itself militarily inthe region not through its own force of arms, but by borrowing its military clout

from Russia. Kyrgyzstan meanwhile forswore forever the building of an army anddeclared its neutrality. (Rashid 1994, p233. See further Rashid 2001)

Some of these factors are simply means ofgaining leverage in the international systemand credibility at home, e.g. Kazakhstan's control of its nuclear missiles gained itinternational leverage, but this was soon eroded by problems of democratic governance.Likewise, the pretensions of Kyrgyzstan to become the Switzerland of Asia should not beexaggerated and the country has failed to achieve a true neutrality: it remains dependenton the help of neighbours and international debt reached $1.27 billion in 1999 (Rashid2001, p42; Dannreuther 1994, p40). However, what should not be underestimated is thepossibility for innovation and change in the policies of these new states, which areseeking to lessen Russian domination, avoid ethnic wars, and hasten economicdevelopment. Kyrgyzstan was able in early 2002 to engage U.S. support for militaryforward basing in the ongoing war against terrorism, a move that would probably havesurprised Chinese expectations.

These trends have encouraged some states to look for new avenues of development. It istherefore no surprise that one of the most important shifts in Central Asia has beenKazakhstan's improved relationship with China, with the trade between these two

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Stabilisation of local currencies and inflation rates, as well as avoiding loan defaultsthat might reduce foreign investment (see Rashid 2001, p41; Rashid 1993, p248).

The problem of illegal drug flows, smuggling (arms and people), and misdirectedefforts to control drug production, including research for bio-engineered fungidesigned to attack opium plants. (6) This probably has only been temporarily

interrupted with the intervention in Afghanistan in 2001.

We can sense how importantly this part of the world has been viewed at the level ofsecurity issues by the fact that all Central Asian states are members of the OSCE, andall are also members of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), indicatingNATO and EU concerns over the security of the entire region (International Institute forStrategic Studies 1995c). In reality Russia will remain a major influence in the region, afact which even Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan admits and attempts to turn into a positivealliance of the Slavic and Turkic worlds (Dannreuther 1994, p46). To date most ofCentral Asia (excluding Afghanistan and Tajikistan) compared to the Yugoslav orCaucasian turmoils, has emerged as a relatively stable regional order(Dannreuther 1994,p4). Whether this continues will dependent upon constructive engagements by regionaland great powers who must resist the temptation to use Central Asia as a domain forproxy conflicts. Yet a genuine Eurasia system has not yet emerged. At best, we can seean ongoingEurasian process (see Dawisha and Parrott 1994) which is bringing thesecommunities into the world diplomatic and economic systems. There are also dangers insuch a process: if NATO expansion and U.S.-China pressures continue, China and Russiacould be forced even closer together, and be tempted to control the entire Eurasianheartland as a strategic resource.

Fortunately, there are factors in play during 1997-2002 that suggest these issues are nowbeing seriously addressed, by necessity, by the international community. Whether theywill have the staying power to help transform Central Asia into a progressive Eurasianprocess remain to be seen. Furthermore, a peacefully integrated Eurasia could seriouslyreduce tension over access to energy and metal resources in the 21st century , and helpmaintain a multi-polar world system with high levels of cooperation. We will pursue thistheme in lecture 11, when we look at Europe-Asia relations in long term.

7. Bibliography and Further Resources

Footnotes

1."The Silk Road: Caravans and Trade Routes", China Pages, Internet resource athttp://www.pages.com.cn/chinese_culture/silk/caravan.html

2. "The Silk Road: Religion and Art", China Pages, Internet Resource athttp://www.pages.com.cn/chinese_culture/silk/religion.html

3. "Russian Buddhists Protest Statues Destruction in Afghanistan",ITAR/TASS New Agency, 1 March 2001[Internet Access via Infotrac Searchbank].

4. Spanier 1971, p3. See Spykman 1944. Somewhat similar ideas were developed by German geopoliticalthinkers such as Karl Haushofer, and used by their leadership in World War II to justify their push into

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Russia, and their efforts to encircle the Mediterranean, Black and Caspian Seas. Such connections, of whichMacKinder himself knew nothing, have given a negative connotation to the term 'geopolitics' until recently.

5. "A Road Not So Smooth: The European Union Wants to Revive the Old Silk Road", ArmenianInternational Magazine, 31 October 1998 [Internet Access via Electric Library].

6. "Analysis: A Covert Bio-war Against Drugs in Central Asia?", United Press International, 15 December2000 [Internet Access via Infotrac Searchbank].

Resources

UNESCO and other cultural materials on Central Asia will be found at the Virtual Memory ofCentral Asia Websiteathttp://www.unesco.org/webworld/asicent/capmem.htm

The Silk Road Foundationhas a range of useful references athttp://www.silk-road.com/toc/index.html

Further Reading

BANUAZIZI, Ali & WINER, Myron (eds.) The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and ItsBorderlands, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1994

CHRISTIAN, David "Silk Roads or Steppe Roads? The Silk Roads in World History",Journal of World History, 2 no. 1, Spring 2000, pp1-14 [Access via Infotrac SearchbankDatabase]

DANNREUTHER, Roland Creating New States in Central Asia, Adelphi Paper 288, London,IISS, 1994

FRANCK, Irene & BROWNSTONE, David The Silk Road: A History, N.Y., Facts on FilePublications, 1986

GORENBURG, Dmitry " Nationalism for the Masses: Popular Support for Nationalism inRussia's Ethnic Republics",Europe-Asia Studies, 53 no. 1, January 2001 [Internet Access viaInfotrac Searchbank]

STROEV. E.S. et al. Russia and Eurasia at the Crossroads: Experience and Problems of EconomicReforms in the Commonwealth of Independent States, Berlin, Springer, 1999

References

ABBAS, Najam "Central Asian, Caucasian Leaders Call for Equity, Reforms in CIS", EurasiaNews, 21November 1998 [Internet Access via the Eurasian Research Center Homepage ]

ADSHEAD, S.A.M. Central Asia in World History, London, Mcamillan, 1993

AKAHA, Tsuneo "Japan's Comprehensive Security Policy: A New East Asian Environment", AsianSurvey, 31 no. 4, April 1991, pp324-340

http://www.unesco.org/webworld/asicent/capmem.htmhttp://www.unesco.org/webworld/asicent/capmem.htmhttp://www.unesco.org/webworld/asicent/capmem.htmhttp://www.silk-road.com/toc/index.htmlhttp://www.silk-road.com/toc/index.htmlhttp://www.silk-road.com/toc/index.htmlhttp://www.silk-road.com/toc/index.htmlhttp://www.silk-road.com/toc/index.htmlhttp://www.silk-road.com/toc/index.htmlhttp://www.unesco.org/webworld/asicent/capmem.htm

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ALAM, Shah "The Changing Paradigm of Iranian Foreign Policy", Strategic Analysis, 24 no. 9, December2000, pp1629-1653

AMIN, Samir "1492" (Columbus and the New World Order 1492-1992),Monthly Review, 44 no. 3, July-August 1992, pp10-20

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Babbage, RossMaritime Change: Issues for Asia, St. Leonards, NSW, Allen & Unwin in association withthe Royal Australian Navy and Australian Defence Industries, 1993

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BARNHART, Michael A.Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941,Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1987

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CHAPMAN, J.W.M., DRIFTE, R. & GOW, I.T.M.Japan's Quest for Comprehensive Security: Defence -Diplomacy - Dependence, London, Frances Pinter Publishers, 1983

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COTTON, JamesAsian Frontier Nationalism: Owen Lattimore and the American Policy Debate,Manchester, Manchester university Press, 1989

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DANNREUTHER, Roland Creating New States in Central Asia, Adelphi Paper 288, London, IISS, 1994

D'ANTOINE, Henri "The Uighurs' Watches Still on Beijing Time",Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, June-July 1992, pp36-37

DAWISHA, Karen & PARROTT, BruceRussia and the New States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval,

Cambridge, CUP, 1994

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GORBACHEV, Mikhail Selected Speeches and Articles, Rev. ed., Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1987

HALL, RichardEmpires of the Monsoon: A History of the Indian Ocean and Its Invaders, N.Y., HarperCollins, 1996

Hanks, RobertAmerican Sea Power and Global Strategy, Washington, Institute for Foreign PolicyAnalysis, Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985

HAUNER, Milan What is Asia to Us?: Russia's Heartland Yesterday and Today, London, Routledge, 1992

HENZE, Paul B. "Turkey's Caucasian Initiatives", Orbis, 45 no. 1, Winter 2001 [Internet Access via

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HOLM, Hans-Henrik (ed.) Whose World Order?: Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War,Boulder, Westview Press, 1995

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES "Afghanistan: No Settlement in View",Strategic Comments, No. 3, 22 March 1994

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INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES "Caspian Oil: No Way Out?", StrategicComments, No. 4, 4 May 1995

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JAFFE, Amy Myers & MANNING, Robert A. "The Myth of the Caspian 'Great Game': The RealGeopolitics of Energy", Survival, 40 no. 4, Winter 1998-1999, pp112-131

JONES, Benjamin "The Silk Road",Europe, March 1995, pp30-32

JURAEVA, Gavhar "Tragic Visions in Tajikistan",Pacific Research, 7 no. 2, May 1994, pp15-16

KIM, Samuel S. (ed.) China and the World: Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era , 3rd ed.,Boulder, Westview Press, 1994

KLIMKEIT, Hans-Joachim (trans.) Gnosis on the Silk Road: Gnostic Texts from Central Asia, SanFrancisco, Harper Collins, 1993

LACH, Donald F.Asia in the Making of Europe, 2 vols, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1965

LATTIMORE, OwenInner Asian Frontiers of China, N.Y., American Geographical Society, 1940

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