Lee Van Cott, 2003, From Exclusion to Inclusion. Bolivia's 2002 Elections

8/9/2019 Lee Van Cott, 2003, From Exclusion to Inclusion. Bolivia's 2002 Elections

1/26

From Exclusion to Inclusion: Bolivia's 2002 ElectionsAuthor(s): Donna Lee Van CottReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Nov., 2003), pp. 751-775Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3875831.

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2/26

J.

Lat.

Amer. Stud.

35,

751-775

?

2003

Cambridge

University

Press

75

I

DOI:

io.iro7/Soozz222i6Xo3oo6977

Printed in the United

Kingdom

From

Exclusion

to

Inclusion:

Bolivia's

2002

Elections*

DONNA LEE

VAN COTT

Although

we are a

simple

people,

we

are

prudent

like 'Amaru' and

'Katari',

and we raise

our

sights

to

the horizon

full

of

hope

that

they

will

once

again

unite the

oppressed

people

for

the finalreconstruction

f

their

people.Thus,we willhoist the divinecocaleafthroughoutheterritory f

Qullasuyu

ntil the DAY

of

Kutipacha-Pachakuti.

Manifestoof the Instrumento

Politico

para

a

Soberania

e los Pueblos-Movimiento

l

Socialismo1

We are

entering

here

-

in

the

Congress

in

order

to sit ourselves

down

and

see ourselves

face to face

with our

oppressors;

his is

going

to be

a

struggle

of

the

mind,

of

the

indigenous

mind

against

the

q'ara

white]

mind,

and

therewe are

going

to

fight.

Felipe

Quispe,presidential

andidate,

Movimiento

ndigena

Pachakutik2

Abstract. n

Bolivia's

2ooz

national

elections

ndigenous-movement-based

olitical

parties

combined

to

capture

27

per

cent

of

the

vote,

far

surpassing

heir

previous

performance

and

constituting

a

major

mprovement

n the

representation

f

the

country's

excluded

indigenous

majority.Using

a

social

movement

theory

frame-

work,

I

attribute his

result to five

interacting

actors:

institutional

hanges

that

opened

the

system;

the

collapse

of

two

competitive

parties;

he consolidation

of

indigenous

peoples'

socialmovement

organisations;

he

unpopularity

f the

Banzer-

Quirogagovernmentand the intense

anti-government

mobilisations t provoked

in

2000;

and

the

ability

of

the

indigenousparties

o

capitalise

n

growing

nationalist,

anti-US

public

sentiment.

Donna Lee

Van

Cott

is

AssistantProfessor

n

the

Department

f

Political

cience,

University

f

Tennessee,

noxville.

*

The

author

wishes o thank

Willem

Assies,

Kevin

Healy,

ose

AntonioLucero

ndthe

anonymouseviewersf this ournalor comments na previous raft, nd o acknowl-

edge

he

receipt

f

funding

rom

he

University

f Tennessee

ordellHull

Fund nda UT

Professional

evelopment

ward,

hich

upported

ield

research

n

2oo001

nd

2oo2.

1

Movimientol

socialismo,

Territorio,

oberania

vida,'

n

Opinionesy

ndlisis.

lecciones

Generales

002-2007.

ropuestas

lectores

La

Paz,

2002),

p.

88.

2

'Mallku:

Nuestros

ministros

erain

os Mamani

Yujra ,' a

Prensa,

a

Paz,

28

June

2002,

p.

8.


3/26

7

5

2

Donna ee

Van

Cott

In Bolivia's

30

June

2002 nationalelections two

indigenous

peoples'3

par-

ties

combined,

the

InstrumentoPolitico

para

la Soberania

de los

Pueblos

(IPSP),

running

under the borrowed

registration

of the

Movimiento

al

Socialismo(MAS),and the MovimientoIndigenaPachakutikMIP),won

27

per

cent

of

the vote

(see

Table

i).

Despite

the

fact that

62.05

per

cent

of

the

population

is

indigenous, according

to the

200oo

census,

this was a

revolutionary

esult for

the

politicallyunder-represented

ndigenous

ma-

jority.

In

previous

national

elections,

the best result

for

all

indigenous

parties

combined

was

4.6

per

cent

(see

Table

2).

One

of

the

indigenous

parties,

he

IPSP-MAS,

inished

second

in

a

fragmented

ield

of i i

presi-

dential

candidates,4

ess

than

two

percentagepoints

behind

the

winner,

former

President Gonzalo Sanchez

de Lozada

(1993-1997).

The

IPSP-

MAS

now holds the second

majority

n

both

houses

of

congress

and

approximately

ne-third

of

the

seats

in the

57-member

ody

are

occupied

by

indigenousrepresentatives

with

strong

links to

indigenous

and

peasant

organisations. reviously,

no more

than

ten

indigenous

persons

had

sat

in

congress

at one

time,

and

most

of these

were

accountable

o traditional

political

parties.5

n

order

to

accommodate

the

unprecedented

inguistic

3

Social

scientists

disagree

on

how to define

'indigenouspeoples'.

For

purposes

of

clarity,

I use the United NationsSub-commission n the Preventionof Discrimination ndPro-

tection

of Minorities:

'Indigenous

communities,

peoples

and nations are

those

which,

having

a

historical

ontinuity

with

pre-invasion

nd

pre-colonial

ocieties

that

developed

on their

territories,

onsidered

hemselvesdistinct

rom other

sectors

of

the

societies

now

prevailing

n

those

territories,

r

parts

of

them.

They

form

at

present

non-dominant

ectors

of

society

and

aredetermined

o

preserve,

develop

and

transmit

o future

generations

heir

ancestral

erritories,

nd their

ethnic

identity,

as the basis

of their

continuedexistenceas

peoples,

in accordancewith

their own cultural

patterns,

ocial institutions

and

legal

sys-

tems'.

Study

f

the

Problem

f

Discrimination

gainst

ndigenous

opulations,

N Doc.

E/Cn.4/

Sub.z/1986/7Add.4, para.

379

(1986).

4

Bolivia

has

one

of the most

fragmented

arty

systems

n Latin

America,

with an

average

effectivenumberof parties or seats (ENPS)between

1979-1993

of 4. ENPS was 4.7 in

1993.

See Scott

Mainwaring

nd

Timothy

R.

Scully

(eds.),

Building

emocratic

nstitutions:

Party

Systems

n

Latin

America

Stanford,

1995),p.

30.

ENPS

was

5.07

in

1997

and

4.82

in

2002

(my

calculations ased on

senate

plus

chamber

of

deputies).

The effective

number

of

parties

or

seats s

calculated

y

squaring

he

proportion

of seatseach

party

wins,

adding

up

all of the

squares,

and

dividing

one

by

that number.

See

MurkuuLaakso

and Rein

Taagepera,

EffectiveNumber

of Parties.

A

Measure

with

Application

o

Western

Europe,'

Comparative

olitical

tudies,2,

I979,

pp.

3-27.

5 Craig

Mauro,

Bolivia's

downtrodden ndian

majority ains

political

voice, clout,'

Associ-

ated

Press,

15

Aug.

2002.

Wigberto

Rivero

Pinto,

former

director

of the

Instituto

Indigenista

Boliviana,

nd

vice minister

f

campesino

and

ndigenous

ffairs nder

Banzer-

Quiroga

also

puts

the current

ndigenous

deputy

otalat

50o,

asedon the criteria

language

spoken,

customs,

and

self-identification)

sed

in the

2001

Censo

Nacional

de Poblaci6n

y

Vivienda.He

distributes hese

among

the

parties

as:

MAS

(30),

MIP

(6),

MIR

(8),

NFR

(8),

and

MNR

(i).

Rivero,

Indigenasy Campesinos

n las elecciones:

el

poder

de

la

Bolivia

emergente,'

unpublished ms.,

20zoo03,

.

z21.

According

to Natalia

Wray, eight indigenous

legislators

sat in the

previous congress, representing

various

parties.

'Los

cambios en las

relaciones

politicas

entre

pueblos indigenas,

los estados

y

las

sociedades

nacionales en las


4/26


5/26

7

5

4

DonnaLee

Van Cott

Table

2.

Combined

lectoral esults

for

Indigenous

arties,

97&-2oo2

Combined

Year

%

of

Vote

Indigenous

Parties

Competing

1978N o.6 Movimiento Indio Tupaj Katari (MITKA), Movimiento Revolucionario

Tupak

Katari

(MRTK)*

1979N

1.6

MITKA,

MRTK*

I98oN

2.1

MITKA,

MITKA-I,

MRTK*

I985N

2.7

MRTK,

Movimiento

Revolucionario

Tupaj

Katari

de

Liberaci6n

(MRTKL)

I989N

2.5

MRTKL,

Frente

de Unidad de

Liberaci6n Katarista

(FULKA)

I993N

0.7

Movimiento

Katarista

Nacional

(MKN),

Eje

Pachakuti,

MRTKL**

I995M

4.4

MRTKL,

Asamblea de la

Sobernia de los

Pueblos

(ASP)

1997N

4.6

ASP,

Eje

Pachakuti,

MKN***

1999M

4.9

MRTKL,

Katarismo

Democritico

Nacional

(KDN)

(new

name of

MKN),

ASP,

ISPS-MAS

(split

from

ASP)

zoozN

27.0

MAS,

Movimiento

Indigena

Pachakutik

(MIP)

N:

national

election;

M:

municipal

election.

*

MRTK

results

not

included because

it

ran in

alliance

with

leftist

parties.

**

MRTKL

ran

with

the MNR and

separate voting

results

are

not

available.

***

MKN ran

with

ADN.

Sources:

Diego

Pacheco,

El

indianismoy

os indios

contemporaneas

n

Bolivia

La

Paz,

1992).

Mario

Rol6n

Anaya,

Politicay

Partidos

en

Bolivia,

3rd

ed.

(La

Paz,

i999).

Salvador

Romero

Balliviain,

Geografia

lectoral e

Bolivia

(asi

votan los

bolivianos),

nd ed.

(La

Paz,

1998).

Luciano

Tapia,

UkhamawaJakawisaxa

Asi

es

nuestra

vida).

Autobiografia

e

un

aymara La

Paz,

1995).

set of

constraints on

and

incentives

for

collective

political

action

presented

by

the

political

environment

to

existing

or

potential

social

movements.

Typical

POS

variables

include:

shifts

in

elite

alignments

or the

emergence

of

intra-elite

cleavages,

the

support

of

key

allies,

the

relative

openness

of

political

institutions,

changes

in

government policies

affecting

social move-

ments,

international

trends that

shape

domestic

institutions,

and the state's

capacity

for

repression.7

The

application

of the

POS

framework

to

Bolivia's

new indigenous parties is particularlyapt, given their lack of formal political

party

structure and

their

reliance, instead,

on

social

movements

for

organis-

ational,

ideological

and

human

resources.

The

first

POS variable

consists of

institutional

changes

undertaken

in

Bolivia

between

1994-1995

that

enabled

regionally strong

indigenous organ-

isations

to

compete

in

national

elections.

Of

particular mportance

were the

municipal

decentralisation and

the conversion of 68

seats

in the

chamber

of

7 Joe

Foweraker,

TheoriZng

ocial

Movements

London,

1995), pp.

71-2;

Doug

McAdam,

'Conceptual

origins,

current

problems,

future

directions,'

in

Doug

McAdam

et

al.

(eds.),

Comparative

erspectives

n Social

Movements

(Cambridge,

1996), p.

27;

Sidney

Tarrow,

Power

in

Movement.

ocialMovements

nd

Contentious

olitics,

znd

ed.

(Cambridge, 1998), p.

8o;

Donna

Lee Van

Cott,

'Andean

Indigenous

Movements and

Constitutional Transformation:

Venezuela

in

Comparative

Perspective,'

Latin

American

Perspectives,

ol.

30,

no.

i,

Jan.

2003,

pp.

50,

66,

n.

3.


6/26

FromExclusion

o

Inclusion:

olivia's

002Elections

755

deputies

from

party-list

to

a uninominal

(named

candidate)

districts

system.

As

POS

theorists

predict,

a more

open political

system

provided

incen-

tives

for collective actors

to

engage

in formal

politics.

Second,

the

political

party system lost two parties that had absorbed on average

35.22

per cent

of the vote

in

previous

national elections

since

i989,

and

a

third

major

party experienced

a more

moderate

decline.

The loss

of these

parties

provoked

a shift in elite

alignments

that

favored

the

emergence

of a

new

counter-elite.

Whereas

these two

POS variables

-

representing

the

cumulative

impact

of a

longer

process

of institutional

and

party

system

change

- created

a

more favourable

political

environment

and,

thus constitute

necessary

con-

ditions, two additional catalysts of a

more

conjunctural

nature

tipped

the

political

balance

decisively

in

favour

of the two

new

indigenous

parties.

First,

the

Banzer-Quiroga government

(i997-2002)

enacted

unpopular

policies

that caused

many

former

supporters

of the

traditional

parties

to

seek

alternatives.

The

government's

actions

provoked

intense

anti-government

mobilisations

that increased the

political popularity

of

the

leaders

of

the two

indigenous parties

successful

in 2002.

Second,

indigenous

political

parties

capitalised

on

the

growing

nationalism

generated

by

overt

pressure

from the

United

States

to eradicate coca

crops,

together

with

offensive

statements

made

by

the

US

ambassador

days

before

the

elections.

Widespread

outrage

expanded

the

parties' support

beyond

their

base

to

include

protest

votes

from middle class

and even

wealthy

elites offended

by

the

ambassador's

audacious statements.

Each of these

five

arguments

will

be

presented

in

turn.

Institutional

hange

Bolivia has had one of the least stable

political

histories in Latin America,

with

frequent coups

interrupting

brief

periods

of elected

civilian

rule since

independence

in

1825.

The

most recent

democratic

period

began

in

i982.

Today

Bolivia

has a

presidential,

unitary political

system,

with

nine

depart-

ments,

divided

into

i22

provinces

and

314

municipalities.

Two

recent

insti-

tutional

changes

made

it

easier for

indigenous

political

parties

to

form,

to

contest

elections,

and to win those

contests:

the

municipal

decentralisation

of

1995,

pursuant

to the

1994

Law

of

Popular

Participation

(LPP),

and the

creation in the 1994-5 constitutional reform of uninominal districts for

68

of

the seats

in the

13o-seat

the

chamber

of

deputies.

Prior

to

these

reforms

it was difficult

for

local,

regional,

or

poorly

funded

movements

to

compete

in

Bolivia's

centralised,

unitary system.

Party

lists

for national

elections

were

constructed at

the national level

and,

since

I979,

have had

to earn three

per

cent of

the vote

in

order

to

maintain

registration.

Many


7/26

756

Donna

Lee Van Colt

fledgling

indigenous

parties

lost

their

registration

in the

i98os

because

they

were unable to

win sufficient

votes

or

to

pay

fines

imposed

for this

failure.8 The

national-level,

proportional representation,

party

list

system

for electing the legislature made it difficult for geographically concentrated

indigenous

movements to

win

enough

votes

nationwide

to

gain

national

office.

Prior

to

1994

only

a few

dozen

municipal

governments

existed

in the

country, mainly

in

urban

areas.

The

1994

LPP created

3

11

(later

expanded

to

3

14)

municipalities,

the

majority

in rural

areas,

many

of them

with

majority-

indigenous populations.

In

the

first-ever nationwide

direct

municipal

elec-

tions in

1995,

candidates

identifying

themselves as

peasant

or

indigenous

won 28.6

per

cent of

municipal

council

seats, constituting

a

majority

in

73

of

311

municipalities.9

For

the most

part,

they

did so

by

allying

with

non-indigenous

traditional

parties, particularly

the

Movimiento

Nacional

Revolucionario

(MNR)

and

the

leftist,

agrarian-oriented

party

Movimiento

Bolivia Libre

(MBL).

As

described

below,

the

indigenous party

Asamblea

de

la

Soberania

de los

Pueblos

(ASP)

was formed

in

1995

and established

a foothold in

these

municipal

elections

that

it would

use to

expand

rep-

resentation to

the

national

level.

In

addition,

uninominal

seats

created

for the

first time

for

the

1997

elec-

tions enabled

geographically

concentrated

movements to

compete

success-

fully

in

their

geographic

base. The

ASP

elected

four national

deputies

in

1997

from the coca

growing regions

of Cochabamba. Coca

growers

leader,

Evo

Morales,

representing

six

of the

seven

coca

growers'

organisations,

won the

highest

percentage

of

the vote

of

any

uninominal candidate

in

the

country

-

more

than

6o

per

cent in a

field

of

Io candidates.10

Political

arty

system

hange

Bolivia returned

to elected

civilian

rule

in

1982

after

a tumultuous

four-year

transition that

ended

a

period

of

military

rule

that had

begun

in

1964.11

The

only

important political party

to survive the

military interregnum

was

the

MNR,

the

party

that

led the

1952

Bolivian

Revolution.

A

variety

of leftist

parties

split

off

from the

MNR,

of

which

the centre-left

Movimiento

de la

Izquierda

Revolucionaria

(MIR)

would become

the most

important.

General

8

Luciano

apia,

UkhamawaJakawisaxa

Asi

snuestra

ida).

utobiografia

eun

aymara

La

Paz,

1995),

P.

390-440.

9

DonnaLee Van

Cott,

The

Friendly

iquidationf

thePast:The

Politics

f

Diversity

n

Latin

America

Pittsburgh,

oo2000),

.

i88.

10

Clifford

Krauss,

LaucaEne

Journal:

A

Bolivian

Legislator

Who

Just Says

Yes to

Coca,'

NewYork

Times,3June

1998,

.

4A.

n

See Laurence

Whitehead,

Bolivia's

aileddemocratization

977-1980,'

in

Guillermo

O'Donnell t

al.

(eds.),

Transitionsfrom

uthoritarianule:

atinAmerica

Baltimore,

986).


8/26

From

Exclusion

o Inclusion:

olivia's

200oo2

lections

757

Table

3.

Variation

n Votes

for

Dominant

Parties

and

Leftist

Parties

in

Bolivia,

19g0-2002

Combined otes

ThreeDominant arties Combined otes

MNR

+

ADN

+

MIR

Add

Condepa

UCS

Leftist

Parties

i98oN

37.0%

47.4%

i985N

63.9%

I4.3%

1989N

65.3% 76.3%

29.3%

1993N

54.1%

80.8%

6.o%

I995M

42.0% 75.0% 16.30%

1997N

56.7%

88.4%

6.2%

999M

61.0o%

66.9%

7.3%

2oo2N 42.17%

48.1%

0.7%

Leftist parties areUnidad DemocraiticaPopular, MIR until 1989, Movimiento Bolivia Libre,

Izquierda

Unida,

Partido

Socialista-i,

Partido Comunista

de

Bolivia,

Partido Socialista.

N:

national,

M:

municipal. Figures

do

not include uninominal

ballot results

for half chamber

of

deputies,

after

1997.

Sources:Data

prior

to

1993

is from Eduardo

A.

Gamarra

and

James

M.

Malloy,

'The

patrimonial

ynamics

f

party

olitics

n

Bolivia',

n

Scott

Mainwaring

nd

Timothy

R.

Scully

(eds.),

Building

emocratic

nstitutions:

arty

Systems

n LatinAmerica

Stanford, 995).

For later

years,

data s from

www.georgetown.edu/pdba/elecdata/bolivia,

alvador

Romero

Balliviain,

Geografia

lectoral e Bolivia

(asi

votan os

bolivianos),

nd

ed.

(La

Paz,

1998);

La

Raodn,

on-line,

9

July

2002.

Hugo

Banzer,

who

had ruled

during

1971-1978,

renounced

authoritarianism

and

formed a

center-right party,

Acci6n Democritica

Nacional

(ADN).12

Between

1985

and

I997

a

party

system

developed

around

the

competition

among

these

three

major parties

-

the

centre-right

MNR and

ADN,

and

the

centre-left MIR.

These three

attracted more than

o50

er

cent of

the

vote

in

all national

elections

during

that

period.

In

1989

two

populist

parties

joined

the

system,

Conciencia de Patria

(Condepa)

and

Uni6n Civica

Solidaridad

(UCS), which thereafterattracted a combined 22 per cent of the vote. Thus,

from

the return to

democracy

in

i982

through

the

1997

national

elections,

the five

major parties

received a

majority

of the votes

(see

Table

3).

What

may

be

more

important,

during

this

period

political parties

established

themselves as Bolivia's most

important political

actors.

Previously,

parties

organised competition

among

the

small

middle

class elite

for access

to

government

jobs,

but

were

only

a

secondary

source

of

political power,

which

was

mainly

wielded

by

corporate

actors. The

most

important

of

these

were

the militaryand the labour movement, particularly he miners union. As both

12

Eduardo A. Gamarra

and

James

M.

Malloy,

'The

Patrimonial

Dynamics

of

Party

Politics

in

Bolivia' in Scott

Mainwaring

and

Timothy

R.

Scully

(eds.),

Building

Democratic nstitutions:

Party

ystems

nLatin

America

Stanford,

99

).


9/26

758

Donna Lee Van

Cott

of these actors declined

in the

198os,

political

parties

increased

in

importance

as vehicles

for

the

pursuit

of

political

power.

Most

governments during

this

period

were

constructed

from

pacts

between two of the three main parties,while the third main competitor was

excluded from

power.13

Thus,

Bolivia had an

equilibrated

party

system

with

the

main axis of

competition among

the three

largest

parties,

which

formed

short-term

patronage-based

alliances

with smaller

parties.

The

fluidity

of

these alliances

has made Bolivian

politics

quite

pragmatic.

The cost

has

been the

increasing

disaffection

of

the

electorate,

which time and

again

saw

its

political

leaders sell

out

their

constituencies

for

government

jobs.

The

necessity

of

keeping

alliance

options

open

has

robbed

the

parties

of their

ability

to make

convincing ideological appeals.

The needs

of

the

poor,

in-

digenous

majority

have received

only

rhetorical

recognition,

with

no

major

party

delivering

on the

promise

of

political

and

economic

inclusion

since

the

return to

democracy

in

i982.

The

2002

elections

marked

the end of

that

system.

The

results

of

those elections

are

displayed

in

Table

i,

together

with

a

comparison

of the

1997

and

2002

results for

seats

in

congress.

The

com-

bined

vote for the

five

major parties dropped

to

48

per

cent

in

2002,

with

the

main

three

winning

only

42.2

per

cent.

These

results

indicate

that

the

Bolivian

party system,

like

many

in

South

America

in the

199os,

is

experi-

encing dealignment.

During

the last electoral

cycle

new

parties

emerged

to

challenge

the

dominance

of the

traditional

parties.14

During

the

2002

election

campaign

and

post-mortem, press

and

political

analysts

referred

to these

as 'anti-

system'

parties.

In

2002,

for the first

time,

the three

dominant

parties

MNR,

MIR,

and ADN

had to

unite to

prevent

the

election

of an

'anti-systemic'

president.15

Thus,

the

axis of

competition

has

shifted

from

intra-elite

com-

petition

to

competition

between

the

'systemic'

and

'anti-systemic'

parties.16

Much of this shift can be explained by the severe decline of three dominant

13

From

1985-1989,

the MNR and ADN

governed;

from

1989-1993,

the

MIR and

ADN

governed;

from

1993-1997,

the

MNR and UCS

governed;

from

1997-zooz02,

he

ADN,

MIR,

UCS,

and

Condepagoverned,

with

Condepa

eaving

he

alliance

arly

n the

term.

14

Another new

party,

Nueva

Fuerza

Revolucionaria,

was

formed

in the

mid-i99os.

It is

mainly

a

Cochabamba

egionalparty,although

ts

leader

made a

respectable

bid

for the

presidency

n

2002,

finishing

only

0.02

per

cent behind

Morales.

Although

an

interesting

phenomenon

n its own

right,

a

complete

discussionof the NFR is

beyond

the

scope

of

this article.

15

Under

Bolivia's

constitution,

f no candidate

wins an

absolute

majority,

he

president

s

chosen

by

the new

congress

from

among

the

top

two

recipients

f votes.

16

Interview,

Rene

Antonio

Mayorga,

25June

2002; Leopoldo

Vegas

R.,

'Es

el

reflejo

de

la

realidad,'

El

Deber,

anta

Cruz,

6

July

2002,

p.

A

3;

Carlos

Cordero,

El

pais

esta

dividido

entre dos fuerzas

politicas,'

El

Deber

July

2002:

AI

3.


10/26

From

Exclusion

o

Inclusion:

olivia's

002

Elections

759

parties:

Banzer's

right-right

ADN,

and the

populist

parties

Condepa

and

UCS.

All

three

parties

suffered

from the death

of their

founders,

who

had

been

such dominant

figures

that their absence resulted

in internal divisions

and a loss of public support.'

The

collapse

of

Condepa

-

from

22

seats

in

congress

in

1997

to

none

in 2002

-

was

particularly

helpful

to

the

new

indigenous

parties.

Condepa's

base was the

poor,

urban,

mostly Aymara

migrant

population

in the

de-

partment

of

La

Paz

and,

to a lesser

extent,

rural

indigenous

voters

in

the

highland

departments

of

Oruro,

La

Paz,

and

Potosi

and the

migrant

areas of

Cochabamba. The

indigenous

party

IPSP-MAS

won

all four

departments

in 2002.

Moreover,

Condepa

and

its leader

Carlos

Palenque

had

explicitly

identified

with the ethnic

subordination of its

base, invoking symbols

and

themes that resonated

with them

as an

oppressed

ethnic

minority.

It was

the

first

electorally

successful Bolivian

party

to

do

so,

inspiring

similar,

albeit less

successful,

ethnic

appeals

by

other

parties.

After the

death of

Palenque,

the

party

was riven

by

bitter

internal

rivalries. These

public

disputes,

as

well

as

the

cooptation

of

the

party

by

the Banzer

government

-

Condepa

joined

Banzer's

'megacoalition'

in

1997

-

lost

the

party

support

among

its base.

By

the

2002

elections

it had become

essentially

a

patronage

machine

for the

urban

Aymara

counter-elite.

Thus,

the

collapse

of these

parties,

particularly

Condepa, opened

space

for

new

ones,

especially

those

appealing

directly

to

the

disenfranchised,

poor

indigenous

majority.'8

Finally,

the

sharp

decline in the

vote

share

for leftist

parties

during

the

1990s opened

space

on

the left

of

the

political spectrum.

Whereas

the com-

bined vote share for

the leftist

Unidad

Democraitica

Popular

(UDP)

coalition

plus

the

Socialist

Party

(SP-I)

was

47.4

per

cent

in

1982,

the disastrous

economic

performance

of the

UDP caused

the

enduring

decline

of the

left,

thereafter

associated

in

voters' minds

with economic and

political

chaos.

In

the 1985 elections, leftist parties'combined share of the vote fell to 14.3 per

cent.

The

economic

austerity

and

structural

adjustment policies

imposed

by

the

MNR-ADN

government

(1985-1989)

further weakened

the

left,

particularly

he

once-dominant

miners'

union. After the

MIR moved

to the

right

in

1989,

the remainder

of the left would

not exceed

io

per

cent

of

the vote in

the

1990s.

Unified elite

support

of

the neoliberal

economic

model and the

global

decline

of

socialism

robbed

leftist

parties,

and

the

17

Banzer died in

May

zooz of

cancer,

the

diagnosis

of which caused him to

resign

as

president

in

Aug.

zooi.

Condepa

founder

Carlos

Palenque

died of

a

heart

attack

in

1997,

shortly

before the

June presidential

elections;

UCS

founder

Max

Fernaindez

died

in

a

plane

crash

n

'995.

is

Interviews,

Maria

Eugenia

Choque,

20

June

2002;

Rene Antonio

Mayorga,

zs

June

2002;

Salvador

Romero

Ballivian,

GeograJfa

lectorale

Bolivia

as

votan os

bolivianos),

nd

ed.,

La

Paz,

1998,pp.

237-45-


11/26

760

Donna

ee

Van

Cott

traditional,

Marxist-oriented

abour movement as

articulated

hrough

the

CentralObrera

Boliviana

COB),

of

a

viable economic

programme

o

offer

the

economically

isenfranchised.

heir

radical conomic

demandswere

not

politically easible n the nationalandinternational oliticalconjuncture f

the

990os,

nd their

mestizo

eaders

epeatedly

ailed

o

articulate

discourse

that

would

appeal

o

urban

and rural

poor

voters

increasingly

nterested

n

politicalexpressions

of

ethnic

and cultural

dentity.

Maturity

nd

consolidation

of

the

ndigenous

nd

peasant

movements

As

in

most

Latin

American

ountries,

he

indigenouspopulation

n

Bolivia s

culturally

nd

organisationally

istinct

n

the

highland

and

lowland

regions.In

the

densely

populated

western

highlands,

more

acculturatedndians

are

mainly

small

peasant

farmers

belonging

either

to the

Quechua

(2,298,980)

or

Aymara

i,549,320)

language

groups,

which are also located

across

the

borders

with

Peru, Chile,

and

Argentina.

n

the eastern

Amazonian ow-

lands

groups

are more

diverse:

286,726

Indiansare divided

nto

more

than

30

distinct

languagegroups19.

Although

for most

of

Bolivia's

history

the

indigenous

have

been

predominantly

ural,

massiveurban

migration

n

the

1990S

resulted

n

more

than half of

the

indigenous

populationresiding

n

urbancentresby

zoo200.20

Illiterates

mainlyIndians)

received the

vote after

the

I925

revolution,

almost

30

years

earlier

han

illiterates

n

other centralAndeancountries.

n

exchange

or

protection

of

their ands and the

right

to

vote,

they

servedas

the

dependable

onservative nchor

of the

MNR

party

and a succession

of

military overnments

until

the

mid-i97os.

By

that time

the

military

ad

en-

acted a

number

of

economic

policies

that hurt small farmers.

After

govern-

ment

troops

killed

13

Quechua

Indians

protesting

agricultural

olicies

in

1974(theTolataMassacre), nemerging lassof Aymarantellectualsormed

independent

peasant

organisations

and

political

parties

that

challenged

the

traditional

ominanceand

manipulation

f

the

political

parties

and the

military.

Most

took

the nameof

Tupaj

Katari,

n

Aymara

ndianrebel eader

of

the

late

18th

century

who,

before

his

execution,

vowed

to

return

made

into

millions',

and

developed

a

'Katarista'

deology

hat

combined

struggles

against

ethnic

and class

oppression.21

19

The

largest

owland

groups

are

the Guarani

(75,500o),

the

Chiquitano

61,5

o),

and the

Moxefio

(38,500).

See

VAIPO,

Desarrolloon dentidad:

olitica

nacional

ndigenay

riginaria

(La

Paz,

1998),

p.

35.

20

MACPIO,

Pueblos

ndigenas

originarios

e

Bolivia.

Diagnostico

acional

La

Paz,

zooi).

21

Silvia

Rivera

Cusicanqui,

Aymara

Past,Aymara

Future,'

Report

n heAmericas

XV,

3

(Dec.

199

),

pp.

18-i

9;

SilviaRivera

Cusicanqui,

Luchas

ampesinasontemporaneas

n Boli-

via:El

movimiento

katarista

1

97o-1

980),'

in Rene ZavaletaMercado

comp.),

Bolivia

Hoy,

and ed.

(Mexico,

1987),

pp.

I44-6.


12/26

From

xclusion

oInclusion:

olivia's

oo2

lections

76

1

The

most

important

contemporary ighland ndigenous

organisation

s

the

Confederaci6n

Sindical

Unica de

Trabajadores

ampesinos

de

Bolivia

(CSUTCB),

stablished

at a

I979

congress organised

by

the COB to

unite

disparatendependentunionsthathademergedn the late1970s.ItsAymara

leaders

nfused the

class-basedMarxist

analysis

of economic

exploitation

derivedfrom

associationswith

leftist

parties

with

the

developing

Katarista

ideology.

Thus,

the

CSUTCB's

agenda

and

discourse

encompassed

class

and ethno-national

emands

hat

emphasised

he

dual-basis

f

exploitation

of

the

highland

ndigenous

population.

The

CSUTCB

mmediately

taged

massive

demonstrations

hat forced the

government

to attend

to

peasant

demands.22

As

the

political

effectivenessof

the CSUTCB

declined

in

the

mid-late

1980s,

a

new force

within the

peasant

sector

emerged

o

fight

the Bolivian

government's

ncreasing

ffortsto

eradicate

he coca

leaf.

Most coca

culti-

vation

occurred

n

the

lowland

tropicalregions

of

the

Chapare

n the

de-

partment

of

Cochabamba

nd

in

the

Yungas

n

the

department

f

La

Paz.

The

growers

were

mainly

migrants

rom the

highlands

dislocated

by

the

MNR

government's

iring

of

state mineworkers

nd

structural

djustment

policies

that

hurt

peasant

agriculture.

y

the late

1990s

therewere

approxi-

mately

300,000

mostly

Quechua

migrants

n the

Chapare,

where

they

found

coca leaf to be the most

profitablecrop.23

Politicalmobilisation

by

coca

growers

began shortly

after the

democratic ransition

with road blockades

in

1983. By 1984

coca

growers

began forming

their own federations

as

opposed

to

the

military's

op-down

federations

to

present

heir

agricultural

demandsand to

protest against

ncreased

government

eradication

fforts.24

Under US

pressure

o crack

down on coca

growing

cocaine

production

had

dramatically

ncreasedn

198

3-1984

-

in

1986

the

government

nnounced

a

plan

to

eradicate ll

coca leaf

grown

for

export

as

coca

paste

or cocaine.As

Patzi Paco observes, Confrontedwith thisplan,for the firsttimethe coca

producers

consolidated

hemselves

as

a class movement with

possibilities

of

converting

hemselves nto a

movement of

masses,

in

that

they began

organising

lockadeswith

other

social

actors'.25

22

CSUTCB,

El

desafio

de

mantener

a

unidad,'

V

Congreso

rdinario

elCSUTCB

La

Paz,

1990);

Rivera

Cusicanqui,

Aymara

Past';

Esteban

Ticona,

Organizaci6ny

iderazgo

ymara,

197P9-996

La

Paz,

zooo).

23

Xavier

Alb6,

'Diversidad

Etnica,

Cultural

y Linguistica,'

in

Fernando

Campero

Prudencio

(ed.),

Boliviaenel

siglo

XX:

Laformacidn

e la Bolivia

contemporainea

La

Paz,

1999),

p.

476;

Felix

Patzi

Paco,

Insurgenda

sumision:

ovimientos

ndigeno-campesinos

I983-i9A')

La

Paz,

I999),

p.

49;

Esteban

Ticona,

Gonzalo

Rojas

and Xavier

Alb6,

Votosy

I

Vphalas:

campesinosy

ueblos

orginarios

n

democradcia

La

Paz,

I995),

pp.

54-5.

24

Kevin

Healy,

'Coca,

the State

and the

Peasantry

in

Bolivia,

1982-1988,' Journal

of

Inter-

american tudies nd

WorldAffairs,

3o,

2

&

3

(summer/fall 1988), pp.

Io0-26.

25

My

translation,

Patzi

Paco,

'Insurgencia

y

sumisi6n,'

p.

86.


13/26

762

Donna

Lee Van

Cott

As

the

government

crackdown

intensified

in

the late

198os

and

199os,

the

coca

growers

became

more

organised

and

militant.

By

i

990

the

Chapare

growers

had

formed

I6o

local unions

'under

the

umbrella

of

30

sub-

federations (centrales)hich, in turn, are organised into 5 federations', while

in

the

Yungas

another five

federations had formed.26

In

the

absence

of

local

government

in

these

areas,

the coca

growers'

federations became

the

most

authoritative

and

legitimate

public

authority.27

In

1988

the

five Co-

chabamba

federations

formed a

Coordinating

Committee. The

growers

had

tripled

the

number of their

delegates

at

the

1987

CSUTCB

congress;

in

1988

their

Quechua

leaders seized

control

of

the

organisation

from

the

Aymara

intellectuals

that

had

founded it. A new

set

of

leaders

emerged

from

the

coca

growers

movement.

The

most important

was Evo

Morales,

who

had

migrated

to

the

Chapare

with

his

Aymara

father and

Quechua

mother.

While

focused

on

securing

the

economic survival

of

their

members,

the

coca

growers'

federations

assumed

many

features of ethno-cultural

move-

ments.

Their

members

were

primarily

Aymara

and

Quechua

migrants

who

retained

ties to

traditional

communities and

experienced

discrimination

based on

their

ethnic

identity.

They justified

their resistance

to

government

eradication

policies

in

light

of

the

fact that

coca

growing

is

a

long-standing

cultural

and

religious

practice

among

the

indigenous peoples

of

Bolivia

and,

indeed,

the Andes.

This

culturalist-nationalist

discourse

earned

the move-

ment the

support

of

sympathetic

social sectors

-

Cochabamba's

elite-based

civic

committee,

human

rights

organisations,

anthropologists,

and

journal-

ists,

notwithstanding

the

fact that

most

of

the coca leaf

grown

in

the

Chapare

and

Yungas

was

destined for

export.28

The coca

growers'

movement

also

is an ethnic

movement

by

dint

of

its

membership

-

and

leadership

from

1987

-

of

the

CSUTCB,

the

members

of

which

are

primarily

Quechua

and

Aymara

Indians and

which

has

always promoted

a

discourse

of

ethnic

rights

along with its agrarianagenda. Moreover, as Gustafson observes, the urban

press

and

the

government

portray

the coca

growers

as an ethnic movement.29

By

i992

the

coca

growers

had seized

control of the

CSUTCB.

They

sought

to

construct

an

independent

political party

in

order

to

complement

their

strategy

of

massive

mobilisation and resistance to

the

eradication

of

coca.

Peasant

leaders had

become

increasingly

dissatisfied with alliances

be-

tween

the

movement and

traditional

political parties,

particularly

those

on

26

Kevin

Healy,

'Political

Ascent of

Bolivia's Peasant Coca

Leaf

Producers,'

Journal

of

Inter-

american

tudies

nd

WorldAffairs,

33,

I,

spring

199

,

pp.

88-9.

27

Healy,

'Political Ascent,'

p.

89.

28

Patzi

Paco,

Insut~genciay

umisidn, .

86;

Healy,

'Political

Ascent,'

pp.

93-4.

29

Bret

Gustafson, 'Indigenous

Movements and State

Processes n Bolivia:

Racism, Regional

Politics,

and

the

Paradoxes of

Intercultural

Reform,'

in David

Maybury-Lewis (ed.),

Ident-

itiesin

Conflict:

ndigenous

eoples

nd the State n

Latin America

(Cambridge,

2002).


14/26

From

Exclusion

to

Inclusion:

Bolivia's

2002

Elections

763

the

left.

Leftist

parties

had

increased heir

interference n

peasant

politics

since

the

electoral

declineof

the

left

in the

mid-

98os

in

an

attempt

o

regain

political

nfluence

through

manipulation

f

the

more

dynamicpeasant

ector.

Discussionswithin the CSUTCBconcerning he constructionof a peasant

'political

nstrument'

began

in

earnest

at

a

1992 meeting

commemorating

the

invasion of the

Americas

by

Europeans.

For

a

variety

of

reasons,

that

meeting

was a

complete

failure,

but CSUTCB eaders

agreed

o take

up

the

issue

again

at

a

25-27

March

I995

assembly.

Participants

t

that

meeting

agreed

o

create

he

Asamblea

de

la Soberania e

los Pueblos

(ASP)

n

order

to

participate

ndependently

n

the December

1995 municipal

elections.30

Thus,

they

took

advantage

of one

of the

two recent institutional

hanges

discussed

above

-

the

municipaldecentralisationf 1995.Among

the

most

enthusiastic

proponents

of

the

project

was Evo

Morales,

hen leaderof

the

Coordinadora

de

las

Federacionesdel

Tr6pico

de

Cochabamba,

one of

the

main

coca

growersorganisations.

In

its first

electoral

outing

the

ASP

dominated

the

coca-growing

dis-

tricts

of

the

Chapare,

netting

ten

mayors,49

municipal

ouncillors,

and six

departmental-level

onsejeros

n

Cochabamba.

t also

won

five councillors

n

other

highland

departments.31

ccording

o

peasant

eader

Rom'n

Loayza,

who

would

represent

he

ASP in

congress

(1997-2002),

the

municipal

de-

centralisationnabledthe CSUTCB

finally

o form its firstviable

political

party.32

n

1998,

mirroring

he

division within the

peasant

movement,

the

partysplit

over internal

divisionsbetweenEvo Moralesand

Alejo

VWliz

and

presented

wo lists for

the

1999

municipal

lections.The

rump

ASP,

led

by

Veliz,

won 28

municipal

councillors

and

five

mayors

n

Cochabamba;

the

splinter

nstrumento

Politico

para

a

Soberania e los Pueblos

(ISPS),

ed

by

Morales,

won

79

municipal

councillors

n

seven

of

the

country's

nine

departments

mainly

n

Cochabamba

40]

and

La Paz

[18],

the

other

main

location for cocagrowing).33 t the nationalevel,as noted above,the ASP

won

four

uninominal

eats

in

the

1997 congressional

lections.

In the

pro-

portional

vote,

which

determines

he

occupancy

of the other62

seats

n

the

chamber

of

deputies,

ASP

won

17.5

per

cent

of the

vote

in

Cochabamba,

3.7

per

cent

nationwide.

Problems

with

their

registration

equired

hat the ASP and IPSP

adopt

the

legal

registration

f defunct

eftist

parties.

n

1995

and

1997

ASP used the

registration

f

the

Izquierda

Unida

(IU).

In

1999

t borrowed

he

registration

of the PartidoComunistade Bolivia (PCB).In 1999 and

z002

the IPSP

used the

registration

f

the

Movimientoal

Socialismo

MAS).

According

o

30

CSUTCB,

'El

desafio,'

pp. I

5-I6;

Patzi

Paco,

Insurgencday

umisidn,

p.

I16-19.

31

Donna

Lee

Van Cott,

'Institutional

Changeand

Ethnic

Parties n

South

America,'

Latin

American

Politicsand

Socidety,

5, 2,

summer

zoo3,

pp.

1-39.

32

Interview, La

Paz,

21

June

1997.

*

Van

Cott,

'Institutional

Change'.


15/26

764

Donna Lee

Van Cott

Morales,

he

MAS

s

in

the

process

of

adding

he

words 'communitarian' r

'pachakuti'34

o the

name

MAS

in

order to

convey

more

of its

cultural

message,

while

maintaining

a

name with

high public

identification.35In

contrast,Quispehadno difficulty egistering isparty orthe 200zelections,

even

though

he

fell

1o,ooo

signatures

hort

of

the number

required.

Ana-

lysts

and

MAS

militants

allege

that the

traditional

parties

pressured

the

national

electoral

ourt to

register

him

anyway

n

orderto

split

the

indigen-

ous

vote and

prevent

a

MAS-MIP

alliance,

which

might

have occurredhad

Quispe

been

barred rom

running.36

MAS militantswere

incensed

by

the

differential

reatment,

ince

their

registration

ad been

rejected

our

times

for more

minor

infractions.37

n 2002

the much-diminished

ump

ASP

did

not run a

separateist;

its

most

prominent

militantswere absorbed

by

the

Cochabamba-based

opulist

party

Nueva Fuerza

Republicana

NFR).

The

IPSP-MAS

inished irst

n

the

departments

f

Cochabamba,

a

Paz, Oruro,

and

Potosi,

winning

8

senatorsand

27

deputies.38

These

experiences

ar

surpass

arlier

fforts

by

Indians

o form

successful

parties.

When

the

military

held

elections

n

1978

to

restore

the democratic

order,

tiny

new

indigenous

parties

competed. Struggling gainst

their

lack

of

resources,

he

requirement

f

distributing

heir own

ballots,

and

fines

imposed

on

parties

not

earning

hree

per

cent

of the national

ote,

they

com-

peted

again

n

1979

and

1980,

as

military

eaders

epeatedly

nnulled lections

won

by

the

left.

In

1982,

the

1980

resultswere allowed

to

stand and

inde-

pendent

indigenous

eaders

entered

congress

for

the first

time.39

Between

34

Pachakuti

s a

Quechua

word

with

multiple

meanings.

Literally

meaning

turning

or

returning kuti)

of

the

earth

(pacha),

t is

translated

lternatively

s

'new

beginning',

re-

awakening',

revolution',

or

'renovation'.

See Andrew

Canessa,

Contesting

Hybridity:

Evangelistas

nd

Kataristasn

Highland

Bolivia,'

Journal

f

LatinAmerican

tudies,

ol.

32,

no.

i,

Feb.

2ooo,p.

I

26;

CSUTCB,

VII

Congreso

SUTCB.

Documentosy

esoludciones

La

Paz,

1996),p. 66; Rivera, AymaraPast,' pp.

19-23.

It has replacedTupajKatarias the key

symbol

of

indigenous

resistance n

the

Andes,

as demonstrated

y

its use

in

indigenous

politicalparties'

names

n

Ecuador

Movimiento

Unido

Pluricultural

achakutik)

nd Peru

(Partido

nka

Pachactiteq),

s

well

as

Felipe

Quispe's

Movimiento

Indigena

Pachakutik.

Pachakuti

s also

the nameof a

prominent

5

h-century

nca

eaderwho

ruled

during

a time

of

territorial

expansion personal

ommunication,

osn

Antonio

Lucero,

4

Dec.

20oo2).

35

Ben

Backwell,

A

Rural

Fight.

Ben

BackwellTalks to Bolivian Peasant Leader

Evo

Morales,'

Morningtar,

5

Oct.

2002,

p.

io.

On-line

through

LexisNexis

database.

36

3odias,

La

Paz,

Oct.

zoo

:

90.

37

'La

clase

politica

e

dio

la

sigla

a

Felipe

para

evitar

que

se una a

Evo,'

Pulso

emanario,

1-27

June

2oo2,

p.

13.

38

www.cne.gov.bo.

Each

department

as threesenators: wo from the

party inishing

irst n

the

joint

presidential-congressional

alloting;

one from

the

party inishing

econd.

39

The

Movimiento

ndio

Tupaj

Katari

MITKA)

won

o.6

per

cent

of the votes in

1978

and

1.6

per

cent of

the

votes in

1979

(entitling

t to a seat in

congress).

The

MITKA divided

before

the

1980

elections,

with

MITKA

winning per

cent and

MITKA-I

winning

.I

per

cent of

the vote.

The

Movimiento

Revolucionario

upaj

Katari

MRTK)

ompeted

as

part

of

the leftist UDP

coalition n

1978.

In 1979

the MRTK

divided nto

three

parties.

The


16/26

From

xclusion

o

Inclusion:olivia's

002

lections

765

1985

and

1995

two

lineages

of

indigenousparties

competed

in

elections.

One

lineage

derived from the

Movimiento

Indio

Tupak

Katari

(MITKA),

which

represented

more

radical,

thno-national

train

of

Katarism,

ome-

times called ndianismo.lthoughdominantatthetimeof the firstdemocratic

elections,

t

virtually

disappeared

s a

political

force after

1985.

The more

radical train

would

emerge

again

n 2000 led

by

one

of its

original

eaders,

Felipe Quispe.

The

Movimiento Revolucionario

Tupak

Katari

(MRTK),

which

represented

more

moderate train

of Katarism hat

sought

to work

with

non-indigenous

social

sectors,

generated

the second

lineage.

Both

lineages fragmented

hroughout

he

I98os

until

there were

approximately

ten

tiny

splinter

parties

with

Katarista-sounding

ames.

One

of

these,

the

Movimiento

Revolucionario

Tupak

Kataride

Liberaci6n

MRTKL),

n

off-

shoot of the

MRTK,

gained

momentum

n

the

late

198os

and

early1990s

led

by

Victor

Hugo

Cirdenas,

who

made

history

by

allying

he MRTKLwith

the

MNR

for

the

1993

presidential

lections.

On the

strength

of

Cardenas'

support

n

the

indigenoushighlands,

he MNR-MRTKL

oalitionwon

35.6

per

cent

of

the

vote,

the most

decisive

presidential

ictory

since the

leftist

UDP

coalition's

victory

in

198o

(38.7

per

cent).40

However,

the

MRKTL

faded nto

electoraloblivion

thereafter,

oining

he

MITKA

and

its

descend-

ants

(see

Table

2).41

Parallel o these

developments

n the

highlands,

a lowlandmovement

emergedduring

he

democratic ransition

1978-1982)

to

demand erritorial

rights

and to

protect

indigenous

tribes

from extractive

activities

n

their

traditional

erritories.

n

1982

the

Guarani,

Ayoreo,Chiquitano,

nd

Guarayo

formed the

Confederaci6n

ndigena

del Oriente

Boliviano

(CIDOB). By

1989

CIDOB

had

expanded

o

encompass

most

indigenous

organisations

n

the

lowlands.

Through

spectacular

marchesand

successful

negotiations

with

the

government

hey

enjoyed

a

number

of

achievements

during

he

1990s.

By the mid-I990s,CIDOBhad createda six-tieredorganisationaltructure

fraction

retaining

he MRTKname

ran

with

the

MNR;

another

raction

oined

the

UDP

coalition;

the

third did

not

participate, instructing

its

militants

to

vote

for

the

left.

See,

Ricardo

Calla,

'Hallu

Hayllisa

huto.

Identificaci6n

etnica

y

procesos

politicos

en

Bolivia,'

in

Carlos

Ivin

Degregori

(ed.),

Democracia,

tnicidad

violenciapolitica

n

lospaises

andinos

Lima,

1993), p.

68;

Patzi

Paco,

Insurgeniday

umision,

.

40;

Felipe

Quispe

Huanca,

El

indio

en escena

(La

Paz,

1999);

Jan

Rocha,

'Democracy

dawns,'

pp.

254-8;

Mario

Rol6n

Anaya,

Politicay

Partidos

n

Bolivia,

3rd

ed.

(La

Paz,

1999);

Luciano

Tapia,

UkhamawaJakawisaxa.

40 Gamarra and

Malloy,

'The Patrimonial

Dynamics,'

p.

432.

41

Among

the

reasons

for

the

MRTKL's

demise

are

Cirdenas'

failure

to institutionalise

the

party

by

sharing power

with other

leaders

and the loss

of

support

among

indigenous

voters

he

encountered when he 'sold out' the

party

to

ally

with the neoliberal

MNR

government.

Patzi

Paco,

Insurgencidayumisidn,

p.

41-42;

Van

Cott,

'Institutional

Change

and Ethnic

Parties';

interviews,

Ivin

Arias,

Ramiro

Molina,

Esteban

Ticona,

La

Paz,

'1997,

2001.


17/26

766

Donna Lee

Van Cott

that

encompassed

four

regional organisations

-

the

Central de

Pueblos

Indigenas

del

Beni

(CPIB),

the Central

Indigena

de

la

Regi6n

Amaz6nica

Boliviana

(CIRABO),

uniting

indigenous

communities

in

Pando

and

north-

ern Beni, the Consejo Yuqui, and the Coordinadora Etnica de Santa Cruz

(CESC).

The latter was

created between

1992-1994

at the insistence

of

CPIB,

which

objected

to CIDOB

playing

the dual

role

of national

coordi-

nator of

the

indigenous

movement and

representative

of the

indigenous

peoples

of the

department

of

Santa Cruz

(CIDOB

1995:

44-46).

The

CESC

later added the

word

'Pueblos'

(Peoples)

to

its

name,

becoming

CPESC. As

CIDOB

underwent

deterioration as an

organisation

between

1997

and

2002,

because

of

internal

rivalries and a rift between its

moderate

and

radical fac-

tions,

CPESC became the more

dynamic organisation.

The

lowland

organ-

isations discussed

forming

their own

political

instrument

in the

990os

but

could not reach

consensus

on

this

course

of action. Some

lower-level

organ-

isations and

individuals decided to

support

the ASP

and, later,

the MAS.

CPESC

president

Jose

Bailaba won a seat

in

congress

representing

the

MAS

in

2002.

For the

most

part,

however,

lowland Indians

entered

formal

politics

by

allying

with

traditional

political

parties,

and these

alliances

fractured

the

organisation

in

1997

and 2002.42

The

political

mobilisation of

the nation's

indigenous

majority

and the

success of the new

indigenous parties

in

1997

and

1999

convinced traditional

parties

-

particularly

he MNR

and

MIR

-

to offer candidacies

n 2002 to more

indigenous

and

campesino

leaders than

ever before.43

Many

of

these

were

elected.

For

example,

the MIR

successfully

ran Elsa

Guevara,

a

Quechua

peasant

leader who

was

subsequently

named

head

of the

MIR

congressional

42

The

latest

important

ndigenous

movement

to

emerge

has been

promoted

by Aymara

historiansand anthropologists o reconstitute he traditional yllus the pre-colombian

form of

Aymara

and

Quechua

political,

social,

and

economic

organisation

and

to or-

ganise

them

into federations.

See Maria

Eugenia

Choque

and Carlos

Mamani,

Recon-

stituci6ndel

aylluy

derechos

de los

pueblos ndigenas:

El movimiento

ndio en los

Andes

de

Bolivia,'Journal

fLatin

American

Anthropology,

ol.

6,

no.

I,

zooi,

p.

207.

As

the

highland

peasant

movement

declined

n

the

late

i980s

and

I99os,

traditional

yllu

uthorities

egan

to

challenge

and

even

to

replace

he

peasant

unions

as the most

legitimate

orm of

local

authority.

As

key

proponents

of the

movement

explain,

The return

of

our

own

authority

constitutes

an

act of

self-determination,

f

restoring

o the

community

ts

own

govern-

ment,'

while

rejecting

mposed

'foreign'

authority

tructures.

Choque

and

Mamani,

Re-

constituci6n

del

ayllu,'

p.

212. In

1997

an umbrella

rganisation

as

established

o unite

the

movement

(Consejo

de

Ayllusy

Markas el

Qullasuyu,

CONAMAQ).

This movementwas

too

new to

participate oherently

n

the

2002 elections.

Based

on

the

location

of the

organisation's

ase in La

Paz,

Oruro,

and Potosi

-

all dominated

by

the IPSP-MAS

and

MIP in

zooz

-

we can

conclude that

many

of its members

voted for the two

indigenous

candidates.

43

Interviews,

La

Paz,

Bertha Beatriz

Acarapi, 29

June

200oo2;

Elena

Argirakis,

19

June

2002zooz;

Maria

Eugenia Choque, 20zoune 2002zooz;orge

Lema,

20zoune zoo2002.


18/26

From

xclusion

o

Inclusion:olivia's

002

lections

767

delegation.

The

populist,

Cochabamba-based

arty

NFR

incorporated

he

portion

of the

coca

growers

movement

hat

split

from

Evo

Morales n

1998,

including

ASP leader

Alejo

Veliz.

The keyobstacleto politicaladvancementor the peasantmovementon

the eve

of the 2002

electionswas a

seriousdivision

hat had

emerged

within

the

CSUTCBbetween

Evo Moralesand

Alejo

Veliz

at its

1998

Congress.

When

the

organisation

ould not decide

between

Veliz

and

Morales,

Felipe

Quispe

was chosen

as

a

compromise

ecretary-general.

he decision

revived

the

moribund

political

career

of the radical

Aymara

nationalist,

who

had

been involved

n

the

MITKA n the

early

98os,

before

leaving

to

build

an

armed

movement

(the

Ejercito

Guerrillero

Tupaj

Katari).Quispe

was

ar-

rested in

1992

and released from prison in 1997.

He attended

the

1998

CSUTCB

congress

in

order

to

generate

political

support

for his defence

against

urther riminal

charges

elated o his

guerrilla

ctivities.

After

being

elected

secretary-general

uispe

assumed he

title

of

Mallku,

high-ranking

Aymara

authority.

rom

this

institutional

latform,

over

the

next three

years

Quispe

led

militant,

sometimes

violent,

mobilisations

against

the Banzer-

Quiroga

government.

His starwould rise

quickly

during

2000

when

he led

massive roadblocks

n the

highlands

that forced

concessions

on

agrarian

policy.

UnlikeMoralesand

Vliz,

who talked

mainly

of

the economic

exploi-

tation of Bolivia's

peasants by

the Bolivian

government

and its

'puppet

master',

the United

States,

Quispe provoked

the

ire

of even

sympathetic

elites with his

fiery

ethno-nationalist

hetoric.

He

articulated

n

opposition

between the

European,

ight-skinned

Bolivia,

and

the darker

skinned,

n-

digenous

majority

nd called

or

the construction

f a

separate

Aymara

tate.

In

response

to

derogatory

acial

epithets

directed

at

Quispe,

his rhetoric

became

increasingly

nflammatory.45

The lesson of this

experience

s

that

the ethnic

parties

that

succeeded

most in Boliviawere not the personalistic ehiclesof individualndigenous

leaders,

as had been the

practice

n the

1980s

and

early1990s.

Instead,

suc-

cessful

ethnic

parties

constitute he

political

arms

of established

ndigenous

social movement

organisations

nd

were

constructed

with

significant

up-

port

from and

participation

of

their

membership.

Notwithstanding

he

severe

split

within

the

CSUTCBafter

1998,Quispe

and Morales

were

able

to

draw on the financialand

logistical

resources

of

long-established,

ocally

legitimate

CSUTCB affiliates.Even

in the

lowlands,

where

the

umbrella

indigenousorganisationCIDOBwasin disarray riorto the zooz elections,

44

Patzi

Paco,

Insutgencia

sumisin,

pp.

77-83,

i21i-;

interviews,

Victor

Hugo

Cirdenas,

Esteban

Ticona,

La

Paz,

zool.

45

Willem

Assies,

'Uncommon

citizens,

their

usosy

costumbres,

nd the

media,'

paper prepared

for the Third

European Congress

of

Latin-Americanists,

Amsterdam,

2-6

July

zooz,

p.

I

6;

Gustafson,

'Indigenous

Movements,'

p.

269.


19/26

768

Donna

Lee

Van Cott

Table

4.

Spending

or

2oo2

Presidential

ampaigns

Seconds

f

TV

US$

Provided Total

US$

Spent

Total

US$

Spending

Party

Time

Bought'

by

CNE2

on

Propaganda

Declared

y

Party

MNR

592,722

931,295 6,519,942 6,000,000

NFR

451,898

376,00o

4,970,878

3,000,000

MIR

306,428

858,121

3,370,708

3,000,000

ADN

257,590

757,316

2,833,490

4,000,000

UCS

162,303

824,349 1,785,333

1,536,312

Condepa

48,875

878,078

537,625

No

response

MAS

28,503

94,664

313,533

Undetermined

MCC

25,406

0

279,466

No

response

LYJ

8,I6o

0

89,760

No

response

MIP

7,876

0

86,636

1,396

PS

0

0

o

No

response

Sources:

Los

partidos

astaron

us

20

millones

61o

en

Tv',

La

Ra.zn

LaPaz),

29June

2002, B6-7);

'Desde

camiones

hasta

helic6pteros

en

campafia',

La

Razdn

(La

Paz),

2z5

June

2002,

p.

B5.

1

In

cities f La

Paz,Cochabamba,

nd

SantaCruz.

Funding rovided

o

parties

ased

n

results

n

previous

lections.

his

represents

alfthe

total

money

awardedach

party.

The

second

half

s

deliveredfter

he

elections,

rovided

he

party omplies

withcertain

equire-

ments.

Article

15

of

the

Constitution

rovides

72

seconds f

TV

time

daily

o each

political

party

or

55

ays,

r

14,998

or

each

party.

the IPSP-MAS formed an alliancewith the main indigenous organisation of

Santa

Cruz,

CPESC,

and

the

organisation

secured

the

party 9.6 per

cent

of

the

vote in

that

department.46

Ties

to

these

well-rooted,

highly

mobil-

ised

organisations

provided

the

resources that the two

financially

weak

par-

ties

needed to

beat

better

financed

traditional

parties

-

surmounting

the

hurdle

that

had

tripped up

so

many

Katarista

parties

in

the

1980s.

As

shown

in

Table

4,

the

two

indigenous parties

IPSP-MAS

and

MIP

spent

far

less

on

their

campaigns

than

did

the

traditional

Documents

Lee Van Cott, 2003, From Exclusion to Inclusion. Bolivia's 2002 Elections