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1
ATTY. CARMEN LEONOR M. ALCANTARA, VICENTE P.
MERCADO, SEVERINO P. MERCADO AND SPOUSES JESUS
AND ROSARIO MERCADO, Complainants,
- versus -
A.C. No. 5859 (Formerly CBD Case No.
421)
Present:
CORONA, C.J., CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES, VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION, PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,* ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and SERENO, JJ.
ATTY. EDUARDO C. DE VERA,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
November 23, 2010
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
For our review is the Resolution[1] of the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) finding respondent Atty. Eduardo C.
De Vera liable for professional malpractice and gross misconduct and
recommending his disbarment.
The facts, as appreciated by the investigating commissioner,[2] are
undisputed.
The respondent is a member of the Bar and was the former counsel of
Rosario P. Mercado in a civil case filed in 1984 with
the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and an administrative case filed
before the Securities and Exchange Commission, Davao City Extension
Office.[3]
Pursuant to a favorable decision, a writ of execution pending appeal
was issued in favor of Rosario P. Mercado. Herein respondent, as her legal
counsel, garnished the bank deposits of the defendant, but did not turn over
2
the proceeds to Rosario. Rosario demanded that the respondent turn over
the proceeds of the garnishment, but the latter refused claiming that he had
paid part of the money to the judge while the balance was his, as attorneys
fees. Such refusal prompted Rosario to file an administrative case for
disbarment against the respondent.[4]
On March 23, 1993, the IBP Board of Governors promulgated a
Resolution holding the respondent guilty of infidelity in the custody and
handling of clients funds and recommending to the Court his one-year
suspension from the practice of law.[5]
Following the release of the aforesaid IBP Resolution, the respondent
filed a series of lawsuits against the Mercado family except George Mercado.
The respondent also instituted cases against the family corporation, the
corporations accountant and the judge who ruled against the reopening of
the case where respondent tried to collect the balance of his alleged fee
from Rosario. Later on, the respondent also filed cases against the chairman
and members of the IBP Board of Governors who voted to recommend his
suspension from the practice of law for one year. Complainants allege that
the respondent committed barratry, forum shopping, exploitation of family
problems, and use of intemperate language when he filed several frivolous
and unwarranted lawsuits against the complainants and their family
members, their lawyers, and the family corporation.[6] They maintain that
the primary purpose of the cases is to harass and to exact revenge for the
one-year suspension from the practice of law meted out by the IBP against
the respondent. Thus, they pray that the respondent be disbarred for
malpractice and gross misconduct under Section 27,[7] Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court.
In his defense the respondent basically offers a denial of the charges
against him.
He denies he has committed barratry by instigating or stirring up George
Mercado to file lawsuits against the complainants. He insists that the lawsuits
that he and George filed against the complainants were not harassment suits
but were in fact filed in good faith and were based on strong facts.[8]
Also, the respondent denies that he has engaged in forum shopping.
He argues that he was merely exhausting the remedies allowed by law and
that he was merely constrained to seek relief elsewhere by reason of the
denial of the trial court to reopen the civil case so he could justify his
attorneys fees.
3
Further, he denies that he had exploited the problems of his clients
family. He argues that the case that he and George Mercado filed against
the complainants arose from their perception of unlawful transgressions
committed by the latter for which they must be held accountable for the
public interest.
Finally, the respondent denies using any intemperate, vulgar, or
unprofessional language. On the contrary, he asserts that it was the
complainants who resorted to intemperate and vulgar language in accusing him
of extorting from Rosario shocking and unconscionable attorneys fees.[9]
After careful consideration of the records of this case and the parties
submissions, we find ourselves in agreement with the findings and
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
It is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a
privilege bestowed by the State upon those who show that they possess,
and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the
conferment of such privilege.[10] Membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice
law only during good behavior and can only be deprived of it for misconduct
ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be
heard has been afforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege
or right, an attorneys right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding
to suspend or disbar him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a
license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must
be understood that the purpose of suspending or disbarring an attorney is to
remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him
unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to an
office of an attorney, and thus to protect the public and those charged with
the administration of justice, rather than to punish the
attorney.[11] In Maligsa v. Cabanting,[12] we explained that the bar should
maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair
dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully
performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his
clients. To this end a member of the legal profession should refrain from
doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust
reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal
profession. An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of
his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor, which include
statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court.
4
In the present case, the respondent committed professional
malpractice and gross misconduct particularly in his acts against his former
clients after the issuance of the IBP Resolution suspending him from the
practice of law for one year. In summary, the respondent filed against his
former client, her family members, the family corporation of his former
client, the Chairman and members of the Board of Governors of the IBP who
issued the said Resolution, the Regional Trial Court Judge in the case where
his former client received a favorable judgment, and the present counsel of
his former client, a total of twelve (12) different cases in various fora which
included the Securities and Exchange Commission; the Provincial
Prosecutors Office of Tagum, Davao; the Davao City Prosecutors Office; the
IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline; the Department of Agrarian Reform; and
the Supreme Court.[13]
In addition to the twelve (12) cases filed, the respondent also re-filed
cases which had previously been dismissed. The respondent filed six criminal
cases against members of the Mercado family separately docketed as I.S.
Nos. 97-135; 97-136; 97-137; 97-138; 97-139; and 97-140. With the
exception of I.S. No. 97-139, all the aforementioned cases are re-filing of
previously dismissed cases.[14]
Now, there is nothing ethically remiss in a lawyer who files numerous
cases in different fora, as long as he does so in good faith, in accordance
with the Rules, and without any ill-motive or purpose other than to achieve
justice and fairness. In the present case, however, we find that the barrage
of cases filed by the respondent against his former client and others close to
her was meant to overwhelm said client and to show her that the respondent
does not fold easily after he was meted a penalty of one year suspension
from the practice of law.
The nature of the cases filed by the respondent, the fact of re-filing
them after being dismissed, the timing of the filing of cases, the fact that the
respondent was in conspiracy with a renegade member of the complainants
family, the defendants named in the cases and the foul language used in the
pleadings and motions[15] all indicate that the respondent was acting beyond
the desire for justice and fairness. His act of filing a barrage of cases
appears to be an act of revenge and hate driven by anger and frustration
against his former client who filed the disciplinary complaint against him for
infidelity in the custody of a clients funds.
In the case of Prieto v. Corpuz,[16] the Court pronounced that it is
professionally irresponsible for a lawyer to file frivolous lawsuits. Thus, we
stated in Prieto,
5
Atty. Marcos V. Prieto must be sanctioned for filing this
unfounded complaint. Although no person should be penalized for the exercise of the right to litigate, however, this right must
be exercised in good faith.[17]
As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to
assist in the proper administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing frivolous petitions that only add to
the workload of the judiciary.
A lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration
of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its ends the speedy, efficient, impartial, correct and inexpensive adjudication of cases and the prompt satisfaction of final judgments. A lawyer should not only help attain these
objectives but should likewise avoid any unethical or improper practices that impede, obstruct or prevent their realization,
charged as he is with the primary task of assisting in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice.[18] Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility promulgated on 21 June 1988 is
very explicit that lawyers must exert every effort and consider it their duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice.
Further, the respondent not only filed frivolous and unfounded lawsuits
that violated his duties as an officer of the court in aiding in the proper
administration of justice, but he did so against a former client to whom he
owes loyalty and fidelity. Canon 21 and Rule 21.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility[19] provides:
CANON 21 - A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets
of his client even after the attorney-client relation is terminated.
Rule 21.02 A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person,
unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.
The cases filed by the respondent against his former client involved
matters and information acquired by the respondent during the time when
he was still Rosarios counsel. Information as to the structure and operations
of the family corporation, private documents, and other pertinent facts and
figures used as basis or in support of the cases filed by the respondent in
pursuit of his malicious motives were all acquired through the attorney-client
relationship with herein complainants. Such act is in direct violation of the
Canons and will not be tolerated by the Court.
6
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law effective immediately upon his
receipt of this Resolution.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be spread
on the records of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5108 May 26, 2005
ROSA F. MERCADO, complainant, vs.
ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J.:
Rosa F. Mercado filed the instant administrative complaint against Atty.
Julito D. Vitriolo, seeking his disbarment from the practice of law. The complainant alleged that respondent maliciously instituted a criminal case
for falsification of public document against her, a former client, based on confidential information gained from their attorney-client relationship.
Let us first hearken to the facts.
Complainant is a Senior Education Program Specialist of the Standards Development Division, Office of Programs and Standards while respondent is
a Deputy Executive Director IV of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED).1
Complainant's husband filed Civil Case No. 40537 entitled "Ruben G. Mercado v. Rosa C. Francisco," for annulment of their marriage with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. This annulment case had been dismissed by the trial court, and the dismissal became final and executory
on July 15, 1992.2
In August 1992, Atty. Anastacio P. de Leon, counsel of complainant, died. On February 7, 1994, respondent entered his appearance before the trial
court as collaborating counsel for complainant.3
On March 16, 1994, respondent filed his Notice of Substitution of
Counsel,4 informing the RTC of Pasig City that he has been appointed as counsel for the complainant, in substitution of Atty. de Leon.
It also appears that on April 13, 1999, respondent filed a criminal action
against complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City, entitled "Atty. Julito Vitriolo, et al. v. Rose Dela Cruz F. Mercado," and
docketed as I.S. No. PSG 99-9823, for violation of Articles 171 and 172
7
(falsification of public document) of the Revised Penal Code.5 Respondent
alleged that complainant made false entries in the Certificates of Live Birth of her children, Angelica and Katelyn Anne. More specifically, complainant
allegedly indicated in said Certificates of Live Birth that she is married to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez, and that their marriage was solemnized on
April 11, 1979, when in truth, she is legally married to Ruben G. Mercado and their marriage took place on April 11, 1978.
Complainant denied the accusations of respondent against her. She denied
using any other name than "Rosa F. Mercado." She also insisted that she has gotten married only once, on April 11, 1978, to Ruben G. Mercado.
In addition, complainant Mercado cited other charges against respondent that are pending before or decided upon by other tribunals (1) libel suit before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City;6 (2) administrative case for dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service, pursuit of private business, vocation or profession without the permission required by Civil Service rules and regulations, and violations of
the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," before the then Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption;7 (3) complaint for dishonesty,
grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service before the Office of the Ombudsman, where he was found guilty of
misconduct and meted out the penalty of one month suspension without
pay;8 and, (4) the Information for violation of Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, as amended, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees before the Sandiganbayan.9
Complainant Mercado alleged that said criminal complaint for falsification of
public document (I.S. No. PSG 99-9823) disclosed confidential facts and information relating to the civil case for annulment, then handled by
respondent Vitriolo as her counsel. This prompted complainant Mercado to bring this action against respondent. She claims that, in filing the criminal
case for falsification, respondent is guilty of breaching their privileged and
confidential lawyer-client relationship, and should be disbarred.
Respondent filed his Comment/Motion to Dismiss on November 3, 1999 where he alleged that the complaint for disbarment was all hearsay,
misleading and irrelevant because all the allegations leveled against him are subject of separate fact-finding bodies. Respondent claimed that the pending
cases against him are not grounds for disbarment, and that he is presumed to be innocent until proven otherwise.10 He also states that the decision of
the Ombudsman finding him guilty of misconduct and imposing upon him the penalty of suspension for one month without pay is on appeal with the Court
of Appeals. He adds that he was found guilty, only of simple misconduct,
which he committed in good faith.11
In addition, respondent maintains that his filing of the criminal complaint for falsification of public documents against complainant does not violate the
rule on privileged communication between attorney and client because the bases of the falsification case are two certificates of live birth which are
public documents and in no way connected with the confidence taken during the engagement of respondent as counsel. According to respondent, the
complainant confided to him as then counsel only matters of facts relating to
8
the annulment case. Nothing was said about the alleged falsification of the
entries in the birth certificates of her two daughters. The birth certificates are filed in the Records Division of CHED and are accessible to anyone.12
In a Resolution dated February 9, 2000, this Court referred the
administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.13
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline set two dates for hearing but complainant failed to appear in both. Investigating Commissioner Rosalina R.
Datiles thus granted respondent's motion to file his memorandum, and the case was submitted for resolution based on the pleadings submitted by the
parties.14
On June 21, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors approved the report of investigating commissioner Datiles, finding the respondent guilty of violating
the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client, and recommending his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.
On August 6, 2003, complainant, upon receiving a copy of the IBP report and recommendation, wrote Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., a letter of
desistance. She stated that after the passage of so many years, she has now found forgiveness for those who have wronged her.
At the outset, we stress that we shall not inquire into the merits of the
various criminal and administrative cases filed against respondent. It is the
duty of the tribunals where these cases are pending to determine the guilt or innocence of the respondent.
We also emphasize that the Court is not bound by any withdrawal of the
complaint or desistance by the complainant. The letter of complainant to the Chief Justice imparting forgiveness upon respondent is inconsequential in
disbarment proceedings.
We now resolve whether respondent violated the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client when he filed a criminal case for falsification of public document against his former client.
A brief discussion of the nature of the relationship between attorney and
client and the rule on attorney-client privilege that is designed to protect such relation is in order.
In engaging the services of an attorney, the client reposes on him special powers of trust and confidence. Their relationship is strictly personal and
highly confidential and fiduciary. The relation is of such delicate, exacting and confidential nature that is required by necessity and public
interest.15 Only by such confidentiality and protection will a person be encouraged to repose his confidence in an attorney. The hypothesis is that
abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice.16 Thus, the preservation and protection of
that relation will encourage a client to entrust his legal problems to an attorney, which is of paramount importance to the administration of
justice.17 One rule adopted to serve this purpose is the attorney-client privilege: an attorney is to keep inviolate his client's secrets or confidence
9
and not to abuse them.18 Thus, the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's
secrets and confidence outlasts the termination of the attorney-client relationship,19 and continues even after the client's death.20 It is the glory of
the legal profession that its fidelity to its client can be depended on, and that a man may safely go to a lawyer and converse with him upon his rights or
supposed rights in any litigation with absolute assurance that the lawyer's tongue is tied from ever disclosing it.21 With full disclosure of the facts of the
case by the client to his attorney, adequate legal representation will result in the ascertainment and enforcement of rights or the prosecution or defense
of the client's cause.
Now, we go to the rule on attorney-client privilege. Dean Wigmore cites the
factors essential to establish the existence of the privilege, viz:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating
to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by
the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.22
In fine, the factors are as follows:
(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-
client relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship that the client made the communication.
Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on privileged communication even if the prospective client does not
thereafter retain the lawyer or the latter declines the employment.23 The reason for this is to make the prospective client free to discuss whatever he
wishes with the lawyer without fear that what he tells the lawyer will be divulged or used against him, and for the lawyer to be equally free to obtain
information from the prospective client.24
On the other hand, a communication from a (prospective) client to a lawyer for some purpose other than on account of the (prospective) attorney-client
relation is not privileged. Instructive is the case of Pfleider v.
Palanca,25 where the client and his wife leased to their attorney a 1,328-hectare agricultural land for a period of ten years. In their contract, the
parties agreed, among others, that a specified portion of the lease rentals would be paid to the client-lessors, and the remainder would be delivered by
counsel-lessee to client's listed creditors. The client alleged that the list of creditors which he had "confidentially" supplied counsel for the purpose of
carrying out the terms of payment contained in the lease contract was disclosed by counsel, in violation of their lawyer-client relation, to parties
whose interests are adverse to those of the client. As the client himself, however, states, in the execution of the terms of the aforesaid lease contract
between the parties, he furnished counsel with the "confidential" list of his creditors. We ruled that this indicates that client delivered the list of his
creditors to counsel not because of the professional relation then existing between them, but on account of the lease agreement. We then held that a
violation of the confidence that accompanied the delivery of that list would
partake more of a private and civil wrong than of a breach of the fidelity owing from a lawyer to his client.
10
(2) The client made the communication in confidence.
The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of
confidentiality.26 The client must intend the communication to be confidential.27
A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary
act of disclosure between attorney and client in confidence and by means
which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the information to no third person other than one reasonably necessary for the transmission of the
information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given.28
Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground. Thus, a compromise agreement prepared by a lawyer pursuant to the instruction of
his client and delivered to the opposing party,29 an offer and counter-offer for settlement,30 or a document given by a client to his counsel not in his
professional capacity,31 are not privileged communications, the element of confidentiality not being present.32
(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.33
The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended
for mere information, but for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or obligations. The communication must have been
transmitted by a client to his attorney for the purpose of seeking legal
advice.34
If the client seeks an accounting service,35 or business or personal assistance,36 and not legal advice, the privilege does not attach to a
communication disclosed for such purpose.
Applying all these rules to the case at bar, we hold that the evidence on
record fails to substantiate complainant's allegations. We note that complainant did not even specify the alleged communication in confidence
disclosed by respondent. All her claims were couched in general terms and lacked specificity. She contends that respondent violated the rule on
privileged communication when he instituted a criminal action against her for falsification of public documents because the criminal complaint disclosed
facts relating to the civil case for annulment then handled by respondent. She did not, however, spell out these facts which will determine the merit of
her complaint. The Court cannot be involved in a guessing game as to the existence of facts which the complainant must prove.
Indeed, complainant failed to attend the hearings at the IBP. Without any testimony from the complainant as to the specific confidential information
allegedly divulged by respondent without her consent, it is difficult, if not impossible to determine if there was any violation of the rule on privileged
communication. Such confidential information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule on privileged communication between attorney and
client. It is not enough to merely assert the attorney-client privilege.37 The burden of proving that the privilege applies is placed upon the party
asserting the privilege.38
11
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the complaint against respondent Atty. Julito D.
Vitriolo is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur. Tinga, J., out of the country.
A.C. No. 927 September 28, 1970
IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT OF
ATTORNEY POTENCIANO A. PALANCA. WILLIAM C. PFLEIDER, complainant,
vs. POTENCIANO A. PALANCA, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
CASTRO, J.:
The respondent Atty. Potenciano A. Palanca was for sometime the legal
counsel of the complainant William C. Pfleider. According to the
complainant, he retained the legal services of Palanca from January 1966, whereas the latter insists that the attorney-client relationship between
them began as early as in 1960.
At all events, the relations between the two must have attained such a
high level of mutual trust that on October 10, 1969, Pfleider and his wife leased to Palanca a 1,328 hectare agricultural land in Hinobaan, Negros
Occidental, known as the Hacienda Asia, for a period of ten years. In their contract, the parties agreed, among others, that a specified portion of the
lease rentals would be paid to Pfleider, and the remainder would be
delivered by Palanca to Pfleider's listed creditors.
The arrangement worked smoothly until October 14, 1969 when the rupture came with the filing by Pfleider of a civil suit (civil case 9187 of
the CFI of Negros Occidental) against Palanca for rescission of the
contract of lease on the ground of alleged default in the payment of rentals. In his answer to the complaint, Palanca averred full satisfaction
of his rental liabilities, and therefore contended that the lease should continue. He also charged that he had already been dispossessed of
the hacienda by Pfleider and the latter's goons at gunpoint and
consequently had suffered tremendous financial losses.
With this history in, perspective, we shall now consider the administrative
charges of gross misconduct in office brought by Pfleider against Palanca. The indictment consists of four counts.
First count. In regard to a criminal case for estafa filed in December 1965
by one Gregorio Uy Matiao against Pfleider, the latter instructed Palanca
to offer in settlement the sum of P10,000, payable in installments, to Uy
12
Matiao for the dismissal of the case. After sometime, Palanca reported to
Pfleider that the offer has been rejected. Finally in October 1969, Palanca supposedly informed Pfleider that he had succeeded in negotiating the
dismissal of the estafa case by leaving the sum of P5,000 with the Dumaguete City Court where the action was then pending. Sometime in
December 1969, however, Pfleider was the object of a warrant of arrest
in connection with the same estafa case. It turned out, charged the complainant Pfleider, that Palanca had not deposited the sum of P5,000
with the Dumaguete City Court, let alone communicated to Uy Matiao his earlier offer of settlement.
We have closely examined all the pleadings filed by the parties in this case and the annexes thereto, and it is our view that the first charge is
devoid of merit. In support of his claim of alleged assurance made by Palanca that theestafa case had already been terminated, Pfleinder relies
on certain letters written to him by Palanca. Our own reading of these
letters, however, belies his claim. They contain nothing which might reasonably induce the complainant to believe that the criminal action
against him had been finally settled by his attorney. On the contrary, the letters merely report a continuing attempt on the part of Palanca to
secure a fair bargain for Pfleider. The letter-report of October 10, 1969,
invoke by the complainant, states in no uncertain terms that "I am bargaining this (referring to the estafa case) even for P8,000.00 and I
think they will agree. I'll finalize this and pay Tingyan on Tuesday. I have already left in Dumaguete P5,000.00 to show them the color of our
money and I will bring the balance when I go there Tuesday."
Nothing in the above letter indicates that Palanca had deposited the sum
of P5,000 with the Dumaguete City Court. What he did state is that he had left that sum in that City to enable their adversaries to see "the color
of our money." In this connection, the veracity of the certification by
Felicisimo T. Hilay, Dumaguete branch manager of RCPI, that he (Hilay) had been holding the sum of P5,000 during the early part of October in
trust for Pfleider and his lawyer, has not been assailed by Pfleider.
If Pfleider was the object of a warrant of arrest in December 1969, no
substantial blame can be laid at the door of the respondent Palanca inasmuch as the latter's services were implicitly terminated by Pfleider
when the latter sued his lawyer in October of the same year. While the object of the suit is the rescission of the contract of lease between the
parties, the conflict of interest which pits one against the other became
incompatible with that mutual confidence and trust essential to every lawyer-client relation. Moreover, Pfleider fails to dispute Palanca's claim
that on October 26, 1968, Pfleider refused to acknowledge receipt of a certain letter and several motions for withdrawal, including Palanca's
withdrawal as counsel in the estafa case.
Second count. Palanca had fraudulently charged the sum of P5,000
(which he supposedly had left with the City Court in Dumaguete) to his
rental account with Pfleider as part payment of the lease rentals of the Hacienda Asia.Third count. In the same statement of account, Palanca
falsely represented having paid, for the account of Pfleider, one Samuel
13
Guintos the sum of P866.50 when the latter would swear that he had
received only the sum of P86.50.
These two charges are anchored upon the same "Statement of Disbursements" submitted by Palanca to Pfleider. It is our view that this
statement is but a memorandum or report of the expenses which Palanca
considered as chargeable to the account of Pfleider. By its very tentative nature, it is subject to the examination and subsequent approval or
disapproval of Pfleider, and any and every error which it contains may be brought to the attention of Palanca for rectification or adjustment. Viewed
in relation to the contract of lease between Pfleinder and Palanca, this
"statement" is but one aspect of the prestation required of Palanca by the contract. Whatever breach he might have committed in regard to this
prestation would be but a civil or contractual wrong which does not affect his office as a member of the Bar.
Final count. It is charged that the list of creditors which Pfleider had "confidentially" supplied Palanca for the purpose of carrying out the terms
of payment contained in the lease contract was disclosed by Palanca, in violation of their lawyer-client relation, to parties whose interests are
adverse to those of Pfleider.
As Pfleider himself, however, in the execution of the terms of the
aforesaid lease contract between the parties, complainant furnished
respondent with a confidential list of his creditors." This should indicate that Pfleider delivered the list of his creditors to Palanca not because of
the professional relation then existing between them, but on account of the lease agreement. A violation therefore of the confidence that
accompanied the delivery of that list would partake more of a private and
civil wrong than of a breach of the fidelity owing from a lawyer to his client. Moreover, Pfleider fails to controvert Palanca's claim that there is
no such thing as a "confidential" list of creditors and that the list of creditors referred to by Pfleider is the same list which forms part of the
pleadings in civil case 9187 (the action for rescission of the lease
contract) now, pending between the complainant and the respondent lawyer, and therefore is embraced within the category of public records
open to the perusal of persons properly interested therein.
In sum, we are satisfied, and we so hold, that nothing in written
complaint for disbarment against Palanca and in his reply to Palanca's answer supports a prima facie finding of such misconduct in office by
Palanca as would warrant further proceedings in this case.
ACCORDINGLY, the complaint is hereby dismissed.
Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Fernando, Teehankee,
Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar, J., took no part.
Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.
14
G.R. No. L-961 September 21, 1949
BLANDINA GAMBOA HILADO, petitioner,
vs. JOSE GUTIERREZ DAVID, VICENTE J. FRANCISCO, JACOB ASSAD
and SELIM JACOB ASSAD,respondents.
Delgado, Dizon and Flores for petitioner.
Vicente J. Francisco for respondents.
TUASON, J.:
It appears that on April 23, 1945, Blandina Gamboa Hilado brought an
action against Selim Jacob Assad to annul the sale of several houses and
lot executed during the Japanese occupation by Mrs. Hilado's now deceased husband.
On May 14, Attorneys Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita filed an answer on
behalf of the defendant; and on June 15, Attorneys Delgado, Dizon,
Flores and Rodrigo registered their appearance as counsel for the plaintiff. On October 5, these attorneys filed an amended complaint by
including Jacob Assad as party defendant.
On January 28, 1946, Attorney Francisco entered his appearance as
attorney of record for the defendant in substitution for Attorney Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita who had withdrawn from the case.
On May 29, Attorney Dizon, in the name of his firm, wrote Attorney Francisco urging him to discontinue representing the defendants on the
ground that their client had consulted with him about her case, on which occasion, it was alleged, "she turned over the papers" to Attorney
Francisco, and the latter sent her a written opinion. Not receiving any
answer to this suggestion, Attorney Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo on June 3, 1946, filed a formal motion with the court, wherein the case
was and is pending, to disqualify Attorney Francisco.
Attorney Francisco's letter to plaintiff, mentioned above and identified as
Exhibit A, is in full as follows:
VICENTE J. FRANCISCO
Attorney-at-Law 1462 Estrada, Manila
July 13, 1945.
Mrs. Blandina Gamboa Hilado Manila, Philippines
My dear Mrs. Hilado:
From the papers you submitted to me in connection with civil case
No. 70075 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled
15
"Blandina Gamboa Hilado vs. S. J. Assad," I find that the basic facts
which brought about the controversy between you and the defendant therein are as follows:
(a) That you were the equitable owner of the property described in
the complaint, as the same was purchased and/or built with funds
exclusively belonging to you, that is to say, the houses and lot pertained to your paraphernal estate;
(b) That on May 3, 1943, the legal title to the property was with your husband, Mr. Serafin P. Hilado; and
(c) That the property was sold by Mr. Hilado without your
knowledge on the aforesaid date of May 3, 1943.
Upon the foregoing facts, I am of the opinion that your action
against Mr. Assad will not ordinarily prosper. Mr. Assad had the right to presume that your husband had the legal right to dispose of
the property as the transfer certificate of title was in his name.
Moreover, the price of P110,000 in Japanese military notes, as of May 3, 1943, does not quite strike me as so grossly inadequate as
to warrant the annulment of the sale. I believe, lastly, that the transaction cannot be avoided merely because it was made during
the Japanese occupation, nor on the simple allegation that the real
purchaser was not a citizen of the Philippines. On his last point, furthermore, I expect that you will have great difficulty in proving
that the real purchaser was other than Mr. Assad, considering that death has already sealed your husband's lips and he cannot now
testify as to the circumstances of the sale.
For the foregoing reasons, I regret to advise you that I cannot
appear in the proceedings in your behalf. The records of the case you loaned to me are herewith returned.
Yours very truly,
(Sgd.) VICENTE J. FRANCISCO
VJF/Rag.
In his answer to plaintiff's attorneys' complaint, Attorney Francisco
alleged that about May, 1945, a real estate broker came to his office in connection with the legal separation of a woman who had been deserted
by her husband, and also told him (Francisco) that there was a pending suit brought by Mrs. Hilado against a certain Syrian to annul the sale of a
real estate which the deceased Serafin Hilado had made to the Syrian
during the Japanese occupation; that this woman asked him if he was willing to accept the case if the Syrian should give it to him; that he told
the woman that the sales of real property during the Japanese regime were valid even though it was paid for in Japanese military notes; that
this being his opinion, he told his visitor he would have no objection to
defending the Syrian;
16
That one month afterwards, Mrs. Hilado came to see him about a suit she
had instituted against a certain Syrian to annul the conveyance of a real estate which her husband had made; that according to her the case was
in the hands of Attorneys Delgado and Dizon, but she wanted to take it away from them; that as he had known the plaintiff's deceased husband
he did not hesitate to tell her frankly that hers was a lost case for the
same reason he had told the broker; that Mrs. Hilado retorted that the basis of her action was not that the money paid her husband was
Japanese military notes, but that the premises were her private and exclusive property; that she requested him to read the complaint to be
convinced that this was the theory of her suit; that he then asked Mrs.
Hilado if there was a Torrens title to the property and she answered yes, in the name of her husband; that he told Mrs. Hilado that if the property
was registered in her husband's favor, her case would not prosper either;
That some days afterward, upon arrival at his law office on Estrada
street, he was informed by Attorney Federico Agrava, his assistant, that Mrs. Hilado had dropped in looking for him and that when he, Agrava,
learned that Mrs. Hilado's visit concerned legal matters he attended to her and requested her to leave the "expediente" which she was carrying,
and she did; that he told Attorney Agrava that the firm should not handle
Mrs. Hilado's case and he should return the papers, calling Agrava's attention to what he (Francisco) already had said to Mrs. Hilado;
That several days later, the stenographer in his law office, Teofilo
Ragodon, showed him a letter which had been dictated in English by Mr.
Agrava, returning the "expedients" to Mrs. Hilado; that Ragodon told him (Attorney Francisco) upon Attorney Agrava's request that Agrava thought
it more proper to explain to Mrs. Hilado the reasons why her case was rejected; that he forthwith signed the letter without reading it and
without keeping it for a minute in his possession; that he never saw Mrs.
Hilado since their last meeting until she talked to him at the Manila Hotel about a proposed extrajudicial settlement of the case;
That in January, 1946, Assad was in his office to request him to handle his case stating that his American lawyer had gone to the States and left
the case in the hands of other attorneys; that he accepted the retainer and on January 28, 1946, entered his appearance.
Attorney Francisco filed an affidavit of stenographer Ragodon in corroboration of his answer.
The judge trying the case, Honorable Jose Gutierrez David, later
promoted to the Court of Appeals, dismissed the complaint. His Honor
believed that no information other than that already alleged in plaintiff's complaint in the main cause was conveyed to Attorney Francisco, and
concluded that the intercourse between the plaintiff and the respondent did not attain the point of creating the relation of attorney and client.
Stripped of disputed details and collateral matters, this much is undoubted: That Attorney Francisco's law firm mailed to the plaintiff a
written opinion over his signature on the merits of her case; that this
17
opinion was reached on the basis of papers she had submitted at his
office; that Mrs. Hilado's purpose in submitting those papers was to secure Attorney Francisco's professional services. Granting the facts to be
no more than these, we agree with petitioner's counsel that the relation of attorney and client between Attorney Francisco and Mrs. Hilado
ensued. The following rules accord with the ethics of the legal profession
and meet with our approval:
In order to constitute the relation (of attorney and client) a professional one and not merely one of principal and agent, the
attorneys must be employed either to give advice upon a legal
point, to prosecute or defend an action in court of justice, or to prepare and draft, in legal form such papers as deeds, bills,
contracts and the like. (Atkinson vs. Howlett, 11 Ky. Law Rep. (abstract), 364; cited in Vol. 88, A. L. R., p. 6.)
To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have employed the attorney professionally on any
previous occasion. . . . It is not necessary that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that
the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about
which the consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in
his professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or
acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional employment
must be regarded as established. . . . (5 Jones Commentaries on Evidence, pp. 4118-4119.)
An attorney is employed-that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or counselor-when he is listening to his client's
preliminary statement of his case, or when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his client's pleadings,
or advocating his client's cause in open court. (Denver Tramway Co.
vs. Owens, 20 Colo., 107; 36 P., 848.)
Formality is not an essential element of the employment of an attorney. The contract may be express or implied and it is sufficient
that the advice and assistance of the attorney is sought and
received, in matters pertinent to his profession. An acceptance of the relation is implied on the part of the attorney from his acting in
behalf of his client in pursuance of a request by the latter. (7 C. J. S., 848-849; see Hirach Bros. and Co. vs. R. E. Kennington Co., 88
A. L. R., 1.)
Section 26 (e), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court provides that "an attorney
cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in
the course of professional employment;" and section 19 (e) of Rule 127
imposes upon an attorney the duty "to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client." There
is no law or provision in the Rules of Court prohibiting attorneys in
18
express terms from acting on behalf of both parties to a controversy
whose interests are opposed to each other, but such prohibition is necessarily implied in the injunctions above quoted. (In re De la Rosa, 27
Phil., 258.) In fact the prohibition derives validity from sources higher than written laws and rules. As has been aptly said in In re Merron, 22 N.
M., 252, L.R.A., 1917B, 378, "information so received is sacred to the
employment to which it pertains," and "to permit it to be used in the interest of another, or, worse still, in the interest of the adverse party, is
to strike at the element of confidence which lies at the basis of, and affords the essential security in, the relation of attorney and client."
That only copies of pleadings already filed in court were furnished to Attorney Agrava and that, this being so, no secret communication was
transmitted to him by the plaintiff, would not vary the situation even if we should discard Mrs. Hilado's statement that other papers, personal
and private in character, were turned in by her. Precedents are at hand to
support the doctrine that the mere relation of attorney and client ought to preclude the attorney from accepting the opposite party's retainer in the
same litigation regardless of what information was received by him from his first client.
The principle which forbids an attorney who has been engaged to represent a client from thereafter appearing on behalf of the client's
opponent applies equally even though during the continuance of the employment nothing of a confidential nature was revealed to the
attorney by the client. (Christian vs. Waialua Agricultural Co., 30
Hawaii, 553, Footnote 7, C. J. S., 828.)
Where it appeared that an attorney, representing one party in
litigation, had formerly represented the adverse party with respect to the same matter involved in the litigation, the court need not
inquire as to how much knowledge the attorney acquired from his former during that relationship, before refusing to permit the
attorney to represent the adverse party. (Brown vs. Miller, 52 App.
D. C. 330; 286, F. 994.)
In order that a court may prevent an attorney from appearing against a former client, it is unnecessary that the ascertain in detail
the extent to which the former client's affairs might have a bearing
on the matters involved in the subsequent litigation on the attorney's knowledge thereof. (Boyd vs. Second Judicial Dist. Court,
274 P., 7; 51 Nev., 264.)
This rule has been so strictly that it has been held an attorney, on
terminating his employment, cannot thereafter act as counsel against his client in the same general matter, even though, while
acting for his former client, he acquired no knowledge which could operate to his client's disadvantage in the subsequent adverse
employment. (Pierce vs. Palmer [1910], 31 R. I., 432; 77 Atl., 201,
Ann. Cas., 1912S, 181.)
19
Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of
litigations, a complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well known facts. In the complexity of what is said
in the course of the dealings between an attorney and a client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial,
of other matters that might only further prejudice the complainant's
cause. And the theory would be productive of other un salutary results. To make the passing of confidential communication a condition
precedent; i.e., to make the employment conditioned on the scope and character of the knowledge acquired by an attorney in determining his
right to change sides, would not enhance the freedom of litigants, which
is to be sedulously fostered, to consult with lawyers upon what they believe are their rights in litigation. The condition would of necessity call
for an investigation of what information the attorney has received and in what way it is or it is not in conflict with his new position. Litigants would
in consequence be wary in going to an attorney, lest by an unfortunate
turn of the proceedings, if an investigation be held, the court should accept the attorney's inaccurate version of the facts that came to him.
"Now the abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is by hypothesis an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice." (John H.
Wigmore's Evidence, 1923, Section 2285, 2290, 2291.)
Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship
of attorney and client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest
practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest
lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. (Strong vs. Int. Bldg., etc.; Ass'n, 183 Ill., 97; 47 L.R.A., 792.) It is founded on
principles of public policy, on good taste. As has been said in another case, the question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but
as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard.
With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of
paramount importance in the administration of justice.
So without impugning respondent's good faith, we nevertheless can not
sanction his taking up the cause of the adversary of the party who had sought and obtained legal advice from his firm; this, not necessarily to
prevent any injustice to the plaintiff but to keep above reproach the
honor and integrity of the courts and of the bar. Without condemning the respondents conduct as dishonest, corrupt, or fraudulent, we do believe
that upon the admitted facts it is highly in expedient. It had the tendency to bring the profession, of which he is a distinguished member, "into
public disrepute and suspicion and undermine the integrity of justice."
There is in legal practice what called "retaining fee," the purpose of which
stems from the realization that the attorney is disabled from acting as counsel for the other side after he has given professional advice to the
opposite party, even if he should decline to perform the contemplated
services on behalf of the latter. It is to prevent undue hardship on the
20
attorney resulting from the rigid observance of the rule that a separate
and independent fee for consultation and advice was conceived and authorized. "A retaining fee is a preliminary fee given to an attorney or
counsel to insure and secure his future services, and induce him to act for the client. It is intended to remunerate counsel for being deprived, by
being retained by one party, of the opportunity of rendering services to
the other and of receiving pay from him, and the payment of such fee, in the absence of an express understanding to the contrary, is neither made
nor received in payment of the services contemplated; its payment has no relation to the obligation of the client to pay his attorney for the
services which he has retained him to perform." (7 C.J.S., 1019.)
The defense that Attorney Agrava wrote the letter Exhibit A and that
Attorney Francisco did not take the trouble of reading it, would not take the case out of the interdiction. If this letter was written under the
circumstances explained by Attorney Francisco and he was unaware of its
contents, the fact remains that his firm did give Mrs. Hilado a formal professional advice from which, as heretofore demonstrated, emerged the
relation of attorney and client. This letter binds and estop him in the same manner and to the same degree as if he personally had written it.
An information obtained from a client by a member or assistant of a law
firm is information imparted to the firm. (6 C. J., 628; 7 C. J. S., 986.) This is not a mere fiction or an arbitrary rule; for such member or
assistant, as in our case, not only acts in the name and interest of the firm, but his information, by the nature of his connection with the firm is
available to his associates or employers. The rule is all the more to be
adhered to where, as in the present instance, the opinion was actually signed by the head of the firm and carries his initials intended to convey
the impression that it was dictated by him personally. No progress could be hoped for in "the public policy that the client in consulting his legal
adviser ought to be free from apprehension of disclosure of his
confidence," if the prohibition were not extended to the attorney's partners, employers or assistants.
The fact that petitioner did not object until after four months had passed
from the date Attorney Francisco first appeared for the defendants does
not operate as a waiver of her right to ask for his disqualification. In one case, objection to the appearance of an attorney was allowed even on
appeal as a ground for reversal of the judgment. In that case, in which throughout the conduct of the cause in the court below the attorney had
been suffered so to act without objection, the court said: "We are all of
the one mind, that the right of the appellee to make his objection has not lapsed by reason of failure to make it sooner; that professional
confidence once reposed can never be divested by expiration of professional employment." (Nickels vs. Griffin, 1 Wash. Terr., 374, 321 A.
L. R. 1316.)
The complaint that petitioner's remedy is by appeal and not by certiorari
deserves scant attention. The courts have summary jurisdiction to protect the rights of the parties and the public from any conduct of attorneys
prejudicial to the administration of the justice. The summary jurisdiction
of the courts over attorneys is not confined to requiring them to pay over
21
money collected by them but embraces authority to compel them to do
whatever specific acts may be incumbent upon them in their capacity of attorneys to perform. The courts from the general principles of equity and
policy, will always look into the dealings between attorneys and clients and guard the latter from any undue consequences resulting from a
situation in which they may stand unequal. The courts acts on the same
principles whether the undertaking is to appear, or, for that matter, not to appear, to answer declaration, etc. (6 C.J., 718 C.J.S., 1005.) This
summary remedy against attorneys flows from the facts that they are officers of the court where they practice, forming a part of the machinery
of the law for the administration of justice and as such subject to the
disciplinary authority of the courts and to its orders and directions with respect to their relations to the court as well as to their clients. (Charest
vs. Bishop, 137 Minn., 102; 162, N.W., 1062, Note 26, 7 C. J. S., 1007.) Attorney stand on the same footing as sheriffs and other court officers in
respect of matters just mentioned.
We conclude therefore that the motion for disqualification should be
allowed. It is so ordered, without costs.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes
and Torres, JJ., concur.
CLARITA J. SAMALA, Complainant,
ADM. CASE NO. 5439
Present: PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, SANDOVAL-
GUTIERREZ, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, - versus - CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, GARCIA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ. ATTY. LUCIANO D. VALENCIA,
Promulgated:
Respondent. ___________________
22
____
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
R E S O L U T I O N AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Before us is a complaint[1] dated May 2, 2001 filed by
Clarita J. Samala (complainant) against Atty. Luciano D. Valencia
(respondent) for Disbarment on the following grounds: (a)
serving on two separate occasions as counsel for contending
parties; (b) knowingly misleading the court by submitting false
documentary evidence; (c) initiating numerous cases in exchange
for nonpayment of rental fees; and (d) having a reputation of
being immoral by siring illegitimate children.
After respondent filed his Comment, the Court, in its
Resolution of October 24, 2001, referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.[2]
The investigation was conducted
by Commissioner Demaree Jesus B. Raval. After a series of
hearings, the parties filed their respective memoranda[3] and the
case was deemed submitted for resolution.
Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes prepared the Report
and Recommendation[4] dated January 12, 2006. He found
respondent guilty of violating Canons 15 and 21 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and recommended the penalty of
suspension for six months.
In a minute Resolution[5] passed on May 26, 2006, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and
recommendation of Commissioner Reyes but increased the
penalty of suspension from six months to one year.
23
We adopt the report of the IBP Board of Governors except
as to the issue on immorality and as to the recommended
penalty.
On serving as counsel for contending parties.
Records show that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, filed in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 272, Marikina City, entitled
Leonora M. Aville v. Editha Valdez for nonpayment of rentals,
herein respondent, while being the counsel for defendant Valdez,
also acted as counsel for the tenants Lagmay,
Valencia, Bustamante and Bayuga[6] by filing an Explanation and
Compliance before the RTC.[7]
In Civil Case No. 98-6804 filed in the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MTC), Branch 75, Marikina City, entitled Editha S. Valdez
and Joseph J. Alba, Jr. v. Salve Bustamanteand her husband
for ejectment, respondent represented Valdez
against Bustamante one of the tenants in the property subject
of the controversy. Defendants appealed to the RTC, Branch
272, Marikina City docketed as SCA Case No. 99-341-MK. In his
decision dated May 2, 2000,[8] Presiding Judge Reuben
P. dela Cruz[9] warned respondent to refrain from repeating the
act of being counsel of record of both parties in Civil Case No. 95-
105-MK.
But in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK, filed in the RTC, Branch
273, Marikina City, entitled Editha S. Valdez v. Joseph J. Alba,
Jr. and Register of Deeds of MarikinaCity, respondent, as counsel
for Valdez, filed a Complaint for Rescission of Contract with
Damages and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
275500 against Alba, respondent's former client in Civil Case No.
98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK.
24
Records further reveal that at the hearing of November 14,
2003, respondent admitted that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, he
was the lawyer for Lagmay (one of the tenants) but not
for Bustamante and Bayuga[10] albeit he filed the Explanation and
Compliance for and in behalf of the tenants.[11] Respondent also
admitted that he represented Valdez in Civil Case No. 98-6804
and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK against Bustamante and her
husband but denied being the counsel for Alba although the case
is entitled Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her husband,
because Valdez told him to include Alba as the two were the
owners of the property[12] and it was only Valdez who signed the
complaint for ejectment.[13] But, while claiming that respondent
did not represent Alba, respondent, however, avers that he
already severed his representation for Alba when the latter
charged respondent with estafa.[14] Thus, the filing of Civil Case
No. 2000-657-MK against Alba.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.
A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional
misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts
with that of his present or former client.[15] He may not also
undertake to discharge conflicting duties any more than he may
represent antagonistic interests. This stern rule is founded on the
principles of public policy and good taste.[16] It springs from the
relation of attorney and client which is one of trust and
confidence. Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the
clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery
and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to
entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.[17]
One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of
the lawyers duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or
25
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the
performance of that duty.[18]
The stern rule against representation of conflicting interests
is founded on principles of public policy and good taste. It
springs from the attorneys duty to represent his client with
undivided fidelity and to maintain inviolate the clients confidence
as well as from the injunction forbidding the examination of an
attorney as to any of the privileged communications of his
client.[19]
An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in
which he has represented him but also after the relation of
attorney and client has terminated.[20] The bare attorney-client
relationship with a client precludes an attorney from accepting
professional employment from the clients adversary either in the
same case[21] or in a different but related action.[22] A lawyer is
forbidden from representing a subsequent client against a former
client when the subject matter of the present controversy is
related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the
previous litigation in which he appeared for the former client.[23]
We held in Nombrado v. Hernandez[24] that the termination
of the relation of attorney and client provides no justification for a
lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that
of the former client. The reason for the rule is that the clients
confidence once reposed cannot be divested by the expiration of
the professional employment.[25] Consequently, a lawyer should
not, even after the severance of the relation with his client, do
anything which will injuriously affect his former client in any
matter in which he previously represented him nor should he
disclose or use any of the clients confidences acquired in the
previous relation.[26]
In this case, respondents averment that his relationship
with Alba has long been severed by the act of the latter of not
turning over the proceeds collected in Civil Case No. 98-6804, in
26
connivance with the complainant, is unavailing. Termination of
the attorney-client relationship precludes an attorney from
representing a new client whose interest is adverse to his former
client. Alba may not be his original client but the fact that he
filed a case entitled Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her
husband, is a clear indication that respondent is protecting the
interests of both Valdez and Alba in the said case. Respondent
cannot just claim that the lawyer-client relationship between him
and Alba has long been severed without observing Section 26,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court wherein the written consent of his
client is required.
In Gonzales v. Cabucana, Jr.,[27] citing the case
of Quiambao v. Bamba,[28] we held that: The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action. It is of no moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyers respective retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.[29]
Respondent is bound to comply with Canon 21 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall
preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the
attorney-client relation is terminated.
The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of
attorney and client, which is one of trust and confidence of the
highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts
connected with his clients case. He learns from his client the
27
weak points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such
knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care.[30]
From the foregoing, it is evident that respondents
representation of Valdez and Alba against Bustamante and her
husband, in one case, and Valdez against Alba, in another case, is
a clear case of conflict of interests which merits a corresponding
sanction from this Court. Respondent may have withdrawn his
representation in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK upon being warned by
the court,[31] but the same will not exculpate him from the
charge of representing conflicting interests in his representation
in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK.
Respondent is reminded to be more cautious in accepting
professional employments, to refrain from all appearances and
acts of impropriety including circumstances indicating conflict of
interests, and to behave at all times with circumspection and
dedication befitting a member of the Bar, especially observing
candor, fairness and loyalty in all transactions with his clients.[32]
On knowingly misleading the court by submitting false
documentary evidence.
Complainant alleges that in Civil Case No. 00-7137 filed
before MTC, Branch 75 for ejectment, respondent submitted TCT
No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's ownership despite the fact
that a new TCT No. 275500 was already issued in the name of
Alba on February 2, 1995.
Records reveal that respondent filed Civil Case No. 00-7137
on November 27, 2000 and presented TCT No. 273020 as
evidence of Valdez's ownership of the subject property.[33] During
the hearing before Commissioner Raval, respondent avers that
when the Answer was filed in the said case, that was the time
28
that he came to know that the title was already in the name of
Alba; so that when the court dismissed the complaint, he did not
do anything anymore.[34] Respondent further avers
that Valdez did not tell him the truth and things were revealed to
him only when the case for rescission was filed in 2002.
Upon examination of the record, it was noted that Civil
Case No. 2000-657-MK for rescission of contract and cancellation
of TCT No. 275500 was also filed on November 27,
2000,[35] before RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, thus belying the
averment of respondent that he came to know of Alba's title only
in 2002 when the case for rescission was filed. It was revealed
during the hearing before Commissioner Raval that Civil Case
Nos. 00-7137 and 2000-657-MK were filed on the same date,
although in different courts and at different times.
Hence, respondent cannot feign ignorance of the fact that
the title he submitted was already cancelled in lieu of a new title
issued in the name of Alba in 1995 yet, as proof of the latter's
ownership.
Respondent failed to comply with Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not
do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be mislead by any
artifice. It matters not that the trial court was not misled by
respondent's submission of TCT No. 273020 in the name
of Valdez, as shown by its decision dated January 8,
2002[36] dismissing the complaint for ejectment. What is decisive
in this case is respondent's intent in trying to mislead the court
by presenting TCT No. 273020 despite the fact that said title was
already cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 275500, was already
issued in the name of Alba.
In Young v. Batuegas,[37] we held that a lawyer must be a
disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he
will do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court
29
and he shall conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of
his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to his clients.[38] He should bear in mind that as an
officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the
court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing
justice and arriving at correct conclusion.[39] The courts, on the
other hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from
lawyers appearing and pleading before them. While a lawyer has
the solemn duty to defend his clients rights and is expected to
display the utmost zeal in defense of his clients cause, his
conduct must never be at the expense of truth.
A lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a
profession to which society has entrusted the administration of
law and the dispensation of justice.[40] As such, he should make
himself more an exemplar for others to emulate.[41]
On initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment
of rental fees.
Complainant alleges that respondent filed the following
cases: (a) Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK at the RTC, Branch 272;
(b) Civil Case No. 00-7137 at the MTC, Branch 75; and (c) I.S.
Nos. 00-4439 and 01-036162 both entitled Valencia v. Samala
for estafa and grave coercion, respectively, before
the Marikina City Prosecutor. Complainant claims that the two
criminal cases were filed in retaliation for the cases she filed
against Lagmay docketed as I.S. No. 00-4306 for estafa and I.S.
No. 00-4318 against Alvin Valencia (son of respondent) for
trespass to dwelling.
As culled from the records, Valdez entered into a retainer
agreement with respondent. As payment for his services, he was
allowed to occupy the property for free and utilize the same as
his office pursuant to their retainer agreement.[42]
30
Respondent filed I.S. Nos. 00-4439[43] and 01-
036162[44] both entitled Valencia v. Samala for estafa and grave
coercion, respectively, to protect his client's rights against
complainant who filed I.S. No. 00-
4306[45] for estafa against Lagmay, and I.S. No. 00-
4318[46] against Alvin Valencia[47] for trespass to dwelling.
We find the charge to be without sufficient basis. The act
of respondent of filing the aforecited cases to protect the interest
of his client, on one hand, and his own interest, on the other,
cannot be made the basis of an administrative charge unless it
can be clearly shown that the same was being done to abuse
judicial processes to commit injustice.
The filing of an administrative case against respondent for
protecting the interest of his client and his own right would be
putting a burden on a practicing lawyer who is obligated to
defend and prosecute the right of his client.
On having a reputation for being immoral by siring
illegitimate children.
We find respondent liable for being immoral by siring
illegitimate children.
During the hearing, respondent admitted that he sired
three children by Teresita Lagmay who are all over 20 years of
age,[48] while his first wife was still alive. He also admitted that
he has eight children by his first wife, the youngest of whom is
over 20 years of age, and after his wife died in 1997, he
married Lagmay in 1998.[49] Respondent further admitted
that Lagmay was staying in one of the apartments being claimed
by complainant. However, he does not consider his affair
with Lagmay as a relationship[50]and does not consider the latter
as his second family.[51] He reasoned that he was not staying
31
with Lagmay because he has two houses, one in Muntinlupa and
another inMarikina.[52]
In this case, the admissions made by respondent are more
than enough to hold him liable on the charge of
immorality. During the hearing, respondent did not show any
remorse. He even justified his transgression by saying that he
does not have any relationship with Lagmay and despite the fact
that he sired three children by the latter, he does not consider
them as his second family. It is noted that during the hearing,
respondent boasts in telling the commissioner that he has two
houses - in Muntinlupa, where his first wife lived, and in Marikina,
where Lagmay lives.[53] It is of no moment that respondent
eventually married Lagmay after the death of his first wife. The
fact still remains that respondent did not live up to the exacting
standard of morality and decorum required of the legal
profession.
Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. It may be difficult to specify the
degree of moral delinquency that may qualify an act as immoral,
yet, for purposes of disciplining a lawyer, immoral conduct has
been defined as that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion
of respectable members of the community.[54] Thus, in several
cases, the Court did not hesitate to discipline a lawyer for keeping
a mistress in defiance of the mores and sense of morality of the
community.[55] That respondent subsequently married Lagmay in
1998 after the death of his wife and that this is his first infraction
as regards immorality serve to mitigate his liability.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Atty. Luciano D.
Valencia GUILTY of misconduct and violation of Canons 21, 10
and 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
32
He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years,
effective immediately upon receipt of herein Resolution.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the
land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as well as the Office of
the Bar Confidant for their information and guidance, and let it be
entered in respondents personal records.
SO ORDERED.
REBECCA J. PALM, A.C. No. 8242 Complainant, Present: PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, CARPIO, - versus - CORONA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and BERSAMIN, JJ. ATTY. FELIPE ILEDAN, JR., Promulgated: Respondent. October 2, 2009 x - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The case before the Court is a disbarment proceeding filed
by Rebecca J. Palm (complainant) against Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr.
(respondent) for revealing information obtained in the course of
an attorney-client relationship and for representing an interest
33
which conflicted with that of his former client, Comtech
Worldwide Solutions Philippines, Inc. (Comtech).
The Antecedent Facts
Complainant is the President of Comtech, a corporation
engaged in the business of computer software
development. From February 2003 to November 2003,
respondent served as Comtechs retained corporate counsel for
the amount of P6,000 per month as retainer fee. From
September to October 2003, complainant personally met with
respondent to review corporate matters, including potential
amendments to the corporate by-laws. In a meeting held on 1
October 2003, respondent suggested that Comtech amend its
corporate by-laws to allow participation during board meetings,
through teleconference, of members of the Board of Directors
who were outside the Philippines.
Prior to the completion of the amendments of the corporate
by-laws, complainant became uncomfortable with the close
relationship between respondent and Elda Soledad (Soledad), a
former officer and director of Comtech, who resigned and who
was suspected of releasing unauthorized disbursements of
corporate funds. Thus, Comtech decided to terminate its retainer
agreement with respondent effective November 2003.
In a stockholders meeting held on 10 January 2004,
respondent attended as proxy for Gary Harrison
(Harrison). Steven C. Palm (Steven) and Deanna L. Palm,
members of the Board of Directors, were present through
teleconference. When the meeting was called to order,
respondent objected to the meeting for lack of
quorum. Respondent asserted that Steven and Deanna Palm
could not participate in the meeting because the corporate by-
laws had not yet been amended to allow teleconferencing.
34
On 24 March 2004, Comtechs new counsel sent a demand
letter to Soledad to return or account for the amount
of P90,466.10 representing her unauthorized disbursements
when she was the Corporate Treasurer of Comtech. On 22 April
2004, Comtech received Soledads reply, signed by
respondent. In July 2004, due to Soledads failure to comply with
Comtech's written demands, Comtech filed a complaint for Estafa
against Soledad before the Makati Prosecutors Office. In the
proceedings before the City Prosecution Office of Makati,
respondent appeared as Soledads counsel.
On 26 January 2005, complainant filed a Complaint[1] for
disbarment against respondent before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP).
In his Answer,[2] respondent alleged that in January 2002,
Soledad consulted him on process and procedure in acquiring
property. In April 2002, Soledad again consulted him about the
legal requirements of putting up a domestic corporation. In
February 2003, Soledad engaged his services as consultant for
Comtech. Respondent alleged that from February to October
2003, neither Soledad nor Palm consulted him on confidential or
privileged matter concerning the operations of the
corporation. Respondent further alleged that he had no access to
any record of Comtech.
Respondent admitted that during the months of September
and October 2003, complainant met with him regarding the
procedure in amending the corporate by-laws to allow board
members outside the Philippines to participate in board
meetings.
Respondent further alleged that Harrison, then Comtech
President, appointed him as proxy during the 10 January 2004
meeting. Respondent alleged that Harrison instructed him to
observe the conduct of the meeting. Respondent admitted that
he objected to the participation of Steven and Deanna Palm
35
because the corporate by-laws had not yet been properly
amended to allow the participation of board members by
teleconferencing.
Respondent alleged that there was no conflict of interest
when he represented Soledad in the case for Estafa filed by
Comtech. He alleged that Soledad was already a client before he
became a consultant for Comtech. He alleged that the criminal