LEGAL ETHICS

1. As a result of a vehicular mishap between a Toyota Land Cruiser driven by Judge Garcia and the motorcycle driven by Francisco Ortega, the latter died and Judge Garcia was subsequently charged with the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide. Judge Ortega filed a Motion to Quash the Information on grounds that the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged and over his person. He argued that the Ombudsman should refer all cases against judges and court personnel filed before his office to the Supreme Court since it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof by virtue of its constitutional power of supervision over all courts and court personnel. Resolve the motion to quash.

A: The Motion to Quash should be denied. Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and court personnel and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation of the laws of the land. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of separation of powers. However, that prerogative only extends to administrative supervision. As such, the Ombudsman cannot encroach upon this Courts task to oversee judges and court personnel and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation of the laws of the land. Since the criminal case filed against Judge Ortega was in no way related to the performance of his duties as a judge. As such, the jurisdiction of the MCTC over the case is beyond contestation.

2. Judge Untalan is a former official of the Mandaluyong city government entrusted with the duty of settling land disputes. After he was appointed as a judge, he continued to assist neighbors and friends, without any compensation, in settling their land differences. Is there an ethical/professional responsibility problem in this situation? If a problem exists, what are its implications or potential consequences?

A:Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. By using his position to help private persons settle a legal dispute, Judge Untalan is administratively liable under Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. His intentions may have been noble as he sought to make complainant realize that he had been occupying by mistake the property subject of the dispute, but Judge Untalan should be mindful to conduct himself in a manner that gives no ground for reproach. The Court held in Miranda v. Judge Mangrobang that a judges private life cannot be dissociated from his public life and it is, thus, important that his behavior both on and off the bench be free from any appearance of impropriety.

While there was no categorical finding of bad faith or malice on the part of respondent Judge, who was motivated by the noble intention of settling the property dispute between Lozada and Abando, however, he must bear in mind that his office demands an exacting standard of decorum to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Judge Untalan should be more prudent in the observance of his dealings with the public to obviate the mistaken impression of impropriety in that he is probably using his position as a judge to impose improper pressure or exert undue influence so as to obtain the desired result in a given situation.

3. When is inhibition considered as mandatory and when is it considered as a matter of discretion on the part of a judge?

A: Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court stated that no judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record. A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

4. A Complaint was filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant by Mrs. Agbulos against Atty. Viray for allegedly notarizing a document denominated as Affidavit of Non-Tenancy in violation of the Notarial Law since a competent evidence of identity was not presented. Atty. Viray argued that the Notarial Rules did not amend Section 163 of the Local Government Code which only requires the presentation of a Community Tax Certificate when notarizing a document since the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court cannot amend the law. Was the affidavit validly notarized? Explain.

A: The Community Tax Certificate and a competent evidence of identity must be presented to the Notary Public since the Notarial Rules did not amend Section 163 of the Local Government Code. The law and the rule must be complied with.

5. Ana Salinas filed a case for Violence Against Women and their Children with a Petition for the Issuance of a Temporary Protection Order against her husband Roy Salinas before the Regional Trial Court. After a chamber conference with both parties counsels, Judge Bitas immediately issued an Order appointing Mervyn Aover as the administrator of the spouses community properties. Ana Salinas avers that she did not agree to the appointment of an administrator, hence, she filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order appointing Mervyn Aover as the administrator. In response, Roy Salinas counsel filed his comment on the motion, with motion to cite Ana Salinas for indirect contempt for her defiance to the order of the court by disallowing Mervyn Aover to take over the management of the spouses community properties. Judge Bitas summarily held petitioner in contempt of court for violating the courts order by disallowing the administrator to perform his duty. Is Judge Bitas correct in issuing an order peremptorily holding Ana Salinas in contempt of court?

A: Judge Bitas should be held administratively liable for summarily holding Ana Salinas in contempt of court. Charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision. From the foregoing, it is clear that the following procedural requisites must be complied with before petitioner may be punished for indirect contempt: First, there must be an order requiring the petitioner to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt. Second, the petitioner must be given the opportunity to comment on the charge against her. Third, there must be a hearing and the court must investigate the charge and consider petitioners answer. Finally, only if found guilty will petitioner be punished accordingly. What is most essential in indirect contempt cases, however, is that the alleged contemner be granted an opportunity to meet the charges against him and to be heard in his defenses.

Here, it appears that Roy Salinas did not file a verified complaint, but instead initiated the indirect contempt through his Comment/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Cite Defendant for Indirect Contempt. Regardless of this fact, however, respondent Judge still issued an order peremptorily holding petitioner in contempt of court. Moreover, assuming that the contempt charge was initiated motu proprio by the Court, respondent Judge still failed to abide by the rules when he did not require petitioner to show cause why she should not be punished for contempt. Plainly, respondent Judge's obstinate disregard of established rules of procedure amounts to gross ignorance of the law or procedure, since he disregarded the basic procedural requirements in instituting an indirect contempt charge.

6. Johnwell Tiggangay ran for the mayoralty position of Kalinga in the election but lost to Rhustom L. Dagadag by a slim margin. Following Dagadag's proclamation, Tiggangay filed an electoral protest which was raffled to the sala of Judge Wacas. Judge Wacas rendered a Decision finding Dagadag to have won the protested election but at a reduced winning margin. Tiggangay filed a complaint charging Judge Wacas with Impropriety and Partiality, alleging that during the course of the proceedings, he learned that Judge Wacas is Dagadags second cousin by affinity, the formers aunt is married to an uncle of Dagadag. Should Judge Wacas be held administratively liable for Impropriety and Partiality for not inhibiting himself from hearing the electoral protest case?

A: No. There is no affinity between the blood relatives of one spouse and the blood relatives of the other. A husband is related by affinity to his wifes brother, but not to the wife of his wifes brother. There is no affinity between the husbands brother and the wifes sister; this is called affinitas affinitatis. There is no relationship by affinity between Judge Wacas and Dagadag as they are not in-laws of each other. Thus, Judge Wacas is not disqualified under Sec. 1 of Rule 137 to hear the election case.

7. Atty. Revilla notarized a complaint-affidavit signed by Heneraline L. Brosas, a sister of Atty. Revillas wife, without requiring the presentation of the latters valid identification card. Can this be a ground for the disbarment of Atty. Revilla?

A: Section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice clearly disqualifies him from notarizing the complaint-affidavit, from performing the notarial act, since the affiant or principal is his relative within the fourth civil degree of affinity. Given the clear provision of the disqualification rule, it behooved upon Atty. Revilla, Jr. to act with prudence and refuse notarizing the document.

The fact that a valid identification card has not been presented is immaterial. If the notary public knows the affiants personally, he need not require them to show their valid identification cards. This rule is supported by the definition of a "jurat" under Section 6, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.

Atty. Revilla, Jr.s violation of the disqualification rule under Section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice is not a sufficient ground to disbar him. He did not commit any deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct or gross immoral conduct, or any other serious ground for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

8. An administrative case for gross incompetence, inefficiency, negligence, and dereliction of duty was filed against Judge Andaya of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Lucena City, Quezon. However, the action was brought in court only after he retired on March 27, 2009. Did Judges Andayas retirement bar the Supreme Court from pursuing the administrative proceeding against him?

A: A judges retirement effectively barred the Court from pursuing the instant administrative proceeding that was instituted after his tenure in office, and divested the Court, much less the OCA, of any jurisdiction to still subject him to the rules and regulations of the judiciary and/or to penalize him for the infractions committed while he was still in the service. The Court has lost jurisdiction to find him liable for the cases and motions left unresolved prior to his retirement.

9. What are the three tests provided by Jurisprudence in determining whether a lawyer is guilty of representing conflicting interest?

A: Jurisprudence has provided three tests in determining whether a lawyer is guilty of representing conflicting interest. One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client. Thus, if a lawyers argument for one client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a violation of the rule. Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyers duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Still another test is whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment.

10. During the pendency of a litigation case between Czarina Malvar and Kraft Foods Phils, a Compromise Agreement was executed by the parties. Atty. Perez, believing that the compromise agreement was authored by Kraft Foods Phils to evade a possible loss of P182,000,000.00 or more as a result of the labor litigation, refused to withdraw the case. Considering Atty. Perez as a major stumbling block in the settlement of her case, Malvar terminated his services. Claiming that Malvar unceremoniously and without any justifiable reason terminated his legal service and required him to withdraw from the case, Atty. Perez filed a Motion for Intervention to recover his full compensation based on his written agreement with Malvar. Can the Motion for Intervention prosper?

A: Atty. Perez has the right recover in full its compensation based on its written agreement with his client who unceremoniously and without any justifiable reason terminated its legal service and required it to withdraw from the case. A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place, but if the contract between client and attorney has been reduced to writing and the dismissal of the attorney was without justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to recover from the client the full compensation stipulated in the contract. However, the attorney may, in the discretion of the court, intervene in the case to protect his rights. For the payment of his compensation the attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgment, rendered in the case wherein his services had been retained by the client.

11. Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in 1979 and passed the same years bar examinations. He took the Attorneys Oath but failed to Sign the Roll of Attorneys allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys given by the Bar Office when he went home to his province for a vacation. Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record. By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was mainly doing corporate and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation practice. Thus, he operated under the mistaken belief that since he had already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer; and the matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten. In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he was required to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited. Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number. About seven years later, Medado filed a Petition to the Supreme Court praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys. Should the petition be granted?

A: Yes. Not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions of members of the Bar. In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.

Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by ones assuming to be an attorney or officer of the court, and acting as such without authority, may constitute indirect contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. Such a finding, however, is in the nature of criminal contempt and must be reached after the filing of charges and the conduct of hearings. In this case, while it appears quite clearly that Medado committed indirect contempt of court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from making any finding of liability for indirect contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed against him. Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provided that a lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law. While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyers duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in accordance with the ethical standards of the legal profession.

12. Atty. Espejo, after being introduced to Victoria by a common friend, obtained a loan from the latter in the amount of P250,000.00. Despite successive demands by Victoria, Atty. Espejo failed to fulfill her obligation. Instead, she issued worthless checks to settle her loan. Can Atty. Espejo be disbarred due to the fact that she issued worthless checks despite the fact that the loan was obtained in her private capacity?

A: The fact that Atty. Espejo obtained the loan and issued the worthless checks in her private capacity and not as an attorney of Victoria is of no moment. A lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession but also for his misconduct outside of his professional capacity. While the Court may not ordinarily discipline a lawyer for misconduct committed in his non-professional capacity, the Court may be justified in suspending or removing him as an attorney where his misconduct outside the lawyers professional dealings is so gross in character to show him morally unfit and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and the law confer.

13. Atty. Lacaya and Vicente Cadavedo entered into a contract with the following stipulation: That due to the above circumstances, the plaintiffs were forced to hire a lawyer on contingent basis and if they become the prevailing parties in the case at bar, they will pay the sum of P2,000.00 for attorneys fees. Is the stipulation in the contract is valid?

A: This agreement is champertous and is contrary to public policy. Champerty, along with maintenance (of which champerty is an aggravated form), is a common law doctrine that traces its origin to the medieval period. The doctrine of maintenance was directed "against wanton and in officious intermeddling in the disputes of others in which the intermeddler has no interest whatever, and where the assistance rendered is without justification or excuse. "Champerty, on the other hand, is characterized by "the receipt of a share of the proceeds of the litigation by the intermeddler. "Some common law court decisions, however, add a second factor in determining champertous contracts, namely, that the lawyer must also, "at his own expense maintain, and take all the risks of, the litigation."

As matters currently stand, any agreement by a lawyer to "conduct the litigation in his own account, to pay the expenses thereof or to save his client therefrom and to receive as his fee a portion of the proceeds of the judgment is obnoxious to the law." The rule of the profession that forbids a lawyer from contracting with his client for part of the thing in litigation in exchange for conducting the case at the lawyers expense is designed to prevent the lawyer from acquiring an interest between him and his client. To permit these arrangements is to enable the lawyer to "acquire additional stake in the outcome of the action which might lead him to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client or to accept a settlement which might take care of his interest in the verdict to the sacrifice of that of his client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to his clients cause."

14. The Heirs of Mcabangkit sued National Power Corporation for recovery of damages and of property with the alternative prayer for the payment of just compensation. Atty. Dibaratun was the original counsel of the Heirs of Macabangkit. When the appeal was submitted for decision in the Court of Appeals, Atty. Ballelos filed his entry of appearance and a motion for early decision. When the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, the same was furnished solely to Atty. Ballelos. However, shortly before the rendition of the decision, Atty. Dibaratun filed in the Court of Appeals a motion to register attorneys lien, alleging that he did not withdraw his appearance and he was not aware of the entry of appearance by Atty. Ballelos. Amir Macabangkit, one of the heirs of Macabangkit, confirmed Atty. Dibaratuns representation through an ex parte manifestation that he filed in his own behalf and on behalf of his siblings. Amir imputed malpractice to Atty. Ballelos for having filed an entry of appearance bearing his forged signature and for plagiarism for copying verbatim the arguments contained in the pleadings previously filed by Atty. Dibaratun. Atty. Ballelos claimed that he was hired by the other heirs of Mcabangkit. Both Atty. Dibaratun and Atty. Ballelos posited that their entitlement to attorneys fees was contingent. What is the appropriate attorneys fees? Who is entitled to attorneys fees?

A: With neither Atty. Dibaratun nor Atty. Ballelos presenting a written agreement bearing upon their supposed contingent fees, the only way to determine their right to appropriate attorneys fees is to apply the principle ofquantum meruit. Quantum meruitliterally meaningas much as he deservesis used as basis for determining an attorneys professional fees in the absence of an express agreement. The recovery of attorneys fees on the basis ofquantum meruitis a device that prevents an unscrupulous client from running away with the fruits of the legal services of counsel without paying for it and also avoids unjust enrichment on the part of the attorney himself.An attorney must show that he is entitled to reasonable compensation for the effort in pursuing the clients cause, taking into account certain factors in fixing the amount of legal fees. Atty. Dibaratun, the attorney from the outset, unquestionably carried the bulk of the legal demands of the case. His representation of all the Heirs of Macabangkit was not denied by any of them. In fairness and justice, the Court accords full recognition to Atty. Dibaratun as the counselde parteof the Heirs of Macabangkit who discharged his responsibility in the prosecution of the clients cause to its successful end. It is he, not Atty. Ballelos, who was entitled to the full amount of attorneys fees that the clients ought to pay to their attorney. Given the amount and quality of his legal work, his diligence and the time he expended in ensuring the success of his prosecution of the clients cause, he deserves the recognition, notwithstanding that some of the clients might appear to have retained Atty. Ballelos after the rendition of a favorable judgment. Atty. Ballelos may claim only from Cebu, Batowa-an, Sayana, Nasser, Manta and Edgar, the only parties who engaged him. The Court considers his work in the case as very minimal.

15. Robert Seares, Jr. filed a complaint against Atty. Alzate charging her with incompetence, professional negligence and violation of the prohibition against conflicting interests. Seares alleged that Atty. Alzate was his legal counsel when he ran for the position of Municipal Mayor of Dolores, Abra. When he lost, Atty. Alzate filed in his behalf a Petition of Protest Ad Cautelam, however, the same was dismissed for being fatally defective. Several months later, Atty. Alzate insisted on filing a Petition of Protest, but the petition was also dismissed on the ground that it was already time barred. After sometime, Seares again ran for Municipal Mayor and won. He subsequently learned that his political opponents retained Atty. Alzate as their counsel. Barely two months in office, Seares was charged by one Carlito Turqueza with abuse of authority, oppression and grave misconduct and Atty. Alzate was the one who represented the latter as counsel. Seares stated that Atty. Alzate made false and hurtful statements in the memorandum that she prepared in that administrative case in order to attack him. He asserts that Atty. Alzate violated Canon 15, Canon 17 and Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for negligently handling his election protest, for prosecuting him, and for uttering false and hurtful allegations against him. Hence, he prays that she should be disbarred. Did Atty. Alzate violated the Code of Professional Responsibility?

A: There is no conflict of interest in a situation where a lawyer represents his present client against his former client, so long as no confidential information acquired during the previous employment was used against the former client by the lawyer. The prohibition does not cover a situation where the subject matter of the present engagement is totally unrelated to the previous engagement of the attorney.

16. Rey Decena had brought an administrative case against Judge Malanyaons wife, Dr. Amelita, the then Assistant Provincial Health Officer of Camarines Sur. During the hearing of the administrative case, Judge Malanyaon was occupying a seat beside his daughter, Atty. Maria Kristina Malanyaon, the counsel of Dr. Amelita. The Judges presence therein enabled him to advise his daughter on what to do and say during the hearing. When the counsel of Decena inquired regarding the personality of Judge Malanyaon, being seated at the lawyers bench, the Judge then proudly introduced himself and manifested that he was the counsel of the respondents counsel. The Judge stated that he was merely assisting her daughter who just passed the bar. Subsequently, the complainants lodged an administrative complaint for conduct unbecoming a judge against Judge Malanyaon. Are the actuations of Judge Malanyaon constitute conduct unbecoming of a judge?

A: The act of a judge coaching her daughter who is the counsel of the respondent during a hearing is considered as engaging in private practice of law. A judge may not involve himself in any activity that is an aspect of the private practice of law. His acceptance of an appointment to the Bench inhibits him from engaging in such practice, regardless of the beneficiary of the activity being a member of his immediate family. The judges act of doing so renders him guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge.

17. Atty. De Leon persuaded Arthur, Liza and Ethel to invest in a business venture that later went bankrupt. Arthur, Liza and Ethel charged Atty. De Leon with estafa. Simultaneously, they filed an administrative complaint against Atty. De Leon with the Supreme Court. If Atty. De Leon is convicted of estafa, will he be disbarred? If Atty. De Leon is acquitted of the estafa charge, will the disbarment complaint be dismissed?

A: Moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals. In essence and in all respects, estafa, no doubt, is a crime involving moral turpitude because the act is unquestionably against justice, honesty and good morals. If Atty. De Leon is convicted of estafa, then his guilt cannot now be questioned and his disbarment is inevitable. On the other hand, if he is acquitted, the disbarment case will not be automatically dismissed since the quantum of proof required for a criminal case may not have been sufficient for his conviction but may suffice for his disbarment

18. The Supreme Court suspended indefinitely Atty. Cruz from the practice of law for gross immorality. He asked the Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge of his town if he can be appointed counsel de oficio for Martin, a childhood friend who is accused of theft. The judge refused because Atty. Cruz's name appears in the Supreme Court's List of Suspended Lawyers. Atty. Cruz then inquired if he can appear as a friend for Martin to defend him. If you were the judge, will you authorize him to appear in your court as a friend for Martin?

A: Suspension is the removal of a lawyer from the practice of law for a specified minimum period of time. Generally, suspension should be for a period of time equal to or greater than six months, but in no event should the time period prior to application for reinstatement be more than three years. Procedures should be established to allow a suspended lawyer to apply for reinstatement, but a lawyer who has been suspended should not be permitted to return to practice until he has completed a reinstatement process demonstrating rehabilitation, compliance with all applicable discipline or disability orders and rules, and fitness to practice law. Allowing him to act as an agent or friend of a litigant before the MCTC is akin to doing indirectly what he cannot do directly.

19. Sheila consulted Atty. Fernandez whether she can successfully prosecute her case for declaration of nullity of marriage she intends to file against her husband. Atty. Fernandez advised her in writing that the case will not prosper for the reasons stated therein. Sheila, however, decided to file the case and engaged the services of another lawyer, Atty. Lim. Her husband, Noel, having learned about the opinion of Atty. Fernandez, hired him as his lawyer. Is Atty. Fernandezs acquiescence to be Noel's counsel ethical?

A: Yes. There is conflict of interest since the confidential information Atty. Fernandez acquired during his previous employment with Sheila can be used against the latter. A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant asked respondent for legal advise regarding the formers business. To constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion.

It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his service had been sought. If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional employments is established.

20. Atty. Toquerro was admitted as a member of the New York Bar. While in Manhattan, he was convicted of estafa and was disbarred. Does his disbarment in New York a ground for his automatic disbarment in the Philippines?

A: No. Disbarment in the NY bar is not a ground for disbarment in the Philippines. At most, it can serve as prima facie evidence for the disbarment case in the Philippines.