1) In re Luis Tagorda

Facts:

Luis Tagorda is a practicing lawyer and a member of provincial board of Isabela. During a general

election, he included in his election card a writing which says that he is a lawyer and notary public who

accepts clients for legal advices and representations. Also, in a letter addressed to a barrio lieutenant of

Echague, Isabela, he stated that he is still practicing his law profession in the said barrio and that the

former must disseminate such information to the residents.

During the investigation against him, he admitted to the truthfulness of the preceding facts. The

Attorney-General thought that he must only be reprimanded.

Issue: Whether or not Luis Tagorda is guilty of advertising his legal profession.

Held: Yes.

The Code of Professional Ethics provides that lawyers must not advertise or solicit their legal

practice, directly or indirectly. The most worthy and effective advertisement is the establishment of a

well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust.

2) Dacanay v. Baker & McKenzie – Adm. Case No. 2131

Facts:

Atty. Adriano Dacanay received a letter from respondent Atty. Vicente Torres, using the

letterhead of Baker & McKenzie with the names of nine other lawyers, asking for the release of shares of

a particular client in one company. Atty. Dacanay then requested that he be informed whether the

lawyer of said client is Baker & McKenzie and if not, the purpose of using their letterhead. Not having

received any reply, he then sought to enjoin Atty. Torres and nine other lawyers from practicing law

under the name of Baker & McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois. The respondents aside from being

a member of the firm Guerrero & Torres are also members and/or associates of Baker & McKenzie.

Issue: Whether or not the respondents can use the firm name of an alien law firm.

Held: No. Baker & McKenzie being an alien firm cannot practice law in the Philippines, hence, its name

cannot be used and the use of such is unethical.

3) Uy v. Dizon-Capulong – Adm. Matter No. RTJ-91-766

Facts:

Judge Dizon-Capulong rendered a decision regarding the adjudication of the estate of one

Ambrocio C. Pingco filed by special administratix Hermina Alvos. In said decision, the judge ordered the

cancellation of the titles of Jose Uy to parcels of land allegedly bought by them through fraud from the

deceased. The petitioners raised the issue to the CA which reversed the respondent Judge’s decision and

enjoined the latter from proceeding against the petitioners. Alvos sought for reconsideration but was

denied by the appellate court. Despite of the order of the appellate Court, the respondent judge

proceeded from hearing the matter and giving favor to the petitions filed by the administratix Alvos. The

SC affirmed the decision of CA which annulled and set aside the order of the respondent Judge.

The petitioners asserted that the respondent judge committed gross ignorance of the law by

rendering a decision regarding ownership in a probate proceeding; and gross misconduct for disobeying

the lawful order of the superior courts. The respondent judge argued that the CA did not prohibited her

from proceeding against the petitioners and reversion of the title to them.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge committed gross ignorance and misconduct.

Held: Yes.

It is a well-settled principle that judges cannot adjudicate third party or adverse claims of a

property in a probate proceeding. The court, acting as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate

such matter, which must be settled in a court of general jurisdiction. Hence, the respondent’s failure to

apply this principle indicates disregard of well-known legal rules.

The acts of the respondent judge in giving orders despite of the prohibition made by superior

courts and reversal of its decision is a clear manifest of grave misconduct prejudicial to the interest of

the public, the bench and the bar.

4) Ali v. Bubong – Adm. Case No. 4018

Facts:

Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong was holding position in the Register of Deeds of Marawi City. An

administrative complaint was charged against him for illegal exaction, indiscriminate issuance of TCTs

and manipulating the criminal complaint filed against the respondent’s relative for violation of Anti-

Squatting Law. The LRA absolved him but the through the recommendation of the Sec. of Justice, Pres.

Ramos issued an administrative order dismissing the respondent for gross misconduct for the imprudent

issuance of TCTs and manipulating the criminal case for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law. Due to

outcome of the administrative case against respondent, the petitioner sought for the disbarment of the

former because it has become obvious that respondent had proven himself unfit to be further entrusted

with duties of an attorney and is a serious threat to the integrity of legal profession. The respondent

denied the allegations against him. After investigation, the IBP recommended for the suspension of the

respondent. Upon the death of the petitioner, his heirs moved for the withdrawal of the deceased

petition for disbarment.

Issue: Whether or not respondent may be disbarred for grave misconduct committed while he was in

government service

Held: Yes

The CPR does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the gov’t service.

Canon 6.02 provides that a lawyer in gov’t service shall not use his public position to promote or

advance his private interest, not allow the latter to interfere with his public duties. Thus, where a

lawyer’s misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or

to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar.

5) Suarez v. Platon – Phil Reports No. 46371

69 Phil 556 – Legal Ethics – Duty of the Prosecutor

In May 1935, Atty. Fortunato Suarez was riding a train on his way to Calauag, Tayabas. Apparently he

was very vocal and he was despising the abuses made by government officers. Incidentally, Lieutenant

Vivencio Orais was aboard the train. Orais arrested Suarez and charged him with sedition. Orais however

later moved for the dismissal of the case upon the instruction of his superior. Thereafter, Suarez filed a

case against Orais for arbitrary detention. Provincial Fiscal Ramon Valdez moved for the dismissal of the

case due to insufficiency of evidence. Suarez asked Valdez to inhibit and later asked for a special

prosecutor to take his place as he alleged that Valdez does not have the courage to prosecute the case.

Valdez was then replaced by special prosecutor Jacinto Yamzon who also found that there is insufficient

evidence to prosecute the case. Eventually, the case was dismissed by Judge Servillano Platon on the

ground that there is insufficiency of evidence. Suarez appealed the dismissal of the case but his appeal

was denied on the ground that mandamus is the proper remedy. Hence, Suarez filed this Mandamus

case to compel Platon to reinstate the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be reinstated.

HELD: No. The fiscals are well within their rights not to push through with the case if they find the

evidence to be insufficient. The prosecuting officer is the representative not of an ordinary party to a

controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation

to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case,

but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law,

the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence shall suffer.

6) PCGG v. Sandiganbayan

1976: General Bank & Trust Company (Genbank) encountered financial difficulties. Central Bank

extendedloans to Genbank in the hope of rehabilitating it (P310M). Nonetheless, Genbank failed to

recover.

1977: Genbank was declared insolvent. A public bidding of Genbank’s assets was held with the Lucio

TanGroup winning the bid. Solicitor General Mendoza, representing the government, intervened with

theliquidation of Genbank.

1986: after EDSA I, Cory established the PCGG to recover the ill-gotten wealth of Marcos, his family

andcronies.

1987: PCGG filed a case against Lucio Tan and certain other people (basta marami sila). In relation to

thiscase, PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the respondents

bytaking advantage of their close relationship and influence with Marcos. Sandiganbayan heard the

case.

Estelito Mendoza (Solicitor General during the time of Marcos) represented the respondents.

1991: PCGG filed a motion to disqualify Mendoza, because of his participation in the liquidation of

Genbank. Genbank (now Allied Bank) is one of the properties that PCGG is seeking to be sequestered

fromthe Lucion Tan group. PCGG invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Sandiganbayan denied PCGG’s motion. According to the Sandiganbayan, Mendoza did not take an

adverseposition to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank. And Mendoza’s appearance as counsel was

beyondthe 1 year prohibitory period since he retired in 1986.

Issue:

W/N Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility apllies to Estelito Mendoza

Held:

No, it does not apply to Mendoza. Sandiganbayan decision is affirmed.

The matter (see 3rdnote), or the act of Mendoza as Solicitor General is advising the Central Bank on how

toproceed with the liquidation of Genbank. This is not the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the

Code of Professional Responsibility.

The matter involved in the liquidation of Genbank is entirely different from the matter involved in

thePCGG case against the Lucio Tan group.

The intervention contemplated in Rule 6.03 should be substantial and important. The role of Mendoza

inthe liquidation of Genbank is considered insubstantial.

SC is even questioning why PCGG took such a long time to revive the motion to disqualify

Mendoza.Apparently, PCGG already lost a lot of cases against Mendoza. Kyle’s interpretation: PCGG

getting desperate

Something to think about: SC is somehow of the opinion that Rule 6.03 will make it harder for

thegovernment to get good lawyers in the future to work for them because of the prohibition of

acceptingcases in the future that were related to one’s work as a government counsel.

Concurring Opinions:

Panganiban & Carpio: the congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03 should have a prescriptive period

Tinga: Rule 6.03 cannot apply retroactively to Mendoza (when he was Solicitor General, no Rule 6.03

yet)

Bottom line, they are all questioning the unfairness of the rule if applied without any prescriptive

periodand if applied retroactivelyNotes:

Adverse-interest conflicts – where the matter in which the former government lawyer represents a

clientin private practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed

with thegovernment and the interests of the current and former are adverse

Congruent-interest conflicts – the use of the word “conflict” is a misnomer, it does not involve conflicts

atall, as it prohibits lawyers from representing a private person even if the interests of the

formergovernment client and the new client are entirely parallel

Matter – any discrete, isolatable act as well as indentifiable transaction or conduct involving a

particularsituation and specific party

Intervention – interference that may affect the interests of others

Canon 10-13

1) Vda. De Victoria v. CA

467 SCRA 78

Every lawyer pledges to act with “candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

The Supreme Court granted petitioner Mario Victoria (Victoria) an extended period to file the petition,

conditioned, however, on the timeliness of the filing of the Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition

for Review on Certiorari. It is a basic rule of remedial law that a motion for extension of time must be

filed before the expiration of the period sought to be extended. Where a motion for extension of time is

filed beyond the period of appeal, the same is of no effect since there would no longer be any period to

extend, and the judgment or order to be appealed from the will have become final and executory.

In the case at bar, an examination of the records reveals that the reglementary period to appeal had in

fact expired almost 10 months prior to the filing of Victoria’s motion for extension of time on April 10,

2001. The Registry Return Receipt of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissing the CA

Certiorari Petition shows that the same was received by counsel for Victoria’s agent on June 5, 2000.

Hence, Victoria had only until June 20, 2000 within which to file an appeal or motion for new trial or

reconsideration.

In the same Decision, the Court noted that Victoria, with the aid of his counsel, Atty. Abdul Basar (Atty.

Basar), made misleading statements in his Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review on

Certiorari and in his subsequent Petition respecting the timeliness of his appeal and the status of the

Resolutions of the CA.

Consequently, the SC ordered Victoria and Atty. Basar, to show cause, within 10 days from receipt of the

Decision, why they should not be held in contempt of court and disciplinarily dealt with for violation of

Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

ISSUES: Whether or not Atty. Basar can be held liable in contempt of court and for misconduct

HELD:

As part of his or her oath, every lawyer pledges to act with ―candor, fairness and good faith to the

court.‖ Thus, a lawyer is honor bound to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and

nobility in the conduct of litigation and in his relations with his client, the opposing part and his counsel,

and the court before which he pleads his client’s cause.

Moreover, the Code of Professional Responsibility obligates lawyers to ―observe the rules of procedure

and not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. It is, therefore, lamentable that Atty. Basar, by

misrepresenting the timeliness of an appeal from a final and executor Resolution of the Court of

Appeals, chose to disregard the fundamental tenets of the legal profession. In fact, from his explanation,

he was well aware that the reglementary period for appeal from the Decision of the RTC had already

lapsed, but he nevertheless persisted in filing a petition for review on certiorari.

2) Allied Banking v. CA

3) Samar Mining Co. v. Arnado

24 SCRA 402 – Legal Ethics – Duty to Assist in the Administration of Justice

In 1958, Rufino Abuyen won a labor case against Samar Mining Company. Abuyen was awarded

compensation plus hospitalization expenses for a disease he incurred while working for Samar

Mining. The decision was rendered by Pompeyo Tan, a labor lawyer duly appointed by Francisco

Arnado, a regional administrator of the Department of Labor. In 1961, Samar Mining’s lawyer, Atty.

Benedicto Arcinas, filed an action for certiorari before CFI Cebu contending that Tan has no

authority or jurisdiction over said case because he was a “mere labor lawyer” who had no authority

to render the award being complained of. CFI Cebu dismissed the petition of Arcinas.

Meanwhile, in the same year, the Supreme Court made a ruling in the case of Caltex v. Villanueva (L-

15658, August 21, 1961) that duly appointed hearing officers by regional administrators of the labor

department may issue awards. Notwithstanding this ruling, Arcinas still filed an appeal before the

Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal has merit.

HELD: No. It is obvious that the purpose of the filing is just to delay and prolong the litigation in the

hope of “draining the resources of the poorer party” “and of compelling it to submit out of sheer

exhaustion.” The conduct of Atty. Arcinas is hardly compatible with the duty of the Bar to assist in

the Administration of Justice, not to obstruct or defeat the same. The Supreme Court ordered

Samar Mining and Atty. Arcinas to shoulder the litigation costs of this case jointly and severally.

4) Biascan v. Lopez

5) Torres v. Javier

6) Tiongco v. Aguilar

7) Estrada v. Sandiganbayan

EN BANC [G.R. No. 159486-88. November 25, 2003]PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA,

petitioner, vs.

THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN[SPECIAL DIVISION], HON. MINITA CHICO-NAZARIO, HON.

EDILBERTO SANDOVAL, HON.TERESITA LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES,

respondents.

Facts:

-Attorney Alan F. Paguia, as counsel for Estrada, averred that the respondent justices have violated

Rule5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct by attending the ‘EDSA 2 Rally’ and by authorizing the

assumption of Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to the Presidency in violation of the 1987

Constitution.

“Rule 5.10. A judge is entitled to entertain personal views on political questions. But to avoid

suspicion of political partisanship, a judge shall not make political speeches, contribute to party

funds, publicly endorse candidates for political office or participate in other partisan

politicalactivities.”

-Also, petitioner contended that the justices have prejudged a case that would assail the legality of

the acttaken by President Arroyo. The subsequent decision of the Court in

Estrada v. Arroyo

(353 SCRA 452and356 SCRA 108) is, petitioner states, a patent mockery of justice and due process.-

According to Atty. Paguia, during the hearing of his ‘Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon’ on 11 June

2003, thethree justices of the Special Division of the Sandiganbayan made manifest their bias and

partiality agains this client.-Thus, he averred, Presiding Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario supposedly

employed foul and disrespectfullanguage when she blurted out,‘Magmumukha naman kaming

gago,’ and Justice TeresitaLeonardo-De Castro characterized the motion as insignificant even before

the prosecution could file itscomments or opposition thereto, (Rollo, p. 12.) remarking in open court

that to grant Estrada’s motionwould result in chaos and disorder.

Prompted by the alleged ‘bias and partial attitude’ of theSandiganbayan justices, Attorney Paguia

filed, on 14 July 2003, a motion for their disqualification.-The petitioner also asked the Court to

include in its Joint Resolution the TRUTH of the acts of Chief JusticeDavide, et al., last January 20,

2001 in:‘a) going to EDSA 2;‘b) authorizing the proclamation of Vice-President Arroyo as President

on the ground of ‘permanent disability’ even without proof of compliance with the

correspondingconstitutional conditions, e.g., written declaration by either the President or

majorityof his cabinet; and‘c) actually proclaiming Vice-President Arroyo on that same ground of

permanentdisability.-In a letter, dated 30 June 2003, addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,

and Associate JusticeArtemio V. Panganiban, he has demanded, in a clearly disguised form of forum

shopping, for severaladvisory opinions on matters pending before the Sandiganbayan.-

Subsequently, the court ruled that the instant petition assailing the foregoing orders must be

DISMISSEDfor gross insufficiency in substance and for utter lack of merit. The Sandiganbayan

committed no graveabuse of discretion, an indispensable requirement to warrant a recourse to the

extraordinary relief of petition forc ertiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

-In a resolution, dated 08 July 2003, the Court strongly warned Attorney Alan Paguia, on pain of

disciplinarysanction, to desist from further making, directly or indirectly, similar submissions to this

Court or to itsMembers.-Unmindful of the well-meant admonition to him by the Court, Attorney

Paguia appears to persist on end.In fact, on the 7th September 2003 issue of the Daily Tribune, Atty.

Paguia wrote to say -

“What is the legal effect of that violation of President Estrada’s right to due process of law? It

rendersthe decision in Estrada vs. Arroyo unconstitutional and void. The rudiments of fair play were

not observed. There was no fair play since it appears that when President Estrada filed his petition,

Chief Justice Davide and his fellow justices had already committed to the other party - GMA - with a

judgment already made and waiting to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone

thecharade of a formal hearing. After the justices had authorized the proclamation of GMA as

president,can they be expected to voluntarily admit the unconstitutionality of their own act?”

Issue:

WON Atty. Paguia committed a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held:

-Criticism or comment made in good faith on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or

unsoundness, of a decision of the Court would be welcome for, if well-founded, such reaction can

enlighten the court andcontribute to the correction of an error if committed. (In Re Sotto, 82 Phil

595.) However, Attorney Paguiahas not limited his discussions to the merits of his client’s case

within the judicial forum. Indeed, he hasrepeated his assault on the Court in both broadcast and

print media.

“Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a member of the bar from making

such public statements on any pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.

By his acts, Attorney Paguia may have stoked the fires of public dissension and posed a potentially

dangerous threat to the administration of justice.”

-It should be clear that the phrase “partisan political activities,” in its statutory context, relates to

actsdesigned to cause the success or the defeat of a particular candidate or candidates who have

filedcertificates of candidacy to a public office in an election. The taking of an oath of office by any

incomingPresident of the Republic before the Chief Justice of the Philippines is a traditional official

function of theHighest Magistrate. The assailed presence of other justices of the Court at such an

event could be nodifferent from their appearance in such other official functions as attending the

Annual State of the NationAddress by the President of the Philippines before the Legislative

Department.-The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; but it will not countenance any

wrongdoing nor allow theerosion of our people’s faith in the judicial system, let alone, by those who

have been privileged by it topractice law in the Philippines.-Canon 11 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility mandates that the lawyer should observe andmaintain the respect due to the courts

and judicial officers and, indeed, should insist on similar conduct byothers. In liberally imputing

sinister and devious motives and questioning the impartiality, integrity, andauthority of the

members of the Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded in seeking to impede, obstruct andpervert

the dispensation of justice.-The Court has already warned Atty. Paguia, on pain of disciplinary

sanction, to become mindful of hisgrave responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court.

Apparently, he has chosen not to at alltake heed.-WHEREFORE, Attorney Alan Paguia is hereby

indefinitely suspended from the practice of law, effectiveupon his receipt hereof, for conduct

unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the Court

8) Earth Minerals Exploration v. Macaraig

9) Phil Pharmahealth v. Pfizer

Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc. & Pfizer (Phil.), Inc. G.R. No. 167715, 17 November 2010

by: Alpheus D. Macalalad

Facts: Pfizer is the registered owner of a patent pertaining to Sulbactam Ampicillin. It is

marketed under the brand name “Unasyn.” Sometime in January and February 2003, Pfizer

discovered that Pharmawealth submitted bids for the supply of Sulbactam Ampicillin to several

hospitals without the Pfizer’s consent. Pfizer then demanded that the hospitals cease and desist

from accepting such bids. Pfizer also demanded that Pharmawealth immediately withdraw its

bids to supply Sulbactam Ampicillin. Pharmawealth and the hospitals ignored the demands.

Pfizer then filed a complaint for patent infringement with a prayer for permanent injunction and

forfeiture of the infringing products. A preliminary injunction effective for 90 days was granted

by the IPO’s Bureau of Legal Affairs (IPO-BLA). Upon expiration, a motion for extension filed by

Pfizer was denied. Pfizer filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA)

assailing the denial.

While the case was pending in the CA, Pfizer filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati (RTC) a

complaint for infringement and unfair competition, with a prayer for injunction. The RTC issued

a temporary restraining order, and then a preliminary injunction.

Pharmawealth filed a motion to dismiss the case in the CA, on the ground of forum shopping.

Nevertheless, the CA issued a temporary restraining order. Pharmawealth again filed a motion

to dismiss, alleging that the patent, the main basis of the case, had already lapsed, thus making

the case moot, and that the CA had no jurisdiction to review the order of the IPO-BLA because

this was granted to the Director General. The CA denied all the motions. Pharmawealth filed a

petition for review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issues:

a) Can an injunctive relief be issued based on an action of patent infringement when the patent

allegedly infringed has already lapsed?

b) What tribunal has jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Director of Legal Affairs of the

Intellectual Property Office?

c) Is there forum shopping when a party files two actions with two seemingly different causes of

action and yet pray for the same relief?

Held:

a) No. The provision of R.A. 165, from which the Pfizer’s patent was based, clearly states that

"[the] patentee shall have the exclusive right to make, use and sell the patented machine, article

or product, and to use the patented process for the purpose of industry or commerce,

throughout the territory of the Philippines for the term of the patent; and such making, using, or

selling by any person without the authorization of the patentee constitutes infringement of the

patent."

Clearly, the patentee’s exclusive rights exist only during the term of the patent. Since the patent

was registered on 16 July 1987, it expired, in accordance with the provisions of R.A. 165, after 17

years, or 16 July 2004. Thus, after 16 July 2004, Pfizer no longer possessed the exclusive right to

make, use, and sell the products covered by their patent. The CA was wrong in issuing a

temporary restraining order after the cut-off date.

b) According to IP Code, the Director General of the IPO exercises exclusive jurisdiction over

decisions of the IPO-BLA. The question in the CA concerns an interlocutory order, and not a

decision. Since the IP Code and the Rules and Regulations are bereft of any remedy regarding

interlocutory orders of the IPO-BLA, the only remedy available to Pfizer is to apply the Rules and

Regulations suppletorily. Under the Rules, a petition for certiorari to the CA is the proper

remedy. This is consistent with the Rules of Court. Thus, the CA had jurisdiction.

c) Yes. Forum shopping is defined as the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has

been rendered in one forum, of seeking another (and possibly favorable) opinion in another

forum (other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari), or the institution of two (2)

or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the

other court would make a favorable disposition.

The elements of forum shopping are: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties that

represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed

for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; (c) identity of the two preceding particulars,

such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful,

amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. This instance meets these elements.

The parties are clearly identical. In both the complaints in the BLA-IPO and RTC, the rights

allegedly violated and the acts allegedly violative of such rights are identical, regardless of

whether the patents on which the complaints were based are different. In both cases, the

ultimate objective of Pfizer was to ask for damages and to permanently prevent Pharmawealth

from selling the contested products. Relevantly, the Supreme Court has decided that the filing of

two actions with the same objective, as in this instance, constitutes forum shopping.

Owing to the substantial identity of parties, reliefs and issues in the IPO and RTC cases, a

decision in one case will necessarily amount to res judicata in the other action.

10) Bildner v. Ilusorio

ERLINDA I. BILDNER and MAXIMO K. ILUSORIO, Petitioners, vs. ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, RAMON K.

ILUSORIO, MARIETTA K. ILUSORIO, SHEREEN K. ILUSORIO, CECILIA A. BISUÑA, and ATTY. MANUEL R.

SINGSON, Respondents.

G.R. No. 157384

June 5, 2009

FACTS:

A complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action against respondent was filed by petitioners for

alleged gross misconduct, among other offenses. Said disbarment case arises from a case presided

by Judge Antonio Reyes where respondent attempted to influence the outcome of the case as can

be inferred from his acts evidenced by the following documents, to wit: (1) the transcript of the

stenographic notes of the May 31, 2000 hearing in the sala of Judge Reyes when the judge made it

of record that respondent offered Atty.Oscar Sevilla P500,000 to be given to Judge Reyes for a

favorable decision; (2) the affidavit of Judge Reyes alleged that respondent, as soon as the case

started, visited him about three times in his office, and made more than a dozen calls to his Manila

and Baguio residences, some of which were even made late evenings; and (3) the affidavit of Atty.

Sevilla confirmed that he was approached by the respondent to convince the judge, his close family

friend, to rule in Atty. Singson’s favor.

ISSUE: WON respondent should be administratively disciplined or disbarred from the practice of law

for the alleged misconduct in attempting to bribe Judge Antonio Reyes.

RULING:

The highly immoral implication of a lawyer approaching a judge––or a judge evincing a willingness––

to discuss, in private, a matter related to a case pending in that judge’s sala cannot be over-

emphasized. The fact that Atty. Singson did talk on different occasions to Judge Reyes, initially

through a mutual friend, Atty. Sevilla, leads us to conclude that Atty. Singson was indeed trying to

influence the judge to rule in his client’s favor. This conduct is not acceptable in the legal profession.

Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins it:

Canon 13. A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which

tends to influence or gives the appearance of influencing the court.

While the alleged attempted bribery may perhaps not be supported by evidence other than Judge

Reyes’ statements, there is nevertheless enough proof to hold Atty. Singson liable for unethical

behavior of attempting to influence a judge, itself a transgression of considerable gravity.