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RBCI v FLORIDOA.C. No. 5736, June 18, 2010CARPIO, J.:FACTS:Rural Bank of Calape, Inc. filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent. RBCI allegedthat respondent violated his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.According to RBCI, respondent and his clients, Nazareno-Relampagos group, through force andintimidation, forcibly took over the management and the premises of RBCI. They also forcibly evictedCirilo A. Garay, the bank manager, destroyed the bank’s vault, and installed their own staff to run the bank.Respondent added that the criminal complaint for malicious mischief filed against him by RBCI wasalready dismissed; while the complaint for grave coercion was ordered suspended because of theexistence of a prejudicial question. Respondent said that the disbarment complaint was filed against himin retaliation for the administrative cases he filed against RBCI’s counsel and the trial court judges of Bohol.Moreover, respondent claimed that RBCI failed to present any evidence to prove their allegations.Respondent added that the affidavits attached to the complaint were never identified, affirmed, or confirmed by the affiants and that none of the documentary exhibits were originals or certified truecopies.ISSUE:Whether or not respondent violated his oath and the CPR Canon 19.HELD:The Court held that respondent was guilty as charged and suspended for a year. The first andforemost duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, uphold theConstitution and obey the laws of the land. It is the lawyer’s duty to promote respect for the law and legal processes and to abstain from activities aimed at defiance of the law or lessening confidence in the legalsystem.Canon 19 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of thelaw. It is his duty to counsel his clients to use peaceful and lawful methods in seeking justice and refrainfrom doing an intentional wrong to their adversaries.A lawyer’s duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice. To that end, his client’s success iswholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law andethics.Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his client’s cause, is condemnable and unethical.

Facts:•Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio appeared as legal counselfor Grace C. Hufana in an illegal dismissal casebefore the National Labor Relations Commission(NLRC) against complainant Fernando Martin Pena.Hufana is praying for claim for separation pay, butPena rejected the claim as baseless.•Thereafter, Aparicio sent Pena a letter reiteratinghis client's claim for separation pay. Through hisletter, he threatened complainant that should Penafail to pay the amounts they propose as settlement,he would file and claim bigger amounts includingmoral damages, as well as multiple charges such astax evasion, falsification of documents, andcancellation of business license to operate due toviolations of laws.Issue:•WON Aparicio violated Canon 19 (and 19.01) of theCPR, enjoining every lawyer to represent his client withzeal within the bounds of the law? YES

NB:Rule 19.01. A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain animproper advantage in any case or proceeding." •WON it is proper to disbar Aparicio?NO,reprimand onlyHeld:•Under Canon 19, a lawyer should not file or threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminalcase or cases against the adversaries of his clientdesigned to secure leverage to compel theadversaries to yield or withdraw their own casesagainst the lawyer's client.•In the case at bar, the threats are not onlyunethical for violating Canon 19, but they alsoamount toblackmail.Blackmail is "the extortion of money from a person by threats of accusation or exposure or opposition in the public prints,…obtaining of value from a person as a condition of refraining from making an accusation against him, or disclosing some secret calculated to operate to his prejudice." The letter in this case contains more than just a simple demand to pay. It even contains athreat to file retaliatory charges against complainantwhich have nothing to do with his client's claim for separation pay. Indeed, letters of this nature are definitely proscribed by the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility.•It was not respondent's intention to pointout complainant's violations of the law as he sogallantly claims. Far from it, the letter even containsan implied promise to"keep silent"about the saidviolations if payment of the claim is made on thedate indicated.•DECISION:While the writing of the letter went beyond ethical standards, we hold thatdisbarment is too severe a penalty to be imposed onrespondent, considering that he wrote the same outof his overzealousness to protect his client'sinterests. Accordingly, the more appropriate penaltyisreprimand.•On the sui generis character of disbarmentproceedings, the Court ratiocinated inIn re Almacen:Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers aresui generis.Neither purely civil nor purely criminal,they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but israther aninvestigation by the Court into theconduct of one of its officers. Not being intended toinflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminalprosecution. Accordingly,there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by theCourtmotu proprio.

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Public interest is its primaryobjective, and the real question for determinationis whether or not the attorney is still a fit personto be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in theexercise of its disciplinary powers,the Court merelycalls upon a member of the Bar to account for hisactuations as an officer of the Court with the endin view of preserving the purity of the legalprofession and the proper and honestadministration of justice by purging theprofession of members who by their misconducthave proved themselves no longer worthy to beentrusted with the duties and responsibilitiespertaining to the office of an attorney. In suchposture, there can thus be no occasion to speakof a complainant or a prosecutor .RODOLFO MILLARE, petitioner, vs.ATTY. EUSTAQUIO Z. MONTERO, respondent.

Complainant obtained a favorable judgment from the MTC which ordered respondent’s client to vacate the premises subject of the ejectment case. respondent as counsel, appealed the decision. CA dismissed Co's appeal from the decision of the RTC for failure to comply with the proper procedures. Respondent thereafter resorted to devious and underhanded means to delay the execution of the judgment rendered by the MTC adverse to his client.

Held: SUSPENDED for (1) year. Rule 12.02. — A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause. Rule 12.04. — A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes.

Under Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to represent his client "within the bounds of the law." The Code enjoins a lawyer to employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client (Rule 19.01) and warns him not to allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the case (Rule 19.03). In short, a lawyer is not a gun for hire.

It is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or wrongfully use the judicial process, like the filing of dilatory motions, repetitious litigation and frivolous appeals for the sole purpose of frustrating and delaying the execution of a judgment.

A judgment can be annulled only on two grounds: (a) that the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law, or (b) that it has been obtained by fraud.

Judging from the number of actions filed by respondent to forestall the execution of the same judgment, respondent is also guilty of forum shopping. Forum shopping exists when, by reason of an adverse decision in one forum, defendant ventures to another for a more favorable resolution of his case.

Corpuz vs CAAtty David and Corpuz were good friends. In Corpuz’s civil case, David became his counsel. Prior to rendering of final judgment, Corpuz gave the lawyer a check which the latter returned. After favorable decision was rendered, Atty. David demanded attorney’s fee which Corpuz refused to deliver alleging that David’s services were offered gratuitously. The Court decided that Atty. David should be paid attorney’s fees.

H: An attorney-client relationship can be created by implied agreement, as when the attorney actually rendered legal services for a person who is a close friend. The obligation of such a person to pay attorney’s fees is

based on the law of contracts’ concept of facio ut des (no one shall unjustly enrich himself at the expense of others.) Absence of an express contract for attorney’s fees between respondent David and petitioner Corpus is no argument against the payment of attorney’s fees, considering their close relationship which signifies mutual trust and confidence between them.

Albano v. Coloma (1967)F: Coloma was Albano’s counsel during the Japanese occupation. According to Albano, Coloma failed to expedite hearing and termination of case. Coloma denied that she did nothing to expedite the hearing and termination of such civil case as the records would show otherwise. After Albanos won in the case, Coloma intervened to collect attorney’s fee which is computed at 33.3% of what theAlbanos can recover. The Court held that Coloma may recover attorney’s fees.

H: Counsel, any counsel, if worthy of his hire, is entitled to be fully recompensed for his services. With his capital consisting solely of his brains and his skill, acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in the expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of a client to escape payment of his fees. It is indeed ironic if after putting forth the best that is in him to secure justice for the party he represents, he himself would not get his due. Such an eventuality this Court is determined to avoid.

Case of Traders Royal Bank Employees Union- Independent vs NLRC and Emmanuel Noel A. CruzG.R.No. 120592 14March1997

FACTS OF THE CASE:That TRB Employees Union, had a retainer agreement with Atty. Cruz, for 3,000.00 in consideration of the law firm’s undertaking to render the services enumerated in their contract. During the existence of the agreement the union referred to the private respondent the claims of its members for holiday, mid-year and year-end bonuses against their employer TRB.The NLRC granted the petition of the union with regard to the demand for bonuses. After, the S.C. acting upon the challenge of TRBank of the NLRC decision in its decision on August 30, 1990 modified the decision of the NLRC by deleting the award of mid- year and year- end bonus differentials while affirming the award of holiday pay differential.

After TRB voluntarily complied with the decision, the respondent on September 18, 1990 notified the union, TRB management, and the NLRC of his right to exercise and enforce his attorney’s lien over the award of holiday pay differential through a letter dated October 8, 1990.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Was the lien made by the respondent attorney over the award as attorney’s fees valid?

- Yes, Because the contract between the Union and the attorney stipulates that the 3,000.00 paid as retainer fees is intended merely as a consideration for the law firm’s commitment to render the services enumerated on PART A and B of the retainer agreement.- The retainer fee paid by the Union is not a payment for the firm’s execution or performance of the services listed in the contract, subject to the particular qualifications.- Obligations do not emanate only from contracts. One of the sources of extra- contractual obligations found in our civil code is the quasi contract premised on the roman maxim that nemo alterius detrimento locupletari potest

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- As early as 1903 the court has allowed the payment of reasonable professional fees to an interpreter, not withstanding the lack of understanding with his client as to his remuneration, on the basis a quasi-contract. It is not necessary that the parties agree on a definite fee for the special services rendered by the firm in order that the union may be obligated to pay compensation. Equity and fair play dictate that petitioner should pay the same after it accepted, availed itself of, and benefited from the firm’s services.- The measure of compensation for private respondent’s services as against his client should be properly addressed by the rule of quantum meruit is used as the basis for determining the lawyer’s professional fees in the absence of a contract.HELD:The resolution of the NLRC with regard to the attorney’s fees is modified, and Union is hereby ordered to pay 10,000 for the firm’s rendered services.

Obligations and Contracts Terms:

• General Retaining Fee- is the fee paid to a lawyer to secure his future services as general counsel for any ordinary legal problem that may arise from routinary business of the client and referred to him for legal action. The reason for the remuneration is that the lawyer is deprived of the opportunity of rendering services for a fee to the opposing party or other parties. It is a compensation for lost opportunities.

Distinguish from Rule 34 – Nocom v. Camerino GR 182984 Feb 10, 2009 F: Camarino were agricultural tenants w/ right to redeem. Allegedly executed an irrevocable Power of Atty to sell parcels of land. Subsequently annotated to the TCT,. Camarino wanted to annul such, consent was vitiated because did not know it was an irrevocable power of attorney. Nocom alleged that it cannot be cancelled unilaterally, alleged that he paid for it....Camarinos filed motion for summary judgment stating that sicne Nocom admitted to the existence of the irrevocable power of attorney...summary judgment proper because only resolve WON it was coupled w/ interest and WON it is irrevocable. Allege that there is not issue as to the contents of the irrevocable power of attyH: facts not subject motion for summary jdugment2 requisites:No genuine issue as to material factsParty moving for summary judgment entitled to judgment by lawGENATO v. SILAPANPUNO, July 14, 2003NATUREComplaint for disbarmentFACTS (Complainant’s side)-July 1992, respondent allegedly askedthe complainant if he could rent asmall office space in complainant’sbuilding in Quezon City for his lawpractice. Complainant acceded andintroduced respondent to Atty.Benjamin Dacanay, complainant’sretained lawyer, who accommodatedrespondent in the building and madehim handle some of complainant’scases.-Respondent borrowed two hundredthousand pesos (P200,000.00) fromcomplainant which he intended to useas down payment for the purchase of a new car. In return, respondentissued to complainant a postdatedcheck in the amount of P176,528.00to answer for the six (6) monthsinterest on the loan. He likewisemortgaged to complainant his houseand lot in Quezon City but did notsurrender its title claiming that it wasthe subject of reconstitutionproceedings before the Quezon CityRegister of Deeds.-The respondent bought the car butthe document of sale was issued inthe complainant’s name and financedthrough City Trust Company.-January 1993: respondent introducedto complainant a certain EmmanuelRomero who wanted to borrow moneyfrom complainant. Complainant lentRomero the money and, from thistransaction, respondent earnedcommission in the amount of P52,289.90. Complainant used thecommission to pay respondent’sarrears with the car financing firm.-Subsequently, respondent failed topay the amortization on the car andthe financing

firm sent demand lettersto complainant. Complainant tried toencash respondent’s postdated checkwith the drawee bank but it wasdishonored as respondent’s accounttherein was already closed.Respondent failed to heedcomplainant’s repeated demands forpayment. Complainant then filed acriminal case against respondent forviolation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22and a civil case for judicial foreclosureof real estate mortgage.-In the foreclosure case, therespondent alleged that thecomplainant is engaged in buy andsell of deficiency taxed imported cars,shark loans and shady deals, and hasmany cases pending in court, whichthe complainant denied, adding thatthe allegations were libelous and wereirrelevant to the foreclosure case. Aparticular allegation states that in onecase, the complainant would only givethe respondent the document of saleof the car if the latter would bribe thereview committee of the DOJ for acase of the complainant. According tothe complainant, the allegation was,aside from being false, immaterial tothe foreclosure case and maliciouslydesigned to defame him, therespondent was also guilty of breakingtheir confidential lawyer-clientrelationship and should be heldadministratively liable.- the complainant then filed thiscomplaint for disbarment, praying alsothat an administrative sanction bemeted against respondent for hisissuance of a bouncing check (respondent’s side)-It was complainant who offered himan office space in his building andretained him as counsel as the latterwas impressed with the way hehandled a B.P. 22 case filed againstcomplainant.-There was nothing libelous in hisimputations of dishonest businesspractices to complainant and hisrevelation of complainant’s desire tobribe government officials in relationto his pending criminal case. Heclaimed to have made thesestatements in the course of judicialproceedings to defend his case anddiscredit complainant’s credibility byestablishing his criminal propensity tocommit fraud, tell lies and violatelaws. He argued that he is not guiltyof breaking his confidential lawyer-client relationship with complainant ashe made the disclosure in defense of his honor and reputation.-Respondent asserted that heexecuted the real estate mortgage infavor of complainant withoutconsideration and only as a “formalrequirement” so he could obtain theP200,000.00 loan and for this reason,he did not surrender his title over themortgaged property to complainant.-Respondent claimed that he issuedthe postdated check, not for accountor for value, but only: (a) to serve as“some kind of acknowledgment” thathe already received in advance aportion of his attorney’s fees from thecomplainant for the legal services herendered, and (b) as a form of assurance that he will not abandonthe cases he was handling forcomplainant.-Respondent denied that he receiveda P52,289.90 commission fromRomero’s loan which he allegedlyhelped facilitate, alleging that theamount paid to him was for attorney’sfees. He used this amount to pay hisarrears with the car financing firm.On January 29, 1993, before payingthe next amortization on the car, heasked complainant to execute a deedof sale transferring ownership of thecar to him. Complainant refused andinsisted that he would transferownership of the car only after thetermination of his criminal case whichrespondent was handling as hisdefense lawyer. Consequently,respondent stopped paying theamortization on the car. Respondentalso alleged that he filed a perjurycase against complainant who, in turn,filed a complaint for libel against him.-October 27, 1993: the Court referredthe administrative case to theIntegrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)for investigation, report andrecommendation.-August 3, 2002, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved thereport of the investigatingcommissioner finding the respondentguilty as charged and recommendinghis suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.ISSUES1. WON the court has the jurisdictionto sanction respondent for hisissuance of the bouncing check.2. WON the respondent committed abreach of trust and confidence byimputing to complainant illegalpractices and disclosing

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complainant’salleged intention to bribe governmentofficials in connection with a pendingcase, and thus would be sanctioned.HELD1. NO, it is not for the Court tosanction respondent for hisissuance of a bouncing check,which would be determined bythe trial court.RatioWe shall not delve into themerits of the various criminal and civilcases pending between the parties. Itis for the trial courts handling thesecases to ascertain the truth or falsityof the allegations made therein.2. YES, respondent’s allegations anddisclosures in the foreclosure caseamount to a breach of fidelitysufficient to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him.RatioA lawyer must conduct himself,especially in his dealings with hisclients, with integrity in a manner thatis beyond reproach. His relationshipwith his clients should becharacterized by the highest degree of good faith and fairness.ReasoningCanon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility providesthat a lawyer owes fidelity to thecause of his client and shall bemindful of the trust and confidencereposed on him. The long-establishedrule is that an attorney is notpermitted to disclose communicationsmade to him in his professionalcharacter by a client, unless the latterconsents.-The obligation to preserve theconfidences and secrets of a clientarises at the inception of theirrelationship. The protection given tothe client is perpetual and does notcease with the termination of thelitigation, nor is it affected by theparty’s ceasing to employ theattorney and retaining another, or byany other change of relation betweenthem. It even survives the death of the client.-However, the privilege against disclosure of confidential communications or information islimited only to communications whichare legitimately and properly withinthe scope of a lawful employment of alawyer.It does not extend to thosemade in contemplation of a crime orperpetration of a fraud. If the unlawfulpurpose is avowed, as in this case, thecomplainant’s alleged intention tobribe government officials in relationto his case, the communication is notcovered by the privilege as the clientdoes not consult the lawyerprofessionally. It is not within theprofession of a lawyer to advise aclient as to how he may commit acrime as a lawyer is not a gun forhire. Thus, the attorney-clientprivilege does not attach, there beingno professional employment in thestrict sense.-The disclosures were notindispensable to protect his rights asthey were not pertinent to theforeclosure case. It was improper forthe respondent to use it against thecomplainant in the foreclosure case asit was not the subject matter of litigation therein and respondent’sprofessional competence and legaladvice were not being attacked in saidcase.DispositionIN VIEW WHEREOF,respondent Atty. Essex L. Silapan isordered suspended from the practiceof law for a period of six (6) monthseffective upon receipt of thisDecision. Let a copy of this Decisionbe furnished the Office of the BarConfidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The CourtAdministrator is directed to circulatethis order of suspension to all courtsin the country.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-961 September 21, 1949BLANDINA GAMBOA HILADO, petitioner, vs.JOSE GUTIERREZ DAVID, VICENTE J. FRANCISCO, JACOB ASSAD and SELIM JACOB ASSAD, respondents.

Petitioner alleged that she and the counsel for the defendant had an attorney-client relationship with her when, before the trial of the case, she went to defendant’s counsel, gave him the papers of the case and other information relevant thereto, although she was not able to pay him legal fees. “That respondent’s law firm mailed to the plaintiff a written opinion over his signature on the merits of her case; that this

opinion was reached on the basis of papers she had submitted at his office; that Mrs. Hilado's purpose in submitting those papers was to secure Attorney Francisco's professional services.” Atty. Francisco appeared as counsel for defendant and plaintiff did not object to it until (4) months after. Then, plaintiff moved to dismiss the case between her and defendant.

Issue: Was there an attorney-client relationship between plaintiff and Atty. Francisco?

Held: YES. In order to constitute the relation a professional one and not merely one of principal and agent, the attorneys must be employed either to give advice upon a legal point, to prosecute or defend an action in court of justice, or to prepare and draft, in legal form such papers as deeds, bills, contracts and the like.

To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as established.

“An attorney is employed-that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or counselor-when he is listening to his client's preliminary statement of his case, or when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his client's pleadings, or advocating his client's cause in open court. An acceptance of the relation is implied on the part of the attorney from his acting in behalf of his client in pursuance of a request by the latter.”

That only copies of pleadings already filed in court were furnished to Attorney Agrava and that, this being so, no secret communication was transmitted to him by the plaintiff, would not vary the situation even if we should discard Mrs. Hilado's statement that other papers, personal and private in character, were turned in by her. Precedents are at hand to support the doctrine that the mere relation of attorney and client ought to preclude the attorney from accepting the opposite party's retainer in the same litigation regardless of what information was received by him from his first client.

An attorney, on terminating his employment, cannot thereafter act as counsel against his client in the same general matter, even though, while acting for his former client, he acquired no knowledge which could operate to his client's disadvantage in the subsequent adverse employment"A retaining fee is a preliminary fee given to an attorney or counsel to insure and secure his future services, and induce him to act for the client. It is intended to remunerate counsel for being deprived, by being retained by one party, of the opportunity of rendering services to the other and of receiving pay from him, and the payment of such fee, in the absence of an express understanding to the contrary, is neither made nor received in payment of the services contemplated; its payment has no relation to the obligation of the client to pay his attorney for the services which he has retained him to perform."

Felicisimo Montano vs IBPPONENTE: KapunanFACTS: Atty. Dealca, counsel for Felicisimo Montano withdrew his services for his client upon

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the latter's failure to comply with their retainer agreement.HELD: We find Atty Dealca’s conduct unbecoming of a member of the legal profession. UnderCanon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall withdraw his services onlyfor good cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances. Although he may withdraw hisservices when client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services, under the circumstancesof the present case, Atty. Dealca’s withdrawal was unjustified as complainant did not deliberatelyfail to pay him the atty’s fees. Rule 20.4 of Canon 290, mandates that a lawyer shall avoidcontroversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial action only toprevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Sadly, for not so large a sum owed to him by complainant (P 3,500.00), respondent lawyer failed to act in accordance with the demands of the Code. But,only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyeras an officer of the court and member of the bar will mdisbarment be imposed a s penalty.

FELICISIMO M. MONTANO, complainant, vs. INTEGRATED BAR of the PHILIPPINES AND Atty. JUAN S. DEALCA, respondents.R E S O L U T I O NKAPUNAN, J.:In a verified complaint filed before this Court on March 9, 1994, complainant Felicisimo M. Montano charged Atty. Juan Dealca with misconduct and prays that he be “sternly dealt wit administratively.” The complaint[1][1] is summarized as follows:1. On November 14, 1992, the complainant hired the services of Atty. Juan S. Dealca as his counsel in collaboration with Atty. Ronando L. Gerona in a case pending before the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 37467 wherein the complainant was the plaintiff-appellant.2. The parties agreed upon attorney’s fees in the amount of P15,000.00, fifty percent (50%) of which was payable upon acceptance of the case and the remaining balance upon the termination of the case. Accordingly, complainant paid respondent the amount of P7,500.00 representing 50% of the attorney’s fee.3. Thereafter, even before the respondent counsel had prepared the appellant’s brief and contrary to their agreement that the remaining balance be payable after the termination of the case, Atty. Dealca demanded an additional payment from complainant. Complainant obliged by paying the amount of P4,000.00.4. Prior to the filing of the appellant’s brief, respondent counsel again demand payment of the remaining balance of 3,500.00. When complainant was unable to do so, respondent lawyer withdrew his appearance as complainant’s counsel without his prior knowledge and/or conformity. Returning the case folder to the complainant, respondent counsel attached a Note dated February 28, 1993,[1][2] stating:28 February 1994Pepe and Del Montano,For breaking your promise, since you do not want to fulfill your end of the bargain, here’s your reward:Henceforth, you lawyer for yourselves. Here are your papers.JohnnyComplainant claimed that such conduct by respondent counsel exceeded the ethical standards of the law profession and prays that the latter be sternly dealt with administratively. Complainant later on filed motions praying for the imposition of the maximum penalty of disbarment.After respondent counsel filed his comment on the complaint, the Court in the Resolution of August 1, 1994, referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.The Investigating Commissioner found respondent counsel guilty of unprofessional conduct and recommended that he be “severely reprimanded.” However, in a Resolution[1][3] by the IBP Board of Governors on July 26, 1997, it was resolved that the penalty

recommended by the Investigating Commissioner meted to respondent by amended to “three (3) months suspension from the practice of law for having been found guilty of misconduct, which eroded the public confidence regarding his duty as a lawyer.”Respondent counsel sought reconsideration of the aforementioned resolution of the IBP, alleging that the latter misapprehended the facts and that, in any case, he did not deserve the penalty imposed. The true facts, according to him, are the following:1. Complainant is being represented by Atty. Ronando L. Gerona in his case on appeal;2. Due to the ailment of Atty. Gerona’s daughter, he could not prepare and submit complainant’s appellant’s brief on time;3. Complainant went to the respondent to do just that, i.e., prepare and submit his appellant’s brief on time at the agreed fee of P15,000.00, 50% down and 50% upon its completion;4. Working overtime, respondent was able to finish the appellant’s brief ahead of its deadline, so he advised the complainant about its completion with the request that the remaining balance of P7,500.00 be paid. Complainant paid P4,000.00 only, promising to pay the P3,500.00 “tomorrow” or on “later particular date.” Please take note that, at this juncture, there was already a breach of the agreement on complainant’s part.5. When that “tomorrow” or on a “later particular date” came, respondent, thru a messenger, requested the complainant to pay the P3,500.00 as promised but word was sent that he will again pay “tomorrow” or on “later date.” This promise-non-payment cycle went on repeatedly until the last day of the filing of the brief. Please take note again that it was not the respondent but the complainant who sets the date when he will pay, yet fails to pay as promised;6. Even without being paid completely, respondent, of his own free will and accord, filed complainant’s brief on time;7. After the brief was filed, respondent tried to collect from the complainant the remaining balance of P3,500.00, but the latter made himself scarce. As the records would show, such P3,500.00 remains unpaid until now;8. Sensing that something was amiss, respondent sent the February 28, 1993 note and case folder to the complainant, hoping that the latter would see personally the former about it to settle the matter between them;9. However, instead of seeing the respondent, complainant filed this case;10. Respondent was constrained to file his withdrawal with the Court of Appeals because of this case to avoid further misunderstanding since he was the one who signed the appellant’s brief although Atty. Gerona was his counsel of record. Such withdrawal was accordingly granted by the appellate court;xxx xxx xxx.[1][4]Respondent counsel further averred that complainant’s refusal to pay the agreed lawyer’s fees, measly as it was, was deliberate and in bad faith; hence, his withdrawal as counsel was “just, ethical and proper.” Respondent counsel concluded that not only was the penalty of suspension harsh for his act of merely trying to collect payment for his services rendered, but it indirectly would punish his family since he was the sole breadwinner with children in school and his wife terminally ill with cancer.In its Resolution No. XIII-97-129 dated October 25, 1997, the IBP denied Atty. Dealca’s motion for reconsideration, to wit:xxxRESOLVED TO DENY Atty. Dealca’s Motion For Reconsideration of the Board’s Decision in the above-entitled case there being no substantive reason to reverse the finding therein. Moreover, the motion is improperly laid the remedy of the respondent is to file the appropriate pleading with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of said Decision pursuant to Sec. 12 [c] of Rule 139-B.[1][5]

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On December 10, 1997, this Court noted the following pleadings filed in the present complaint,(a) notice and a copy of Resolution No. XII-97-154 dated July 26, 1997 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines amending the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of reprimand to three (3) months suspension of respondent from the practice of law for having been found guilty of misconduct which eroded the public confidence regarding his duty as a lawyer;(b) complainant’s motion for praying for the imposition of the maximum penalty of disbarment;(c) motion dated September 15, 1997 of respondent for reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution of July 26, 1997;(d) comment/opposition of respondent praying that the motion for the imposition of the maximum penalty be denied;(e) comment of complainant praying that the penalty of three (3) months suspension for the practice of law as recommended by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines pursuant to Resolution No. XII-97-154 be raised to a heavier penalty;(f) comment/manifestation/opposition of complainant praying that the respondent be disbarred; and(g) rejoinder of respondent praying that this case be dismissed for being baseless.[1][6]and referred the same to the IBP for evaluation and report.In compliance therewith, on March 28, 1998, the IBP issued Resolution No. XIII-98-42 referring the above-entitled case to Commissioner Vibar for evaluation, report and recommendation “in view of the Motion for Reconsideration granted by the Supreme Court.”The Investigating Commissioner, after referring the case, recommended that his original recommendation of the imposition of the penalty of reprimand be maintained, noting that respondent counsel had served the IBP well as President of the Sorsogon Chapter.[1][7] Accordingly, on February 23, 1999, the IBP Board of Governors, issued the following resolution:RESOLUTION NO. XIII-99-48xxxRESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex “A”; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the Motion for Reconsideration be granted and that the penalty of REPRIMAND earlier recommended by the Investigating Commissioner be imposed on Atty. Juan S. Dealca.[1][8]Complainant asked the IBP to reconsider the foregoing resolution but the motion was denied.[1][9]On April 10, 2000, complainant filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari in connection with Administrative Case No. 4215 against the IBP and respondent counsel averring that the IBP Board of Governors committed grave abuse of discretion when it overturned its earlier resolution and granted respondent counsel’s motion for reconsideration on February 23, 1999. He claimed that the earlier resolution denying the motion for reconsideration issued on October 25, 1997 had already become final and executory; hence, any further action or motion subsequent to such final and executory judgment shall be null and void.When the Court issued the resolution of December 10, 1997 treating the several pleadings filed in the present complaint, it should be noted that the IBP resolution denying respondent’s motion for reconsideration (Resolution No. XIII-97-129) dated October 25, 1997, for some reason, had not yet reached this Court. As of that date, the only IBP resolution attached to the records of the case was Resolution No. XII-97-54 amending the administrative sanction from reprimand to three months suspension. Hence, at the time the pleadings were referred back to the IBP in the same resolution, the Court was not aware that the IBP had already disposed of the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent

counsel.Thus, when the IBP was informed of the said Court resolution, it construed the same as granting Atty. Dealca’s motion for reconsideration and as an order for IBP to conduct a re-evaluation of the case. The IBP assumed that its resolution of October 25, 1997 was already considered by this Court when it referred the case back to the IBP. It failed to notice that its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration was not among those pleadings and resolution referred back to it.Hence, on the strength of this Court’s resolution which it had inadvertently misconstrued, the IBP conducted a re-evaluation of the case and came up with the assailed resolution now sought to be reversed. The Court holds that the error is not attributable to the IBP. It is regrettable that the procedural infirmity alleged by complainant actually arose from a mere oversight which was attributable to neither party.Going into the merits, we affirm the findings made by the IBP that complainant engaged the services of respondent lawyer only for the preparation and submission of the appellant’s brief and the attorney’s fees was payable upon the completion and submission of the appellant’s brief and not upon the termination of the case.There is sufficient evidence which indicates complainant’s willingness to pay the attorney’s fees. As agreed upon, complainant paid half of the fees in the amount of P7,500.00 upon acceptance of the case. And while the remaining balance was not yet due as it was agreed to be paid only upon the completion and submission of the brief, complainant nonetheless delivered to respondent lawyer P4,000.00 as the latter demanded. This, notwithstanding, Atty. Dealca withdrew his appearance simply because of complainant’s failure to pay the remaining balance of P3,500.00, which does not appear to be deliberate. The situation was aggravated by respondent counsel’s note to complainant withdrawing as counsel which was couched in impolite and insulting language.[1][10]Given the above circumstances, was Atty. Dealca’s conduct just and proper?We find Atty. Dealca’s conduct unbecoming of a member of the legal profession. Under Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances. Although he may withdraw his services when the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services,[1][11] under the circumstances of the present case, Atty. Dealca’s withdrawal was unjustified as complainant did not deliberately fail to pay him the attorney’s fees. In fact, complainant exerted honest efforts to fulfill his obligation. Respondent’s contemptuous conduct does not speak well of a member of the bar considering that the amount owing to him was only P3,500.00. Rule 20.4 of Canon 20, mandates that a lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Sadly, for not so large a sum owed to him by complainant, respondent lawyer failed to act in accordance with the demands of the Code.The Court, however, does not agree with complainant’s contention that the maximum penalty of disbarment should be imposed on respondent lawyer. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar will disbarment be imposed as a penalty. It should never be decreed where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired.[1][12] In the present case, reprimand is deemed sufficient.WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Juan S. Dealca is REPRIMANDED with a warning that repetition of the same act will be dealt with more severely.SO ORDERED.OBANDO V. FIGUERAS18 Jan. 2000Facts

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:In a civil case, D filed a motion to dismiss and this was granted. P claimed that themotion to dismiss is invalid since at the time of filing, Atty. Y no longer represented D.Issue:Whether or not Atty. Y ceased to be D’s counselHeld:No. Representation continues until the court dispenses with the services of counsel inaccordance with Sec. 26, Rule 138. Counsel may be validly substituted only if the followingrequisites are complied with: (1) new counsel files a written application for substitution; (2) theclient’s written consent is obtained; and (3) the written consent of the lawyer to be substituted issecured, if it can still be; if the written consent can no longer be obtained, then the applicationfor substitution must carry proof that notice of the motion has been served on the attorney to besubstituted in the manner required by the rules.OBANDO V. FIGUERAS18 Jan. 2000Facts:In a civil case, D filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that P lost his capacity to sueduring the pendency of the case. P assailed the motion, saying that it was too late since P hadalready finished presenting his evidence.Issue:Whether the motion to dismiss should be grantedHeld:Yes. The period to file a motion to dismiss depends upon the circumstances of the case.Sec. 1 of Rule 16 requires that, in general, a motion to dismiss should be filed within thereglementary period for filing a responsive pleading. But the court allows a defendant to file amotion to dismiss on the ff. grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction; (2) litis pendentia; (3) lack of causeof action; and (4) discovery during trial of evidence that would constitute a ground for dismissal.