LegJudEthicsUpdates2013 (MJ)

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R B GLawyers Ethical, Leaders Principled

LEGAL ETHICS AND JUDICIAL ETHICSHIGHLIGHTS AND UPDATES

RENE B. GOROSPEMagnificus JurisBar Review 2013

A. LAWYERS AND SOCIETY

1. Practice of Lawa. Paguia v. Office of the President, 621 SCRA 600 (2010)

In this case, the Supreme Court held that a suspended lawyer is incapacitated to bring up the issueof the legality of the appointment of ambassadors beyond the retirement age. “Petitioner’ suspensionfrom the practice of law bars him from performing ‘any activity, in or out of court, which requires theapplication of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.’ Certainly, preparing a petitionraising carefully crafted arguments on equal protection grounds and employing highly legalistic rulesof statutory construction to parse Section 23 of RA 7157 falls within the proscribed conduct.”1

2. Integrity of the Legal Professiona. Angalan v. Delante, 578 SCRA 113 (2009)

A person who takes the 8.102-hectare property of his illiterate clients and who is incapable of tellingthe truth is unfit to be a lawyer.

b. Arellano University, Inc. v. Mijares III, 605 SCRA 93 (2009)

What the Court said here about “facilitation” fees or expenses is quite interesting. “The Court is alsonot inclined to go along with the IBP’s recommendation that the Court include in its decision an orderdirecting Mijares to return the P500,000.00 that the University entrusted to him. The Universityknowingly gave him that money to spend for ‘facilitation’ and processing. It is not naïve. There is nolegitimate expense called ‘facilitation’ fee. This term is a deodorized word for bribe money. The Courtwill not permit the conversion of a disbarment proceeding into a remedy for recovering bribe money lostin a bad deal.”

c. Office of the Court Administrator v. Liangco, 662 SCRA 103 (2011)

In this case, the former judge who was dismissed way back in 2000 was disbarred based on the samegrounds for dismissal as magistrate – gross misconduct and inexcusable gross ignorance. Then, as amember of the bench, he acted upon a Petition for Declaratory Relief filed by the Sangguniang Bayanof San Luis, Pampanga, without the mandatory notice to the respondent therein, Gozun. The Court notedthat the records showed that, upon receipt of the Petition, he had it docketed in his court, designated therespondent in the case title, and quickly disposed of the matter by issuing a Resolution – all on the sameday that the Petition was filed without notice and hearing. He admitted that, to his mind, he was merely

Paguia was reinstated on 14 October 2011.1

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rendering a legal opinion at the local government’s behest, which he gladly and expeditiously obliged.And, because of what he did, the Sanguniang Bayan, relying on his Resolution-Legal Opinion, causedthe demolition of the house of Gozun and his family, who were thus ejected from the property they hadbeen occupying for decades – “[i]n effect, Gozun was deprived of his property without due process”!

In discussing his gross ignorance, the Court said: “We are appalled by respondent’s ignorance of thebasic rules of procedure. His wanton use of court processes in this case without regard for therepercussions on the rights and property of others clearly shows his unfitness to remain a member of thebar.” And, referring to his act of purportedly issuing a “legal opinion,” the Court said: “Even this excuseis unacceptable. Judges do not, and are not allowed, to issue legal opinions. Their opinions are alwaysin the context of judicial decisions, or concurring and dissenting opinions in the case of collegiate courts,and always in the context of contested proceedings.”

With respect to the case filed in his court, he was reminded that as judge of a first-level court, he wasexpected to know that he had no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for declaratory relief.

d. Re: SC Decision Dated May 20, 2008 in G.R. No. 161455 Under Rule 139-B of the Rulesof Court v. Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin, 670 SCRA 366 (2012)

The crime of Falsification of Public Document is contrary to justice, honesty, and good morals and,therefore, involves moral turpitude, enough to cause the disbarment of a lawyer convicted of such anoffense. Here, even as the complainant did not appear before the investigation of the IBP, and even asthe IBP recommended the dismissal of the disbarment case, the Court still proceeded to take away thelicense of the lawyer. And, what seemed relevant in the ultimate penalty is the fact that, in spite of thecriminal conviction having become final in 2008, for which the lawyer was sentenced to prisioncorreccional, he has not yet served sentence. Thus, the Court held: “As a rule, this Court exercises thepower to disbar with great caution. Being the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, it is imposedonly for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moralcharacter of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Yet this Court has alsoconsistently pronounced that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment fora crime involving moral turpitude. Here, Atty. Pactolin’s disbarment is warranted. The Sandiganbayanhas confirmed that although his culpability for falsification has been indubitably established, he has notyet served his sentence. His conduct only exacerbates his offense and shows that he falls short of theexacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.”

Yes, even as he might have eluded jail, his profession slipped away, however.

3. Respect for the Lawa. Re: Report on the Financial Audit Conducted on the Books of Accounts of Atty. Raquel G.

Kho, Clerk of Court IV, Regional Trial Court, Oras, Eastern Samar, 521 SCRA 25(2007)

A clerk of court’s failure to remit judiciary funds for over a year, an omission contrary to themandatory provisions of OCA Circular 8A-93, is a breach of his oath to obey the laws as well as thelegal orders of the duly constituted authorities, and of his duties under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code

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of Professional Responsibility.

It is no accident that Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 are the first edicts laid down in the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility for these are a lawyer’s foremost duties. Lawyers should always keep in mind that,although upholding the Constitution and obeying the law is an obligation imposed on every citizen, alawyer’s responsibilities under Canon 1 mean more than just staying out of trouble with the law. Asservants of the law and officers of the court, lawyers are required to be at the forefront of observing andmaintaining the rule of law, making themselves exemplars worthy of emulation. This, in fact, is whata lawyer’s obligation to promote respect for law and legal processes entails.

The least a lawyer can do in compliance with Canon 1 is to refrain from engaging in unlawfulconduct. By definition, any act or omission contrary to law is unlawful. It does not necessarily imply theelement of criminality although it is broad enough to include it. The presence of evil intent on the partof the lawyer is not essential in order to bring his act or omission within the terms of Rule 1.01.

4. Immoralitya. Advincula v. Macabata, 517 SCRA 600 (2007)

Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be. This permissivenessnotwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a high degree of socialresponsibility and, hence, must handle their personal affairs with greater caution. It is difficult to statewith precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is “grossly immoral conduct” or to specify themoral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar.The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be theimmoral conduct that warrants disbarment.

Acts of kissing or beso-beso on the cheeks as mere gestures of friendship and camaraderie, formsof greetings, casual and customary. However, the acts of respondent, though, in turning the head ofcomplainant towards him and kissing her on the lips are distasteful. Nevertheless, such act, even ifconsidered offensive and undesirable, cannot be considered grossly immoral.

Finally, complainant’s bare allegations that respondent made use and took advantage of his positionas a lawyer to lure her to agree to have sexual relations with him deserves no credit – complainantmiserably failed to comply with the burden of proof required of her.

b. Guevarra v. Eala, 529 SCRA 1 (2007)

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which provides the grounds for disbarment or suspensionuses the phrase “grossly immoral conduct,” not “under scandalous circumstances.”

In a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife, it is immaterialwhether the affair was carried out discreetly. A lawyer, in carrying on an extra-marital affair with amarried woman prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage was null and void, and despite suchlawyer himself being married, showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law – he betrayedhis unfitness to be a lawyer.

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c. Arnobit v. Arnobit, 569 SCRA 247 (2008)

The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public isconcerned, than the possession of legal learning. Good moral character is more than just the absence ofbad character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and theresolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. Grossly immoral conduct as basis for disciplinaryaction must be so corrupt as to virtually constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensibleto a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the commonsense of decency.

A member of the bar and an officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterousrelationships or keeping a mistress but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the publicby creating the impression that he is flouting those moral standards. Undoubtedly, a lawyer’s act ofleaving his wife and 12 children to cohabit and have children with another woman constitutes grosslyimmoral conduct.

d. Tiong v. Florendo, 662 SCRA 1 (2011)

Here, the lawyer had an adulterous relationship with the wife of his client, which fact was admittedby both parties involved. The parties – including the offended spouses – subsequently executed a jointaffidavit where the admission was contained, together with pardon granted by the offended spouses.Subsequently, the offended husband filed case for disbarment. Is there a case?

The Court held that the lawyer’s “act of having an affair with his client's wife manifested hisdisrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. It showed hisutmost moral depravity and low regard for the ethics of his profession. Likewise, he violated the trustand confidence reposed on him by complainant which in itself is prohibited under Canon 17 of the Codeof Professional Responsibility.” His illicit relationship with the wife of the complainant amounts to adisgraceful and grossly immoral conduct warranting disciplinary action.

What is the effect of the pardon? The Court reminded everyone that “a case of suspension ordisbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case but is intendedto cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public andthe courts. It is not an investigation into the acts of respondent as a husband but on his conduct as anofficer of the Court and his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar. Hence, the Affidavit dated March15, 1995, which is akin to an affidavit of desistance, cannot have the effect of abating the instantproceedings.”

5. Moral Turpitudea. Catalan, Jr. v. Silvosa, 677 SCRA 352 (2012)

In this case, the respondent lawyer was earlier convicted of direct bribery. Does this have any bearingon his possible disbarment? Yes, very much. The Court said, for starters, that “[i]n a disbarment case,this Court will no longer review a final judgment of conviction.” And, take note that the crime of directbribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. Accordingly, such fact taken with other misconduct of the

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lawyer leads to his loss of his profession. Declared the Court: “Atty. Silvosa’s representation ofconflicting interests and his failed attempt at bribing Pros. Toribio merit at least the penalty ofsuspension. Atty. Silvosa’s final conviction of the crime of direct bribery clearly falls under one of thegrounds for disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138. Disbarment follows as a consequence of Atty.Silvosa’s conviction of the crime. We are constrained to impose a penalty more severe than suspensionbecause we find that Atty. Silvosa is predisposed to flout the exacting standards of morality and decencyrequired of a member of the Bar. His excuse that his conviction was not in his capacity as a lawyer, butas a public officer, is unacceptable and betrays the unmistakable lack of integrity in his character. Thepractice of law is a privilege, and Atty. Silvosa has proved himself unfit to exercise this privilege.”

6. Deceitful Conducta. Mendoza v. Deciembre, 580 SCRA 26 (2009)

Respondent lawyer had earlier been meted the penalty of indefinite suspension in at two cases filedagainst him (See Olbes v. Deciembre, 457 SRCRA 341 [2005], and Manaois v. Deciembre, 562 SCRA359 [2008]). This arose from what the Court considered as deceitful conduct relative to relative to hislending activities. In this particular case filed by Mendoza, involving the same kind of conduct, the Courtproceeded to sanction him with the ultimate penalty – disbarment. The Court explained that a high senseof morality, honesty and fair dealing is expected and required of members of the bar. The fact that thereis no attorney-client relationship and the transactions entered into by respondent were done in his privatecapacity cannot shield respondent, as a lawyer, from liability. The acts of respondent lawyer indemanding excessive payments from his borrowers, then filling up his borrowers’ blank checks withfictitious amounts, falsifying commercial documents for his material gain, and then using said checksas bases for filing unfounded criminal suits against his borrowers in order to harass them manifest hisperversity of character, meriting his severance from the legal profession.

b. Overgaard v. Valdez, 567 SCRA 118 (2008) and 582 SCRA 567 (2009)

Here, the lawyer received P=900,000 as fees, then he refused to perform any of his obligations underthe contract for legal services, ignored client’s request for status report, and rejected demands for returnof the money paid. In disbarring him, the Court declared that the he was not just incompetent, he waspractically useless; he was not just negligent, he was indolent; and rather than being of help to thecomplainant, he prejudiced the client. A lawyer is required to keep the client informed of the status ofhis case and to respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information. And, where alawyer did not carry out any of the services he was engaged to perform, nor did he appear in court ormake any payment in connection with litigation, or give any explanation as to how such a large sum ofmoney was spent and allocated, he must immediately return the money he received from the client upondemand.

On motion for reconsideration, he claimed he had no inkling about the existence of the disbarmentcase as he had to abruptly abandon his Makati office following persistent and serious threat to hisphysical safety and security, thereafter relocating in Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. He allegedly only foundout about the decision from a colleague in Bukidnon who read the decision from the Court’s website.“The respondent cannot claim lack of knowledge of the complaint for disbarment against him when theComplaint and the Order for him to submit an Answer were duly received by his agent at his Makati law

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office. Succeeding notices in connection with the disbarment proceedings were also sent to therespondent’s Makati law office. He cannot escape liability for his misdeeds by feigning ignorance of thedisbarment case, since the notices in connection with the proceedings were sent to his office addressmade known to the public and properly received by his agent.” The IBP Commission on Bar Disciplinewas correct in proceeding with the investigation ex parte, because it was due to the his own fault andnegligence that he was not able to submit an answer to the Complaint and participate in the investigation.“Rule 138, Section 30 provides that an attorney should be heard before he is removed or suspended; butif, upon reasonable notice, an attorney fails to appear and answer the accusations against him, the mattermay be dealt with ex parte.” The Court further held that his “feeble excuse that he was no longer holdingoffice at his Makati office address at the time the Order of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline wassent to him is unacceptable. Ordinary prudence would have guarded against his alleged failure to receivethe notices. All notices to the respondent were sent to his Makati office address, which was the addressmade known to the public and to the complainant. This is even the address printed on the letterhead ofthe Retainer Agreement between the complainant and the respondent. And although the respondentclaims that he had to ‘make himself “scarce”’ due to threats to his life and safety, this does not mean thathe avoids the responsibility of taking account of his mail. The respondent owes it to himself and to hisclients to adopt a system whereby he would be able to receive mail sent to his law office during hisabsence. Assuming that circumstances would justify the respondent’s abrupt abandonment of his Makatioffice, it absolutely does not give him the license to abandon his clients as well.”

Further, the Court declared that “respondent’s disbarment is not anchored on his failure to doanything in relation the cases entrusted to his care, but on his abandonment of his client. He will not beabsolved from liability on the basis alone of these inconsequential acts which he claims to haveaccomplished because the glaring fact remains that he has failed to perform his essential obligations tohis client, to the courts and to society. As the complainant’s lawyer, the respondent is expected to servehis client with competence and diligence. This includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to hiscare and giving the complainant sound legal advice, but also properly representing his client in court,attending scheduled hearings, preparing and filing required pleadings, prosecuting the cases entrustedto his care with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for his client or thecourt to prod him to do so. He should not idly sit by and leave the rights of his client in a state ofuncertainty. The respondent’s acts and omissions were not just a case of inaction, but they amount todeceitful conduct and are contrary to good morals.”

c. De Leon v. Castelo, 639 SCRA 237 (2011)

Here, the Court held: “Their being officers of the Court extends to attorneys not only the presumptionof regularity in the discharge of their duties, but also the immunity from liability to others for as longas the performance of their obligations to their clients does not depart from their character as servantsof the Law and as officers of the Court. In particular, the statements they make in behalf of their clientsthat are relevant, pertinent, or material to the subject of inquiry are absolutely privileged regardless oftheir defamatory tenor. Such cloak of privilege is necessary and essential in ensuring the unhinderedservice to their clients’ causes and in protecting the clients’ confidences. With the cloak of privilege,they can freely and courageously speak for their clients, verbally or in writing, in the course of judicialand quasi-judicial proceedings, without running the risk of incurring criminal prosecution or actions fordamages.”

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d. Brennisen v. Contawi, 670 SCRA 358 (2012)

The lawyer here was entrusted with administration of property by an owner who resided in theUnited States. The latter also entrusted to the former title to the property. Then, without the consent ofthe owner, the lawyer mortgaged and subsequently sold the land, using what purported to be a SpecialPower of Attorney, with a forged signature of the owner. The Court disbarred the lawyer, holding thathe “acted with deceit when, through the use of a falsified document, he effected the unauthorizedmortgage and sale of his client’s property for his personal benefit.”

On a defense by the lawyer that there was no professional relationship between him and the owner,the Court said that the same is unavailing. It “will not serve to mitigate his liability. There is nodistinction as to whether the transgression is committed in a lawyer’s private or professional capacity,for a lawyer may not divide his personality as an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.”

7. Debts and Satisfactiona. Cham v. Paita-Moya, 556 SCRA 1 (2008)

A lawyer who has incurred just debts has the moral duty and legal responsibility to settle them whenthey become due. She should comply with just contractual obligations, and act fairly and adhere to highethical standards. Deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitutegross misconduct. And, her act of abandoning a leased apartment unit to avoid her obligations for therent and electricity bills constitutes deceitful conduct. Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully performtheir duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to their clients. As part of those duties, they mustpromptly pay their financial obligations.

Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice. As vanguards of our legal system, they areexpected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrityand fair dealing. Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar,to the courts and to their clients. As part of those duties, they must promptly pay their financialobligations.

B. LAWYERS AND THE COURTS1. Courts, Criticism and Contempt

a. Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty Entitled “Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Facultyof the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism andMisrepresentation in the Supreme Court,” 644 SCRA 543 (2011)

Members of a faculty of a College of Law may not invoke the guarantee of freedom of expressionand academic freedom to shield themselves from possible disciplinary proceedings against them forhaving come up with a public statement which the Court took to be disrespectful and contemptuous.Freedom of expression is not a defense in administrative cases against lawyers for using intemperatespeech in open court or in court submissions. The Court also pointed out that a reading of the Show

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Cause Resolution it issued will plainly show that it was neither the fact that respondents had criticizeda decision of the Court nor that they had charged one of its members of plagiarism that motivated thesaid Resolution – it was the manner of the criticism and the contumacious language by whichrespondents, who are not parties nor counsels in a pending case have expressed their opinion in favorof the petitioners in said pending case. The right to criticize the courts and judicial officers must bebalanced against the equally primordial concern that the independence of the Judiciary be protected fromundue influence or interference.

The Court further reminded the respondents and everybody else that there are other societal valuesthat press for recognition, and one such societal value that presses for recognition is the threat to judicialindependence and the orderly administration of justice that immoderate, reckless and unfair attacks onjudicial decisions and institutions pose. The constitutional right to freedom of expression of membersof the Bar may be circumscribed by their ethical duties as lawyers to give due respect to the courts andto uphold the public’s faith in the legal profession and the justice system.

And, with higher standing in the community, as an educator, for instance, comes greaterresponsibility, the Court declaring that the reason that freedom of expression may be so delimited in thecase of lawyers applies with greater force to the academic freedom of law professors. When the criticismcomes from persons outside the profession who may not have a full grasp of legal issues or fromindividuals whose personal or other interests in making the criticism are obvious, the Court may perhapstolerate or ignore them, but when law professors are the ones who appear to have lost sight of theboundaries of fair commentary and worse, would justify the same as an exercise of civil liberties, theCourt cannot remain silent for such silence would have a grave implication on legal education in thecountry. The Court failed to see how it can ennoble the profession if it allowed respondents to send asignal to their students that the only way to effectively plead their cases and persuade others to their pointof view is to be offensive – the mark of the true intellectual is one who can express his opinions logicallyand soberly without resort to exaggerated rhetoric and unproductive recriminations.

Further, it was pointed out that lawyers, when they teach law, are considered engaged in the practiceof law – their actions as law professors must be measured against the same canons of professionalresponsibility applicable to acts of members of the Bar as the fact of their being law professors isinextricably entwined with the fact that they are lawyers.

b. Re: Suspension of Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, Former Senior State Prosecutor, 535 SCRA200 (2007)

While lawyers are not prevented from being critical of orders and decisions that they may not agreewith, they are not that free to malign the judges who issued the same. Worse, they should course theirgrievance through proper means and fora. So, if instead of questioning the judge’s acts before the highercourts, they go to the press, then they are in trouble. Here, the respondent lawyer who used to be a SeniorState Prosecutor caused the holding of a press conference where he made statements against the orderof the judge granting bail to an accused who was charged with murder.

“Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend;and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Canon 11 of the Code of Professional

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Responsibility mandates a lawyer to ‘observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicialofficers and [he] should insist on similar conduct by others.’ Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 states that a lawyer‘shall submit grievances against a judge to the proper authorities only.’”

Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that the trial court judge was displayingjudicial arrogance in an article which appeared in a local newspaper, which statements were made whilethe criminal case was still pending in court. Such circumstance also violated Rule 13.02 of Canon 13,which states that “a lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending casetending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.” As for a radio interview, he also violated Rule11.05 of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for not resorting to the proper authoritiesonly for redress of his grievances against the judge. He was also found of violating Canon 11 for hisdisrespect of the court and its officer when he stated that the judge was ignorant of the law, that as amahjong aficionado, he was studying mahjong instead of studying the law, and that he was a liar.

Further, he also violated the Lawyer’s Oath, as he has sworn to “conduct [himself] as a lawyeraccording to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to[his] clients.”

And just to make sure that the Court is not misunderstood in meting out penalties on disrespectfulcriticism, the Court added that it “is not against lawyers raising grievances against erring judges but therules clearly provide for the proper venue and procedure for doing so, precisely because respect for theinstitution must always be maintained.”

2. Baseless Administrative Complaintsa. Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, 664 SCRA 465 (2012)

This has something to do with what the Court found as a baseless administrative complaint againstCourt of Appeals. The Court then went on to state for the guidance of everyone that “[a]llowing a partywho feels aggrieved by a judicial order or decision not yet final and executory to mount anadministrative, civil or criminal prosecution for unjust judgment against the issuing judge would, at aminimum and as an indispensable first step, confer the prosecutor (Ombudsman) with an incongruousfunction pertaining, not to him, but to the courts: the determination of whether the questioned dispositionis erroneous in its findings of fact or conclusions of law, or both. . . . It is not, as already pointed out,within the power of public prosecutors, or the Ombudsman or his Deputies, directly or vicariously, toreview judgments or final orders or resolutions of the Courts of the land.”

Complainant was then directed to show cause in writing within ten (10) days from notice why heshould not be punished for indirect contempt of court for degrading the judicial office of respondentAssociate Justices of the Court of Appeals, and for interfering with the due performance of their workfor the Judiciary.

b. In Re: Supreme Court Resolution Dated 28 April 2003 in G.R. Nos. 145817 and 145822, 669SCRA 530 (2012)

In the motion to inhibit the ponente in a pending case, there was an insinuation that bribery (a brand-

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new Mercedes) might have attended the issuance of a questionable resolution which was rendered aftera motion for clarification was filed by the other party, without furnishing the respondent lawyer a copyof said motion. There was also reference to purported notations on the Supreme Court Division agendawhich indicated that the pending motion was noted but the resolution that was allegedly issued indicatedthat it was granted. Subsequently, the lawyer also voiced suspicion that the present ponente of theconsolidated petitions from which this separate administrative case arose, Justice Maria Lourdes P. A.Sereno, would exclude or suppress material evidence found in the Office of the Bar Confidant’s reportfrom her ponencia in the parent case in gratitude for the alleged help that Justice Carpio had given herin that he allegedly recommended her for the Supreme Court.

The Court held: “Respondent Peña attempts to draw a connection and direct correlation betweenUrban Bank’s failure to furnish him a copy of its Motion for Clarification, purportedly denying him anopportunity to refute the allegations therein, and the supposedly corrupt means by which the unfavorableResolution was thereby obtained. This is completely untenable and irresponsible. Had he simplyconfined the issue to an alleged deprivation of due process, then there would hardly be any controversyregarding his conduct as a lawyer and an officer of the Court. The purported lack of notice of the Motionfor Clarification filed the bank in the consolidated petitions could have been raised as a valid concernfor judicial resolution. Instead, respondent Peña insinuates ill motives on the part of Members of theCourt imputing the failure of a private party to give him due notice to be, in effect, a failure of the Court.This merits the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary powers over him as a member of the Bar. To allegethat bribery has been committed by members of the judiciary, a complainant – especially, a lawyer –must go beyond mere suspicions, speculations, insinuations or even the plain silence of an opposingcounsel.” The Court further said that “Atty. Peña cannot be excused for uttering snide and accusatoryremarks at the expense of the reputation and integrity of members of this Court, and for using thoseunsubstantiated claims as basis for the subject Motion for Inhibition. Instead of investigating the veracityof Atty. Singson’s revelations, respondent read too much into the declarations and the purported silenceof opposing counsel towards his joke. Respondent made unfounded imputations of impropriety to aspecific Member of the Court. Such conduct does not befit a member of the legal profession and fallsutterly short of giving respect to the Court and upholding its dignity.”

As to Atty. Peña’s defense that the allegation of bribery and collusion between Justice Carpio, thelawyer for the other party was a “joke” failed to convince the Court, “as in fact, he was deadly seriousabout the charges he raised. Respondent insisted that his alleged insinuation of ill motives was just a‘joke’ between two lawyers engaged in a private telephone conversation regarding the case. Althoughthe courts and judicial officers are entitled to due respect, they are not immune to criticisms nor are theybeyond the subject matter of free speech, especially in the context of a private conversation between twoindividuals. In this case, though, respondent himself was responsible for moving the private matter intothe realm of public knowledge by citing that same ‘joke’ in his own Motion for Inhibition filed beforethis Court. In general, courts will not act as overly sensitive censors of all private conversations oflawyers at all times, just to ensure obedience to the duty to afford proper respect and deference to theformer. Nevertheless, this Court will not shy away from exercising its disciplinary powers wheneverpersons who impute bribery to judicial officers and bring such imputations themselves to the court’sattention through their own pleadings or motions.”

It is not only in making jokes about bombs in airports or planes that may get you in trouble – it is also in regardto allegedly criminal or underhanded manner in which your opponent may have put one over you!

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3. Abuse of Court Processesa. Angeles v. Gutierrez, 668 SCRA 803 (2012)

In this case, the Court took note of the apparently mutually destructive legal skirmishes between ajudge and a public prosecutor. It noted, as a Final Note: “Finally, the Court notes with strongdisapproval both parties’ resort to abuse of the judicial processes of this Court. This is the third case weknow of that the parties have filed against each other, and that has reached the Supreme Court. This factis especially regrettable, considering that petitioner as judge and respondent as prosecutor should havebeen well-cognizant of our clogged court dockets and should have thus exercised more restraint in filingcases against each other. Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer fromfiling multiple actions arising from the same cause and from misusing court process. Judging from thenumber of cases and the vengeful tone of the charges that the parties have hurled against each other intheir pleadings, they seem more bent on settling what has become a personal score between them, ratherthan on achieving the ends of justice.”

4. Misuse of Procedural Advantagesa. Anson Trade Center, Inc. v. Pacific Banking Corporation, 581 SCRA 751 (2009)

In this case, the Court reminded lawyers about the proper use of procedural rules. “Litigation is nota game of technicality, in which one more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement andposition entraps and destroys the other. It is rather a contest in which each contending party fully andfairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive allimperfection of forms and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier’s thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its properoffice as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant considerationfrom courts. As we have stressed emphatically on previous occasions, the rules of procedure may notbe misused and abused as instruments for the denial of substantial justice.”

Then, the Court said: “Here is another demonstrative instance of how some members of the bar,availing themselves of their proficiency in invoking the letter of the rules without regard to their realspirit and intent, succeed in inducing courts to act contrary to the dictates of justice and equity, and, insome instances, to wittingly or unwittingly abet unfair advantage by ironically camouflaging theiractuations as earnest efforts to satisfy the public clamor for speedy disposition of litigations, forgettingall the while that the plain injunction of Section 2 of Rule 1 is that the ‘rules shall be liberally construedin order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining’ not only ‘speedy’ but moreimperatively, ‘just ... and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.’”

5. Misleading Representations and Citationsa. United Overseas Bank Phils. v. Rosemoor Mining & Development Corp., 518 SCRA 123

(2007)

Under Section 1, Rule 4, the venue of real actions affecting properties found in different provincesis determined by the singularity or plurality of the transactions involving said parcels of land. Where said

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parcels are the object of one and the same transaction, the venue is in the court of any of the provinceswherein a parcel of land is situated.

While the Bank itself correctly summarized the applicable jurisprudential rule in one of the pleadingsbefore the Court, it, resorting to deliberate misrepresentation, stated in the same pleading that “theBulacan and Nueva Ecija [p]roperties were not the subject of one single real estate mortgagecontract,” even as there was only one proceeding sought to be nullified and that is the extrajudicialmortgage foreclosure sale. And there is only one initial transaction which served as the basis of theforeclosure sale and that is the mortgage contract. The Bank itself has provided the noose on which itwould be hung. “This apparent deliberate misrepresentation cannot simply pass without action. The realestate mortgage form supplied to Rosemoor is the Bank’s standard pre-printed form. Yet the Bankperpetrated the misrepresentation. Blame must be placed on its doorstep. But as the Bank’s pleading wasobviously prepared by its counsel, the latter should also share the blame. A lawyer shall not do anyfalsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court, nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misledby any artifice. Both the Bank’s president and counsel should be made to explain why they should notbe sanctioned for contempt of court.”

b. Serana v. Sandiganbayan, 542 SCRA 224 (2008)

“As a parting note, petitioner’s counsel, Renato G. dela Cruz, misrepresented his reference to Section4 of P.D. No. 1606 as a quotation from Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019. A review of his motion to quash,the instant petition for certiorari and his memorandum, unveils the misquotation. We urge petitioner’scounsel to observe Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 10.02 of theRules stating that ‘a lawyer shall not misquote or misrepresent.’ The Court stressed the importance ofthis rule in Pangan v. Ramos, where Atty Dionisio D. Ramos used the name Pedro D. D. Ramos inconnection with a criminal case. The Court ruled that Atty. Ramos resorted to deception by using a namedifferent from that with which he was authorized. We severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warnedthat a repetition may warrant suspension or disbarment. We admonish petitioner’s counsel to be morecareful and accurate in his citation. A lawyer’s conduct before the court should be characterized bycandor and fairness. The administration of justice would gravely suffer if lawyers do not act withcomplete candor and honesty before the courts.”

c. Nepomuceno v. City of Surigao, 560 SCRA 41 (2008)

In Silva v. Mationg, 499 SCRA 724 (2006), we find this passage: “The Court notes that petitioner’scounsel relied on several decisions of the Court of Appeals in addition to Supreme Court cases tobuttress his arguments. The Court reminds counsel that decisions of the Court of Appeals are neithercontrolling nor conclusive on the Supreme Court. Moreover, the Court strongly suggests that petitioner’scounsel be brief and straightforward in drafting pleadings. He should, as much as possible, refrain fromquoting lengthily irrelevant portions of Supreme Court decisions.” In this particular case of Nepomuceno,the same problem reverberates, as the Court observed: “Moreover, petitioners cannot properly insist onthe application of the CA decision in Spouses Mamerto Espina, Sr. and Flor Espina v. City of Ormoc.A decision of the CA does not establish judicial precedent. A ruling of the CA on any question of lawis not binding on this Court. In fact, the Court may review, modify or reverse any such ruling of the CA.”

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d. Hipos v. Bay, 581 SCRA 674 (2009)

In this case the Court found that the lawyer adverted to alleged rulings of the Supreme Court, whichparticular passages are not, however, found in the cited cases. In particular, he counsel contended thatthe order issued by the trial court judge was null and void in lieu of the ruling of the Supreme Court inLedesma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113216, September 5, 1997, 86 SCAD 695, 278 SCRA 657which allegedly stated: “In the absence of a finding of grave abuse of discretion, the court’s bare denialof a motion to withdraw information pursuant to the Secretary’s resolution is void.” The Court said:“This statement of petitioners’ counsel is utterly misleading. There is no such statement in our Decisionin Ledesma. The excerpt from Ledesma, which appears to have a resemblance to the statement allegedlyquoted from said case, provides: ‘. . . the trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion when itdenied the motion to withdraw the information, based solely on his bare and ambiguous relianceon Crespo. The trial court's order is inconsistent with our repetitive calls for an independent andcompetent assessment of the issue(s) presented in the motion to dismiss. . . .’” The Court thenconcluded: “It very much appears that the counsel of petitioners is purposely misleading this Court, inviolation of Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, . . .”

The Court also referred to the manner by which the counsel cited alleged case law as authority:“Counsel’s use of block quotation and quotation marks signifies that he intends to make it appear thatthe passages are the exact words of the Court. Furthermore, putting the words ‘Underscoring ours’ afterthe text implies that, except for the underscoring, the text is a faithful reproduction of the original.” Thelawyer was ordered to show cause why he should not be disciplined as a member of the bar.

6. Forgeries, Perjuries, False Testimonies and Inexistent Processesa. Suan v. Gonzalez, 518 SCRA 82 (2007)

While every litigant is expected to examine all the documents that he files in court, not every mistakeor oversight he commits should be deemed dishonest, deceitful or deliberate so as to mislead the court.A mere assertion of a false, objective fact, a falsehood, is not enough to warrant a finding of perjury –the prosecution must prove which of two statements is false and must show the statement to be false byother evidence than the contradicting statement. It is necessary that there must be contradictorystatements for perjury to exist.

Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest, undertaken for public welfare and for thepurpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of the persons unfit to practicethem. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution and only in a clear case of misconductwhich seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and memberof the bar.

b. Molina v. Magat, 672 SCRA 1(2012)

This is a disbarment case filed way back in 1978 – much earlier than the date of birth of most barexaminees!

In this case, the respondent lawyer, through misrepresentation, falsely alleged that there was a similar

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criminal case to the case that was filed by complainant against respondent’s client. With that ploy,respondent lawyer then filed a motion to quash on account of double jeopardy. Complainant then filedthe case for disbarment against respondent, adding that the respondent likewise committed willfuldisobedience of the court order when he appeared as counsel for de Leon on two (2) occasions despitethe fact that he was suspended from the practice of law.

The Court agreed that there was a deliberate intent on the part of respondent to mislead the courtwhen he filed the motion to dismiss the criminal charges on the basis of double jeopardy. A lawyershould not make any false and untruthful statements in his pleadings. With regard to his appearance ontwo occasion in spite of his suspension from practice, the Court noted that he was truly moved byaltruistic intentions when he appeared before the trial court despite having been suspended, he couldhave informed the Presiding Judge of his plight and explained why the party he was representing couldnot attend. Instead, he kept his silence and proceeded to represent his client as counsel.

Respondent lawyer – who must have beeen about seventy or more at the time the case was resolved– was suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.

7. Incompetent Representation and Haphazard Pleadingsa. Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc, 665 SCRA 367 (2012)

The Supreme Court could not contain its disappointment with the kind of representation and casehandling by lawyers from the Office of the Solicitor General and the Presidential Commission on GoodGovernment. Because of what it saw as gross incompetence, the Republic lost its case. And, all becauseof the “best evidence rule.

The Court lectured. “As earlier adverted to, the best evidence rule has been recognized as anevidentiary standard since the 18th century. For three centuries, it has been practiced as one of the mostbasic rules in law. It is difficult to conceive that one could have finished law school and passed the barexaminations without knowing such elementary rule. Thus, it is deeply disturbing that the PCGG andthe Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) – the very agencies sworn to protect the interest of the stateand its people – could conduct their prosecution in the manner that they did. To emphasize, the PCGGis a highly specialized office focused on the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, while the OSG is the principallegal defender of the government. The lawyers of these government agencies are expected to be the bestin the legal profession. However, despite having the expansive resources of government, the membersof the prosecution did not even bother to provide any reason whatsoever for their failure to present theoriginal documents or the witnesses to support the government’s claims. Even worse was presenting inevidence a photocopy of the TSN of the PCGG proceedings instead of the original, or a certified truecopy of the original, which the prosecutors themselves should have had in their custody. Such mannerof legal practice deserves the reproof of this Court. We are constrained to call attention to this apparentlyserious failure to follow a most basic rule in law, given the special circumstances surrounding this case.The public prosecutors should employ and use all government resources and powers efficiently,effectively, honestly and economically, particularly to avoid wastage of public funds and revenues. Theyshould perform and discharge their duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism,intelligence and skill.”

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Further, the Court declared: “The basic ideal of the legal profession is to render service and securejustice for those seeking its aid. In order to do this, lawyers are required to observe and adhere to thehighest ethical and professional standards. The legal profession is so imbued with public interest thatits practitioners are accountable not only to their clients, but to the public as well. The publicprosecutors, aside from being representatives of the government and the state, are, first and foremost,officers of the court. They took the oath to exert every effort and to consider it their duty to assist in thespeedy and efficient administration of justice. Lawyers owe fidelity to the cause of the client and shouldbe mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them. Hence, should serve with competence anddiligence.” What then do we see of the image of these lawyers? “[G]iven the particular context of thiscase, the failure of the prosecution to adhere to something as basic as the best evidence rule raisesserious doubts on the level and quality of effort given to the government’s cause. Thus, we highlyencourage the Office of the President, the OSG, and the PCGG to conduct the appropriate investigationand consequent action on this matter.”

And to make sure that the Court meant business, it added: “Let a copy of this Decision be furnishedto the Office of the President so that it may look into the circumstances of this case and determine theliability, if any, of the lawyers of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Presidential Commissionon Good Government in the manner by which this case was handled in the Sandiganbayan.”

b. Heirs of Antonio Bobadilla v. Castillo, 526 SCRA 107 (2007)

The Court, after noting the perfunctory manner by which respondent lawyer complied with theCourt’s Resolution requiring him to comment on a petition – pithily averring in one sweeping paragraphthat the allegations contained in the petition are all rehash or reiterations of the issues and argumentsalready passed upon by the appellate court – it said that with such lackadaisical outlook, respondentblinded himself with what appeared to be gross misrepresentation foisted by petitioners, which wouldhave otherwise put him on guard. “At this juncture, it is apropos to firmly remind lawyers of their duties,as officers of the court, to exercise utmost care and complete candor in the preparation of pleadings andto lay before the court the pertinent facts with methodical and meticulous attention, without anysuppression, obscuration, misrepresentation or distortion thereof.”

c. Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr., 545 SCRA 92 (2008)

A four-page memorandum that clearly contains neither substance nor research is absolutely insultingto the Supreme Court. As a member of the bar and as an officer of the court, a lawyer ought to be keenlyaware that the chief safeguard of the body politic is respect for the law and its magistrates. There isnothing more effective than the written word by which counsel can persuade the Court of therighteousness of his cause. For if truth were self-evident, a memorandum would be completelyunnecessary and superfluous.

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C. LAWYERS AND FELLOW LAWYERS1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines

a. In the Matter of the Brewing Controversies in the Election in the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines (Attys. Marcial M. Magsino, Manuel M. Maramba and NasserMarohomsalic v. Attys. Rogelio A. Vinluan, Abelardo C. Estrada, Bonifacio T.Barandon, Jr., Evergisto S. Escalon and Raymund Jorge A. Mercado), 638 SCRA 1(2010)

By not fielding a candidate for Governor and by declining the nomination raised in favor of itsChapter President, an IBP Chapter is deemed to have waived its turn in the rotation order. The “rotationrule” is not absolute but subject to waiver as when the chapters in the order of rotation opted not tofield or nominate their own candidates for Governor during the election regularly done for that purpose.The “rotation rule” should be applied in harmony with, and not in derogation of, the sovereign will ofthe electorate as expressed through the ballot.

If a validly nominated candidate obtains the highest number of votes in the election conducted, hiselectoral mandate deserves to be respected unless obtained through fraud as established by evidence.

It has long been held that, as provided for in Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility that “(a) lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct,”and, added to this, Rule 7.03, Canon 7 requires that “(a) lawyer shall not engage in conduct thatadversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave ina scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.” The unethical practices of lawyers duringIBP elections cannot but result in the stature of the IBP as an association of the practitioners of a nobleand honored profession being diminished.

To the Court, if Atty. Vinluan cannot be fit to become a Governor and EVP of the IBP then he is notentitled to succeed as its President for the 2009-2011 term.

D. LAWYERS AND CLIENTS1. Relationships with and Responsibility to the Client

a. Nevada v. Casuga, 668 SCRA 441 (2012)

In this case, the respondent lawyer was entrusted with pieces of jewelry worth P=300,000 and a$12,000 Rolex for sale. He failed to return the same or remit the proceeds when required by the owner.

In addition, he was also found to have engaged in misconduct when he misrepresented himself asadministrator of a hotel and thereafter entered into a contract of lease with someone, after which hepocketed for himself the deposit and rentals. And, in the contract of lease, the lawyer signed his nameabove the printed name of somebody else and then proceeded to notarize the document himself. All ofthese misdeeds resulted in his being suspended and disqualified to be notary for some time.

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b. Fil-Garcia, Inc. v. Hernandez, 558 SCRA 40 (2008)

Here, the Court said that respondent lawyer’s act of filing three (3) successive motions for extensionof time to file the petition on the careless assumption that each motion will be granted by the Court, andwithout taking care of informing himself of the Court’s action thereon, constitutes inexcusablenegligence. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, skill and competence, regardless ofits importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He must constantly keep in mind that hisactions or omissions or nonfeasance would be binding upon his client. Thus, he is expected to beacquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and a client who deals with him has the rightto expect not just a good amount of professional learning and competence but also a whole-hearted fealtyto the client’s cause. “While pressure of work or some other unavoidable reasons may constrain a lawyerto file a motion for extension of time to file pleadings, he should not presume that his motion forextension of time will be granted. Well-settled is the rule that motions for extension of time to file apleading are not granted as a matter of course but lie in the sound discretion of the court. It is thusincumbent on any movant for extension to exercise due diligence to inform himself as soon as possibleof the Court’s action on his motion, by timely inquiry from the Clerk of Court. Should he neglect to doso, he runs the risk of time running out on him, for which he will have nobody but himself to blame.”

Also, in case of busy lawyers, the Court admonished: “A lawyer who finds it impracticable tocontinue representing a client should inform the latter of his predicament and ask that he be allowed towithdraw from the case to enable the client to engage the services of another counsel who can study thesituation and work out a solution.”

c. Barbasa v. Tuquero, 575 SCRA 102 (2008)

The Court took this occasion to remind lawyers that equally important, as their duty to clients, is theirduty as officers of the court to see to it that the orderly administration of justice is not unduly impededor delayed. Counsel needs to advise a client, ordinarily a layman unaccustomed to the intricacies andvagaries of the law, concerning the objective merit of his case. If counsel finds that his client’s causelacks merit, then it is his bounden duty to advise accordingly. Indeed a lawyer’s oath to uphold the causeof justice may supersede his duty to his client’s cause; for such fealty to ethical concerns is indispensableto the success of the rule of law.

d. National Power Corporation v. Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (now PhilippineCommercial International Bank), 598 SCRA 326 (2009)

Here, there was a judgment way back in 1970 in favor of PCIBank in the case the bank filed againstSebastian and Associates, Inc. Sebastian subsequently filed a complaint against NPC in 1972, resultingin judgment in favor of Sebastian in the amount of P=2,007,157.00), judgment becoming final in 1976.Notice of Garnishment was issued in the in PCIB case, directed at NPC for P=580,228.19. NPC paid inthe amount of P=249,256.74 in 1978, leaving a balance of P=340,971.45. Is NPC bound to interest on theremaining balance? Yes. All that is necessary for the trial court to lawfully bind the person of thegarnishee or any person who has in his possession credits belonging to the judgment debtor is serviceupon him of the writ of garnishment. The garnishee is obliged to pay all interests and bank charges thathave accumulated on the amount garnished or, on such amount which has not been paid, from the dateof its receipt of the notice of garnishment until it has made payment.

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And, in deciding this case, the Court obserfed: “It has not escaped our attention that the NPC hasemployed a variety of seemingly legitiamte tactics to delay the execution of the CFI Branch II decision.In fact, due to its various legal maneuverings, the NPC succeeded in avoiding its obligation to pay PCIBsince 1976, or more than 30 years, to PCIB’s great prejudice. In so doing, the NPC has made a mockeryof justice. We therefore take this opportunity to admonish the NPC and to remind NPC’s counsels thatwhile it agrees that lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of their clients, they should notforget that they are also officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy andefficient administration of justice. They should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeatthe ends of justice or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse courtprocesses.”

e. Vargas v. Ignes, 623 SCRA 1 (2010)

Here, four (4) Lawyers were fined P=5,000 each for willfully appearing as an attorney for a party toa case without authority to do so.

2. Client Confidences and Privileged Communicationsa. Hadjula v. Madianda, 526 SCRA 241 (2007)

The moment the complainant approached the respondent lawyer to seek legal advice, a veritablelawyer-client relationship evolved between the two. Such relationship imposed upon the lawyer certainrestrictions circumscribed by the ethics of the profession. Among the burdens of the relationship is thatwhich enjoins the lawyer to keep inviolate confidential information acquired or revealed during legalconsultations. The fact that one is, at the end of the day, not inclined to handle the client’s case is hardlyof consequence. Of little moment, too, is the fact that no formal professional engagement followed theconsultation. Nor will it make any difference that no contract whatsoever was executed by the partiesto memorialize the relationship. The purpose of the rule of confidentiality is actually to protect the clientfrom possible breach of confidence as a result of a consultation with a lawyer.

3. Negligence of Counsela. Pangasinan Electric Cooperative I (PANELCO I) v. Montemayor, 533 SCRA 1 (2007)

While it is settled that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear caseof misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Courtand as a member of the bar will disbarment be imposed as a penalty, the case of respondent lawyerhowever is different. He is guilty not only of his unjustified failure to file the appellant’s brief of hisclient not only once but twice. Moreover the Court notes with dismay the huge losses suffered bycomplainant in the total amount of sixteen million pesos (P=16,000,000). The respondent lawyer alsodemonstrated an utter lack of regard for the very serious charges against him and a gross disrespect forthe Court when he failed to file his comment after being required to file his response to the said charges.Respondent could have presented sufficient justification for his inability to file the appellant’s briefs but failed to do so.

In view of the forgoing circumstances, he does not deserve anymore to remain as an active member

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of the legal profession. The breaches of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the palpable slothand irresponsibility he has demonstrated in handling the cases of his client undeniably reveal that he hasbecome more of a liability than an asset to the legal profession. He cannot be entrusted anymore withthe sacred duty and responsibility to protect the interests of any prospective client. If he is then allowedto resume his law practice after suspension, this will surely subvert the ends of justice, dishonor the bar,and lose the respect of society for the profession of law. The Court will not allow such affront to pass.

b. Hernandez v. Padilla, 674 SCRA 1 (2012)

Filing the wrong pleading could land you in trouble. Here, the lawyer filed a Memorandum of Appealinstead of Appeal Brief, resulting in prejudice to his client. He tried to defend himself by saying that hewas not really the lawyer of the complainant (wife) and that he was just approached by complainant’shusband to prepare a pleading due in three (3) days. The Court did not give credence to his explanation,however, noting that “a perusal of the Memorandum of Appeal filed in the appellate court revealed thathe had signed as counsel for the defendant-appellants therein, including complainant and her husband.. . . Nowhere does the document say that it was filed only on behalf of complainant’s husband.”

But what if the client said that it was a particular pleading that he needed? Well, the lawyer issupposed to know better when it comes to the law and its procedural aspects. “Regardless of theparticular pleading his client may have believed to be necessary, it was respondent’s duty to know theproper pleading to be filed in appeals from RTC decisions.” And, for the guidance of everyone: “Whenthe RTC ruled against complainant and her husband, they filed a Notice of Appeal. Consequently, whatshould apply is the rule on ordinary appealed cases or Rule 44 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. Rule 44requires that the appellant’s brief be filed after the records of the case have been elevated to the CA.Respondent, as a litigator, was expected to know this procedure.”

What about the fact that the lawyer barely had time to acquaint himself with the case? “The supposedlack of time given to respondent to acquaint himself with the facts of the case does not excuse hisnegligence. Rule 18.02 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall not handle any legal matter withoutadequate preparation. While it is true that respondent was not complainant’s lawyer from the trial to theappellate court stage, this fact did not excuse him from his duty to diligently study a case he had agreedto handle. If he felt he did not have enough time to study the pertinent matters involved, as he wasapproached by complainant’s husband only two days before the expiration of the period for filing theAppellant’s Brief, respondent should have filed a motion for extension of time to file the proper pleadinginstead of whatever pleading he could come up with, just to ‘beat the deadline set by the Court ofAppeals.’”

How about problems contacting the client, what is a lawyer to do? “If it were true that all attemptsto contact his client proved futile, the least respondent could have done was to inform the CA by filinga Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance as counsel. He could have thus explained why he was no longerthe counsel of complainant and her husband in the case and informed the court that he could no longercontact them. His failure to take this measure proves his negligence.”

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4. Misguided Zeal and Devotiona. Sebastian v. Bajar, 532 SCRA 435 (2007)

This involves a disbarment complaint against Atty. Emily A. Bajar, a lawyer of the Bureau ofAgrarian Legal Assistance (BALA) of the Department of Agrarian Reform for obstructing, disobeying,resisting, and impeding final decisions of Regional Trial Courts, the Court of Appeals and of theHonorable Supreme Court, and also for submitting those final decisions for the review and reversal ofthe DARAB, an administrative body, and for contemptuous acts and dilatory tactics. After the ejectmentsuit had been decided against her client, she filed a case for Specific Performance to produce conversionorder. She then filed a case for Maintenance of Possession with DARAB. An administrative complaintwas filed against her and the same was referred to the IBP. The Supreme Court’s directive for her to fileComment and a Rejoinder went unheeded. The IBP Resolution subsequently recommended indefinitesuspension, which resolution was “noted” by the Court, with directive to Court Administrator tocircularize IBP resolution suspending Bajar. Claiming that she did not receive the Court Administratorcircular, Atty. Bajar continued to practice law as a Prosecutor in Mandaluyong City despite hersuspension because she believed that a notation by the Court in the 20 January 1997 Resolution did notmean an implementation of the IBP’s Resolution on her indefinite suspension.

“As culled from the records, the Court had merely noted IBP Resolution No. XII-96-149 whichrecommended respondent’s indefinite suspension. ‘The term “noted” means that the Court has merelytaken cognizance of the existence of an act or declaration, without exercising a judicious deliberationor rendering a decision on the matter — it does not imply agreement or approval.’ Hence, the penaltyof indefinite suspension imposed by the IBP Board of Governors has not attained finality.”

Administrative proceedings against lawyers are sui generis and they belong to a class of their own.They are neither civil nor criminal actions but rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of itsofficer. They involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. A disciplinary actionagainst a lawyer is intended to protect the administration of justice from the misconduct of its officers.

Clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the penalty in disbarment orsuspension proceedings.

Respondent’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutesutter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondent’s conduct indicates a high degree ofirresponsibility. A Court’s Resolution is “not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it becomplied with partially, inadequately, or selectively.” Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders andprocesses and respondent’s deference is underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof will subjectthe lawyer not only to punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graverresponsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to showrespect to their processes. Respondent’s failure to comply with the Court’s directive to file a Rejoinderand to file a Comment also constitutes gross misconduct.

The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-in-interestmust initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases. In fact, the person who called the attention ofthe court to a lawyer’s misconduct “is in no sense a party, and generally has no interest in the outcome.”

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Respondent’s act of filing cases with identical issues in other venues despite the final ruling whichwas affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court is beyond the bounds of the law. “Topermit lawyers to resort to unscrupulous practices for the protection of the supposed rights of theirclients is to defeat one of the purposes of the state – the administration of justice.” Respondent abusedher right of recourse to the courts. Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandateslawyers to represent their clients with zeal but within the bounds of the law.

The penalty of suspension or disbarment is meted out in clear cases of misconduct that seriouslyaffect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. In this case, respondent hasshown her great propensity to disregard court orders. Respondent’s acts of wantonly disobeying herduties as an officer of the court show an utter disrespect for the Court and the legal profession. However,the Court will not disbar a lawyer if it finds that a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desiredend. Respondent’s acts constitute gross misconduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders of asuperior court. Respondent also violated Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Hersuspension is consequently warranted.

b. Briones v. Jimenez, 522 SCRA 236 (2007)

This arose from incidents in an Intestate Estate Proceeding. Briones was the Special Administratorwhile respondent Jimenez was counsel for the heirs. Briones complains about the act of the respondentin filing a criminal case against the former for allegedly resisting and seriously disobeying the RTCOrder directing Briones to deliver residue of the estate to the Heirs (Art. 151, RPC). Complainantclaimed that the filing of the unfounded criminal complaint was meant to obtain an improper advantageand to coerce complainant to deliver to the Heirs without any writ of execution or any pronouncementfrom the RTC as to the finality of the Order. On the other hand, respondent contended that when heassisted the Heirs in filing a criminal case against complainant, he was merely fulfilling his legal dutyto take the necessary steps to protect the interests of his clients.

“[T]here is sufficient ground in support of complainant’s claim that respondent violated Rule 19.01of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Records reveal that before respondent assisted the Heirs infiling the criminal complaint against herein complainant, he sent demand letters to the latter to complywith the Order of Judge Tipon to deliver the residue of the estate to the heirs of the late Luz J. Henson.Considering that complainant did not reply to the demand letters, respondent opted to file said criminalcomplaint in behalf of his clients for refusal to obey the lawful order of the court. The Order referred tois the third part of the assailed Order dated April 3, 2002 which directs complainant to deliver the residueto the Heirs in proportion to their shares. As aptly pointed out by complainant, respondent should havefirst filed the proper motion with the RTC for execution of the third part of said Order instead ofimmediately resorting to the filing of criminal complaint against him. A mere perusal of the rest of theOrder dated April 3, 2002 readily discloses that the approval of the report of complainant as SpecialAdministrator was suspended prior to the audit of the administration of complainant. Consequently, theRTC would still have to determine and define the residue referred to in the subject Order. The filing ofthe criminal complaint was evidently premature.”

The long and short of it? “Fair play demands that respondent should have filed the proper motionwith the RTC to attain his goal of having the residue of the estate delivered to his clients and not subjectcomplainant to a premature criminal prosecution.” Nevertheless, “[a]lthough respondent failed to live

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up to this expectation, there is no evidence that he acted with malice or bad faith. Consequently, it is butfit to reprimand respondent for his act of unfair dealing with complainant.”

c. Pena v. Aparicio, 525 SCRA 444 (2007)

This is aomplaint for disbarment for violation of Rule 19.01 – the act of a lawyer writing a demandletter the contents of which threatened complainant with the filing of criminal cases for tax evasion and falsification of documents. In short, complainant claims an act of blackmail from the respondent lawyer.

Under Rule 19.01 (Employment of Fair and Honest Means for Lawful Objectives), a lawyer shouldnot file or threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases against the adversaries of hisclient designed to secure a leverage to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own casesagainst the lawyer’s client. “In the case at bar, respondent did exactly what Canon 19 and its Ruleproscribe. Through his letter, he threatened complainant that should the latter fail to pay the amountsthey propose as settlement, he would file and claim bigger amounts including moral damages, as wellas multiple charges such as tax evasion, falsification of documents, and cancellation of business licenseto operate due to violations of laws. The threats are not only unethical for violating Canon 19, but theyalso amount to blackmail. Blackmail is ‘the extortion of money from a person by threats of accusationor exposure or opposition in the public prints, . . . obtaining of value from a person as a condition ofrefraining from making an accusation against him, or disclosing some secret calculated to operate to hisprejudice.’ In common parlance and in general acceptation, it is equivalent to and synonymous withextortion, the exaction of money either for the performance of a duty, the prevention of an injury, or theexercise of an influence. Not infrequently, it is extorted by threats, or by operating on the fears or thecredulity, or by promises to conceal or offers to expose the weaknesses, the follies, or the crime of thevictim.”

But is the act of threatening the possibility of criminal prosecution blackmail? Or, when does ademand letter become blackmail? “[I]t is quite obvious that respondent’s threat to file the cases againstcomplainant was designed to secure some leverage to compel the latter to give in to his client’s demands.It was not respondent’s intention to point out complainant’s violations of the law as he so gallantlyclaims. Far from it, the letter even contains an implied promise to ‘keep silent’ about the said violationsif payment of the claim is made on the date indicated. Indeed, the writing of demand letters is a standardpractice and tradition in this jurisdiction. It is usually done by a lawyer pursuant to the principal-agentrelationship that he has with his client, the principal. Thus, in the performance of his role as agent, thelawyer may be tasked to enforce his client’s claim and to take all the steps necessary to collect it, suchas writing a letter of demand requiring payment within a specified period. However, the letter in this casecontains more than just a simple demand to pay. It even contains a threat to file retaliatory chargesagainst complainant which have nothing to do with his client’s claim for separation pay. The letter wasobviously designed to secure leverage to compel complainant to yield to their claims. Indeed, letters ofthis nature are definitely proscribed by the Code of Professional Responsibility.”

Further, the Court said that “[t]he privileged nature of the letter was removed when respondent usedit to blackmail complainant and extort from the latter compliance with the demands of his client.”

Nevertheless, “while the writing of the letter went beyond ethical standards, we hold that disbarmentis too severe a penalty to be imposed on respondent, considering that he wrote the same out of his

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overzealousness to protect his client’s interests. Accordingly, the more appropriate penalty isreprimand.”

As a sidelight in this case, the Court took an this as an occasion to discuss whether there is a needfor a certification against forum shopping in disbarment complaints. “The Investigating Commissionerand the IBP Board of Governors took against complainant his failure to attach the certification againstforum shopping to his complaint and consequently dismissed his complaint. This Court, however,disagrees and, accordingly, grants the petition. However, a remand of the case to the IBP would undulyprolong its adjudication. The Court’s determination is anchored on the sui generis nature of disbarmentproceedings, the reasons for the certification against forum shopping requirement, complainant’ssubsequent compliance with the requirement, and the merit of complainant’s complaint againstrespondent.” Thus, “[i]n view of the nature of disbarment proceedings, the certification against forumshopping to be attached to the complaint, if one is required at all in such proceedings, must refer toanother administrative case for disciplinary proceedings against the same respondent, because such otherproceedings or ‘action’ is one that necessarily involves ‘the same issues’ as the one posed in thedisbarment complaint to which the certification is supposedly to be attached.”

Further, “[i]t would seem that the scenario sought to be avoided, i.e., the filing of multiple suits andthe possibility of conflicting decisions, rarely happens in disbarment complaints considering that saidproceedings are either ‘taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person.’ Thus, if the complainant in a disbarmentcase fails to attach a certification against forum shopping, the pendency of another disciplinary actionagainst the same respondent may still be ascertained with ease.”

5. Misappropriation of or Non-Accounting for Client’s Fundsa. Arroyo-Posidio v. Vitan, 520 SCRA 1 (2007)

Lawyers are prohibited from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and aremandated to serve their clients with competence and diligence. To this end, nothing should be done byany member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the publicin the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the profession.

Where a client gives money to his lawyer for a specific purpose, such as to file an action, appeal anadverse judgment, consummate a settlement, or pay the purchase price of a parcel of land, the lawyershould, upon failure to take such step and spend the money for it, immediately return the money to hisclient. In the instant case, respondent received the amount of P=100,000.00 as legal fees for filingadditional claims against the estate of Nicolasa S. de Guzman Arroyo. However, he failed to institutean action, thus it was imperative that he immediately return the amount to complainant upon demandtherefor. Having received payment for services which were not rendered, respondent was unjustified inkeeping complainant’s money. His obligation was to immediately return the said amount. His refusalto do so despite complainant’s repeated demands constitutes a violation of his oath where he pledges notto delay any man for money and swears to conduct himself with good fidelity to his clients.

Respondent must likewise be reminded that a lawyer should, at all times, comply with what the courtlawfully requires. It bears stressing that the judgment against him in a civil case to pay the complainant

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the amount of P=100,000, as well as interest and attorney’s fees, has long become final and executory yethe has not complied. His refusal to comply with the said order constitutes a willful disobedience to thecourt’s lawful orders.

Needless to say, too, the act of issuing a bouncing check further compounded respondent’sinfractions. The act of a lawyer in issuing a check without sufficient funds to cover the same constituteswillful dishonesty and immoral conduct as to undermine the public confidence in law and lawyers. Suchconduct indicates the respondent’s unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows suchlack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence andconstitutes a ground for disciplinary action. Lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court ordersand processes and are expected to stand foremost in complying with court directives being themselvesofficers of the court. And while respondent issued a check in the amount of P=120,000.00 in favor ofcomplainant, purportedly to satisfy the judgment against him, the check was later dishonored for havingbeen drawn against a closed account.

b. Tarog v. Ricafort, 645 SCRA 320 (2011)

Here, the complainants sought the assistance of a lawyer relative to the foreclosure of their property.The complainants alleged that the amount of P=65,000, to be used for court purposes, wasmisappropriated by the lawyer. She said the money was deposited by way of consignment. The lawyerclaimed that the amount was his acceptance fee

“Atty. Ricafort’s act of obtaining P=65,000.00 and P=15,000.00 from the Tarogs under the respectivepretexts that the amount would be deposited in court and that he would prepare and file thememorandum for the Tarogs erected a responsibility to account for and to use the amounts in accordancewith the particular purposes intended. For him to deposit the amount of P=65,000.00 in his personalaccount without the consent of the Tarogs and not return it upon demand, and for him to fail to file thememorandum and yet not return the amount of P=15,000.00 upon demand constituted a serious breachof his fiduciary duties as their attorney. He reneged on his duty to render an accounting to his clientsshowing that he had spent the amounts for the particular purposes intended. He was thereby presumedto have misappropriated the moneys for his own use to the prejudice of his clients and in violation ofthe clients’ trust reposed in him. He could not escape liability, for upon failing to use the moneys for thepurposes intended, he should have immediately returned the moneys to his clients.”

c. Freeman v. Reyes, 660 SCRA 48 (2011)

The grief of a widow was compounded by the misconduct of a lawyer she engaged to help her. Inthis case, the British husband of the complainant died and she sought the assistance of respondent sinceshe and her son could not get a visa for a trip to London. Complainant shouldered the expenses of therespondent to fly to London and secure the proceeds from the insurance company. It turned out that thelawyer’s trip was more in relation to convention than her professional engagement. In any event therespondent was able to get the insurance proceeds which she then deposited in her own personal bankaccount and without duly accounting for the same – and not handing the right amount due the client.

The Court ruled that the respondent committed gross dishonesty for having appropriated theinsurance policies of complainant’s deceased husband. It then ordered her disbarred. “[A]ssuming that

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respondent acted within the scope of her authority to represent the complainant in pursuing the insuranceclaims, she should never deviate from the benchmarks set by Canon 16 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility which mandates that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his clientthat may come into his possession. Specifically, Rule 16.01 states that a lawyer shall account for allmoney or property collected or received for or from the client, and Rule 16.03 thereof requires that alawyer shall deliver the funds and property of a client when due or upon demand. When a lawyerreceives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting tothe client showing that the money was spent for a particular purpose. And if he does not use the moneyfor the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to his client. In the present case,the cash/check voucher and the temporary receipts issued by respondent, with the letterhead of her lawfirm, Z.P. Reyes Law Office, indubitably showed that she received the total amount of P=167,000.00 fromthe complainant, in connection with the handling of the latter’s case. Respondent admitted havingreceived money from the complainant, but claimed that the total amount of P=120,000.00 she receivedwas in accordance with their agreement. Nowhere was it shown that respondent rendered an accountingor, at least, apprised the complainant of the actual expenses incurred.”

As to the misrepresentation with regard to the purpose of her complainant-financed foreign travel,the Court noted: “[C]omplainant gave P=50,000.00 to the respondent for the purpose of assisting her inclaiming the insurance proceeds; however, per Application for United Kingdom Entry Clearance, datedDecember 8, 1998, it showed that respondent’s primary purpose in traveling to London was to attendthe International Law Conference in Russell Square, London. It is appalling that respondent had the gallto take advantage of the benevolence of the complainant, then grieving for the loss of her husband, andmislead her into believing that she needed to go to London to assist in recovering the proceeds of theinsurance policies. Worse, respondent even inculcated in the mind of the complainant that she had toadhere to the nefarious culture of giving ‘grease money’ or lagay, in the total amount of P=43,000.00, tothe British Embassy personnel, as if it was an ordinary occurrence in the normal course of conductingofficial business transactions, as a means to expedite the visa applications. This runs afoul the dictumin Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall notengage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”

For the continuing guidance of those in the noble profession, the Court reminds that: “Law advocacy,it has been stressed, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births are simple rewards for a jobdone or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal offreedom from government interference, is impressed with public interest, for which it is subject to Stateregulation. Respondent’s repeated reprehensible acts of employing chicanery and unbecoming conductto conceal her web of lies, to the extent of milking complainant’s finances dry, and deceitfully arrogatingupon herself the insurance proceeds that should rightfully belong to complainant, in the guise ofrendering legitimate legal services, clearly transgressed the norms of honesty and integrity required inthe practice of law. This being so, respondent should be purged from the privilege of exercising thenoble legal profession.”

As to other reliefs that might have been sought by the complainant, the Court declared: “Being a suigeneris proceeding, the main disposition of this Court is the determination of the respondent’sadministrative liability. This does not include the grant of affirmative reliefs, such as moral andexemplary damages as prayed for by the complainant, which may very well be the subject of a separatecivil suit for damages arising from the respondent's wrongful acts, to be filed in the regular courts.”

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6. Conflict of Interestsa. Buehs v. Bacatan, 591 SCRA 217 (2009)

There is a conflict of interest where one who acted as a Voluntary Arbitrator of the NCMB alsosubsequently acted as counsel for the complainants in a criminal case they filed against the respondentin the labor case.

b. Catalan, Jr. v. Silvosa, 677 SCRA 352 (2012)

In this case, Atty. Silvosa, a public prosecutor subsequently entered his appearance as counsel forthe accused. The Court ruled that when he entered his appearance on the Motion to Post Bail BondPending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa conveniently forgot Rule 15.03 which provides that a lawyer shall notrepresent conflicting interests. The Court characterized his attempts to minimize his involvement in thesame case on two occasions can only be described as desperate. The Court cited its ruling in Hilado v.David, 84 Phil. 569, 576-579 (1949): “An attorney is employed – that is, he is engaged in hisprofessional capacity as a lawyer or counselor – when he is listening to his client’s preliminary statementof his case, or when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his client’spleadings, or advocating his client’s pleadings, or advocating his client’s cause in open court. . . . Hencethe necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and client as the yardstickfor testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonestpractitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicionof unprofessional practice. It is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste. As has been saidin another case, the question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether theattorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys,like Caesar’s wife, not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearanceof treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to theirattorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.”

The Court added that “the prohibition against representation of conflicting interests applies althoughthe attorney’s intentions were honest and he acted in good faith.”

7. Fraud Against Clienta. Sy Bang v. Sy, 586 SCRA 719 (2009)

This involves a petition for relief from a judgment dismissing action for Quieting of Title due tomisrepresentation by counsel that the clients were no longer interested. He misled them into thinkingthat earlier decision was favorable to them when in fact it is not – he allegedly was in a hurry to receivehis attorney’s fees. “Although petitioners knew that an order was already issued by the RTC in CivilCase No. 96-81, they thought that it was favorable to them, as Atty. Eduardo Santos was demanding thathe be paid his attorney’s fees after claiming that petitioners already won the case. Upon verification,petitioners were surprised and dismayed to learn, only around 29 July 2002, that their Petition forQuieting of Titles in Civil Case No. 96-81 was actually dismissed by the RTC.”

“ * * * The extrinsic or collateral fraud that invalidates a final judgment must be such that itprevented the unsuccessful party from fully and fairly presenting his case or defense and the losing party

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from having an adversarial trial of the issue. There is extrinsic fraud when a party is prevented from fullypresenting his case to the court as when the lawyer connives to defeat or corruptly sells out his client'sinterest. Extrinsic fraud can be committed by a counsel against his client when the latter is preventedfrom presenting his case to the court.” Here, the Court concluded that the petitioners were able toestablish, by a preponderance of evidence, that their former lawyer committed extrinsic fraud againstthem. “By virtue of his Manifestation filed on 19 April 2002, without petitioners’ knowledge andconsent, thus inducing the RTC to dismiss the Petition for Quieting of Titles, Atty. Eduardo Santosdeprived petitioners of the opportunity to fully and fairly present their case in court. Such is the verydefinition of extrinsic fraud, which entitles the petitioners to the grant of their Petition for Relief fromthe Order dated 6 May 2002 of the RTC in Civil Case No. 96-81.”

8. Attorney’s Feesa. Santos-Tan v. Robiso, 582 SCRA 556 (2009)

Here, the Court noted that, in practice, acceptance fees of lawyers are generally non-refundable.

b. Ortiz v. San Miguel Corporation, 560 SCRA 654 (2008)

“[T]here are two commonly accepted concepts of attorney’s fees, the so-called ordinary andextraordinary. In its ordinary concept, an attorney’s fee is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyerby his client for the legal services the former has rendered to the latter. The basis of this compensationis the fact of the attorney’s employment by and his agreement with the client. In its extraordinaryconcept, attorney’s fees are deemed indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losingparty in a litigation. The instances in which these may be awarded are those enumerated in Article 2208of the Civil Code, specifically paragraph 7 thereof, which pertains to actions for recovery of wages, andis payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have agreed that the award shall pertainto the lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof. Article 111 of the Labor Code, asamended, contemplates the extraordinary concept of attorney’s fees.” In this regard, the attorney’sfees awarded by the NLRC pertain to the complainants as indemnity for damages, not to their lawyer forhis legal services. It follows, therefore, that since the attorney’s fees pertained to the complainants asindemnity for damages, it was totally within the complainants’ right to waive the amount of saidattorney’s fees and settle for a lesser amount thereof in exchange for the immediate end to litigation.Their lawyer cannot prevent them from compromising and/or withdrawing their complaints at any stageof the proceedings just to protect his anticipated attorney’s fees.

And, are quitclaims executed without the lawyer being around defective? No. “There is no specificprovision in the Labor Code, as amended, which requires the conformity of petitioner, as thecomplainants’ counsel, to make their Deeds of Release, Waiver and Quitclaim valid.”

c. Masmud v. National Labor Relations Commission (First Division), 579 SCRA 509 (2009)

“Contingent fee contracts are subject to the supervision and close scrutiny of the court in order thatclients may be protected from unjust charges. The amount of contingent fees agreed upon by the partiesis subject to the stipulation that counsel will be paid for his legal services only if the suit or litigationprospers. A much higher compensation is allowed as contingent fees because of the risk that the lawyer

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may get nothing if the suit fails.”

In this case, the Court found nothing wrong with a contingent fee equivalent to 39% of the monetaryaward “Considering that Atty. Go successfully represented his client, it is only proper that he shouldreceive adequate compensation for his efforts. Even as we agree with the reduction of the award ofattorney's fees by the CA, the fact that a lawyer plays a vital role in the administration of justiceemphasizes the need to secure to him his honorarium lawfully earned as a means to preserve the decorumand respectability of the legal profession. A lawyer is as much entitled to judicial protection againstinjustice or imposition of fraud on the part of his client as the client is against abuse on the part of hiscounsel. The duty of the court is not alone to ensure that a lawyer acts in a proper and lawful manner,but also to see that a lawyer is paid his just fees. With his capital consisting of his brains and with hisskill acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in expenditure of time and energy, he is entitledto the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of his client to escape paymentof his just compensation. It would be ironic if after putting forth the best in him to secure justice for hisclient, he himself would not get his due.

d. National Power Corporation v. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay, 656 SCRA 60 (2011)

In this case, the Court noted that the trial court included an amount of attorney’s fees to be paid bythe defendant without providing in the body of the decision the factual and legal reasons for the same.The Court observed that “[i]n assessing attorney’s fees against NPC and in favor of the respondents, theRTC casually disregarded the fundamental distinction between the two concepts of attorney’s fees – theordinary and the extraordinary.” Apparently, the trial court judge overlooked the difference between theordinary and extraordinary concepts of attorney’s fees, i.e., that the former refers to what is agreed uponto be paid by the client to his lawyer, while the latter is in the concept of damages which the losing partymay be made to indemnify the prevailing party, but which ordinarily does not automatically accruesimply because one party prevailed.

What the trial court apparently had in mind was attorney’s fees in their ordinary not extraordinaryconcept. The High Court noted, with a veiled admonition to the Court of Appeals for not having spottedthe error, that: “By referring to the award as contingency fees, and reducing the award from 20% to 15%,the RTC was really referring to a supposed agreement on attorney’s fees between the Heirs ofMacabangkit and their counsel. As such, the concept of attorney’s fees involved was the ordinary. Yet,the inclusion of the attorney’s fees in the judgment among the liabilities of NPC converted the fees toextraordinary. We have to disagree with the RTC thereon, and we express our discomfort that the CAdid not do anything to excise the clearly erroneous and unfounded grant.”

9. Law Firmsa. Bachrach Corporation v. Philippine Ports Authority, 580 SCRA 659 (2009)

Here, the Court found that the handling lawyer in a law firm was at fault. However, the same did notabsolve the firm itself of any liability for its own negligence.

The records showed that even the filing of a motion for reconsideration from the Regional TrialCourt’s ruling was late. In this case, the lawyer even had the benefit of an extended period for the filing

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of the brief, but nevertheless failed to comply with the requirements. If the present counsel were to bebelieved, the former counsel did not even make a proper turnover of his cases – a basic matter for alawyer and his law office to attend to before a lawyer leaves. “But while fault can be attributed to thehandling lawyer, we find that the law firm was no less at fault. The departure of a lawyer activelyhandling cases for a law firm is a major concern; the impact of a departure, in terms of the assignmentof cases to new lawyers alone, is obvious. Incidents of mishandled cases due to failures in the turnoverof files are well-known within professional circles. For some reason, the law firm merely attributes thefailure to file the appeal brief to the handling lawyer. This is not true and is a buck-passing that wecannot accept. The law firm itself was grossly remiss in its duties to care for the interests of its client.”

E. LAWYERS AND GOVERNMENT SERVICE1. Catu v. Rellosa, 546 SCRA 209 (2008)

Rule 6.03 which prohibits former government lawyers from accepting “engagement oremployment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service” appliesonly to a lawyer who has left government service and in connection “with any matter in which heintervened while in said service” and has no application to one who is still in the service, such as anincumbent punong barangay.

2. Catalan, Jr. v. Silvosa, 677 SCRA 352 (2012)

A former public prosecutor could not appear as private counsel for someone whose case he dealt withwhile still in government service. The Court said: “Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03. When he enteredhis appearance on the Motion to Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa conveniently forgot Rule15.03 which provides that ‘A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consentof all concerned given after a full disclosure of facts.’”

3. Gumaru v. Quirino State College, 525 SCRA 412 (2007)

“[T]he Solicitor General cannot refuse to represent the government, its agencies, instrumentalities,officials and agents without a just and valid reason. He should not desist from appearing before the Courteven in those cases where his opinions may be inconsistent with the government or any of its agents heis expected to represent. As in the case of fiscals or prosecutors, bias or prejudice and animosity orhostility do not constitute legal and valid excuses for inhibition. Unlike a practicing lawyer who has theright to decline employment, a fiscal or prosecutor, or the Solicitor General in the case at bar, cannotrefuse to perform his functions without violating his oath of office. Refusal to perform the duty iscompellable by a writ of mandamus.”

On the other hand, government agencies were admonished not to reject the services of the SolicitorGeneral, or otherwise fail or refuse to forward the papers of a case to the OSG for appropriate action.Actions filed in the name of the Republic that are not initiated by the OSG will be summarily dismissed.Moreover, the fee of the lawyer who rendered legal service to the government in lieu of the OSG or theOGCC is the personal liability of the government official who hired his services without the prior writtenconformity of the OSG or the OGCC, as the case may be.

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4. Ramos v. Imbang, 530 SCRA 759 (2007)

Lawyers in government service are expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as they aresubject to public scrutiny. They cannot handle private cases for they are expected to devote themselvesfull-time to the work of their respective offices. A government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and isburdened with a high degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in private practice. Sincethe Public Attorney’s Office was created for the purpose of providing free legal assistance to indigentlitigants, a PAO lawyer should not accept attorney’s fees from a party as this is inconsistent with theoffice’s mission.

A lawyer could not be held guilt of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibilitywhere he did not hold the money for the benefit of the client but accepted it as his attorney’s fees.

5. Commission on Higher Education v. Dasig, 574 SCRA 227 (2008)

For the same acts which gave rise to her disbarment – Vitriolo v. Dasig, 400 SCRA 172 (2003) –Dasig was also dismissed from her position in the government. This was, however, reduced the penaltyto six-months’ suspension only by the Court of Appeals, in spite of having been informed of thedisbarment handed down by the Court during the appeal before said appellate body. The Court tookumbrage at this disregard of its earlier ruling. “The Court of Appeals committed a monumental blunderwhen it arrived at findings of fact different from those of the Court in the disbarment case. It isinexplicable why the appellate court would propound and insist on its ‘moonlighting’ conclusion wheneven Dasig herself had denied offering her services to anyone in the first place.”

The Court took to task the Court of Appeals for what it did in ignoring the Highest Court’s decisionin the disbarment case. “Despite having been apprised of the Court’s findings in the disbarment casewhich should be a matter of judicial notice in the first place, the Court of Appeals still insisted on itsdivergent finding and disregarded the Court’s decision ordering the disbarment of Dasig in which oneof the determinative facts in issue was whether Dasig had attempted to extort money . . . ” And, just tomake sure that everyone else knows who is the final arbiter when it comes to questions of law, the Courtsaid: “Apart from its mandated duty to take judicial notice of the resolution in the disbarment case, theCourt of Appeals is bound by this Court’s findings and conclusions in the said resolution in accordancewith the doctrine of ‘stare decisis et non quietamovere.’ Although the administrative case is differentfrom the disbarment case, the parties are different and trials were conducted separately, there can onlybe one truth: Dasig had attempted to extort money from the students. For the sake of certainty, aconclusion reached in one case should be applied to that which follows, if the facts are substantially thesame, even though the parties may be different. Otherwise, one would be subscribing to the sophistry:truth on one side of the Pyrenees, falsehood on the other!” The Court added: “[T]he statements of theCourt of Appeals constitute a desultory assault on the institutional integrity of this Court, aside frombeing incorrect and illogical. Indeed, the remarks tend to erode and undermine the people’s trust andconfidence in the judiciary, ironically coming from one of its subordinate courts. No lower court justiceor judge may deride, chastise or chide the Supreme Court. And the ‘with due respect’ approach thatpreceded the remarks as a veneer cannot justify much less obliterate the lack of respect which theremarks evince. In fact, it is the duty of lower courts to obey the decisions of the Supreme Court andrender obeisance to its status as the apex of the hierarchy of courts.”

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F. LAWYERS AND NOTARIZATION1. 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (1 August 2004)

a. Baylon v. Almo, 555 SCRA 248 (2008)

Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive publicinterest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarizationconverts a private document into a public document thus making that document admissible in evidencewithout further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and creditupon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon theacknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument. Notaries publicshould not take for granted the solemn duties pertaining to their office. Slipshod methods in theirperformance of the notarial act are never to be countenanced. They are expected to exert utmost care inthe performance of their duties, which are dictated by public policy and are impressed with publicinterest.

A notary public should exercise utmost diligence in ascertaining the true identity of the person whorepresents himself. He should not rely on Community Tax Certificates in view of the ease with they areobtained these days. Recognizing the established unreliability of a community tax certificate in provingthe identity of a person who wishes to have his document notarized, the Supreme Court did not includeit in the list of competent evidence of identity.

2. Documents, Notarization and Evidentiary Valuea. Bautista v. Silva, 503 SCRA 334 (2006)

When the document under scrutiny is a special power of attorney that is duly notarized, the notarialacknowledgment is prima facie evidence of the fact of its due execution. A buyer presented with sucha document would have no choice between knowing and finding out whether a forger lurks beneath thesignature on it. The notarial acknowledgment has removed that choice from him and replaced it with apresumption sanctioned by law that the affiant appeared before the notary public and acknowledged thathe executed the document, understood its import and signed it. In reality, he is deprived of such choicenot because he is incapable of knowing and finding out but because, under our notarial system, he hasbeen given the luxury of merely relying on the presumption of regularity of a duly notarized SPA. Andhe cannot be faulted for that because it is precisely that fiction of regularity which holds togethercommercial transactions across borders and time.

In sum, all things being equal, a person dealing with a seller who has possession and title to theproperty but whose capacity to sell is restricted, qualifies as a buyer in good faith if he proves that heinquired into the title of the seller as well as into the latter’s capacity to sell; and that in his inquiry, herelied on the notarial acknowledgment found in the seller’s duly notarized special power of attorney. Heneed not prove anything more for it is already the function of the notarial acknowledgment to establishthe appearance of the parties to the document, its due execution and authenticity. But said rule shouldnot apply, when there is an apparent flaw afflicting the notarial acknowledgment of the special powerof attorney as would cast doubt on the due execution and authenticity of the document; or when thebuyer has actual notice of circumstances outside the document that would render suspect its genuineness.

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3. Notarial Misconduct and Other Irregularitiesa. Pantoja-Mumar v. Flores, 520 SCRA 470 (2007)

Notarization of documents is not an empty, meaningless or routinary act – it is through the act ofnotarization that a private document is converted into a public one, making it admissible in evidencewithout need of preliminary proof of authenticity and due execution. A notary public should not notarizea document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed andpersonally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.

b. Guerrero v. Bihis, 521 SCRA 394 (2007)

The acknowledgment of a notarial will coerces the testator and the instrumental witnesses to declarebefore an officer of the law, the notary public, that they executed and subscribed to the will as their ownfree act or deed. And, an acknowledgment can only be made before a competent officer, that is, a lawyerduly commissioned as a notary public. Outside the place of his commission, a notary public is bereft ofpower to perform any notarial act – he is not a notary public. Acknowledgment taken outside theterritorial limits of the officer’s jurisdiction is void as if the person taking it were wholly without officialcharacter.

c. Aquino v. Pascua, 539 SCRA 1 (2007)

A lawyer is guilty of misconduct in the performance of his duties if he fails to register in his NotarialRegister the affidavits-complaints which were filed in an administrative case before the Civil ServiceCommission.

d. St. Mary’s Farm, Inc. v. Prima Real Properties, Inc., 560 SCRA 704 (2008)

The non-appearance of the party before the notary public who notarized the deed does not necessarilynullify or render the parties’ transaction void ab initio. However, the non-appearance of the partyexposes the notary public to administrative liability which warrants sanction by the Court.

Notarization converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in courtwithout further proof of its authenticity. On the basis of this notarized board resolution, a person hasevery reason to rely on an agent’s authority to sell the subject property.

e. Abadiano v. Martir, 560 SCRA 676 (2008)

In this case, two documents allegedly had the same notarial inscriptions. Did it affect the validity ofthe document? The Court held that the error in the notarial inscription would not have invalidated thesale. It only meant that the document cannot be treated as a notarial document and thus, not entitled tothe presumption of regularity. The document would be taken out of the realm of public documents whosegenuineness and due execution need not be proved. It would have to be proven as an private document.

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G. DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST LAWYERS

1. Disbarment as Last Recoursea. Pantoja-Mumar v. Flores, 520 SCRA 470 (2007)

Disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment less severe – such as reprimand,suspension, or fine – would accomplish the end desired.

2. Proceedings Sui Generisa. Paras v. Paras, 529 SCRA 81 (2007)

In this case, the administrative case against Atty. Paras resulted in his suspension for 6 months forfalsifying his wife’s signature in bank documents and suspension for one year for immorality andabandonment of family. Would this also translate into basis for declaration of nullity of marriage? No.

“Jurisprudence abounds that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. Theyare distinct from and may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. The basic premise is thatcriminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that thedisposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa.” Stated otherwise,“one’s unfitness as a lawyer does not automatically mean one’s unfitness as a husband or vice versa.The yardsticks for such roles are simply different. This is why the disposition in a disbarment casecannot be conclusive on an action for declaration of nullity of marriage. While Rosa’s chargessufficiently proved Justo’s unfitness as a lawyer, however, they may not establish that he ispsychologically incapacitated to perform his duties as a husband. In the disbarment case, ‘the realquestion for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privilegesas such.’ Its purpose is ‘to protect the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court.’On the other hand, in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage based on the ground ofpsychological incapacity, the question for determination is whether the guilty party suffers a grave,incurable, and pre-existing mental incapacity that renders him truly incognitive of the basic maritalcovenants. Its purpose is to free the innocent party from a meaningless marriage. In this case, as will beseen in the following discussion, Justo’s acts are not sufficient to conclude that he is psychologicallyincapacitated, albeit such acts really fall short of what is expected from a lawyer.”

b. Garrido v. Garrido, 611 SCRA 508 (2010)

Here, the Court reiterated the rule that “[l]aws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure – suchas the verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or thefiling of affidavits of desistance by the complainant – do not apply in the determination of a lawyer’squalifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. . . . First, admission to the practice of law is acomponent of the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves serviceto the public. The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of theprivilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practiceof law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may inquire into through thisCourt. In this sense, the complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party whose interest in the

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outcome of the charge is wholly his or her own; effectively, his or her participation is that of a witnesswho brought the matter to the attention of the Court.”

Incidentally, in this case involving a charge for immorality for trying to have as many wives as a mancould get away with, the Court came up with a litany of a man’s misdeeds: among others: “In this case,the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Garrido established a patternof gross immoral conduct that warrants his disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt orunprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree. First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he leftConstancia to pursue his law studies; thereafter and during the marriage, he had romantic relationshipswith other women. He had the gall to represent to this Court that the study of law was his reason forleaving his wife; marriage and the study of law are not mutually exclusive. Second, he misrepresentedhimself to Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in truth he was already married to Constancia. This was amisrepresentation given as an excuse to lure a woman into a prohibited relationship. Third, Atty. Garridocontracted his second marriage with Maelotisea notwithstanding the subsistence of his first marriage.This was an open admission, not only of an illegal liaison, but of the commission of a crime. Fourth,Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with Atty. Valencia while his two marriages were inplace and without taking into consideration the moral and emotional implications of his actions on thetwo women he took as wives and on his six (6) children by his second marriage. Fifth, instead of makinglegal amends to validate his marriage with Maelotisea upon the death of Constancia, Atty. Garridomarried Atty. Valencia who bore him a daughter. Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge andconvinced Atty. Valencia (who was not then a lawyer) that he was free to marry, considering that hismarriage with Maelotisea was not ‘valid.’ Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty. Garridomarried Atty. Valencia in Hongkong in an apparent attempt to accord legitimacy to a union entered intowhile another marriage was in place. Eighth, after admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garridosimultaneously cohabited and had sexual relations with two (2) women who at one point were both hiswedded wives. He also led a double life with two (2) families for a period of more than ten (10) years.Lastly, Atty. Garrido petitioned for the nullity of his marriage to Maelotisea. Contrary to the positionadvanced by Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, this was not an act of facing up to his responsibility or an actof mending his ways. This was an attempt, using his legal knowledge, to escape liability for his pastactions by having his second marriage declared void after the present complaint was filed against him.By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal profession, specifically,violations of the bar admission rules, of his lawyer’s oath, and of the ethical rules of the profession.”

How about the woman with whom the immoral liaison was entered into, a woman who wasapparently gracious enough not to mind sharing her man? She was also led to the same fate. The Courtdeclared: “”Under the circumstances, we cannot overlook that prior to becoming a lawyer, Atty. Valenciaalready knew that Atty. Garrido was a married man (either to Constancia or to Maelotisea), and that healready had a family. As Atty. Garrido’s admitted confidante, she was under the moral duty to give himproper advice; instead, she entered into a romantic relationship with him for about six (6) years duringthe subsistence of his two marriages. In 1978, she married Atty. Garrido with the knowledge that he hadan outstanding second marriage. These circumstances, to our mind, support the conclusion that shelacked good moral character; even without being a lawyer, a person possessed of high moral values,whose confidential advice was sought by another with respect to the latter’s family problems, would notaggravate the situation by entering into a romantic liaison with the person seeking advice, therebyeffectively alienating the other person’s feelings and affection from his wife and family. While Atty.Valencia contends that Atty. Garrido’s marriage with Maelotisea was null and void, the fact remains that

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he took a man away from a woman who bore him six (6) children. Ordinary decency would haverequired her to ward off Atty. Garrido’s advances, as he was a married man, in fact a twice-married manwith both marriages subsisting at that time; she should have said no to Atty. Garrido from the very start.Instead, she continued her liaison with Atty. Garrido, driving him, upon the death of Constancia, awayfrom legitimizing his relationship with Maelotisea and their children. Worse than this, because of Atty.Valencia’s presence and willingness, Atty. Garrido even left his second family and six children for athird marriage with her. This scenario smacks of immorality even if viewed outside of the prism of law.We are not unmindful of Atty. Valencia’s expressed belief that Atty. Garrido’s second marriage toMaelotisea was invalid; hence, she felt free to marry Atty. Garrido. While this may be correct in the strictlegal sense and was later on confirmed by the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garrido’s marriage toMaelotisea, we do not believe at all in the honesty of this expressed belief. The records show that Atty.Valencia consented to be married in Hongkong, not within the country. Given that this marriagetranspired before the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garrido’s second marriage, we can only call thisHongkong marriage a clandestine marriage, contrary to the Filipino tradition of celebrating a marriagetogether with family. Despite Atty. Valencia’s claim that she agreed to marry Atty. Garrido only afterhe showed her proof of his capacity to enter into a subsequent valid marriage, the celebration of theirmarriage in Hongkong leads us to the opposite conclusion; they wanted to marry in Hongkong for theadded security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage outsidePhilippine jurisdiction. In this regard, we cannot help but note that Atty. Valencia afterwards opted toretain and use her surname instead of using the surname of her “husband.” Atty. Valencia, too, did notappear to mind that her husband did not live and cohabit with her under one roof, but with his secondwife and the family of this marriage. Apparently, Atty. Valencia did not mind at all “sharing” herhusband with another woman. This, to us, is a clear demonstration of Atty. Valencia’s perverse senseof moral values. Measured against the definition of gross immorality, we find Atty. Valencia’s actionsgrossly immoral. Her actions were so corrupt as to approximate a criminal act, for she married a manwho, in all appearances, was married to another and with whom he has a family. Her actions were alsounprincipled and reprehensible to a high degree; as the confidante of Atty. Garrido, she preyed on hisvulnerability and engaged in a romantic relationship with him during the subsistence of his two previousmarriages. As already mentioned, Atty. Valencia’s conduct could not but be scandalous and revoltingto the point of shocking the community’s sense of decency; while she professed to be the lawfullywedded wife, she helped the second family build a house prior to her marriage to Atty. Garrido, and didnot object to sharing her husband with the woman of his second marriage.”

Both lawyers ended up together with the same fate – disbarment.

3. Procedural Safeguardsa. Guevarra v. Eala, 529 SCRA 1 (2007)

Clearly preponderant evidence – i.e., that the evidence adduced by one party which is moreconclusive and credible than that of the other party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other –is the quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.


When it comes to administrative charges against lawyers, the respondent should not just come up

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with a nonchalant manner of defending himself. “When the integrity of a member of the bar ischallenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him. He must meet the issue and overcomethe evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integritywhich at all times is expected of him.”

4. Imprescriptibilitya. Bengco vs. Bernardo, 672 SCRA 8(2012)

The Court reiterated the principle that administrative cases against lawyers do not prescribe. “Thelapse of considerable time from the commission of the offending act to the institution of theadministrative complaint will not erase the administrative culpability of a lawyer. Otherwise, membersof the bar would only be emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding fromthe fact that as long as no private complainant would immediately come forward, they stand a chanceof being completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for.”


Since administrative offenses do not prescribe, mere delay in the filing of an administrativecomplaint against a member of the bar does not automatically exonerate a respondent. “No matter howmuch time has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act complained of and the time of theinstitution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm ofthe Court.”

5. Miscellanya. Cadiz v. Presiding Judge, Br. 48, RTC-Puerto Princesa, 654 SCRA 694 (2011)

Can the IBP Board of Governors be held liable for having prematurely recommended the disbarmentof a lawyer, the same having been based on position papers and affidavits? That is the issue in this caseinvolving a disbarment case filed against Atty. Gacott for gross misconduct, deceit, and gross dishonesty.

Even as the IBP Board recommended the disbarment of Atty. Gacott, the Supreme Court remandedthe case to the Board for further proceedings in order to give the parties the chance to fully present theircase. This then provided the basis for Atty. Gacott to file the damage suit against the members of theBoard, contending that the remand of his case is an affirmation of the latter’s arbitrary abuse of itsinvestigatory power. The Board sought dismissal but the same was denied by both the trial court and theCourt of Appeals. The Supreme Court reversed, however, holding: “The petitioner IBP Board membersare correct in claiming that Atty. Gacott’s complaint states no cause of action. The IBP Commissionerand Board of Governors in this case merely exercised delegated powers to investigate the complaintagainst Atty. Gacott and submit their report and recommendation to the Court. They cannot be chargedfor honest errors committed in the performance of their quasi-judicial function. And that was what it wasin the absence of any allegation of specific factual circumstances indicating that they acted maliciouslyor upon illicit consideration. If the rule were otherwise, a great number of lower court justices and judgeswhose acts the appellate courts have annulled on ground of grave abuse of discretion would be opentargets for damage suits.”

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The Court also pointed out that “Atty. Gacott submitted the disbarment case against him forresolution based on the position papers that he and the complainants presented, without reservation, tothe IBP along with the affidavits of their witnesses. The IBP Board prepared its report andrecommendation to the Court based on these papers and documents.”

6. Disciplinary Actions in Foreign Jurisdictionsa. Vera v. De Vera, 496 SCRA 345 (2006)

The recommendation of the hearing officer of the State Bar of California, standing alone, is not proofof malpractice. No final judgment for suspension or disbarment was meted against Atty. de Vera despitea recommendation of suspension of three years as he surrendered his license to practice law before hiscase could be taken up by the Supreme Court of California. Moreover, the judgment of the foreign courtmerely constitutes prima facie evidence of unethical acts as lawyer.

In herein case, considering that there is technically no foreign judgment to speak of, therecommendation by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California does not constitute prima facieevidence of unethical behavior by Atty. de Vera. Complainant must prove by substantial evidence thefacts upon which the recommendation by the hearing officer was based. If he is successful in this, hemust then prove that these acts are likewise unethical under Philippine law.

H. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION, REINSTATEMENT AND RESUMPTION OF

PRACTICE1. Maniago v. De Dios, 617 SCRA 142 (2010)

Guidelines in lifting of an order suspending a lawyer from the practice of law:

1)After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of law, the Court shall render adecision imposing the penalty;

2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory upon receipt thereof, respondenthas 15 days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of said motion shall render thedecision final and executory;

3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn Statement with the Court,through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted from the practice of law and hasnot appeared in any court during the period of his or her suspension;

4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP and to the Executive Judgeof the courts where respondent has pending cases handled by him or her, and/or where he or she has appeared ascounsel;

5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondent’s compliance with the order of suspension;

6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer under oath shall be a ground for theimposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.”

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2. Bernardo v. Mejia, 531 SCRA 639 (2007)

This relates to the plea for reinstatement of a 71-year-old lawyer after 15 years of having been barredfrom practice. “Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extenton the sound discretion of the Court. The action will depend on whether or not the Court decides thatthe public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice will continue to be preservedeven with the applicant’s reentry as a counselor at law. The applicant must, like a candidate foradmission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character, a fit and proper personto practice law. The Court will take into consideration the applicant’s character and standing prior to thedisbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequentto the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and the application forreinstatement.”

The Court noted that he acknowledged his indiscretions in the law profession. Fifteen years hadalready elapsed since his name was dropped from the Roll of Attorneys. At the age of seventy-one, heis begging for forgiveness and pleading for reinstatement. According to him, he has long repented andhe has suffered enough. Through his reinstatement, he wants to leave a legacy to his children and redeemthe indignity that they have suffered due to his disbarment. It then went on to reinstate him.

3. Macarubbo v. Macarubbo, – SCRA – (Adm. Case No. 6148, 22 January 2013)

In 2004, the Court disbarred respondent for having contracted a bigamous marriage with complainantand a third marriage while his first marriage to was still subsisting. Respondent filed a Motion forReconsideration/Appeal for Compassion and Mercy which the Court denied with finality in theResolution. Eight years after, respondent filed a Petition (For Extraordinary Mercy) seeking judicialclemency and reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys. The Court initially treated the suit as a secondmotion for reconsideration and accordingly, denied it for lack of merit. Subsequently, the same petitionwas endorsed to the Court by the Office of the Vice President for re-evaluation, which prompted theCourt to look into the substantive merits of the case.

In resolving the case, the Court referred to the guidelines for resolving requests for judicial clemencywhich it had earlier set out in Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of QuezonCity, Branch 37, Appealing for Clemency, 533 SCRA 534 (2007), viz:

1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited tocertifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judgesassociations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding ofguilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation.

2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reform.

3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him that canbe put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.

4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contributionto legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well aspotential for public service.

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5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.

“Moreover, to be reinstated to the practice of law, the applicant must, like any other candidate foradmission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character.”

The Court found Macarrubo to have sufficiently complied with the standards and accordinglyreinstated him. “Respondent has sufficiently shown his remorse and acknowledged his indiscretion inthe legal profession and in his personal life. He has asked forgiveness from his children by complainantTeves and maintained a cordial relationship with them as shown by the herein attached pictures. Recordsalso show that after his disbarment, respondent returned to his hometown in Enrile, Cagayan and devotedhis time tending an orchard and taking care of his ailing mother until her death in 2008. In 2009, he wasappointed as Private Secretary to the Mayor of Enrile, Cagayan and thereafter, assumed the position ofLocal Assessment Operations Officer II/ Office-In-Charge in the Assessor’s Office, which office hecontinues to serve to date.” The Court also noted that, “[a]t 58 years of age, he still has productive yearsahead of him that could significantly contribute to the upliftment of the law profession and thebetterment of society. While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline and even remove its errantofficers, concomitant to it is its duty to show compassion to those who have reformed their ways, . . .”

4. Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law, Benjamin M. Dacanay, 540 SCRA 424 (2007)

A lawyer who has lost his citizenship cannot practice in the Philippines. Does his reacquisition ofPhilippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 (“Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of2003”) automatically restore the privilege to practice law? Since Filipino citizenship is a requirementfor admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently,the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jureterminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied toforeigners. The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen ofanother country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because “all Philippinecitizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippinecitizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225].” Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen ofanother country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it inaccordance with RA 9225. Nevertheless, although he is also deemed never to have terminated hismembership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.

“Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and hereacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions ‘(he) shall apply with the proper authorityfor a license or permit to engage in such practice.’ Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquiresFilipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure from thisCourt the authority to do so, conditioned on: (a) the updating and payment in full of the annualmembership dues in the IBP; (b) the payment of professional tax; (c) the completion of at least 36 credithours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially significant to refresh theapplicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and (d) theretaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as alawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republicof the Philippines.”

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I. LAWYERS AS JUSTICES, JUDGES AND COURT EMPLOYEES1. A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC (1 October 2002)

Administrative cases against erring lower court justices and judges, and lawyers in the judiciary maybe automatically treated as disbarment cases.

2. Miscellanya. De La Cruz v. Carretas, 532 SCRA 218 (2007)

Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, the administrative case against respondent judge was also

considered as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a member of the bar. Violation of the fundamentaltenets of judicial conduct embodied in the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary,the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics constitutes a breach of Canons 1 and 11of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Certainly, a judge who falls short of the ethics of the judicialoffice tends to diminish the people’s respect for the law and legal processes. He also fails to observe andmaintain the esteem due to the courts and to judicial officers. Respondent judge also transgressed Canon8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he humiliated, insulted or embarrassedlawyers appearing in his sala. Instead of establishing a cordial and collaborative atmosphere withlawyers, respondent judge alienated them and effectively disregarded their significant role in theadministration of justice. He was found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge, for which he was finedP=7,500 and also adjudged guilty of violating Canons 1, 8 and 11 and Rule 8.01 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility, for which was fined another amount of P=7,500.

b. Heirs of Spouses Jose and Concepcion Olorga v. Beldia, 578 SCRA 191 (2009)

Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, this administrative case against respondent as a judge, based ongrounds which are also grounds for the disciplinary action against members of the Bar, shall beconsidered as disciplinary proceedings against such judge as a member of the Bar.

Violation of the fundamental tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the Code of Judicial Conductconstitutes a breach of Canons 1 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Certainly,a judge who falls short of the ethics of the judicial office tends to diminish the people’s respect for thelaw and legal processes. He also fails to observe and maintain the esteem due to the courts and to judicialofficers. Respondent judge’s negligence also ran counter to Canon 12 of the CPR.

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J. JUDICIAL ETHICS

1. In Re: Undated Letter of Mr. Louis C. Biraogo, Petitioner in Biraogo v. Nograles andLimkaichong, G.R. No. 179120, 580 SCRA 106 (2009)

The subsequent retirement of a judge or any judicial officer from the service does not preclude thefinding of any administrative liability to which he is answerable. The New Code of Judicial Conductprovides that confidential information acquired by justices and judges in their judicial capacity shall notbe used or disclosed for any other purpose not related to their judicial duties. Ineluctably, any release ofa copy to the public, or to the parties, of an unpromulgated ponencia infringes on the confidential internaldeliberations of the Court. It is settled that the internal deliberations of the Court are confidential. Afrank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure byinterested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercisejudicial power. And, the fact that Justice Reyes was not formally charged is of no moment. It is settledthat under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court may impose its authority upon erring judgeswhose actuations, on their face, would show gross incompetence, ignorance of the law ormisconduct.

For leaking a confidential internal document of the En Banc, the committee likewise finds JusticeReyes administratively liable for GROSS MISCONDUCT for violating his lawyer’s oath and the Codeof Professional Responsibility, for which he may be disbarred or suspended per Section 27, Rule 138of the Rules of Court. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires a lawyer to upholdthe Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. It is likewiseprovided in Rule 1.01 and 1.02 of the said canon that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,immoral or deceitful conduct and that a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance ofthe law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. Here, the act of Justice Reyes not only violatedthe New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, the Code of Judicial Conduct and theCanons of Judicial Ethics, it also infringed on the internal deliberations of the Court and impeded anddegraded the administration of justice. The act is rendered all the more pernicious considering that it wascommitted by no less than a justice of the Supreme Court who was supposed to serve as example to thebench and bar.

That Justice Reyes was an impeachable officer when the investigation started is of no moment. Therule prohibiting the institution of disbarment proceedings against an impeachable officer who is requiredby the Constitution to be a member of the bar as a qualification in office applies only during his or hertenure and does not create immunity from liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged violations ofthe Code of Judicial Conduct or other supposed violations. Once the said impeachable officer is nolonger in office because of his removal, resignation, retirement or permanent disability, the Court mayproceed against him or her and impose the corresponding sanctions for misconduct committed duringhis tenure, pursuant to the Court’s power of administrative supervision over members of the bar.Provided that the requirements of due process are met, the Court may penalize retired members ofthe Judiciary for misconduct committed during their incumbency.

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2. Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita, 526 SCRA 353 (2007)

Since from records of the Supreme Court, respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen, hewas enjoined from accepting an appointment to the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Courtor assuming the position and discharging the functions of that office, until he shall have successfullycompleted all necessary steps, through the appropriate adversarial proceedings in court, to show that heis a natural-born Filipino citizen and correct the records of his birth and citizenship.

3. Topacio v. Ong, 574 SCRA 817 (2009)

The rightful authority of a judge, in the full exercise of his public judicial functions, cannot bequestioned by any merely private suitor, or by any other, except in the form especially provided by law.To uphold such action would encourage every disgruntled citizen to resort to the courts, thereby causingincalculable mischief and hindrance to the efficient operation of the governmental machine.

4. Flores v. Garcia, 567 SCRA 342 (2008)

Judicial office circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge and imposes a number of restrictionsthereon which he must pay for accepting and occupying an exalted position in the administration ofjustice. His personal behavior, not only upon the bench but also in everyday life, should be abovereproach and free from the appearance of impropriety. The Code of Judicial Ethics dictates that a judge,in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave withpropriety at all times. Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willinglyaccept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. He shouldpersonify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. Thus, when respondent judge actedwithout exercising civility, self-restraint, prudence and sobriety even – if at all – he was indeedprovoked, he did so in violation of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

5. Andres v. Majaducon, 574 SCRA 169 (2009)

The act of a judge of unceremoniously citing complainants in direct contempt is a clear evidence ofhis unjustified use of the authority vested upon him by law. While the power to punish in contempt isinherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold due administrationof justice, still, judges must be slow to punish for direct contempt. This drastic power must be usedjudiciously and sparingly. A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion,or pettiness in the performance of his duties. The salutary rule is that the power to punish for contemptmust be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatoryidea of punishment. The courts must exercise the power to punish for contempt for purposes that areimpersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for thefunctions that they exercise. Besides the basic equipment of possessing the requisite learning in the law,a magistrate must exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint. Ajudge should be the last person to be perceived as a petty tyrant holding imperious sway over his domain.

6. Laurel v. Francisco, 624 SCRA 1 (2010)

A judge, as a public servant, should not be so thin-skinned or sensitive as to feel hurt or offended

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if a citizen expresses an honest opinion about him which may not altogether be flattering to him – heshould never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the performance ofhis duties. A judge, in issuing a Direct Contempt Order without legal basis, is more appropriately guiltyof the administrative offense of grave abuse of authority, rather than gross ignorance of the law andincompetence.

7. Velasco v. Angeles, 530 SCRA 204 (2007)

An act unrelated to a judge’s discharge of judicial functions may give rise to administrative liabilityeven when such act constitutes a violation of penal law. Criminal and civil cases are altogether differentfrom administrative matters, and each must be disposed of according to the facts and the law applicableto it – the disposition in the first two will not necessarily govern the third, and vice versa.

8. Luarca v. Molato, 670 SCRA 293 (2012)

The complainants charged respondent judge and his wife with having enticed them to invest in acorporation (Lucky Socorro Investor and Credit Corporation) in which the judge’s wife was thePresident, promising the complainants with interest of 2.5% per month. There was failure to deliver onthe promised rate of return, and gave land titles instead as collaterals.

The Court found no evidence in these cases that the judge engaged in a private business, undulymixing it up with his official work as judge, and that the complainants themselves were unsure of thenature of the judge’s involvement in the corporation. They seem to have connected him to it by the merefact that the president of that corporation was his wife. The Court concluded: “It is unmistakable fromcomplainants’ testimonies that Judge Molato never used the fact of his being a judge to entice them intoputting money into Lucky Corporation.” Thus, “[a]bsent any showing that Judge Molato defraudedcomplainants of their money or committed acts that detract from the dignity of his position, the mere factthat the corporation of which his wife was the president had difficulties meeting its obligations does notper se make him lacking in moral integrity and of questionable character as would make him liable forconduct unbecoming a judge.”

Is the judge then completely off the hook? No. He was reprimanded “for agreeing to serve as one ofLucky Corporation’s alternate bank signatories even if he may not have performed such service for thecorporation. He has no business agreeing to the performance of such service. His offense constitutes aviolation of Administrative Circular 5 which in essence prohibits public officials from performing oragreeing to perform functions or services outside of their official functions for the reason that the entiretime of the officials and employees of the judiciary shall be devoted to their official work to ensure theefficient and speedy administration of justice.”

9. Geroy v. Calderon, 573 SCRA 188 (2008)

The complainant’s guilt or intentions in an immoral relationship with a judge does not mitigate thelatter’s liability. Whatever intentions complainant may have has no bearing. The purpose of anadministrative proceeding is to protect the public service, based on the time-honored principle that apublic office is a public trust. And complainants are, in a real sense, only witnesses therein.

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10. Cañeda v. Menchavez, 580 SCRA 521 (2009)

In the courtroom, a lawyer makes submissions before a judge whose role is to hear and consider thesubmissions, and subsequently rule on the matter. It is not a situation where two equals, such as theopposing counsels, argue against each other. The respondent judge had a misplaced concept of what acourtroom situation should ideally be when he was effectively arguing with counsel as shown by hisclearly contentious stance when he made his ruling. He should have coolly ruled and allowed counselto respond to his ruling, instead of proceeding in a manner that invited further arguments. And when thecomplainant-lawyer continued to argue despite the judge’s ruling, the latter’s response, under thissituation, should have been to direct the complainant to wind up his arguments under pain of directcontempt if this warning would be disregarded. Thereafter, he could have declared the complainant indirect contempt if he persisted in his arguments. A direct contempt, of course, is not enforced by ajudge’s act of bringing out his weapon and asking counsel the direct question “What do you want?” Thisconfrontational manner – shown usually in the western genre of movies – has no place in the justicesystem. There are agents of the law, specifically, officers of the court and the police who can be calledupon to implement contempt orders and restore order as needed. Bringing out a gun for everyone presentin the court to see, even for purposes of maintaining order and decorum in the court, is inexcusable inthe absence of overt acts of physical aggression by a party before the court.

11. Bayaca v. Ramos, 577 SCRA 93 (2009)

The act of a judge of issuing an order for the arrest of a person despite the deletion by the appellatecourt of that portion of the judgment imposing the penalty of imprisonment is an act of inexcusablenegligence and conduct which is prejudicial to the best interest of the service. It shows failure to observethat diligence, prudence and circumspection which the law requires in the rendition of any public service.The judge cannot pass on the blame to his Clerk of Court and/or Stenographer. A judge cannot takerefuge behind the inefficiency or mismanagement of his very own court personnel. Certainly, a judgeis responsible not only for the dispensation of justice but also for managing his court efficiently to ensurethe prompt delivery of court services. In the discharge of the functions of his office, respondent Judgemust strive to act in a manner that puts him and his conduct above reproach and beyond suspicion. Hemust act with extreme care for his office indeed is laden with a heavy burden of responsibility. Surely,a judge is enjoined to pore over all documents whereon he is required to affix his signature and give hisofficial imprimatur. And, his act of in giving money in exchange for the withdrawal of the cases filedagainst him by the complainant cannot be countenanced, the same being considered by law as anobstruction of justice.

12. Santiago III v. Enriquez, Jr., 579 SCRA 1 (2009)

That cases cited to support a Decision are not applicable, and the appreciation of evidence and factsis erroneous, do not necessarily warrant the filing of an administrative complaint against a judge, unlessthe Decision is tainted with fraud, malice or dishonesty or with deliberate intent to cause injustice. Anadministrative complaint is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available, such asa motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari, unless the assailed order or decisionis tainted with fraud, malice, or dishonesty. The principle of “judicial immunity” insulates judges, andeven Justices of superior courts, from being held to account criminally, civilly or administratively foran erroneous decision rendered in good faith.

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The filing of charges against a single member of a division of the appellate court is inappropriate –the Court of Appeals is a collegiate court whose members reach their conclusions in consultation andaccordingly render their collective judgment after due deliberation.

13. Re: Cases Left Undecided by Former Judge Ralph S. Lee, MeTC, Branch 38, Quezon City, 580SCRA 461 (2009)

The charge of misrepresentation, a form of dishonesty as the OCA puts it, for the purpose of ensuringa personal gain, carries a grave implication on the member of the judiciary who committed it. It foreverstains the name of that member and makes him a pariah among those who learn of his dishonesty. Hisstanding with his peers, even with this Court, would particularly be affected.

14. Mago v. Peñalosa-Fermo, 582 SCRA 1 (2009)

The act of a judge of delegating the examination of the complainant in the preliminary investigationto the stenographer, and worse, by allowing the witnesses to “read/study the [written] question[s]” to bepropounded to them and to “write their answers [thereto]” upon such judge’s justification that thescheme was for the convenience of the stenographers, betrays her lack of knowledge of procedure,thereby contributing to the erosion of public confidence in the judicial system. By way of flashback,“[p]rior to the amendment on October 3, 2005 of Rules 112 and 114 of the Rules of Court via A.M. No.05-8-26-SC, Re: Amendment of Rules 112 and 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure byRemoving the Conduct of Preliminary Investigation from Judges of the First Level Courts, judges ofmunicipal trial courts were empowered to conduct preliminary investigations in which they exerciseddiscretion in determining whether there was probable cause to hale the respondent into court. Such beingthe case, they could not delegate the discretion to another.”

15. Re: Complaint Against Justice Elvi S. Asuncion of the Court of Appeals, 518 SCRA 512 (2007)

The failure of a judge to decide a case within the required period constitutes gross inefficiency which,if the case remains undecided for years, would become serious misconduct that would justify dismissalfrom the service. In the case of respondent Justice Asuncion, the prolonged delay in deciding orresolving a staggering number of cases/matters assigned to him, borders on serious misconduct whichcould subject him to the maximum administrative sanction.

Failure to follow basic legal commands embodied in the law and the Rules constitutes grossignorance of the law, from which no one is excused, and surely not a judge. Judges owe it to the publicto be knowledgeable, hence they are expected to have more than just a modicum of acquaintance withthe statutes and procedural rules. While a judge is presumed to act with regularity and good faith in theperformance of judicial functions, a blatant disregard of the clear and unmistakable provisions of astatute, as well as Supreme Court circulars enjoining strict compliance therewith, upends thispresumption and subjects the magistrate to administrative sanctions.

16. Heirs of Spouses Jose and Concepcion Olorga v. Beldia, 578 SCRA 191 (2009)

Judges who are transferred do not take with them cases substantially heard by them and submittedto them for decision unless they are requested to do so by any of the parties and such request is endorsed

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by the incumbent presiding judge through the OCA.

A judge could not be held liable for infidelity in the custody of public documents where there is noevidence that the records were lost while they were in his possession, that he took them with him toanother place or that he destroyed or concealed them. While it is not the presiding judge who makes theentries in the docket book, still the trial judge is expected to adopt a system of record management andorganize his docket in order to bolster the prompt and effective dispatch of business – proper andefficient court management is the responsibility of the judge. It is incumbent upon judges to devise anefficient recording and filing system in their courts so that no disorderliness can affect the flow of casesand their speedy disposition. A judge is negligent if he fails to observe that degree of care, precautionand vigilance required of his position. Considering his administrative authority over the court’spersonnel, he directs them to be diligent in the performance of their functions. Here, the respondentjudge neglected to properly supervise them, particularly those in charge of the docket books, resultingin incomplete entries therein.

17. Re: Conviction of Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, RTC, Br. 121, Caloocan City in Criminal CasesNos. Q-97-69655 to 56 for Child Abuse, 543 SCRA 196 (2008)

An incumbent judge’s conviction by the RTC does not necessarily warrant her suspension in themeantime that her appeal is pending. As such, she still enjoys the constitutional presumption ofinnocence. It must be remembered that the existence of a presumption indicating the guilt of the accuseddoes not in itself destroy the constitutional presumption of innocence unless the inculpating presumption,together with all the evidence, or the lack of any evidence or explanation, proves the accused’s guiltbeyond a reasonable doubt. Until the accused’s guilt is shown in this manner, the presumption ofinnocence continues.

18. Garcia v. Miro, 582 SCRA 127 (2009)

The Supreme Court’s administrative supervision over all inferior courts and court personnel, doesnot extend to a criminal case filed against a judge which is not related to the performance of his dutiesas a judge. Trial courts retain jurisdiction over the criminal aspect of offenses committed by judges ofthe lower courts.

19. Marcoleta v. Borra, 582 SCRA 474 (2009)

Section 58 of Article VII of the Omnibus Election Code which provides that “[t]he chairman andmembers of the Commission shall be subject to the canons of judicial ethics in the discharge of theirfunctions” relates to the quasi-judicial function of the Comelec, which function rests on judgment ordiscretion, so that while it is of judicial nature or character, it does not involve the exercise of functionsof a judge. “The same provision thus directs that in the exercise of the Comelec’s quasi-judicial power,the chairman and members should be guided by the canons of judicial ethics. It bears emphasis that theNew Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary applies only to courts of law, of which theComelec is not, hence, sanctions pertaining to violations thereof are made exclusively applicable tojudges and justices in the judiciary, not to quasi-judicial officers like the Comelec chairman andmembers, who have their own codes of conduct to steer them.”

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20. Mercado v. Salcedo, 604 SCRA 4 (2009)

The retirement of the respondent judge and death of both the complainant and the respondent judgepending the investigation of these administrative cases are not deterrents to the resolution on the meritsof the complaints and to the imposition of the sanctions demanded by the circumstances – the death ofthe respondent, as a rule, does not preclude a finding of administrative liability, unless, first, therespondent has not been heard and continuation of the proceedings would deny him of his right to dueprocess, second, exceptional circumstances exist in the case leading to equitable and humanitarianconsiderations, and third, the kind of penalty imposed or imposable would render the proceedingsuseless.

21. City of Cebu v. Gako, Jr., 554 SCRA 15 (2008)

Can a judge call to the witness stand somebody that neither of the parties parties intend to presentas a witness? And, if he does so, could he be held administratively liable for violating any of the canonsof judicial ethics, such as the rules on propriety and impartiality? Here, the Court said no. It did not findanything irregular in the act of a judge “calling a witness to the stand and conducting the latter’s directtestimony even if the respective counsels were not interested or did not intend to present said person astheir witness,” since “[r]evealed in the hearings of the said case is that the respondent judge intended toobtain enlightenment from the said witness, the project director of one of the signatories to the contractbeing litigated. In not a few cases, this Court has declared that the trial judge, if he is not satisfied afterhearing all the evidence adduced by the parties, may, in the exercise of sound discretion, on his ownmotion and in furtherance of justice, call additional witnesses or recall some or the same witnesses forthe purpose of questioning them himself to enlighten him on particular facts or issues involved in thecase.”

22. Medina v. Canoy, 666 SCRA 424 (2012)

In this case, among the defenses of the judge put up in the administrative case against him is the lackof personality of the complaining lawyers since they neither counsel nor party litigants in the proceedingsthey were complaining about. The Court dismissed such defense, upholding the Office of the CourtAdministrator in holding that in administrative proceedings it is immaterial whether or not thecomplainant himself or herself has a cause of action against the respondent. The Court declared: “Tosettle the issue on complainant’s cause of action, the OCA correctly observed that complainants may filethe present administrative complaint against respondent judge. As the Court held in LBC Bank ViganBranch v. Guzman, [510 SCRA 28 (2006),] the objective in administrative cases is the preservation ofthe integrity and competence of the Judiciary by policing its ranks and enforcing discipline among itserring employees.”

23. Re: Petition for Judicial Clemency of Judge Irma Zita V. Masamayor, 667 SCRA 467 (2012)

Under Section 5, Rule 4 of the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council, those who have been foundguilty in an administrative case where the penalty imposed is at least a fine of more than P=10,000.00,unless granted judicial clemency, are disqualified from being nominated for appointment to any judicialpost or as Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman.

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In this case, Judge Masamayor applied with the JBC for lateral transfer from Talibon, Bohol toTagbilaran City (nearer her residence). Because of her previous administrative cases where she wasfound guilty of gross inefficiency in 1999 and 2000 for belatedly filing her motions for extension of timeto resolve several cases then pending before her sala – for which she was fined in amounts from P=5,000to P=12,000 – she was advised by the JBC that she was not included in the list of nominees for the RTCbranches in Tagbilaran City. She then sought judicial clemency.

The Court referred to the guidelines it set out in Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, MetropolitanTrial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for Clemency, 533 SCRA 534 (2007), and afterapplying them to the Judge Masamayor, it found merit in the request.

In granting judicial clemency, the Court noted several factors that it took into account, including thefact that she was not seeking a promotion, just a lateral transfer: “A review of the records reveals thatpetitioner has exhibited remorse for her past misdeeds, which occurred more than ten (10) years ago.While she was found to have belatedly filed her motions for additional time to resolve the aforecitedcases, the Court noted that she had disposed of the same within the extended period sought, except inA.M. No. 99-2-79-RTC where she submitted her compliance beyond the approved 45-day extendedperiod. Nevertheless, petitioner has subsequently shown diligence in the performance of her duties andhas not committed any similar act or omission. In the Memorandum of the Office of the CourtAdministrator, her prompt compliance with the judicial audit requirements of pending cases wasacknowledged and she was even commended for her good performance in the effective management ofher court and in the handling of court records. Moreover, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)Bohol Chapter has shown its high regard for petitioner per the letter of support signed by a number ofits members addressed to the IBP dated October 15, 1999 during the pendency of her administrativecases and the IBP Resolution No. 11, Series of 2009 endorsing her application for lateral transfer to theRTC of Tagbilaran City. Petitioner’s dedicated service of 23 years to the judiciary, having been firstappointed as Municipal Circuit Trial Court judge in 1989, merits compassion from the Court. It bearsto note that petitioner does not seek for promotion to a higher position but only a lateral transfer to aplace of work near her residence.”2

N

In regard to the concept of judicial clemency itself, the Court in Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz explained that2

“[c]lemency, as an act of mercy removing any disqualification, should be balanced with the preservation of public confidencein the courts. The Court will grant it only if there is a showing that it is merited. Proof of reformation and a showing ofpotential and promise are indispensable.”