Legres Research on Religious Freedom

7/31/2019 Legres Research on Religious Freedom

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Religious Freedom Jurisprudence


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I. Local Jurisprudence

Register of Deeds vs. Ung Si Su Temple

Facts:

The Register of Deeds for the province of Rizal refused to accept for record

a deed of donation executed in due form on January 22, 1953, by Jesus Dy, a Filipino

citizen, conveying a parcel of residential land, in Caloocan, Rizal, known as lot No. 2,

block 48-D, PSD-4212, G.L.R.O. Record No. 11267, in favor of the unregistered

religious organization UngSiu Si Temple, operating through three trustees all of

Chinese nationality. The donation was duly accepted by Yu Juan, of Chinese nationality,

founder and deaconess of the Temple, acting in representation and in behalf of the latter

and its trustees.

The refusal of the Registrar was elevated en Consulta to the IVth Branch of the

Court of First Instance of Manila. On March 14, 1953, the Court upheld the action of

the Rizal Register of Deeds, stating that

this Court is of the opinion and so hold that in view of the

provisions of the sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution of the

Philippines limiting the acquisition of land in the Philippines to its citizens,

or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital

stock of which is owned by such citizens adopted after the enactment of said


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Act No. 271, and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Krivenko

vs. the Register of Deeds of Manila, the deed of donation in question should

not be admitted for registration." (Printed Rec. App. pp. 17-18).

Counsel for the done UySiu Si Temple appealed to the Supreme Court, claiming:

(1) that the acquisition of the land in question, for religious purposes, is authorized and

permitted by Act No. 271 of the old Philippine Commission, providing as follows:

"SECTION 1. It shall be lawful for all religious associations, of

whatever sort or denomination, whether incorporated in the Philippine

Islands or in the name of other country, or not incorporated at all, to hold

land in the Philippine Islands upon which to build churches, parsonages, or

educational or charitable institutions.

"SECTION. 2.Such religious institutions, if not incorporated, shall

hold the land in the name of three Trustees for the use of such associations;

. . ." (Printed Rec. App. p. 5.)

and (2) that the refusal of the Register of Deeds violates Article III, Section 1 (7) or the

freedom of religion clause of the Constitution.


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Issue:

Whether or not the acquisition of the land in question, for religious purposes, is

authorized and permitted by Act No. 271 of the old Philippine Commission

Whether or not the refusal of the Register of Deeds to accept the Deed of

Donation violates Article III, Section 1 (7) of the Constitution

Held:

In view of the absolute terms of section 5, Title XIII, of the Constitution,

the provisions of Act No. 271 of the old Philippine Commission must be deemed

repealed since the Constitution was enacted, in so far as incompatible therewith. In

providing that,

"Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land

shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations or

associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the

Philippines",

The Constitution makes no exception in favor of religious associations. Neither is there

any such saving found in sections 1 and 2 of Article XIII, restricting the acquisition of

public agricultural lands and other natural resources to "corporations or associations at

least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens" (of the

Philippines).


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The fact that the appellant religious organization has no capital stock does not

suffice to escape the Constitutional inhibition, since it is admitted that its members are of

foreign nationality. The purpose of the sixty per centum requirement is obviously to

ensure that corporations or associations allowed to acquire agricultural land or to exploit

natural resources shall be controlled by Filipinos, and the spirit of the Constitution

demands that in the absence of capital stock, the controlling membership should be

composed of Filipino citizens.

As to the complaint that the disqualification under article XIII is violative of the

freedom of religion guaranteed by Article III of the Constitution, we are by no means

convinced (nor has it been shown) that land tenure is indispensable to the free exercise

and enjoyment of religious profession or worship; or that one may not worship the

Deity according to the dictates of his own conscience unless upon land held in fee

simple. The resolution appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.


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Islamic DaWah Council of the Philippines, Inc., herein represented by Prof.

Abdulrafih H. Sayedy,petitioner, vs. Office of the Executive Secretary of the Office

of the President of the Philippines, herein represented by Hon. Alberto G. Romulo,

Executive Secretary, and the Office on Muslim Affairs, herein represented by its

Executive Director, Habib Mujahab Hashim, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines, Inc. (IDCP) a corporation that

operates under Department of Social Welfare and Development License No. SB-01-085, is a

non-governmental organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people,

especially to Muslim communities. It claims to be a federation of national Islamic

organizations and an active member of international organizations such as the Regional

Islamic Da'wah Council of Southeast Asia and the Pacific (RISEAP) and The World

Assembly of Muslim Youth. The RISEAP accredited petitioner to issue halal certifications

in the Philippines. Thus, among the functions petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars,

orient manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications to qualified products and

manufacturers.

Petitioner alleges that, on account of the actual need to certify food products as halal

and also due to halal food producers' request, petitioner formulated in 1995 internal rules

and procedures based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah for the analysis of food, inspection


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thereof and issuance of halal certifications. In that same year, petitioner began to issue, for a

fee, certifications to qualified products and food manufacturers. Petitioner even adopted for

use on its halal certificates a distinct sign or logo registered in the Philippine Patent Office

under Patent No. 4-2000-03664.

On October 26, 2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO

46 creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent OMA to

oversee its implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to

issue halal certificates and perform other related regulatory activities.

On May 8, 2002, a news article entitled "OMA Warns NGOs Issuing Illegal 'Halal'

Certification" was published in the Manila Bulletin, a newspaper of general circulation. In

said article, OMA warned Muslim consumers to buy only products with its official halal

certification since those without said certification had not been subjected to careful analysis

and therefore could contain pork or its derivatives. Respondent OMA also sent letters to

food manufacturers asking them to secure the halal certification only from OMA lest they

violate EO 46 and RA 4109. As a result, petitioner lost revenues after food manufacturers

stopped securing certifications from it.A petition for prohibition was filed by petitioner

praying for the declaration of nullity of Executive Order (EO) 46, s. 2001 and the

prohibition of herein respondents Office of the Executive Secretary and Office of Muslim

Affairs (OMA) from implementing the subject EO.

Issue:


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Whether or not Executive Order No. 46 violates Article II, Section 6 of the 1987

Constitution on the separation of Church and State

Whether or not subject EO violates Sections 15 and 16 of Article XIII of the 1987

Constitution

Whether or not respondents violated Section 10, Article III of the 1987 Constitution

Held:

OMA was created in 1981 through Executive Order No. 697 (EO 697) "to ensure the

integration of Muslim Filipinos into the mainstream of Filipino societywith due regard to their

beliefs, customs, traditions, and institutions." OMA deals with the societal, legal, political and

economic concerns of the Muslim community as a "national cultural community" and not as a

religious group. Thus, bearing in mind the constitutional barrier between the Church and State,

the latter must make sure that OMA does not intrude into purely religious matters lest it

violate the non-establishment clause and the "free exercise of religion" provision found

in Article III, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution.

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental

law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is

"designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to


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believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to

live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good."

Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the

standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive

power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of

Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food

products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing

halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of

the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.

To justify EO 46's intrusion into the subject religious activity, the Solicitor General

argues that the freedom of religion is subservient to the police power of the State. By

delegating to OMA the authority to issue halal certifications, the government allegedly seeks

to protect and promote the muslim Filipinos' right to health, and to instill health

consciousness in them.

In the case at bar, we find no compelling justification for the government to deprive muslim

organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even

on the premise that the health of muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning

to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of

the muslim Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered

to by government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the market


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are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not

encroach on the religious freedom of muslims.

Section 48(4) of the Administrative Code of 1987 gives to the National Meat

Inspection Commission (NMIC) of the Department of Agriculture (DOA) the power to

inspect slaughtered animals intended for human consumption to ensure the safety of the

meat released in the market. Another law, RA 7394, otherwise known as "The Consumer

Act of 1992," gives to certain government departments the duty to protect the interests of

the consumer, promote his general welfare and to establish standards of conduct for

business and industry. To this end, a food product, before its distribution to the market, is

required to secure the Philippine Standard Certification Mark after the concerned

department inspects and certifies its compliance with quality and safety standards.

One such government agency designated by RA 7394 is the Bureau of Food and

Drugs (BFD) of the Department of Health (DOH). Under Article 22 of said law, BFD has

the duty to promulgate and enforce rules and regulations fixing and establishing a reasonable

definition and standard of identity, a standard of quality and a standard of fill of containers

for food. The BFD also ensures that food products released in the market are not

adulterated.

Furthermore, under Article 48 of RA 7394, the Department of Trade and Industry

(DTI) is tasked to protect the consumer against deceptive, unfair and unconscionable sales

acts or practices as defined in Article 50. DTI also enforces compulsory labeling and fair


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packaging to enable the consumer to obtain accurate information as to the nature, quality

and quantity of the contents of consumer products and to facilitate his comparison of the

value of such products.

With these regulatory bodies given detailed functions on how to screen and check the

quality and safety of food products, the perceived danger against the health of muslim and

non-muslim Filipinos alike is totally avoided. Of great help are the provisions on labeling of

food products (Articles 74 to 85) of RA 7394. In fact, through these labeling provisions, the

State ably informs the consuming public of the contents of food products released in the

market. Stiff sanctions are imposed on violators of said labeling requirements.

Through the laws on food safety and quality, therefore, the State indirectlyaids muslim

consumers in differentiating food from non-food products. The NMIC guarantees that the

meat sold in the market has been thoroughly inspected and fit for consumption. Meanwhile,

BFD ensures that food products are properly categorized and have passed safety and quality

standards. Then, through the labeling provisions enforced by the DTI, Muslim consumers

are adequately apprised of the products that contain substances or ingredients that,

according to their Islamic beliefs, are not fit for human intake. These are the non-secular

steps put in place by the State to ensure that the muslim consumers' right to health is

protected. The halal certifications issued by petitioner and similar organizations come

forward as the official religious approvalof a food product fit for muslim consumption.


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We do not share respondents' apprehension that the absence of a central

administrative body to regulate halal certifications might give rise to schemers who, for

profit, will issue certifications for products that are not actually halal. Aside from the fact

that muslim consumers can actually verify through the labels whether a product contains

non-food substances, we believe that they are discerning enough to know who the reliable

and competent certifying organizations in their community are. Before purchasing a product,

they can easily avert this perceived evil by a diligent inquiry on the reliability of the

concerned certifying organization.

Wherefore, the petition is granted. Executive Order 46, s.2011 is hereby declared null

and void. Consequently, respondents are prohibited from enforcing the same.


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Gil Balbuna, et al., petitioners and appellants, vs. The Honorable Secretary of

Education, et al., respondents and appellees

Facts:

The action was brought to enjoin the enforcement of Department Order No. 8, s.

1955, issued by the Secretary of Education, promulgating rules and regulations for the

conduct of the compulsory flag ceremony in all schools, as provided in Republic Act No.

1265. Petitioners appellants assail the validity of the above Department Order, for it

allegedly denies them freedom of worship and of speech guaranteed by the Bill of Rights;

that it denies them due process of law and equal protection of the laws; and that it

unduly restricts their rights in the upbringing of their children. Since the brief for the

petitioners-appellants assails Republic Act No. 1265 only as construed and applied, the

issue ultimately boils down to the validity of Department Order No. 8, s. 1955, which

promulgated the rules and regulations for the implementation of the law.

Issue:

Whether or not Department Order No. 8 has no binding force and effect, not

having been published in the Official Gazette as allegedly required by Commonwealth Act

638, Article 2 of the New Civil Code, and Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code

Whether or not Republic Act No. 1265 is unconstitutional and void for being an

undue delegation of police power


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Held:

In relation to Article 2 of the New Civil Code and Section 11 of the Revised

Administrative Code, statutes or laws shall take effect fifteen days following the

completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless otherwise provided. It is

likewise true that administrative rules and regulations, issued to implement a law, have the

force of law. Nevertheless, the cases cited above involved circulars of the Central Bank

which provided for penalties for violations thereof and that was the primary factor that

influenced the rationaleof those decisions. In the case at bar, Department Order No. 8 does

not provide any penalty against those pupils or students refusing to participate in the flag

ceremony or otherwise violating the provisions of said order. Their expulsion was merely

the consequence of their failure to observe school discipline which the school authorities

are bound to maintain.

As observed in Gerona vs .Secretary of Education, supra,

". . . for their failure or refusal to obey school regulations about the flag

salute, they were not being prosecuted. Neither were they being criminally

prosecuted under threat of penal sanction. If they chose not to obey the flag

salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public education being

maintained at the expense of their fellow citizens, nothing more. . . . Having

elected not to comply with the regulations about the flag salute, they

forfeited their right to attend public schools.


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Finally, appellants contend that Republic Act No. 1265 is unconstitutional and void for

being an undue delegation of legislative power, "for its failure to lay down any specific and

definite standard by which the Secretary of Education may be guided in the preparation of

those rules and regulations which he has been authorized to promulgate." With this view

we again disagree. Sections 1 and 2 of the Act read as follows:

"Section 1.All educational institutions shall henceforth, observe daily flag

ceremony, which shall be simple and dignified and shall include and playing

or singing of the Philippine National Anthem.

"Section 2.The Secretary of Education is hereby authorized and directed to

issue or cause to be issued rules and regulations for the proper conduct of

the flag ceremony herein provided."

In our opinion, the requirements above-quoted constitute an adequate standard,

to wit, simplicity and dignity of the flag ceremony and the singing of the National

Anthem specially when contrasted with other standards heretofore upheld by the

Courts: "public interest" (People vs. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328): "public welfare"

(Municipality of Cardona vs. Binangonan, 36 Phil. 547); "interest of law and order"

(Rubi vs. Provincial Board, 39 Phil., 669; justice and equity and the substantial merits of

the case" (Int. Hardwood vs. Pagil Federation of Labor, 70 Phil. 602); or "adequate and

efficient instruction" (P.A.C.U. vs. Secretary of Education, 97 Phil., 806; 51 Off. Gaz.,

6230). That the Legislature did not specify the details of the flag ceremony is no

objection to the validity of the statute, for all that is required of it is the laying down of


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standards and policy that will limit the discretion of the regulatory agency. To require the

statute to establish in detail the manner of exercise of the delegated power would be to

destroy the administrative flexibility that the delegation is intended to achieve.


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Iglesia ni Cristo, complainantvs. Judge Leopoldo B. Gironella, Court of First

Instance of Abra, respondent.

Facts:

Respondent judge was charged with ignorance of the law and conduct

unbecoming a member of the bench for including in a decision penned by him,

statements offensive to the members of the Iglesiani Cristo sect to wit: ". . . It cannot,

therefore, be discarded that the filing of the charge was retorted to as a gimmick of

showing to the community of La Paz, Abra in particular and to the public in general

that the Iglesia ni Cristo inhesitatingly helps its members of his/her problem."

In his comment, respondent judge alleged that such statements complained of

are his honest appraisal and evaluation of the evidence presented.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent judges remarks about the Iglesia ni Cristo were

offensive

Held:

Under the freedom of religion guarantee, no one, much less a public official, is

privileged to characterize the actuation of edherents of a religious sect in a derogatory sense.


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Respondent judge was admonished to be much more careful in the use of language likely to

offend an individual or religious sect.


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Gregorio Aglipay, petitioner, vs. Juan Ruiz, respondent.

Facts:

In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would

order the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila

of the Thirty- third International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic

Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested

Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President

of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly

announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage for printing. Said

stamps were issued and sold, but a great part remained unsold. Petitioner seeks the issuance

from the Supreme Court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the Director of Posts from

issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International

Eucharistic Congress.

Issue:

Whether or not the action of respondent in issuing and selling said stamps is a

violation of the provisions of Article VI, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution

Held:

Respondent issued the postage stamps in question under the provisions of Act No.

4052, which contemplates no religious purpose in view. Instead, it gave the Director of Posts


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discretionary power to determine if issuance would be advantageous to the government. The

stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Church. What was emphasized is not

the Eucharistic Congress, but the City of Manila, the capital of the Philippines. Main

purpose should not be frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental results not

completed.


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Martin Centeno, petitioner, vs. Hon. Victoria Villalon-Pornillos, Presiding Judge of

the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 10, and the People of The

Philippines, respondents.

Facts:

Sometime in the last quarter of 1985, the officers of a civic organization known as

the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ngTikaylaunched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating

the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner Martin Centeno, the chairman of the

group, together with Vicente Yco, approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of

Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00. It is admitted that the solicitation

was made without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development.

As a consequence, based on the complaint of Judge Angeles, an information was filed

against petitioner Martin Centeno, together with Religio Evaristo and Vicente Yco, for

violation of Presidential Decree No. 1564, or the Solicitation Permit Law, before the

Municipal Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 2, and docketed as Criminal Case No.

2602. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts alleged

therein do not constitute an offense, claiming that Presidential Decree No. 1564 only covers

solicitations made for charitable or public welfare purposes, but not those made for

a religious purpose such as the construction of a chapel. This was denied by the trial court,

and petitioner's motion for reconsideration having met the same fate, trial on the merits

ensued.


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Issue:

Whether or not the phrase "charitable purposes" should be construed in its broadest

sense so as to include religious solicitation

Held:

Solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in

the exercise of police power. However, in this case, considering that solicitations intended

for religious purpose are not within the coverage of Presidential Decree no. 1564, as earlier

demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable.


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American Bible Society,plaintiff-appellant, vs. City of Manila, defendant-appellee.

Facts:

American Bible Society is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary

corporation duly registered and doing business in the Philippines through its Philippine

agency established in Manila in November, 1898, with its principal office at 636 Isaac Peral

in said City. The defendant-appellee is a municipal corporation with powers that are to be

exercised in conformity with the provisions of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised

Charter of the City of Manila.

In the course of its ministry, plaintiff's Philippine agency has been distributing and

selling bibles and/or gospel portions thereof (except during the Japanese occupation)

throughout the Philippines and translating the same into several Philippine dialects. On May

29, 1953, the acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed plaintiff that it was

conducting the business of general merchandise since November, 1945, without providing

itself with the necessary Mayor's permit and municipal license, in violation of Ordinance No.

3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364, and required plaintiff to

secure, within three days, the corresponding permit and license fees, together with

compromise covering the period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953, in

the total sum of P5,821.45 (Annex A).

Issue:


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Whether or not the ordinances of the City of Manila, Nos. 3000, as amended, and

2529, 3028 and 3364, are constitutional and valid

Held:

It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered

unconstitutional, even if applied to plaintiff Society. But as Ordinance No. 2529 of the City

of Manila, as amended, is not applicable to plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellee is

powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff Society involved herein for, as stated

before, it would impair plaintiff's right to the free exercise and enjoyment of its religious

profession and worship, as well as its rights of dissemination of beliefs, We find that

Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, is also inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation

of the plaintiff.


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Fernando Ignacio and Simeon De La Cruz, petitioners-appellants, vs. The

Honorable Norbeto Ela, Mayor of Sta. Zambales, respondent-appellee.

Facts:

Petitioners are members of the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, commonly

known as Jehovah's Witnesses, whose tenets and principles are derogatory to those

professed by the Catholic organization. In its publication "FACE THE FACTS", that society

branded the latter as a religious organization which is "a part of the monstrosity now

appearing in and claiming the right to rule the earth." Desiring to hold a meeting in

furtherance of its objectives, petitioners asked respondent to give them permission to use the

public plaza together with the kiosk, but, instead of granting the permission, respondent

allowed them to hold their meeting on the northwestern part corner of the plaza. He

adopted as a policy not to allow the use of the kiosk for any meeting by any religious

denomination as it is his belief that said Kiosk should only be used "for legal purposes." And

when their request for reconsideration was denied, petitioners instituted the present action

for mandamus.

Issue:

Whether or not the action taken by respondent is unconstitutional being an

abdrigement of the freedom of speech, assembly, and worship guaranteed by the

Constitution


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Held:

The right to freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble, though

guaranteed by our Constitution, is not absolute, for it may be regulated in order that it

may not be "injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious

to the rights of the community or society", and this power may be exercised under the

"police power" of the state, which is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the

health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.

It is true that there is no law nor ordinance which expressly confers upon respondents

the power to regulate the use of the public plaza, together with its kiosk, for the purposes

for which it was established, but such power may be exercised under his broad powers as

chief executive in connection with his specific duty "to issue orders relating to the police

or to public safety" within the municipality (section 2194, paragraph c, Revised

Administrative Code). And it may even be said that the above regulation has been

adopted as an implementation of the constitutional provision which prohibits any public

property to be used, directly or indirectly, by any religious denomination (paragraph 3,

section 23, Article VI of the Constitution).

The power exercised by respondent cannot be considered as capricious or

arbitrary considering the peculiar circumstances of this case. It appears that the public

plaza, particularly the kiosk, is located at a short distance from the Roman Catholic

Church. The proximity of said church to the kiosk has caused some concern on the part

of the authorities that to avoid disturbance of peace and order, or the happening of


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untoward incidents, they deemed it necessary to prohibit the use of that kiosk by any

religious denomination as a place of meeting of its members. This was the policy adopted

by respondent for sometime previous to the request made by petitioners. Respondent

never denied such request but merely tried to enforce his policy by assigning them the

northwestern part of the public plaza. It cannot therefore be said that petitioners were

denied their constitutional right to assemble for, as was said, such right is subject to

regulation to maintain public order and public safety. This is especially so considering

that the tenets of petitioners' congregation are derogatory to those of the Roman

Catholic Church, a factor which respondent must have considered in denying their

request.

Verily, the pretense of petitioners cannot be attributed to the unsuitability of that

portion as a meeting place but rather to their obstinate desire to use the kiosk knowing it

to be contrary to the policy of the municipality.


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The Province of Abra, represented by Ladislao Ancheta, Provincial Assessor,

petitioner, vs. Honorable Harold M. Hernando, in his capacity as Presiding

Judge of Branch I, Court of First Instance Abra; The Roman Catholic Bishop

of Bangued, Inc., represented by Bishop Odilo Etspueler and Reverend Felipe

Flores, respondents.

Facts:

The Provincial Assessor of Abra levied a tax assessment on the properties of

respondent Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued. The latter filed a petition for

declaratory relief on the ground that it is exempted from payment of real estate taxes,

its properties being actually, directly and exclusively used for religious or charitable

purposes as sources of support for the bishop, the parish priest and his helpers.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss but the same was denied. After conducting a

summary hearing, respondent Judge granted the exemption without hearing the side

of petitioner. Hence, this present petition for certiorari and mandamus alleging denial

of procedural due process.

Issue:

Whether or not the properties of The Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued,

Inc., are exempted from taxation


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Held:

The petitioner was right in seeking necessary proof as the law frowns on

exemptions from taxation; hence respondent judges failure to accord a hearing

therefore was in violation of the constitutional command of procedural due process.


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ANDRES GARCES, Reverend Father SERGIO MARILAO OSMEA,

NICETAS DAGAR and JESUS EDULLANTES, petitioners, vs. Hon.

NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance

of Leyte, Ormoc City Branch V, BARANGAY COUNCIL of Valencia, Ormoc

City, Barangay Captain MANUEL C. VELOSO, Councilmen GAUDENCIO

LAVEZARES, TOMAS CABATINGAN and MAXIMINO NAVARRO,

Barangay Secretary CONCHITA MARAYA and Barangay Treasurer

LUCENA BALTAZAR, respondents.

Facts:

A wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer was acquired by the barangay council

with funds raised by means of solicitations and cash donations pursuant to

Resolution No. 5 of said council, duly ratified by the barangay assembly in a

plebiscite, reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration of the feast day of the

saint. The image was brought to the Catholic parish church during the saint's feast

day as per Resolution No. 6 which also designated the hermano mayor as the

custodian of the image. After the fiesta, however, petitioner parish priest refused to

return custody of the image to the council until after the latter, by resolution, filed a

replevin case against the priest and posted the required bond. The parish priest and

his co-petitioners thereafter filed an action for annulment of the council's resolutions

relating to the subject image contending that when they were adopted, the barangay

council was not duly constituted because the chairman of the Kabataang Barangay


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Held:

On petition for review, the Supreme Court held, that the absence of the

Kabataang Barangay chairman, despite due notice from the sessions of the barangay

council, did not render the resolutions then adopted void since there was a quorum;

and that the questioned resolutions did not contravene any constitutional provision

since the image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money, and in

connection with a socio- religious affair, the celebration of which is an ingrained

tradition in rural communities.


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Epicharis T. Garcia, petitioner, vs. The Faculty Administration Committee,

Loyola School of Theology, herein represented by Fr. Antonio B. Lambino,

respondent.

Facts:

Petitioner alleged that she was admitted by respondent in the Summer of 1975

to pursue graduate studies leading to a Master of Arts in Theology but was denied re-

admission in the following semester. She contended that the reason given by

respondent for such denial, namely: that "her frequent questions and difficulties were

not always pertinent and had the effect of slowing down the progress of the class," is

not a valid ground for her expulsion. Respondent, on the other hand, contended that

petitioner was admitted in the Summer of 1975 not to a degree program but merely

to take some courses for credit, since admission to a degree program requires

acceptance by the Assistant Dean of the Graduate School and no such acceptance

was given; that respondent has discretion to admit or continue admitting in said

school any particular student, considering not only academic or intellectual standards

but also other factors such as personality traits, character orientation in relation with

other students, space limitations, facilities, professors and optimum classroom size;

and that there was no clear duty to admit petitioner since the school of theology is a

seminary for the priesthood and petitioner is admittedly and obviously not studying

for the priesthood, she being a lay person and a woman.


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Issue:

Whether or not petitioner has the right to compel the Faculty Administration

Committee to allow her to continue studying in the said educational institution

Held:

The Supreme Court denied the petition for mandamus and held that the academic

freedom expressly granted by the Constitution to "institutions of higher learning" involves

two kinds of freedom: that which is enjoyed by the university as a corporate body to

determine for itself who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may

be admittedly to study, and that which is accorded to a university professor to inquire,

discover, publish and teach the truth as he sees it in the field of his competence. Universities

and colleges, should not be looked upon as public utilities devoid of any discretion as to

whom to admit or reject.


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MVRS Publications, Inc., Mars C. Laconsay, Myla C. Aguja and Agustino G.

Binegas, Jr., petitioners, vs. Islamic Da'Wah Council Of The Philippines, Inc.,

Abdul-Rahman R.T. Linzag, Ibrahim F.P. Arcilla, Abdul Rashid De Guzman, Al-

Fared Da Silva and Ibrahim B.A. Junio, respondents

Facts:

Respondents, the ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., a

local federation of more than 70 Muslim religious organizations and individual Muslims, filed

a complaint for damages in their own behalf and as a class suit, against MVRS Publications,

Inc. (MVRS) arising from an article published in Bulgar, a daily tabloid, which allegedly

contained libelous statement that alluded to the pig as the God of the Muslims, and this was

published with intent to disparage the Muslims and Islam, as a religion in this country.

The trial court dismissed the complaint since the persons allegedly defamed by the article

were not specifically identified. The Court of Appeals, however, ordered the petitioners to

pay damages to private respondents Muslims to whom it was clear the defamation was

directed.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners had the legal standing to institute a class suit against

respondents


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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Director of Lands,

petitioner-appellant, vs. JUDGE CANDIDO P. VILLANUEVA, of the Court

of First Instance of Bulacan, Malolos Branch VII, and IGLESIA NI CRISTO,

as a corporation sole, represented by ERAO G. MANALO, as Executive

Minister, respondents-appellees.

Facts:

In 1933, private respondent, a corporation sole duly existing under Philippine

laws, acquired two lots with a total area of 313 square meters from Andres Perez,

who had possessed the property since 1933 and had declared the same for tax

purposes. On September 13, 1977, private respondent filed an application for

registration of the two lots pursuant to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Law alleging

that it and its predecessor-in-interest had possessed the land for more than 30 years.

The Republic of the Philippines opposed the application on the ground that the

Iglesia Ni Cristo, as a corporation sole, is disqualified under the Constitution to hold

alienable lands of the public domain and that the land applied for is a public land.

After hearing, the trial court ordered the registration of the two lots in the name of

private respondent. Hence, this appeal by the Republic.


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United Employees Union of Gelmart Industries Philippines (UEUGIP),

petitioner, vs. Hon. Carmelo Noriel, Director, Bureau of Labor Relations;

George A. Eduvala, Representation Officer, Bureau of Labor Relations; and

National Union of Garments, Textile, Cordage and Allied Workers of the

Philippines (GATCORD), respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner Union seeks to declare null and void the certificate election conducted and

supervised by the Bureau of Labor Relations in Gelmart Industries Philippines, Inc. on the

ground of irregularity, lack of fairness, and violation of procedural due process. Its objection

thereto was predicated on the wilful deletion and replacement of its name in the notice of

certification election and sample ballot by a non-contending party which caused confusion in

the minds of independent workers and demoralization in the ranks of those inclined to favor

it, and the electioneering of nuns and priest as observers or inspectors on behalf of private

respondent union which garnered the highest number of votes in said election. This last

point was raised as a ground in a protest filed by petitioner.

Private respondent union stoutly denied the imputation of irregularity and clarified matters

by a factual presentation of what transpired.


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Issue:

Whether or not there was a willful deletion and replacement of its name in the notice

of certification election and sample ballots

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled for the respondents, it being obvious that the grievance

spoken of by the petitioner was more fancied than real, the assertion of confusion and

demoralization based on conjecture rather than on reality and that petitioner did not choose

to press the point of alleged participation by nuns and priest.


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Lim Che Boon, Tan Hon Koc, Joseph Lim and Yiu Yek See,petitioners, vs.

Lydia Basa, Anthony Sayheeliam and Yao Chek, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioners Joseph Lim, Liu Yek See, Alfredo Long and Felix Almeria were

members of a religious group known as "The Church In Quezon City (Church Assembly

Hall), Incorporated" which was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission

in 1973. The members of the said Church vested upon their Board of Directors the

absolute power to admit and expel a member of the Church. As early as 1988, the Board

of Directors observed that certain members of the church including petitioners herein

exhibited conduct which was dishonorable, improper and injurious to the character and

interest of the Church. They warned petitioners that if they persist in their highly

improper conduct, they will be dropped from the membership of the Church. However,

petitioners ignored their repeated admonitions. Alarmed that petitioners' conduct will

continue to undermine the integrity of the principles of faith of the Church, the Board of

Directors, during its August 30, 1993 regular meeting, removed from the membership list

certain names of members, including the names of herein petitioners. On September 29,

1993, petitioners and others questioned their expulsion by filing with the SEC Securities

Investigation and Clearing Department a petition seeking mainly the annulment of the

August 30, 1993 membership list and the reinstatement of the original list, on the ground

that it was made without prior notice and hearing. Subsequently, SEC Hearing Officer

Manuel Perea ruled, among others, that the expulsion was in accordance with the Church


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By-laws. In a petition for certiorari, the SEC en bancaffirmed the Perearuling. Petitioners

did not appeal the said decision. Since the said SEC en bancdecision pertained only to the

preliminary injunction incident, the SEC, through a hearing panel, conducted further

proceedings. Petitioners filed motions to dismiss/strike out the counterclaim and third-

party complaint, but those motions were denied. Upon denial of the separate motions for

reconsideration of both parties, the respondents filed with the SEC en banca petition for

review questioning the validity of the expulsion. The SEC en bancissued an order setting

aside the expulsion of certain members of the Church. The private respondents filed a

petition for review with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the order

of the SEC en banc.

Issue:

Whether or not the expulsion made by the SEC en bancin its July 11, 1994 decision is

valid

Held:

The Court emphasized that the issue of the validity of the expulsion had

long been resolved and declared valid by the SEC en banc in its decision dated July 11,

1994 in SEC EB Case No. 389. The petitioners themselves admitted in their present

petition that they did not appeal anymore from the July 11, 1994 decision of the SEC en


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banc, thereby rendering the same final and conclusive. As such, the expulsion order is

now inextricably binding on the parties concerned and can no longer be modified, much

less reversed.

Further, the provision on expulsion under the CHURCH By-Laws, as phrased,

may sound unusual and objectionable to petitioners as there is no requirement of prior

notice to be given to an erring member before he can be expelled. It must be stressed

that the basis of the relationship between a religious corporation and its members is the

latter's absolute adherence to a common religious or spiritual belief. Once this basis ceases,

membership in the religious corporation must also cease. Thus, generally, there is no

room for dissension in a religious corporation. And where, as here, any member of a

religious corporation is expelled from the membership for espousing doctrines and

teachings contrary to that of his church, the established doctrine in this jurisdiction is

that such action from the church authorities is conclusiveupon the civil courts.


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Alejandro Estrada, complainant,vs. Soledad S. Escritor, respondent.

Facts:

Soledad S. Escritor, a court interpreter, who admittedly, while still married to another,

cohabited since 1980 to Luciano Quilapio, Jr., who was himself married to another. Escritor

and Quilapio had a nineteen-year old son. The private complainant herein was not personally

related to Escritor nor did he personally know her. However, he wanted the Court to declare

as immoral the relationship of Escritor with Quilapio in consonance with the pertinent

provision of the Administrative Code. In her defense, Escritor contended that under the

rules of the Jehovah's Witnesses, a religious sect of which she is a member, the act of signing

a Declaration Pledging Faithfulness, is sufficient to legitimize a union which would otherwise

be classified as adulterous and bigamous. Escritor alleged that in compliance with the

foregoing rules, she and her partner signed the Declaration Pledging Faithfulness in 1991,

and by virtue of such act, they are for all purposes, regarded as husband and wife by the

religious denomination of which they are devout adherents.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent's right to religious freedom should be carved out as an

exception from the prevailing jurisprudence on illicit relations for which government

employees are held administratively liable


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Held:

The Supreme Court resolved to remand this case to the Office of the Court

Administrator. The Solicitor General was ordered to intervene in the case where it will be

given the opportunity (a) to examine the sincerity and centrality of respondent's claim of

religious belief and practice; (b) to present evidence on the state's "compelling interest" to

override respondent's religious belief and practice: and (c) to show that the means the state

adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondent's religious freedom. The

Court also ordered the setting of the rehearing of the case.


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Reli German, Ramon Pedrosa, Tirso Santillan, Jr., Ma. Luisa Andal, Nieva

Malinis, Ricardo Lavina, Cesar Cortes, Danilo Reyes, Jose Reyes, Josefina

Mate, Lourdes Calma, Mildred Juan, Olive Guanzon, Fernando Cochico,

Sherman Cid, Nazareno Bentulan, Roslina Donaire, Mario Martinez, Beatriz

Teylan, Angelina Lapid, Rosemarie Flores, Daniel Van Soto, Edgardo

Mercader, Nelly Agustin, Marily Magcalas, David Chan, Arsenio Salansang,

Nelson De Guzman, Marciano Araneta, Cesar Meneses, Dionisio Rellosa,

Mario Santiago, Severino Santos, Leonora Santos, Nimfa Doronilla, Florence

Guinto, Rosalina Manansala, Percival Ostonal, Tommy Macaranas, Roger

Nicandro,petitioners, vs. Gen. Santiago Barangan and Major Isabela Lariosa,

respondents.

Facts:

At about 5:00 in the afternoon of October 2, 1984, petitioners, composed of

about 50 businessmen, students and office employees converged at J.P. Laurel Street,

Manila, for the ostensible purpose of hearing Mass at the St. Jude Chapel which

adjoins the Malacaang grounds locate in the same street. Wearing the now familiar

inscribed yellow T-shirts, they started to march down said street with raised clenched

fists and shouts of anti-government invectives. Along the way, however, they were

barred by respondent Major Isabelo Lariosa, upon orders of his superior and co-

respondent Gen. Santiago Barangan, from proceeding any further, on the ground that

St. Jude Chapel was located within the Malacaang security area. When petitioners'


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protestations and pleas to allow them to get inside the church proved unavailing, they

decided to leave. However, because of the alleged warning given them by respondent

Major Lariosa that any similar attempt by petitioners to enter the church in the future

would likewise be prevented, petitioners took this present recourse.

Petitioners' alleged purpose in converging at J.P. Laurel Street was to pray and hear

mass at St. Jude church. At the hearing of this petition, respondents assured petitioners and

the Court that they have never restricted, and will never restrict, any person or persons from

entering and worshipping at said church They maintain, however, that petitioners' intention

was not really to perform an act of religious worship, but to conduct an anti-government

demonstration at a place close to the very residence and offices of the President of the

Republic. Respondents further lament petitioners' attempt to disguise their true motive with

a ritual as sacred and solemn as the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass. Undoubtedly, the yellow T-

shirts worn by some of the marchers, their raised clenched fists, and chants of anti-

government slogans strongly tend to substantiate respondents allegation.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners claim to the free exercise of religion is valid

Held:

Petitioners are not denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their religion,

but only in the manner by which they had attempted to translate the same into action. This


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Re: Request of Muslim Employees in the Different Courts of Iligan City (Office

Hours)

Facts:

In their Letter dated November 19, 2001 addressed to Executive Judge Valerio M.

Salazar, Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, several Muslim employees in the different courts

in the said city request that they be allowed to enjoy the following privileges:

1.to hold office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without lunch break or

coffee breaks during the month of Ramadan;

2.to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday

(Muslim Prayer Day) during the entire calendar year.

Judge Salazar forwarded the said letter-request to the Office of the Court Administrator

(OCA). Judge Salazar expressed his conformity with the first request, i.e., allowing them to

hold office from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without any break during the month of Ramadan.

However, he expressed some misgivings about the second request, i.e., excusing them from

work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday during the entire calendar year.

Issue:

Whether or not Muslim employees in the different courts in the said city can be

excused from work on the periods aforementioned


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month. Further, this would encourage other religious denominations to request for similar

treatment.

The performance of religious practices, whether by the Muslim employees or those

belonging to other religious denominations, should not prejudice the courts and the public.

Indeed, the exercise of religious freedom does not exempt anyone from compliance with

reasonable requirements of the law, including civil service laws.

In fine, the remedy of the Muslim employees, with respect to their request to be

excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday during the entire calendar year,

is legislative, which is to ask Congress to enact a legislation expressly exempting them from

compliance with the prescribed government working hours.


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Dominador L. Taruc, Wilberto Dacera, Nicanor Galanida, Renerio Canta, Jerry

Canrta, Cordencio Consigna, Susano Alacala, Leonardo Dizon, Salvador Gelsano and

Benito Laugo, petitioners, vs. Bishop Porfirio B. De La Cruz, Rev. Fr. Rustom

Florano and Delfin Bordas, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC) in

Socorro, Surigao del Norte. Respondents Porfirio de la Cruz and Rustom Florano were the

bishop and parish priest, respectively, of the same church in that locality. Petitioners, led by

Dominador Taruc, clamored for the transfer of Fr. Florano to another parish but Bishop de

la Cruz denied their request. It appears from the records that the family of Fr. Florano's wife

belonged to a political party opposed to petitioner Tarucs, thus the animosity between the

two factions with Fr. Florano being identified with his wife's political camp. Bishop de la

Cruz, however, found this too flimsy a reason for transferring Fr. Florano to another parish.

Bishop de la Cruz, however, failed to stop Taruc from carrying out his plans. On

June 19, 1993, at around 3:00 p.m., Taruc and his sympathizers proceeded to hold the open

mass with Fr. Ambong as the celebrant. cdtai2005

On June 28, 1993, Bishop de la Cruz declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated from

the Philippine Independent Church for reasons of:

(1)disobedience to duly constituted authority in the Church;


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(2)inciting dissension, resulting in division in the Parish of Our Mother of

Perpetual Help, Iglesia Filipina Independiente, Socorro, Surigao del

Norte when they celebrated an open Mass at the Plaza on June 19,

1996; and

(3)for threatening to forcibly occupy the Parish Church causing anxiety and

fear among the general membership.

Petitioners appealed to the Obispo Maximo and sought reconsideration of the above

decision

In the meantime, Bishop de la Cruz was reassigned to the diocese of Odmoczan and

was replaced by Bishop Rhee M. Timbang. Like his predecessor, Bishop Timbang did not

find a valid reason for transferring Fr. Florano to another parish. He issued a circular

denying petitioners' persistent clamor for the transfer/re-assignment of Fr. Florano.

Petitioners were informed of such denial but they continued to celebrate mass and hold

other religious activities through Fr. Ambong who had been restrained from performing any

priestly functions in the PIC parish of Socorro, Surigao del Norte.

Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a complaint for

damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the Regional Trial

Court of Surigao City, Branch 32. They impleaded Fr. Florano and one Delfin T. Bordas on

the theory that they conspired with the Bishop to have petitioners expelled and


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excommunicated from the PIC. They contended that their expulsion was illegal because it

was done without trial thus violating their right to due process of law.

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the case before the lower court on the ground

of lack of jurisdiction but it was denied. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise

denied so they elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.

The appellate court reversed and set aside the decision of the court a quo and ordered

the dismissal of the case without prejudice to its being refiled before the proper forum.

Issue:

Whether or not the courts have jurisdiction to hear a case involving the

expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution

Held:

Section 5, Article III or the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution specifically

provides that:

Sec. 5.No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or

prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of

religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall

forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil

or political rights. cdlaws06


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The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization

is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said

institution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities in

the performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of

religious institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations.


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II. Foreign Jurisprudence

COX v. NEW HAMPSHIRE, 312 U.S. 569 (1941)

312 U.S. 569

COX et al.

v.

STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE.

No. 502.

Argued March 7, 1941.

Decided March 31, 1941.

Facts:

Appellants are five 'Jehovah's Witnesses' who, with sixty-three others of the same

persuasion, were convicted in the municipal court of Manchester, New Hampshire, for

violation of a state statute prohibiting a 'parade orprocession' upon a public street without a

special license.

After their arrest, the group sued the state for violating their Fourteenth Amendment

rights to freedom of speech, press, worship, and assembly.

Upon appeal, there was a trial de novo of these appellants before a jury in the

Superior Court, the other defendants having agreed to abide by the final decision in that


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summary, "No interference with religious worship or the practice of religion in any proper sense

is shown, but only the exercise of local control over the use of streets for parades and

processions."

This decision allows states to impose licensing fees for people who want to have parades

or processions. The State faces increased costs in policing and overseeing parades so they are

permitted to pass some of these expenses on to the groups conducting these events. The requiring

of licenses is consistent with allowing time and place restrictions to prevent a public

inconvenience.

In the instant case, we are aided by the opinion of the Supreme Court of the State which

construed the statute and defined the limitations of the authority conferred for the granting of

licenses for parades and processions. The court observed that if the clause of the Act requiring a

license 'for all open-air public meetings upon land contiguous to a highway' was invalid, that

invalidity did not nullify the Act in its application to the other situations described. Recognizing

the importance of the civil liberties invoked by appellants, the court thought it significant that the

statute prescribed 'no measures for controlling or suppressing the publication on the highways of

facts and opinions, either by speech or by writing'; that communication 'by the distribution of

literature or by the display of placards and signs' was in no respect regulated by the statute; that

the regulation with respect to parades and processions was applicable only 'to organized

formations of persons using the highways'; and that 'the defendants separately or collectively in

groups not constituting a parade or procession', were 'under no contemplation of the act'. In this

light, the court thought that interference with liberty of speech and writing seemed slight; that the

distribution of pamphlets and folders by the groups 'traveling in unorganized fashion' would have


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had as large a circulation, and that 'signs carried by members of the groups not in marching

formation would have been as conspicuous, as published by them while in parade or procession'.

There is no evidence that the statute has been administered otherwise than in the fair and

non-discriminatory manner which the state court has construed it to require.


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Issue:

Whether or not a taxpayer has standing to sue the government to prevent an

unconstitutional use of taxpayer funds.

Held:

Surely it is plain that the rights and interests of taxpayers who contest the

constitutionality of public expenditures are markedly different from those of "Hohfeldian"

plaintiffs,including those taxpayer-plaintiffs who challenge the validity of their own tax

liabilities. We must recognize that these non-Hohfeldian plaintiffs complain, just as the

petitioner in Frothingham sought to complain, not as taxpayers, but as "private attorneys-

general."The interests they represent, and the rights they espouse, are bereft of any personal

or proprietary coloration. They are, as litigants, indistinguishable from any group selected at

random from among the general population, taxpayers and nontaxpayers alike.

Although various efforts have been made in Congress to authorize public actions to

contest the validity of federal expenditures in aid of religiously affiliated schools and other

institutions, no such authorization has yet been given.

The Court ruled that the taxpayers could sue the federal government if its spending

violated a specific limitation on its power.


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GILLETTE v. UNITED STATES, 401 U.S. 437 (1971)

401 U.S. 437

GILLETTE v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 85.

Argued December 9, 1970

Decided March 8, 1971

Facts:

Petitioner in No. 85, who was convicted for failure to report for induction, and

petitioner in No. 325, who sought discharge from the armed forces upon receipt of orders

for Vietnam duty, claim exemption from military service because of their conscientious

objection to participation in the Vietnam conflict, as an "unjust" war, pursuant to 6 (j) of the

Military Selective Service Act of 1967. That section provides that no person shall be subject

to "service in the armed forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training and

belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form." Petitioners also

challenge the constitutionality of 6 (j) as construed to cover only objectors to all war, as

violative of the Free Exercise and Establishment of Religion Clauses of the First

Amendment.
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=401&invol=437#f*http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=401&invol=437#f*


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This decision limited itself to assessing the constitutionality of the Congressional

limitations on conscientious objection. Marshall stated "Of course we do not suggest that

Congress would have acted irrationally or unreasonably had it decided to exempt those who

object to particular wars." People are now required to become religious pacifists if they wish

to be exempt from military service.


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HAMILTON v. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIF., 293 U.S. 245

(1934)

293 U.S. 245

HAMILTON et al.

v.

REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA et al.*

No. 55.

Argued Oct. 17-18, 1934.

Decided Dec. 3, 1934.

[293 U.S. 245, 246] Messrs. John Beardsley, of Los Angeles, Cal., and Gregory Hankin, of

Washington, D.C., for appellants.

[293 U.S. 245, 249] Mr. John U. Calkins, Jr., of San Francisco, Cal., for appellees. [293 U.S.

245, 250]

Mr. Justice BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court.

Facts:

Each of these minors registered, became a student in the University, and fully

conformed to all its requirements other than that compelling him to take the course in


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military science and tactics in the Reserve Officers Training Corps which they assert to be an

integral part of the military establishment of the United States and not connected in any way

with the militia or military establishment of the state. The courses in military. The regents

require enrollment and participation of ablebodied male students who are citizens of the

United States. These courses include instruction in rifle marksmanship, scouting and

patrolling, drill and command, musketry, combat principles, and use of automatic rifles.

Arms, equipment, and uniforms for use of students in such courses are furnished by the War

Department of the United States government.

These minors are members of the Methodist Episcopal Church and of the Epworth

League and connected religious societies and organizations. For many years their fathers

have been ordained ministers of that church. Because the Methodist Episcopal Church in

her General Conference of 1928 has declared: 'We renounce war as an instrument of

national policy.' Because our nation led the nations of the world in signing the Paris Peace

Pact, and the Constitution of the United States, Article 6, Section 2, provides that: 'This

Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof and

all treaties made under authority of the United States shall be the Supreme Law of the Land'.

The regents refused to make military training optional or to exempt these students. Then,

because of their religious and conscientious objections, they declined to take the prescribed

course, and solely upon that ground the regents by formal notification suspended them from

the University, but with leave to apply for readmission at any time conditioned upon their


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States are permitted to, and have an interest in, creating a citizenry capable of serving

in the country's military. Attendance in the University of California is a privilege in which the

students want to partake. "Taken on the basis of the facts alleged in the petition, appellants'

contentions amount to no more than an assertion that the due process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment as a safeguard of 'liberty' confers the right to be students in the

State University free from obligation to take military training as one of the conditions of

attendance." Such a position is not constitutionally supportable. Just as states have a duty to

protect their citizens, citizens have a reciprocal duty to aid in defending their states.


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JONES v. CITY OF OPELIKA, 316 U.S. 584 (1942)

316 U.S. 584

JONES

v.

CITY OF OPELIKA.

BOWDEN et al.

v.

CITY OF FORT SMITH, ARK.

JOBIN

v.

STATE OF ARIZONA.

Nos. 280, 314, and 966.

Argued Feb. 5, April 30, 1942.

Decided June 8, 1942.

Facts:

The City of Opelika, Alabama, filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Lee County

charging petitioner Jones with violation of its licensing ordinance by selling books without a

license, by operating as a Book Agent without a license, and by operating as a transient


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agent, dealer or distributor of books without a license. Petitioner demurred, alleging that the

ordinance because of unlimited discretion in revocation and requirement of a license was an

unconstitutional encroachment upon freedom of the press. During the trial without a jury

these contentions, with the added claim of interference with freedom of religion, were

renewed at the end of the city's case, and at the close of all the evidence. The court overruled

these motions, and found petitioner guilty on evidence that without a license he had been

displaying pamphlets in his upraised hand and walking on a city street selling them two for

five cents.

Issue:

Whether or not there is a violation both of rights to freedoms of the press and

religion.

Held:

Freedom of press and religion, explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, must at least

be entitled to the same freedom from burdensome taxation which it has been thought that

the more general phraseology of the commerce clause has extended to interstate commerce.

Whatever doubts may be entertained as to this Court's function to relieve, unaided by

Congressional legislation, from burdensome taxation under the commerce clause, it cannot

be thought that that function is wanting under the explicit guaranties of freedom of speech,

press and religion. In any case the flat license tax can hardly become any the less

burdensome or more permissible, when levied on activities within the protection extended


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by the First and Fourteenth Amendments both to the orderly communication of ideas,

educational and religious, to persons willing to receive them, and to the practice of religion

and the solicitation of funds in its support.

The Court upheld the statute because it only covered individuals engaged in a

commercial activity rather than a religious ritual.

Individual rights must be balanced against competing rights of the state. The fact that

a person is engaged in disseminating religious materials does not place his action above

regulation by the state. [W]hen, as in these cases, the practitioners of these noble callings

choose to utilize the vending of their religious books and tracts as a source of funds, the

financial aspects of their transactions need not be wholly disregarded. To subject any

religious or didactic group to a reasonable fee for their money-making activities does not

require a finding that the licensed acts are purely commercial. It is enough that money is

earned by the sale of articles.When traditional means of distribution are used by religious

groups, they can be held to the same standards as non-religious groups. Because Jones did

not have a license revoked arbitrarily by the state he has no standing to challenge that part of

the statute.

This decision forces religious groups to meet the same requirements as non-religious

groups engaged in a similar activity. The fact that they are selling religious materials does not

exempt them from statutes regulating commercial acts.


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(and its property) from the general church, or whether the local church is inseparably

integrated into and subordinate to the general church.

The Supreme Court vacated the lower court's decision by a 5-4 vote. The case was

ordered for re-argument before these lower courts.

The general principle of "Neutral Principles of Law" can be used to resolve

ownership disputes within a church. "The state has an obvious and legitimate interest in the

peaceful resolution of property disputes, and in providing a civil forum where the ownership

of church property can be determined conclusively." In this case, the state court did not

properly articulate the grounds for its decision because this dispute was not between the

church hierarchy and a local church but was between two factions of a local church. If the

laws and regulations of the general church matter, deference to the local church's identity

may be made by representatives of the church hierarchy. The NPoL can be used as long as

the courts do not consider any religious doctrines. The lower courts can independently

decide which criteria to use.

The Court asserted the interest in the state's settling of disputes regarding religious

property. However, it failed to explicate which criteria should be used. Rather, it stated that

one of these criterion cannot be religious doctrine.


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Issue:

Whether or not the State can exercise its reserved power to control this property

without invading religious freedom, because it is a Cathedral and devoted to religious uses.

Held:

The State cannot exercise its reserved power to control this property without

invading religious freedom, because it is a Cathedral and devoted to religious uses. I forbear

discussion of the extent to which restraints imposed upon Congress by the First

Amendment are transferred against the State by the Fourteenth Amendment beyond saying

that I consider that the same differences which apply to freedom of speech and .

The fact that property is dedicated to a religious use cannot, in my opinion, justify the

Court in sublimating an issue over property rights into one of deprivation of religious liberty

which alone would bring in the religious guaranties of the First Amendment. I assume no

one would pretend that the State cannot decide a claim of trespass, larceny, conversion,

bailment or contract, where the property involved is that of a religious corporation or is put

to religious use, without invading the principle of religious liberty.

The Supreme Court ruled that the New York statute improperly involved the state

with an internal church dispute.

The New York law violates the Fourteenth Amendment by limiting the parishioners'

rights to freely exercise their religion. In the statute transferring church control to American


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LEE v. WEISMAN, 505 U.S. 577 (1992)

505 U.S. 577

ROBERT E. LEE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PRINCIPAL OF

NATHAN BISHOP MIDDLE SCHOOL, ET AL.,

PETITIONERS v. DANIEL WEISMAN ETC. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 90-1014

Argued November 6, 1991

Decided June 24, 1992

Facts:

Principals of public middle and high schools in Providence, Rhode Island, are

permitted to invite members of the clergy to give invocations and benedictions at their

schools' graduation ceremonies. Petitioner Lee, a middle school principal, invited a rabbi to

offer such prayers at the graduation ceremony for Deborah Weisman's class, gave the rabbi a

pamphlet containing guidelines for the composition of public prayers at civic ceremonies,

and advised him that the prayers should be nonsectarian. Shortly before the ceremony, the

District Court denied the motion of respondent Weisman, Deborah's father, for a temporary

restraining order to prohibit school officials from including the prayers in the ceremony.

Deborah and her family attended the ceremony, and the prayers were recited. Subsequently,


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Weisman sought a permanent injunction barring Lee and other petitioners, various

Providence public school officials, from inviting clergy to deliver invocations and

benedictions at future graduations. It appears likely that such prayers will be conducted at

Deborah's high school graduation. The District Court enjoined petitioners from continuing

the practice at issue on the ground that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First

Amendment. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Issue:

Whether or notthe graduation prayer violated the Establishment Clause.

Held:

In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the graduation prayer violated the

Establishment Clause.

The government's involvement in the religious exercise at graduation is 'pervasive'.

The prayers violate the earlier rulings preventing school sponsored prayer. The state places

both public and peer pressure on students to take rise for and remain silent during the

prayer.

Although a person might stand for the prayer merely as a sign of respect for others,

such an action could properly be construed as accepting the message. The control held by

teachers and principals over the students' actions forces those graduating to submit to the

standards of behavior.


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MINERSVILLE SCHOOL DIST. v. GOBITIS, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)

310 U.S. 586

MINERSVILLE SCHOOL DIST. et al.

v.

GOBITIS et al.

No. 690.

Argued April 25, 1940.

Decided June 3, 1940.

Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court.

Facts:

Lillian Gobitis, aged twelve, and her brother William, aged ten, were expelled from

the public schools of Minersville, Pennsylvania, for refusing to salute the national flag as part

of a daily school exercise. The local Board of Education required both teachers and pupils to

participate in this ceremony. The ceremony is a familiar one. The right hand is placed on the

breast and the following pledge recited in unison: 'I pledge allegiance to my flag, and to the

Republic for which it stands; one nation indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.' While the

words are spoken, teachers and pupils extend their right hands in salute to the flag. The

Gobitis family are affiliated with 'Jehovah's Witnesses', for whom the Bible as the Word of


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God is the supreme authority. The children had been brought up conscientiously to believe

that such a gesture of respect for the flag was forbidden by command of scripture.

Issue:

Whether or not the Constitutional challenge to the law was under Article I, Section 8, to

spend for the general welfare as the expenditure is of a large sum of funds is valid.

Held:

The very fact that we have constitutional guaranties of civil liberties and the

specificity of their command where freedom of speech and of religion are concerned require

some accommodation of the powers which government normally exercises, when no

question of civil liberty is involved, to the constitutional demand that those liberties be

protected against the action of government itself. The state concededly has power to require

and control the education of its citizens, but it cannot by a general law compelling

attendance at public schools preclude attendance at a private school adequate in its

instruction, where the parent seeks to secure for the child the benefits of religious

instruction not provided by the public school. And only recently we have held that the state's

authority to control its public streets by generally applicable regulations is not an absolute to

which free speech must yield, and cannot be made the medium of its suppression. any more

than can its authority to penalize littering of the streets by a general law be used to suppress

the distribution of handbills as a means of communicating ideas to their recipients.


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The guaranties of civil liberty are but guaranties of freedom of the human mind and

spirit and of reasonable freedom and opportunity to express them. They presuppose the

right of the individual to hold such opinions as he will and to give them reasonably free

expression, and his freedom, and that of the state as well, to teach and persuade others by

the communication of ideas. The very essence of the liberty which they guaranty is the

freedom of the individual from compulsion as to what he shall think and what he shall say,

at least where the compulsion is to bear false witness to his religion. If these guaranties are to

have any meaning they must, I think, be deemed to withhold from the state any authority to

compel belief or the expression of it where that expression violates religious convictions,

whatever may be the legislative view of the desirability of such compulsion.

In an 8-1 decision, the Court ruled that the school district's interest in creating national unity

was sufficient to allow them to require students to salute the flag.

This case requires the Court to balance the religious interests of the Jehovah's

Witness children with the secular interests of the school district. "Conscientious scruples

have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious toleration, relieved the individual

from obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious

beliefs. The mere possess

Documents

Legres Research on Religious Freedom