Lesotho and the Inner Periphery in the New South Africa

Lesotho and the Inner Periphery in the New South AfricaAuthor(s): Richard F. WeisfelderSource: The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Dec., 1992), pp. 643-668Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/161269 .

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The Journal of Modern African Studies, 30, 4 (1992), pp. 643-668 Copyright ( 1992 Cambridge University Press

Lesotho and the Inner Periphery in the New South Africa

by RICHARD F. WEISFELDER*

REFORM and the transformation of authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and the Horn of Africa have been associated with rampant nationalism, secession of component units, and ultimately, demands for the return of lost territories. By contrast, within supposedly 'tribal' Southern Africa, the African National Congress (A.N.C.) and its Africanist opponents are agreed that any settlement must apply to the whole of the Republic of South Africa, including the so-called 'independent Homelands'.

Throughout the past two decades, most literature supportive of black liberation has emphasised the regional character of South Africa's economic and military hegemony. The neighbouring states of Bots- wana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland constitute what Sehoai Santho calls 'the inner periphery',' terminology that reflects their special vulnerability as labour reserves, as well as their relatively complete dependence on South African products, transportation, and communications. However, common knowledge that decisions about South Africa's future will have substantial impact upon these states has not spawned suggestions that they be invited to participate in the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa) or any of the negotiations which could alter their destinies. Nor, apparently, have any of them asked to be included. In the midst of a revolutionary process, established international boundaries define the parameters of the discussion.

* Professor of Political Science, University of Toledo, Ohio. An earlier version of this article was presented at the annual meeting of the New England Political Science Association, Providence, Rhode Island, April 1992.

' Sehoai Santho, 'Political Economy of Small States in Southern Africa. Dependency and Development Options - Towards Regionalism', Conference on the New Post-Apartheid South Africa and its Neighbours, Maseru, 9-13 July 1990, p. 1.



644 RICHARD F. WEISFELDER

THE REGIONAL IMPACT OF UTIPOSSIDETIS

Crawford Young has explained how the principle of sacrosanct borders and territorial integrity, embodied in the legal doctrine of uti possidetis ('as you now possess'), has 'acquired robust authority in Africa'.2 He observed that this doctrine was reinforced throughout the continent by the implementation of the Homelands policy in South Africa, which 'epitomized a vision of ethnicity as the manipulation of the oppressed by the master race'.' With the exception of Bophuthatswana, all of the 'independent' and self-governing Bantustans are participating in the Codesa talks after agreeing to reincorporation in South Africa.4 But Lesotho and Swaziland, which 'objectively' are as much a part of South Africa as the Homelands, are not. The fact that their boundaries are artifacts of British colonialism, albeit as truncated and artificial as those assigned to the Homelands by Pretoria, makes all the difference. Talk of a broader regional amalgamation presumes a future role for South Africa in the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (S.A.D.C.C.), recently reconstituted as the Development Community (S.A.D.C.), or through negotiation of some type of federal structure by the future majority government in Pretoria and its neighbours.5

This study seeks to identify factors that sustain established state structures via the doctrine of uti possidetis, despite their possibly dysfunctional economic and political outcomes for Southern Africa. Ultimately, a number of difficult questions must be answered. How great a role does the institutionalisation of this presumption throughout the continent by the Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U.) play in the current discussions? Young suggests that the African state system can 'withstand a handful of derogations without the entire edifice crumbling'. If he is correct that international law ' accommodates itself to force' and faits accomplis,6 what could forestall the implementation of unique arrangements agreed to by peoples in several of the pre-existing states of Southern Africa? To what extent is commitment to the territorial integrity of South Africa a requisite for negotiating an end to

2 Crawford Young, 'Self-Determination, Territorial Integrity, and the African State System', in Francis M. Deng and I. William Zartman (eds.), Conflict Resolution in Africa (Washington, DC, 199I), p. 328. Ibid. p. 334.

4 Paul Stober, 'Quietly Codesa Gets It Together', in Weekly Mail Johannesburg), 8, Io, 6-12 March 1992, p. Io.

5 For a preliminary discussion of these issues, see Richard F. Weisfelder, 'SADCC after Apartheid', in Transafrica Forum (New Brunswick), 8, 3, Fall 199I, pp. 3-18.

6 Young, loc. cit. pp. 345-6.



LESOTHO AND THE INNER PERIPHERY 645

white hegemony? Could commitment to uti possidetis unravel once the more difficult task of governing falls to the successor regime?

We can just begin to touch upon these questions. They will be examined primarily from the perspective of Lesotho, where domestic sovereignty and the existing regional configuration of states have been most significantly questioned. Why are doubts about survival as an independent state raised primarily in Lesotho? What differentiates Lesotho from Botswana and Swaziland, which have similar heritages, but little apparent debate about the possibility of surrendering sovereignty to some larger entity?

In an article published over ten years ago, I examined the components of national identity in Lesotho, and tried to predict what challenges substantial change in South Africa might pose for the Basotho nation-state.7 With the exception of the greatly heightened role of the military, few of the operative characteristics have changed. However, the economic and social problems confronting Lesotho at that time have intensified almost geometrically. In the process, the quite limited legitimacy then afforded to the post-colonial state has eroded substantially. Omitted from most analyses and discussions of the future of Southern Africa, Lesotho seems not to be taken seriously in a continent which is itself described as increasingly marginal, economically and strategically.8

Perceptions of being a marginalised periphery of Africa have led to the contemplation of radical new alternatives, at least in intellectual circles. Two conferences sponsored by the National University of Lesotho have focused on that country's role in a post-apartheid South Africa. These discussions of potential mergers or federations have filtered into both the press and general political discourse. They have gained additional credibility from the resolution endorsing 'political integration of Lesotho into non-racial, non-sexist democratic South Africa' which was passed in April I 99I at a conference of the National Union of Mineworkers (N.U.M.) of South Africa.9 One analyst contends that proposals once 'branded as treason' have been transformed from debates about 'whether integration is desirable' to

7 Richard F. Weisfelder, 'The Basotho Nation-State: what legacy for the future?', in The Journal of Modern African Studies (Cambridge), 19, 2, June 1981, pp. 22I-56.

8 Thomas M. Callaghy, 'Africa and the World Economy: caught between a rock and a hard place', in John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild (eds.), Africa in World Politics (Boulder,

)99), p. 39. ' Quoted in 'Would Lesotho Be Integrated Into South Africa?', in The Mirror (Maseru), 3, 38, 9 August 199i. The complete resolution is reproduced below in the Appendix.




discussions of 'how it should be achieved and the form it should assume 10

THE INNER PERIPHERY: SHARED EXPERIENCES

AND SPECIAL SITUATIONS

Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland owe their existence as independent states to the nineteenth-century struggles for dominance between Boer and Briton. Instead of being incorporated by conquest into British South African colonies or Boer Republics like the Zulu and Xhosa, they retained truncated, but separate identities, under British direction. Initiatives taken by their leaders and people were crucial to their survival. Led by their future monarch, Lerotholi, the Basotho nation forced a stalemate with Cape forces during the Gun War, which led to reversal of the annexation of Basutoland by the Cape Colony and the resumption of British sovereignty. Khama III, the Bangwato leader in Botswana, developed linkages with the influential London Mission- ary Society, which provided political leverage against those seeking incorporation of that territory into what is now South Africa. Only active lobbying by delegations of chiefs sent to London prevented all three territories from being incorporated involuntarily in the Union of South Africa when the British allowed the defeated Boers to recoup politically the leverage that they had lost on the battlefield.1

The three territories remained under the jurisdiction of the British High Commissioner to South Africa. However, their separate status continued to be in constant jeopardy until i963, when the Prime Minister, H. F. Verwoerd, relaxed Pretoria's longstanding demand to incorporate them into the Republic. The struggle to retain separate geo-political status helped to unite virtually all traditional and new elites within the 'Protectorates' or 'High Commission Territories', as they had come to be known. The implementation of apartheid during the i960s became the catalyst for unprecedented political activity. Demands for self-government and independence supplanted the prior reluctant acceptance of the view that the status quo of continued British administration was the only realistic course. While British 'protection'

10 This assertion appears in the abstract of a proposed paper entitled 'Towards a Federal Integration: the case of Lesotho and South Africa', submitted for the African Studies Association meeting in Seattle, November 1992, by Nqosa Mohau, lecturer in law at the National University of Lesotho.

'" Richard P. Stevens, 'The History of the Anglo-South African Conflict over the Proposed Incorporation of the High Commission Territories', in Christian P. Potholm and Richard Dale (eds.), Southern Africa in Perspective: essays in regional politics (New York and London, I972), pp.

97-109.




permitted the restoration of independence, it also fostered virtually complete assimilation of the territories as impoverished 'labour reserves' within the hegemonic South African regional economy."2

All three states evolved towards independence between i966 and I968. All gained recognition by the African and international communities, and assumed their places as sovereign states in the United Nations and O.A.U. Reflecting their extreme economic dependency, all three remained members of the Southern African Customs Union and, until the mid- I970s, the Rand Monetary Union with the Republic. Nevertheless, two major differences in their political evolution must be noted. Both Botswana and Swaziland experienced considerable economic development with the discovery of new resources and more extensive exploitation of existing assets. Second, both Botswana and Swaziland had relatively stable and rather inert political environments, with the former ruled as a paternalist democracy, and the latter as a paternalistic monarchical system. Lesotho, by contrast, had a tumultuous multi-party system and a highly mobilised citizenry. Unlike Swaziland, where a royalist coup conformed with traditional expectations of authority, Lesotho's Prime Minister, LeabuaJonathan, used police-state mechanisms to govern after refusing to accept the overwhelming defeat of his party in the 1970 general election. His actions led to endemic instability, vicious repressions, attempted coups and endless rumours of others, an armed insurgency encouraged by South Africa and, ultimately, military rule.

Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland are all fortunate in being spared divisive ethnic conflicts since their societies are cohesive ethnically, culturally, and linguistically. More significantly from the perspective of utipossidetis, each has a substantial 'lost territory' within the borders of South Africa that has been designated a Homeland under the edifice of separate development. Hence, each shares a border with at least a part of the corresponding ethnically configured Bantustan; namely, Bophuthatswana, QwaQwa, and KaNgwane, respectively. The ethnic Basotho, Batswana, and Swazi who are citizens of South Africa, or of a supposedly independent Homeland, substantially outnumber the populations of the corresponding independent nation-states. Moreover, these ethnic kinsmen are spread throughout the industrial heartland of South Africa, and are by no means confined within the Homeland boundaries.

Both Lesotho and Swaziland have challenged the principle of uti

12 Colin Murray, 'From Granary to Labour Reserve', in 'Focus on Lesotho', South African Labour Bulletin (Durban), 6, 4, I980, pp. 3-17.




possidetis. They consider the land taken from them during the period of colonial occupation to be 'unredeemed' conquered territories whose future must be negotiated. In fact, the late Swazi monarch, Sobhuza II, had come close to realising his lifelong dream of a greater Swaziland. In the early I98os he negotiated a pact with South Africa which would have transferred to Swazi sovereignty the KaNgwane Bantustan and a corridor to the sea through a portion of KwaZulu. The agreement was not implemented due to vehement protests from the Zulu, from the leadership of Natal Province, and especially from elements in KaNgwane, who had never been consulted about these changes in their borders, or their impending loss of South African citizenship."3 Despite strong internal and external criticism for having embraced the Verwoerdian concept of ethnic separatism, the Swazi aristocracy risked its credibility in S.A.D.C.C. and at the O.A.U. by putting its irredentist objectives ahead of commitment to uti possidetis. For Swaziland, the monarchy provided the stabilising element, which permitted taking the risks of incorporating the more numerous South African Swazi, and of challenging the dominant regional paradigm in Africa.

For land-hungry Lesotho, there has been no commitment to the current system sufficient to offset the lure of the prosperous Free State farms so visible from Maseru and other major towns. From the pre- independence period to the present, Basotho political parties have pledged to negotiate for the return of the 'conquered territories'. These include small portions of Transkei and Bophuthatswana, tiny QwaQwa, and vast tracts of the Free State, together with many thriving border towns."4 Is Lesotho's claim still alive? When A.N.C. officials visited Maseru in September I 990 to give a briefing on their organisation's initiatives and strategies, the government newspaper, Lesotho Today, made the 'conquered territories' the initial focus of its lead story. It recounted how Ntsu Mokhehle, leader of the Congress Party (B.C.P.), had raised the issue in the 195os and I 96os, and how LeabuaJonathan, the National Party leader and former Prime Minister, had resurrected it, unsuccessfully, a decade later. It reported that Alfred Nzo, the A.N.C.'s general secretary, had told the press conference in Maseru that 'When the ANC has dealt with the apartheid monster in South Africa, it may start negotiating about Lesotho's territories in South

13 Ieuan LI. Griffiths and D. C. Funnell, 'The Abortive Swazi Land Deal', in African Affairs (London), 90, 358, January 1991, pp. 51-64.

14 For a more extensive discussion of geopolitical identity, see Weisfelder, loc. cit. pp. 244-9.




Africa.'15 While it seems unlikely that Nzo used the exact words 'Lesotho's territories', that phrasing in Lesotho Today strongly suggests that these lands are still viewed as such within government circles.

Can this irredentism be reconciled with the paradoxical theme of negotiating some sort of federal arrangement with a majority-ruled, post-apartheid South Africa? The N.U.M. resolution on the political integration of Lesotho into the Republic acknowledges that the lands 'alienated from them by deceit and force' rendered the remainder of Lesotho economically non-viable. It recognises that the inhabitants have a 'legitimate moral claim to access to land available in South Africa ... and to benefits accruing from the South African economy to whose development they have contributed over a century'. However, the resolution also observes that the current residents of the conquered territories have struggled 'to free and realise a united and democratic South Africa'. Moreover, it alleges that 'the territorial integrity of South Africa is supported by the International Law and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Charter, and, therefore, the restoration of the Free State to Lesotho is not objectively realisable'.16 Hence the N.U.M. resolution sees a greater Lesotho precluded by the accepted doctrine of uti possidetis, but permits integration as a desirable and legitimate alternative.

The apparent tension between irredentism and federation would also disappear, if the boundaries of the Basotho political entity within a federal South Africa were expanded to include all or part of the disputed territories. However, F. W. de Klerk and his National Party, as well as Gatsha Buthelezi and his Inkatha Freedom Party (I.F.P.), also advocate federal solutions to protect group identity and the rights of ethnic minorities. The A.N.C., its allies, and even its Africanist rivals, perceive such arrangements as mechanisms designed by reactionary adversaries to 'divide and rule'. Hence they construe any form of federalism where borders coincide with ethnic boundaries as inviting a contrived and institutionalized ethnic factionalism, permitting minorities to frustrate the will of a popularly elected central government.

If the Codesa process and other subsequent negotiations in South Africa are successful, the participating parties, including de Klerk and the Homeland leaders, will have agreed to a new structural format as part of a series of compromises required to achieve consensus. It is highly improbable that the Lesotho Government could reopen those

15 Kalosi Ramakhula, 'ANC Chiefs Visit Lesotho', in Lesotho Today (Maseru), 5, 28-29, 27 September and 4 October i9go, p. '. 16 The Mirror, 9 August 1991.




disruptive issues in new negotiations after an internal South African bargain had been struck. Indeed, the N.U.M. resolution mentions no such discussion, and speaks of persuading Basotho to vote in a referendum for 'political integration into a future non-racial, non-sexist democratic South Africa'.17 If Lesotho has any choice at all, it will be to accede to the terms of a South African settlement made without its participation.

By contrast, Botswana has not made, to my knowledge, any irredentist claims regarding Bophuthatswana, its counterpart Home- land, or to other areas of South Africa historically occupied by Tswana peoples. If Botswana's extensive resources, rapid growth, and stable political democracy could be fused with the mineral wealth, arable land, and substantial population of the Tswana areas of South Africa, a large and very viable Tswana state would emerge. A greater Botswana would encompass the western Transvaal as far east as Pretoria, the northern Free State as far south as Tchaba Nchu and Bloemfontein, and the northern Cape as far south as Kimberley.

What can explain the absence of even superficial support for that objective? The answer is not the absence of interaction across the frontiers. Citizens of Botswana were quick to protest to their Government when borders closed by a visa dispute prevented them from visiting relatives, attending funerals, or shopping in Bophu- thatswana. Five points deserve to be emphasized.

First of all, unlike Lesotho and Swaziland, the traditional political system of pre-colonial Botswana was decentralized, with no single authority consolidating state power over most of the Tswana ethnic area. Hence, Botswana has less historical justification for an irredentist claim. Second, the country is already large and relatively prosperous. With a rural economy based upon cattle ranching and other alternatives available to farming, land hunger seems less of a factor than in the other two states. Third, the risks of bringing in the more urbanised South African Tswana are substantial. Their greater numbers could easily transform the political balance and create instability. Moreover, Tswana immersed in South Africa have little experience with, or commitment to, Botswana-style multi-party democracy. Fourth, Botswana is a Frontline state, a founding member of S.A.D.C.C., a committed proponent of the O.A.U., and a model of non-racial opposition to apartheid. Therefore, the Government has assiduously avoided providing any recognition to Bophuthatswana, the collaborationist spawn of separate development. It has supported the

17 Ibid.



LESOTHO AND THE INNER PERIPHERY 65I

mass democratic movement in its demand that the Bantustans be reincorporated in South Africa. Finally, Botswana has proved its ability to prosper within its existing boundaries, and is under no pressure to evoke irredentism as a panacea for resolving its problems. Needless to say, the unpopular regime of Lucas Mangope in Bophuthatswana has little reason to join Botswana. Such a union would supplant his repressive, apartheid-tainted cadres in Mmabatho with the legitimate incumbents from Gaborone or a new A.N.C.- oriented leadership.

THE MOTIVATION FOR REINCORPORATION: WHAT

DIFFERENTIATES LESOTHO?

The special factors which lead some Basotho to question the future relevance of their nation-state need attention. Are they truly unique or simply more intense versions of issues arising in other states of the inner periphery or of the entire S.A.D.C. grouping? If the latter is true, the emergence of a majority-ruled South Africa could provide the catalyst for the development of comprehensive regional economic and political institutions. These could transcend mere economic co-operation and lead to the eventual amalgamation of existing Southern African states through gradual processes similar to the directions taken by the European Economic Community. My organising hypothesis embraces the more pessimistic alternative; namely, that the special circumstances of Lesotho's geo-political situation, economic retrogression, and recent history play the decisive roles. The post-colonial state system, reinforced by the doctrine of uti possidetis, seems solidly entrenched in South Africa and throughout the region.

The reputation and legitimacy of all of the institutions of the Basotho nation-state have been tarnished during Lesotho's quarter-century of independence. Was any other outcome conceivable, given the complete dearth of economic options, encapsulation by the apartheid regime, and high expectations of the population? My earliest writings on Lesotho used such phrases as 'abject dependence, poverty, and frustration', 'desperation ... occasioned further division', and 'inauspicious future'.18 Unfortunately, these despairing warnings have been all too accurate and, equally regrettably, must recur here. Indeed, the Conference on Democracy and National Unity held in Maseru during

1 Richard F. Weisfelder, 'Power Struggle in Lesotho', in Africa Report (New York), 12, 1,

January 1 967, p. 13; Defining National Purpose in Lesotho (Athens, OH, 1 969), p. 28; and 'Lesotho', in Potholm and Dale (eds.), op. cit. p. 140.




October 1991 noted 'its profound concern about disunity in our society':

This disunity provides a conducive environment for power mongers and impostors to seize and entrench themselves in power in utter disregard of popular aspirations and grievances ... this disunity has undermined the basic pillars and symbols of nationhood such as the constitution, the monarchy, the national flag, the national anthem and the language."9

Many authors have focused entirely upon Lesotho's dismal options and victimisation by South Africa. What differentiates my perspective is the greater attention devoted to domestic factors and, particularly, to the poor choices made by Basotho leaders, which have exacerbated already monumental problems.

I. Political Parties and Parliamentary Government

Lesotho's political parties are presently organising and campaigning to win the general elections scheduled to return the country from military to civilian rule late in November I992. While there are a multitude of new parties in the present field of I5, the early favourites seem to be the B.N.P. and B.C.P., the ageing heavyweights which competed for power in i965 and I970. Many party leaders are the same old stalwarts from the pre-independence era. Periodic prohibition of political activity under civilian and military rule since I 970 accounts for the absence of promising new faces. The majority of the electorate, too young to vote in I970, are said to be fascinated by the ig60s-style political rallies. It is unnerving to realise that those picked by the media as the likely victors are severely tainted by past failures, and not spokesmen for a new set of alternatives. Sehoai Santho describes both the B.C.P. and B.N.P. as 'so fossilized that they [are] neither democratically run nor accountable to their support bases'.20

Ntsu Mokhehle remains entrenched as the embattled leader of the B.C.P. His party has been weakened by factional recrimination from the long years in exile and bitter disputes about the wisdom of accepting support for armed insurrection from South Africa.21 Frequently criticised for his authoritarian tactics, Mokhehle bears considerable responsibility for his party's naive failure to anticipate

19 'National Conference on National Unity and Democratic Rule in Lesotho', in Mphatlalatsane (Maseru), 1, i, 14 December 1991, p. 3.

20 Quoted in 'Santho Criticized the BNP and BCP', in The Mirror, 4, 4, 13 December 1991,

PP- 3-4. 21 'Power Struggle with BCP to be Exposed in Court', in ibid. 3, 30, 7 June 1991, p. i.




Jonathan's I970 coup, for its hopelessly 'clumsy' and unsuccessful counter-coup of I974, and for directing the Lesotho Liberation Army (L.L.A.) in a campaign often aimed at 'soft' targets.22 His message may also be suspect, as the B.C.P.'s militant Africanist ideology of prior days has been compromised by collaboration with Botha's national security system. However, Mokhehle's views on relations with a democratic South Africa have been remarkably consistent over time. Describing South Africa and Lesotho, together with Botswana, Namibia, and Swaziland, as 'one country', he has argued that 'federal relations' within the region should be discussed seriously once South Africa's internal negotiations have been successfully concluded.23 But would he actually implement such a strategy upon assuming power after decades of struggle?

Chief Retselisitsoe Sekhonyana, the newly elected leader of the B.N.P., and Chief Peete Peete, his deputy, were both Cabinet Ministers and intimate political associates of the late Prime Minister, Leabua Jonathan. They share responsibility for destroying constitutional government in I970, for holding fraudulent elections in i985, and for sustaining an unpopular, corrupt, and repressive regime until the military coup of i986. Sekhonyana's reputed competence allowed him to continue as Minister of Finance and Planning in the regime headed by General Metsing Lekhanya. However, allegations of massive corruption have surfaced intermittently and undermined his popularity.24 He was one of two Ministers forced to flee temporarily to South Africa on I May i99i, when Lekhanya was ousted at gunpoint and replaced by Colonel (now Major-General) Phisoana Ramaema.

Although the B.N.P. was originally the bastion of traditional rural, conservative Catholic, and strident anti-communist values, it also put political expediency ahead of ideology. After its I970 electoral defeat revealed the high price of collaboration with Verwoerd and Vorster, the B.N.P. established links with the A.N.C., opened diplomatic relations with China and the Soviet Union, and received military aid from North Korea. Given this background, it boggles the imagination that Sekhonyana and Peete can continue to portray the B.N.P. as 'a symbol of national unity and peace'! The B.N.P. takes the position that

22 For more detailed analysis of these issues, see Weisfelder, 'The Basotho Nation-State', pp. 249-53.

23 Mike Pitso, 'Federal Relations with South Africa Envisaged', in The Mirror, 3, 12, i8 January 1991, p. 1.

24 'How the Trio Could Not Part? Investors Blackmailed and Soldiers Intervened: the web of corruption that held together Lekhanya, Sekhonyana and Thabane has been revealed', in ibid. 3, 49, 25 October 1gg1, p. 1.




the question of future federation with a democratic South Africa is premature until the constitutional outcome there is determined.25

According to a letter in The Mirror, the general 'lack of confidence' in national leaders has caused 'political and ideological' fragmentation in Lesotho. However, the proliferation of new political parties makes it difficult for the younger generation with 'different views and approaches to politics' to build workable coalitions.26 Some of the allegedly less significant competitors also include old political war- horses. B. M. Khaketla, the outspoken, septuagenarian editor of Moh- labani, leads the Marematlou Freedom Party (M.F.P.), which strongly supports the monarchy, believes that Lesotho 'should remain an independent sovereign state among the nations of the world', and rejects integration within a post-apartheid South Africa.27 Charles Mofeli, leader of the United Democratic Party (U.D.F.), has long argued that Lesotho's 'unique' geographical position gives priority to closer 'politico-economic and military union' with South Africa.28

Among the interesting new entrants is the Popular Front for Democracy (P.F.D.). Described as a leftist coalition of academics, trade unionists, and human-rights activists, it includes the faculty members at the National University of Lesotho most actively exploring the concept of federation.29 Equally noteworthy is the emergence of the Kopanang Basotho Party (K.B.P.), led by Limakatso Ntakatsane, which seeks to mobilise the substantial numerical majority of female voters to end 'segregation practices, based on sex', to ensure 'equal opportunities' and equality 'before the law', and to open the domains of political leadership and public policy to women.30 Phaphamang Basali, a newly formed 'non-political' women's movement patronised by Queen Mother 'Mamohato, aims to 'conscientise women to their rights and duties', and to end the 'passivity and indifference' which has marginalised them politically in Lesotho.3" The Lesotho Labour

25 Bethuel Thai, 'Sekhonyana Leads BNP', in Lesotho Today, 6, 47, 12 December 1991, p. 1. 26 'What Future Does Our Politics Have?', in The Mirror, 3, 35, 19July 1991, p. 7. 27 Mike Pitso, 'Lesotho Should Not Be Integrated Into Non-Racial South Africa, MFP

Leader', in ibid. 3, 39, i6 August 1991, pp. 1-2. See also, 'MFP 1992 Elections Manifesto Special', in Mohlabani (Maseru), 2, 1, 1991, pp. 2-8.

28 Mike Pitso, 'Mofeli Argues for Federation with South Africa', in The Mirror, 2, 11, I

December 1989, p. i.

29 'A Democratic Alternative to Lcsotho', in ibid. 33, July 1991, p. i, and 'Political Leaders Betrayed the People', in ibid. 3, 35, 19July 1991, p. 3.

30 Mike Pitso, 'Lesotho Women Brave the Weather in Forming a Political Party', in ibid. 3, 46, 4 October 1991, p. i.

31 'The Role of Women in Emerging Democratic Lesotho', in Mphatlalatsane, 1, 1, 14 December 1991, pp. 3-4, and "'A Single Vote May Be Decisive", Her Majesty Cautions', in ibid. 2, 21 December 1991, p. 1.




Party also emphasises the rights of women and workers.32 At present, none of these innovative organizations appears to have mobilised the resources necessary to capture power or to form an effective national government.

The return to a democratic constitutional system has been facilitated by a Constituent Assembly appointed by the present regime, and consisting of leading citizens drawn from the chieftainship, political parties, bureaucracy, military, and various voluntary organizations. Although lacking a popular mandate, the Constituent Assembly has produced an amended version of the i966 constitution which was abrogated by ChiefJonathan in I970. Since that enactment has often been criticised as an alien British imposition, it is difficult to imagine how this latest version confers much legitimacy on the institutions and offices established by it. The problem is compounded by the fact that the new document includes the hotly disputed Office of the King Order of i990, which permitted Moshoeshoe II's removal and Letsie III's installation, as well as constitutionally entrenched provisions for the Lesotho Defence Force and its Commander.

By contrast, Botswana has prospered politically and economically for a quarter of a century under its independence constitution. It has had numerous contested general elections, an ineffectual but vocal opposition, a peaceful succession of Presidents, and a military establishment compliant with civilian direction. Currently, Botswana suffers from the malaise common to states where incumbents have governed too long. Corruption is becoming all too prevalent. Unlike Lesotho, such allegations are investigated, commissions of inquiry established, and powerful incumbents sacked.33 Imperfect as it may have proved to be, Botswana's system has been responsive to popular pressures and has had sufficient resources to dispense the economic patronage necessary to mollify the rank-and-file. Hence, criticism has been focused on the failings of the Government and the malfeasance of individual power-holders, whereas in Lesotho the nature of the state and its very reason for being have come into question.

32 The policies of i3 organizations are compared in 'Which Party Supports You?', in Shoeshoe (Maseru), 2, 5, Summer 1992, pp. 4-5 and i i.

33 Botswana was recently wracked by a major scandal involving corruption in land allocation which forced the Vice-President, P. S. Mmusi, to resign, as well as several Cabinet Ministers and Members of Parliament from the ruling B.D.P. See Methaetsile Leepile, 'Masire's Choice', in Mmegi (Gaborone), 9, 8, 6-I2 March I992, pp. 4 and 9; Mesh Moeti, "'Corrupt" MPs Told to Resign', in ibid. 9, 13-I9 March 1992, p. 13; and 'Cutting the Corruption Cutworm', in ibid. p. 2.




2. The Monarchy

Lesotho's articulate, progressive, Oxford-educated Moshoeshoe II, Lesotho's King, seemed well positioned to benefit from the failings of the political parties, and the civilian and military regimes. During the run-up to independence and brief period of parliamentary government, he had been badly outmanoeuvred and limited to the ceremonial role of a constitutional monarch by Chief Jonathan and other experienced civilian politicians. After periods in exile abroad and 'sabbaticals' spent completing his law degrees, Moshoeshoe used his limited opportunities to promote national reconciliation and to speak forcefully for human rights and, by implication, against the repressive excesses of the paramilitary and police. However, the B.N.P. Government's co- operative relationship with the A.N.C. and participation in S.A.D.C.C. coincided with the King's perspectives regarding Southern Africa. When these more adversarial policies resulted in South African raids, destabilization, closure of the border, and support for L.L.A. surrogates, Moshoeshoe was hardly in a position to confront his Government.

Alarmed by the emergence of an armed and militant B.N.P. Youth League which threatened the hierarchy and discipline of the Lesotho Defence Force, a military junta seized power in January I986.

Uncertain of their reception, General Lekhanya and his cohorts consulted closely with Moshoeshoe II to create what appeared to be a ' military-monarchical government'.34 The King's co-operation was assured since Colonels Thaabe Letsie and Sekhobe Letsie, who had been instrumental in initiating the coup, were his distant cousins and known to be supportive of the monarchy. Several of his close associates, including B. M. Khaketla, Thabo Makenete, Michael Sefali, and Khalaki Sello, were appointed to the politically diverse new Council of Ministers. However, the price Moshoeshoe II paid was unexpectedly high, especially assent to the notorious Order No. 4, which prohibited political activity and legitimized repression. Later the King's image was further tarnished when Sekhobe Letsie, his favourite within the Military Council, was convicted as an accessory to murder for concealing the perpetrators of the brutal assassinations of two former B.N.P. Cabinet Ministers and their wives.35 Moshoeshoe II also underestimated his politically inexperienced military partners. Instead of weaning them away from collaborating with the South African

3 'Lesotho's Democratization Challenge', in Southern Star (Maseru), 5, 4, June i990, p. 6. 3 Lawrence Keketso, 'Brutal Killings at Bushman's - Sekhobe Found Guilty', in The Mirror,

3, 20, I5 March i991, p. i, and 'Sekhobe Letsie and Ngoanantloana Guilty', in Lesotho Today, 6, 12, 21 March i991, pp. r and 4.




security forces and persuading them to address many serious and long- neglected economic and social issues, he found himself compelled to lend royal assent to their decisions.

The hostility between the General and the King gradually escalated. Two incidents fuelled the tension. First, Lekhanya, acting unilat- erally, had invited South African commandos to enter Lesotho and assist with a hostage rescue operation during the papal visit of John Paul II in i988. The King was outraged by this public evidence of connivance with Pretoria, and by other humiliating aspects of this mismanaged visit.36 As a result he requested the Military Council to relieve the General of his Defence portfolio. Second, Lekhanya was personally charged with the shooting of a fleeing student, alleged to be a rapist. To no avail, Moshoeshoe II urged the Military Council to have Lekhanya step down temporarily until the investigation and inquest were concluded. Undoubtedly, his requests augmented conflict within the junta, feeding rumours that the King was acting through Sekhobe and Thaabe Letsie to foment a coup.

Not long after the Chief Magistrate had ruled that Lekhanya's act was 'justifiable homicide',37 the General turned the tables on his rivals, who were also the King's allies, by ousting them from the Military Council and the Council of Ministers. Moshoeshoe II refused to give his assent and later supported the legal action taken by one of those sacked, who challenged the validity of his dismissal. In suspiciously quick succession, both Letsies were charged with the murders of the former Cabinet Ministers, and the monarch was forced into another 'sabbatical' in the United Kingdom.38 The Lesotho Government had become purely military, if indeed the King had ever been a major factor, as Lekhanya moved against him almost exactly as Leabua Jonathan had done in i966 and 1970.

In exile, Moshoeshoe II gave interviews, wrote letters, drafted papers on democracy and human rights, instituted civil proceedings, set conditions for his own return, and in other ways kept his grievances against Lekhanya on the front pages of Lesotho's press. General Lekhanya treated the King's actions as renewed evidence that the monarch sought to retain absolute 'legislative and executive powers

36 Mike Pitso, 'South African Commandos Came Without King's Consent - Theko', in ibid. I, 30, 24 March I 989, pp. 1-2.

37 'Court Ruling on Student Killing: "Justifiable Homicide"', in Lesotho Today, 4, 29, I2

October 1989, p. I, and Mike Pitso, 'Lekhanya Comes Out of Inquest a Hero', in The Mirror, 2,

4, I2 October I989, pp. I and 4. 38 Mike Pitso, 'Suspects in the Brutal Killings of the Two Former Ministers Arrested', in ibid.

2, 21, 2 March i990, p. i, and 'Tears Flow as King Moshoeshoe Leaves the Palace and Chiefs Oppose His Exile', in ibid. 2, 24, 23 March i9go.




forever and to rule with the assistance of his favourite military officers'.39 Information about the allegedly extravagant costs to the Government of maintaining the King in exile were also provided to the press. The penultimate act in this political farce was the dethronement of Moshoeshoe II by Lekhanya's military regime, and the installation of his 27-year-old son as King Letsie III, but with severely circumscribed ceremonial duties.40

On 20 July 1992, Moshoeshoe II returned to Lesotho, where he received a warm welcome from thousands of citizens and from his son, Letsie III. This memorable event was the result of growing public pressure from a coalition of chiefs, clergy, politicians, and journalists in Lesotho, as well as the good offices of the Commonwealth Secretary- General and British Foreign Office. However, the exact meaning of the agreement reached between General Ramaema and Moshoeshoe II remains open to interpretation. The Military Council contends that as head of the royal family Moshoeshoe II retains the title of His Majesty, but that his son remains King. Indeed, the government paper ran a tiny story on Moshoeshoe II's arrival, bracketed in prior and subsequent issues by a barrage of articles affirming Letsie III's kingship.41 Moshoeshoe II says ambiguously that 'the people of Lesotho will decide his future'.42 His supporters note that the ranking chiefs and royal family capitulated to strong military coercion when, in order to preserve the monarchy, they agreed to his son's succession. But this family arrangement suggests that Letsie III would resign should his father decide to resume his reign.

Moshoeshoe II continues to characterise his past actions and resulting exile as the result of his longstanding 'belief and commitment' to 'genuine democracy'.43 Upon his return he renewed this pledge 'to contribute to genuine democratization' and spoke against the pre-

3 Bethuel Thai, 'Lekhanya Clarifies Situation - King's Allegation Denied', in Lesotho Today, 5, 26, 13 September i9go, p. 1. See also, 'King Moshoeshoe II Tells the Whole of Africa about His Ailing Relations Major General' [sic], in The Mirror, 2, 50, 21 September 1990, pp. 2-4.

40 Mike Pitso, 'The Dethronement of the King Restores 1966 Independence Monarchy in Lesotho', in The Mirror, 3, 5, 9 November i990, pp. I-2, and 'King Letsie III Becomes the New King of Lesotho', in ibid. 6, i6 November 199o, p. i. Also, 'King to Assent Laws', in Lesotho Today, 5, 35, 15 November i9go, p. i.

41 'King Turns 29: Long Live Our King Letsie III', 'Symbol of Our National Unity', and His Majesty in Pictures', in Lesotho Today, 7, 28, i6July 1992, pp. r and 4-5; 'Former King Arrives in Lesotho', in ibid. 7, 29, 23 July I992, p. i; and 'Mphatlalatsane Out To Sow Seeds of Confusion', in ibid. 7, 30, 30 July 1992, p. 4.

42 Mike Pitso, 'King Moshoeshoe II Given a Rousing Welcome Home', in The Mirror, 4, 34, 24 July I 992, p. 2.

41 'King Moshoeshoe Says His Enforced Exile Resulted from His Conviction in Genuine Democracy', in ibid. 4, 25, 22 May I992, pp. 1-2.




vailing 'tendency' of Lesotho's past rulers 'to monopolise state machinery, state services ... and the means of livelihood' resulting in the marginalisation of most citizens.44 Whatever his intentions, Moshoeshoe II's presence and undetermined future role will remain an issue in the election campaign which, if past experience is any guide, could complicate the transition to democratic rule.

The Byzantine saga chronicled above has enmeshed Moshoeshoe II in less than regal activities, not unlike the venal politics he deplores. His royal authority can serve as a formidable bulwark for democratisation and human rights in Lesotho and Southern Africa. However, royal interests have rarely coincided with those of elected politicians, civilian bureaucrats, and the Lesotho Defence Force. Support for the monarchy has frequently been a temporary expedient for those seeking to gain or consolidate their own power. A politically active Moshoeshoe II risks the future of the precariously positioned kingship, should he be on the losing side and exiled for a third time.

By contrast, young King Mswati III in Swaziland has been successful in utilising the powerful royal establishment and repressive state bureaucracy, entrenched by his predecessor, to act on his behalf. Nevertheless, commonplace images of stability may be illusory portents of a latent explosion. Fuelled by changes in South Africa, illegal, but increasingly vocal, Swazi opposition groups have defiantly challenged the existing royalist order. Mswati III can no longer afford to stand above the daily fray and take the traditional rural base of support of the monarchy for granted. Though he maintains an 'equivocal position on democratic reform', the King must, for the first time in many years, cope with popular pressures for the 'normalisation of political life' and even democratisation.45 The evolution of the Swazi monarchy could increasingly parallel the pattern of conflict in Lesotho.

3. The Military

Far from being in an unassailable position, General Lekhanya was himself forced to resign at gunpoint by his fellow soldiers within six months of ousting the King. The precipitating issues were not human rights or the struggle for democracy but, significantly, demands from

44 Pitso, 'King Moshoeshoe II', p. i. 45 Richard Levin, 'Challenge to All the King's Men', in The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 8,

II, 13-I9 March 199g, p. 29.



66o RICHARD F. WEISFELDER

46 the ranks for better pay. His successor, Phisoana Ramaema, is the sole survivor in office from the junta that seized power in i986. Described as Lekhanya's 'right hand man' who unsuccessfully tried to 'mediate between the King and the General', Ramaema was arguably the least visible member of the original Military Council.47 Perhaps, like Claudius after the overthrow of Caligula, this career soldier and former mineworker was discovered by more junior officers and soldiers, who needed someone recognisable, but relatively innocuous, to legitimise their actions.

There can be no doubt that the popularity of the military has suffered greatly from its altercations with the King and its well- deserved reputation for lawlessness and disregard for basic human rights, amply reinforced by the recent behaviour of its leaders. Moreover, it was perceived as far too subservient to the more reactionary segments of the South African security establishment in the very period when they were increasingly discredited in their own country. But the greatest liability of the Military Council has been its abysmal failure to stem the deterioration of the economy and the quality of life in Lesotho.

Many of the country's problems are simply beyond the control of the Government. The number of jobs for workers from Lesotho on the South African mines had declined by more than I 6,ooo during the past decade, while the number seeking employment has dramatically increased.48 Given the changes in Southern Africa and Eastern Europe, the spigot of external aid is being sharply curtailed. Moreover, many allege that the dependence of the military regime on South African support prevented it from negotiating appropriate arrangements for the employment of Basotho workers on the construction of the multi- billion-dollar Highlands Water Project. Neither, they argue, were the long-term rates for the sale of water and power sufficiently favourable.49

The predictable result of increasing unemployment has been a surge of serious crime, rampant corruption, and racial violence involving Asian and other foreign traders.50 Pay increases granted to appease the military and the civil service have left few other financial resources

46 Lawrence Keketso, 'Lekhanya Resigns at Gun-Point', and 'I Was Not Surprised - Says Lekhanya', in The Mirror, 3, 26, 3 May 1991, pp. I and 3.

4 Caption under a photograph, in ibid. 2, 22, 9 March 1990, p. 7. 48 'Thousands of Basotho Mineworkers Sent Home!', in The Mirror, 3, x8, I March 199i, pp.

I-2; Majara Theko, 'i6,ooo Basotho Have Been Retrenched from South African Mines - Outgoing Chief', in Lesotho Today, 7, 3, i6 January 1992, p. i; and 'The Miners Return', in Shoeshoe, 2, 5, Summer 1992, pp. 2-3 and io-i i.

49 'Political Leaders Betrayed the People', p. 2.

0 Greg Mills, 'Lesotho: race riots intensify military's troubles', in Bulletin of the Africa Institute (Pretoria), 31, 7, 1991, P. 3.



LESOTHO AND THE INNER PERIPHERY 66i

available to accomplish national objectives in agriculture, education, health, and other vital economic sectors. Progress is marked more by new roads and bridges in the countryside, used by domestic elites and foreigners employed by aid donors, than by improved services vital in meeting the basic needs of the urban unemployed and rural landless. At present, the discontented public has joined hands with external donors in supporting democratization and the return to civilian rule. With all' its liabilities, the current regime possesses the power to delay rather than actually to resist these pressures.

Nevertheless, the military has reason to fear discussion of incorporation in South Africa because Lesotho's continued existence as a separate nation-state is intrinsic to its mission as a national defence force. Although General Ramaema has reaffirmed his commitment to restore democratic rule, his recent warning against 'sly' politicians who 'promise anything' is a reminder that soldiers, who have intervened before, may easily be tempted to do so again, if 'disorderly' civilian politics offends them or threatens their livelihood.51 When push comes to shove, promises to surrender power can also be broken! However, the Military Council's increasing vulnerability to domestic and international pressure was quite evident when it reluctantly permitted Moshoeshoe II to return to Lesotho.

The growing Botswana Defence Force (B.D.F.) has, by contrast, remained subservient to the elected Government and not attempted to seize power. However, the interpenetration of civilian and military elites has permitted the former B.D.F. commander to become a member of the ruling B.D.P. Cabinet. Criticism has surfaced about the inordinate portion of the national budget going to defence, for construction of a large air base at a time when a 'peace dividend' might have been expected. Although the B.D.F.'s mission seems uncertain in the new regional environment, its political clout and access to the Treasury are unsurpassed.52 Nevertheless, it is important to make a sharp distinction between the legitimacy of a military establishment, which has learned how to promote its interests within a civilian-run democracy, and the Lesotho Defence Force, which has repeatedly had its way through the barrel of a gun.

51 "'Beware of Sly Politicians"', in Lesotho Today, 7, 10, 12 March 1992, p. i. See also, 'The Final Year of Military Rule; Yet No Elections Date', in Mphatlalatsane, i, 6, 25 January 1992,

p. 1.

52 Goitsebeng Mophuting, 'BDF Calls the Shorts' [sic], in Mmegi, 9, 6, 21-27 February 1992,

p. 8.




4. Alternative Institutions

Are there any other institutions within Lesotho which can provide some residual legitimacy to the state? Diplomats and other officials in the state apparatus, whose careers are directly threatened, are quick to ridicule talk of incorporation. But the civil service has been thoroughly tarnished by constant allegations of endemic corruption and bribery, made by the press, party leaders, clergy, and the military leadership itself.53 Even more damaging, the perpetrators have rarely been dismissed, much less tried and punished for their crimes. The judiciary, led by expatriates too often concerned about the renewal of their own contracts, has generally lacked the backbone to stand up to the usurpation of power by the military. The failings of the Ministry of Justice and courts to process cases and enforce judgements ex- peditiously, recently led to a boycott of the ceremonial opening of the High Court by legal practitioners and the resignation of the externally based judges of the Court of Appeal.54 Members of the chieftainship have, on occasion, criticised and resisted abuses of central power. However, legislation from the Jonathan period has given the Government virtually unlimited authority to discipline and depose dissident chiefs. Moreover, dependence upon the state for authority and emoluments renders the institution of chieftainship largely ineffectual in leading or organising sustained grassroots resistance to the central administration.

The most viable restraints have come from outside the state apparatus, particularly from a dynamic network of non-governmental organisations (N.G.O.s). When the leaders of the religious denomi- nations speak out jointly against abuses of power, neither civilian nor military regimes have been able to confront them directly. Similarly, the small independent local press, including the two Sesotho-language church newspapers, Leselinyana and Moeletsi, seem to be remarkably free to criticism. Part of their ability to survive must be attributed to the economic leverage of the major western aid donors, which have threatened to cut off support should the rights of the press be curtailed. The unions and the teachers' associations have demonstrated occasional willingness to challenge the Government, but lack much staying power.

In October i99i, the Council of Churches sponsored a National Conference on National Unity and Democratic Rule in Lesotho, which

53 'Stop Corruption, Ramaema Warns', in Lesotho Today, 6, 38, 3 and Io October 1991, p. 1. "I 'Lesotho Judges Resign from the Bench', in The Mirror, 3, i6, s6 February i991, p. 1, and

Mike Mokomeng, 'Legal Practitioners Boycott Opening Ceremony of High Court: "Judges Be Increased"',. in Lesotho Today, 7, 5, 6 February 1992, p. i.




was attended by virtually all political participants with the significant exceptions of the military Government, the B.C.P., and the B.N.P. The resolutions passed (I) detailed the steps necessary to return Lesotho to democratic rule, (2) emphasised the need for national reconciliation, (3) criticised the undemocratic process of revising the constitution, (4) called for the return of King Moshoeshoe, and (5) requested that churches refrain from divisive intrusions into partisan politics.55 A networking group of N.G.O.s has also been established to monitor abuses of human rights. Its recommendations include a provision urging 'relevant institutions to observe, promote, and preserve the principle of the sovereignty of the state of Lesotho'.56

Not surprisingly, several of the more militant groups have com- plained that some of the specific resolutions of these conferences have entrenched private agendas, and undermined prospects for future collective effort.57 Indeed, both sets of resolutions share considerable common ground with the agenda that King Moshoeshoe II advocated at the International Institute for Democracy and Human Rights in Africa in London in July I99I.58 Thus far, this emerging Lesotho N.G.O. movement has effectively highlighted the venality of the existing state, and articulated alternatives for a democratic order sensitive to human rights. Whether its constituents, either individually or collectively, can build the political consensus and capacity to regenerate positive elements of national soliddarity remains very much in doubt.

5. Federal Options: Costs and Benefits

If citizens of Lesotho seek some form of political integration with the 'new' South Africa, what do they stand to gain and lose?59 The first problem is that proposals to date have been very general, espousing a principle, but virtually no specifics. The prospective federation cannot be defined until after South Africa has delineated the terms of its own internal settlement. When those decisions have been reached, Lesotho will probably be precluded from having much impact and will have to accept what others have already decided. There seems to be no place for Lesotho at the present negotiations. After the principles shaping the

5 'National Conference', p. 3. 56 'The Human Rights Day: i991', in Mphatlalatsane, I, I, I4 December 1991, pp. 4 and 6. 5 'Some Political Parties and Trade Unions Complain to Heads of Churches', in The Mirror,

3, 51, 8 November 1991, p. i, and 'Editorial Comment', in ibid. 50, X November 1991, p. 2.

58 'The Human Rights Day: 1991', p. 2.

5 For an excellent overview of possible options, see James Cobbe, 'Lesotho: what will happen after apartheid goes?', in Africa Today (Denver), 38, 1, i99i, pp. 18-32.




new institutions have been determined, there will be little room for any discussion about the parameters of a broader federation. Once again, Lesotho seems to be virtually irrelevant.

The economic risks and benefits are already quite well known.60 Most observers assume that majority rule in South Africa will mean certainly fewer employment opportunities for Basotho in the mines, because the Republic's citizens will inevitably demand preference over foreigners. Reduced revenue from the remittances of migrant workers will lower revenues from the existing Customs Union. The new South African Government might also be reluctant to sustain the current revenue formula that compensates the weaker members for the costs of being linked to a stronger economy. It is also feared that the shortage of skilled and experienced black educators, health professionals, and administrators in South Africa could contribute to a stupendous brain drain from Lesotho, when the best and brightest Basotho seek greener pastures.61 On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine what the new South Africa would gain from reincorporating Lesotho. The main advantage would be to prevent an impoverished source of perennial discontent from weakening South Africa itself. Similarly, the goal of creating 'one South African people' has considerable appeal, especially because an independent Lesotho would otherwise perpetuate a model of ethnic nationhood within South Africa's borders. But the price of such gains would be to assume responsibility for providing scarce resources to an additional impoverished and unpromising territory.

Political federation would, under any circumstances, alter and limit Lesotho's choices. It would no longer have a separate voice in regional and international forums. The state of Lesotho would no longer be available as a hedge and sanctuary for ethnic Basotho, should political stability be disrupted in majority-ruled South Africa. Explicit guarantees would have to be provided to ensure that the revenues for Lesotho's water and power continued to flow to its successor region within such a federation. Even then, what sanctions would remain available to enforce such arrangements? Once federated, the doctrine of uli possidelis would most probably preclude the option of future secession. Finally, there remains Lesotho's own deep-seated ambiv- alence. Fundamental change of long-standing political values and habits is difficult, no matter how poorly existing institutions have

60 See Mamokotlana Molise and Theresa Muller, 'Would Lesotho Sink Without Apartheid?', in Sethala (Maseru), 5, 33, January-February i99 I, p. 1 5.

61 'The Basotho Brain Drain', in SA Special Despatch, 4, 9, October 199i, pp. I 1-12.




performed. This is more true when the implications of the alternative are so little understood.

UTI POSSIDETIS REVISITED

In the absence of leadership able to articulate a national strategy or to inspire the citizenry, incorporation within a federal South Africa has, by default, become a conceivable alternative for Lesotho. During the early nineteenth century, Moshoeshoe I created his independent Kingdom as a refuge for peoples displaced by black and white invaders. But in the new South Africa, Lesotho's mountain fortresses no longer provide sanctuary. Instead, they, as well as the Maloti currency named after them, and the concept of national sovereignty, increasingly symbolise the alienation of the Basotho from participation in a potentially better future.

Pragmatic economic motivations seem dominant over ideology and ethnic chauvinism in the current debate. Employment opportunities in South Africa and substantial aid from international donors will simply no longer be forthcoming, and even less so if Lesotho fails to get its political house in order. The mini-boom in the early i98os, which Jonathan built upon an exaggerated portrayal of Lesotho as just a helpless victim, has ended. All of Africa seems increasingly to be of marginal importance to western donors preoccupied with the political transformations and economic problems of the former Soviet empire and its allies. Support for the idea of regional federation was heard loud and clear when Herman Cohen, the American Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, visited Lesotho in January I 99 I. He told a press conference in Maseru that

when apartheid is brought to an end in South Africa and every country of Southern Africa enjoys freedom in determining its own destiny, it would be an ideal thing to have economic integration that would finally lead to political integration for all the countries of Southern Africa.62

The National Union of Mineworkers (N.U.M.) of South Africa is another major transnational factor challenging Lesotho's future as a sovereign state. Earlier research suggested that 'the likely motivation for the politicising of migrants would be to sustain their established position as part of the South African work force'.63 When Jonathan's opportunistic linkages with the A.N.C. seemed to threaten their

62 'Hope for Federation of States in Southern Africa', in The Mirror, 3, 14, I February I991,

p. 63 Weisfelder, 'The Basotho Nation-State', p. 239.




livelihoods, some miners became involved in Mokhehle's so-called 'liberation army'. The recent N.U.M. resolutions on the integration of Lesotho into South Africa reflect the fact that the Basotho constitute a large, but especially vulnerable, contingent within the Union's membership. By seeking power within the existing state framework, both the B.N.P. and B.C.P. seem to stand in the way of the future security of many migrant workers. As a result, the leaders of the N.U.M. have had to emphasise that their resolutions do not commit the A.N.C. or the Cosatu federation to integration, and that they have not become aligned with specific political groups in Lesotho.64 Nevertheless, the steering committee created to liaise with the N.U.M. provides an implicit linkage with the portion of Lesotho's political spectrum favourable to political integration with South Africa.65

Nothing in the Basotho proposals for regional economic and political co-operation or full amalgamation in a federal framework contradicts the premises of uti possidetis as construed by the O.A.U. As William Foltz has explained:

Mergers of existing political units are not only permissible but also may be hailed as steps toward greater pan-African unity... The key is that the merger appear voluntary, that it produce order, not disorder that would divide neighbors and the organization itself, and that no major neighboring state object vigorously.66

Neither should there be any problem regarding a revised configuration of internal sub-unit boundaries within the new South Africa. A potential risk lies in the possibility that borders defined primarily in ethnic terms could stimulate secessionist claims to self-determination and national sovereignty, especially if the reconstituted South African state should encounter particularly disruptive economic and political crises. The present controversies involving Gatsha Buthelezi, Inkatha, and KwaZulu illustrate these dangers.

The doctrine of uti possidetis creates complications, because it sustains the presumption that the current negotiations must be circumscribed by existing state boundaries. Lesotho and the other members of S.A.D.C. must wait until agreement has been reached in South Africa before their concerns can be addressed. But the Republic's role as the regional economic and military hegemon makes the two processes

64 Mike Pitso, 'Federation with Post Apartheid South Africa is Discussed', in The Mirror, 3, 49, 25 October 1991, p. 2.

6 'NUM Is Putting Record Straight', in ibid. 50, I November I99I, p. 2.

66 WilliamJ. Foltz, 'The Organization of African Unity and the Resolution of Africa's Conflicts', in Deng and Zartman (eds.), op. cit. p. 354.




inseparable. By becoming involved only after the new internal South African format is afait accompli, the inner periphery may discover that matters of importance have been effectively rendered non-negotiable. On the other hand, the inclusion of neighbouring states in Codesa or future bargaining processes could delay and greatly complicate them, possibly dooming them to failure.

There is little indication that political federation with South Africa is a hot topic in either Gaborone or Mbabane, much less Harare or Windhoek. Discussions in those and most other S.A.D.C. capitals centre on the role that post-apartheid South Africa might play in novel regional frameworks for economic co-operation. Whether, under what conditions and with what effect, post-apartheid South Africa might join S.A.D.C. is widely debated.67 Because of its unique circumstances, only certain elements in Lesotho see amalgamation as a better current option than minor variations on the regional status quo. Even there, neither newly elected politicians, privileged bureaucrats, politicised soldiers, nor the returned monarch are likely to concede the power and prestige conferred through national sovereignty. At least for the time being, the S.A.D.C. states seem committed to maintaining their separate national identities. But, they are agreed that national sovereignty must co-exist with mechanisms for regional co-operation designed to help all to achieve their objectives of political stability and economic progress.

APPENDIX

Resolution passed at the Congress of the National Union of Mineworkers for South Africa, Johannesburg, 24-27 April iggi68

The Congress noting: (i) The intensifying structural integration of Lesotho into the economy of

South Africa which integration has further been heightened by the multi- billion Water Project jointly launched by the governments of Lesotho and South Africa in the i98os.

(2) The economic relationship between South Africa and Lesotho has until now onesidedly favoured the former while registering no tangible benefits to the latter and its people except to accentuate its dependency.

(3) The status of aliens ascribed to Basotho working in South Africa is deceitfully manipulated by a system of apartheid to restrict their rights and to subject them to severe exploitation.

67 Weisfelder, 'SADCC after Apartheid', pp. 13-I5. 68 Reproduced in 'Would Lesotho Be Integrated Into South Africa?', in The Mirror, 3, 38, 9

August 199i, p. I.




(4) Parts or the whole of the territory which lies between the Caledon and Vaal rivers historically belonged to Basotho and was alienated from them by deceit and force, thus leaving them with a small piece of land which has no prospects of economically sustaining a growing population. Believing that:

(i) Larger numbers of Basotho will forever look to South Africa forjobs and that their rights shall remain restricted as long as they are 'foreign' workers in a 'foreign' country.

(2) Without a viable economy and given its total encirclement Lesotho's independence will forever remain less than meaningful and vulnerable.

(3) The wish of the people who historically have always populated the territory severed from Lesotho during the last century, a majority of whom are also Basotho, is to retain that territory as an integral part of non-racial, non- sexist democratic South Africa; and in that regard they are justified by the sacrifices they have made in the struggle to free and realise a united and democratic South Africa; aware also that the territorial integrity of South Africa is supported by the International Law and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Charter, and, therefore, the restoration of the Free State to Lesotho is not objectively realisable.

(4) The people of Lesotho have nonetheless a legitimate moral claim to access to land available in South Africa, to which they have lost a substantial territory, and to benefits accruing from the South African economy, to whose development they have contributed over a century.

(5) The peoples of Lesotho and South Africa have strong historical and cultural ties.

(6) The eradication of Apartheid and the dawning of a new non-racial, non-sexist democratic South Africa is now a real possibility.

(7) Political integration of Lesotho into a future non-racial, non-sexist democratic South Africa provides the only realistic answer which is in the best interest of the people of both countries.

Therefore resolves: (i) That in view of the fact that the people of Lesotho must necessarily be

central to the decision to effect the political integration of Lesotho into non- racial, non-sexist democratic South Africa, the NUM undertakes to canvass the idea and consult with the widest possible spectrum of their representatives.

(2) That the political integration in Lesotho into a future non-racial, non- sexist democratic South Africa can only be effected after a referendum in which the people of Lesotho have freely and democratically affirmed their will to such a development.



Documents

Lesotho and the Inner Periphery in the New South Africa