Changing South Africa: The New DebateModernizing Racial Domination: The Dynamics of South African Politics by Heribert Adam;The South African Connection: Western Investments in Apartheid by Ruth First; JonathanSteele; Christabel Gurney; South Africa: Civilizations in Conflict by Jim HoaglandReview by: George W. Shepherd, Jr.Africa Today, Vol. 19, No. 4, Lesotho, Burundi, Guinea-Bissau (Autumn, 1972), pp. 78-82Published by: Indiana University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4185266 .

Accessed: 10/06/2014 22:02

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

.

Indiana University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Africa Today.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 195.34.78.42 on Tue, 10 Jun 2014 22:02:19 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Changing South Africa: The New Debate

George W. Shepherd, Jr.

Heribert Adam, MODERNIZING RACIAL DOMINATION: THE DYNAMICS OF SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1971) 214 pp., $8.00 (cloth) $2.65 (paper).

Ruth First, Jonathan Steele, Christabel Gurney, THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONNECTION: WESTERN INVESTMENTS IN APARTHEID, (London, Temple Smith, 1972) 353 pp., EL3.50.

Jim Hoagland, SOUTH AFRICA: CIVILIZATIONS IN CONFLICT, (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1972) 364 pp., $10.00.

These three books set the dimensions of the contemporary debate regard- ing the nature of change within South Africa and the way in which outside and internal forces should respond. That rapid change is taking place within South Africa as a result of her emergence as an industrial power with nuclear capability and growing influences in Southern Africa and the Western world is generally conceded by all. But what the implications are from this develop- ment in terms of the internal racial system, the distribution of opportunity, and the prospects for African self-determination both within South Africa and in Southern Africa in general is widely disputed by these authors as well as many of their peers.

The way in which a particular internal conflict is viewed in the world determines directly the policy nations who wish to influence the out- come adopt. The insistence by the United States that the Vietnam War was an international conflict rather than a civil war for a great many years obscured the capacity of either the public or the policy makers themselves to understand what was really happening. Various ways of looking at the racial conflict in South Africa and the liberation struggle in Southern Africa are being set forth today. The American public in general has as little interest in these tracts and debates as they had in 1954 when the U.S. made its crucial com- mitments regarding intervention on behalf of South Vietnam. If we have learned anything, it should be to look behind what the leaders of Western powers like the United States are saying to what is actually going on. Here

Dr. Shepherd, an editor of AFRICA TODAY, is Director of the Center on International Race Relations, University of Denver Graduate School of International Studies. Currently on sabbatical leave, he is researching international intervention in South Africa under the joint auspices of CIRR and UNITAR.

78

This content downloaded from 195.34.78.42 on Tue, 10 Jun 2014 22:02:19 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

George W. Shepherd, Jr.

scholars and journalists can help, especially if they have the expertise and insights of these several authors. They do not agree on final prescriptions, in fact directly disagree, but provide us with a debate over the essential issues. None of them are misled by the naive slogans of the Nixon administration in support of friendly contacts and "peaceful change" in a subcontinent already wracked by violent oppression and liberation wars. They all agree that South Africa represents a modern form of racial violence and expansive power that threatens us all if it does not change. The basic point of difference is how to change it by manipulating the external interventionary forces available to the outside world: by trade and investments, by military boycotts, or by support for liberation movements.

Heribert Adam presents an inadequately substantiated argument on behalf of the thesis that the internal forces of industrial change are gradually creating an African and Colored middle class elite who can ally with the Verlichtes and Progressives as a pervasive force for social change. (pp. 157-8) He sees a gradual "deracialization" coming about through economic concessions out of self-interest on the part of whites and blacks and under the enlightened leadership of what he calls "effective technocrats." This realization of mutual interests within separate communities including homelands and Bantustans will not be realized without violence, but he hopes that the Clausewitz doctrine of war as an extension of politics will be reversed (p. 167) and the most violent racial passions will become class conflicts. The role of the external forces should be to facilitate this industrial change, reduce the sharp edges of the color bar, and support the subordinate groups in their struggle for par- ticipation and greater equity. While doubting some of the claims made on behalf of the Bantustans, he does appear to endorse their utility, especially as a trade union or political party substitute for blacks. He fails to elaborate on how this might work, and among the many weak points in the argument, this is the most vulnerable.

Those familiar with the "floating color bar" argument of Sir Harry Op- penheimer and his group of "progressives" in South Africa will recognize many of Adam's points. Yet his thesis is closer to the Verlichte view in the way they see Afrikaners changing under industrialism and their willingness to modify and deracialize the system within the framework of separate development.

What gives Adam's thesis initial appeal is the way in which he reminds us of the failures of earlier liberal analysis about the coming revolution and the ef- fectiveness of intervention in the writings of Leo Kuper and Pierre Van den Berghe. (The latter unaccountably endorses the book on the cover.)

These arguments remind me of a discussion I had with Professor Nic Olivier of Stellenbosch. Great stress is put upon the fact that the revolution is not around the corner and that sanctions cannot work unless the West is ready to mount a direct invasion of South Africa. But this is boxing with shadows. The external view was considerably different twelve years ago in the pre- Sharpeville era, and not even Ronald Segal is talking seriously about mounting a United Nations invasion today. The argument has shifted to the role of Ban- tustans, economic boycotts, and support for liberation movements - subjects not really discussed by Adam.

Not even Oppenheimer sees the direct relation between economic change, i.e. black skilled workers, and the sociological changes that Professor Adam

79

This content downloaded from 195.34.78.42 on Tue, 10 Jun 2014 22:02:19 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

claims to perceive. (p. 173) The Progressive group in South Africa is far more skeptical than Adam is about the extent of change in the Afrikaner and his readiness to compromise with the colored or the African. Helen Suzman is not at all optimistic about either the racial attitudes of the Government or the basic social economic trends. The general conclusions of the SPROCAS and SAIRR studies give little encouragement to the idea that deracialization is about to take place.

Since the corporations came into the controversy, with Polaroid and Bar- clays Bank leading the "reforms," the Adam thesis has rallied considerable support in the West. It is unintentional grist for the State Department mill which is busy promoting dialogue, opposing sanctions, and building a case for maintaining economic investments and "contact" rather than "isolating South Africa," as Jim Hoagland documents in his critique of the Nixon com- munications option (p. 367).

Neither Hoagland nor Ruth First and her co-authors are persuaded by Adam's argument that industrial reform is the road to social change - quite the reverse. The Pulitzer prize winning correspondent interviewed a number of business executives in South Africa concerning their plans for social change and was impressed with individual responses, but concludes the prime ob- jective of firms like General Motors is to maintain a policy of cheap labor and that no campaign for change can be effective short of a policy which permits independent African trade unions. He sees some slight prospect for economic improvement for blacks but no political or social change. (pp. 357-358.)

Some might dismiss Hoagland's arguments as hasty journalism, but they are strongly sustained by the well-documented case made by First, Steele, and Gurney in a book that represents the most thorough collection of the evidence and arguments against the reformist thesis to date. Any case as strongly argued as this one is easily categorized as polemics by those who are less persuaded or committed, usually before they read it. However, because the volume concentrates upon the role of corporations and social change, it is able to bring to bear an immense amount of useful information for all interested in the general debate.

The crucial point of the argument is over the emergence of the "skilled African middle class" and its ability to play a real role in changing the social system. First and company conclude after examining several indus- tries that such a group is emerging only marginally, but is swept aside by the firmly established government policy of a migratory labor system con- sciously extended from the mines to industry and utilizing the homelands as reserves for cheap labor. (p. 44) All their indicators point to a growing gap be- tween white and black labor. They argue that whites, including white labor, in their advocacy of removing job reservation (pp. 63-65) are only interested in allowing a cheap semi-skilled African and colored labor group to emerge. Jobs are fragmented. Blacks continue to work under the supervision of whites and are much more poorly paid, thus enhancing profits as well. They believe that insofar as the South Africans will allow a black middle class to evolve, it will be a subservient one used to blunt the -demands of the black masses and prevent trade unionism and political participation. (p. 77). The crucial role of the Bantustans is to deprive the Africans of any political rights in South Africa while persuading outside powers that Africans are receiving self-determination and that South African separate development should be recognized. (p. 289) These British writers oppose Adam's conventional view that an industrial

80

This content downloaded from 195.34.78.42 on Tue, 10 Jun 2014 22:02:19 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

George W. Shepherd, Jr.

revolution operates naturally to undermine the existing order. They believe it may well strengthen it and "leave the race system embedded in that order." (p. 290). The social indicators appear to support First, Steele, and Gurney against Adam in terms of social change. An African middle class in- creasingly better off than their fellows without the capacity to organize politically or economically is more likely to play the role of eunuch than revolutionary. Economic development within the Bantustans is very limited, and even border industries play a minor role and do not alter the general pat- tern of growing pools of landless, unemployed cheap labor.

There is a great deal of wishful thinking in this reformist thesis, similar to the early notions of the imminent revolution. The determination of South African government to regulate the ratio of black participation and benefits in industry is very clear. They have constantly assured their trade union and farm supporters that no base of power will be permitted to black workers, Ban- tustans, or border industries. The reformists who see the dialectic at work are like American Marxists who still view American labor as a revolutionary force. We may be pardoned if we ask for the evidence.

First and company supply no alternative in this volume though they hint in the last chapter that support for external liberation movements would be their primary strategy without going into the ambiguities of that policy. Hoagland is more ambitious and surveys the various alternative strategies of anti- Apartheid groups from the United Church of Christ in the USA to the Defense and Aid Fund based in London. While perceptive, his conclusion is unsatisfying, and we are led to expect more. Hoagland is convinced that white tyranny will probably hold firm despite outside efforts to modify it. We should continue to observe the struggle because we might learn something before catastrophe engulfs first South Africa and then ourselves.

Hoagland does not consider seriously the kinds of support that various groups are giving to liberation movements and the varieties of successes and failures in these strategies. Nor does he take up the kinds of limited steps the U.S. might undertake at the United Nations regarding subjects such as Namibia which are very open to American influence.

Unfortunately, none of these authors supply us with a full perspective from which a response to the contemporary situation can be made. One of the most difficult issues for all external agencies dealing with South Africa is now the question of the Bantustans. The South African strategy as it has emerged recently over Namibia is quite clear. They intend to create these entities and grant them independence in a de jure sense. This raises basic questions. Will they still be governed by white South African officials with Africans unable to make final decisions because their economies will remain totally dependent up- on South Africa for economic subsidy and trade? Will they continue as sources of a cheap labor supply for the growing South African industries? Cannot the slightest indication of revolutionary activity be quickly rooted out by the in- former system and the South African mobile army if necessary? Black and white proponents of the Bantustans, which now include many liberals, argue that even though these are client states, they provide a point of interest and a symbol of resistance to the totally suppressed non-whites in South Africa. (See Alan Paton's article in the London Times, July 22, 1971.) But how they believe the Butelezis can leap from protest to political power is not spelled out.

81

This content downloaded from 195.34.78.42 on Tue, 10 Jun 2014 22:02:19 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

There already is a great deal of pressure in the Western world to recognize, aid and legitimize these Bantustans in relation to Vorster's decentralized solution in Namibia and the talk of independence for the Transkei and Kwa Zulu. It is possible that the South Africans will push some of these Bantustans into a premature independence even over the protest of their leaders in order to try to gain African and world acceptance of a "separate development solution." What attitude should the outside world take to this policy which its own external pressures in a direct sense have created? The answers or even serious discussion of this issue are not found in these books. But it is clear that the reformist thesis and Nixon's "communications" pressure will be in the direction of recognizing and dealing with the Bantustans out of the hope that change will result and trade will grow. This could mean the loss of the only real lever the outside world has on the racial system of Apartheid which is the universal abhorrence of its subordination of the black man. If the Western world pretends that a solution has been found while the Africans and Asians are convinced it has not, the color line of confrontation will be clearly drawn.

UNIVERSITY OF ZAMBIA INSTITUTE FOR AFRICAN STUDIES

(formerly Rhodes-Livingstone Institute) P. O. Box 900, Lusaka, Zambia.

PUBLICATIONS: African Social Research (bi-annual journal) Zambian Papers (annual) Communications (annual)

BOOKS

AFRICAN SOCIAL RESEARCH NO. 14 December 1972

Another Look at the Mineworker by Michael Burawoy

Some Values and Attitudes of Young Zambians, Studied through Spontaneous Autobiographies

by Leonard Bloom

Kingdoms and Villages: a Possible New Perspective in African History

by John Omer-Cooper

Chirupula Stephenson and Copperbelt History-a Note by Marcia Wright

Reviews by A.R. Quartermain, A. Drysdale, Eileen Haddon, Ben Obumselu, Paul Cross and David Wilkin.

All correspondence and books for review should be addressed to: The Publications Officer.

82

This content downloaded from 195.34.78.42 on Tue, 10 Jun 2014 22:02:19 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions