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LESSONSLEARNED

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LESSONSLEARNED

IN EACEKEEPINGOPERATIONS

Forewordto AHG Lessons Learned in

Peacekeeping operations

As witnessed by the NATO-led IFOR and SFOR operations in Bosnia, peacekeeping has assumed a prominent place among NATO’s new missions after the end of the Cold War. Since 1992, peacekeeping has also been a subject for consultations with Partners in the Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping. Indeed, the Ad Hoc Group has become the principal forum for ex-changing views and sharing experiences among Allies and Partners in the field of peacekeeping.

In the course of its work, the Group has produced two detailed special reports on cooperation in peacekeeping, which are a unique example of a coherent and successful regional effort to develop common concepts of peacekeeping. The first report from 1993 - known as the «Athens Report - dealt with conceptual approaches to peacekeeping. A second report, the «Follow-On to the Athens Report» of 1995, revisited these issues in the light of experiences gained since 1993.

Drawing on the extensive peacekeeping experience of Group members, including in the

former Yugoslavia, the members of the Ad Hoc Group have completed the present compendium of «Lessons Learned in Peacekeeping Operations». The paper reflects national experiences gained by Allied and Partner countries in areas such as the preparation, implementation and operations aspects of such operations. By exchanging national experiences, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) members aim to develop further common practical approaches to peacekeeping.

The common understanding and valuable lessons contained in the report bears witness to the utility of cooperation activities taking place within the framework of the EAPC. It also offers useful substance to our regular interchanges and cooperation with the UN, OSCE and other rele-vant organisations in the field of peacekeeping.

AmbassadorS.Balanzino DeputySecretaryGeneral ChairmanoftheAdHocGrouponCooperationinPeacekeeping

LESSONSLEARNED

INPEACEKEEPINGOPERATIONS

LESSONSLEARNED

INPEACEKEEPINGOPERATIONS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 1 - 3

PRACTICALLESSONSLEARNED

GroupI:Preparation

A. Planning 4 - 18

B. CoordinationAmongTroopContributingNations 19 - 21 andWithImplementingOrganisation

C. CoordinationAmongInstitutions 22 - 24 (includingHumanitarianAspectsandRefugees)

D. RoleofNeighbouringCountries 25 - 29

GroupII:Implementation

E. Civil-MilitaryRelations 30 - 35

F. PublicRelations 36 - 42

G. CommandandControl 43 - 46

GroupIII:Operations

H. CommunicationandInformationSystems 47 - 48

I. InformationandIntelligence 49 - 52

J. Logistics 53 - 61

K. MedicalSupport 62 - 71

L. Training 72 - 80

M. PersonnelandAdministration 81

N. FinancialAspects 82 - 87

LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS �

INTRODUCTION

1TheAdHocGrouponCooperationinPeacekee-

pingwasestablishedwithintheframeworkofNACCin1993.TheaimoftheGroupistodevelopacommonunderstandingofthepoliticalprinciplesofandthetoolsforpeacekeeping,andtoshareexperienceandtherebydevelopcommonpracticalapproachesandcooperationinsup-portofpeacekeepingundertheresponsibilityoftheUNortheOSCE.Sinceitsinception,theGrouphasprovidedavaluableforumforcomparingnationalexperiencesandlearninglessonsarisingfromourparticipationinpeacekeepingoperations. TheGrouppresentedMinisterswithaninitialreportattheirAthensMeetingon11thJune1993,andsupplementedthiswithaFollow-Onreport,reflectinglessonslearnedinmorerecentoperations,inDecember1995.

2TheAthensReportanditsFollow-Oncollectively

provideagoodbasisforacommonunderstandingofthepoliticalprinciplesinvolvedinpea-cekeeping.TheAdHocGrouponCooperationinPeacekeepinghasnowtakenitsworkonestepfurther,withtheaimofdevelopingcommonpracticalapproachestopeacekeeping,whichwasalsoidentifiedasanobjectiveinthe1993AthensReport.Thiscurrentpaperrepresentsacompendiumofpracticalnationalexperiencesinrecentpeacekeepingoperations,principally(butnotexclusively)intheformerYugoslavia.

3 Incarryingout thisexercise, theAdHocGroup

onCooperationinPeacekeepingnotedtheimportanceofcontinuingclosecooperationandregularinterchangeswiththerelevantelementsoftheUNandtheOSCE,toensurethatlessonslearnedaregiventhewidestpossibledistribution.


PRACTICALLESSONSLEARNED

GROUP I Preparation

A. Planning

GENERALEXPERIENCES

4Unityofeffortofallcomponentsofanoperation,

aswellascooperationamongallrelevantbodiesinthefield,mustbeestablishedfromthebeginningofamissionandmustbeforeseenintheplanningprocess.ThestrategiclevelHea-dquarters(HQ)shoulddevelopthedirectionandconceptofoperations,andcoordinatetheinitialgenerationofforces.Inparallel,acoordinatedmissionplanshouldbepreparedattheoperationallevel.ThisshouldideallybecoordinatedunderaMissionHeaddrawingtogetherallmissioncomponents,includingallocationoftasksandprioritiesandlogisticaspects.TimemustbeallowedfortheproperformationofthemissionHQbeforedeployment.

5Planningapeacekeepingoperationshouldnotbe

conductedinisolation,andplannersshouldinparticularbeawareofthepossibleimpactoftheiractivityonpublicopinion.Planningfora«worst-case»scenariohasproventobethebestprerequisiteforasuccessfulpeacekeepingoperation.Plannersmusttakeintoaccountandcoordinateallelementsofthemissionwithaviewtoachievingitsoverallobjective.Allrelevantactors,includingtheForceCommander,mustbeinvolvedinthejointandcombinedmilitaryandcivilianplanningprocessfromtheearlieststage.Reinforcedandimprovedmechanismsofcoordinationshouldbedevelopedbetweentheinternationalorganisationimplementingtheoperationandallpotentialcontributors.Forexample,allpotentialcontributorsshouldbeinformedoftheexpectedforcerequirementsatanearlystage.Moreover,theconceptofope-rationsshouldreflecttothemaximumpossibleextenttheviewsofpotentialcontributors.Tothisend,earlyconsultationswithcontributors,andwheneverpossible,theiractiveparticipationindevelopingtheconceptoftheoperation,isdesirable.Planningshouldalsocoverrotation(amaximumofsixmonthshasbeensuggested),reinforcement,redeploymentandwithdrawaloftheforces.Acomprehensiveexitstrategyisanimportantaspectofthisplanning.

� LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

6Itisimportanttopursueeffortstoinitiatetheplan-

ningprocessinatimelyfashionandtodevelopitonthebasisofastep-by-stepapproach.Inthisregard,plannersalwayshavetokeepinmindthatthepoliticaldecisiontocontributemaycomelate;therefore,contingencyplanningmustbeinitiatedlongbeforethisdecisionistaken.Inviewofthis,itisalsoessentialtodevelopacapacitytoreactquickly.Accordingly,somefeelthatitmaybeusefulfornationstoworkonthebasisofstandbyforces,includingpreparedunitsformedwithpre-selectedpersonnel.

7SomenationsfeelthatUNstandbyarrangements

constituteakeytoenhancedefficiencyofpeacekeepingandamoreexpedientdeploymentofmultifunctionaloperations.InthiscontextsomenationsnotedthattheStandbyForcePlanningInitiativeisavaluablestrategicplanningtool,providingtheUNwithasoundknowledgeofmilitarycapabilitiesandasanindicatorofthepotentialavailabilityofforces.Anotherpro-posalistoplanandpreparedifferentpackagesofpossiblenationaltroopcontributionsandestablishandupdateadatabaseasapossiblesupportforfuturemissions,bypreparingsomekindofstandardcontributionplan.Thenextstepwouldbetodevelopanunderstandingofthepoliticalcriteriaappliedbypotentialcontributorsbeforecontributingpersonnel.

8Afrequentlyneglectedaspectof theoperational

conceptrelatestohumanitarianassistanceanditsimplications.Especiallyinrecentpeacekee-pingoperationsofamultifunctionalnature,themilitarycomponenthasoftenbeenrequestedtoprovideadditionalprotectionandcarryoutpeace-buildingactivitiesotherthanthoseexpli-citlydesignatedinthemandate.Themore«non-militaryservices»anticipatedbythemilitary,themoreadditionalresourcesarenecessarybeyondatraditionalTableofOrganisationandEquipment(TOE).SomefeelthatUNmultifunctionalpeacekeepingoperationsareparticularlywell-suitedtoensureaflexibleresponsetothechangingsituationwithinaconflictarea,toensureeven-handednessindealingwiththepartiestotheconflictand,aboveall,tominimise,ifnottoavert,thethreatofciviliancasualties,destructionofinfrastructureofacorrespondingstateandemergenceofaconsiderablenumberof«attendant»problems(includingrefugees,provisionofhumanitarianandtechnicalassistanceandde-mining).

9Theconceptoftheleadnation,wherebyonena-

tionestablishestheorganisationalcoreoftheoperationuntilotherforcesbecomeavailable,hasproventobefeasibleforcontributorsofsmallercontingentsandseemstobeapracticalarrangementforthefuture.Thecaseofthe«BELUGA»formationwithinIFOR,isoneexam-pleofthesuccessfulapplicationofthe«leadnation»concept.Onlythroughrapidreactionfromnationsthatarewillingtoprovidethenecessaryresources,cantheleadnationconceptbeefficient.Nationsprovidingforcesattheearlystagesofamission(socalled«vanguard»forces)maywishforearlywithdrawaloftheseforcesoncethemainbodyisinplace.OnepossibilitywouldbetosendthepreliminaryandpreformedHQtotheprospectivemissionareainadvanceoftheactualmandatingoftheoperation,inordertoensurespeedyandrealisticplanningandtofacilitateanefficientdeploymentoftheforcesintheareaofoperation.Ingeneral,unitsassignedtothemissionshouldbeequippedfromthebeginningsoastoensurethesafetyandeffectivenessofpersonnel.Whenappropriate,personnelandkeyequipmentshouldbedeployedbyair,ifpossibleusingstrategicairliftcapabilities.Tacticalairliftcapabilitymustalsobemaintainedin-theatre.

10Ifacompositenationalormultinationalunitisto

bedeployed,thedesignatedcommandershouldtakepartintheplanningforandformationoftheunit.Itwouldalsobeusefultoestablishacoordinatinggroup,comprisingrepresentativesfromthenationsinvolved,todeveloptheorganisationandoverseetheformationoftheunit,coordinateplanningandpolicyandsolveanyproblemsthatmayariseduringdeployment.Suchacoordinatinggroupshouldmeetatregularintervals.


11Itisimportantthatunitsinthefieldbeatthere-

quired levelof interoperability;asan importantprecondition,nationalCrisisManagementCentres,andthatoftheimplementingorganisation,shoulddevelopacapabilityofoperatingtogether,onthebasisofcommonstandardstobedevelopedinthelightofexperienceinamission.OperationJointEndeavouroffersusefulmaterialonwhichtodrawtoimproveinte-roperabilityatthislevel.

12Planninghastocontinueinthemissionarea.The

ForceCommander should takeaccountof significantpolitical,humanitarian,militaryandenvironmentalconsiderationsinselectinglocationsforunits.Theresultsofeachphaseofanoperationshouldbeevaluatedinlightoftheoperation’soverallpolitical-militaryplan.Eachsuccessivephaseshouldonlybestartedwhenthesuccessfulimplementationoftheprecedingstageisachieved,asthiswillhaveanimportantimpactonthecontinuedsuccessofthemis-sion.AllplanningmustbedirectedtowardsachievingthefinalgoalofthemissionasdefinedintheMandate.

13Thesafetyandsecurityofpeacekeepingpersonnel

continuestobeofseriousconcern.Inrecentyearstheinternationalcommunityhaswitnesseddangerousactsofviolenceagainstpeacekeepersbeingtakenhostageandusedasa«humanshield».Thecontinuinguseoffirearms,inparticularsnipersbythepartiestoaconflictagainstthepersonnelofapeacekeepingforceremainsamatterofseriousconcern.Thewidespreaduseofmines,inparticularanti-personnelmines,inareasofpeacekeepingoperationsalsoposesimpedimentstothesafetyofpeacekeepingpersonnel.

14Therefore the security of personnel must be an

integralpartof theplanningofanypeacekeepingoperation. Allappropriatemeasures, inconformitywiththeUNCharterandwithintheagreedmandate,shouldbetakenbytherelevantinternationalorganisationsandtheirMemberStatestoensurethesecurityofpeacekeepers.SomedelegationsnotedthattheearlyentryintoforceoftheConventionontheSafetyofUNPeacekeepingandAssociatedPersonneladoptedbytheGeneralAssemblyResolution49/59of9thDecember1994wouldbeastepforwardinthisdirection.

15De-miningoperationsshouldbe,wheneverappro-

priate,animportantelementandanintegralpartofpeacekeepingoperations.

IFOR-SPECIFICEXPERIENCES

16IFOR experience has shown that the planners’

ability to influenceeventsduringearlypreparationof themission, throughdirectcontactswithnegotiatorsinvolvedinthePeacePlanprocess,helpedtoavoidproblemsencounteredbyUNPROFOR(mainlybecausethiswasnotbasedonapeaceagreement)andtoensureacleardefinitionofmilitarytasksunderaunifiedchainofcommand.Theintegrationof15PfPandfourothernon-NATOnationsunderaunifiedcommandandcontrolhasbeenamajorsuccess,buildingonexperiencefromthePfPprogrammeandbasedoninnovativecommandandcontrolarrangementsatalllevels.Moreover,mostnationsbelievethatIFOR’smilitarysuccessderivedtoalargeextentfrompreformed,provencommandstructuresandlogisticsystemsandfromlong-termcontingencyplanningcarriedoutatNATO.

10 LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

17InthecaseofIFOR,militaryplanninghadtotake

placeaheadofcivilianplanning,sincethesamedegreeofadvanceplanningandorganisationdidnotexistonthecivilside.ItwasthereforedifficultforIFORtoplaninatimelyfashionitssecondarytasksofsupportingcivilimplementation.Thereisaneed,priortopeacekeepingoperations,toensureabetterunderstandingoftheroles,operationalconceptsandcapabilitiesofthecivilorganisationslikelytobeparticipating.Atthesametimecontactsandexercisesinvolvingboththemilitaryandcivilorganisationsshouldbeencouraged.

18TheIFORoperationhasshowedtheneedtoaddress

theissuesofimprovedmechanismsfortheearlyinvolvementofTroopContributingNations(TCNs)intheplanning,preparation,commandstructure,aswellastheirparticipationinthepoliticaloversightanddecision-makingproceduresinoperationstowhichtheycontribute.ThereisroomforimprovingtheamountofinformationprovidedbytheTCNsincertainareas.Forinstance,ithasbeenpointedoutthattherecouldhavebeenabettercoordinationwithinIFORconcerningevacuationplans.Thesameapplieswithregardtodecisionstakenbytheimplementingorganisation,whichcouldhaveanimpactonthesecurityofcontingentspro-videdbyTCNs.

B. Coordination Among Troop-Contributing Nations and With Mandating and Implementing Organisations

19Nationsconfirmtheimportancetheyattachtode-

velopingmechanismsforholdingconsultationsandexchanginginformationwithTCNs.TheUNSecurityCouncil,inparticular,hasconvenedmeetingsofitsmembers,TCNsandtheUNSecretariattofacilitateexchangeofinformationandviewsbeforedecidingtoextend,termi-nate,orsubstantiallymodifythemandateofspecificpeacekeepingoperations.MeetingswithTCNsareplannedandheldbothonaregularandanadhocbasiswhentheSecurityCouncilenvisagestheestablishmentofanewpeacekeepingoperation.SeveralcountriesargueformoreeffectivearrangementsandmechanismsforconsultationbetweentheUNSecurityCouncil,theSecretariatandTCNsinplanningaswellasincommandandcontrolofpeacekeepingoperations.Theypointoutthatconfusionandseriousproblemscouldoccurwhenforcesactonnationalcommand.Nationshavehighlightedtheneedforintensiveconsultations,beforetheadoptionofamandate,withallcountriescapableofandwillingtocontributetoparticularoperations.Asafirststep,itwouldbeimportanttodevelopamorestructuredinvolvementofTCNsintheprocessofformulationofmandatesbytheUNSecurityCouncil(UNSC).Infact,thereisaneedtofurtherinstitutionalisetheconsultationsbetweentheUNSCandTCNsonpeacekeepingmandates.Inthecaseofapeacekeepingoperationwhereconsentofthehostcountryisrequired,itmayalsobebeneficialtoinvolvethehostcountryinthepreliminarystageofconsultations.Withinamultinationaloperation,contributorsshouldhavetheoppor-tunitytoparticipateintheprimarydecision-makingprocess,thuscontributingtothepoliticalguidanceforthemilitarycommandoftheoperation.

20Asasecondstep,MemorandaofUnderstanding

(MoUs)shouldideallybeconcludedamongTCNsinthepreparatoryphaseoftheoperation.Whereappropriate,TCN liaisonofficers shouldbe sent to the staffplanninganoperationand,asappropriate, toother troop-contributingnations. It isalsonecessarytoimplementa standardised planning process (phased and timed, including fact-finding and advancedpartymechanisms)involvingnationalstaffofficerstobeassignedtothefuturePeacekeepingHeadquarters.ThispreliminaryHQstaffcanserveasareferenceteamfortroop-contributingnationsinthenationalplanningprocess.

LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 11

21TCNsshouldbeconsultedpriortochangesinthe

mandatecausedbyasignificantevolutionofthesituationinthefield.Theyshouldbeofferedachoicebetweenreconsideringtheirparticipationandroleintheupdatedmissionandrea-djustingthecomposition,equipmentandleveloftrainingoftheirforces,forthemtobeabletocontinuetocarryouttheirmissioneffectively.Somebelievethatchangestothemandatesandtothesubsequentroleofthedeployedtroopsshouldnotbecarriedoutuntilthetroopsarereadytoadjusttheirroleonthegroundinthemissionarea.Insomecases,ashappenedwithBosnia-Herzegovina,itmaybenecessarytomodifythenatureandtheobjectivesofanoperation:ifthechangeissignificantenough,amodificationofthemandatewouldnotbesufficient,butanentirelynewoperationshouldbedeployed,onthebasisofacompletelynewmandate.

C. Coordination Among Institutions (Including Humanitarian Aspects and Refugees)

22Asanimportantpreconditionforeffectivecoope-

ration,thereis,inthefirstplace,aneedforaclearandefficientallocationoftasksamongthevariousorganisationsinvolvedintheimplementationofdifferentaspectsofapeaceplan.Mostoftoday’sconflictsareinternal,foughtnotonlybyregulararmiesbutalsobyirregularforces.Civiliansarethemainvictims,andhumanitarianemergenciesarecommonplace.Stateinstitutionshaveoftencollapsed.Thismeansthatinternationalinvolvementmustoftenextendbeyondtraditionalpeacekeeping.Therefore,cooperationbetweenthemandatingorganisation,regionalandcivilianorganisations,troop-contributingnationsandnon-governmentalagencies(NGOs)shouldbeinitiatedattheearliestpossiblemomentofthemissionplanningstageandmaintainedthroughoutthedurationofthemission.Thisdoesnotmeanthatapeacekeepingoperationcanreplacestateinstitutions.Incomplex,multi-dimensionalpeacekeepingopera-tions,theassistanceprovidedtothepopulationbyinternationalandnon-governmentalhuma-nitarianorganisationssuchastheRedCrossisakeyelementtothesettlementoftheconflict.Successofthemissionoftenhingesontheabilitytofulfilnon-militarytasks.Internationalandnon-governmentalorganisationsshouldcooperatewithinanagreedcoordinationarrangement.Ataminimum,closeliaisonbetweenthevariousorganisationsshouldbeassuredwiththemaintenanceofcoordination-liaisoncells.

23Particularlyinthecaseofpeacekeepingoperations

ofamultifunctionalnature,itisessentialtodefinefromtheoutsetthevariousagenciesandorganisations involved in the implementationofelementsof themandateand toestablishappropriateworkingrelationshipswiththem.RelationsbetweenthepeacekeepingforceandtheUN,inthecaseofoperationscarriedoutunderaUNSCResolution,areofspecialim-portance.RelationswiththeUNandotherorganisationsshouldideallycoverthefollowingareas:coordinationandcooperation,suchassupportandresourcesharingandassistance;proceduresforreimbursementandpropertytransfers;informationexchange,liaison,mediationandnegotiation;andcommonplanningandintegratedexecution.Intheviewofsomenations,experiencesinUNPROFORandinSomaliasuggestthatthehumanitariantaskswithinamulti-functionalpeacekeepingoperationshouldbeprimarilycarriedoutbyspecialisedhumanitarianorganisations (includingWHO, UNHCR, UNICEF,WFP, ICRC), operationally autonomousfromthemilitary,undergeneralpoliticalguidanceand,whenevernecessary,coordinationbytheUN.Inthiscontext,thedevelopmentofaninternationalarrangementgoverningbasicprinciplesofcooperationandinteractionbetweentheUNandregionalorganisationsinvolvedinpeacekeepinghasbeensuggested.


24An important lesson learned from IFOR is that

permanent liaison arrangements should be established with other international bodies intheatre,includingrepresentativesofthemandatingbodyandotherorganisationschargedwithimplementingvariousaspectsofthemandate.

D. Role of Neighbouring Countries

25Acountryneighbouring a crisis areahas a vital

interestintheearliestpossibleeffectivesolutionofthecrisisandintherestorationofpeace.Therefore,neighbouringcountriesshouldfacilitatethesuccessfulconductofpeacekeepingoperationsandrefrainfromkindlinginter-ethnic,inter-confessionalandotherdifferencesinthecrisisareaaswellasfromencouragingseparatistandnationalistgroups,movementsandoppositionfactionsstrivingtoprovokeasplit insocietyandthebreakdownofthestate.Aparticularlydelicatesituationarisesforaneighbouringcountrywhichhasasignificantnationalminorityinthecrisisareaitself.Suchasituationmightservetolimititsfreedomofaction,inviewoftheimpactthatcertaindecisionsmighthaveonthenationalminorityinquestion.

26Countriesneighbouringareasofcrisisplayanim-

portantroleinpeacekeepingoperations,beyondservingaszonesoftransitforpersonnelandmaterial.Incomplexoperationssuchas«DenyFlight»,«SharpGuard»and«JointEndeavour»,andforactioninvolvingtheuseofpower,neighbouringcountriesfunctionasadvancedbasesofoperationalandlogisticstructures.Theyalsoprovideservices,withoutwhichtheoperationswouldbeexcessivelycostlyorevenimpossibletocarryout.Theycanalsoprovidetemporarysupportandaccommodationforrefugees.OnelessonfromtheformerYugoslaviaisthatabroa-derareacouldbeaffectedbyacrisis.Inparticular,theeconomiesofneighbouringcountriescanbenegativelyaffectedbytheimplementationofUN-mandatedsanctions.

27InthecaseoftheIFORoperationtheavailability

ofportsandairportsnearthecrisisareaprovedtobeofcrucialimportanceinmaintainingconstant,precisecontroloverairandmaritimespace,whetheritbeforbanningflightsorenfor-cinganarmsembargo,orforairoperationsinsupportoftheunitsonthegroundandensuringcompliancewithaheavyweapons-exclusionzone.Theuseofportsandairportsnecessitatesaseriesofstructuresandserviceswhichinturnrequirestheuseoflocalinfrastructure.Theuseofthesestructurescanhaveaconsiderableandlastingimpactonsocialandeconomicconditions,withresultingburdensofvarioustypesfortheneighbouringcountry.

28Inaddition,theneighbouringcountry’sresponsibi-

litiessometimesinvolvetheadoptionoftechnicalandlegalmeasuresrelatedtothetransitandstationingonitsterritoryofarmedpersonnel,aswellasadministrativemeasuresformanagingtheservicesrequiredforthepresenceofforeignforces,theprovisionofinformationactivityandtheavailabilityofliaisonpersonnel.Therecouldalsobevariousburdensderivingfromtheexposuretopossibleretaliatoryactionsbythewarringfactions.

29InthecaseofthecrisisintheformerYugoslavia,

neighbouringcountriessufferedconsiderableburdens.Duringtheperiodofarmedconflict,neighbouringcountrieshadtomakeeveryeffortpossibleinordertoisolateandcontainthewar,andhadtoreckonwitharmedgroupsandairstrikesspillingover.Thus,theyhadtoputtheirarmedforcesonacertainstateofalert.


GROUP IIImplementation

E. Civil-Military Relations

GENERALEXPERIENCES

30Fullintegrationofallthoseinvolvedinanoperation

withmultifunctionalaspectsisoftendifficulttoachieveduetothemanyplayersinanytheatreofoperations,althoughaMissionHeadattunedtobothcivilandmilitarycultureswouldgreatlyassistincoordinationandintegration.Intheviewofsomenations,aCivil-MilitaryOperationsCentreisthebestwaytoensurecoordinationandintegration.Interdisciplinarycooperationandahierarchicalstructurearenotmutuallyexclusive.Forinstance,thereshouldbeveryclosecooperationbetweenthemilitaryandcivilianpolicecomponentsofapeacekeepingoperation.Moreover,themilitaryshouldnotbegivenpolicetasksforwhichtheyhavenotbeentrained.

31Also important is coordination at the level of

missionheadquarters.Thiscoordinationshouldideallyberegulatedintheframeworkofa«relationmanagementplan»,whichmaybecoordinatedbytheofficeoftheMissionHeadortheForceCommanderand/orfacilitatedbyanad-hocworkinggroupcomprisingthevariouscomponentsinthemissionarea.ItcouldbeadvantageoustodespatchanationalliaisonteamtotheUNHeadquartersinthemissionareaatanearlystageinordertopreparethedeploymentandfacilitatethearrivalofthetroops.

32Non-governmentalorganisations(NGOs)canoffer

apositiveandimportantcontributiontopeacekeepingoperations;however,theirpresencecanalsomakeoperationsmorecomplex.Inprinciple,theconsentofthepartiestotheiractivitiesisdesirable.Non-governmentalorganisationsvaryfromthelargerinternationalagenciesandassociationsdowntosmallcharities,othergroupsorevenindividualswhomaylackexpe-rience,preparationandorganisation.Civiliansmaylackunderstandingofwhatthemilitaryisdoing,andvice-versa.BothmilitaryandcivilianorganisationsshouldconsiderhowbesttoavoidmisunderstandingsandhowtoestablishaworkablestructurecapableofcoordinatingtherequirementsbothofmilitaryandNGOstomutualadvantage.ACivil-MilitaryOperationsCentreshouldhandlein-theatrecoordinationandsupportissueswithnon-governmentalandprivatevoluntaryorganisations.

IFOR-SPECIFICEXPERIENCES

33ExperienceswithinUNPROFORand IFORhave

shownthateffectivecooperationintheatrebetweenthemandatingorganisationandimplemen-tingnations/authoritiesiscrucial,butthatitisdifficulttomakeitaspermanentandsystematicasitshouldbe.Infact,itisnotalwayseasytoestablisheffectivemechanismsofcooperationandcoordination,partlyinviewofthedifferentrolesandperceptionsoftheissuesandthetasks,partlybecauseofthedifferentproceduresadopted.

34SomeaspectsoftherelationshipbetweentheUN

andIFORworkedbetterthanothers.Relationsattheseniorlevelhavebeendescribedbythe

1� LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

UNasverygoodandsupportprovidedtotheUNthroughcivil-militarycooperation(CIMIC)hasbeendeemedexcellent.AnexcellentrelationshiphasalsodevelopedbetweenIFORandtheOSCEmission,aswellaswiththeInternationalPoliceTaskForce(IPTF).Butinthelattercase,ithasbeennotedthatthereisroomforimprovingcommunications(compatibleequip-mentislacking)andcollaboration,especiallyinhigh-riskareas.

35Onelessonlearnedfrompeacekeepingexperience

isthatcivilianpolicehavefrequentlyplayedanimportantrole.Thereis,therefore,aneedtoensureclosecoordinationbetweenmilitarypeacekeepingforcesandunarmedcivilpoliceadvisors. ThisreflectsthefactthatsomeofthemostdifficultproblemsfacedbyIFOR,forexample,relatednottoitsprimarytaskofensuringmilitarycompliance,buttodealingwithcivildisturbances.Thiswasparticularlytrueduringelections.TheexperienceofIFORindealingwithpublicdisturbancesishighlyrelevantandmeritsfurtherconsideration.

F. Public Relations

36Inaddressinglessonslearnedfrompeacekeeping

operations,oneshouldnotunderestimatetheimportanceofrelationswithlocalauthoritiesandthelocalpopulation,aswellaswiththemedia,whichallrequirecarefulyetdifferentia-tedhandling.Jointcommissions,whichincludepartiestotheconflict,governmentofficials,representativesfromthepeacekeepingforceand,asrequired,non-governmentalorganisationsoperatingintheareaofconflict,areusefulbodiesinthisrespect.

37Bearing inmind the large interest shownby the

media in recentpeacekeepingoperations, relationswithmedia representatives,aswellasasound,pro-activepublicinformationpolicy,areofcrucialimportance.Suchapolicyhastwokeyaudiences:thefirstiseitheratroop-contributingstateoranotherstateclosetothemissionareaorwithaspecificinterest,suchassharedethnicorculturalroots;thesecondisthecountryreceivingthemission.Themessagebeinggiventobothaudiencesmustbeclearandconsistentandlinkedtothemission’sobjectives.Aninformationpolicymaybereinforcedin-theatrebya«heartsandminds»campaign.InoperationJointEndeavour,thePsychologicalOperationsTaskForcewasassignedprimaryresponsibilityforcommunicatingwiththeBosnianpeople,whilethePublicInformationTeamcommunicatedwiththemassmedia-domesticandinternational.TheroleofpsychologicaloperationsintheIFORandSFORoperationsistodevelopandmaintaintheconsentofthelocalpopulationtothepresenceoftheForce,todiscourageinterferencewiththepeacekeepingoperation,andtoassess,reportandcounterpropagandadirectedtowardstheforce.

38In course of preparations for theoperation, it is

highlyadvisabletoworkout-onthebasisofthemandate-aplanofinformationalcoverage,atleastingeneralterms,aswellastoformulatemethodologyforitsimplementation,inclu-ding:

- personnelrequired;- informationmaterials;- independentchannelsfordistribution.

Theneedforflexibilitytoadjustplanstoeventsshouldberecognised.

39TheinformationsupportofPKOsshouldbebased

onaninformationpolicyofthehigheststandardsofconsistency,honestyandtransparency.The

LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 1�

specialnatureofactivitiesconductedwhenpreparingtheoperation,andtheneedtopreventtheleakageofsensitiveinformationthroughthemassmedia,shouldbetakenintoaccount.Even-handedandnon-provocativepresentationandinterpretationofeventswillbeimportant.

40ThelessonslearnedfromIFOR’sinformationpolicy

suggestthatearlydeploymentofresourcesinthisrespectwouldbeverybeneficial.Whenthepersonnelinchargeofrelationswiththepressactuallyarrivedin-theatre,theabilityofCommanderstoconveytothepressanaccurateappreciationoftheobjectivesandtasksofthemissionwasimproved.Mediaunderstandingofthechallengesofmissionimplementationroseaswell.Furthermore,theuseofmasscommunicationsmediabythepeacekeepingforcecansignificantlycontributetocounteringfactionalpropagandaandprovidingthepopulationwithasourceofunbiasednews.Theuseofradiocommunicationcanbeparticularlyimportantinsecuringthesuccessfuloutcomeofapeacekeepingoperation.Theadvantageoftheradioisthatitcanreachalargeraudiencethananyothermedia.Inaddition,itdoesnotdependonelectricitysupplies,itcannotbecensored,anditisimmediateandprecise.

41Electronic information exchange and handling,

both internal and external, directed towards the public and international media must beorganised,institutionalised,andprepared.Personnelmustbeproperlytrained.Computerequipment,networklinkageandhandlingskills,aswellasdatamanagement,willberequiredtomeetagrowingdemandforinformation.

42Relationswiththelocalpopulationareparticularly

importantforthesuccessofapeacekeepingmission.Theserelationsshouldbebasedontheimpartialityoftheforces,even-handednessindealingwiththelocalpopulation,onagoodknowledgeoftheculture,localcircumstancesandthepoliticalandeconomicsituationoftheregion,aswellasontheabilitytocommunicatedirectly.Beyondthenormalstabilisingeffectofestablishedpeacekeepingtasks,arethosesuchasthedistributionofhumanitarianaidandthecontributiontotherestorationofthecountry’sinfrastructure,whichmayinthemselvesbeapartofthemission.Theuseofmissionassets(suchasconstructionengineersormedicalresources)forappropriatelocalprojectswillalsocontributetobuildinggoodrelationswiththelocalpopulationandauthorities.

G. Command and Control

43An important prerequisite for successful peace-

keepingoperations, in theviewofsomenations, lies in theprovisionofstrategicpoliticalleadershipin,andcontrolover,operationsonthepartoftheSecurityCouncil.TheForceCommandershouldbecarefultoobservethegenerallyacceptedprinciplesofpeacekeeping,includingthoserelatingtocommandandcontrol.

44Command and control arrangements should be

clearlydefinedandagreedbeforethedeployment.Itisnecessarytoestablishresponsibilitiesatalllevelsinthecommandstructure;toclarifyproceduresandworkingrelationswithinthemission;andtoestablishcommunicationsproceduresandotherlogisticsupportcompatiblewiththeneedsofthemission.Commandandcontrolarrangementsshouldincludethemeansforcommunicatingwithliaisonteamstheorganisationofsuchteams,andtheselectionofheadquarterselementswithwhichliaisonisrequired.


45Duringthemission,theForceCommandershould

makethemosteffectiveuseoftheinternationalunitsathisdisposal,withinthelimitsofthemission’smandate.Boththecivilandmilitaryelementsoftheoperationmustbecoordinatedthroughoutthecommandstructure,andcommandandcontrolmustberesponsiveandflexible,withauthoritydelegatedtothemostappropriatecommandlevel.Provisionsshouldbemadetoallownon-governmentalandprivateorganisationsaccesstocommunications.

46Animportantlessonlearnedfrompeacekeepingis

that,forUN-ledoperations,theUNchainofcommandmustberespectedbyTCNs.Ifnatio-naldirectivesmakeitnecessaryforacontingentcommandertodeviatefromthisprinciple,hissuperiorintheUNchainofcommandshouldbeinformedimmediately.Foritspart,theUNshouldkeepTNCsthoroughlyandpromptlyinformedaboutthesituationinthemissionarea.


GROUP IIIOperations

H. Communication and Information Systems

47Communication and Information Systems (CIS)

supportwithin theareaofoperationand from theMissionHeadquarters tohigher levelsofcommandsneeds tobecarefullyplannedprior todeploymentof forces. TheobjectiveshouldbetoachieveinteroperabilityofCISusedbytheorganisationleadingtheoperationandbetweenthoseusedbyTCNs.Thereisarequirementforstandardisationpertainingtotheleveloftechnicalinteroperabilityandtothelevelofcommonalityofoperatingandreportingproceduresused.

48CoordinationwithTCNs,interoperabilitytestingof

CISandtrainingofoperatingprocedurespriortodeploymentwillassistseamlessinformationflowduringtheoperation.Regardingspecificlessons,somenationsfeelthat:

- In-theatreCISshouldbecentrallymanagedbytheTheatreHQCISSupportCell;- CivilandmilitaryelementsoftheForceshouldnotusetheHostNations’telecom-

municationsinfrastructureasaprimarymeansofcommunication;- TheForcemustcontrolitsownCIS;- ThetacticalcommunicationsshouldbebasedonVHFCombatNetRadiosasprimary

meansofthegeographicareatobecoverediftheterraindoesnotdictatetheuseofothermeanssuchasTacticalSATCOM(TACSAT);

- HFCombatNetRadiosmaybeusedasback-upsystems.ThelinkstothehomecountriesofTCNsmaybebasedonINMARSAT;

- Encryptionequipmentwouldbeuseful;- Diplomaticmailshouldbeusedtotheextentpossible;- TheGlobalPositioningSystem(GPS)isaveryusefultooltoestablishcommunica-

tionswithitinerantelements inareaswithinsufficientroadsandcommunicationfacilities.

I. Information and Intelligence

49Historical, political, and ethnographic factors

shouldbetakenintoaccountbeforethedeploymentofpeacekeepingforcesfromonenationintoanother.Inthiscontext,recentdevelopmentswithintheUNareinstructive.ASituationCentrewasestablishedunder theUNDepartmentofPeacekeepingOperations (DPKO) in1993.WithintheSituationCentre,aninformationandresearchunitreceives,processesandanalysesinformationgatheredfromcurrentfieldoperations.Inaddition,theUnitmonitorsdevelopmentsinotherareaswithaviewtopossiblefuturedeployments.Oneusefulmeansofobtaininginformationaboutacrisisareapriortotheagreementonamandateforapea-cekeepingoperationisthedispatchoffact-findingmissionsandcommissionstoinvestigatedisputesandsituations,aswellasmissionsofaspecialenvoyoftheUNSecretaryGeneralforthesepurposes.Thesearesentattherequestorbyagreementoftheparties.TheoutcomeoftheiractivitiesistobereportedtotheUNSecurityCouncilandtakenintoaccountinthecourseofpreparationandplanningofmultifunctionalpeacekeepingoperations.Thus,theUNseekstoraiseitslevelofpreparednessforfuturepeacekeepingoperations.


50In the course of multifunctional peacekeeping

operationsitbecomesveryimportanttoobtaintimely,reliableandfullinformationonthesituationinaconflictregion,changesinthepositionsofthepartiesandanycircumstancesthatcannegativelyinfluenceorimpedetheimplemetationoftheoperation.Informationorintelligenceaboutlocalconditionsisthereforeessentialtoallpeacekeeping.OnesourceofinformationistheUnitedNationswhichgathersandanalysesinformationreceivedfromtheUNmemberstates,differentUN-familyagencies,thepartiestoaconflictthemselvesaswellasfrommediareportsandmembersofdiplomaticcorps.Bearinginmindtheneedtomaintainthehighstandingofthepeacekeepingmission,intelligencegatheringshouldbeclearlycontrolledandconductedsolelyforthepurposesofthepeacekeepingmissionandonlyatthedirectionoftheForceCommander.Covertintelligenceoperationsunrelatedtothesafetyofpeacekeepersandthesuccessofthemissionareinappropriatetopeacekeepingenvironments.

51Experience shows that identification of actual

factors of a dispute or conflict constitutes an indispensable prerequisite for initiating andconductingamultifunctionalpeacekeepingoperation.Reconnaissanceofaprospectivemis-sionareaisanessentialprerequisiteforaneffectiveconceptofoperations,asisthecaseforanymilitaryoperation.Reconnaissancepartiesshouldincluderepresentativesofallelementsofthemission.Intelligenceisalsoavitalelementintheanalysis,planningandconductofanyoperationanditisimportantthatindevelopinganassessmentofasituationallavailablesourcesareused.Thisincludesacademicexperts,in-theatrenon-governmentalorganisations(NGOs)andotherbodies.

52It would be desirable to adopt uniform military

symbolsandabbreviations-forinstance,usingthoseemployedbytheimplementingorga-nisation-aswellasUniversalTransverseMercatorProjection(UTM)maps,thedevelopmentofIdentifyFriendorFoe(IFF)systemsandtheadoptionofcommonrescuestandards.InthecontextoftheIFORoperation,unitsfromdifferentnationshaveactivelycooperatedinthefieldoftopographicpreparation,successfullyadoptingunifiedmapsymbolsandmapformatsforuseatthevariouslevelsofcommandandbythedifferentnationalcontingents.

J. Logistics

53The logistic aspects of operations, and in parti-

cularthefinancialquestions,mustbeconsideredearlybyallmissionplanners.Thereisaneedtoclarifyatanearlystagethechannelsthroughwhichthesequestionsaretobeinitiallydiscussed.Infact,logisticandoperationalplanningareinextricablylinked.It isessentialthatbothlogisticsandoperationsstaffhaveaclearunderstandingofeachothers’aimsandrequirements.Itisimportanttoclearlyidentifywhatisexpectedofnationalcontingents,toconfirmthefeasibilityoftheseexpectationsortomakeandconfirmalternativearrangementsasrequiredinadvanceofdeployment.

54Thereisaneedforincreasedattentiontologistic

requirementsintheplanningphase,suchastheworkrequiredforthepreparationofdeploymentcamps(suchasde-mining,clearingthearea,settingupfences,organisingguardanddefencesystems,settingupthecamp,installingequipment,creatingaccessroads).Selectionofin-frastructureinregardtolocationandcapacitymustpermitadditionalroomforpeace-buildingworksuchashousingforrefugees,storageoffood,orcontributiontopublicinfrastructure.


55ManyUNoperationshavebenefittedfromlogistic

supportbeingprovidedcentrallybytheUnitedNations.However,theIFORoperationde-monstratedthatanexcellentwayofproceedingistotaskonecontributorwiththeprovisionoflogisticsupport(e.g.,alogisticbattalion).Inanycase,detaileddeterminationofnationalandnon-nationalresponsibilitiesmustbedefinedintheconceptofoperationsandguidelinesfortroop-contributingnations.ATableofOrganisationandEquipment(TOE)ofcontributingunitsshouldbecollectedandmaintainedinaccessibledatabasesformodellingthecompatibilityandinterfacepossibilities.Hostnations’supportshouldbepoliticallyagreed,clearlystatedinaStatusofForceAgreement(SOFA)whereappropriate,andutilisedwhereverpossibleinordertokeeplogisticcostslow.

56In thefirst periodof a newmission, there is an

increasedrequirementforspecialistunitsandpersonnel.Asimilarrequirementexistsattheendofamission.Duringthestart-upphase,thereisanincreasedrequirementforconstructionengineers, legalexpertsandotherspecialists. Engineersandadditionalmedical resourcesforhelpingthelocalpopulationinthecaseofemergenciesarevaluabletoolsforconfidencebuildingatthelocallevel.Specialistsarealsoneededtoconductmineclearance,establishcamps,observationposts,shelters,instalutilities,conductroadrepairs,andestablishcom-munications.Legal,contractingandfinancialexpertsareneededtonegotiateanddrawupleaseagreements,hirelocalemployeesandsoon.Duringthedraw-downphase,thereisanincreasedrequirementforsupplyexpertstopackupandregistersuppliesandequipmentforshipmentandforlegalandfinancialexpertstoterminateagreementsandcontracts.

57Movementbybothairandsurfacecanbedifficult;

carefuldecision-makinginrespectofhighvaluetransportationassetsisrequiredtoavoidun-necessaryadditionalexpense.Accordingly,itisessentialthatmovementplansarelinkedtothemissionplanandfinalisedbeforethesubmissionofcosts,keepinginmindthatfreedomofmovementisimperative.Themethodoftransportationmustbedecidedatanearlystagetoallowfordetailedplanning.Cargocontainersshouldbestandardisedandreportedtotheshippingorganisation.Availabilityofunloadingcapacities,transportandstoragefortheportofdisembarkationinthemissionareaisalsoimportant.

58There canbe a significant shortfall between the

logisticsupportintendedin-theatreandwhatisactuallyprovided.Whenfirstdeployed,unitsshouldbeself-sufficient,withsuppliescommensuratetothetask.Stockmanagementbasedonconsumerstatisticsmustbeforeseen,withaminimumstocklevelof60days.Equipmentmustbeadaptedtoenvironmentalconditionsandshouldenabletroopstolivecomfortablyinapotentiallydifficultenvironmentforprolongedperiods.Asaprinciple,equipmentshouldnotbedeployedunlessthenecessarymaintenancecapacityandlogisticback-upisathandinthemissionarea.Equipmentrenderedunserviceableduetonon-availabilityofbasicmaintenanceorsparepartswillunderminetheeffectivenessofthemission.Inspectionbeforeshipping,andtransportsupervisionbytherecipient,shouldbeanormtoensurethatequipmentarrivesinuseablecondition.

59Insomemissionsitmaybeappropriateforacom-

mercialcontractortoprovidecorelogistics.Suchcontractorsshouldbeidentifiedbyopencompetitionandmeetanyrequiredperformancecriteriainadvance,andideallyshouldhavedemonstratedaprovenperformancestandard.Contractadministrationandmonitoringshouldbestrengthenedtoensurestandardsaremet,andcontractsbesecuredinsufficienttimeforthecontractortobeabletoprovideeffectivesupporttothemission.


60Fornavaloperations,aforwardlogisticssiteshould

beestablishedneartheareaofoperations,comprisingpersonnelfromallparticipatingnations.Asufficientnumberofhelicoptersshouldbeavailablefortransportbetweenshipsandthelogisticsite.Iffreespaceonboardtheshipsislimited,depots(e.g.,forspareparts)canbeestablishedatthelogisticssite.Intheareaofoperation,thereshouldbeanareafordegaussingships.

61The«Compendiumof LessonsObservedDuring

LogisticSupportofPeacekeepingOperations»producedbytheLogisticsDirectorateoftheNATO Infrastructure, Logistics andCivil EmergencyPlanningDivisionprovides additionalmaterialinrelationtologisticsupportofpeacekeepingoperations.

K. Medical Support

62Peacekeeping operations are complicated by a

numberofpeculiarcharacteristics,whichimpactfundamentallyupontheprovisionofmedicalsupport.Medicalsupportplansthereforemustbepurpose-builtforeachoperation.Plansmustbecapableofspeedyinitialreactionandflexibleenoughtomanagerapidlychangingdemands.MedicalsupportplanningandmanagementmustbeacceptabletoNATO/UnitedNationsHeadquartersandtoparticipatingnationsaswell.

63Theoverallobjectiveofmedicalsupportmustbe

physicalandmentalwell-beingofthedeployedpersonnel,theconservationofmanpower,preservationoflifeandthelimitationofresidualphysicalandmentaldisabilities.Operationalmedicalsupportthereforerequiresclearlydefinedanddistinctiveguidance.Thetaskofplan-ning,executingandcontrollingoperationalmedicalsupportmustlieproperlywithamedicallytrainedplanningstaffwhomusthaveanestablishedorganizationofsufficient,experiencedmanpower,communicationsandinformation.

64ThemedicalC3Iorganizationmustbecapableof

planning,executing,controlling,supportingandauditingthefullrangeofmedicalsupportfunctions.Itmustbecapableofprovidingaseamlesssystemofcontroloftreatment,evacuationandtransferofinformationfrominitialpointofinjuryorsicknessthroughouttheevacuationchaintodefinitivetreatment.EachlevelofoperationalcommandthereforehastohaveaSeniorMedicalOfficer,directlyaccountabletotheoperationalcommander.

- TheForceMedicalOfficer(FMEDO)ofaFieldMissionplans,directs,advisesandsupervisesallactivities related to themedicalsupportplan.He/she is theSeniorMedicalAdvisertotheForceCommander(FC)andtoallcontingentSeniorMedicalOfficers(SMEDOS)ofthemission.

- TheSeniorMedialOfficers(SMedOs)areFMedO’spointofcontactoncontingent(national) level.He/sheis theSeniorclinicianforhis/hernationalunit(s)andtheSeniorMedicalAdvisertothenationalContingentCommander.

65Preventivehealthmeasures involveevery indivi-

dualintheoperationaltheatre.Theorganizationtoundertakethem,itsstructureandsizewillbemission-dependant,andmustbebasedonbestavailablemedicalintelligenceevaluationof


theareaofoperations,butwillincludeatleastindividualadvisersateachlevelofoperationalcommand.Itisanationalresponsibilityatnationalexpensetoensurethatpersonnelispre-paredandappropriatelytrainedinfieldpreventivemedicinemeasurespriortodeploymenttoapeacekeepingoperation.Thismustincludethenecessaryvaccinationandimmunization.EducationforthepreventionofmedicaldiseasesmustincludethepreventionagainstAIDS/HIV.Eachparticipant,militaryleadersateachlevelinparticular,musthavebasictraininginthepreventionofsexuallytransmitteddiseasesandHIV/AIDS.

66All personnel being deployed on peacekeeping

operationsmustbemedicallyanddentallyfitfordutyandmustmeetatleastUN’medicalstandardsforpeace-keepingmissions.UNmedicalstandards,however,donotprecludena-tionalcontingents/militaryservicesfromestablishinghigherqualifyingmedicalstandards.Innocase,however,shouldanindividual,unacceptablefornationalmilitaryduties,beincludedinthepeacekeepingmilitarycontingentforce.

67Nationsretainultimateaccountabilityforthehealth

oftheirforcesbut,ontheassumptionofauthority,thePeacekeepingForceCommanderwillsharetheresponsibilityforthehealthofassignedforces.Tomeetthisrequirement,theForceCommanderneedsappropriatemedicalstaff.Theyshallplanandexecutethemedicalsupportplan.

68Medical information, particularly regarding pa-

tients,isavitalelementofcompetentmedicalsupportplanning.Theinformationmustbemanagedefficientlyanddistributedrapidlywithoutviolatingmedicalprofessionalsecrecy.Theabilitytotrackindividualpatientsthroughthetreatmentandevacuationchainisparamount.

69Policyandplanning for the resupplyofmedical

material is a medical matter and is inter-related directly with patient treatment. Medicalplanningstaffmustaimtoachieveasmuchstandardizationaspossibleandestablisheffectivemeansofauditingusageandresupply.Anefficient,well-regulatedandcost-effectivemedicallogisticssystemisfundamentaltomissionmedicalsupport.Medicallogisticsmustbeabletorespondrapidlytourgentclinicaldemands.

70From the outset of an operation, a theatre eva-

cuationpolicymustbeestablishedbytheoperationalandmedicalplanningstaffworkinginconcertwiththeForceCommander(FC)andFMedO(FMedO).DedicatedandfullyequippedMEDEVAChelicopterswithappropriatemedicalstaffshallbeallocatedwheneverpossibleandshallbemarkedwiththedistinctiveemblems.

71Therulesforentitlementtomedicalcaremustbe

establishedearlyintheplanningprocess.Plannersmustconsider,butnotbesidetrackedby,legalissuesofcompensationandclaims.Thedegreeofsupporttobegiventolocalorhuma-nitarianaidpersonnelmustbeclearlydelineatedintheoperationsorder.Ifcareistobegiventocivilians,considerationmustbegiventomodifyingthestaffingandequippingofmedicalunits.Veryfewpediatricorgynaecologicmedicationsarenormallystockedinfieldmedicalunits,andtheconditionofthelocalpopulacemaymandateadditionofmedicalspecialistswhodonotnormallyaccompanymilitarypeacekeepingforces.


L. Training

72Military or other specific skills, together with

appropriate training,are the fundamentalbasis for successfullymeeting thepeacekeepingchallenges. Specialpeacekeeping training isneededparticularly in relation tooperationsofamultifunctionalnature,sincebehavioursandtechniquesrequiredarenotnecessarilyinlinewith-andsometimesevencontradict-acquiredmilitaryskills,ormayneedanadequatecomplement,forinstanceinthediplomatic,civilorpolicefields.Acommontacticalleveldoctrineisrequiredfortroopcontributorstoanoperation,aswellasacommonunderstandingamongthemilitaryandotherelementsofapeacekeepingoperation-thepolice,civilians,NGOs,humanitarianorganisations.

73Relianceontheuseofhighlyandprofessionally

trainedunits,showsofforceanddetermination,andtherespectbythelocalpartieswhichisgainedbyactingfirmlycanimprovethecredibilityoftheforceandinfactreducetheneedtouseforce,thusretainingthemainaccentonconsentandcooperationwiththeparties.

74Eachnationshouldberesponsiblefortrainingits

owntroops;however,therearebenefitsinmultinationaldevelopmentofminimumtrainingstandards.TheUNplaysausefulsupportingrolebyestablishingguidelines,preparingcom-montrainingmodulesandpublishingaregisterofmemberstates’trainingfacilities.However,somenationssaytheyhaveexperienceddifficultiesinensuringtheirofficers’participationinUNtrainingcoursespriortoassignmentstoservewithinapeacekeepingoperation.

75Pre-deployment orientation training ensures that

troopsunderstandhowtheirroleaspeacekeepersdiffersfromthatascombatforces.Duringtheorientationperiod,specialattentionshouldbedrawnto recentpoliticaldevelopmentsandotherissuesrelatedtotheconflict,inordertocreatethenecessaryawarenessandun-derstandingbytheforcesinvolved.Personnelshouldunderstandtheorganisation,structureandobjectivesofthemissionandthenatureoftheconditionsinwhichtheywillbeworking.Thisincludesthenatureofthesocietyofthemissionarea,itsnational,factional,culturalandreligiouscharacteristics,aswellasphysicalsecurityandclimaticissues.Commontrainingactivitiesareanimportantprerequisiteformultinationaloperations.Theuseofmultinationalexercises,bringingtogetherdiplomatic,militaryandciviliancomponents,hasbeensuggestedinthisregard.Commontrainingstandardshelpdevelopthecohesivenessofmultinationalformations.

76Realistic simulation is equally important, and

shouldinvolvetrainerswithrecentexperience.RealisticstafftrainingalsorequiressimulationofthemultinationalcompositionofaHQ.Inter-linkagesbetweenthevariouscomponentsshouldbesimulatedbyamixtureofinternationalpersonnelalreadyinthetrainingphase.Whereappropriate,trainingshouldcontinueinthemissionareaasitwillnotalwaysbepossibletoreplicatethefieldconditionsinhometrainingareas.

77PfPprovidesausefulsourceoftrainingexperiences.

AveryeffectiveinstrumenttohelppreparationsofstaffandoperationalforcesareNATO/PfPexercisesfocusingonpeacekeepingand/orhumanitarianoperations.APfPcourseforplatooncommandersinpeacekeepingoperationsorganisedinthepastbytheCzechRepublicplayedausefulroleinthiscontext. CoursesorganisedinanumberoftrainingcentresinvariousNACC/PfPcountriesarealsoconsideredtobeextremelyvaluable.


78However,somefeelthattheexperiencegathered

sofarsuggeststhatthenumberofinternationaltrainingexercisesshouldbeincreasedandthescopeoftopicscoveredinPfPtrainingandexercisesexpanded.Thechangingnatureofpea-cekeepingoperations,especiallyinthelightoflessonslearnedinBosnia-Herzegovina,clearlyshowstheneedtocarryouttrainingandexerciseactivitiesatanoperationallevel.Exercisesshouldbroadenthescopeofthoseactivitiestoincludestandardcombatactivitiesortrainingintheareasofsmallgroupindependentactionandminecounter-measures.

79Thereisaneedforacommonlanguagecapability

amongunitsdeployedonmissions.Thisisessentialtoboththeexecutionofthemissionandtheday-to-dayadministrationofdeployed forces. Foreign language training for the forcesshouldthereforebeintensified.Withregardtolocallanguagecapability,accesstocompetentinterpretersandtranslatorsisrequiredasanintegralpartofthemission,sinceitmaynotbepossible,ordesirable,torelyentirelyonlocally-recruitedstafffortheseroles.

80Thefollowingelementswereconsideredtobeof

particularimportanceintrainingforcesfordeploymentwithIFOR:abackgroundofexperien-cesgainedinpreviousmissionsandspecificpeacekeepingtrainingforforcestobeusedinthemission;andplanningandarrangementofadditionaltraining.Moreover,certainnationshavepointedtotheusefulnessofextendedtrainingofpersonnelexpectingtohavedualfunctions(e.g.,driver/mechanic)andofdirectselectionofpersonnelwithspecialskills,inparticularlogisticsexpertsorspecialistsinmaintenance.

M. Personnel and Administration

81Somenationsfeelthattrainingshouldbecomple-

mentedbyapersonnelselectionprocesswhichshouldtakeintoaccountpreviousexperiencesacquiredinthefieldandincludeapsychologicalscanning.Inthislight,itmaybeusefultoincludeasapartofthepreparatoryactivitiesstresspreventiontrainingandaregulardebriefingaftereachmissiontodiagnosethepossibledangerofpost-traumaticstressdisorder.

N. Financial Aspects

82Thesuccessofpeacekeepingoperations isoften

conditionedbytheavailabilityoffunds.TheconductofpeacekeepingoperationsundertheauspicesoftheUN,i.e.,cost-sharingamongUNmembers,improvesthesenseofresponsibilityandtheinvolvementoftheworldcommunity.

83Thebudgetaryprocedureapplyingtothemission

andthetroopcontributionsshouldbeclearlyspecifiedinallbasicandframeworkplanningdocuments:Ifapplicable,rulesforcost-sharingshouldbeclearlyspelledoutandtermsofdepreciationofequipmentshouldbespecified.Thefinancialquestionsraisedbythelogisticaspectsofoperationsshouldbeconsideredearlybyallmissionplanners.Finally,therewouldbeaneedtoidentifyproceduresforreimbursementofanylogisticsupportrenderedbyTCNs,andforpropertytransfers.


84Thereisacommoninterestthatthefinancialme-

chanismsforpeacekeepingoperationsworkasefficientlyaspossible.Thisproducesaneedtodrawupfinancialrulesandregulationstomakethemcompatiblewiththeoperationalneedsofcomplexandlarge-scalemissions.Toensuresufficientexpertiseisavailabletothem,troop-contributingnationsshouldconsiderappointingabudgetexperttoworkin-theatrewithChiefAdministrativeOfficers(CAO)andChiefLogisticsOfficers.

85Oneshouldalsoconsiderincreasingthedelegation

offinancialauthoritytoandwithinmissions,intheinterestsofbothmissionefficiencyandresponsivenesstotheneedsoftroopcontributorsandoftheForceCommander.Inanycase,alltroopcontributorsinvolvedintheoperationshouldapplythesamerulesvis-à-visthelocalauthorities.Inthisregard,asingle«claimspolicy»(aspractisedbyIFOR)hasproveduseful.

86ChiefAdministrativeOfficers shouldcontinue to

retainauthorityforexpenditurebutmissionbudgetsmustbedrawnupinconsultationwithcivilandmilitaryelementsandencompassall thedeclaredmissionaims,while reflectingbudgetaryrealities.CAOrecommendationsmustgoforwardaccompaniedbycertificationfromForceCommandersandMissionHeadsthattheproposalshavebeenfullydiscusseddowntotheloweroperationallevelandendorsedasrealisticandachievable.Areservecadreofadministrativeofficerscouldensuretheoptimaluseofresources.

87Aspecificaspectofrelationsamongorganisationsis

thereimbursementofcostsincurredbycontributingnations.Inthisregard,experienceshowsthatreimbursementsfromtheUNareseldomtimelyandthatforcecontributorsneedtobeabletobridgethedelayinreimbursementthroughnationalfunding.Onlyself-sustainingandsupportableforcesshouldbecommitted.

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