Lessons Learned in Peacekeeping Operations (2006)

7/30/2019 Lessons Learned in Peacekeeping Operations (2006)

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NATO

GRAPHICSSTUDIO

1578-97

LESSONSLEARNED

INEACEKEEPINGOPERATIONS

LESSONSLEARNED

INEACEKEEPINGOPERATIONS


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Forewordto AHG Lessons Learned in

Peacekeeping operations

As witnessed by the NATO-led IFOR and SFOR operations in Bosnia, peacekeeping hasassumed a prominent place among NATOs new missions after the end of the Cold War. Since1992, peacekeeping has also been a subject for consultations with Partners in the Ad Hoc Group onCooperation in Peacekeeping. Indeed, the Ad Hoc Group has become the principal forum for ex-changing views and sharing experiences among Allies and Partners in the eld of peacekeeping.

In the course of its work, the Group has produced two detailed special reports on cooperationin peacekeeping, which are a unique example of a coherent and successful regional effort to developcommon concepts of peacekeeping. The rst report from 1993 - known as the Athens Report -dealt with conceptual approaches to peacekeeping. A second report, the Follow-On to the AthensReport of 1995, revisited these issues in the light of experiences gained since 1993.

Drawing on the extensive peacekeeping experience of Group members, including in theformer Yugoslavia, the members of the Ad Hoc Group have completed the present compendiumof Lessons Learned in Peacekeeping Operations. The paper reects national experiences gainedby Allied and Partner countries in areas such as the preparation, implementation and operationsaspects of such operations. By exchanging national experiences, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council(EAPC) members aim to develop further common practical approaches to peacekeeping.

The common understanding and valuable lessons contained in the report bears witness tothe utility of cooperation activities taking place within the framework of the EAPC. It also offersuseful substance to our regular interchanges and cooperation with the UN, OSCE and other rele-

vant organisations in the eld of peacekeeping.

AmbassadorS.Balanzino DeputySecretaryGeneral ChairmanoftheAdHocGrouponCooperationinPeacekeeping


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LESSONSLEARNED

INPEACEKEEPINGOPERATIONS

LESSONSLEARNED

INPEACEKEEPINGOPERATIONS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 1 - 3

PRACTICALLESSONSLEARNED

GroupI:Preparation

A. Planning 4 - 18

B. CoordinationAmongTroopContributingNations 19 - 21 andWithImplementingOrganisation

C. CoordinationAmongInstitutions 22 - 24 (includingHumanitarianAspectsandReugees)

D. RoleoNeighbouringCountries 25 - 29

GroupII:Implementation

E. Civil-MilitaryRelations 30 - 35

F. PublicRelations 36 - 42

G. CommandandControl 43 - 46

GroupIII:Operations

H. CommunicationandInormationSystems 47 - 48

I. InormationandIntelligence 49 - 52

J. Logistics 53 - 61

K. MedicalSupport 62 - 71

L. Training 72 - 80

M. PersonnelandAdministration 81

N. FinancialAspects 82 - 87


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LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

1TheAdHocGrouponCooperationinPeacekee-

pingwasestablishedwithintherameworkoNACCin1993.TheaimotheGroupistodevelopacommonunderstandingothepoliticalprinciplesoandthetoolsorpeacekeeping,andtoshareexperienceandtherebydevelopcommonpracticalapproachesandcooperationinsup-portopeacekeepingundertheresponsibilityotheUNortheOSCE.Sinceitsinception,theGrouphasprovidedavaluableorumorcomparingnationalexperiencesandlearninglessonsarisingromourparticipationinpeacekeepingoperations. TheGrouppresentedMinisterswithaninitialreportattheirAthensMeetingon11thJune1993,andsupplementedthiswitha

Follow-Onreport,reectinglessonslearnedinmorerecentoperations,inDecember1995.

2TheAthensReportanditsFollow-Oncollectively

provideagoodbasisoracommonunderstandingothepoliticalprinciplesinvolvedinpea-cekeeping.TheAdHocGrouponCooperationinPeacekeepinghasnowtakenitsworkonestepurther,withtheaimodevelopingcommonpracticalapproachestopeacekeeping,whichwasalsoidentifedasanobjectiveinthe1993AthensReport.Thiscurrentpaperrepresentsacompendiumopracticalnationalexperiencesinrecentpeacekeepingoperations,principally(butnotexclusively)intheormerYugoslavia.

3Incarryingoutthisexercise,theAdHocGroup

onCooperationinPeacekeepingnotedtheimportanceocontinuingclosecooperationandregularinterchangeswiththerelevantelementsotheUNandtheOSCE,toensurethatlessonslearnedaregiventhewidestpossibledistribution.


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PRACTICALLESSONSLEARNED

GROUP IPreparation

A. Planning

GENERALEXPERIENCES

4Unityoeortoallcomponentsoanoperation,

aswellascooperationamongallrelevantbodiesinthefeld,mustbeestablishedromthebeginningoamissionandmustbeoreseenintheplanningprocess.ThestrategiclevelHea-dquarters(HQ)shoulddevelopthedirectionandconceptooperations,andcoordinatetheinitialgenerationoorces.Inparallel,acoordinatedmissionplanshouldbepreparedattheoperationallevel.ThisshouldideallybecoordinatedunderaMissionHeaddrawingtogetherallmissioncomponents,includingallocationotasksandprioritiesandlogisticaspects.TimemustbeallowedortheproperormationothemissionHQbeoredeployment.

5Planningapeacekeepingoperationshouldnotbe

conductedinisolation,andplannersshouldinparticularbeawareothepossibleimpactotheiractivityonpublicopinion.Planningoraworst-casescenariohasproventobethebestprerequisiteorasuccessulpeacekeepingoperation.Plannersmusttakeintoaccountandcoordinateallelementsothemissionwithaviewtoachievingitsoverallobjective.Allrelevantactors,includingtheForceCommander,mustbeinvolvedinthejointandcombinedmilitaryandcivilianplanningprocessromtheearlieststage.Reinorcedandimprovedmechanismsocoordinationshouldbedevelopedbetweentheinternationalorganisationimplementingtheoperationandallpotentialcontributors.Forexample,allpotentialcontributorsshouldbeinormedotheexpectedorcerequirementsatanearlystage.Moreover,theconceptoope-rationsshouldreecttothemaximumpossibleextenttheviewsopotentialcontributors.Tothisend,earlyconsultationswithcontributors,andwheneverpossible,theiractiveparticipationindevelopingtheconceptotheoperation,isdesirable.Planningshouldalsocoverrotation(amaximumosixmonthshasbeensuggested),reinorcement,redeploymentandwithdrawalotheorces.Acomprehensiveexitstrategyisanimportantaspectothisplanning.


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6Itisimportanttopursueeortstoinitiatetheplan-

ningprocessinatimelyashionandtodevelopitonthebasisoastep-by-stepapproach.Inthisregard,plannersalwayshavetokeepinmindthatthepoliticaldecisiontocontributemaycomelate;thereore,contingencyplanningmustbeinitiatedlongbeorethisdecisionistaken.Inviewothis,itisalsoessentialtodevelopacapacitytoreactquickly.Accordingly,someeelthatitmaybeuseulornationstoworkonthebasisostandbyorces,including

preparedunitsormedwithpre-selectedpersonnel.

7SomenationseelthatUNstandbyarrangements

constituteakeytoenhancedefciencyopeacekeepingandamoreexpedientdeploymentomultiunctionaloperations.InthiscontextsomenationsnotedthattheStandbyForcePlanningInitiativeisavaluablestrategicplanningtool,providingtheUNwithasoundknowledgeomilitarycapabilitiesandasanindicatorothepotentialavailabilityoorces.Anotherpro-posalistoplanandpreparedierentpackagesopossiblenationaltroopcontributionsandestablishandupdateadatabaseasapossiblesupportoruturemissions,bypreparingsomekindostandardcontributionplan.Thenextstepwouldbetodevelopanunderstandingothepoliticalcriteriaappliedbypotentialcontributorsbeorecontributingpersonnel.

8Arequentlyneglectedaspectotheoperational

conceptrelatestohumanitarianassistanceanditsimplications.Especiallyinrecentpeacekee-pingoperationsoamultiunctionalnature,themilitarycomponenthasotenbeenrequestedtoprovideadditionalprotectionandcarryoutpeace-buildingactivitiesotherthanthoseexpli-citlydesignatedinthemandate.Themorenon-militaryservicesanticipatedbythemilitary,themoreadditionalresourcesarenecessarybeyondatraditionalTableoOrganisationandEquipment(TOE).SomeeelthatUNmultiunctionalpeacekeepingoperationsareparticularlywell-suitedtoensureaexibleresponsetothechangingsituationwithinaconictarea,toensureeven-handednessindealingwiththepartiestotheconictand,aboveall,tominimise,inottoavert,thethreatociviliancasualties,destructionoinrastructureoacorrespondingstateandemergenceoaconsiderablenumberoattendantproblems(includingreugees,provisionohumanitarianandtechnicalassistanceandde-mining).

9Theconceptotheleadnation,wherebyonena-

tionestablishestheorganisationalcoreotheoperationuntilotherorcesbecomeavailable,hasproventobeeasibleorcontributorsosmallercontingentsandseemstobeapracticalarrangementortheuture.ThecaseotheBELUGAormationwithinIFOR,isoneexam-pleothesuccessulapplicationotheleadnationconcept.Onlythroughrapidreactionromnationsthatarewillingtoprovidethenecessaryresources,cantheleadnationconceptbeefcient.Nationsprovidingorcesattheearlystagesoamission(socalledvanguardorces)maywishorearlywithdrawalotheseorcesoncethemainbodyisinplace.OnepossibilitywouldbetosendthepreliminaryandpreormedHQtotheprospectivemissionareainadvanceotheactualmandatingotheoperation,inordertoensurespeedyandrealisticplanningandtoacilitateanefcientdeploymentotheorcesintheareaooperation.Ingeneral,unitsassignedtothemissionshouldbeequippedromthebeginningsoastoensurethesaetyandeectivenessopersonnel.Whenappropriate,personnelandkeyequipmentshouldbedeployedbyair,ipossibleusingstrategicairlitcapabilities.Tacticalairlitcapabilitymustalsobemaintainedin-theatre.

10Iacompositenationalormultinationalunitisto

bedeployed,thedesignatedcommandershouldtakepartintheplanningorandormationo

theunit.Itwouldalsobeuseultoestablishacoordinatinggroup,comprisingrepresentativesromthenationsinvolved,todeveloptheorganisationandoverseetheormationotheunit,coordinateplanningandpolicyandsolveanyproblemsthatmayariseduringdeployment.Suchacoordinatinggroupshouldmeetatregularintervals.


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11Itisimportantthatunitsinthefeldbeatthere-

quiredlevelointeroperability;asanimportantprecondition,nationalCrisisManagementCentres,andthatotheimplementingorganisation,shoulddevelopacapabilityooperatingtogether,onthebasisocommonstandardstobedevelopedinthelightoexperienceinamission.OperationJointEndeavouroersuseulmaterialonwhichtodrawtoimproveinte-roperabilityatthislevel.

12Planninghastocontinueinthemissionarea.The

ForceCommandershouldtakeaccountosignifcantpolitical,humanitarian,militaryandenvironmentalconsiderationsinselectinglocationsorunits.Theresultsoeachphaseoanoperationshouldbeevaluatedinlightotheoperationsoverallpolitical-militaryplan.Eachsuccessivephaseshouldonlybestartedwhenthesuccessulimplementationotheprecedingstageisachieved,asthiswillhaveanimportantimpactonthecontinuedsuccessothemis-sion.AllplanningmustbedirectedtowardsachievingthefnalgoalothemissionasdefnedintheMandate.

13Thesaetyandsecurityopeacekeepingpersonnel

continuestobeoseriousconcern.Inrecentyearstheinternationalcommunityhaswitnesseddangerousactsoviolenceagainstpeacekeepersbeingtakenhostageandusedasahumanshield.Thecontinuinguseofrearms,inparticularsnipersbythepartiestoaconictagainstthepersonneloapeacekeepingorceremainsamatteroseriousconcern.Thewidespreaduseomines,inparticularanti-personnelmines,inareasopeacekeepingoperationsalsoposesimpedimentstothesaetyopeacekeepingpersonnel.

14Thereorethesecurityopersonnelmustbean

integralpartotheplanningoanypeacekeepingoperation.Allappropriatemeasures,inconormitywiththeUNCharterandwithintheagreedmandate,shouldbetakenbytherelevantinternationalorganisationsandtheirMemberStatestoensurethesecurityopeacekeepers.SomedelegationsnotedthattheearlyentryintoorceotheConventionontheSaetyoUNPeacekeepingandAssociatedPersonneladoptedbytheGeneralAssemblyResolution49/59o9thDecember1994wouldbeasteporwardinthisdirection.

15De-miningoperationsshouldbe,wheneverappro-

priate,animportantelementandanintegralpartopeacekeepingoperations.

IFOR-SPECIFICEXPERIENCES

16IFOR experience has shownthat the planners

abilitytoinuenceeventsduringearlypreparationothemission,throughdirectcontactswithnegotiatorsinvolvedinthePeacePlanprocess,helpedtoavoidproblemsencounteredbyUNPROFOR(mainlybecausethiswasnotbasedonapeaceagreement)andtoensureacleardefnitionomilitarytasksunderaunifedchainocommand.Theintegrationo15PPandourothernon-NATOnationsunderaunifedcommandandcontrolhasbeenamajorsuccess,buildingonexperienceromthePPprogrammeandbasedoninnovativecommandandcontrolarrangementsatalllevels.Moreover,mostnationsbelievethatIFORsmilitarysuccessderivedtoalargeextentrompreormed,provencommandstructuresandlogistic

systemsandromlong-termcontingencyplanningcarriedoutatNATO.


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10 LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

17InthecaseoIFOR,militaryplanninghadtotake

placeaheadocivilianplanning,sincethesamedegreeoadvanceplanningandorganisationdidnotexistonthecivilside.ItwasthereoredifcultorIFORtoplaninatimelyashionitssecondarytasksosupportingcivilimplementation.Thereisaneed,priortopeacekeepingoperations,toensureabetterunderstandingotheroles,operationalconceptsandcapabilitiesothecivilorganisationslikelytobeparticipating.Atthesametimecontactsandexercises

involvingboththemilitaryandcivilorganisationsshouldbeencouraged.

18TheIFORoperationhasshowedtheneedtoaddress

theissuesoimprovedmechanismsortheearlyinvolvementoTroopContributingNations(TCNs)intheplanning,preparation,commandstructure,aswellastheirparticipationinthepoliticaloversightanddecision-makingproceduresinoperationstowhichtheycontribute.ThereisroomorimprovingtheamountoinormationprovidedbytheTCNsincertainareas.Forinstance,ithasbeenpointedoutthattherecouldhavebeenabettercoordinationwithinIFORconcerningevacuationplans.Thesameapplieswithregardtodecisionstakenbytheimplementingorganisation,whichcouldhaveanimpactonthesecurityocontingentspro-videdbyTCNs.

B. Coordination Among Troop-Contributing Nations and

With Mandating and Implementing Organisations

19Nationsconfrmtheimportancetheyattachtode-

velopingmechanismsorholdingconsultationsandexchanginginormationwithTCNs.TheUNSecurityCouncil,inparticular,hasconvenedmeetingsoitsmembers,TCNsandtheUN

Secretariattoacilitateexchangeoinormationandviewsbeoredecidingtoextend,termi-nate,orsubstantiallymodiythemandateospecifcpeacekeepingoperations.MeetingswithTCNsareplannedandheldbothonaregularandanadhocbasiswhentheSecurityCouncilenvisagestheestablishmentoanewpeacekeepingoperation.SeveralcountriesargueormoreeectivearrangementsandmechanismsorconsultationbetweentheUNSecurityCouncil,theSecretariatandTCNsinplanningaswellasincommandandcontrolopeacekeepingoperations.Theypointoutthatconusionandseriousproblemscouldoccurwhenorcesactonnationalcommand.Nationshavehighlightedtheneedorintensiveconsultations,beoretheadoptionoamandate,withallcountriescapableoandwillingtocontributetoparticularoperations.Asafrststep,itwouldbeimportanttodevelopamorestructuredinvolvementoTCNsintheprocessoormulationomandatesbytheUNSecurityCouncil(UNSC).Inact,thereisaneedtourtherinstitutionalisetheconsultationsbetweentheUNSCandTCNsonpeacekeepingmandates.Inthecaseoapeacekeepingoperationwhereconsentothehost

countryisrequired,itmayalsobebenefcialtoinvolvethehostcountryinthepreliminarystageoconsultations.Withinamultinationaloperation,contributorsshouldhavetheoppor-tunitytoparticipateintheprimarydecision-makingprocess,thuscontributingtothepoliticalguidanceorthemilitarycommandotheoperation.

20Asasecondstep,MemorandaoUnderstanding

(MoUs)shouldideallybeconcludedamongTCNsinthepreparatoryphaseotheoperation.Whereappropriate,TCNliaisonofcersshouldbesenttothestaplanninganoperationand,asappropriate,toothertroop-contributingnations.Itisalsonecessarytoimplementastandardisedplanningprocess(phasedandtimed,includingact-fndingandadvancedpartymechanisms)involvingnationalstaofcerstobeassignedtotheuturePeacekeeping

Headquarters.ThispreliminaryHQstacanserveasareerenceteamortroop-contributingnationsinthenationalplanningprocess.


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LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 11

21TCNsshouldbeconsultedpriortochangesinthe

mandatecausedbyasignifcantevolutionothesituationinthefeld.Theyshouldbeoeredachoicebetweenreconsideringtheirparticipationandroleintheupdatedmissionandrea-djustingthecomposition,equipmentandlevelotrainingotheirorces,orthemtobeabletocontinuetocarryouttheirmissioneectively.Somebelievethatchangestothemandatesandtothesubsequentroleothedeployedtroopsshouldnotbecarriedoutuntilthetroops

arereadytoadjusttheirroleonthegroundinthemissionarea.Insomecases,ashappenedwithBosnia-Herzegovina,itmaybenecessarytomodiythenatureandtheobjectivesoanoperation:ithechangeissignifcantenough,amodifcationothemandatewouldnotbesufcient,butanentirelynewoperationshouldbedeployed,onthebasisoacompletelynewmandate.

C. Coordination Among Institutions

(Including Humanitarian Aspects and Refugees)

22Asanimportantpreconditionoreectivecoope-

ration,thereis,inthefrstplace,aneedoraclearandefcientallocationotasksamongthevariousorganisationsinvolvedintheimplementationodierentaspectsoapeaceplan.Mostotodaysconictsareinternal,oughtnotonlybyregulararmiesbutalsobyirregularorces.Civiliansarethemainvictims,andhumanitarianemergenciesarecommonplace.Stateinstitutionshaveotencollapsed.Thismeansthatinternationalinvolvementmustotenextendbeyondtraditionalpeacekeeping.Thereore,cooperationbetweenthemandatingorganisation,regionalandcivilianorganisations,troop-contributingnationsandnon-governmentalagencies(NGOs)shouldbeinitiatedattheearliestpossiblemomentothemissionplanningstageandmaintainedthroughoutthedurationothemission.Thisdoesnotmeanthatapeacekeepingoperationcanreplacestateinstitutions.Incomplex,multi-dimensionalpeacekeepingopera-

tions,theassistanceprovidedtothepopulationbyinternationalandnon-governmentalhuma-nitarianorganisationssuchastheRedCrossisakeyelementtothesettlementotheconict.Successothemissionotenhingesontheabilitytoulflnon-militarytasks.Internationalandnon-governmentalorganisationsshouldcooperatewithinanagreedcoordinationarrangement.Ataminimum,closeliaisonbetweenthevariousorganisationsshouldbeassuredwiththemaintenanceocoordination-liaisoncells.

23Particularlyinthecaseopeacekeepingoperations

oamultiunctionalnature,itisessentialtodefneromtheoutsetthevariousagenciesandorganisationsinvolvedintheimplementationoelementsothemandateandtoestablishappropriateworkingrelationshipswiththem.Relationsbetweenthepeacekeepingorceand

theUN,inthecaseooperationscarriedoutunderaUNSCResolution,areospecialim-portance.RelationswiththeUNandotherorganisationsshouldideallycovertheollowingareas:coordinationandcooperation,suchassupportandresourcesharingandassistance;proceduresorreimbursementandpropertytransers;inormationexchange,liaison,mediationandnegotiation;andcommonplanningandintegratedexecution.Intheviewosomenations,experiencesinUNPROFORandinSomaliasuggestthatthehumanitariantaskswithinamulti-unctionalpeacekeepingoperationshouldbeprimarilycarriedoutbyspecialisedhumanitarianorganisations (includingWHO,UNHCR,UNICEF,WFP, ICRC),operationally autonomousromthemilitary,undergeneralpoliticalguidanceand,whenevernecessary,coordinationbytheUN.Inthiscontext,thedevelopmentoaninternationalarrangementgoverningbasicprinciplesocooperationandinteractionbetweentheUNandregionalorganisationsinvolvedinpeacekeepinghasbeensuggested.


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24Animportant lesson learned rom IFOR isthat

permanent liaison arrangements shouldbe establishedwith other internationalbodiesintheatre,includingrepresentativesothemandatingbodyandotherorganisationschargedwithimplementingvariousaspectsothemandate.

D. Role of Neighbouring Countries

25Acountryneighbouringacrisisareahasavital

interestintheearliestpossibleeectivesolutionothecrisisandintherestorationopeace.Thereore,neighbouringcountriesshouldacilitatethesuccessulconductopeacekeepingoperationsandrerainromkindlinginter-ethnic,inter-conessionalandotherdierencesinthecrisisareaaswellasromencouragingseparatistandnationalistgroups,movementsandoppositionactionsstrivingtoprovokeasplitinsocietyandthebreakdownothestate.Aparticularlydelicatesituationarisesoraneighbouringcountrywhichhasasignifcantnational

minorityinthecrisisareaitsel.Suchasituationmightservetolimititsreedomoaction,inviewotheimpactthatcertaindecisionsmighthaveonthenationalminorityinquestion.

26Countriesneighbouringareasocrisisplayanim-

portantroleinpeacekeepingoperations,beyondservingaszonesotransitorpersonnelandmaterial.IncomplexoperationssuchasDenyFlight,SharpGuardandJointEndeavour,andoractioninvolvingtheuseopower,neighbouringcountriesunctionasadvancedbasesooperationalandlogisticstructures.Theyalsoprovideservices,withoutwhichtheoperationswouldbeexcessivelycostlyorevenimpossibletocarryout.Theycanalsoprovidetemporarysupportandaccommodationorreugees.OnelessonromtheormerYugoslaviaisthatabroa-derareacouldbeaectedbyacrisis.Inparticular,theeconomiesoneighbouringcountries

canbenegativelyaectedbytheimplementationoUN-mandatedsanctions.

27InthecaseotheIFORoperationtheavailability

oportsandairportsnearthecrisisareaprovedtobeocrucialimportanceinmaintainingconstant,precisecontroloverairandmaritimespace,whetheritbeorbanningightsorenor-cinganarmsembargo,ororairoperationsinsupportotheunitsonthegroundandensuringcompliancewithaheavyweapons-exclusionzone.Theuseoportsandairportsnecessitatesaseriesostructuresandserviceswhichinturnrequirestheuseolocalinrastructure.Theuseothesestructurescanhaveaconsiderableandlastingimpactonsocialandeconomicconditions,withresultingburdensovarioustypesortheneighbouringcountry.

28Inaddition,theneighbouringcountrysresponsibi-

litiessometimesinvolvetheadoptionotechnicalandlegalmeasuresrelatedtothetransitandstationingonitsterritoryoarmedpersonnel,aswellasadministrativemeasuresormanagingtheservicesrequiredorthepresenceooreignorces,theprovisionoinormationactivityandtheavailabilityoliaisonpersonnel.Therecouldalsobevariousburdensderivingromtheexposuretopossibleretaliatoryactionsbythewarringactions.

29Inthecaseo thecrisisintheormerYugoslavia,

neighbouringcountriessueredconsiderableburdens.Duringtheperiodoarmedconict,neighbouringcountrieshadtomakeeveryeortpossibleinordertoisolateandcontainthewar,andhadtoreckonwitharmedgroupsandairstrikesspillingover.Thus,theyhadtoputtheirarmedorcesonacertainstateoalert.


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GROUP IIImplementation

E. Civil-Military RelationsGENERALEXPERIENCES

30Fullintegrationoallthoseinvolvedinanoperation

withmultiunctionalaspectsisotendifculttoachieveduetothemanyplayersinanytheatreooperations,althoughaMissionHeadattunedtobothcivilandmilitarycultureswouldgreatlyassistincoordinationandintegration.Intheviewosomenations,aCivil-MilitaryOperationsCentreisthebestwaytoensurecoordinationandintegration.Interdisciplinarycooperationandahierarchicalstructurearenotmutuallyexclusive.Forinstance,thereshouldbeveryclosecooperationbetweenthemilitaryandcivilianpolicecomponentsoapeacekeepingoperation.Moreover,themilitaryshouldnotbegivenpolicetasksorwhichtheyhavenot

beentrained.

31Alsoimportantiscoordinationatthelevelo

missionheadquarters.Thiscoordinationshouldideallyberegulatedintherameworkoarelationmanagementplan,whichmaybecoordinatedbytheofceotheMissionHeadortheForceCommanderand/oracilitatedbyanad-hocworkinggroupcomprisingthevariouscomponentsinthemissionarea.ItcouldbeadvantageoustodespatchanationalliaisonteamtotheUNHeadquartersinthemissionareaatanearlystageinordertopreparethedeploymentandacilitatethearrivalothetroops.

32Non-governmentalorganisations(NGOs)canoer

apositiveandimportantcontributiontopeacekeepingoperations;however,theirpresencecanalsomakeoperationsmorecomplex.Inprinciple,theconsentothepartiestotheiractivitiesisdesirable.Non-governmentalorganisationsvaryromthelargerinternationalagenciesandassociationsdowntosmallcharities,othergroupsorevenindividualswhomaylackexpe-rience,preparationandorganisation.Civiliansmaylackunderstandingowhatthemilitaryisdoing,andvice-versa.BothmilitaryandcivilianorganisationsshouldconsiderhowbesttoavoidmisunderstandingsandhowtoestablishaworkablestructurecapableocoordinatingtherequirementsbothomilitaryandNGOstomutualadvantage.ACivil-MilitaryOperationsCentreshouldhandlein-theatrecoordinationandsupportissueswithnon-governmentalandprivatevoluntaryorganisations.

IFOR-SPECIFICEXPERIENCES

33ExperienceswithinUNPROFORandIFORhave

shownthateectivecooperationintheatrebetweenthemandatingorganisationandimplemen-tingnations/authoritiesiscrucial,butthatitisdifculttomakeitaspermanentandsystematicasitshouldbe.Inact,itisnotalwayseasytoestablisheectivemechanismsocooperationandcoordination,partlyinviewothedierentrolesandperceptionsotheissuesandthetasks,partlybecauseothedierentproceduresadopted.

34SomeaspectsotherelationshipbetweentheUN

andIFORworkedbetterthanothers.Relationsattheseniorlevelhavebeendescribedbythe


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UNasverygoodandsupportprovidedtotheUNthroughcivil-militarycooperation(CIMIC)hasbeendeemedexcellent.AnexcellentrelationshiphasalsodevelopedbetweenIFORandtheOSCEmission,aswellaswiththeInternationalPoliceTaskForce(IPTF).Butinthelattercase,ithasbeennotedthatthereisroomorimprovingcommunications(compatibleequip-mentislacking)andcollaboration,especiallyinhigh-riskareas.

35Onelessonlearnedrompeacekeepingexperience

isthatcivilianpolicehaverequentlyplayedanimportantrole.Thereis,thereore,aneedtoensureclosecoordinationbetweenmilitarypeacekeepingorcesandunarmedcivilpoliceadvisors.ThisreectstheactthatsomeothemostdifcultproblemsacedbyIFOR,orexample,relatednottoitsprimarytaskoensuringmilitarycompliance,buttodealingwithcivildisturbances.Thiswasparticularlytrueduringelections.TheexperienceoIFORindealingwithpublicdisturbancesishighlyrelevantandmeritsurtherconsideration.

F. Public Relations

36Inaddressinglessonslearnedrompeacekeeping

operations,oneshouldnotunderestimatetheimportanceorelationswithlocalauthoritiesandthelocalpopulation,aswellaswiththemedia,whichallrequirecareulyetdierentia-tedhandling.Jointcommissions,whichincludepartiestotheconict,governmentofcials,representativesromthepeacekeepingorceand,asrequired,non-governmentalorganisationsoperatingintheareaoconict,areuseulbodiesinthisrespect.

37Bearinginmindthe largeinterestshownby the

mediainrecentpeacekeepingoperations,relationswithmediarepresentatives,aswellasasound,pro-activepublicinormationpolicy,areocrucialimportance.Suchapolicyhastwokeyaudiences:thefrstiseitheratroop-contributingstateoranotherstateclosetothemissionareaorwithaspecifcinterest,suchassharedethnicorculturalroots;thesecondisthecountryreceivingthemission.Themessagebeinggiventobothaudiencesmustbeclearandconsistentandlinkedtothemissionsobjectives.Aninormationpolicymaybereinorcedin-theatrebyaheartsandmindscampaign.InoperationJointEndeavour,thePsychologicalOperationsTaskForcewasassignedprimaryresponsibilityorcommunicatingwiththeBosnianpeople,whilethePublicInormationTeamcommunicatedwiththemassmedia-domesticandinternational.TheroleopsychologicaloperationsintheIFORandSFORoperationsistodevelopandmaintaintheconsentothelocalpopulationtothepresenceotheForce,todiscourageintererencewiththepeacekeepingoperation,andtoassess,reportandcounterpropagandadirectedtowardstheorce.

38Incourse opreparations or theoperation, itis

highlyadvisabletoworkout-onthebasisothemandate-aplanoinormationalcoverage,atleastingeneralterms,aswellastoormulatemethodologyoritsimplementation,inclu-ding:

- personnelrequired;

- inormationmaterials;

- independentchannelsordistribution.

Theneedorexibilitytoadjustplanstoeventsshouldberecognised.

39TheinormationsupportoPKOsshouldbebased

onaninormationpolicyothehigheststandardsoconsistency,honestyandtransparency.The


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specialnatureoactivitiesconductedwhenpreparingtheoperation,andtheneedtopreventtheleakageosensitiveinormationthroughthemassmedia,shouldbetakenintoaccount.Even-handedandnon-provocativepresentationandinterpretationoeventswillbeimportant.

40ThelessonslearnedromIFORsinormationpolicy

suggestthatearlydeploymentoresourcesinthisrespectwouldbeverybenefcial.Whenthepersonnelinchargeorelationswiththepressactuallyarrivedin-theatre,theabilityoCommanderstoconveytothepressanaccurateappreciationotheobjectivesandtasksothemissionwasimproved.Mediaunderstandingothechallengesomissionimplementationroseaswell.Furthermore,theuseomasscommunicationsmediabythepeacekeepingorcecansignifcantlycontributetocounteringactionalpropagandaandprovidingthepopulationwithasourceounbiasednews.Theuseoradiocommunicationcanbeparticularlyimportantinsecuringthesuccessuloutcomeoapeacekeepingoperation.Theadvantageotheradioisthatitcanreachalargeraudiencethananyothermedia.Inaddition,itdoesnotdependonelectricitysupplies,itcannotbecensored,anditisimmediateandprecise.

41

Electronicinormationexchange andhandling,both internal andexternal,directed towards thepublicand internationalmediamustbeorganised,institutionalised,andprepared.Personnelmustbeproperlytrained.Computerequipment,networklinkageandhandlingskills,aswellasdatamanagement,willberequiredtomeetagrowingdemandorinormation.

42Relationswiththelocalpopulationareparticularly

importantorthesuccessoapeacekeepingmission.Theserelationsshouldbebasedontheimpartialityotheorces,even-handednessindealingwiththelocalpopulation,onagoodknowledgeotheculture,localcircumstancesandthepoliticalandeconomicsituationotheregion,aswellasontheabilitytocommunicatedirectly.Beyondthenormalstabilisingeect

oestablishedpeacekeepingtasks,arethosesuchasthedistributionohumanitarianaidandthecontributiontotherestorationothecountrysinrastructure,whichmayinthemselvesbeapartothemission.Theuseomissionassets(suchasconstructionengineersormedicalresources)orappropriatelocalprojectswillalsocontributetobuildinggoodrelationswiththelocalpopulationandauthorities.

G. Command and Control

43

Animportantprerequisiteorsuccessulpeace-keepingoperations,intheviewosomenations,liesintheprovisionostrategicpoliticalleadershipin,andcontrolover,operationsonthepartotheSecurityCouncil.TheForceCommandershouldbecareultoobservethegenerallyacceptedprinciplesopeacekeeping,includingthoserelatingtocommandandcontrol.

44Commandandcontrolarrangementsshouldbe

clearlydefnedandagreedbeorethedeployment.Itisnecessarytoestablishresponsibilitiesatalllevelsinthecommandstructure;toclariyproceduresandworkingrelationswithinthemission;andtoestablishcommunicationsproceduresandotherlogisticsupportcompatiblewiththeneedsothemission.Commandandcontrolarrangementsshouldincludethemeans

orcommunicatingwithliaisonteamstheorganisationosuchteams,andtheselectionoheadquarterselementswithwhichliaisonisrequired.


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45Duringthemission,theForceCommandershould

makethemosteectiveuseotheinternationalunitsathisdisposal,withinthelimitsothemissionsmandate.Boththecivilandmilitaryelementsotheoperationmustbecoordinatedthroughoutthecommandstructure,andcommandandcontrolmustberesponsiveandexible,withauthoritydelegatedtothemostappropriatecommandlevel.Provisionsshouldbemadetoallownon-governmentalandprivateorganisationsaccesstocommunications.

46Animportantlessonlearnedrompeacekeepingis

that,orUN-ledoperations,theUNchainocommandmustberespectedbyTCNs.Inatio-naldirectivesmakeitnecessaryoracontingentcommandertodeviateromthisprinciple,hissuperiorintheUNchainocommandshouldbeinormedimmediately.Foritspart,theUNshouldkeepTNCsthoroughlyandpromptlyinormedaboutthesituationinthemissionarea.


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GROUP IIIOperations

H. Communication and Information Systems

47CommunicationandInormationSystems(CIS)

supportwithintheareaooperationandromtheMissionHeadquarterstohigherlevelsocommandsneedstobecareullyplannedpriortodeploymentoorces.Theobjectiveshouldbe toachieveinteroperabilityoCISusedbytheorganisationleadingtheoperationandbetweenthoseusedbyTCNs.Thereisarequirementorstandardisationpertainingtothelevelotechnicalinteroperabilityandtothelevelocommonalityooperatingandreportingproceduresused.

48CoordinationwithTCNs,interoperabilitytestingo

CISandtrainingooperatingprocedurespriortodeploymentwillassistseamlessinormationowduringtheoperation.Regardingspecifclessons,somenationseelthat:

- In-theatreCISshouldbecentrallymanagedbytheTheatreHQCISSupportCell;

- CivilandmilitaryelementsotheForceshouldnotusetheHostNationstelecom-municationsinrastructureasaprimarymeansocommunication;

- TheForcemustcontrolitsownCIS;

- ThetacticalcommunicationsshouldbebasedonVHFCombatNetRadiosasprimarymeansothegeographicareatobecovereditheterraindoesnotdictatetheuseoothermeanssuchasTacticalSATCOM(TACSAT);

- HFCombatNetRadiosmaybeusedasback-upsystems.ThelinkstothehomecountriesoTCNsmaybebasedonINMARSAT;

- Encryptionequipmentwouldbeuseul;

- Diplomaticmailshouldbeusedtotheextentpossible;

- TheGlobalPositioningSystem(GPS)isaveryuseultooltoestablishcommunica-tionswithitinerantelementsinareaswithinsufcientroadsandcommunicationacilities.

I. Information and Intelligence

49Historical,political, andethnographicactors

shouldbetakenintoaccountbeorethedeploymentopeacekeepingorcesromonenationintoanother.Inthiscontext,recentdevelopmentswithintheUNareinstructive.ASituationCentrewasestablishedundertheUNDepartmentoPeacekeepingOperations(DPKO)in1993.WithintheSituationCentre,aninormationandresearchunitreceives,processesandanalysesinormationgatheredromcurrentfeldoperations.Inaddition,theUnitmonitorsdevelopmentsinotherareaswithaviewtopossibleuturedeployments.Oneuseulmeansoobtaininginormationaboutacrisisareapriortotheagreementonamandateorapea-cekeepingoperationisthedispatchoact-fndingmissionsandcommissionstoinvestigatedisputesandsituations,aswellasmissionsoaspecialenvoyotheUNSecretaryGeneralorthesepurposes.Thesearesentattherequestorbyagreementotheparties.Theoutcome

otheiractivitiesistobereportedtotheUNSecurityCouncilandtakenintoaccountinthecourseopreparationandplanningomultiunctionalpeacekeepingoperations.Thus,theUNseekstoraiseitslevelopreparednessoruturepeacekeepingoperations.


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50In thecourseomultiunctionalpeacekeeping

operationsitbecomesveryimportanttoobtaintimely,reliableandullinormationonthesituationinaconictregion,changesinthepositionsothepartiesandanycircumstancesthatcannegativelyinuenceorimpedetheimplemetationotheoperation.Inormationorintelligenceaboutlocalconditionsisthereoreessentialtoallpeacekeeping.OnesourceoinormationistheUnitedNationswhichgathersandanalysesinormationreceivedromthe

UNmemberstates,dierentUN-amilyagencies,thepartiestoaconictthemselvesaswellasrommediareportsandmembersodiplomaticcorps.Bearinginmindtheneedtomaintainthehighstandingothepeacekeepingmission,intelligencegatheringshouldbeclearlycontrolledandconductedsolelyorthepurposesothepeacekeepingmissionandonlyatthedirectionotheForceCommander.Covertintelligenceoperationsunrelatedtothesaetyopeacekeepersandthesuccessothemissionareinappropriatetopeacekeepingenvironments.

51Experience shows thatidentiicationo actual

actors oa disputeorconict constitutes anindispensable prerequisite orinitiatingandconductingamultiunctionalpeacekeepingoperation.Reconnaissanceoaprospectivemis-sionareaisanessentialprerequisiteoraneectiveconceptooperations,asisthecaseoranymilitaryoperation.Reconnaissancepartiesshouldincluderepresentativesoallelementsothemission.Intelligenceisalsoavitalelementintheanalysis,planningandconductoanyoperationanditisimportantthatindevelopinganassessmentoasituationallavailablesourcesareused.Thisincludesacademicexperts,in-theatrenon-governmentalorganisations(NGOs)andotherbodies.

52Itwouldbedesirabletoadoptuniormmilitary

symbolsandabbreviations-orinstance,usingthoseemployedbytheimplementingorga-nisation-aswellasUniversalTransverseMercatorProjection(UTM)maps,thedevelopmentoIdentiyFriendorFoe(IFF)systemsandtheadoptionocommonrescuestandards.Inthe

contextotheIFORoperation,unitsromdierentnationshaveactivelycooperatedinthefeldotopographicpreparation,successullyadoptingunifedmapsymbolsandmapormatsoruseatthevariouslevelsocommandandbythedierentnationalcontingents.

J. Logistics

53Thelogisticaspectsooperations,andinparti-

cularthefnancialquestions,mustbeconsideredearlybyallmissionplanners.Thereisaneedtoclariyatanearlystagethechannelsthroughwhichthesequestionsaretobeinitiallydiscussed.Inact,logisticandoperationalplanningareinextricablylinked.Itisessentialthatbothlogisticsandoperationsstahaveaclearunderstandingoeachothersaimsandrequirements.Itisimportanttoclearlyidentiywhatisexpectedonationalcontingents,toconfrmtheeasibilityotheseexpectationsortomakeandconfrmalternativearrangementsasrequiredinadvanceodeployment.

54Thereisaneedorincreasedattentiontologistic

requirementsintheplanningphase,suchastheworkrequiredorthepreparationodeploymentcamps(suchasde-mining,clearingthearea,settingupences,organisingguardanddeencesystems,settingupthecamp,installingequipment,creatingaccessroads).Selectionoin-

rastructureinregardtolocationandcapacitymustpermitadditionalroomorpeace-buildingworksuchashousingorreugees,storageoood,orcontributiontopublicinrastructure.


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55ManyUNoperationshavebenefttedromlogistic

supportbeingprovidedcentrallybytheUnitedNations.However,theIFORoperationde-monstratedthatanexcellentwayoproceedingistotaskonecontributorwiththeprovisionologisticsupport(e.g.,alogisticbattalion).Inanycase,detaileddeterminationonationalandnon-nationalresponsibilitiesmustbedefnedintheconceptooperationsandguidelinesortroop-contributingnations.ATableoOrganisationandEquipment(TOE)ocontributingunits

shouldbecollectedandmaintainedinaccessibledatabasesormodellingthecompatibilityandinteracepossibilities.Hostnationssupportshouldbepoliticallyagreed,clearlystatedinaStatusoForceAgreement(SOFA)whereappropriate,andutilisedwhereverpossibleinordertokeeplogisticcostslow.

56Inthefrstperiodoanewmission,thereisan

increasedrequirementorspecialistunitsandpersonnel.Asimilarrequirementexistsattheendoamission.Duringthestart-upphase,thereisanincreasedrequirementorconstructionengineers,legalexpertsandotherspecialists.Engineersandadditionalmedicalresourcesorhelpingthelocalpopulationinthecaseoemergenciesarevaluabletoolsorconfdencebuildingatthelocallevel.Specialistsarealsoneededtoconductmineclearance,establishcamps,observationposts,shelters,instalutilities,conductroadrepairs,andestablishcom-munications.Legal,contractingandfnancialexpertsareneededtonegotiateanddrawupleaseagreements,hirelocalemployeesandsoon.Duringthedraw-downphase,thereisanincreasedrequirementorsupplyexpertstopackupandregistersuppliesandequipmentorshipmentandorlegalandfnancialexpertstoterminateagreementsandcontracts.

57Movementbybothairandsuracecanbedifcult;

careuldecision-makinginrespectohighvaluetransportationassetsisrequiredtoavoidun-necessaryadditionalexpense.Accordingly,itisessentialthatmovementplansarelinkedtothemissionplanandfnalisedbeorethesubmissionocosts,keepinginmindthatreedom

omovementisimperative.Themethodotransportationmustbedecidedatanearlystagetoallowordetailedplanning.Cargocontainersshouldbestandardisedandreportedtotheshippingorganisation.Availabilityounloadingcapacities,transportandstorageortheportodisembarkationinthemissionareaisalsoimportant.

58Therecanbeasignifcantshortallbetweenthe

logisticsupportintendedin-theatreandwhatisactuallyprovided.Whenfrstdeployed,unitsshouldbesel-sufcient,withsuppliescommensuratetothetask.Stockmanagementbasedonconsumerstatisticsmustbeoreseen,withaminimumstocklevelo60days.Equipmentmustbeadaptedtoenvironmentalconditionsandshouldenabletroopstolivecomortablyinapotentiallydifcultenvironmentorprolongedperiods.Asaprinciple,equipmentshouldnot

bedeployedunlessthenecessarymaintenancecapacityandlogisticback-upisathandinthemissionarea.Equipmentrenderedunserviceableduetonon-availabilityobasicmaintenanceorsparepartswillunderminetheeectivenessothemission. Inspectionbeoreshipping,andtransportsupervisionbytherecipient,shouldbeanormtoensurethatequipmentarrivesinuseablecondition.

59Insomemissionsitmaybeappropriateoracom-

mercialcontractortoprovidecorelogistics.Suchcontractorsshouldbeidentifedbyopencompetitionandmeetanyrequiredperormancecriteriainadvance,andideallyshouldhavedemonstratedaprovenperormancestandard.Contractadministrationandmonitoringshouldbestrengthenedtoensurestandardsaremet,andcontractsbesecuredinsufcienttimeor

thecontractortobeabletoprovideeectivesupporttothemission.


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60Fornavaloperations,aorwardlogisticssiteshould

beestablishedneartheareaooperations,comprisingpersonnelromallparticipatingnations.Asufcientnumberohelicoptersshouldbeavailableortransportbetweenshipsandthelogisticsite.Ireespaceonboardtheshipsislimited,depots(e.g.,orspareparts)canbeestablishedatthelogisticssite.Intheareaooperation,thereshouldbeanareaordegaussingships.

61TheCompendiumoLessonsObservedDuring

LogisticSupportoPeacekeepingOperationsproducedbytheLogisticsDirectorateotheNATOInrastructure,Logistics andCivil EmergencyPlanningDivisionprovidesadditionalmaterialinrelationtologisticsupportopeacekeepingoperations.

K. Medical Support

62Peacekeepingoperationsare complicatedby a

numberopeculiarcharacteristics,whichimpactundamentallyupontheprovisionomedicalsupport.Medicalsupportplansthereoremustbepurpose-builtoreachoperation.Plansmustbecapableospeedyinitialreactionandexibleenoughtomanagerapidlychangingdemands.MedicalsupportplanningandmanagementmustbeacceptabletoNATO/UnitedNationsHeadquartersandtoparticipatingnationsaswell.

63Theoverallobjectiveomedicalsupportmustbe

physicalandmentalwell-beingo thedeployedpersonnel,theconservationomanpower,preservationolieandthelimitationoresidualphysicalandmentaldisabilities.Operationalmedicalsupportthereorerequiresclearlydefnedanddistinctiveguidance.Thetaskoplan-ning,executingandcontrollingoperationalmedicalsupportmustlieproperlywithamedicallytrainedplanningstawhomusthaveanestablishedorganizationosufcient,experiencedmanpower,communicationsandinormation.

64ThemedicalC3Iorganizationmustbecapableo

planning,executing,controlling,supportingandauditingtheullrangeomedicalsupportunctions.Itmustbecapableoprovidingaseamlesssystemocontrolotreatment,evacuationandtranseroinormationrominitialpointoinjuryorsicknessthroughouttheevacuationchaintodefnitivetreatment.EachlevelooperationalcommandthereorehastohaveaSenior

MedicalOfcer,directlyaccountabletotheoperationalcommander.

- TheForceMedicalOfcer(FMEDO)oaFieldMissionplans,directs,advisesandsupervisesallactivitiesrelatedtothemedicalsupportplan.He/sheistheSeniorMedicalAdvisertotheForceCommander(FC)andtoallcontingentSeniorMedicalOfcers(SMEDOS)othemission.

- TheSeniorMedialOfcers(SMedOs)areFMedOspointocontactoncontingent(national)level.He/sheistheSeniorclinicianorhis/hernationalunit(s)andtheSeniorMedicalAdvisertothenationalContingentCommander.

65Preventivehealthmeasuresinvolveeveryindivi-

dualintheoperationaltheatre.Theorganizationtoundertakethem,itsstructureandsizewillbemission-dependant,andmustbebasedonbestavailablemedicalintelligenceevaluationo


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theareaooperations,butwillincludeatleastindividualadvisersateachlevelooperationalcommand.Itisanationalresponsibilityatnationalexpensetoensurethatpersonnelispre-paredandappropriatelytrainedinfeldpreventivemedicinemeasurespriortodeploymenttoapeacekeepingoperation.Thismustincludethenecessaryvaccinationandimmunization.EducationorthepreventionomedicaldiseasesmustincludethepreventionagainstAIDS/HIV.Eachparticipant,militaryleadersateachlevelinparticular,musthavebasictraininginthepreventionosexuallytransmitteddiseasesandHIV/AIDS.

66Allpersonnelbeingdeployedonpeacekeeping

operationsmustbemedicallyanddentallyftordutyandmustmeetatleastUNmedicalstandardsorpeace-keepingmissions.UNmedicalstandards,however,donotprecludena-tionalcontingents/militaryservicesromestablishinghigherqualiyingmedicalstandards.Innocase,however,shouldanindividual,unacceptableornationalmilitaryduties,beincludedinthepeacekeepingmilitarycontingentorce.

67Nationsretainultimateaccountabilityorthehealth

otheirorcesbut,ontheassumptionoauthority,thePeacekeepingForceCommanderwillsharetheresponsibilityorthehealthoassignedorces.Tomeetthisrequirement,theForceCommanderneedsappropriatemedicalsta.Theyshallplanandexecutethemedicalsupportplan.

68Medicalinormation,particularlyregardingpa-

tients,isavitalelementocompetentmedicalsupportplanning.Theinormationmustbemanagedefcientlyanddistributedrapidlywithoutviolatingmedicalproessionalsecrecy.Theabilitytotrackindividualpatientsthroughthetreatmentandevacuationchainisparamount.

69Policyandplanningortheresupplyomedicalmaterial isamedicalmatterand isinter-relateddirectlywithpatient treatment. Medicalplanningstamustaimtoachieveasmuchstandardizationaspossibleandestablisheectivemeansoauditingusageandresupply.Anefcient,well-regulatedandcost-eectivemedicallogisticssystemisundamentaltomissionmedicalsupport.Medicallogisticsmustbeabletorespondrapidlytourgentclinicaldemands.

70Fromtheoutsetoanoperation,atheatreeva-

cuationpolicymustbeestablishedbytheoperationalandmedicalplanningstaworkinginconcertwiththeForceCommander(FC)andFMedO(FMedO).Dedicatedandullyequipped

MEDEVAChelicopterswithappropriatemedicalstashallbeallocatedwheneverpossibleandshallbemarkedwiththedistinctiveemblems.

71Therulesorentitlementtomedicalcaremustbe

establishedearlyintheplanningprocess.Plannersmustconsider,butnotbesidetrackedby,legalissuesocompensationandclaims.Thedegreeosupporttobegiventolocalorhuma-nitarianaidpersonnelmustbeclearlydelineatedintheoperationsorder.Icareistobegiventocivilians,considerationmustbegiventomodiyingthestafngandequippingomedicalunits.Veryewpediatricorgynaecologicmedicationsarenormallystockedinfeldmedicalunits,andtheconditionothelocalpopulacemaymandateadditionomedicalspecialistswhodonotnormallyaccompanymilitarypeacekeepingorces.


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L. Training

72Militaryorotherspeciicskills,togetherwith

appropriatetraining,aretheundamentalbasisorsuccessullymeetingthepeacekeepingchallenges.Specialpeacekeepingtrainingisneededparticularlyinrelationtooperations

oamultiunctionalnature,sincebehavioursandtechniquesrequiredarenotnecessarilyinlinewith-andsometimesevencontradict-acquiredmilitaryskills,ormayneedanadequatecomplement,orinstanceinthediplomatic,civilorpolicefelds.Acommontacticalleveldoctrineisrequiredortroopcontributorstoanoperation,aswellasacommonunderstandingamongthemilitaryandotherelementsoapeacekeepingoperation-thepolice,civilians,NGOs,humanitarianorganisations.

73Relianceontheuseohighlyandproessionally

trainedunits,showsoorceanddetermination,andtherespectbythelocalpartieswhichisgainedbyactingfrmlycanimprovethecredibilityotheorceandinactreducetheneedtouseorce,thusretainingthemainaccentonconsentandcooperationwiththeparties.

74Eachnationshouldberesponsibleortrainingits

owntroops;however,therearebeneftsinmultinationaldevelopmentominimumtrainingstandards.TheUNplaysauseulsupportingrolebyestablishingguidelines,preparingcom-montrainingmodulesandpublishingaregisteromemberstatestrainingacilities.However,somenationssaytheyhaveexperienceddifcultiesinensuringtheirofcersparticipationinUNtrainingcoursespriortoassignmentstoservewithinapeacekeepingoperation.

75Pre-deploymentorientationtrainingensures that

troopsunderstandhowtheirroleaspeacekeepersdiersromthatascombatorces.Duringtheorientationperiod,specialattentionshouldbedrawntorecentpoliticaldevelopmentsandotherissuesrelatedtotheconict,inordertocreatethenecessaryawarenessandun-derstandingbytheorcesinvolved.Personnelshouldunderstandtheorganisation,structureandobjectivesothemissionandthenatureotheconditionsinwhichtheywillbeworking.Thisincludesthenatureothesocietyothemissionarea,itsnational,actional,culturalandreligiouscharacteristics,aswellasphysicalsecurityandclimaticissues.Commontrainingactivitiesareanimportantprerequisiteormultinationaloperations.Theuseomultinationalexercises,bringingtogetherdiplomatic,militaryandciviliancomponents,hasbeensuggestedinthisregard.Commontrainingstandardshelpdevelopthecohesivenessomultinationalormations.

76Realisticsimulationisequallyimportant,and

shouldinvolvetrainerswithrecentexperience.RealisticstatrainingalsorequiressimulationothemultinationalcompositionoaHQ.Inter-linkagesbetweenthevariouscomponentsshouldbesimulatedbyamixtureointernationalpersonnelalreadyinthetrainingphase.Whereappropriate,trainingshouldcontinueinthemissionareaasitwillnotalwaysbepossibletoreplicatethefeldconditionsinhometrainingareas.

77PPprovidesauseulsourceotrainingexperiences.

AveryeectiveinstrumenttohelppreparationsostaandoperationalorcesareNATO/PPexercisesocusingonpeacekeepingand/orhumanitarianoperations.APPcourseorplatooncommandersinpeacekeepingoperationsorganisedinthepastbytheCzechRepublicplayedauseulroleinthiscontext.CoursesorganisedinanumberotrainingcentresinvariousNACC/PPcountriesarealsoconsideredtobeextremelyvaluable.


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78However,someeelthattheexperiencegathered

soarsuggeststhatthenumberointernationaltrainingexercisesshouldbeincreasedandthescopeotopicscoveredinPPtrainingandexercisesexpanded.Thechangingnatureopea-cekeepingoperations,especiallyinthelightolessonslearnedinBosnia-Herzegovina,clearlyshowstheneedtocarryouttrainingandexerciseactivitiesatanoperationallevel.Exercisesshouldbroadenthescopeothoseactivitiestoincludestandardcombatactivitiesortraining

intheareasosmallgroupindependentactionandminecounter-measures.

79Thereisaneedoracommonlanguagecapability

amongunitsdeployedonmissions.Thisisessentialtoboththeexecutionothemissionandtheday-to-dayadministrationodeployedorces.Foreignlanguagetrainingortheorcesshouldthereorebeintensifed.Withregardtolocallanguagecapability,accesstocompetentinterpretersandtranslatorsisrequiredasanintegralpartothemission,sinceitmaynotbepossible,ordesirable,torelyentirelyonlocally-recruitedstaortheseroles.

80Theollowingelementswereconsideredtobeo

particularimportanceintrainingorcesordeploymentwithIFOR:abackgroundoexperien-cesgainedinpreviousmissionsandspecifcpeacekeepingtrainingororcestobeusedinthemission;andplanningandarrangementoadditionaltraining.Moreover,certainnationshavepointedtotheuseulnessoextendedtrainingopersonnelexpectingtohavedualunctions(e.g.,driver/mechanic)andodirectselectionopersonnelwithspecialskills,inparticularlogisticsexpertsorspecialistsinmaintenance.

M. Personnel and Administration

81Somenationseelthattrainingshouldbecomple-

mentedbyapersonnelselectionprocesswhichshouldtakeintoaccountpreviousexperiencesacquiredinthefeldandincludeapsychologicalscanning.Inthislight,itmaybeuseultoincludeasapartothepreparatoryactivitiesstresspreventiontrainingandaregulardebriefngatereachmissiontodiagnosethepossibledangeropost-traumaticstressdisorder.

N. Financial Aspects

82Thesuccessopeacekeepingoperationsisoten

conditionedbytheavailabilityounds.TheconductopeacekeepingoperationsundertheauspicesotheUN,i.e.,cost-sharingamongUNmembers,improvesthesenseoresponsibilityandtheinvolvementotheworldcommunity.

83Thebudgetaryprocedureapplyingtothemission

andthetroopcontributionsshouldbeclearlyspecifedinallbasicandrameworkplanningdocuments:Iapplicable,rulesorcost-sharingshouldbeclearlyspelledoutandtermsodepreciationoequipmentshouldbespecifed.Thefnancialquestionsraisedbythelogistic

aspectsooperationsshouldbeconsideredearlybyallmissionplanners.Finally,therewouldbeaneedtoidentiyproceduresorreimbursementoanylogisticsupportrenderedbyTCNs,andorpropertytransers.


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84Thereisacommoninterestthatthefnancialme-

chanismsorpeacekeepingoperationsworkasefcientlyaspossible.Thisproducesaneedtodrawupfnancialrulesandregulationstomakethemcompatiblewiththeoperationalneedsocomplexandlarge-scalemissions.Toensuresufcientexpertiseisavailabletothem,troop-contributingnationsshouldconsiderappointingabudgetexperttoworkin-theatrewithChieAdministrativeOfcers(CAO)andChieLogisticsOfcers.

85Oneshouldalsoconsiderincreasingthedelegation

ofnancialauthoritytoandwithinmissions,intheinterestsobothmissionefciencyandresponsivenesstotheneedsotroopcontributorsandotheForceCommander.Inanycase,alltroopcontributorsinvolvedintheoperationshouldapplythesamerulesvis--visthelocalauthorities.Inthisregard,asingleclaimspolicy(aspractisedbyIFOR)hasproveduseul.

86ChieAdministrativeOfcersshouldcontinueto

retainauthorityorexpenditurebutmissionbudgetsmustbedrawnupinconsultationwithcivilandmilitaryelementsandencompassallthedeclaredmissionaims,whilereectingbudgetaryrealities.CAOrecommendationsmustgoorwardaccompaniedbycertifcationromForceCommandersandMissionHeadsthattheproposalshavebeenullydiscusseddowntotheloweroperationallevelandendorsedasrealisticandachievable.Areservecadreoadministrativeofcerscouldensuretheoptimaluseoresources.

87Aspecifcaspectorelationsamongorganisationsis

thereimbursementocostsincurredbycontributingnations.Inthisregard,experienceshowsthatreimbursementsromtheUNareseldomtimelyandthatorcecontributorsneedtobeabletobridgethedelayinreimbursementthroughnationalunding.Onlysel-sustainingand

supportableorcesshouldbecommitted.

Documents

Lessons Learned in Peacekeeping Operations (2006)