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Lessons Learned
Cameroon Pilot for Community Organizing: The „Climate and Forest Protection Caravan“
Local e[r] with Volunteers Trainings / Greenpeace roles for community-‐based projects
Summary
The hard facts of this pilot project are as follows: • In 15 communities, 300 solar home systems were installed, 600 portable devices were sold, 30 villagers were trained,
10 green jobs were created, 60 volunteers were trained in community organizing and 50 in solar and efficiency techniques, and knowhow transfer to DRC was started.
• Invested resources: one GP-‐staff during 3 years, operational budget of 50-‐70 k€/year (solar trainings of 2 weeks cost about 10'000 €/each and community trainings of 2 -‐ 3 months about 30'000 €/each).
Further, the pilot project experienced quite a lot of successes, as well as challenges and failures, providing many lessons learned that others NROs might benefit from. One of the crucial factors, summarized as „trust is a must“, is challenging Greenpeace people because trust and capacity building depend on investments of time and training. To address this chal-‐lenge and to assure effective follow-‐up and scale-‐up, a reliable, capable partner(s) and a realistic business model are key. In order to build trust quite quickly, we recommend beginning with energy projects, since these bring immediate results, which in turn, helps to build trust and develop community organizing. We suggest doing this with a capable partner NGO. Since forestry or agricultural projects only show effects by mid-‐term, they should follow an „energy“ and „health“ phase. The role of Greenpeace as enabler in community organizing does not mean Greenpeace shouldn’t do implementation work in communities or stop doing political work, but it does mean that it is important to have a clear understanding of the realities at play. In addition, as GP engages in political work, this must be seen as an amendment, not a primary focus. It is not possible to take big leaps from scratch, but one can accelerate projects in other countries by making good use of the learnings offered by this pilot project.
Notes: 1. In addition to this compilation a documentation with reports, planning docs, photos, etc. is on wave.greenpeace.org (see links in chapter G). 2. For this final version local partners have given their feedback. Most of it has been integrated in this evaluation, however, there have been in seven points strongly differing points of view – they are marked in this document with blue fonts and separately documented in “Lessons Learned Cameroon Pilot Discussion”. A must to read for all working in the field, as some of those point out potentially conflict areas.
December. 2014, for internal use.
Lead: Christian Gyr, ex YSC coach Supervision: Kuno Roth, ex YSC coordinator
Inputs from: Crispin Assimbo Bosenge, GPAfrica and Bureau Executif, PODC
Cameroon Pilot – Lessons Learned 2
A. Background of the pilot project Since 2009, the PODC (Project for Organization and Development of Communities), also called Climate and Forest Solution Caravan, is running as a pilot project to reach out to remote, poor communities in the Congo Rainforest of Cameroon. Main objectives have been to develop a setting for working with remote communities in a sustainable way, allowing them to de-‐velop according to their needs. To be sustainable, development needs to come and grow from inside the community. Cameroon has been chosen because we thought it would be easier to develop and design a community organizing solution approach there rather than in the main campaign country, DR Congo, which is threatened by a civil war. But, Cameroon, has not been an easy place for development after all: In fact, it has been a big challenge to handle a project in a country rich in natural resources, with over 200 ethnics, but with widespread poverty, corruption, and effects of colonization still present. How far this environment had/s influence on the project is seen very differently (Feedback – Corruption, Ethnicity).
The pilot project was based on a concept paper, upon which former GPAf ED agreed and signed a MoU that was extended four times (although not always fulfilled, since point persons at GPAf changed five times). There have been/are four phases:
1. Enabling, analyzing, i.e. training people on two levels: Project staff/volunteers (high level), two “troubleshooters” from each village for maintenance, and performing diagnostics in villages through interviewing community members in a neutral, not influencing way (see methodology below).
2. Energy phase (led by GP in cooperation with three Cameroonian partners), 2012-‐2014, which has been delayed by more than an year: Implementation of the orders as outcome of the diagnostics, i.e. 300 solar home systems and 600 solar lights sold at a subsidized price.
3. Drinking water and health phase (2014/15; lead by Cameroonian NGO, no active GP role anymore) 4. Sustainable agriculture and forestry (TBD, including roles, planned from 2016 on).
For all phases, especially 3 and 4, it is thought to recruit an additional partner with the necessary specific knowhow. The role of Greenpeace was to actively lead the project in phases 1 and 2, a coaching role in phase 3. For future projects we would recommend being cautious in regard to taking on a leading role, and be well prepared. Some reasons why Greenpeace got involved in taking the leading role: To achieve knowhow in regard how community processes happen, to understand the system and in order to be able to transfer the knowhow to DR Congo. See Annex A, overview of outcomes, with transfer results in DRC (and in Senegal). By end of 2014, the project will be handed over during the health phase to Cameroonian hands, and GP will be phased out. This process is managed by a partner NGO, therefore, there is no longer any GP staff on-‐site, but GP will still have full access to knowhow and reports. The whole project in time overview (see more detailed phase-‐overview in annex B below):
2007 -‐ 2008 Two tree planting camps (kids for forests) 2008 Office opening in Kinshasa: Energy Exhibition, remit for proposal ED GPAf 2009 First energy training, first test in community work 2010 MoU GPAf, GPCH, GPYSC; 1st Community Training 2011 & 2012 Planning and implementation Energy Phase
Start transfer DRC, fundraising for first trainings Decision of phase-‐out GP by end of 2014
2013 Cam: Build up own project and organizational structure, handover to local partners to take lead. 2nd Community Training for project expansion. DRC: successful fundraising for transfer 2013 -‐ 2015
2014 Cam: Preparation of phase-‐out GP, phase-‐in partner NGO Solafrica. Fundraising efforts enforced DRC: Develop project, integrate into GPAf/DRC work
B. Methodology and its key take-‐away
1. Preliminary activities of the pilot project have been an energy training with about 30 trainees and practical community work in 33 communities in the North Region, implementing wood-‐efficient stoves. Based on these first experiences, a scientific methodology for community organizing, so-‐called “Psychosociocultural Methodology” was introduced through trainings conducted by Prof. Guilherme dos Santos Barboza, who, as Afro-‐Brazilian anthropologist, has developed and applied the method successfully in communities in the Amazon, in several South American countries and in India. For a short description of the methodology see here (a book is in preparation). The 15 pilot communities have been chosen by one of the partner organizations.
2. Starting point was the question, “How can a marginalized rural community be part of a local energy [r]evolution without just imposing “technical solutions”?”. Sustainability needs some time, but then will have a much higher
Cameroon Pilot – Lessons Learned 3
probability of lasting success. Our approach was, therefore, to embed technical solutions into an organizing process that comes from the within the communities. No external pace making, no impatient activism due to an external agenda that must be followed. Basically, it is a process to develop trust and mutual engagement.
3. The methodology is based on a threefold development: a) Developing Communities capacities for self-‐organization, b) developing technical, professional skills as well as an ethical frame in young volunteers for community organization and organizational development, c) developing organizations to be able to lead projects (HR management, trainings, fundraising, lobbying, controlling)
4. In a context of poverty, unemployment, poor governance etc., empowerment includes a three-‐steps process: a. Satisfy together with the community its needs and find solutions for its problems (energy, health, education,
housing, water, food production, commercialization, access, land & human rights, organization). One-‐dimensional solutions are unreliable and tend to destabilize communities instead of strengthening them.
b. Continuously inform and train the communities, assisting them in the practical implementation of solutions c. The long-‐term goal: Empower communities to organize their human and natural resources in order to achieve
good quality of life and a healthy environment. C. Outcomes In addition to the concrete results mentioned above, the Cameroon Pilot has achieved the following: 1. The Energy Ministry has become very interested in participatory approaches for rural electrification. Ongoing
discussions. 2. The Energy Ministry leads since 2013 a working group of enterprises that should get a full or partial tax exoneration for
solar materials. This working group has been introduced through the German Development Agency (GIZ), for which the concrete achievements and the approach of the Project have been a major inspiration.
3. A range of solar energy players are on the energy market trying to offer their services, some of them even in a social business manner. Most of them have been trained by the project.
4. National NGOs have taken advantage of trainings by recruiting ex-‐trainees. 5. Several NGOs working in communities have appreciated the Psychosociocultural Methodology used by the project.
Some have adopted community development terminology introduced by the pilot, however, it is not known whether as a guideline or just opportunistically for fundraising and profiling.
6. The project has introduced a methodology based on human values such as honesty, thoroughness, and solidarity. Counterforces are: the decade-‐old corrupt habits that have ravaged human values. As the fight against corruption and for human values is difficult anywhere: It requires thorough control, courageous staff and board members, and partners with courage, to be able to counter this phenomenon. The project is actually struggling to make this real change happening.
In summary, while the trainings have, all-‐in-‐all, been a success, the implementation in the respective communities has only been a partial success, with several communities having serious problems for financial recovery of the contributions. One of the main challenges has been to find the right partner NGO, which was quite impactful since Greenpeace doesn’t have an office in Cameroon. Quite a lot of problems were, therefore, resulted, on the one hand, by not having real knowledge of national NGOs and their functioning, and, on the other hand, by not having established efficient and transparent cooperation structures. This in turn, was a major reason for use and abuse of the cooperation, by Greenpeace that, in the view of our partners, used this cooperation to raise funds that did only partly come back to the project, by some of those NGOs having hidden agendas to use the Greenpeace brand for their own politics and benefit that was not intended nor approved by GP. Whether and if yes how far this has been the case is differently seen (see Feedback 2 -‐ Success).
All in all it was an unbelievable ‚up-‐and-‐down’ experience, from high pleasure and great satisfaction, to fears (health of staff), frustrations and feelings of powerlessness. To illustrate, the pilot project received very contrasting feedback, on the one hand statements such as: „They have been promising us since centuries that Jesus will rescue us and bring the brightness. Now you have come and brought us solar light, we are so happy about this.“ (Chief of a Baka community) and, on the other hand, court cases because some trainees turned out to be using unorthodox, little honest or even criminal practices, doing „own solar business“, jeopardizing the entire project for short-‐term personal benefit. For more about lessons learned, see below chapter E. D. How can Greenpeace contribute to the solution work without doing base work? The Greenpeace role (or roles) must be clear. It may change from the role in the beginning to a later “one-‐of-‐the-‐stakeholder”-‐role. There is an internal controversy about whether we at GP should be doing base work ourselves, and if yes, what exactly and how ling – and for what reason/s? E.g., for testing and the acquisition of knowhow for subsequent scaling
Cameroon Pilot – Lessons Learned 4
up of a program together with local partners? Or because we see GP as a part of a movement for change and must, like all others, be involved in base work? We suggest the former, because GP becomes only temporarily involved in base work, e.g. in the frame of trainings in communities, and can also get out of it, because a capable partner NGO is taking over. a) How can GP help move things forward without becoming eternally involved in base work in the villages? In other
words, how is it possible to prevent that GP’s resources will be absorbed in daily problems? The recipe is a capable, reliable partner that is working already with entire communities, wants to continue and is glad to amend its program with, e.g., energy, health and agriculture issues. An important criterion for the selection is that the NGO is stable, has a certain organizational development already done and has a controlled and working administration. Once there are irregular cash flows, one loses not only time and nerves, but also trust. We would recommend starting with a smaller activity, e.g. a training to get used and known to each other (a training, of course, in view of a common project that later on can start on a base of a MoU). b) What are the challenges? • Based on the model of the “double triangle” that becomes an open “double-‐funnel” allowing an exchange between the
“top” and the “bottom” (see Annex C), the crucial question is: “How deep does the (co-‐)catalyzer Greenpeace needs to dive into groundwork in order to know how and what to catalyze?”. Main Greenpeace role is in the interface of the bottom-‐up-‐top-‐down-‐double triangle/funnel, and GP needs to do the less ground work
o the better the partner is working and established o the less project starts with difficult or very remote communities o the more the trainer/s and the expert for the scientific survey are experienced.
• To become a “co-‐catalyzer” of real changes in communities, Greenpeace and its partners need to ensure that the trainer and the project manager are skilled and experienced people and that „independent“ finances, trustful accountability and a good cashing management is happening. Don’t start without having a reliable, trustworthy financial management system in place!
• Ownership is good, but it can become an over-‐responsibility and make one vulnerable, e.g. collaborators becoming over-‐engaged, „doing everything to avoid failure“ – with the result that partners know, at the end, he will arrange things. That means that partners can use or abuse GP’s high commitment, by sending hopeful as well as desperate signals to GP, that way influencing decisions and outcomes. Greenpeace’s tendency to high commitment goes hand in hand with a risk of miss-‐using that commitment by partners for more power or money etc..
• The art of the right size. The Cameroon pilot was too big in size, or more precisely: it involved too many poor communities in too remote areas. It has also been a false assumption that by seeing the results of the project, more finances will be offered or sponsors found.
• The GP identity of 2007 amended solutions as a new part of GP („driving solutions“), but this has not yet been put into action. The biggest internal challenge was, therefore, to have changing point persons at GPAfrica, with different attitudes toward this cultural change, from „This is not GP“ to „This is what we need as the new Yes-‐part of Greenpeace“.
• Problematic role was the one to be the organization with most responsibilities and drive. And since GP YSC was contributing quite a lot of resources in this pilot, we hardly had the liberty to slow down or stop. It is a dilemma: On the one side it is good to really do it in spite of all the problems and to keep on learning; on the other side one loses freedom of decision because of dependencies.
• A crucial moment is when the project lead should go the partners to assure long-‐term engagement/follow-‐up, and Greenpeace involvement is reduced or phased out. This transition is easier, the smaller the project, but scaling up is also a goal. If a new not national NGO is phased in for e.g. fundraising purposes, its profile needs to fit or project needs to be adapted – see below point E9, Solafrica.
c) What are the do’s and don’ts? • Do tests and take first steps with a community that is already a bit organized. First, develop setting and skills before
starting with additional challenges, such as a lot of poverty or very remote communities. To be able to jump or to take big steps, one needs solid ground. Thus, it is necessary to first form ground with some initial smaller activities to test and to build trust. The bigger step, the scaling up, will follow later. To make a small project bigger is easier than to make a big one smaller.
• Consider transport and logistical questions. Don’t start with too many impoverished, remote communities. • The way to scale up can be shortened through knowhow transfer, thanks to knowhow management and accessibility,
and a supply of experienced coaches and trainers. • GP may assure the mini-‐minimum budget to allow beginning working. After developing the project and implementing
some initial activities to test and/or develop the capability, additional funding needs to be found (but maybe it will just remain at this minimum, which is still much better than nothing).
• Instead of a technology focused method dare to use an innovative, reaching the roots approach by putting human beings in the center, teaching self-‐respect and responsibility and build on scientific accompaniment.
• Good roles: Bring people together (the brand helps) and be active part in capacity building.
Cameroon Pilot – Lessons Learned 5
• A difficult but very important issue is how to mount and how to promote solar business cases and „spin offs/start-‐ups“, as self-‐running systems that are by definition auto-‐financed. If it works. A GP role is certainly to make sure, that a business workshop is part of every training as a prerequisite. However, this is not enough. And: What is the role of
d) How to do Community Organizing as a Greenpeace office? There are two principle ways: • One can start quite big (e.g. several communities, maybe a region) if there is a capable partner and a high probability of
finding additional funding because of the good quality of the initial project activities. This assures to a certain degree a follow-‐up and a continuation of the work by broadening it to more communities.
• If this is not given, start smaller as we did it now in DRC, and gain knowhow, e.g. with small trainings as teasers and scaling up if the local population and organizations adhere, leading possibly and only later to community trainings, organized and led by local partners (role of GP tbd). For DRC transfer see chapter F.
E. Lessons learned and critical points
The pilot project showed (again) that building-‐up knowhow and trust, testing cooperation, and establishing project management is necessary and takes time: there are different speeds of the different stakeholders that have to be harmonized, i.e. short-‐term campaign wins are unlikely, but with profiting from these experiences, wins are possible in quite a relatively short amount of time (6 – 12 months). The pilot project also confirmed that it is crucial for sustainability to choose a needs-‐ and target group-‐oriented approach. A general error has been the permanent overuse of financial and human resources. A pilot must, by definition, be error friendly, i.e. including big buffers of resource-‐reserves in order to be able to steer, correct, and adapt (see Comment 3 -‐ implementation). More specific insights have been: E1: Use a needs-‐ and target oriented approach • The orientation of a target and needs oriented project should only be defined after careful evaluation of community
data, obtained through pre-‐diagnostic and diagnostic, discussed and validated in a participatory way with the community.
• The challenge lies in the interest conflict created by the campaign-‐agenda, the financial means available and the outcomes of community diagnostics, that might suggest a divergent orientation for the project. In the case of the Cameroon Pilot, need N°1 was Water, N°2 Health and N°3 Energy. It was a decision by the Project Partners and the Supervisor to choose Energy out of those 3 priorities, for mainly two reasons:
1. It was a subject, attractive enough for the main project driver Greenpeace, to invest more and sustain it for several years
2. It is a subject, where there is already a lot of know-‐how available inside Greenpeace and, with the former training activities, also inside Cameroon. It would be therefore cheaper to start with that, than for example with Water or Health.
• In conclusion, the project did not succeed in applying a 100% purely needs-‐oriented approach, mainly for financial considerations, assuring the sustainability of the project. (see Feedback 3 – Project Orientation)
E2: Start with the right issue(s) • To tackle health and energy problems is, in most cases, the best place to start as it brings “quick wins” for the
communities – success is a good motivator to stay on track. • Energy is a good starting point with potential for a grassroots movement: During the pilot, more and more interest to
participate has been flagged (10 municipalities, 300 communities applied to the project). Several opportunities for integration with larger campaign concepts: Sustainable Energy Regions, Local Energy Revolution, Green Villages, Green Skills, Sustainability University, Anti-‐Land grabbing coalition, Congo Forest Campaign, etc.
• Another entry point for community projects is to ally agriculture and energy. This would help to reduce the worries with payments in poor communities. So, it is important to think how to improve productivity and integrate income-‐generating activities into any health, water or energy-‐project. (See Feedback 4 – Project Steps)
E3: Use a dynamic approach for working with communities that allows learning for the Project and the Community Some lessons concerning the implementation steps, after evaluation with communities. • In general: Do regular community meetings or at least exchanges with the traditional leaders on the results of each
project step and not just consult them when problems occur during the implementation (see Feedback 5 – Methodology)
• During Diagnostic: Get information about the community organization in financial matters, integrate this information into the project implementation plan. Define a minimal contribution to achieve satisfactory results within the community and validate this before mobilizing funds and means for implementation with the community authorities.
Cameroon Pilot – Lessons Learned 6
• Before implementation: Explore and test correctly all technological and technical solutions on their robustness, functionality and warranty.
• Before Follow-‐up: Be sincere with communities and discuss durability of the material, how maintenance could be assured and how much this will cost.
• During Follow-‐up: Separate in the field strictly organizing work from financial recovery and technical maintenance work, to make it possible, that the field organizers can coach and accompany the community and stay in close contact with the community, even if the recovery and maintenance team is putting pressure on some reluctant community members to pay their contributions.
• During Follow-‐up: Make “maintenance” a priority by creating maintenance and recovery teams, that do follow-‐up work during their regular visits.
E4: Select the right communities to start with • In Cameroon too many communities were chosen with the wrong criteria of “most abandoned and poor”. This was
morally correct, but too big a challenge for a pilot: Less communities that are already a bit organized (e.g. in a fight against livelihood destruction) provide a better starting point and require a bit less time for trust building.
• Reflect carefully on “the system”, namely the community structure (organogram, rules, and attitudes), develop the common working methodology (philosophically, science-‐based approach on how to act towards beneficiaries), train community members selected by the community, and reflect on contextualization.
• Capacity-‐building is key: To catalyze solutions with communities means organizing and training. Find good trainers and partners, then there is a real chance of strengthening local civil society to bring forth sustainable solutions.
E5: Select the right trainees • In any case, carefully defining the target public(s) and selecting participants is very crucial (not just anyone who wants,
can participate). Define the deal clearly: „You get this, you give that“. Not anyone who wants to participate can do so. • A possible process for screening and selection of trainees or partner NGOs to send trainees:
o Get key volunteers, and if possible decision makers of partner NGOs to be trained o Observe all trainees at work, in the field, in the office, and attribute responsibilities to those with aptitudes, be
it in executive or administrative functions (project execution vs. project planning) o Invite those with proven reliability, aptitudes and contributions to the project, to become a project partner.
• Long-‐term volunteering in a harsh socio-‐economic environment is a very selective process that does not ensure keeping the good personal. There is a risk of brain drain in the project (what is also an indicator of the training quality) à preview a long-‐term strategy for recruitment and employment. Make CLEAR that trainees are not foreseen to be employed, but may have a higher chance in the work market and get options for social business.
• Founding a social solar enterprise with ex-‐trainees is a great idea, and is realistic as a spin off from trainings and community work (see documentation “Cameroon Solar Solution” enterprise), but not easy – see point Cc above.
E6: Find the right partner NGO(s) • Main actor for the base work is not GP, but local NGOs and citizens of the communities. GP’s role has to be determined,
according to the capacities and needs of NGO partners: As an enabler of trainings, political communicator etc. • Find those local NGOs that are reliable and able, ones that don’t just see in GP a money or brand giver (in countries
where GP has an office it is more likely to detect, control, and correct such attitudes). • How experienced are the partner NGOs, where do they stand in their organizational development? Determine together
the size of a first test or pilot – if it is too big, either there will no follow-‐up (which is most important part of the project) or you will continuously run after resources and become vulnerable to mistakes.
• Without enabling, „nothing“ will happen, i.e. enabling is a prerequisite, as well as a good opportunity to get in touch with partner(s). It is quite easy to manage a one-‐time event, but the more challenging thing is that trainings are kind of a kick-‐off (e.g. trainees may expect jobs), i.e. make sure that the partner organization is ready to „use“ the trained people and that the expectations are channeled to them, unless GP wants qualified volunteers.
• The right partners can become a great source of mobilization; enabling people and preparing them adequately for a task is the right thing to do for further participation and engagement.
• Fundraising: One of the goals that have not been achieved in the pilot was to raise funds through national/local partners for the project. One reason was that it was not worked seriously enough on this goal, i.e. there was no real(istic) plan to enable fundraising and invest enough human resources with longer term perspective.
E7: Find the right cooperation with the partner NGOs • Define clearly and comprehensibly the roles and tasks of each partner. This means:
a. Clear decision-‐making procedures that are accepted by all b. A cooperation contract, a Memorandum of Agreement, stating goals, purpose, working structure,
responsibilities, financial structure and conflict solution proceedings. • Before starting activities, be sure, the means are already available and accessible, and the Terms of Reference are clearly
Cameroon Pilot – Lessons Learned 7
defined and as transparent as possible, to prevent improvisations. • Clarify the contributions of each partner before starting an activity and agree upon a „Plan B“, to prevent confusion,
interest conflicts. • Make regular project progress meetings between the partners and discuss also what can be communicated towards the
target group to prevent raising expectations that might not be satisfied. • Inform the local Authorities before the project launch. • A cooperation is a dynamic organizational development process with roles of the partners changing with time:
a. A cooperation may start with Greenpeace being an active project contributor, may even be a co-‐leader. b. In a next step, selected and trained project staff takes over, by growing up in terms of functions and responsibili-‐
ties. Those responsible project leaders should be coached by the former project coordinator, and GP may continue to be part of the project steering committee.
c. A final step of such organizational development can be the founding of an independent project organization, fed by all partners.
• A major challenge lies in the „Ownership“ of the Project. Who owns it? After growing up, a project might become an organization on its own right or continue to be administratively attached to one of the partners. There are advantages for both forms:
a. Administratively attached to a local partner. Advantages are: empowers local partner, creates quickly the necessary institutional and legal frame for the project, local partner network can easily be used. Disadvantages are: project very dependent on partner dynamics and ways of administration and management (particularly risky, if inside the partner organization unorthodox and unprofessional practices prevail).
b. Organization on its own right: Advantages are: project values and abilities, trained and introduced during the project as innovations, are more likely to be maintained, for, an independent organization needs to develop its own values and organizational culture. More partners are likely to contribute to the success of such a structure, because they would be co-‐owners. Disadvantages: It requires some big efforts to found and build a totally new structure. A local partner will not be as much interested to “incubate” such a new structure instead of just a new project in their own structure, strengthening their organization and enlarging their portfolio.
c. In conclusion: In the beginning of a project, the advantages may outweigh possible inconveniences. But, after having established a project structure, methodology, trained staff, planning, implementation, community contacts and showing some successes, the project could probably profit more from an independent institutional and legal framework. Such a frame, of course, may include all local partners as owners and contributors, in order to profit from networks and in order to continue to feedback with trainings and employments to the contributing local organizations.
d. Be aware that this question can lead to a great challenge, when Greenpeace leaves the project, and the adminis-‐trative organization may use its independence to become “owner” of the project, in spite of preliminary decisions. To counter such developments and secure common achievements, suggestion is that Greenpeace continues as part of e.g. the steering body, and before phasing out financial support to accompany organizational consolidation in the direction of the common decision.
e. Finances: A crucial and sensitive issue that has to be addressed early to assure minimal funding, including options how to assure it (see above “fundraising”, E6).
E8: Some basics • Solution work provides potentials and opportunities to involve formal and traditional authorities that would otherwise
have the power to hinder a project, and threaten the security of project staff. It is key to have a communication behavior that stresses concrete achievements of projects, leaving out any reference to systemic change and criticism and maybe even to human rights and community organization – i.e.. “Seducing, not provoking power.”
• Psychosocial effects of colonialism on cooperation: The “white man” may be “used” for projections such as savior, colonialist, or racist. This can lead to a number of critical behaviors within the broad range between seeing a white person as money-‐purse as well as entrance door to Europe and seeing a white project coordinator as impostor and discriminative who is abusing his power. On the reverse side, Africans can be projection screens for all kind of saviors, idealists, or missionaries. In this field of projections and counter-‐projections, of prejudices and stereotypes, it seems to be rare and difficult to establish a normal relationship between human beings of different origins. It would be a lie to say that everybody has been totally conscious about wishes and expectations and managed to establish always a sincere honest dialogue. This intercultural challenge is impeding the project’s progress, and makes a periodical critical revision of roles, competences and attitudes between partners necessary. How far and in which suggested role/s such prejudices have played a mayor role is seen differently (see Feedback 6 – Intercultural Dialogue).
• Socio-‐political and economic history and context (poverty, insecurity, militarization of daily life) greatly influences the psychological pre-‐dispositions of local staff, organizations and civil society, and can, therefore, be a main obstacle for an integrative human approach that wants to overome corruption and absence of trust, ethno-‐centrism, nepotism, egocentrism etc. energy [r]evolution as real change must pass through a re-‐installation of human values. While all
Cameroon Pilot – Lessons Learned 8
agree about the importance of values, but what this means in practice, the points of view differ (see Feedback 7 – Project Values and Ownership)
E9: Greenpeace internals, and phase-‐out • Internal acceptance @Greenpeace: Adaptation to a new culture takes time. The new Greenpeace will be confronted
with the old GP saying, „But solution work is not GP“ for a long time. (So it was @GPAf, where in four years of project work we have had five point persons with different attitudes towards the “Yes-‐part” of Greenpeace). Starting point or dilemma: ‚Greenpeace is not a development organization’, vs. „It is all about sustainable development what we are doing. There are just different ways for rich and poor countries’“.
• A new type of campaigner may be needed, one who is not too much “urgency-‐driven”, with good negotiation, social and facilitation skills as well as knowledge of human beings.
• If “phasing-‐out Greenpeace” means to phase-‐in another partner that is international or not-‐national, its role must be clarified and accepted before it starts to work. In case of Solafrica, Swiss NGO for energy and fundraising purposes, it was too much of a burden to cover all issues that have been planned, i.e. for not-‐energy issues another, specialized partner for a certain issue is needed.
F. Transfer to DRC: Added values for GPAf/DRC from the solar community work In spite of the problems in Cameroon, learnings and knowhow have started to be transferred to DR Congo – together with two Congolese trained in Cameroon in solar technics and the community methodology. There are obviously several added values for the Greenpeace Forest campaign in DRC. In the words of the Country Manager: „The solar project is vital for us here. We want a strong package to be able to propose practical solutions to communities as a response to any allegation towards GP do not address community needs.” Therefore added values may be: a. It helps communities relieve pressure on the forest in terms of the amount of wood they need for the cooking, and
improving their livelihood. b. The image that Greenpeace is working actively on solutions, together with communities is tangible, and convinces that
GP is not just saying „no“. c. Acknowledgments from communities that GP is working for and with them (although not daily implementation work,
this fosters resilience in the communities) d. Attracts engaged and enabled volunteers, and gives them perspectives through engagement (e.g. spin offs solar micro
enterprises) and new green jobs for villagers. e. Good for fundraising and media work (two Swiss foundation financing the GP share of the project) G. Steps of a “Community-‐Based e[r]”: Documents, Links Step Docs*
I. Understand needs and potentials of a community A) How to prepare a community-‐based project II. Establish trusting relations with the community, by respecting the village
hierarchy and leaders, as well as traditional decision making III. Establish common rules for the project and the activities
a. Define the deal together: What does every partner (community, trainee, NGO, GP) give and receive, best clarified with a written agreement.
b. Any engagement is considered a serious commitment, a word is a word to be respected and to be relied upon
c. Any disrespect towards community or project members will be treated immediately by a mixed commission project-‐community, and measures will be applied
d. Being sober and proper is a minimal sign of respect and minimal requirement for the community to be part of the project
B) How to strengthen the community organization
IV. Accompany decision making and reinforce participation of women, youth, and elders to get all potentials to work for a common community goal
V. Train field technicians and community leaders in the methodology of community organizing, its values, its vision and its approach.
C) How to train youth in community organizing (Several articles and poster, reports about trainings, film links, planning docs)
VI. Train capable solar energy (or water, agroforestry etc.) technicians on the project and at the organizational as well as the community level
D) How to organize and execute a community training or training for trainers
VII. Introduce an empowering follow-‐up: i) a community-‐based or local E) How to do the follow-‐up in
Cameroon Pilot – Lessons Learned 9
maintenance and cashing system, ii) continuous community education through information, trainings and coaching on priority issues, preparing that way their implementation
communities
VIII. Involve administrative authorities of the first level: Municipality and District governmental representatives, if possible for mutual action (very often not possible), but at least to accept the project
F) How to work with governmental administration
IX. Coach project organization in Administration, HR, Fundraising etc. G) How to administrate a project with several partners
X. Find a business model to solve the energy access for communities, allowing the use of the same funds to achieve more impact
H) How to found and build a Social Business
* Find documents on WAVE.greenpeace.org (under construction, ready by end of Dec. 2014) For a more intuitive understanding, see the following films: From Cameroon: http://wave.greenpeace.org/waveV2public/content/climate-‐forest-‐solution-‐caravan-‐cameroon-‐podc-‐community-‐organizing From DRC (installation solar generator for radio station and wood-‐efficient stoves): French: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7_omm1E1zoY ; English: https://www.youtube.com/user/Youth4Renewables
Annexes A) Facts & Figures of Project in Cameroon, and transfer countries DRC and Senegal (by July 2014)
Cameroon Pilot – Lessons Learned 10
B) Time plan – The Phases of the Cameroon Pilot, 2009 – 2014
Time / Phase Sub phase Milestones / key activities 2006 Initiation
Precursors Decision that Greenpeace will open office in Africa, and GP Switzerland one of the big internal money giver. And since Africa with more then 50% of the population is younger then 20, youth & solutions projects have be on the plan from beginning on; that’s why GPCH and YSC have been asked to test, youth activities.
2007 & 2008 Tests Two Kids for Forests tree planting camps with CED; national NGO with whom GP has been working since several years
Nov. 2008 to Jan. 2009
Internal Lobbying / The energy workshop @office opening Kinshasa showed plastically how people can be involved through demonstrations & trainings, with the outcome of a remit for concept with (a) „No hit and run“ (ED GPAf), (b) work with remote communities in Congo forest
Feb. 2009 Planning …
Analysis – > Goal Formulation, ideas for concept; green light for a test
One important baseline: Not to do just “technical implementation”, but real change by embedding technical solutions into an organizing process that comes from the inside of the communities: No external pace making and impatient activism … -‐> Proposal consisting of big picture & goals, but to start with a training)
June 2009 … and deve-‐lopment
Evaluation: Adapted Strategy –> Pilot proposal
• Training: Demand? Quality? Manageable? Partner check ... • Test community work in the very north of Cameroon • Revision of plan and come up with a pilot proposal upon which a MoU GP Africa, GP
Switzerland and GP YSC for three years was signed. April 2010 Implementa-‐tion March 2012
Start pilot – lots of revisions necessary
Community training, diagnostic, energy refresh course, training of community representants (2 per com.), etc. Critical points during the 4 years pilot: • Staff turnover GPAf: In 4 years 5 point persons with different attitudes towards project • „Sudden decisions by matter of fact situation“, e.g. change of main partner, or to
work in 15 communities instead of 7 • Install pay-‐back system for solar material (was not for free) Start transfer DRC, first trainings during 2012 (see separate docs)
Nov. 2012 Running system – hand over
Decision taking: phase out & hand-‐over
Decision was taken @workshop with GPAf, GP Congo campaign, GP YSC to phase-‐out GP by end of 2014 and hand-‐over of project to Cameroonian partner during end of energy-‐phase and start health project phase ... who is responsible for the new structure, employees, how to assure minimum funding? Etc. –> New foreign NGO partner was found (Solafrica) to assure minimal funding -‐> DRC: Money found for further transfer further and continue
2013: Finishing Energy Phase
Preparation Implementation Evaluation
Energy implementation phase was delayed due namely to problems in cashing Start of spin off Cameroonian Solar Solution CSS, and separate it from non-‐profit part. Try to build-‐up capacity of the leading national NGO in terms of project management and administration
Jul. 2013 to 2014
Handover lead to Cameroonian staff
Project lead by Cameroonian staff, trained in the project, employed by the leading NGO (together with 4 staff), coached by former project leader
C) Double Triangle -‐> Double Funnel
Graph for bottom-up and top-down hand shake
a) No hand shakebetween political level (top-down) andcommunity level (bottom-up)
Situation: The Top-Downers are flying overand only see the forest, the Bottom-Uppersonly see the trees.
b) With handshake, i.e. with interaction,i.e. both levels being aware that both are needed: the Top-Downers see that they get fertilizer from the soil for their political struggle, and the Bottom-Uppers needthis support for real change, that is notonly single case. GP as facilitator and bring stakeholders together.
«Community organizing» where strategy meets withneeds from grassroots e.g. through common trainings,
lighthouse installations, workshops etc.
Grassroot level – e.g. real change in communities
Political level - strategy