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Lessons Learned Cameroon Pilot for Community Organizing: The „Climate and Forest Protection Caravan“ Local e[r] with Volunteers Trainings / Greenpeace roles for communitybased projects Summary The hard facts of this pilot project are as follows: In 15 communities, 300 solar home systems were installed, 600 portable devices were sold, 30 villagers were trained, 10 green jobs were created, 60 volunteers were trained in community organizing and 50 in solar and efficiency techniques, and knowhow transfer to DRC was started. Invested resources: one GPstaff during 3 years, operational budget of 5070 k€/year (solar trainings of 2 weeks cost about 10'000 €/each and community trainings of 2 3 months about 30'000 €/each). Further, the pilot project experienced quite a lot of successes, as well as challenges and failures, providing many lessons learned that others NROs might benefit from. One of the crucial factors, summarized as „trust is a must“, is challenging Greenpeace people because trust and capacity building depend on investments of time and training. To address this chal lenge and to assure effective followup and scaleup, a reliable, capable partner(s) and a realistic business model are key. In order to build trust quite quickly, we recommend beginning with energy projects, since these bring immediate results, which in turn, helps to build trust and develop community organizing. We suggest doing this with a capable partner NGO. Since forestry or agricultural projects only show effects by midterm, they should follow an „energy“ and „health“ phase. The role of Greenpeace as enabler in community organizing does not mean Greenpeace shouldn’t do implementation work in communities or stop doing political work, but it does mean that it is important to have a clear understanding of the realities at play. In addition, as GP engages in political work, this must be seen as an amendment, not a primary focus. It is not possible to take big leaps from scratch, but one can accelerate projects in other countries by making good use of the learnings offered by this pilot project. Notes: 1. In addition to this compilation a documentation with reports, planning docs, photos, etc. is on wave.greenpeace.org (see links in chapter G). 2. For this final version local partners have given their feedback. Most of it has been integrated in this evaluation, however, there have been in seven points strongly differing points of view – they are marked in this document with blue fonts and separately documented in “Lessons Learned Cameroon Pilot Discussion”. A must to read for all working in the field, as some of those point out potentially conflict areas. December. 2014, for internal use. Lead: Christian Gyr, ex YSC coach Supervision: Kuno Roth, ex YSC coordinator Inputs from: Crispin Assimbo Bosenge, GPAfrica and Bureau Executif, PODC

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Lessons  Learned  

   

Cameroon  Pilot  for  Community  Organizing:  The  „Climate  and  Forest  Protection  Caravan“    

   

Local  e[r]  with  Volunteers  Trainings  /  Greenpeace  roles  for  community-­‐based  projects    

   

Summary      

The  hard  facts  of  this  pilot  project  are  as  follows:    • In  15  communities,  300  solar  home  systems  were  installed,  600  portable  devices  were  sold,  30  villagers  were  trained,  

10   green   jobs   were   created,   60   volunteers   were   trained   in   community   organizing   and   50   in   solar   and   efficiency  techniques,  and  knowhow  transfer  to  DRC  was  started.  

• Invested  resources:  one  GP-­‐staff  during  3  years,  operational  budget  of  50-­‐70  k€/year  (solar  trainings  of  2  weeks  cost  about  10'000  €/each  and  community  trainings  of  2  -­‐  3  months  about  30'000  €/each).  

 

Further,   the  pilot  project  experienced  quite  a   lot  of   successes,  as  well  as  challenges  and   failures,  providing  many   lessons  learned   that  others  NROs  might  benefit   from.  One  of   the   crucial   factors,   summarized  as   „trust   is   a  must“,   is   challenging  Greenpeace  people  because  trust  and  capacity  building  depend  on  investments  of  time  and  training.  To  address  this  chal-­‐lenge  and  to  assure  effective  follow-­‐up  and  scale-­‐up,  a  reliable,  capable  partner(s)  and  a  realistic  business  model  are  key.  In  order  to  build  trust  quite  quickly,  we  recommend  beginning  with  energy  projects,  since  these  bring   immediate  results,  which  in  turn,  helps  to  build  trust  and  develop  community  organizing.  We  suggest  doing  this  with  a  capable  partner  NGO.  Since  forestry  or  agricultural  projects  only  show  effects  by  mid-­‐term,  they  should  follow  an  „energy“  and  „health“  phase.  The  role  of  Greenpeace  as  enabler  in  community  organizing  does  not  mean  Greenpeace  shouldn’t  do  implementation  work  in   communities   or   stop   doing   political  work,   but   it   does  mean   that   it   is   important   to   have   a   clear   understanding   of   the  realities  at  play.  In  addition,  as  GP  engages  in  political  work,  this  must  be  seen  as  an  amendment,  not  a  primary  focus.  It   is  not  possible  to  take  big  leaps  from  scratch,  but  one  can  accelerate  projects  in  other  countries  by  making  good  use  of  the  learnings  offered  by  this  pilot  project.  

Notes:   1.  In  addition  to  this  compilation  a  documentation  with  reports,  planning  docs,  photos,  etc.  is  on  wave.greenpeace.org  (see  links  in  chapter  G).  2.  For  this  final  version  local  partners  have  given  their  feedback.  Most  of  it  has  been  integrated  in  this  evaluation,  however,  there  have  been  in  seven   points   strongly   differing   points   of   view   –   they   are  marked   in   this   document  with   blue   fonts   and   separately   documented   in   “Lessons  Learned  Cameroon  Pilot  Discussion”.  A  must  to  read  for  all  working  in  the  field,  as  some  of  those  point  out  potentially  conflict  areas.    

   

December.  2014,  for  internal  use.  

  Lead:  Christian  Gyr,  ex  YSC  coach    Supervision:  Kuno  Roth,  ex  YSC  coordinator  

Inputs  from:  Crispin  Assimbo  Bosenge,  GPAfrica  and  Bureau  Executif,  PODC

Cameroon Pilot – Lessons Learned 2

 

A.  Background  of  the  pilot  project    Since  2009,  the  PODC  (Project  for  Organization  and  Development  of  Communities),  also  called  Climate  and  Forest  Solution  Caravan,  is  running  as  a  pilot  project  to  reach  out  to  remote,  poor  communities  in  the  Congo  Rainforest  of  Cameroon.  Main  objectives  have  been  to  develop  a  setting  for  working  with  remote  communities  in  a  sustainable  way,  allowing  them  to  de-­‐velop  according  to  their  needs.  To  be  sustainable,  development  needs  to  come  and  grow  from  inside  the  community.      Cameroon  has  been  chosen  because  we  thought  it  would  be  easier  to  develop  and  design  a  community  organizing  solution  approach  there  rather  than  in  the  main  campaign  country,  DR  Congo,  which  is  threatened  by  a  civil  war.  But,  Cameroon,  has  not  been  an  easy  place  for  development  after  all:  In  fact,  it  has  been  a  big  challenge  to  handle  a  project  in  a  country  rich  in  natural  resources,  with  over  200  ethnics,  but  with  widespread  poverty,  corruption,  and  effects  of  colonization  still  present.  How  far  this  environment  had/s  influence  on  the  project  is  seen  very  differently  (Feedback    –  Corruption,  Ethnicity).  

The  pilot  project  was  based  on  a  concept  paper,  upon  which  former  GPAf  ED  agreed  and  signed  a  MoU  that  was  extended  four  times  (although  not  always  fulfilled,  since  point  persons  at  GPAf  changed  five  times).  There  have  been/are  four  phases:    

1. Enabling,  analyzing,  i.e.  training  people  on  two  levels:  Project  staff/volunteers  (high  level),  two  “troubleshooters”  from  each  village  for  maintenance,  and  performing  diagnostics  in  villages  through  interviewing  community  members  in  a  neutral,  not  influencing  way  (see  methodology  below).    

2. Energy  phase  (led  by  GP  in  cooperation  with  three  Cameroonian  partners),  2012-­‐2014,  which  has  been  delayed  by  more  than  an  year:  Implementation  of  the  orders  as  outcome  of  the  diagnostics,  i.e.  300  solar  home  systems  and  600  solar  lights  sold  at  a  subsidized  price.    

3. Drinking  water  and  health  phase  (2014/15;  lead  by  Cameroonian  NGO,  no  active  GP  role  anymore)  4. Sustainable  agriculture  and  forestry  (TBD,  including  roles,  planned  from  2016  on).  

For  all  phases,  especially  3  and  4,  it  is  thought  to  recruit  an  additional  partner  with  the  necessary  specific  knowhow.    The  role  of  Greenpeace  was  to  actively  lead  the  project  in  phases  1  and  2,  a  coaching  role  in  phase  3.  For  future  projects  we  would  recommend  being  cautious  in  regard  to  taking  on  a  leading  role,  and  be  well  prepared.  Some  reasons  why  Greenpeace  got  involved  in  taking  the  leading  role:  To  achieve  knowhow  in  regard  how  community  processes  happen,  to  understand  the  system  and  in  order  to  be  able  to  transfer  the  knowhow  to  DR  Congo.  See  Annex  A,  overview  of  outcomes,  with  transfer  results  in  DRC  (and  in  Senegal).    By  end  of  2014,  the  project  will  be  handed  over  during  the  health  phase  to  Cameroonian  hands,  and  GP  will  be  phased  out.  This  process  is  managed  by  a  partner  NGO,  therefore,  there  is  no  longer  any  GP  staff  on-­‐site,  but  GP  will  still  have  full  access  to  knowhow  and  reports.    The  whole  project  in  time  overview  (see  more  detailed  phase-­‐overview  in  annex  B  below):    

2007  -­‐  2008   Two  tree  planting  camps  (kids  for  forests) 2008   Office  opening  in  Kinshasa:  Energy  Exhibition,  remit  for  proposal  ED  GPAf 2009   First  energy  training,  first  test  in  community  work 2010   MoU  GPAf,  GPCH,  GPYSC;  1st  Community  Training 2011  &  2012   Planning  and  implementation  Energy  Phase  

Start  transfer  DRC,  fundraising  for  first  trainings    Decision  of  phase-­‐out  GP  by  end  of  2014

2013   Cam:  Build  up  own  project  and  organizational  structure,  handover  to  local  partners  to  take  lead.  2nd  Community  Training  for  project  expansion.  DRC:  successful  fundraising  for  transfer  2013  -­‐  2015

2014   Cam:  Preparation  of  phase-­‐out  GP,  phase-­‐in  partner  NGO  Solafrica.  Fundraising  efforts  enforced  DRC:  Develop  project,  integrate  into  GPAf/DRC  work

 

 

B.  Methodology  and  its  key  take-­‐away      

1. Preliminary  activities  of  the  pilot  project  have  been  an  energy  training  with  about  30  trainees  and  practical  community  work  in  33  communities  in  the  North  Region,  implementing  wood-­‐efficient  stoves.  Based  on  these  first  experiences,  a  scientific  methodology  for  community  organizing,  so-­‐called  “Psychosociocultural  Methodology”  was  introduced  through  trainings  conducted  by  Prof.  Guilherme  dos  Santos  Barboza,  who,  as  Afro-­‐Brazilian  anthropologist,  has  developed  and  applied  the  method  successfully  in  communities  in  the  Amazon,  in  several  South  American  countries  and  in  India.  For  a  short  description  of  the  methodology  see  here  (a  book  is  in  preparation).  The  15  pilot  communities  have  been  chosen  by  one  of  the  partner  organizations.  

2. Starting  point  was  the  question,  “How  can  a  marginalized  rural  community  be  part  of  a  local  energy  [r]evolution  without  just  imposing  “technical  solutions”?”.  Sustainability  needs  some  time,  but  then  will  have  a  much  higher  

Cameroon Pilot – Lessons Learned 3

probability  of  lasting  success.  Our  approach  was,  therefore,  to  embed  technical  solutions  into  an  organizing  process  that  comes  from  the  within  the  communities.  No  external  pace  making,  no  impatient  activism  due  to  an  external  agenda  that  must  be  followed.  Basically,  it  is  a  process  to  develop  trust  and  mutual  engagement.    

3. The  methodology  is  based  on  a  threefold  development:  a)  Developing  Communities  capacities  for  self-­‐organization,  b)  developing  technical,  professional  skills  as  well  as  an  ethical  frame  in  young  volunteers  for  community  organization  and  organizational  development,  c)  developing  organizations  to  be  able  to  lead  projects  (HR  management,  trainings,  fundraising,  lobbying,  controlling)  

4. In  a  context  of  poverty,  unemployment,  poor  governance  etc.,  empowerment  includes  a  three-­‐steps  process:    a. Satisfy  together  with  the  community  its  needs  and  find  solutions  for  its  problems  (energy,  health,  education,  

housing,  water,  food  production,  commercialization,  access,  land  &  human  rights,  organization).  One-­‐dimensional  solutions  are  unreliable  and  tend  to  destabilize  communities  instead  of  strengthening  them.  

b. Continuously  inform  and  train  the  communities,  assisting  them  in  the  practical  implementation  of  solutions  c. The  long-­‐term  goal:  Empower  communities  to  organize  their  human  and  natural  resources  in  order  to  achieve  

good  quality  of  life  and  a  healthy  environment.      C.  Outcomes    In  addition  to  the  concrete  results  mentioned  above,  the  Cameroon  Pilot  has  achieved  the  following:      1. The  Energy  Ministry  has  become  very  interested  in  participatory  approaches  for  rural  electrification.  Ongoing  

discussions.    2. The  Energy  Ministry  leads  since  2013  a  working  group  of  enterprises  that  should  get  a  full  or  partial  tax  exoneration  for  

solar  materials.  This  working  group  has  been  introduced  through  the  German  Development  Agency  (GIZ),  for  which  the  concrete  achievements  and  the  approach  of  the  Project  have  been  a  major  inspiration.  

3. A  range  of  solar  energy  players  are  on  the  energy  market  trying  to  offer  their  services,  some  of  them  even  in  a  social  business  manner.  Most  of  them  have  been  trained  by  the  project.  

4. National  NGOs  have  taken  advantage  of  trainings  by  recruiting  ex-­‐trainees.    5. Several  NGOs  working  in  communities  have  appreciated  the  Psychosociocultural  Methodology  used  by  the  project.  

Some  have  adopted  community  development  terminology  introduced  by  the  pilot,  however,  it  is  not  known  whether  as  a  guideline  or  just  opportunistically  for  fundraising  and  profiling.  

6. The  project  has  introduced  a  methodology  based  on  human  values  such  as  honesty,  thoroughness,  and  solidarity.  Counterforces  are:  the  decade-­‐old  corrupt  habits  that  have  ravaged  human  values.  As  the  fight  against  corruption  and  for  human  values  is  difficult  anywhere:  It  requires  thorough  control,  courageous  staff  and  board  members,  and  partners  with  courage,  to  be  able  to  counter  this  phenomenon.  The  project  is  actually  struggling  to  make  this  real  change  happening.  

 In  summary,  while  the  trainings  have,  all-­‐in-­‐all,  been  a  success,  the  implementation  in  the  respective  communities  has  only  been  a  partial  success,  with  several  communities  having  serious  problems  for  financial  recovery  of  the  contributions.  One  of  the  main  challenges  has  been  to  find  the  right  partner  NGO,  which  was  quite  impactful  since  Greenpeace  doesn’t  have  an  office  in  Cameroon.  Quite  a  lot  of  problems  were,  therefore,  resulted,  on  the  one  hand,  by  not  having  real  knowledge  of  national  NGOs  and  their  functioning,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  by  not  having  established  efficient  and  transparent  cooperation  structures.  This  in  turn,  was  a  major  reason  for  use  and  abuse  of  the  cooperation,  by  Greenpeace  that,  in  the  view  of  our  partners,  used  this  cooperation  to  raise  funds  that  did  only  partly  come  back  to  the  project,  by  some  of  those  NGOs  having  hidden  agendas  to  use  the  Greenpeace  brand  for  their  own  politics  and  benefit  that  was  not  intended  nor  approved  by  GP.  Whether  and  if  yes  how  far  this  has  been  the  case  is  differently  seen  (see  Feedback  2  -­‐  Success).  

All  in  all  it  was  an  unbelievable  ‚up-­‐and-­‐down’  experience,  from  high  pleasure  and  great  satisfaction,  to  fears  (health  of  staff),  frustrations  and  feelings  of  powerlessness.  To  illustrate,  the  pilot  project  received  very  contrasting  feedback,  on  the  one  hand  statements  such  as:  „They  have  been  promising  us  since  centuries  that  Jesus  will  rescue  us  and  bring  the  brightness.  Now  you  have  come  and  brought  us  solar  light,  we  are  so  happy  about  this.“  (Chief  of  a  Baka  community)  and,  on  the  other  hand,  court  cases  because  some  trainees  turned  out  to  be  using  unorthodox,  little  honest  or  even  criminal  practices,  doing  „own  solar  business“,  jeopardizing  the  entire  project  for  short-­‐term  personal  benefit.  For  more  about  lessons  learned,  see  below  chapter  E. D.  How  can  Greenpeace  contribute  to  the  solution  work  without  doing  base  work?    The  Greenpeace  role  (or  roles)  must  be  clear.  It  may  change  from  the  role  in  the  beginning  to  a  later  “one-­‐of-­‐the-­‐stakeholder”-­‐role.  There  is  an  internal  controversy  about  whether  we  at  GP  should  be  doing  base  work  ourselves,  and  if  yes,  what  exactly  and  how  ling  –  and  for  what  reason/s?  E.g.,  for  testing  and  the  acquisition  of  knowhow  for  subsequent  scaling  

Cameroon Pilot – Lessons Learned 4

up  of  a  program  together  with  local  partners?  Or  because  we  see  GP  as  a  part  of  a  movement  for  change  and  must,  like  all  others,  be  involved  in  base  work?  We  suggest  the  former,  because  GP  becomes  only  temporarily  involved  in  base  work,  e.g.  in  the  frame  of  trainings  in  communities,  and  can  also  get  out  of  it,  because  a  capable  partner  NGO  is  taking  over.    a) How  can  GP  help  move  things  forward  without  becoming  eternally  involved  in  base  work  in  the  villages?  In  other  

words,  how  is  it  possible  to  prevent  that  GP’s  resources  will  be  absorbed  in  daily  problems?  The  recipe  is  a  capable,  reliable  partner  that  is  working  already  with  entire  communities,  wants  to  continue  and  is  glad  to  amend  its  program  with,  e.g.,  energy,  health  and  agriculture  issues.  An  important  criterion  for  the  selection  is  that  the  NGO  is  stable,  has  a  certain  organizational  development  already  done  and  has  a  controlled  and  working  administration.  Once  there  are  irregular  cash  flows,  one  loses  not  only  time  and  nerves,  but  also  trust.  We  would  recommend  starting  with  a  smaller  activity,  e.g.  a  training  to  get  used  and  known  to  each  other  (a  training,  of  course,  in  view  of  a  common  project  that  later  on  can  start  on  a  base  of  a  MoU).      b) What  are  the  challenges?    • Based  on  the  model  of  the  “double  triangle”  that  becomes  an  open  “double-­‐funnel”  allowing  an  exchange  between  the  

“top”  and  the  “bottom”  (see  Annex  C),  the  crucial  question  is:  “How  deep  does  the  (co-­‐)catalyzer  Greenpeace  needs  to  dive  into  groundwork  in  order  to  know  how  and  what  to  catalyze?”.  Main  Greenpeace  role  is  in  the  interface  of  the  bottom-­‐up-­‐top-­‐down-­‐double  triangle/funnel,  and  GP  needs  to  do  the  less  ground  work  

o the  better  the  partner  is  working  and  established  o the  less  project  starts  with  difficult  or  very  remote  communities  o the  more  the  trainer/s  and  the  expert  for  the  scientific  survey  are  experienced.  

• To  become  a  “co-­‐catalyzer”  of  real  changes  in  communities,  Greenpeace  and  its  partners  need  to  ensure  that  the  trainer  and  the  project  manager  are  skilled  and  experienced  people  and  that  „independent“  finances,  trustful  accountability  and  a  good  cashing  management  is  happening.  Don’t  start  without  having  a  reliable,  trustworthy  financial  management  system  in  place!  

• Ownership  is  good,  but  it  can  become  an  over-­‐responsibility  and  make  one  vulnerable,  e.g.  collaborators  becoming  over-­‐engaged,  „doing  everything  to  avoid  failure“  –  with  the  result  that  partners  know,  at  the  end,  he  will  arrange  things.  That  means  that  partners  can  use  or  abuse  GP’s  high  commitment,  by  sending  hopeful  as  well  as  desperate  signals  to  GP,  that  way  influencing  decisions  and  outcomes.  Greenpeace’s  tendency  to  high  commitment  goes  hand  in  hand  with  a  risk  of  miss-­‐using  that  commitment  by  partners  for  more  power  or  money  etc..    

• The  art  of  the  right  size.  The  Cameroon  pilot  was  too  big  in  size,  or  more  precisely:  it  involved  too  many  poor  communities  in  too  remote  areas.  It  has  also  been  a  false  assumption  that  by  seeing  the  results  of  the  project,  more  finances  will  be  offered  or  sponsors  found.    

• The  GP  identity  of  2007  amended  solutions  as  a  new  part  of  GP  („driving  solutions“),  but  this  has  not  yet  been  put  into  action.  The  biggest  internal  challenge  was,  therefore,  to  have  changing  point  persons  at  GPAfrica,  with  different  attitudes  toward  this  cultural  change,  from  „This  is  not  GP“  to  „This  is  what  we  need  as  the  new  Yes-­‐part  of  Greenpeace“.  

• Problematic  role  was  the  one  to  be  the  organization  with  most  responsibilities  and  drive.  And  since  GP  YSC  was  contributing  quite  a  lot  of  resources  in  this  pilot,  we  hardly  had  the  liberty  to  slow  down  or  stop.  It  is  a  dilemma:  On  the  one  side  it  is  good  to  really  do  it  in  spite  of  all  the  problems  and  to  keep  on  learning;  on  the  other  side  one  loses  freedom  of  decision  because  of  dependencies.  

• A  crucial  moment  is  when  the  project  lead  should  go  the  partners  to  assure  long-­‐term  engagement/follow-­‐up,  and  Greenpeace  involvement  is  reduced  or  phased  out.  This  transition  is  easier,  the  smaller  the  project,  but  scaling  up  is  also  a  goal.  If  a  new  not  national  NGO  is  phased  in  for  e.g.  fundraising  purposes,  its  profile  needs  to  fit  or  project  needs  to  be  adapted  –  see  below  point  E9,  Solafrica.    

 c) What  are  the  do’s  and  don’ts?  • Do  tests  and  take  first  steps  with  a  community  that  is  already  a  bit  organized.  First,  develop  setting  and  skills  before  

starting  with  additional  challenges,  such  as  a  lot  of  poverty  or  very  remote  communities.  To  be  able  to  jump  or  to  take  big  steps,  one  needs  solid  ground.  Thus,  it  is  necessary  to  first  form  ground  with  some  initial  smaller  activities  to  test  and  to  build  trust.  The  bigger  step,  the  scaling  up,  will  follow  later.  To  make  a  small  project  bigger  is  easier  than  to  make  a  big  one  smaller.  

• Consider  transport  and  logistical  questions.  Don’t  start  with  too  many  impoverished,  remote  communities.  • The  way  to  scale  up  can  be  shortened  through  knowhow  transfer,  thanks  to  knowhow  management  and  accessibility,  

and  a  supply  of  experienced  coaches  and  trainers.  • GP  may  assure  the  mini-­‐minimum  budget  to  allow  beginning  working.  After  developing  the  project  and  implementing  

some  initial  activities  to  test  and/or  develop  the  capability,  additional  funding  needs  to  be  found  (but  maybe  it  will  just  remain  at  this  minimum,  which  is  still  much  better  than  nothing).    

• Instead  of  a  technology  focused  method  dare  to  use  an  innovative,  reaching  the  roots  approach  by  putting  human  beings  in  the  center,  teaching  self-­‐respect  and  responsibility  and  build  on  scientific  accompaniment.  

• Good  roles:  Bring  people  together  (the  brand  helps)  and  be  active  part  in  capacity  building.    

Cameroon Pilot – Lessons Learned 5

• A  difficult  but  very  important  issue  is  how  to  mount  and  how  to  promote  solar  business  cases  and  „spin  offs/start-­‐ups“,  as  self-­‐running  systems  that  are  by  definition  auto-­‐financed.  If  it  works.  A  GP  role  is  certainly  to  make  sure,  that  a  business  workshop  is  part  of  every  training  as  a  prerequisite.  However,    this  is  not  enough.  And:  What  is  the  role  of      

d) How  to  do  Community  Organizing  as  a  Greenpeace  office?  There  are  two  principle  ways:    • One  can  start  quite  big  (e.g.  several  communities,  maybe  a  region)  if  there  is  a  capable  partner  and  a  high  probability  of  

finding  additional  funding  because  of  the  good  quality  of  the  initial  project  activities.  This  assures  to  a  certain  degree  a  follow-­‐up  and  a  continuation  of  the  work  by  broadening  it  to  more  communities.  

• If  this  is  not  given,  start  smaller  as  we  did  it  now  in  DRC,  and  gain  knowhow,  e.g.  with  small  trainings  as  teasers  and  scaling  up  if  the  local  population  and  organizations  adhere,  leading  possibly  and  only  later  to  community  trainings,  organized  and  led  by  local  partners  (role  of  GP  tbd).  For  DRC  transfer  see  chapter  F.    

 

E.  Lessons  learned  and  critical  points  

 

The  pilot  project  showed  (again)  that  building-­‐up  knowhow  and  trust,  testing  cooperation,  and  establishing  project  management  is  necessary  and  takes  time:  there  are  different  speeds  of  the  different  stakeholders  that  have  to  be  harmonized,  i.e.  short-­‐term  campaign  wins  are  unlikely,  but  with  profiting  from  these  experiences,  wins  are  possible  in  quite  a  relatively  short  amount  of  time  (6  –  12  months).  The  pilot  project  also  confirmed  that  it  is  crucial  for  sustainability  to  choose  a  needs-­‐  and  target  group-­‐oriented  approach.  A  general  error  has  been  the  permanent  overuse  of  financial  and  human  resources.  A  pilot  must,  by  definition,  be  error  friendly,  i.e.  including  big  buffers  of  resource-­‐reserves  in  order  to  be  able  to  steer,  correct,  and  adapt  (see  Comment  3  -­‐  implementation).    More  specific  insights  have  been:    E1:  Use  a  needs-­‐  and  target  oriented  approach  • The  orientation  of  a  target  and  needs  oriented  project  should  only  be  defined  after  careful  evaluation  of  community  

data,  obtained  through  pre-­‐diagnostic  and  diagnostic,  discussed  and  validated  in  a  participatory  way  with  the  community.    

• The  challenge  lies  in  the  interest  conflict  created  by  the  campaign-­‐agenda,  the  financial  means  available  and  the  outcomes  of  community  diagnostics,  that  might  suggest  a  divergent  orientation  for  the  project.  In  the  case  of  the  Cameroon  Pilot,  need  N°1  was  Water,  N°2  Health  and  N°3  Energy.  It  was  a  decision  by  the  Project  Partners  and  the  Supervisor  to  choose  Energy  out  of  those  3  priorities,  for  mainly  two  reasons:    

1. It  was  a  subject,  attractive  enough  for  the  main  project  driver  Greenpeace,  to  invest  more  and  sustain  it  for  several  years  

2. It  is  a  subject,  where  there  is  already  a  lot  of  know-­‐how  available  inside  Greenpeace  and,  with  the  former  training  activities,  also  inside  Cameroon.  It  would  be  therefore  cheaper  to  start  with  that,  than  for  example  with  Water  or  Health.    

• In  conclusion,  the  project  did  not  succeed  in  applying  a  100%  purely  needs-­‐oriented  approach,  mainly  for  financial  considerations,  assuring  the  sustainability  of  the  project.  (see  Feedback  3  –  Project  Orientation)

E2:  Start  with  the  right  issue(s)  • To  tackle  health  and  energy  problems  is,  in  most  cases,  the  best  place  to  start  as  it  brings  “quick  wins”  for  the  

communities  –  success  is  a  good  motivator  to  stay  on  track.    • Energy  is  a  good  starting  point  with  potential  for  a  grassroots  movement:  During  the  pilot,  more  and  more  interest  to  

participate  has  been  flagged  (10  municipalities,  300  communities  applied  to  the  project).  Several  opportunities  for  integration  with  larger  campaign  concepts:  Sustainable  Energy  Regions,  Local  Energy  Revolution,  Green  Villages,  Green  Skills,  Sustainability  University,  Anti-­‐Land  grabbing  coalition,  Congo  Forest  Campaign,  etc.  

• Another  entry  point  for  community  projects  is  to  ally  agriculture  and  energy.  This  would  help  to  reduce  the  worries  with  payments  in  poor  communities.  So,  it  is  important  to  think  how  to  improve  productivity  and  integrate  income-­‐generating  activities  into  any  health,  water  or  energy-­‐project.  (See  Feedback  4  –  Project  Steps)  

 E3:  Use  a  dynamic  approach  for  working  with  communities  that  allows  learning  for  the  Project  and  the  Community  Some  lessons  concerning  the  implementation  steps,  after  evaluation  with  communities.    • In  general:  Do  regular  community  meetings  or  at  least  exchanges  with  the  traditional  leaders  on  the  results  of  each  

project  step  and  not  just  consult  them  when  problems  occur  during  the  implementation  (see  Feedback  5  –  Methodology)  

• During  Diagnostic:  Get  information  about  the  community  organization  in  financial  matters,  integrate  this  information  into  the  project  implementation  plan.  Define  a  minimal  contribution  to  achieve  satisfactory  results  within  the  community  and  validate  this  before  mobilizing  funds  and  means  for  implementation  with  the  community  authorities.  

Cameroon Pilot – Lessons Learned 6

• Before  implementation:  Explore  and  test  correctly  all  technological  and  technical  solutions  on  their  robustness,  functionality  and  warranty.  

• Before  Follow-­‐up:  Be  sincere  with  communities  and  discuss  durability  of  the  material,  how  maintenance  could  be  assured  and  how  much  this  will  cost.    

• During  Follow-­‐up:  Separate  in  the  field  strictly  organizing  work  from  financial  recovery  and  technical  maintenance  work,  to  make  it  possible,  that  the  field  organizers  can  coach  and  accompany  the  community  and  stay  in  close  contact  with  the  community,  even  if  the  recovery  and  maintenance  team  is  putting  pressure  on  some  reluctant  community  members  to  pay  their  contributions.  

• During  Follow-­‐up:  Make  “maintenance”  a  priority  by  creating  maintenance  and  recovery  teams,  that  do  follow-­‐up  work  during  their  regular  visits.    

 E4:  Select  the  right  communities  to  start  with  • In  Cameroon  too  many  communities  were  chosen  with  the  wrong  criteria  of  “most  abandoned  and  poor”.  This  was  

morally  correct,  but  too  big  a  challenge  for  a  pilot:  Less  communities  that  are  already  a  bit  organized  (e.g.  in  a  fight  against  livelihood  destruction)  provide  a  better  starting  point  and  require  a  bit  less  time  for  trust  building.  

• Reflect  carefully  on  “the  system”,  namely  the  community  structure  (organogram,  rules,  and  attitudes),  develop  the  common  working  methodology  (philosophically,  science-­‐based  approach  on  how  to  act  towards  beneficiaries),  train  community  members  selected  by  the  community,  and  reflect  on  contextualization.    

• Capacity-­‐building  is  key:  To  catalyze  solutions  with  communities  means  organizing  and  training.  Find  good  trainers  and  partners,  then  there  is  a  real  chance  of  strengthening  local  civil  society  to  bring  forth  sustainable  solutions.  

 E5:  Select  the  right  trainees  • In  any  case,  carefully  defining  the  target  public(s)  and  selecting  participants  is  very  crucial  (not  just  anyone  who  wants,  

can  participate).  Define  the  deal  clearly:  „You  get  this,  you  give  that“.  Not  anyone  who  wants  to  participate  can  do  so.    • A  possible  process  for  screening  and  selection  of  trainees  or  partner  NGOs  to  send  trainees:    

o Get  key  volunteers,  and  if  possible  decision  makers  of  partner  NGOs  to  be  trained    o Observe  all  trainees  at  work,  in  the  field,  in  the  office,  and  attribute  responsibilities  to  those  with  aptitudes,  be  

it  in  executive  or  administrative  functions  (project  execution  vs.  project  planning)  o Invite  those  with  proven  reliability,  aptitudes  and  contributions  to  the  project,  to  become  a  project  partner.  

• Long-­‐term  volunteering  in  a  harsh  socio-­‐economic  environment  is  a  very  selective  process  that  does  not  ensure  keeping  the  good  personal.  There  is  a  risk  of  brain  drain  in  the  project  (what  is  also  an  indicator  of  the  training  quality)  à  preview  a  long-­‐term  strategy  for  recruitment  and  employment.  Make  CLEAR  that  trainees  are  not  foreseen  to  be  employed,  but  may  have  a  higher  chance  in  the  work  market  and  get  options  for  social  business.  

• Founding  a  social  solar  enterprise  with  ex-­‐trainees  is  a  great  idea,  and  is  realistic  as  a  spin  off  from  trainings  and  community  work  (see  documentation  “Cameroon  Solar  Solution”  enterprise),  but  not  easy  –  see  point  Cc  above.

E6:  Find  the  right  partner  NGO(s)  • Main  actor  for  the  base  work  is  not  GP,  but  local  NGOs  and  citizens  of  the  communities.  GP’s  role  has  to  be  determined,  

according  to  the  capacities  and  needs  of  NGO  partners:  As  an  enabler  of  trainings,  political  communicator  etc.  • Find  those  local  NGOs  that  are  reliable  and  able,  ones  that  don’t  just  see  in  GP  a  money  or  brand  giver  (in  countries  

where  GP  has  an  office  it  is  more  likely  to  detect,  control,  and  correct  such  attitudes).    • How  experienced  are  the  partner  NGOs,  where  do  they  stand  in  their  organizational  development?  Determine  together  

the  size  of  a  first  test  or  pilot  –  if  it  is  too  big,  either  there  will  no  follow-­‐up  (which  is  most  important  part  of  the  project)  or  you  will  continuously  run  after  resources  and  become  vulnerable  to  mistakes.  

• Without  enabling,  „nothing“  will  happen,  i.e.  enabling  is  a  prerequisite,  as  well  as  a  good  opportunity  to  get  in  touch  with  partner(s).  It  is  quite  easy  to  manage  a  one-­‐time  event,  but  the  more  challenging  thing  is  that  trainings  are  kind  of  a  kick-­‐off  (e.g.  trainees  may  expect  jobs),  i.e.  make  sure  that  the  partner  organization  is  ready  to  „use“  the  trained  people  and  that  the  expectations  are  channeled  to  them,  unless  GP  wants  qualified  volunteers.  

• The  right  partners  can  become  a  great  source  of  mobilization;  enabling  people  and  preparing  them  adequately  for  a  task  is  the  right  thing  to  do  for  further  participation  and  engagement.  

• Fundraising:  One  of  the  goals  that  have  not  been  achieved  in  the  pilot  was  to  raise  funds  through  national/local  partners  for  the  project.  One  reason  was  that  it  was  not  worked  seriously  enough  on  this  goal,  i.e.  there  was  no  real(istic)  plan  to  enable  fundraising  and  invest  enough  human  resources  with  longer  term  perspective.  

 E7:  Find  the  right  cooperation  with  the  partner  NGOs  • Define  clearly  and  comprehensibly  the  roles  and  tasks  of  each  partner.  This  means:    

a. Clear  decision-­‐making  procedures  that  are  accepted  by  all  b. A  cooperation  contract,  a  Memorandum  of  Agreement,  stating  goals,  purpose,  working  structure,  

responsibilities,  financial  structure  and  conflict  solution  proceedings.    • Before  starting  activities,  be  sure,  the  means  are  already  available  and  accessible,  and  the  Terms  of  Reference  are  clearly  

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defined  and  as  transparent  as  possible,  to  prevent  improvisations.    • Clarify  the  contributions  of  each  partner  before  starting  an  activity  and  agree  upon  a  „Plan  B“,  to  prevent  confusion,  

interest  conflicts.    • Make  regular  project  progress  meetings  between  the  partners  and  discuss  also  what  can  be  communicated  towards  the  

target  group  to  prevent  raising  expectations  that  might  not  be  satisfied.    • Inform  the  local  Authorities  before  the  project  launch.    • A  cooperation  is  a  dynamic  organizational  development  process  with  roles  of  the  partners  changing  with  time:    

a. A  cooperation  may  start  with  Greenpeace  being  an  active  project  contributor,  may  even  be  a  co-­‐leader.  b. In  a  next  step,  selected  and  trained  project  staff  takes  over,  by  growing  up  in  terms  of  functions  and  responsibili-­‐

ties.  Those  responsible  project  leaders  should  be  coached  by  the  former  project  coordinator,  and  GP  may  continue  to  be  part  of  the  project  steering  committee.    

c.     A  final  step  of  such  organizational  development  can  be  the  founding  of  an  independent  project  organization,  fed  by  all  partners.    

• A  major  challenge  lies  in  the  „Ownership“  of  the  Project.  Who  owns  it?  After  growing  up,  a  project  might  become  an  organization  on  its  own  right  or  continue  to  be  administratively  attached  to  one  of  the  partners.  There  are  advantages  for  both  forms:    

a. Administratively  attached  to  a  local  partner.  Advantages  are:  empowers  local  partner,  creates  quickly  the  necessary  institutional  and  legal  frame  for  the  project,  local  partner  network  can  easily  be  used.  Disadvantages  are:  project  very  dependent  on  partner  dynamics  and  ways  of  administration  and  management  (particularly  risky,  if  inside  the  partner  organization  unorthodox  and  unprofessional  practices  prevail).    

b. Organization  on  its  own  right:  Advantages  are:  project  values  and  abilities,  trained  and  introduced  during  the  project  as  innovations,  are  more  likely  to  be  maintained,  for,  an  independent  organization  needs  to  develop  its  own  values  and  organizational  culture.  More  partners  are  likely  to  contribute  to  the  success  of  such  a  structure,  because  they  would  be  co-­‐owners.  Disadvantages:  It  requires  some  big  efforts  to  found  and  build  a  totally  new  structure.  A  local  partner  will  not  be  as  much  interested  to  “incubate”  such  a  new  structure  instead  of  just  a  new  project  in  their  own  structure,  strengthening  their  organization  and  enlarging  their  portfolio.  

c.     In  conclusion:  In  the  beginning  of  a  project,  the  advantages  may  outweigh  possible  inconveniences.  But,  after  having  established  a  project  structure,  methodology,  trained  staff,  planning,  implementation,  community  contacts  and  showing  some  successes,  the  project  could  probably  profit  more  from  an  independent  institutional  and  legal  framework.  Such  a  frame,  of  course,  may  include  all  local  partners  as  owners  and  contributors,  in  order  to  profit  from  networks  and  in  order  to  continue  to  feedback  with  trainings  and  employments  to  the  contributing  local  organizations.  

d. Be  aware  that  this  question  can  lead  to  a  great  challenge,  when  Greenpeace  leaves  the  project,  and  the  adminis-­‐trative  organization  may  use  its  independence  to  become  “owner”  of  the  project,  in  spite  of  preliminary  decisions.  To  counter  such  developments  and  secure  common  achievements,  suggestion  is  that  Greenpeace  continues  as  part  of  e.g.  the  steering  body,  and  before  phasing  out  financial  support  to  accompany  organizational  consolidation  in  the  direction  of  the  common  decision.  

e. Finances:  A  crucial  and  sensitive  issue  that  has  to  be  addressed  early  to  assure  minimal  funding,  including  options  how  to  assure  it  (see  above  “fundraising”,  E6).  

 E8:  Some  basics    • Solution  work  provides  potentials  and  opportunities  to  involve  formal  and  traditional  authorities  that  would  otherwise  

have  the  power  to  hinder  a  project,  and  threaten  the  security  of  project  staff.  It  is  key  to  have  a  communication  behavior  that  stresses  concrete  achievements  of  projects,  leaving  out  any  reference  to  systemic  change  and  criticism  and  maybe  even  to  human  rights  and  community  organization  –  i.e..  “Seducing,  not  provoking  power.”  

• Psychosocial  effects  of  colonialism  on  cooperation:  The  “white  man”  may  be  “used”  for  projections  such  as  savior,  colonialist,  or  racist.  This  can  lead  to  a  number  of  critical  behaviors  within  the  broad  range  between  seeing  a  white  person  as  money-­‐purse  as  well  as  entrance  door  to  Europe  and  seeing  a  white  project  coordinator  as  impostor  and  discriminative  who  is  abusing  his  power.  On  the  reverse  side,  Africans  can  be  projection  screens  for  all  kind  of  saviors,  idealists,  or  missionaries.  In  this  field  of  projections  and  counter-­‐projections,  of  prejudices  and  stereotypes,  it  seems  to  be  rare  and  difficult  to  establish  a  normal  relationship  between  human  beings  of  different  origins.  It  would  be  a  lie  to  say  that  everybody  has  been  totally  conscious  about  wishes  and  expectations  and  managed  to  establish  always  a  sincere  honest  dialogue.  This  intercultural  challenge  is  impeding  the  project’s  progress,  and  makes  a  periodical  critical  revision  of  roles,  competences  and  attitudes  between  partners  necessary.  How  far  and  in  which  suggested  role/s  such  prejudices  have  played  a  mayor  role  is  seen  differently  (see  Feedback  6  –  Intercultural  Dialogue).  

• Socio-­‐political  and  economic  history  and  context  (poverty,  insecurity,  militarization  of  daily  life)  greatly  influences  the  psychological  pre-­‐dispositions  of  local  staff,  organizations  and  civil  society,  and  can,  therefore,  be  a  main  obstacle  for  an  integrative  human  approach  that  wants  to  overome  corruption  and  absence  of  trust,  ethno-­‐centrism,  nepotism,  egocentrism  etc.  energy  [r]evolution  as  real  change  must  pass  through  a  re-­‐installation  of  human  values.  While  all  

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agree  about  the  importance  of  values,  but  what  this  means  in  practice,  the  points  of  view  differ  (see  Feedback  7  –  Project  Values  and  Ownership)  

 E9:  Greenpeace  internals,  and  phase-­‐out  • Internal  acceptance  @Greenpeace:  Adaptation  to  a  new  culture  takes  time.  The  new  Greenpeace  will  be  confronted  

with  the  old  GP  saying,  „But  solution  work  is  not  GP“  for  a  long  time.  (So  it  was  @GPAf,  where  in  four  years  of  project  work  we  have  had  five  point  persons  with  different  attitudes  towards  the  “Yes-­‐part”  of  Greenpeace).  Starting  point  or  dilemma:  ‚Greenpeace  is  not  a  development  organization’,  vs.  „It  is  all  about  sustainable  development  what  we  are  doing.  There  are  just  different  ways  for  rich  and  poor  countries’“.  

• A  new  type  of  campaigner  may  be  needed,  one  who  is  not  too  much  “urgency-­‐driven”,  with  good  negotiation,  social  and  facilitation  skills  as  well  as  knowledge  of  human  beings.  

• If  “phasing-­‐out  Greenpeace”  means  to  phase-­‐in  another  partner  that  is  international  or  not-­‐national,  its  role  must  be  clarified  and  accepted  before  it  starts  to  work.  In  case  of  Solafrica,  Swiss  NGO  for  energy  and  fundraising  purposes,  it  was  too  much  of  a  burden  to  cover  all  issues  that  have  been  planned,  i.e.  for  not-­‐energy  issues  another,  specialized  partner  for  a  certain  issue  is  needed.  

   

F.  Transfer  to  DRC:  Added  values  for  GPAf/DRC  from  the  solar  community  work      In  spite  of  the  problems  in  Cameroon,  learnings  and  knowhow  have  started  to  be  transferred  to  DR  Congo  –  together  with  two  Congolese  trained  in  Cameroon  in  solar  technics  and  the  community  methodology.  There  are  obviously  several  added  values  for  the  Greenpeace  Forest  campaign  in  DRC.  In  the  words  of  the  Country  Manager:  „The  solar  project  is  vital  for  us  here.  We  want  a  strong  package  to  be  able  to  propose  practical  solutions  to  communities  as  a  response  to  any  allegation  towards  GP  do  not  address  community  needs.”  Therefore  added  values  may  be:  a. It  helps  communities  relieve  pressure  on  the  forest  in  terms  of  the  amount  of  wood  they  need  for  the  cooking,  and  

improving  their  livelihood.  b. The  image  that  Greenpeace  is  working  actively  on  solutions,  together  with  communities  is  tangible,  and  convinces  that  

GP  is  not  just  saying  „no“.            c. Acknowledgments  from  communities  that  GP  is  working  for  and  with  them  (although  not  daily  implementation  work,  

this  fosters  resilience  in  the  communities)  d. Attracts  engaged  and  enabled  volunteers,  and  gives  them  perspectives  through  engagement  (e.g.  spin  offs  solar  micro  

enterprises)  and  new  green  jobs  for  villagers.  e. Good  for  fundraising  and  media  work  (two  Swiss  foundation  financing  the  GP  share  of  the  project)    G.  Steps  of  a  “Community-­‐Based  e[r]”:  Documents,  Links   Step   Docs*

I. Understand  needs  and  potentials  of  a  community     A)  How  to  prepare  a  community-­‐based  project II. Establish  trusting  relations  with  the  community,  by  respecting  the  village  

hierarchy  and  leaders,  as  well  as  traditional  decision  making  III. Establish  common  rules  for  the  project  and  the  activities  

a. Define  the  deal  together:  What  does  every  partner  (community,  trainee,  NGO,  GP)  give  and  receive,  best  clarified  with  a  written  agreement.    

b. Any  engagement  is  considered  a  serious  commitment,  a  word  is  a  word  to  be  respected  and  to  be  relied  upon  

c. Any  disrespect  towards  community  or  project  members  will  be  treated  immediately  by  a  mixed  commission  project-­‐community,  and  measures  will  be  applied  

d. Being  sober  and  proper  is  a  minimal  sign  of  respect  and  minimal  requirement  for  the  community  to  be  part  of  the  project  

B)  How  to  strengthen  the  community  organization

IV. Accompany  decision  making  and  reinforce  participation  of  women,  youth,  and  elders  to  get  all  potentials  to  work  for  a  common  community  goal  

V. Train  field  technicians  and  community  leaders  in  the  methodology  of  community  organizing,  its  values,  its  vision  and  its  approach.  

C)  How  to  train  youth  in  community  organizing  (Several  articles  and  poster,  reports  about  trainings,  film  links,  planning  docs)

VI. Train  capable  solar  energy  (or  water,  agroforestry  etc.)  technicians  on  the  project  and  at  the  organizational  as  well  as  the  community  level  

D)  How  to  organize  and  execute  a  community  training  or  training  for  trainers

VII. Introduce  an  empowering  follow-­‐up:  i)  a  community-­‐based  or  local   E)  How  to  do  the  follow-­‐up  in  

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maintenance  and  cashing  system,  ii)  continuous  community  education  through  information,  trainings  and  coaching  on  priority  issues,  preparing  that  way  their  implementation    

communities

VIII. Involve  administrative  authorities  of  the  first  level:  Municipality  and  District  governmental  representatives,  if  possible  for  mutual  action  (very  often  not  possible),  but  at  least  to  accept  the  project  

F)  How  to  work  with  governmental  administration

IX. Coach  project  organization  in  Administration,  HR,  Fundraising  etc.   G)  How  to  administrate  a  project  with  several  partners

X. Find  a  business  model  to  solve  the  energy  access  for  communities,  allowing  the  use  of  the  same  funds  to  achieve  more  impact  

H)  How  to  found  and  build  a  Social  Business

 *  Find  documents  on  WAVE.greenpeace.org  (under  construction,  ready  by  end  of  Dec.  2014)      For  a  more  intuitive  understanding,  see  the  following  films:    From  Cameroon:    http://wave.greenpeace.org/waveV2public/content/climate-­‐forest-­‐solution-­‐caravan-­‐cameroon-­‐podc-­‐community-­‐organizing    From  DRC  (installation  solar  generator  for  radio  station  and  wood-­‐efficient  stoves):    French:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7_omm1E1zoY  ;    English:  https://www.youtube.com/user/Youth4Renewables              

Annexes    A)  Facts  &  Figures  of  Project  in  Cameroon,  and  transfer  countries  DRC  and  Senegal  (by  July  2014)    

 

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B)  Time  plan  –  The  Phases  of  the  Cameroon  Pilot,  2009  –  2014    

Time  /  Phase   Sub  phase   Milestones  /  key  activities 2006    Initiation      

Precursors     Decision  that  Greenpeace  will  open  office  in  Africa,  and  GP  Switzerland  one  of  the  big  internal  money  giver.  And  since  Africa  with  more  then  50%  of  the  population  is  younger  then  20,  youth  &  solutions  projects  have  be  on  the  plan  from  beginning  on;  that’s  why  GPCH  and  YSC  have  been  asked  to  test,  youth  activities.

2007  &  2008   Tests   Two  Kids  for  Forests  tree  planting  camps  with  CED;  national  NGO  with  whom  GP  has  been  working  since  several  years

Nov.  2008  to  Jan.  2009  

Internal  Lobbying  /     The  energy  workshop  @office  opening  Kinshasa  showed  plastically  how  people  can  be  involved  through  demonstrations  &  trainings,  with  the  outcome  of  a  remit  for  concept  with  (a)  „No  hit  and  run“  (ED  GPAf),  (b)  work  with  remote  communities  in  Congo  forest

 Feb.  2009  Planning  …  

Analysis  –  >  Goal  Formulation,  ideas  for  concept;  green  light  for  a  test  

One  important  baseline:  Not  to  do  just  “technical  implementation”,  but  real  change  by  embedding  technical  solutions  into  an  organizing  process  that  comes  from  the  inside  of  the  communities:  No  external  pace  making  and  impatient  activism  …  -­‐>  Proposal  consisting  of  big  picture  &  goals,  but  to  start  with  a  training)

June  2009  …  and  deve-­‐lopment  

Evaluation:  Adapted  Strategy  –>  Pilot  proposal    

• Training:  Demand?  Quality?  Manageable?  Partner  check  ...  • Test  community  work  in  the  very  north  of  Cameroon  • Revision  of  plan  and  come  up  with  a  pilot  proposal  upon  which  a  MoU  GP  Africa,  GP  

Switzerland  and  GP  YSC  for  three  years  was  signed.  April  2010  Implementa-­‐tion      March  2012  

 Start  pilot    –  lots  of  revisions  necessary    

Community  training,  diagnostic,  energy  refresh  course,  training  of  community  representants  (2  per  com.),  etc.  Critical  points  during  the  4  years  pilot:  • Staff  turnover  GPAf:  In  4  years  5  point  persons  with  different  attitudes  towards  project  • „Sudden  decisions  by  matter  of  fact  situation“,  e.g.  change  of  main  partner,  or  to  

work  in  15  communities  instead  of  7    • Install  pay-­‐back  system  for  solar  material  (was  not  for  free)  Start  transfer  DRC,  first  trainings  during  2012  (see  separate  docs)

Nov.  2012  Running  system  –  hand  over  

Decision  taking:  phase  out  &  hand-­‐over  

Decision  was  taken  @workshop  with  GPAf,  GP  Congo  campaign,  GP  YSC  to  phase-­‐out  GP  by  end  of  2014  and  hand-­‐over  of  project  to  Cameroonian  partner  during  end  of  energy-­‐phase  and  start  health  project  phase  ...  who  is  responsible  for  the  new  structure,  employees,  how  to  assure  minimum  funding?  Etc.      –>  New  foreign  NGO  partner  was  found  (Solafrica)  to  assure  minimal  funding  -­‐>  DRC:  Money  found  for  further  transfer  further  and  continue  

2013:    Finishing  Energy  Phase  

Preparation  Implementation  Evaluation    

Energy  implementation  phase  was  delayed  due  namely  to  problems  in  cashing    Start  of  spin  off  Cameroonian  Solar  Solution  CSS,  and  separate  it  from  non-­‐profit  part.  Try  to  build-­‐up  capacity  of  the  leading  national  NGO  in  terms  of  project  management  and  administration

Jul.  2013  to  2014  

Handover  lead  to  Cameroonian  staff  

Project  lead  by  Cameroonian  staff,  trained  in  the  project,  employed  by  the  leading  NGO  (together  with  4  staff),  coached  by  former  project  leader

 C)  Double  Triangle  -­‐>  Double  Funnel  

Graph for bottom-up and top-down hand shake

a) No hand shakebetween political level (top-down) andcommunity level (bottom-up)

Situation: The Top-Downers are flying overand only see the forest, the Bottom-Uppersonly see the trees.

b) With handshake, i.e. with interaction,i.e. both levels being aware that both are needed: the Top-Downers see that they get fertilizer from the soil for their political struggle, and the Bottom-Uppers needthis support for real change, that is notonly single case. GP as facilitator and bring stakeholders together.

«Community organizing» where strategy meets withneeds from grassroots e.g. through common trainings,

lighthouse installations, workshops etc.

Grassroot level – e.g. real change in communities

Political level - strategy