Chris Davey

Letting Slip the Dogs of War: genocidal War in the Twenty-First Century

Blood and destruction shall be so in use,And dreadful objects so familiar,That mothers shall but smile when they beholdTheir infants quarter'd with the hands of war;All pity choked with custom of fell deedsAnd Caesar's spirit, ranging for revenge,With (discord) by his side come hot from Hell,Shall in these confines with a monarch's voiceCry ‘Havoc!’ and let slip the dogs of war,That this foul deed shall smell above the earthWith carrion men, groaning for burial.1

The phenomenon of genocide has been known for its vandalism and brutality throughout the

centuries.2 In Julius Caesar, Shakespeare caught the essence of this violence and foreseeing

twenty-first century wars with this mourning monologue calling forth a hellish war to be

poured out upon its victim: civilians.

The violent combination of exterminatory ideology and targeting civilians has always

existed within the physical space and social context of war. However, war itself is not a

simple explanation of genocide. Scholars acknowledge a more complex relationship,

stressing deeper connections between war and genocide, ‘Examples (of genocide) caution

against any simple idea of “war” itself as a cause of genocide; indeed the many cases of

genocide in wartime do not tell us why some wars see genocides and some parties in wars

commit genocide, and others do not (…) it is not “war” itself that is causal.’3 This paper will

argue in answer to the claim that war is a simple explanation for genocide and that this

complex relationship is a pattern emerging within twenty-first century warfare that is

becoming increasingly genocidal.4 The argument will tackle the definitions of war and

genocide, and survey the debate amongst scholars about the depth and extent of the

1 W. J. Craig, Shakespeare: Complete Works (London: Robinson Publishing, 1993), 833. 2 The terms vandalism and barbarity are attributable of Lemkin’s first works of the definition of

genocide, see Raphael Lemkin, ‘Genocide as a Crime under International Law,’ American Journal of International Law 41, no. 1 (1947): 146.

3 Martin Shaw, ‘War and Genocide: A Sociological Approach,’ Online Encyclopaedia of Mass Violence, http://www.massviolence.org/War-and-Genocide-A-Sociological-Approach, ISSN 1961-9898 [accessed 11 November 2009].

4 Eric Markusen and David Kopf, The Holocaust and Strategic Bombing: Genocide and Total War in the Twentieth Century (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 62.

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connection between war and genocide, making the case for twenty-first century genocidal

war. Case studies will include the actions of the Sudanese government over the past few

decades and the Serbian forces during the Yugoslav wars.5 These will build evidence for the

claim that modern conflict is characterized by state-sponsored armed groups, nationalist or

racial politics, resulting in genocidal violence that strategically targets civilians.

Custom of Fell Deeds

Conceptually war and genocide begin with the military philosopher Carl von Clausewitz and

jurist Raphael Lemkin, and what they fathered, respectively, as the customs of war and

genocide. However, inasmuch as their works were groundbreaking, they are now expired

and in need of refreshment. Jonathon Schell in his powerful history of war and peace argues

that as a result of the evolution of modern conflict and development of nuclear weapons,

Clausewitz’s total warfare is dead,

For war was a paradoxical freak of evolution: a creature that depended for its survival on that unsung virtue of arms, their weakness—without which war’s critical event, its gift to politics, defeat, could not occur (…) The logic of total war had carried its practitioners to the brink of a destination, the far side of human existence, to which the logic of politics could not rationally follow.6

Schell refers here to Clausewitz’s logic of war and the atrocities that have allowed the war

system to work in its destructive, unpredictable way. The evolution of the practice of war

has led to something that is beyond the recognition of its first modern philosopher. Schell

argues that this logic of violent means and political ends has reached the cusp of the dustbin

of history.7 With the deployment of mass armies, ideologies, and means of total destruction,

through machetes, machine guns, or hydrogen bombs, war has now become terrifyingly more

than Clausewitz’s gentlemanly, yet brutal swashbuckling politics.8

Lemkin, a century later, observed the edifice of war as horrific; recognizing war as

more ‘fell deeds’ than anything in Clausewitz’s traditional customs. In the 1930s he 5 Whilst these are the two strongest historical case studies, the crimes committed in the Democratic

Republic of the Congo and the war-like nature of Al-Qaeda could also be cited as case studies. 6 Jonathon Schell, The Unconquerable World: Why Peaceful Protest is Stronger than War (London:

Penguin Books, 2003), 46. 7 Schell, 46. 8 Ibid., 39.

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determined that the ‘crime without a name’ was in fact race (genos) killing (cide).9 His

evaluation was that the atrocities perpetrated against Armenians and the contemporary

actions of the Nazi regime constituted crimes of barbarity and vandalism, referring to the

physical and cultural destruction of genocide.10

According to Mark Levene, Lemkin’s proposal of genocide ‘as itself a form of

warfare’ was not championed in the victors justice pursued against Germany and Japan.11

International Military Tribunal (IMT) failed to demonstrate the linkage between war and

genocide, or the crimes against humanity, as leaders and other perpetrators were tried on an

individual basis, not as a genocidal criminal organization.12 Thus, the Convention for the

Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG), and subsequent

jurisprudence surrounding genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity do not address

the deeper connections between the two social actions. Thus war and genocide, as social and

legal concepts, have arrived at two different destinations, resulting in a disconnection many

authors have tried to reconcile.13

Dreadful Objects so Familiar

Since the rise in incidences of war and genocide few scholars deny any disconnect at all.

Many of these authors stress that there is more to the link between the two phenomena than a

causal relationship, such as Martin Shaw, Adam Jones, Mark Levene, and Eric Markusen and

David Kopf.14 Other authors, like Eric Weitz, see a less central connection, listing war as

another social factor contributing to genocide. Further, with a more Intentionalist perspective

activists, legal specialists and other scholars see the necessity of keeping more clearly

defined categories of war and genocide, thus highlighting the illegal nature of the latter and

9 Churchill is attributed with this quippy statement, ‘Atlantic Charter, 24 August 1941, Broadcast, London,’ in R.R. James (ed), Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches 1897-1963, vol. 6, New York & London: R.R. Bowker, 1974), 6474. And Lemkin rendered the more specific and technical definition, Lemkin, 147.

10 Lemkin, 146. 11 Mark Levene, Genocide in the Age of the State: The Meaning of Genocide, vol. 1 (New York: IB

Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2005), 51. 12 CITE!! 13 Shaw, ‘War and Genocide: A Sociological Approach.’ 14 Adam Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), 48.

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the purposes of the former for humanitarian intervention. This paper will demonstrate that

whilst these positions are useful, they neglect the growing trend in twenty-first century

conflict- that the two phenomena are in fact merging to constitute genocidal war.

Shaw, arguing for a more sociological approach, has pioneered the connection

Lemkin espoused. He states that ‘Genocide can be regarded as a particular form of modern

warfare, and an extension of the more common form of degenerate war.’15 Shaw stresses

that degenerate war and genocide share three integral connections: state, or an associated

organization, as a primary perpetrator; presence of a ‘principal organ’ engaged in carrying

out actions; and a context of war between the state and its enemy.16 Jones adds that war

provides the mobilized human and mechanical weaponry to commit mass killings and induce

societal strife that also solidifies the instability and fear that produce genocide.17 His more

comprehensive listing of common factors supports his label of the ‘Siamese twins of history’,

and that their ‘conjoining’ attributes, or more generally the ‘context of war’ is ‘only a

necessary, not a sufficient, explanation.’18 The significance of this position shared by Jones

and Shaw is that war is negated as a simple explanation of genocide, complicating the

relationship. By stating that the relationship is not only complex, but that war and genocide

can, in fact, be like a set of conjoined twins, makes it difficult to see at first glance where one

ends and the other begins. The social context that war creates, by virtue of its violence,

organization, fear-mongering, and loosening of social norms, provides an almost host-like

body for genocide to thrive within.

Whilst this analysis sees direct and complex connections, other authors have observed

the same relationship, but have used different terms to acknowledge gaps between war and

genocide. Levene breaks down the conjoining of war and genocide into three types of war

waged by the state- ‘state against sovereign states’, ‘state war against other sovereign states

15 Shaw, War and Genocide: Organized Killing in Modern Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), 4. 16 Shaw, War and Genocide: Organized Killing, 41-43. 17 Jones, 49-50. 18 Ibid., 48.

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or nations who are perceived to be illegitimate’, ‘state war within the boundaries, or other

territories, controlled by the sovereign state against national or other groups who are

perceived to be illegitimate.’19 These types contain elements that are genocidal, or outright,

illegal genocide as decreed by the UNCG. The first type includes strategies of civilian

bombing used to terrorize the enemy state, or mass killing of conscripted youths.20 The

second type marks a ‘total dispensing’ of the so-called laws of war and uses ideological

labelling to vilify an enemy; resulting in the deliberate, widespread targeting of enemy

civilians.21 The third type is defined by a greater move towards a policy of genocide against

a relatively defenceless group of stateless victims.22 Levene holds this ‘common causal root’

of state power as the connector between the above three types of the phenomena.23

Markusen and Kopf, in their landmark study on the Holocaust and Allied strategic

bombing, laid crucial foundations for the war and genocide connection. Published in the

mid-1990s this work addressed the emerging intertwinement seen in Bosnian and Rwanda.

Acknowledging the controversy and disagreement between scholars they sought to create a

‘semantic and conceptual bridge’ between war and genocide by using Leo Kuper’s term

‘genocidal massacre’, fleshing it out with their survey of contemporary literature.24

Originally used to ‘characterize acts of mass killing that do not conform strictly to the criteria

of the UNCG but have some features that do fit it,’ this term brings the causes and effects of

war and genocide closer together in an attempt to show the commonalities.25 This type of

state violence falls between war and genocide omitting the total nature of genocide and gives

war-like violence a more terrorizing strategy.26 As the title of their study indicates, this

19 Levene, 57 -65. 20 The Iraq-Iran War and WWI both demonstrate the brutal mass killing of hundred of thousands of

conscripts in battles designed to use wave after wave of advances to slowly advance toward enemy lines. 21 Levene, 60-61. 22 Ibid., 65. 23 Ibid., 57. 24 Markusen and Kopf, 55.25 Markusen and Kopf, 62. 26 Ibid., 63.

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provides an apt definition of Allied strategic bombing of Germany and Japan during WWII,

making war and genocide,

Not (…) mutually exclusive phenomena but instead as forms of governmental mass killing that (…)are closely related and do in fact share important commonalities, which will be appropriately regarded as genocidal, if not actual cases of genocide. Both war and genocide, in both preparation and implementation, may reflect a collective mindset that deserves to be labelled a genocidal mentality.27

The above authors take a similar position—that war and genocide share more commonalities

than differences—indicating that whether by employing different typologies, or by using the

specific terms in a more sociological context, that war and genocide have no concrete lines of

definition. These dreadful objects are more familiar than first expected.

Weitz takes a position which broadens the social context for genocide beyond war, by

acknowledging economic, ideological, racial factors, and the failures of democracy. In

Utopias of Race and Nation, he places ‘moments of crisis generated by war’ along side racial

and nationalist ideologies, revolutionary politics, and popular mobilization as factors

resulting in ‘rituals of population purges’.28 Weitz attributes WWI, with creating ‘a new

model for conducting politics’, resulting with transference of ‘the culture of the battlefield to

politics.’29 War ‘break(s) standard codes of human interaction,’ and allows perpetrators to set

abnormal ‘standards of violence.’30 This type of social approach does not give sufficient

explanation to the linkages and frequency of war and genocide, and relegates war to a causal

role.31

Other voices in this debate highlight the importance of keeping the two couched in

separate terms and within traditional legal definitions. Anti-genocide activists and scholars,

who fall into this group, are keen to identify what is formally known as war and what the

27 Ibid., 62. 28 Eric Weitz, A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation (Princeton: Princeton University

Press, 2003), 14-15. 29 Weitz, 241. 30 Ibid., 251-52. 31 Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Killing (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 2005), 7, 427. Mann shares a similar position, citing war as merely a social cause, or even a result of genocidal, or murderous cleansing, ‘mundane social structures, processes, and cultures, amid objectively dangerous ethnic, state configurations, led toward murderous cleansing through mainly unintended escalations.’

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UNCG defines as genocide. Samuel Totten in his study of Darfur pursues the Sudanese

regime as genocidaries citing witness accounts that testify of racial targeting resulting in

mass rape and killing, and countless scholars, activists, and legal professionals who attest to

the fulfilment of the UNCG requirements.32 The context of decades of war is not as

significant as the Sudanese government’s ability and will, ‘the progress of the killing has

ebbed and flowed as the Government of Sudan has turned the spigot of violence on and off

according to its wiles in its game of brinkmanship with the international community.’33 This

perpetual state of civil war in Sudan has been relegated in the name of expediency for

claiming a textbook UNCG ‘genocide’. With the Sudanese government claiming war and the

above grouping claiming genocide, the debate in the middle acknowledges a far more

systemic problem recognised by Levene, that the organization of the nation-state itself and its

monopoly of violence is far more complicit in genocide than the UNCG indicates.34

The difference in the scholars that attribute commonalities and the social context of

war to creating conditions for genocide, and those who prefer a clearer distinction can be

explained using the Intentionalist/Functionalist debate. Whilst using this framing helps us

understand who is responsible with initiating and perpetrating genocide, the above debate

does not help us in unravelling linkages between war and genocide. It may be true that

Shaw, Levene, and Jones see war as a social context for genocide and conjoining

characteristics; however, Mann and Weitz also share a social outlook without placing any

emphasis on the role of war in genocide. These authors, all Functionalist to some extent,

disagree on the relationship of war and genocide, thus making this debate helpful, but not

conclusive.

Thus the dreadful objects that at first appeared so intertwined have become separated

for various reasons. It is at this point in the debate that another conceptualization of war and

32 Samuel Totten, ‘The Darfur Genocide,’ in Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts, ed. Samuel Totten and William S. Parsons, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2009), 580-84.

33 Totten, 555. 34 Levene, 10.

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genocide is needed. Markusen and Kopf ask, ‘Is it ever appropriate to define war as

genocidal?’35 This paper argues that yes- in an increasing number of incidences war is

becoming genocidal and creating conditions in which when state, or state-like groups wage

war it is with greater ferocity and genocidal tendencies. The conjoining of war and genocide

has now reached a stage of evolution in conflict. Inter-state war is in decline, which has led

to the claim that with it total war is also occurring less, resulting in the culmination of new

violent conflict that can be characterized as genocidal war.36

Let Slip the Dogs of War

As war has developed into a mass enterprise in the twentieth century, with the lack of regard

for the customs of war, civilians now find themselves placed in the middle of a type of war

that targets them as means and places their suffering or destruction as ends.37 By letting ‘slip

the dogs of war’ perpetrators, whether they be governments or other violent groups seeking

civilian destruction, have brought about a new phase in war, namely genocidal war.

Philip Bobbitt in his seminal work on wars of the twenty-first century has identified

that modern conflicts employ terror, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide as

means and ends to destroying these groups because of their very nature.38 Bobbitt asserts that

these phenomena are changing rapidly; modern war, as it was conducted in the twentieth

century, is ‘being replaced by the targeting of civilian populations as a direct objective, rather

than a collateral cost.’39 This evolution represents not only a significant departure from

twentieth century wars, but a threat to human rights and international order.40

35 Markusen and Kopf, 4. 36 ‘Human Security Report 2005’, Human Security Centre,

http://www.humansecurityreport.info/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=28&Itemid=63 [accessed 19 December 2009]. Part 1 of this report addresses the trends inter-state and total-war decline.

37 Schell, 39. Schell describes war as an overwhelming feature of twentieth century politics, where the race of war was turned into a marathon.

38 Philip Bobbitt, Terror and Consent: the Wars of the Twenty-First Century (London: Penguin Books, 2008), 236.

39 Bobbitt, 132. 40 Ibid., 527-29. This claim is also by Kenneth J. Campbell in Genocide and the Global Village (New

York: Palgrave, 2001).

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Similarly, Mary Kaldor describes the ‘new wars’ of the twenty-first century

containing, ‘new forms of power struggle may take the guise of traditional nationalism,

tribalism or religious fundamentalism, but they are, nevertheless, contemporary phenomena

arising from contemporary causes and displaying new characteristics.’41 Kaldor argues that

the ‘traditional’ casting of identities from a people’s past and the technology of the ‘global

era’ are used to accomplish goals of cleansing and murder.42 These wars may be

characterized as ‘low intensity conflicts’, but they blur even further in practise the

distinctions between war, crimes against humanity and genocide, resulting in a ‘mobilization

of extremist politics’ where violence is directed at civilians.43

This trend has also been recognised in the Yugoslavian and Sudanese atrocities

committed in recent years. James Gow, researcher with the International Criminal Tribunal

in Yugoslavia, determined that the Serbian nationalists embarked on a deliberate strategy of

committing war crimes and crimes against humanity as a result of their limited means in

homogenizing Serbian populated areas.44 Gerard Prunier has described the Sudanese

government as genocidal: perpetually using genocidal tools to conduct warfare against

civilians and rebels, thus implicating the government and its affiliates with a strategy of

genocidal warfare.45

Blood and Destruction shall so be in use

Just as the restraints of war were purposely released in the name of blood and destruction by

leading perpetrators (taking an intentionalist perspective?), so to has the process of modern

genocide caused unprecedented suffering. Few incidences are more harrowing and criminal

than the Serbian nationalist project and the on-going brutality of the Sudanese regime. The

common themes of genocidal war drawn into focus here are state-sponsored militias,

41 Mary Kaldor, New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), 72-73.

42 Kaldor, 85. 43 Ibid., 1-2, 9. 44 James Gow, The Serbian Project and its Adversaries: A Strategy of War Crimes (2003), 7-8. 45 Gerard Prunier, Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide (Ithica: University of Cornell Press, 2005), 105.

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nationalist or racial ideals (resulting in ethnic targeting in these cases), and the centralization

of civilian death and abuse as means and ends.

Militias have allowed states to avoid bearing the full cost of conflict, both logistically

and ethically. Both Darfur and Bosnia have been subjected to state sponsored, armed, and

uniformed militias made-up of bandits, criminals, and unemployed young men.46 Since the

outbreak of war in the South to the current conflict in Darfur, the Sudanese army utilized this

strategy of deploying militias, known locally as the Janjaweed to carry out killing, looting,

and rape, functioning with impunity as an arm of the Sudanese Defence Forces (SDF).47

Most recently in Darfur, and previously in the Nuba mountain area, the SDF bombed civilian

villages, or used artillery barrages to reduce settlements to rubble, allowing the militia to

enter uncontested to engage in rape and slaughter, making homes and villages uninhabitable

by poisoning wells and inducing famine.48

Similarly Bosnian-Serb forces were mobilized around the former Yugoslavia to act

where the Yugoslav Army (YA) could not, because of the logistical distance, and it was more

politically viable for militias to carry out the Serbian state project by proxy, reducing the risk

to Belgrade.49 Serb militia groups descended into Bosnia sweeping towns and villages after

the YA bombarded with shelling and mortar fire.50 These methods of combat contribute to

the definition of genocidal war by marking out the impunity and violent strategy with which

civilians are targeted.

Nationalist or racist narratives used by the regimes, or elites, drew in the militias

serving as a motivating factor for the perpetrator. However, ideologies do not singularly

symbolize the ends of genocidal war; they embody the process by which civilians have

46 Prunier, 117. Gow, 178.47 Human Rights Watch, ‘Darfur Documents Confirm Government Policy of Militia Support,’ A

Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, 19 July (2004): 3.48 Totten, ‘The Darfur Genocide,’ 587. African Rights, ‘Facing Genocide: The Nuba of Sudan,’ 7 July

1997, http://www.reliefweb.int/rwarchive/rwb.nsf/db900sid/ACOS-64CT6X?OpenDocument&RSS20&RSS20=FS [accessed 19 November 2009].

49 Gow, 174-78. 50 Ibid., 182-83. Hannes Trotter, et al, ‘Ethnic Cleansing Operations’ in the North-eastern City of

Zvornik from April through June 1992, Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights, http://www.univie.ac.at/bim/php/bim/?level=10&id=351 [accessed 11 October 2009].

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become central. As described by Kaldor, this use of the politics of identity in ‘new wars’

reaches back into the past- calling upon Caesar’s ghost. Each regional area within the case

studies have distinct histories that either were exploited for this purpose, or allowed a free-

flow of an ideology that empowered perpetrators with ends of killing civilians for power.

Sudanese, for decades, had been subject to racial Islam being disseminated from Gaddafi’s

Libya and Khartoum itself. Attacks on civilians, whether in the South, Nuba mountain area,

or Darfur have been imbued with the characteristic of racial narratives and targeting.

Hundreds of thousands of civilians have been implicated in rebel movements because of the

‘blackness’ of their skin and their disloyalty to Islam. Victims of rape have provided the

most detailed evidence of these actions.51

The nationalist narrative employed by the Serb forces and their allies had a similar

demonizing effect on their victims. Areas singled out as ‘Muslim’ were viciously targeted by

Mladic and his terror machine; the most infamous cases being the safe areas of Gozrade,

Srebrenica, and Sarajevo. Srebrenica rightly symbolizes not only the failures of the

International Community, but also the true nature of the Bosnian War, as conducted by

Bosnian-Serb forces. Over 7,000 male Muslims were targeted and killed as an act of

genocidal war. Weitz suggests that Muslims in Bosnia were stigmatized by ‘racial

simplifiers’, making targeted populations fit only for destruction, ‘The point was to annihilate

physically a significant proportion of a community.’52 Here rape also bore the telling stigma

of policy constructed by racial thinking, victims were to conceive not a future generation of

Muslims, but ‘little Chetniks’ named after the glorified WWII Serbian nationalist

movement.53 Thus through the brutal lens of civilian atrocity the nationalist and racial

identity politics, or the ghosts of the past and fears for the future, became essential in the

developing nature of genocidal war. 51 Amnesty International, ‘Sudan Darfur Rape as a weapon of war,’ Stop Violence Against Women:

Sexual Violence and its consequences, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR54/076/2004 [accessed 20 March 2008]. This Amnesty report is just one example of this type of evidence collection by NGOs and governments in the Darfur-Chad border area.

52 Weitz, 205, 223. 53 Ibid., 233.

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Bobbitt described the new evolution of war as a strategic reconciling of means and

ends.54 Both cases show how civilians ‘progressed’ from traditional counter-insurgency

strategy as the ‘fish in the pond’, to being the military target and their destruction an end in

genocidal war.55 Darfuris, and Nubians before them, were a supposed threat to the state, thus

making their destruction an end in itself. Serbian nationalists called for the destruction of

Bosnian Muslims and enacted policies aimed at strategically accomplishing this end.56

Genocidal war carries with it the appearance of ‘low intensity wars’ as indicated by Kaldor,

however, they are distinctly marked by the pursuit of civilian destruction for the maintenance

of power and position. This makes genocidal war a type of war with the destructive potential

of the Holocaust masked within the old shell of civil war.

This Foul Deed shall smell above the earth

The changes in the nature of total warfare and the rise of civilian targeted violence, war and

genocide have now evolved into a form of twenty-first century conflict. Whilst the concept

of genocidal war as it has been described in this paper may be more widely applicable, it

serves as a starting point for the evolution of war and genocide in the twenty-first century.

Foundational to this development is the growing practise of these phenomena that deny war

as a simple explanation for genocide. This union of death and destruction now more than

ever fulfils Lemkin’s prophecy of vandalism and brutality. The destruction of civilians has

now occupied a central place in an increasingly globalized world as an evolved form of war.

Selected Bibliography

Amnesty International. ‘Sudan Darfur Rape as a weapon of war.’ Stop Violence Against Women: Sexual Violence and its consequences. http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR54/076/2004 [accessed 20 March 2008].

54 Bobbitt, 132. 55 Benjamin Valentino, Final Solutions: Mass Killings and Genocide in Twentieth Century (Ithica:

Cornell University Press, 2005), 197-98. 56 Gow, 302.

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Atlantic Charter, 24 August 1941. Broadcast, London. In R. R. James, Ed.. Winston Churchill: His Complete Speeches 1897-1963. Vol. 6. New York & London: R. R. Bowker, 1974.

Bobbitt, Philip. Terror and Consent: The Wars of the Twenty-First Century. London: Penguin Books, 2008.

Campbell, Kenneth. Genocide and the Global Village. New York: Palgrave, 2001.

Craig, W. J. Shakespeare: Complete Works. London: Robinson Publishing, 1993.

Gow, James. Serbian State Project and its Adversaries: A Strategy of War Crimes. London: Hurst & Co. Ltd, 2003.

Human Rights Watch. ‘Darfur Documents Confirm Government Policy of Militia Support.’ A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, 19 July 2004.

Human Security Report 2005. Human Security Centre. http://www.humansecurityreport.info/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=28&Itemid=63 [accessed 19 December 2009].

Jones, Adam. Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction. Oxon: Routledge, 2006.

Kaldor, Mary. New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. 2nd Edition. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006.

Lemkin, Raphael. ‘Genocide as Crime Under International Law.’ American Journal of International Law, 41. No. 1, (1947): 145-151.

Levene, Mark. Genocide in the Age of the State: The Meaning of Genocide. No. 1. New York: IB Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2005.

Mann Michael. The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Killing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Markusen, Eric and David, Kopf. The Holocaust and Strategic Bombing: Genocide and Total War in the Twentieth Century. Boulder: Westview Press, 1995.

Prunier, Gerard. Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide. Ithica: University of Cornell Press, 2005.

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Schell, Jonathon. Unconquerable World: Why Peaceful Protest is Stronger than War. London: Penguin Books, 2003.

Shaw, Martin. War and Genocide: Organized Killing in Modern Society. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003.

_____. ‘War and Genocide: A Sociological Approach.’ Online Encyclopaedia of Mass Violence. http://www.massviolence.org/War-and-Genocide-A-Sociological-Approach, ISSN 1961-9898 [accessed 11 November 2009].

Totten, Samuel. ‘Darfur Genocide.’ Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts. 3rd Edition. New York: Routledge, 2009.

Trotter, Hannes, et al. ‘Ethnic Cleansing Operations in the North-eastern City Zvornik from April through June 1992.’ Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights. http://www.univie.ac.at/bim/php/bim/?level=10&id=351 [accessed 11 October 2009].

Valentino, Benjamin. Final Solutions: Mass Killings and Genocide in Twentieth Century. Ithica: Cornell University Press, 2005.

Weitz, Eric. A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003.

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