Lexical Semantics 5-6

8/16/2019 Lexical Semantics 5-6

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The basic statements of the classical theory of the meaning of terms and, thus, of

categories are the following:

1. Each meaningful term has some concept or intension or cluster of features

associated with it. t is this meaning that is present to the mind when the termis understood. The mental representation of a concept is a summary

description, a pattern of recognition of an entire class.

!. The features in the intension" concept are singly necessary and #ointly sufficient

to define the referent $e%tension& of the term. 'or a feature to be singly

necessary, e(ery ob#ect that )ualifies as a referent must ha(e it, and for a set

of features to be #ointly sufficient, e(ery entity ha(ing that set of featuresmust be in the e%tension of the concept. *ence the name of the necessary

and sufficient conditions model.

The model of + is easily (erified for concepts lie square:

$1/& squares: closed figure

four-sided

e)ual angles

e)ual sides

0e will refer to such necessary and sufficient features as defining features. Let us

also recall, 'rege-arnaps thesis that intension determines e%tenstion.

atisfaction of the features in the intension cluster determines membership

in the e%tension class.


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2. ince the features are necessary, representing defining or criterial attributes, they offer the

basis of analytic statements.

f 3 is a property in some concept T, then the statement 4ll Ts are 3 is true by definition

$11& 4ll Ts are 3 4ll crows are blac 4ll dogs are animals

4ll circles are round.

riterial attributes are essential in the 4ristotelian sense. +otice the difference between

accidental and essential properties: Dogs are animals." Dogs are good pets.

This is also the distinction between the le%icon and the encycloapedia, which is richer,

containing essential as well as accidental or contingent attributes. emember the

structuralist (iew $oseriu& of meaning:

Le sens dun mot est un ensemble de traits r7ferentilelles, de traits )ue doit poss7der un

segment de la r7alite pour 8tre d7nomm7 par ce mot.9

. This conception of meaning leads to certain characteristics of categories:

$i& The conception that categories ha(e clearly delimited boundaries.

$ii& ;embership in a category is a yes"no matter< thus, a certain n geometric figure either is

or is not a s)uare, according as it does or does not satisfy all the necessary and

sufficient conditions for membership in the category square.

$iii& 4ll the members of a category ha(e e)ual status< because each member possesses all

the re)uired properties.

The model of the + has come under the fire of se(ere criticism from linguistic,

philosophical and psychological )uarters, all of which ha(e recently adopted a

cogniti(ist perspecti(e.


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3. Against the NSC model

The model of + both as a model of conceptual analysis and as a model of le%ical

analysis has been found to be deficient in (arious ways.

3.2. Does intension (properly) determine extension?

=ne thesis, implicitly present in the 4 model, and which has been intensely

scrutin>ed from philosophical )uarters is that intensions $concepts& (iewed as

bundles of + correctly determine e%tension. n the se(enties and eightiesthis thesis has been challenged by philosophers within the framewor of the

so-called causal or historical theories of reference.$3utnam, 1?@5, Aonellan,

1?B!&. The following ob#ections were brought against this thesis:

a. The first ob(ious ob#ection was that not all ob#ects which mae up the e%tension

of the term ha(e all or e(en most of the characteristics stipulated in the

definition. E(en if CLemons are yellow and CTigers are striped and ats arefour-legged, there are green lemons, unstriped tigers and three-legged cates.


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b. t is not always the case that intension determines e%tension. 4n e%ample which has becomefamous is 3utnams Twin Earth E%ample.

Putnam’s Twin Earth Story

Twin Earth is a planet in all respects lie Earth. The only peculiarity of Twin Earth is that the li)uidcalled water is not *!=, but a different li)uid whose chemical formula is (ery long, say DF.0e suppose that DF is indistinguishable from water at normal temperature and pressure. nparticular, it tastes lie water and it )uenches thirst lie water.

4 spaceship from Earth first decides that Cwater has the same meaning on TE and E. This suppositionwill be corrected when it is disco(ered that water on TE is DF and the Earthian spaceship willreport something lie the following: on the basis of the following obser(ations:

$15&

Earth Twin Earth

water water li)uid li)uid

colorless colorless

tasteless tasteless

odorless odorless

. .

*!= DF

C=n TE, the word water means DF, determining the e%tension DF.

onclusions : a. The same intension $cluster of properties&, the same definition determines differente%tensions, *!= (s DF. Therefore, one cannot say that intension correctly determinese%tension.

b. The situation is not impro(ed if we e)uate intension with cogniti(e state of a speaer, as determinedwhen entertaining a concept. n that case, to ha(e an intension"concept means to be in acertain psychological state. Two speaers on E and TE may be in the same psychological

state, they may ha(e the same concept of Cwater and yet they determine different e%tensions.


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2.2.! The determination of e%tension. 3utnams di(ision of linguistic labor.

ecall that one problem raised by 3utnams e%amples was: ince the intension does not determine

e%tension, how do we determine the e%tension of a general termG

3artial answers to this )uestion were supplied in the framewor of the causal or historical account of

reference. 4ccording to this orientation reference fi%ing mechanisms are typically non-definitional. 'or most natural ind terms, reference is fi%ed through some ind of causal

interaction between the users of the term and samples of the natural ind to which the term

refers. eference is passed along the reference chain of the community. The causal

e%planation of reference starts from an attempt of defending the position that general terms

must be understood referentially and that they name real essences, e(en if we do not

possess con(entional unre(isable definitions for them. $recall the case of Cwhale and Catoms&.

3utnam suggests that the correct position to adopt is that of metaphysical realism.There are se(eral non-definitional ceremonies of introducing new terms:

$a& ostensie definitions 'or instance, CThis is water with an accompanying gesture, The sentence is

uttered with the presupposition Cthe body of li)uiud that the speaer is pointing to bears a

certain sameness relation $C% is the same li)uid as y& to what must members of the

community will call water.9

$b& giing a stereotype eference may be introduced (ia associated properties, which function as an

operational definition or a stereotype of the normal member of the e%tension. The members ofthe e%tension are sufficiently the same as the typical member.

n both instances we are dealing with #udgments of similarity e(ol(ing the notion Csame % as y. Hut the

relation Csame % as y is a theoretical relation< whether something is or is not the same li)uid

as this may tae an indeterminate amount of scientific in(estigation to determine, and

depends on how ad(anced our tools are etc.. $4 spaceship from Earth before La(oisier, would

not ha(e been in a position to describe the difference between Earth water and Twin Earth

water,


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oming bac to 3utnams water on TE e%amples, one might adopt two different attitudes

to the facts of the case:

$i& 0e may adopt a conentionalist position n that case, we consider the properties

in the intension of water are taen as constant and unre(isable. 0ater is any stuffthat satisfies the +. n that case, TE water, i.e., DF counts as water, i.e., water

has a constant meaning"intension and a world"relati(e e%tension.

$ii& 0e may adopt a realist stance n that case, we consider that the term water

names a real essence of this $our& world. I a stuff with a particular hidden structure

$described chemically as *!/&. Hut then, the stuff called water on TE is not water .

Hut then, in some sense, water no longer has the same meaning on E and T0

since different e!tensions are determined , and it appears that extension is part ofthe term’s semantics.

The two positions embody different epistemological attitudes. =n the first, con(entionalist

$traditionalist& position, water, gold, tiger etc. designate whate(er satisfies the

current operational definitions, since the e%tension is #ust what the term is Ctrue of,

and truth has become an intra-theoretic notion depending on the particular

definitions endorsed by our current theory. 0e call water a li)uid which bears therelation Csame li)uid to water in the actual world. I that is what we intend when we

gi(e an ostensi(e definition.

C0ater is *!& is a metaphysically true statement $i.e., it is true in all possible worlds&,

although it is epistemologically contingent.


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2.2.2 t also appears that terms lie water" gold , etc. ha(e an unnoticed

inde%ical component, water is stuff that bears a certain similarity relation

to the water around here. 0ater at another time or place must bear the

relation Csame Li)uid to our water in order to be water. Thus 3utnamconcludes Cthe theory that $1& words ha(e intensions, which are

something lie concepts associated with words by speaers and that $!&

intension determines e%tension cannot be true of natural ind terms lie

water" for the same reason that it cannot be true of inde%ical words lie .

0e cannot ignore the contribution of the conte%t, the real world I in

determining the hidden structure, the essence of the term.9 0hen 4rchimedes asserted that something was gold, he was not saying that it

had the superficial characteristics of gold, he was saying that it had the

same hidden structure as any normal piece of gold.9 0hen we introduce

the term, we need not now the real essence of the substance we are

naming. 0e merely hope that nowledge of the real essence will be the

product of empirical research. =nce the term has been introduced, it willpass from person to person, through a referential chain, which pro(ides

the historical lin between the different uses of the term, maintaining and

intending to maintain reference.9


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2.2.. The e%ample also suggests that e%tension is not alwaysdetermined at the le(el of the indi(idual speaers, but at the le(elof the community. To tae one more e%ample, two English

speaers would agree that the words elm#tree and $eech#tree ha(e different meanings and e%tensions, although, )uite possibly,they may not be able to tell an elm#tree from a $eech#tree. Thepossibility of using such words in true sentences would not e%ist,if there did not e%ist in the community e%perts who can identifyelm-trees and beech trees, thus, only e%perts can determine thee%tension of words lie moly$denum" gold" hedge#sparrow , etc.

There e%ists, 3utnam belie(es, a sort of diision of linguistic la$or . 4nycommunity possesses at least some terms whose associatedcriteria are nown only to a subset of the speaers who ac)uirethe term and whose use by the others depends upon a structuredcooperation between most speaers and the e%perts. Thus thecorrect correspondence between linguistic e%pressions and the

world may be determined by the speech community as a whole,but may not necessarily be reflected in the nowledge of eachmember of the community.


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2. ;ore on componential definitions as descriptions of prototypes 4s mentioned abo(e, one other

problem raised by 3utnams story regards the role of the componential definition, ince it

does not really include the necessary and sufficient conditions for membership in the

e%tension, it is no longer clear what its functions is.

4 natural suggestion is that a componential definition describes a typical member of the e%tension I aprototype $this is a cogniti(e notion, e%plained below&. The linguistic description of a

prototype is dubbed by 3utnam a stereotype< 4 stereotype is an operational definition<

membership in category is based on a #udgment of family resemblance with the prototype. n

terms of language use, the stereotype represents amy speaers minimal linguistic obligation

I any speaer who nows the word is supposed to now the stereotype. Thus, for most

words, there is a certain minimum number of features $entailments& that all speaers of the

language are supposed to now, e(en though these features may happen not to single out thee%tension reliably. 'or e%amples, English speaers are supposed to now that tigers are

large, cat-lie animals that are orange and ha(e blac stripes, e(en if these features

$entailments& are neither necessary, nor sufficient to distinguish tigers from non-tigers

accurately.

3utnam proposes to di(ide the description of the semantics of concrete terms into two parts:

$1& the determination of e%tension this presupposes the sociolinguistic di(ision of labor, it is a

matter of sociolinguistics and it is based on a structured co-operation between speaers.$!& the description pf semantic competence, the particular ideas and sills re)uired for an

indi(idual to use a word correctly< at least for some terms this nowledge is in fact nowledge

of a stereotype, that is nowledge of a description of a prototypical member. The stereotype is

a linguistic entity, the prototype is a cogniti(e, psychological entity. The concept of prototype

originates in the psychological studies of categori>ation $see osch and associates&.

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Lexical Semantics 5-6