Liberty of Abode and Travel Digests

7/27/2019 Liberty of Abode and Travel Digests

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/liberty-of-abode-and-travel-digests 1/4

Marcos vs. Manglapus [GR 88211, 15 September 1989]

En Banc, Cortes (J): 6 concur, 1 concurs in separate opinion, 5

dissent in separate opinions, 1 on leave

Facts: In February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed

from the presidency via the non-violent "people power"

revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C.

Aquino was declared President of the Republic under a

revolutionary government. Her ascension to and

consolidation of power have not been unchallenged. The

failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by political leaders of

Mr. Marcos, the takeover of television station Channel 7 by

rebel troops led by Col. Canlas with the support of "Marcos

loyalists" and the unsuccessful plot of the Marcos spouses to

surreptitiously return from Hawaii with mercenaries aboard

an aircraft chartered by a Lebanese arms dealer awakened

the nation to the capacity of the Marcoses to stir trouble

even from afar and to the fanaticism and blind loyalty of their

followers in the country. The ratification of the 1987Constitution enshrined the victory of "people power" and

also clearly reinforced theconstitutional moorings of Mrs.

Aquino's presidency. This did not, however, stop bloody

challenges to the government. On 28 August 1987, Col.

Gregorio Honasan, one of the major players in the February

Revolution, led a failed coup that left scores of people, both

combatants and civilians, dead. There were several other

armed sorties of lesser significance, but the message they

conveyed was the same — a split in the ranks of the military

establishment that threatened civilian supremacy over the

military and brought to the fore the realization that civiliangovernment could be at the mercy of a fractious military. But

the armed threats to the Government were not only found in

misguided elements in the military establishment and among

rabid followers of Mr. Marcos. There were also the

communist insurgency and the secessionist movement in

Mindanao which gained ground during the rule of Mr.

Marcos, to the extent that the communists have set up a

parallel government of their own in the areas they effectively

control while the separatists are virtually free to move about

in armed bands. There has been no let up in these groups'

determination to wrest power from the government. Notonly through resort to arms but also through the use of

propaganda have they been successful in creating chaos and

destabilizing the country. Nor are the woes of the Republic

purely political. The accumulated foreign debt and the

plunder of the nation attributed to Mr. Marcos and his

cronies left the economy devastated. The efforts at economic

recovery, three years after Mrs. Aquino assumed office, have

yet to show concrete results in alleviating the poverty of the

masses, while the recovery of the il l-gotten wealth of the

Marcoses has remained elusive. Now, Mr. Marcos, in his

deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines todie. But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire consequences to

the nation of his return at a time when the stability of

government is threatened from various directions and the

economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has

stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos

and his family. Hence, Marcos' petition for mandamus and

prohibition, asking the court to order Raul Manglapus as

Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Catalino Macaraig as Executive

Secretary, Sedfrey Ordonez as Secretary of Justice, Miriam

Defensor Santiago as Immigration Commissioner, Fidel Ramos

as Secretary of National Defense, and Renato de Villa as Chief

of Staff, to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the

immediate members of his family and to enjoin the

implementation of the President's decision to bar their return

to the Philippines. Issue: Whether Ferdinand E. Marcos and

his family have the right to travel and liberty of abode, in light

of the attendant circumstances in the present case.

Held: The individual right involved is not the right to travel

from the Philippines to other countries or within the

Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally

connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return

to one's country, a totally distinct right under international

law, independent from although related to the right to travel.

Thus, the Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the

right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory

of a state, the right to leave a country, and the right to enter

one's country as separate and distinct rights. The Declarationspeaks of the "right to freedom of movement and residence

within the borders of each state" separately from the "right

to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his

country." On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the

"right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his

residence" and the

right to "be free to leave any country, including his own."

which rights may be restricted by such laws as "are necessary

to protect national security, public order, public health or

morals or the separate rights and freedoms of others." asdistinguished from the "right to enter his own country" of

which one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." It would

therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the

right to return to one's country in the same context as those

pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel. The

right to return to one's country is not among the rights

specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only

of the

liberty of abode and the right to travel, but the right to return

may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of

international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the

law of the land. However, it is distinct and separate from the

right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the

International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e.,

against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof. On the other

hand, the Constitution declares among the guiding principles

that "the prime duty of the Government is to serve and

protect the people" and that "the maintenance of peace and

order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and

thepromotion of the general welfare are essential for the

enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy."Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the

maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life,

liberty and property, and the promotion of the general

welfare are essentially ideals to guide governmental action.

Thus, in the exercise of presidential functions, in drawing a

plan of government, and in directing implementing action for

these plans, or from another point of view, in making any

decision as President of the Republic, the President has to

consider these principles, among other things, and adhere to



them. Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is

right to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the

President is, under the Constitution, constrained to consider

these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More than

that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution,

the President has the obligation under the Constitution to

protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the

national interest. Since the persons who seek to return to the

country are the deposed dictator and his family at whose

door the travails of the country are laid and from whom

billions of dollars believed to be ill-gotten wealth are sought

to be recovered, the constitutional guarantees must be

adjusted to the requirements of equally important public

interests, as such are neither absolute nor inflexible. The

President has determined that the destabilization caused by

the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains

achieved during the past few years and lead to total

economic collapse. Given what is within our individual and

common knowledge of the state of the economy, the Court

cannot argue with that determination.

MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS [177 SCRA 668; G.R. NO. 88211;

15 SEPT 1989]

Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and

prohibition asking the court to order the respondents

Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents

to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his

family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's

decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners

assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in thePhilippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically

Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without

power to impair the l iberty of abode of the Marcoses because

only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law.

Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law

has authorized her to do so. They further assert that under

international law, their right to return to the Philippines is

guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted

by the constitution, the President (Aquino) may prohibit the

Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right

involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to

other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the

right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right

involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's

country, a distinct right under international law, independent

from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to

freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a

state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter

one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the

Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement

and residence within the borders of each state". On the other

hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of

movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right

to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights

may only be restricted by laws protecting the national

security, public order, public health or morals or the separate

rights of others. However, right to enter one's country cannot

be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to

construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country

in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of

abode and the right to travel. The Bill of rights treats only the

liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well

considered view that the right to return may be considered,

as a generally accepted principle of International Law and

under our Constitution as part of the law of the land. The

court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave

abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the

Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to

national interest and welfare. President Aquino has

determined that the destabilization caused by the return of

the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the

past few years after the Marcos regime. The return of the

Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting

their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby

DISMISSED.

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS. VASQUEZ [217 SCRA 633; G.R.

NOS. 99289-90; 27 JAN 1993]

Facts: An information was filed against petitioner with the

Sandiganbayan for violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt

Practices Act. The order of arrest was issued with bail for

release fixed at Php. 15,000 so she filed a motion for

acceptance of cash bail bond. On the same day theSandiganbayan issued a resolution authorizing the petitioner

to post cash bond which the later filed in the amount of

Php.15, 000. Her arraignment was set, but petitioner asked

for the cancellation of her bail bond and that she be allowed

provisional release on recognizance. The Sandiganbayan

deferred it. The Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order

against petitioner, by reason of the announcement she made

that she would be leaving for the U.S. to accept a fellowship a

Harvard. In the instant motion she submitted before the S.C.

she argues that her right to travel is impaired.

Issue: Whether or Not the petitioner’s right to travel is

impaired.

Held: The petitioner does not deny and as a matter of fact

even made a public statement, that she he every intension of

leaving the country to pursue higher studies abroad. The

court upholds the course of action of the Sandiganbayan in

taking judicial notice of such fact of petitioners pal to go

abroad and in thereafter issuing a sua sponte the hold

departure order is but an exercise of respondent court’s

inherent power to preserve and to maintain effectiveness of

its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.

Also, the petitioner assumed obligations, when she posted

bail bond. She holds herself amenable at all times to the

orders and process of eth court. She may legally be

prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of

the case. (Manotoc v. C.A.)



Yap vs. CA

Facts: The right against excessive bail, and the liberty of

abode and travel, are being invoked to set aside two

resolutions of the Court of Appeals which fixed bail at

P5,500,000.00 and imposed conditions on change of

residence and travel abroad. For misappropriating amounts

equivalent to P5,500,000.00, petitioner was convicted of

estafa and was sentenced to four years and two months ofprision correccional, as minimum, to eight years of prision

mayor as maximum, “in addition to one (1) year for each

additional P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no case

shall it exceed twenty (20) years.” He filed a notice of appeal,

and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash

bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings.

Issue: Was the condition imposed by the CA on accused’s bail

bond violative the liberty of abode and right to travel?

Held: Imposing bail in an excessive amount could render

meaningless the right to bail. Under the circumstances of this

case, we find that appropriate conditions have been imposed

in the bail bond to ensure against the risk of flight,

particularly, the combination of the hold-departure order and

the requirement that petitioner inform the court of any

change of residence and of his whereabouts. Although an

increase in the amount of bail while the case is on appeal may

be meritorious, we find that the setting of the amount at

P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an

effective denial of petitioner’s right to bail.

YAP vs. Court of Appeals

Ramon Yap purchased a parcel of land situated in Quezon

City, from the spouses Carlos and Josefina Nery. The lot was

thereupon registered in the name of Ramon Yap he also

declared the property in his name for tax purposes and paid

the real estate taxes due threon from 1966 to 1992.

In 1962 Ramon Yap constructed a two storey 3 door

apartment building for the use of the Yap family. 1/5 of the

cost of the construction was defrayed by Ramon Yap while

the rest was shouldered by Chua Mia, the mother of Lorenzo,Benjamin and Ramon. Upon the request of the old woman

the tax declaration for real estate was placed under the name

of Lorenzo Yap.

Lorenzo Yap died on 11 July 1970. A few month leter, his heirs

including Ramon yap allowed petitioners to use one unit of

the apartment building. On March 18, 1992, Ramon Yap sold

the land and his share of the 3-door apartment to his brother,

his herein co-respondent Benjamin Yap, for the sum of

P337,500.00 pursuant to a Deed of Sale.

Petitioners advised respondents of the former’s claim of

ownership over the property and demanded that

respondents execute the proper deed necessary to transfer

the title to them. Petitioners claim that Lorenzo requested his

brother Ramon to allow the use of the latter’s name in the

purchase, registration, and declaration for tax purposes of

the subject lot to which Ramon Yap consented. It was agreed

that the property would remain registered in the name of

Ramon yap until such time as Lorenzo would have acquired

Philippine citizenship but that, should Lorenzo, the lot would

then be transferred to Lorenzo’s heirs upon the latter’s

naturalization.

Both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court denied the

petition and dismisses the case.

Issue: WON the petitioners are entitled to own the

questioned property.

HELD: Petitioners were not able to prove adequately the

agreement between them and the respondent. The petition

was denied and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals.

Yap vs. Court of Appeals [GR 141529, 6 June 2001] Third

Division, Gonzaga-Reyes (J): 4 concur

Facts: For misappropriating amounts equivalent to

P5,500,000.00, Francisco Yap Jr. (@ Edwin Yap] was convicted

of estafa by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City and was

sentenced to four years and two months of prisioncorrectional, as minimum to eight years of prision mayor as

maximum, "in addition to one (1) year for each additional

P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no case shall i t

exceed twenty (20) years." He filed a notice of appeal, and

moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond

he had filed earlier in the proceedings. The motion was

denied by the trial court in an order dated 17 February 1999.

After the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of

Appeals, Yap filed with the said court a Motion to Fix Bail For

the Provisional Liberty of Accused Appellant Pending Appeal,

invoking the last paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1997Revised Rules of Court. Asked to comment on this motion,

the Solicitor General opined that Yap may be allowed to post

bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00 and be required to

secure "a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place

of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he

will remain to be so until final judgment is rendered or in case

he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the

court and private complainant." Yap filed a Reply, contending

that the proposed bail ofP5,500,000.00 was violative of his

right against excessive bail. The resolution of the Court of

Appeals, issued on 6 October 1999, upheld the

recommendation of the Solicitor General. A motion for

reconsideration was filed, seeking the reduction of the

amount of bail fixed by the court, but was denied in a

resolution issued on 25 November 1999. Hence, the petition.

Issue: Whether the bail may be fixed at an amount equivalent

to the civil liability of which the accused is charged.

Held: The Court of Appeals exercised its discretion in favor of

allowing bail to Yap on appeal. The court stated that it was

doing so for "humanitarian reasons", and despite a perceivedhigh risk of flight, as by Yap's admission he went out of the

country several times during the pendency of the case, for

which reason the court deemed it necessary to peg the

amount of bail at P5,500,000.00. The prohibition against

requiring excessive bail is enshrined in the Constitution. The

obvious rationale, as declared in the leading case of De la

Camara vs. Enage, is that imposing bail in an excessive

amount could render meaningless the right to bail.



Thus, in Villaseñor vs. Abano, the Court made the

pronouncement that it will not hesitate to exercise its

supervisory powers over lower courts should the latter, after

holding the accused entitled to bail, effectively deny the same

by imposing a prohibitory sum or exacting unreasonable

conditions. At the same time, Section 9, Rule 114 of the

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure advises courts to

consider the following factors in the setting of the amount of

bail: (a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail; (b) Nature

and circumstances of the offense; (c) Penalty for the offense

charged; (d) Character and reputation of the accused; (e) Age

and health of the accused; (f) Weight of the evidence against

the accused; (g) Probability of the accused appearing at the

trial; (h) Forfeiture of other bail; (i) The fact that the accused

was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and (j) Pendency of

other cases where the accused is on bail. Thus, the court has

wide latitude in fixing the amount of bail. Where it fears that

the accused may jump bail, it is certainly not precluded from

installing devices to ensure against the same. Options may

include increasing the bail bond to an appropriate level, or

requiring the person to report periodically to the court and to

make an accounting of his movements. Herein, where Yap

was found to have left the country several times while the

case was pending, the Court of Appeals required the

confiscation of his passport and the issuance of a hold-

departure order against him. Under the circumstances, we

find that appropriate conditions have been imposed in the

bail bond to ensure against the risk of fl ight, particularly, the

combination of the hold-departure order and the

requirement that petitioner inform the court of any change of

residence and of his whereabouts. Although an increase in

the amount of bail while the case is on appeal may be

meritorious, the setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is

unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial

of Yap's right to bail. The purpose for bail is toguarantee the

appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so

required by the Court. The amount should Constitutional Law

II, 2005 ( 25 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) be high enough to

assure the presence of the accused when required but no

higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. To

fix bail at an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which

Yap is charged (in this case, P5,500,000.00) is to permit the

impression that the amount paid as bail is an exaction of the

civil liability that accused is charged of; this the Court cannot

allow because bail is not intended as a punishment, nor as a

satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily await the

judgment of the appellate court.

Documents

Liberty of Abode and Travel Digests