Libya’s Transition to Democracy: An Assessment with Recommendations

for British Foreign Policy

A Henry Jackson Society Strategic Briefing

By George Grant

December 2011

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYThe Economic Situation

◊ ThetwoprimarysourcesofrevenueforLibya’s

transitionalgovernmentareunfrozenassetsand

revenuesfromtheoilindustry.Theinternational

communityshouldassisttheLibyanauthoritiesin

developingthetransparencyandaccountability

mechanismsnecessarytoensurethatpublic

financesinLibyaareproperlyspent.

◊ ThedevelopmentofLibya’seconomybeyonditsoil

industryisalsoapriority.Inadditiontogenerating

employment,economicdiversificationisimportant

forimprovingdemocraticaccountabilitythatcomes

whenagovernmentcannotdrawsolelyonrevenues

fromnaturalresourcesforitsincomebutmustalso

relyontheenterpriseofitscitizens.

The Security Situation

◊ AlthoughthesecuritysituationinLibyaremains

uncertain,itisimproving.Rivalmilitiascontinue

tooperatebeyondthecontroloftheNational

TransitionalCouncil(NTC),includinginthecapital

Tripoli.However,theinclusivenatureofthenew

transitionalcabinethasgonesomewaytowards

amelioratingtheconcernsofinfluentialmilitiasthat

theircommunity/areabeadequatelyrepresentedat

thedecision-makingtable.

◊ TheNTC’sstatedobjectiveofincorporatingmilitia

intostatesecurityforcesistherightoneandhasthe

potentialtoprovidemilitiamenwithemployment

andbolsterthecountry’sunderdevelopedsecurity

capabilities.

◊ TheNTCremainsreticenttoinvolveoutsiders

initssecurityaffairs.However,theinternational

communityshouldbepreparedtoassistinthe

equippingandtrainingofLibyansecurityandpolice

forcesaswellassecuringthelargenumbersof

weapons,includingchemicalweapons,whichremain

unsecuredatpresent.

Political Reconciliation

◊ Intheabsenceofaproperlyfunctioningpolice

andjudiciary,severalthousandprisonersaccused

ofsupportingGaddafiduringtherevolutionare

currentlydetainedwithnoaccesstodueprocess.

Manyhavebeenabused,inparticularsub-Saharan

Africans,accusedofbeingmercenaries.Aparticular

reconciliationfailurerelatestoLibya’sTawerghan

community.

◊ Theinternationalcommunityshouldsupportthe

NTCbothindevelopingthemechanismsnecessary

toholdandtryallprisonerswithinthelaw,and

alsotoprosecutethoseaccusedofengagingin

mistreatment.

Civil Society and the Democratic

Process

◊ Libya’scivilsociety,whichshouldplayavitalpartin

thecountry’sdemocraticprocess,isverylimitedat

presentandinurgentneedofsupport.TheEUhas

beengiventheleadresponsibilityfordeveloping

Libyancivilsociety,andtheBritishGovernmenthas

declareditsintentiontodirectitseffortsaccordingly.

Inaddition,theGovernmentshouldidentify

worthwhilenon-governmentalinitiativesandprovide

bothpracticalandtheoreticalassistance.

Islamism in Libya

◊ AgreaterroleforIslaminLibya’spublicandpolitical

lifeishighlylikely.However,thedesirefordemocracy

inLibyaappearsgenuine:supportforal-Qaedais

limitedandfewLibyanswishtoseetheemergence

ofatheocraticstate.

◊ Libya’sdraftconstitutionisavowedlyIslamist,

stipulatingthatShariashouldbetheprimarysource

ofLibyanlaw.However,italsostipulatesthatLibya

shouldbeademocraticstatebasedonamulti-party

system,andcommitsthecountrytoupholding

internationalhumanrightslaw.Theaspirationisa

democracywhereinlawsandsocialnormsarebased

uponIslamicprecepts.

◊ IfanIslamistgovernmentisdemocraticallyelected

andthecurrentconstitutionisratified,theBritish

Governmentwillbeobligedtorespectthat.Itshould

befarlesstolerantofIslamistgroupsthatseekto

achievepoweroutsideofthedemocraticprocess,

orwhoattempttosubvertandgobeyondthe

parametersoftheconstitutionhavingbeenelected.

◊ TheBritishGovernmentshouldbeengagingwith

boththeauthoritiesandcivilsocietyinLibyato

ensurethatinternationallyagreedhumanrights

covenantsarerespected,whateverthecomposition

ofthenewLibyangovernment.

IntroductionThisyear’seventsinLibya,andacrosstheArabWorld

morebroadly,havebeenremarkable.Inbarely

twomonthstwoauthoritarianregimes,inEgypt

andTunisia,weredeposedinresponsetopopular

uprisings,makingpossibletransitionstothefirst

genuinelydemocraticelectionsineithercountry’s

history.

InLibya,ColonelMuammarGaddafiremindedthe

worldthathehadafirmergripontheleversofpower,

andthathewasnotafraidtousethemagainsthis

peoplewithlethaleffect.Thespeedwithwhichthe

internationalcommunityralliedtopreventGaddafi

fromfulfillinghispledgeto“cleanseLibyahouse

byhouse”resultedinthethirdWestern-ledmilitary

interventioninaMuslim-majoritycountryinlessthan

adecade,awhollyunanticipatedphenomenonthat

borewitnesstotheuniquenessofevents.

Asimportantasthedepositionoftheseregimes,

however,hasbeenthecrumblingoftheideathey

weresupposedtorepresent,namelythatsecular

dictatorshipsarethesurestguarantorsofWestern

interestsintheArabworld,andthatdemocracyisnot

appropriateforitscitizens.Theserevolutionshave

servedasanoverduereminderthatlong-termstability

isimpossibleincountrieswhereoppressiveand

unaccountablegovernmentsdenytheircitizensthe

possibilityofregime-changethroughthesafety-valve

oftheballotbox.

Ofcourse,establishingagenuinedemocracytakes

time,andhistoryhasknownmorefailuresthan

successesinthisregard.Withouttheruleoflawand

thesupportingstructuresofadevelopedcivilsociety,

afreepress,anindependentjudiciaryandcredible

politicalparties,electionsalonecountforlittle.Even

beforeelectionshavebeencompleted,developments

inEgyptgivecauseforseriousconcern,whilstTunisia’s

futureunderthenewlyelectedIslamistgovernmentof

RashidGannouchialsoremainsuncertain.

ThepurposeofthisStrategicBriefingistoprovide

ashortassessmentofsomeofthekeyissues

confrontingLibyaduringthisearlypost-conflict

transitionstage,aswellasrecommendationsfor

Britishforeignpolicy.Theissuescoveredincludethe

economicsituation;thesecurityenvironment;the

reconciliationprocess;andthedevelopmentofLibya’s

civilsocietyandthefosteringofnascentdemocratic

institutions.Thebriefingalsoprovidesanassessment

ofthefutureroleofIslamistmovementsinLibya,and

whattheappropriatestanceoftheBritishGovernment

towardsthemshouldbe.

4

5

The Economic Situation

After42yearsofColonelGaddafi’sdictatorship,

theinstitutionsoftheLibyanstateareinevitably

underdevelopedandcorrupt.Thecountryranked168

of182inTransparencyInternational’s2011Corruption

PerceptionsIndex,alongsideAngolaandthe

DemocraticRepublicofCongo,andspecificsupportto

buildcapacityandenhancetransparencyinthestate’s

economicaffairsmustbeconsideredapriority.1

On16December2011,theUnitedNations(UN)

SecurityCouncilrespondedtorepeatedcallsbyLibya’s

NationalTransitionCouncil(NTC)tounfreezefrozen

Gaddafiassets,valuedatmorethan$150billion,by

releasingtheassetsoftheCentralBankofLibyaand

itssubsidiary,theLibyanForeignBank.2Commenting

onthedecision,theBritishForeignSecretary,William

Hague,declaredthat“Libya’sgovernmentwillnow

havesignificantfundsneededtohelprebuildthe

country,tounderpinstabilityandtoensurethat

Libyanscanmakethetransactionsthatareessential

toeverydaylife”.3HeaddedthatLondonwouldnow

freesome£6.5billion($10billion)heldintheUnited

Kingdom(UK).4

Ononelevelthedecisionistherightone.TheNTC

hasbeenbadlyshortoffundssincetakingchargeof

Libyafourmonthsago,andensuringthatsalaries

canbepaidandinfrastructurerebuiltisapriority.

However,itisworthrecallingthewarningissuedby

theNTC’sformerinterimoilminister,AliTarhouni,

backinNovember:“Wedon’twantthiswholesale

unblockingorunfreezingofassets.Wecannotcontrol

andmonitortheseassets...So,whatwewanttodois

1 Transparency Internationl, Corruption Perceptions Index 2011, 2011, http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/#CountryResults (last accessed 12 December 2011)

2 CBC News, UN unfreezes assets of 2 Libyan banks, 16 December 2011, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2011/12/16/libya-banks-sanctions-un.html (last accessed 20 December 2011)

3   Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Foreign Secretary welcomes lifting of sanctions on Libyan banks, British Government, 16 December 2011, http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=News&id=707022682 (last accessed 20 December 2011)

4 BBC, UN lifts sanctions on Libya’s key banks, 17 December 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16228845 (last accessed 20 December 2011)

tohaveatargetedtypeofunblockingbasedonthe

identifiedneedsthatwehave.”5ApriorityfortheUK

andothersseekingtofacilitateLibya’stransitionto

democraticrulemustthereforebetoassisttheNTC

indevelopingthemechanismsneededtoensure

thattheseassets,andpublicfinancesgenerally,are

handledaccountably.

TheNTChassignalleditscommitmenttofiscal

transparencyandaccountabilitythroughthe

establishmentofanindependentauditauthority,

inaccordancewithitsConstitutionalDeclaration

of3August2011.6Itisenvisagedthatthiswill

serveasthemainbodyresponsibleforaddressing

corruptionandensuringtransparencyingovernment.

Encouragingly,officialsoftheauditauthorityhave

expressedaninterestininternationalassistancein

ordertosuccessfullyexecuteitsremit,andtheUK,

workingtogetherwithbothmultilateralbodiessuch

astheUNandtheInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF),

aswellasrelevantprivate-sectorserviceproviders,

shouldberespondingtothiscall.Theimportanceof

internationalassistanceinthisfieldisunderpinnedby

thecomparativelackofexperiencesufferedbymany

nowservingintheLibyanauthorities,combinedwith

theunderdevelopedstateofLibyaninstitutionsleftby

MuammarGaddafi.

Nowherewilltransparencyandaccountability

mechanismsbemoreneededthanintherealdriving

forceoftheLibyaneconomy,itsoilindustry.Hitherto

thelargestinallAfrica,Libya’soilindustrywasshut

downandbadlydamagedbytheconflict,leavinga

majorgapintheNTC’sfinances,hencetheurgencyof

theircallsfortheinternationalcommunitytounfreeze

assetsintheinterim.UnderGaddafi,Libya’soil

industryaccountedforsome95%ofexportearnings,

5 Macdonald, Alastair, Oil rush aids new Libya govt, but challenges ahead, Reuters, 10 November 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/10/libya-economy-idUSL5E7MA14Q20111110 (last accessed 12 December 2011)

6   The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, United Nations Security Coucnil Report, 22 November 2011

6

25%ofGDP,and80%ofgovernmentrevenue.7Since

thefallofTripoliinAugust2011,outputhasbeen

recoveringfairlyrapidlyandisexpectedtoreach

800,000barrelsperday(bpd)bytheendofthisyear.It

isforecastthatoiloutputwillreachfullpre-warlevels

of1.6mbpdbytheendof2012.8

Althoughthisrecoveryistobewelcomed,two

obviousconcernswillbefirstthatthetendering

processfornewcontractsisopenandtransparent,

andsecondthatrevenuesareusedforthebenefitof

Libyansocietyasawholeandnotjustitselites.The

independentauditauthoritywillexerciseoversightof

theformer,andtheBritishGovernmentshouldoffer

supportthroughthatavenue.Withregardstothe

latterproblem,thatofensuringthatoilrevenuesare

equitablyspent,thekeytosuccesswillbetheoverall

successofLibya’stransitiontodemocracy.Onthat

measure,theUKneedstorecognisethatasuccessful

recoveryofLibya’soilindustry,ifnotmatchedby

developmentofthebroadereconomy,couldbeas

muchofahindranceasahelp.

PastexperienceinbothLibyaandelsewherehas

demonstratedthatwhereagovernmentdoesnot

needtorelyontheenterpriseofitscitizensforits

income,butcaninsteaddrawonnaturalresources

thatitcontrols,accountabilityandgoodgovernance

canbedramaticallyreduced.Tothatend,theBritish

Governmentshouldcertainlybesupportingefforts

todevelopLibya’sprivatesector.Astrongprivate

sectorinLibyawillnotonlybetothebenefitofthe

Libyanpeopleintermsofgreateremploymentand

prosperity,butalsointermsofnecessitatinggreater

governmentaccountability.

ThepotentialforastrongandsuccessfulLibyan

privatesectorcertainlyexists.Libyansocietyis

comparativelywelleducated,andmanyLibyans

7 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Libya, 2011, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html (last accessed 12 December 2011)

8 BBC, Libya oil output to return to pre-war levels next year, 13 November 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-15712718 (last accessed 12 December 2011)

possessskillsinsectorssuchasengineering,shipping

andconstruction.Literacyamongstmenexceeds92

percent,andinwomenstandsat72percent.9Under

Gaddafi,morethan60percentoftheworkforce

wasemployedbythestate10and30percentof

Libyanswereestimatedtobeunemployed.11There

isconsequentlysignificantcapacitywithintheLibyan

economyforanexpansionoftheprivatesectorfrom

whichLibyanswouldbenefit.Thereisonlysomuch

thatgovernmentscandotoexpandprivatesector

growth;byfarthemosteffectivevehiclebeingthe

freemarket.TheBritishGovernmentcouldseeka

rolebyadvisingtheNTConbusinessregulationsand

educationalinitiatives,butsuchendeavoursmustbe

accompaniedbyconcomitanteffortstohelprestore

securityandlawandorder.

The Security Situation

Bymostaccounts,thesecuritysituationinLibya

isimproving.Althoughanunspecifiednumberof

independentmilitias,or“brigades”,stilloperate,the

majorityofmilitiashavenowcometogetherunderthe

umbrellasofvariousMilitaryCouncils,establishedcity

bycity.Forinstance,thereisaTripoliMilitaryCouncil,

comprisingthebulkofhitherto-independentmilitias

operatinginandaroundTripoli;aBenghaziMilitary

Councilandsoforth.Inanefforttounifythesemilitary

councils,andtobringtheminlinewiththeNTC,each

councilisnowsupposedtosendrepresentativestoa

SupremeMilitaryCouncil,althoughtheprecisenature

orextentofitsconstitutioncurrentlyremainsunclear.

Althoughmanyofthesemilitiashavedeclaredtheir

allegiancetotheNTC,theyarenot,forthemostpart,

controlledbythem.

9 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Libya, 2011, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html (last accessed 12 December 2011)

10   GlobalSecurity, Libya – Politics, GlobalSecurity.org, 2011, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/libya/politics.htm (last accessed 12 December 2011)

11 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Libya, 2011, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html (last accessed 12 December 2011)

7

MilitiasfromthetownsofMisurataandZintan

continuetoproveparticularlyproblematicforthe

NTC.BothretainanarmedpresenceinsideTripoli,

andcontrolvariouskeyassets,including,inthecase

ofZintan,theairport.Powerstrugglescontinue,and

occasionallymanifestthemselvesinopen,albeit

limitedconflict.On11December,theconvoyofLibya’s

armychief,KhalifaHaftar,cameunderfirewhenit

failedtostopatacheckpointcontrolledbynon-Tripoli

militia.12

Tripoli’sauthoritiesaremakingconcertedeffortsto

getthesituationinthecapitalundercontrol,andon6

December,theTripolicitycouncilissuedanultimatum

tothesebrigades,insistingthattheyhaduntil20

Decembertoleave.Asourceinsidethecountry

confirmedthatsuchanultimatumhadindeedbeen

issued,inconjunctionwiththeTripoliMilitaryCouncil,

addingthatthecity’sstreetswouldbelockeddown

iftheexternalmilitiashadnotcompliedbythen.

On8December,theNTC’sinterimprimeminister,

AbdurrahimEl-Keib,contradictedthecouncils,insisting

thatconfrontationwasnottherightwayforwards.13

Onthesameday,however,ElKeibannouncedthata

majorgroupof“freedomfighters”fromoutsideTripoli

hadagreedtoleavethecity,althoughhedeclined

torevealtheidentityofthegroup.14Mostrecently,

Libya’sinterimdefenceminister,Osamaal-Juwali,

saidhebelievedthemilitiascouldbepersuadedto

disarmorleavethecapital“withinamonthandahalf,

approximately”,althoughheinsistedthiswasnota

concretedeadline.15

Whetherornotthesituationisresolvedwithin

thatperiod,thenatureofnegotiationstakingplace

12   Shuaib, Ali, Armed groups clash in turf war near Tripoli airport, Reuters, 11 December 2011, http://af.reuters.com/article/libyaNews/idAFL6E7NB06U20111211?

13   Murphy, Francois and Ali Shuaib, Libya leader says militia to withdraw from Tripoli, Reuters, 8 December 2011, http://af.reuters.com/article/libyaNews/idAFL5E7N84HQ20111208? (last accessed 12 December 2011) 

14 Murphy, Francois, Libyan Berbers vent rage over cabinet exclusion, Reuters, 27 November 2011, http://af.reuters.com/article/libyaNews/idAFL5E7MR0MF20111127? (last accessed 12 December 2011)

15   http://af.reuters.com/article/libyaNews/idAFL6E7NJ3M020111219

betweentheNTCandthemilitiasnonetheless

underlinesthefactthatoutrightconfrontationwith

theLibyangovernmentisnotonthelatter’sagenda

atpresent.Thevastmajorityofmilitiamentookup

armsforthepurposeofsupportingtherevolution

anddeposingGaddafi,anddonotseektoperpetuate

conflictinthispost-Gaddafienvironment.

Thereisalsosignificantsocialpressureamongst

Libyansacrossthecountrytoseethisrevolution

succeed,andtheinfluenceofsuchpressureonwould-

bemaverickmilitiasshouldnotbeunderestimated.

Thereappeartobethreeprimarymotivationsfor

militiamenretainingtheirarmsatpresent.First,

adesiretoensurethattheircommunity/areais

adequatelyrepresentedatthedecision-makingtable;

second,adesiretofindjobsforthemselves;andthird,

genuinesecurityconcerns.

TheNTCappearstobeseizedofalltheseconcerns

andisactingaccordingly.Whenannouncinghis

cabineton22November,El-Keibmadeapointof

insistingthatmembershadbeenappointedonthe

basisofcompetenceandexperience,notpolitics,

buthealsoinsistedthatallregionsofLibyawouldbe

represented.16

Technocratssuchasthenewdeputyprimeminister

DrMustafaAbushagur,afoundingpresidentofthe

USinternationalcollegeRITDubai,andoilminister

AbdulrahmanBenYezza,previouslyanexecutiveat

ItalianoilfirmEni,sitalongsidesignificantregional

appointeessuchasdefenceministeral-Juwaliand

ministeroftheinteriorFawziAbdelali.Immediately

priortohisappointmental-Juwaliwasleadingthe

ZintanBrigaderesponsibleforthecaptureofSaif

Gaddafi,whilstAbdelalihailsfromMisurata,alsoa

majorregionalpowerbase.

16 Ibid.

8

Thecompositionofthecabinethascertainlygone

somewaytowardsassuagingregionalconcernsabout

exclusionfrompowerinpost-GaddafiLibya,although

localisedprotestshavebeenseen,forinstanceby

thecountry’sBerberminority,whocomplainedof

notbeingrepresentedinthecabinet.TheNTChas

respondedbypointingoutthataBerberhasbeen

selectedasthecountry’stopjudge.17

Whathasbeenparticularlynotableaboutthecabinet’s

makeup,however,hasbeenitscomparativelysecular

character.Priortoitscreation,anumberofobservers

hadpredictedthatthecountry’smostprominent

Islamistleader,AbdulHakimBelhadj,whoheadsthe

TripoliMilitaryCouncil,wouldbegivenaprominent

placeinthecabinet,mostlikelyasministerofdefence.

Belhadj,however,insistedhewasnotinterestedina

positioninthecabinet,althoughhehasdeclaredhis

fullsupportforPrimeMinisterEl-Keibandhisefforts

toformastrongcabinet.“Iwanttoservemynation

withallthepowerandabilityIcanoffer”,hesaidinan

interviewinmid-November,“buttochoosewhereand

how.Itistooearlytotalkaboutthisnow.”18Giventhat

membersofthetransitionalcabinetareexcludedfrom

standinginthegeneralelectionstakingplacenext

year,manypredictthatIslamistssuchasBelhadjare

bidingtheirtimeuntilthen.

Althoughthemajorityofmajorpower-brokersappear

tobesatisfiedbytheNTC’sdiplomaticmanoeuvrings

fornow,meetingtheneedsandaspirationsofrank-

and-filemilitiamenisalsoapriority.On24October,

NTCChairmanMustafaAbdelJalilannouncedplans

fortheestablishmentofacommissioncharged

withreintegratingfighters,providingsupporttothe

woundedandthefamiliesofmartyrs,andcollecting

weapons.Thecommissionwasestablishedbydecree

on29October.19Ensuringthatwoundedfightersand

17 Ibid.

18   Holmes, Oliver, Rival Libyan rebel commanders beat chests, Reuters, 18 November 2011, http://af.reuters.com/article/libyaNews/idAFL5E7MI18220111118? (last accessed 20 December 2011)

19   The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, United Nations Security Coucnil Report, 

thefamiliesofthosekilledduringtherevolutionhave

accesstopropersupportiswidelyagreedasbeing

amongstthemosturgentprioritiesfortheNTCtoget

right.

Intermsoffindingemploymentformilitiamenthat

willbringtheminsidethestate’sambit,theNTCis

primarilyfocusingontheirintegrationintostate

securityforcesatpresent.Theobjectivehereistokill

twobirdswithonestone;atonceprovidingmilitiamen

witharegularsourceofemploymentwhilstbolstering

thecountry’ssecurityforces,whichbymostaccounts

areweakborderingonineffective.On1stDecember,

InteriorMinisterAbdelaliannouncedplanstointegrate

50,000fightersintothedefenceandinteriorministries’

securityforces,althoughnotime-framewasgiven.

Ultimately,theNTCplanstointegrate200,000fighters

intothesecurityforces.20

Justhoweffectivethisprocesswillberemainstobe

seen.Inthemeantime,theNTChasresortedtopaying

militiastoprovidesecurityinordertoexertatleast

someinfluenceoverthem.Thekeytothesuccessof

thisstrategy,andthekeytothestrategyofintegrating

themintothesecurityforcesbeyondthat,willbe

ensuringthatthesefightersgetpaid,andpaidon

time.Libyacannotaffordarepeatofwhathappened

inOctoberwhentheNTC,eitherforadministrative

reasonsorlackoffunds,failedtopaytheTMC.In

additiontotheobviousproblemssuchafailure

generates,italsosendsaverynegativeimagetothe

LibyanpeopleabouttheNTC’scompetenceduringthis

criticaltransitionalphase.

Thetwoprimarysourcesoffundingforthesesalaries

atpresentwillbeunfrozenassetsandoilrevenues.

Asmentioned,bothoilproductionandoilexports

areincreasingatahealthyrate,andtheunfreezing

ofassetsshouldhappenatarateconsistentwith

22 November 2011

20   STRATFOR, Libya: Security Forces to Integrate 50,000 Fighters, 1 December 2011, http://www.stratfor.com/sitrep/20111201-libya-security-forces-integrate-50000-fighters (last accessed 12 December 2011)

9

theNTC’scapacitytoensurethattheyarenot

misappropriated.TheroletheBritishGovernment

canplayinfacilitatingbothoftheseareashasbeen

addressedintheprevioussection.

IftheNTCcanensurethatmilitias’salaries

areregularlypaid,andthisiscombinedwitha

consolidationofitsearlyprogressinreconciling

regionaldivides,aswellassecular-Islamistdivides,

thentheprospectsforfurtherimprovementsin

Libya’ssecurityenvironmentlookpositive.Thisin

turnshouldsetinmotionaself-reinforcingcycle

thatwillamelioratethethirdreasonformilitias

failingtodisband,namelygenuinesecurityconcerns.

Inpracticalterms,thereislittlethattheBritish

Governmentcandotoconstructivelyinfluencesuch

developments,beyondofferingadviceormediationif

calledfor.

Thisisnot,however,theendofthestory.Also

importantmustbeenhancingthecompetenceof

Libya’ssecurityforces,andensuringthattheiractions

fallsquarelywithintheruleoflaw.Here,intheoryat

least,theBritishGovernmentcouldhaveamuchmore

positiveroletoplay.Forunderstandablereasons,

however,theNTCisreticentaboutpubliclyaccepting

internationalassistanceinthisparticularareaof

responsibility.DuringtheuprisingagainstColonel

Gaddafi,theNTCrepeatedlyruled-outhiringPrivate

MilitaryCompanies(PMCs),althoughthereisevidence

tosuggestthatPMCswereinfactactiveatthistime,

thoughtowhatextentpreciselyremainsunclear.21

Theprovisionofarmedmercenarypersonnelbyany

statewasprohibitedbyUNSecurityCouncilResolution

1970.22

Inthistransitionalphase,however,Libya’ssecurity

forceswillneedexternalassistance,whichthe

BritishGovernmentisinapositiontohelpprovide.

21   Kerr, Simon, Libyan rebels to form oil protection force, Financial Times, 7 August 2011, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c23c9014-c0f5-11e0-b8c2-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1gLJQk3rI (last accessed 12 December 2011)

22   http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/245/58/PDF/N1124558.pdf?OpenElement

Intermsofbothtrainingandproperlyequipping

Libya’sunderdevelopedsecurityforcesforthemany

diverseresponsibilitiestheywillnowbeexpectedto

undertake,theexperienceofUKtrainingmissionsand

supportteamsgarneredintheatresfromAfghanistan,

toBosnia,toIraq,toNorthernIrelandcouldcertainly

bebroughttobearinLibyanow.

OnefurtherareainwhichtheBritishGovernment

couldbeofuseinimprovingthesecuritysituationin

Libyawouldbethroughhelpingtosecurethelarge

numberofarmsandrelatedmaterialsthatremain

beyondtheNTC’scontrol,andtomanagestockpiles

effectively.Inadditiontosmallarms,asignificant

concernatpresentisexistingandnewly-discovered

stockpilesofchemicalweaponsandman-portable

surface-to-airmissiles.23UnitedNationsSecurity

CouncilResolution2017hasreiteratedthisconcern,

andtheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)has

begunworktosecureknownstockpilesofchemical

weapons.TheBritishGovernmentshouldstandready

toassisttheseeffortsasrequired,butalsotoofferits

assistanceinsecuringnon-chemicalweaponsstocks,

whicharguablyposeamoreimminentthreattothe

securitysituationinsideLibya.

Reconciliation Efforts

FromtheveryearlydaysoftherevolutioninLibya,it

wasclearthatsuccessagainstGaddafiwouldnotbe

broughtaboutthroughforceofarms,butthrough

facilitatingthecollapseoftheregimefromwithin.

NATOairstrikes,combinedwithcovertWesternand

Qatarioperations,wereinvaluableinneutralising

regimecommunicationsandweaponssystems,but

theyalonedidnotbringaboutthefallofregime-

controlledtownsandcities.Thestrategyadopted

bytheNTCwastherightone,andinvolvedquietly

recruitingmembersoftheGaddafiregimetothe

rebelcause,aswellasencouraginguprisingsintowns

23   The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, United Nations Security Coucnil Report, 22 November 2011

10

andcitiesasrebelforcesapproached.24Recognising

boththeneedoftheirservicesinanypost-Gaddafi

environment,andthenear-impossibilityofrebel

successinopenconflictagainstregimeforces,both

theNTCandtheUKwereabsolutelyrightinassuring

pro-regimeforcesandofficialsthattheywouldbe

affordedaplaceinanypost-GaddafiLibya.The

successofthisstrategywasdemonstratedbythe

speedinwhichanumberofmajortownsandcitiesfell

torebelforcesinAugust,notleastTripoliitself,with

veryfewshotsfired.

Thelimitedcapabilitiesofrebelforceswhen

confrontedwithdeterminedresistancewas

demonstratedduringanassaultonanoilrefineryin

Zawiyainmid-August,whenasingleregimesniper

wasabletoholduptheentirerebeladvanceformore

thanaday.Astillclearerexampleofthiswastheslow,

indiscriminateandextremelydestructiveassaulton

Gaddafi’shometownofSirte,whichdidnotfalluntil

mid-Octoberpreciselybecausetheoccupantshadlittle

tonoconfidencethattheirfuturewouldbesecureina

post-GaddafiLibya.

Sincetheendofhostilities,theNTChassuccessfully

integratedanumberofformerregimecivilservants

andsecuritypersonnel,consistentwiththe“Blueprint”

drawn-upbytheNTCduringtheconflict.Thatthis

processbothcontinuesanddeepensisabsolutelyvital

ifLibyaistosucceedinmakingthetransitionfrom

conflicttolastingstability.

Inspiteofthesepositivedevelopments,however,very

significantconcernsexistwithregardstothecapacity

oftheNTCtohandleseveralthousanddetainees

accusedofcommittingcrimesaspartofpro-Gaddafi

forcesduringtherevolution.AccordingtotheUN,

“whilstpoliticalprisonersheldbytheGaddafiregime

havebeenreleased,anestimated7,000detainees

arecurrentlyheldinprisonsandmakeshiftdetention

24   Grant, George, Endgame in Libya, The Henry Jackson Society, 23 August 2011, http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/stories.asp?id=2379 (last accessed 12 December 2011)

centres,mostofwhichareunderthecontrolof

revolutionarybrigades,withnoaccesstodueprocess

intheabsenceofafunctioningpoliceandjudiciary”.25

Therehavebeenreportsoftortureandill-treatmentof

someofthesedetainees,alargenumberofwhomare

ofsub-SaharanAfricanorigin,accusedofbeingforeign

mercenariesandallegedlytargetedonaccountofthe

colouroftheirskin.26

ItistobehopedthatasNTCcontrolacrossLibya

replacesthatofthemilitias,andthestructuresof

thestatecontinuetoberebuilt,thatsituationsof

thisnaturewillreduceinbothscopeandseverity.In

theinterim,theNTCmustberelentlessinexercising

whatleversofinfluenceitdoespossessoverthe

militiasholdingdetaineestoeitherhandthemover

totheNTC,ortotaketangiblestepstoamelioratethe

conditionsoftheirconfinement.

Attheveryleast,mistreatmentandtorturemust

stopimmediately,withthethreatthatthoseaccused

andfoundguiltyofsuchbehaviourwillbeheld

accountable.

TheeffortstowhichtheNTCwenttoassurethe

worldthatSaifGaddafiwouldbeaffordedafairtrial

insideLibya,signallingtheirreadinesstoworkwith

theInternationalCriminalCourt(ICC)tothatend,

demonstrateshowconsciousLibya’snewrulersareof

theirinternationalreputation.Theyshouldbeaware

thattheUNSecretaryGeneral’sreportdocumenting

thedetentionofthe7,000detaineeswaswrittenupon

morethan10,000newssitesintheEnglishspeaking

worldalone.

Inordertodemonstrateitscommitmentto

resolvingthissituation,theNTCshouldannounce

theestablishmentofaninvestigativecommittee,

comprisedofbothLibyanandinternationalspecialists,

25   The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, United Nations Security Coucnil Report, 22 November 2011

26 Ibid.

11

toinvestigateanddocumenttheconditionofformer

Gaddafiloyalistsandmercenariesnowheldin

custody.TheBritishGovernment,workingtogether

withtheUNandotherconcernedstatesifpossible,

shouldbeforthcomingonthispoint.

Morebroadly,thelackofafunctioningjudiciary

andpoliceinLibyaonlyre-emphasisestheurgent

needforinternationalassistanceindeveloping

theseinstitutions,boththroughdirecttrainingand

assistancetolow-levelpersonnel,andthrough

“trainingthetrainers”.

Perhapsthebiggestcauseforconcernintermsof

reconciliationfailures,however,istheplightofthe

Tawerghancommunity.Tawerghaisatownsituated

approximately25milessouthofMisurata,whose

inhabitantswereprimarilydescendedfromblack

Africanslaves.

Priortothisyear’srevolution,Tawerghanswere

allegedlytreatedassecond-classcitizensbynative

Libyans,andrelationswithnearbyMisuratawere

poor.Duringtherevolution,Gaddafiplayedonthis

resentment,armingtheTawerghansandencouraging

themtojointheassaultonMisurata,whichremained

besiegedbyGaddafiforcesfromtheoutsetofthe

revolutioninFebruarytothemiddleofMay.During

thisperiod,Tawerghansareaccusedofcommitting

aseriesofcrimesagainstMisuratans,includingrape,

lootingandindiscriminatekilling.

Withtheconflictover,Misuratanshaveallegedlybeen

mercilessintheirretaliation.AccordingtoHuman

RightsWatch,therehavebeencredibleaccounts

ofMisuratansshootingunarmedTawerghans,and

ofarbitraryarrestsandbeatingsofTawerghan

detainees.BytheendofOctober,theentiretownof

30,000peoplehadbeenabandoned,anditremains

deserted.27

27   Human Rights Watch, Libya: Tawergha Residents Terrorised by Militias, 27 October 2011, http://www.hrw.org/features/libya-tawergha-residents-terrorized-militias (last accessed 12 December 2011)

Accordingtooneinformedsourceinsidethecountry,

themoodamongstMisuratansisthatTawerghans

shouldbedrivenintotheLibyandesertandnotcome

back.

Bothformoralandreputationalreasons,the

NTCmustconsideraresolutionofthiscrisisan

urgentpriority.Thebestplacedfiguretoeffecta

reconciliationistheNTC’sChairmanMustafaJalil.As

therecognisedleaderoftheLibyanrevolutionfrom

almosttheveryoutset,Jalilcommandsenormous

respectamongstLibyansacrossalldivides.Heisthe

onlyseniorrevolutionaryleaderwhohascommanded

therespectofeveryLibyantheauthorofthispaper

hasspokentooverthepastsixmonths.

PublicadmonitionsofMisuratanbehaviourarelikely

toachievelittle,however.Instead,Jalilmustsitdown

inprivatewiththekeypower-brokersinMisurata,not

leasthisnewministeroftheinterior,theMisuratan

FawziAbdelali,tobrokerasettlement.Theconditions

ofthatsettlementmustbedowntotheLibyans

themselves,butallsidesmustbeaware,astheysurely

are,oftherepercussionsthatthissituationwillhave

ifnotresolved,bothinternallyandintermsofLibya’s

internationalstanding.

Fostering Democracy and

Developing Libyan Civil Society

Unlesstheycontraveneagreedinternational

standards,orprovedemonstrablyunableorunwilling

toactinthebestinterestsoftheircitizens,itisnotthe

placeoftheinternationalcommunitytotryandhold

sovereignnationalgovernmentstoaccount.Byfarthe

mosteffectiveandappropriatevehiclethroughwhich

suchinfluencecanandshouldbeexercisedisan

empoweredcitizenry.

Generally,citizensaremostempoweredwhenthey

arebotheducatedandprosperous.Generatingthe

conditionsinwhichafreemarketcanflourishisthe

12

keytothelatter,whilsttheformerdependsupon

goodschoolsandaneffectivecivilsociety.Inevitably,

thetwoarethemselvescloselyinterlinked.After42

yearsofdictatorship,Libya’scivilsocietyremains

extremelyunderdeveloped.Althoughanumberof

NGOshavebeenestablishedinrecentmonths,forthe

mostparttheseareunder-resourced,ill-coordinated

andprimarilyfocusedoncommunalissues.Several

hundrednewspapershavealsobeenestablished,but

theytoolackexpertiseandresources.

InhelpingtodevelopLibyancivilsociety,the

internationalcommunity,especiallycountriessuch

astheUKwithveryeffectivecivilsocieties,havea

pivotalroletoplay.Todate,however,verylittlehas

beenachievedbytheinternationalcommunityin

thisarea,althoughthereareaspirationstothatend.

Atthegovernmental/multilaterallevel,theEUhas

beengiventheleadinhelpingtodevelopLibyancivil

society.Beyondthat,however,non-governmental

effortsarealsobeingundertaken.TheUSAgencyfor

InternationalDevelopment(USAID)recentlyawarded

amultimilliondollarcontracttothedevelopment

consultancyChemonicsInternational,althoughit

remainsunclearhowfareffortshavecomesincethat

time,orwhatpreciselythoseeffortsare.

TheBritishGovernment’scurrentstanceisto

supportthedevelopmentofcivilsocietyinLibya,

butpreferablythroughofficialchannels,inthiscase

theEU.Giventhescaleoftheneed,however,the

BritishGovernmentshouldalsobereadytosupport

crediblenon-governmentalinitiativestodevelop

Libyancivilsocietyandhelpfostertheinstitutionsof

democracy.Intermsofspecifickindsofassistance,

thesecanbebrokendownbyarea.TheLibyanmedia,

forinstance,requirestraininginbasicareassuchas

theprinciplesofeffectivenewsgathering;howto

structureanewsstory;andinthecaseofeditors,

howtorunacommercialmediaoutlet.Aspiring

politiciansandpoliticalactivistsrequireassistancein

everythingfromhowtoestablishapoliticalparty;how

towriteapress-release;howtocampaigneffectively;

andtheimportanceofnotwearingsun-glasseson

camera.Thisformoftrainingcanbeprovidedeither

onthegroundintherelevantareas,orelsethrough

workshopsspecificallydesignedforthepurpose.

Finally,theUKshouldnotunderestimatethe

importanceoftheoretical,aswellaspractical

knowledge.Withverylittlepriorexperienceof

democracy,manyLibyansneedtobetterunderstand

someofthebasicprinciplesofdemocracyandthe

democraticprocess.Issuessuchas“Whatarepolitical

parties?”;“Whyafreepressmatters”;“Whyfree

marketsmatter”;and“theRuleofLaw”;areconcepts

thatmanyLibyanswillonlybeencounteringforthe

firsttimeintheirlives.Perhapsthemosteffectiveway

todisseminatethiskindofknowledgewillbethrough

workshops,ona‘trainthetrainer’basis,aswellasthe

disseminationofrelevantmaterials,bothinhardform

andonline.

Islamism in Libya

LikeitsneighboursinEgyptandTunisia,Libyafindsitself

inuncharteredwaterswherethefutureisextremely

difficulttopredict.NeitherLibyanoritstwoNorthAfrican

neighbourshaseverhadachanceattransitioning

towardsdemocracybeforenow,andhoweachcountry

willmanagethattransition,andwhatsortofsocietywill

ultimatelyemerge,remainsuncertain.

Libyaisadeeplyconservativecountry,inwhich

religiousobservanceremainshigh:97percentof

LibyansareofficiallycategorisedasSunniMuslim.28

ColonelGaddafi,likePresidentBenAliinTunisia,

andPresidentMubarakinEgypt,wasbrutal,but

alsorelativelysecular.Havingbeenaffordedthe

opportunitytoexercisegreaterreligiousfreedom,

therefore,itishighlylikelythatLibyanswillseeka

greaterroleforIslaminpublicandpoliticallife.

28 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Libya, 2011, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html (last accessed 12 December 2011)

13

ThepastfewmonthssuggestthattheNTCisseeking

tolaythegroundworkofastatethatcandeliveronthe

desirefordemocracyanduniversalhumanrightsthat

underpinnedthisyear’srevolution;howthiswillbe

balancedwiththeroleofIslaminpublicpolicyremains

tobeseen.

TheNTC’s‘DraftConstitutionalCharterforthe

TransitionalStage’isanavowedlyIslamistdocument.

Article1statesunequivocallythat“IslamistheReligion

oftheStateandtheprincipalsourceoflegislationis

IslamicJurisprudence(Shari’a)”.29However,Article6

assertsthatallLibyans“shallbeequalbeforethelaw...

shallenjoyequalcivilandpoliticalrights[and]shall

havethesameopportunities”,whileArticle7commits

Libyatojoining“internationalandregionaldeclarations

andcharterswhichprotectsuchrightsandfreedoms.”

Article4assertsthat,“TheStateshallseektoestablisha

politicaldemocraticregimetobebaseduponthepolitical

multitudeandmultipartysysteminaviewofachieving

peacefulanddemocraticcirculationofpower”.30

Thedraftconstitutionappearstooutlineademocracy

whereinlawsandsocialnormsarebasedupon

Islamicprecepts.Whatisnotenvisagedistheoutright

subversionofthedemocraticstructuresofthestate

andtheirreplacementwithagovernmentbased

solelyuponclericalinterpretationoftheQuran.Ifthe

permanentconstitutionreflectsthisdraftconstitution,

andissubsequentlyratifiedbypopularreferendum,

asitisduetobein2012,thenthatwillrepresenta

significantstatementofaspirationandintentbyboth

theLibyangovernmentanditscitizens.

29 National Transitional Council, Draft Constitutional Charter for the Transitional Stage – The Constitutional Declaration, August 2011, http://portal.clinecenter.illinois.edu/REPOSITORYCACHE/114/1R3bTIKElG95H3MH5nvrSxchm9QLb8T6EK87RZQ9pfnC4py47DaBn9jLA742IFN3d70VnOYueW7t67gWXEs3XiVJJxM8n18U9Wi8vAoO7_24166.pdf

30 National Transitional Council, Draft Constitutional Charter for the Transitional Stage – The Constitutional Declaration, August 2011, http://portal.clinecenter.illinois.edu/REPOSITORYCACHE/114/w1R3bTIKElG95H3MH5nvrSxchm9QLb8T6EK87RZQ9pfnC4py47DaBn9jLA742IFN3d70VnOYueW7t67gWXEs3XiVJJxM8n18U9Wi8vAoO7_24166.pdf

Sourcesinsidethecountrymaintainthatveryfew

Libyanswishtoseetheircountrytransformedinto

atheocraticstate,thatthedesirefordemocracy

isgenuineandthatovertsupportforal-Qaedais

extremelylimited.Analystsmustalsobewaryofthe

tendencyofcompetinggroupstobrandoneanother

bycertainlabelsinordertowieldinfluenceand

achievepower.Forinstance,Libyansecularistssuchas

ArefNayed,AmbassadortotheUAE,andMahmoud

Jibril,theNTC’sformerinterimPrimeMinister,

havecriticisedtheIslamistAbdulBelhajfortaking

weaponsfromSudan(whereBelhaj’sfather-in-law

hasinfluence)duringtherevolution,whilstAliSellabi,

anotherleadingIslamist,hasbeenfrequentlycriticised

forbeingtoocloselysupportedbyQatar.

TheroleofinfluentialIslamistsinLibya’sfutureislikely

tobeprominent.Thecomparativelysecularnatureof

theNTC’sinterimcabinetshouldnotbeliethefactthat

anumberofIslamistsmayhavechosentowaituntil

nextyear’sgeneralelectionsbeforeseekingtoachieve

power.31MembersoftheNTCareprohibitedfrom

standingintheelectionsexplicitlytopreventthem

fromusingthatplatformtoundulyobtainpermanent

positionsofinfluencegoingforwards.

TheBritishGovernment’sresponsetowards

IslamistsinLibyadependsbothonthemannerof

theirinfluence,andthekindofpoliciestheyseekto

advance.IfanIslamistgovernmentisdemocratically

electednextyear,andthedraftconstitutionis

ratifiedinareferendumthereafter,thentheBritish

Governmentwillbeobligedtorespectthat.Likewise,

oppositionpartiesthatseektoachievepowerthrough

afreeandfairdemocraticprocess,andrespectthe

limitsofaconstitutionthathasbeenratifiedbythe

Libyanpeople,mustbepermittedtooperatefreely.

31   Hall, Richard, Libya: Islamists snubbed in ‘safe, secular cabinet, The Independent, 23 November 2011, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/libya-islamists-snubbed-in-safe-secular-cabinet-6266399.html (last accessed 22 December 2011)

TheBritishGovernmentshouldbefarlesstolerantof

Islamistgroupsthatseektoachievepoweroutsideof

thedemocraticprocess,orwhoattempttosubvert

andgobeyondtheparametersoftheconstitution

havingbeenelected.Theenshrinementofminority

rightsandtherespectforfundamentalhumanrights

isparamounttoanyfunctioningdemocracy.

InseekingtopromotedemocraticvaluesinLibya,

theBritishGovernmentshouldworkcloselywithcivil

societyorganisationswhilstalsoengagingtheLibyan

Governmentitself.Internationallyagreedhuman

rightscovenantsmustalsoberespected,whateverthe

compositionofademocraticallyelectedgovernment.

14

© 2011 The Henry Jackson Society, Project for Democratic Geopolitics. All rights reserved.http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org

ConclusionLibyahasthepotentialtosuccessfullyachievea

transitiontodemocraticgovernment.Althoughvery

significantproblemsremain,progressisbeingmade

bothindevelopingtheeconomyandimproving

thesecuritysituation.Thecountryishampered,

however,bychronicallyunderdevelopedinstitutions

andadearthofexpertiseacrossmanysectors.It

mustnotbeforgotten,moreover,thatthecountryis

transitioningfromamajorconflictandattemptingto

implementdemocracyforthefirsttimeinitshistory.

Bothpatienceandassistancefromtheinternational

communitywillthereforebeessential.

InadditiontohelpingdevelopLibya’seconomicand

securitysectors,theinternationalcommunityalso

hasaninvaluableroletoplayinhelpingdevelop

thecountry’snascentcivilsocietyandembedding

democraticinstitutionsnecessarytoholdtheLibyan

governmenttoaccount.Afreepress,aneffectiveand

independentjudiciaryandastrongcivilsocietywillbe

asimportantinensuringLibya’sfutureprosperityand

stabilityasastrongeconomyandcapablesecurity

forces.

Anotherpriorityinthecomingmonthswillbeprogress

onthecountry’spoliticalreconciliationprocess.The

Libyangovernmentmustrecognisehowimportantits

inclusivestrategywasinencouragingdefectionsfrom

Gaddafiduringtherevolution,andtheauthorities

mustholdtotheseobligationsnow.Notonlyisthe

persecutionofsuspectedformerregimeloyalists

illegalandimmoral,itcouldalsofermentinstability

andanti-governmenthostilityinthefuture.

Finally,theBritishGovernmentandothersshould

observethedevelopmentofIslamistmovements

insideLibyaclosely.Whilesupportforaatheocratic

stateisminimal,itislikelyIslamistswillhavean

importantroletoplayinLibya’sfuture.TheNTC’sdraft

constitutionenvisagesShari’aastheprimarysourceof

Libyanlaw;howeveritalsostipulatesthatLibyashould

beademocraticstatebasedonamulti-partysystem,

andcommitsthecountrytoupholdinginternational

humanrightslaw.Howcloselythismodelrepresents

theformofgovernmentthatactuallyemergesinLibya

remainstobeseen.

Thisreporthasoutlinedsomeofthewaysthatthe

BritishGovernmentandotherscanassistLibya’s

transitiontodemocraticrule.Ultimately,however,

thedirectionthatLibyatakesistheprerogativeofits

governmentanditspeople.Inadditiontoholdingthe

countrytoitsinternationalhumanrightsobligations,

thepriorityfortheinternationalcommunitymustbe

toensurethattheLibyanpeopledoindeedplayarole

inshapingtheircountry’sfuture,andthatthisceases

tobetheexclusiveprivilegeoftheirgovernment.