License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification Table 3.3-4 Degraded Voltage

George T. Hamrick Vice President Harris Nuclear Plant 5413 Shearon Harris Rd New Hill NC 27562-9300 919-362-2502

January 3, 2013 10 CFR 50.90 Serial: HNP-13-001 ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Docket No. 50-400 Subject: License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification Table 3.3-4 Degraded

Voltage Time Delay Values Acceptance Review Supplement References:

1. Letter from G. T. Hamrick to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification Table 3.3-4 Degraded Voltage Time Delay Values, Serial HNP-12-116, dated November 29, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML123350104)

2. Letter from A. T. Billoch Colón to G. T. Hamrick, Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant,

Unit 1 - Supplemental Information Needed For Acceptance Of Requested Licensing Action Regarding The License Amendment Request To Revise Technical Specification Table 3.3-4, "Degraded Voltage Time Delay Values", dated December 20, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12349A015)

Ladies and Gentlemen: By letter dated November 29, 2012 (Reference 1), Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L) submitted a license amendment request (LAR) for Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 (HNP). The proposed amendment would revise Technical Specification (TS) Table 3.3-4 associated with 6.9 kV Emergency Bus Secondary Undervoltage time delay values to resolve a non-conservative TS. By letter dated December 20, 2012 (Reference 2), the results of the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff’s acceptance review were provided to CP&L. The NRC staff determined that additional information is necessary to make its assessment regarding the acceptability of the proposed amendment. The information below supplements the LAR to provide the additional information specified by the NRC staff.

HNP-13-001 Page2

CP&L has concluded that the information provided in this supplement meets the intent of the original LAR and does not impact the conclusions of the Technical Analysis, No Significant Hazards Consideration or Environmental Consideration as provided in the original submittal.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91(b), CP&L is providing the state ofNorth Carolina with a copy of this supplement.

This document contains no regulatory commitments.

Ifthere are any questions or if additional information is needed, please contact John Caves at (919) 362-2406.

I declare, under penalty of perjury, that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on [ 3 J .

Sincerely,

Enclosure: License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification Table 3.3-4 Degraded Voltage Time Delay Values Acceptance Review Supplement

cc: Mr. J. D. Austin, NRC Sr. Resident Inspector, HNP Ms. A. T. Billoch Colon, NRC Project Manager, HNP Mr. W. L. Cox III, Section Chief, North Carolina DENR Mr. V. M. McCree, NRC Regional Administrator, Region II

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Docket No. 50-400

Enclosure to HNP-13-001 License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification

Table 3.3-4 Degraded Voltage Time Delay Values Acceptance Review Supplement

HNP-13-001 Page 2 of 165 Enclosure

By letter dated November 29, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML123350104), Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L) submitted a license amendment request (LAR) for Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 (HNP). The proposed amendment would revise Technical Specification (TS) Table 3.3-4 associated with 6.9 kV Emergency Bus Secondary Undervoltage time delay values to resolve a non-conservative TS. By letter dated December 20, 2012 (ML12349A015), the results of the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff’s acceptance review were provided to CP&L. The NRC staff determined that additional information is necessary to make its assessment regarding the acceptability of the proposed amendment. This enclosure supplements the LAR to provide the additional information specified by the NRC staff. The information provided in this supplement provides clarifying information but does not expand the scope of the LAR. This supplement does not impact the Technical Analysis, No Significant Hazards Consideration or Environmental Consideration as provided in the original submittal. Request 1

Provide the calculations to support the justification of the revision being made to the degraded voltage time delay relays.

Response 1

Applicable portions of Calculation No. E2-0005.09, Degraded Grid Voltage Protection For 6.9KV Busses 1A-SA & 1B-SB, are attached.

Request 2

Clarify how the proposed degraded voltage time delay relays are consistent with the current Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA) analysis and why the licensee intends to revise the LOCA analysis for implementation during the next refueling outage.

Response 2

High head and low head injection are key mitigating safety functions in the final safety analysis report (FSAR) analysis of large break loss of coolant accident (LOCA). Although the factors affecting when those functions are credited in the analysis include timing of the loss of offsite power (LOOP), actuation logic, equipment acceleration to rated speed, and valve repositioning to achieve rated flow, the LOCA analysis conservatively models no flow for a specified period of time, then rated flow thereafter. The current FSAR large break LOCA analysis without offsite power available credits high head safety injection at 29 seconds. As indicated in the table below, high head injection is expected to occur by 27.3 seconds for the degraded voltage condition. Therefore, the proposed values for degraded voltage time delays are consistent with delivery of high head injection in the current LOCA analysis.

HNP-13-001 Page 3 of 165 Enclosure

The current FSAR large break LOCA analysis without offsite power available credits low head safety injection at 37 seconds. As indicated in the table below, low head injection is expected to occur by 26.8 seconds for the degraded voltage condition. Therefore, the proposed values for degraded voltage time delays are consistent with delivery of low head injection in the current LOCA analysis. The sequence of events for LOCA coincident with degraded voltage conditions are provided in the table below.

Event

Degraded Voltage/LOCA Event Timeline

(time in seconds from event initiation)

Current Large Break LOOP/LOCA

Analysis (time in seconds from

event initiation) RCS pipe break 0 0 Emergency diesel generator (EDG) start signal

2.4 Not explicitly modeled

Emergency bus separated from offsite power

13.3 (analytical limit in LAR)

0

Load block 1 high head safety injection pump energized


Low head safety injection pump energized


Low head safety injection flow

26.8 37

High head safety injection flow

27.3 29

Values in the Degraded Voltage/LOCA Event Timeline are from Calculation E2-0005.09R4, Attachment O, which documents the bases of the 13.3 second analytical limit. HNP intends to revise the large break LOCA analysis to support minor changes in the fuel assemblies to be loaded during the next refueling outage. In addition, the time for delivery of low head injection flow will likely be decreased to improve PCT margin. The revised large break LOCA/LOOP analysis will continue to support a 13.3 second analytical limit for the degraded voltage time delay.

Page 4 of 165

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Docket No. 50-400

Enclosure to HNP-13-001 License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification

Table 3.3-4 Degraded Voltage Time Delay Values Acceptance Review Supplement

Attachment

Applicable Sections from Calculation No. E2-0005.09

Degraded Grid Voltage Protection For 6.9KV Busses 1A-SA & 1B-SB

Revision 4 (161 pages plus cover)

SYSTEM# CALC. SUB-TYPE QUALITY CLASS

5165,5175.5185 69R A

NUCLEAR GENERATION GROUP

CALCULATION NO. E2-0005.09

DEGRADED GRID VOLTAGE PROTECTION FOR 6.9KV BUSSES 1A-SA & 18-SB

o BNP UNIT oCR3 • HNP o RNP o NCP oALL

APPROVAL D Electronically Approved

REV PREPARED BY REVIEWED BY SUPERVISOR

/;r::c~'-' Signat~

. ~L Sit!ure .J.~ . ~ ...... ~ ... ":::1.~ .::;;:: ·~

4 Na~ ' I Name Name \._) G.A. Kilpatrick John Liu Robert Esnes

Date Date J ;,~ 12()(2-

Date '"'\'3>\ \~ 1//t..i/1 z_ Signature Signature Signature

Name Name Name

Date Date Date

Signature Signature Signature

Name Name Name

Date Date Date

(For Vendor Calculations)

Vendor URS Vendor Document No. ___ ..:....:N!..!../A.:...._ __

Owner's Review By =Ji'"'"'m:...;;;D=e=itr=ic=k ___ _ Date See Passport

CALCULATION NO. E2-0005.09 PAGE i , REV. 4

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

PAGE REV PAGE REV PAGE REV

Cover Sheet i ii iii 1 1a 2 3 4 4a 4b 5 6 7 8 8a 8b 8c 8d 8e 8f 9 10 11 12 13 14 14a 15 15a 15b 16 17 18

4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 3 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4

A1 B1 – B12 C1 D1 – D10 E1 – E5 F1 – F2 G1 – G2 H1 – H10 I1 – I6 I7 – I10 J1 – J31 K1 K2 L1-L21 M1 – M4 N1 – N26 O1 – O16

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 2 4 2 3 4 4 3 3 4

CALCULATION NO. E2-0005.09 PAGE ii , REV. 4

REVISION SUMMARY

Rev. # Revision Summary

0 Original Issue – supercedes Calculation 0055-JRG

1 Update in support of new MST-E0045 (formerly MST-E0035 and MST-E0045) to incorporate new MTE, incorporation of ESR 95-00465 and general update to meet format requirements of Procedure ENP-011, R6.

2 Incorporated the following ECs

52295, R00

Incorporated changes per NCR 56623-05 to correct rounding error. During the Station-Blackout SSDI, NRC Question #63 identified that the T/S Table 3.3-4 “allowed value” for the DGVR dropout setting was rounded in a non-conservative direction in Calculation E2-0005.09. The T/S allowed value of 6392 volts was converted to a DGVR relay voltage by dividing 6392 volts by the PT ratio of 7200 / 120. The actual value is 106.5333333 volts; whereas, this value was rounded “conventionally” to 106.5 volts instead of “conservatively” to 106.534 volts.

Miscellaneous Changes

Format changes to meet requirements of Procedure EGR-NGGC-00017 (which supercedes Procedure ENP-011).

Updated References.

Administrative changes for clarification.

3 Incorporated the following ECs

Master EC 71172R2 / Child ECs 73216R0 & 73217R0 (AR 263267)

Replaced existing Agastat E7014 time delay relays used for Relays 2-2/1711 & 2-2/1712 (54 second timer) with NTS Model 812 to improve repeatability.

Miscellaneous Changes

Incorporated NTM AR 456740 to clarify the bases for the Relay 2-1/1711 & 2-1/1712 (13 second timers) setpoint based on research performed to answer 2011 CDBI Request #41. Revised the setpoint bases discussion in Section 4.2.1 and added Attachments M & N associated with this issue.

Updated revision levels of several references & added new references (Section 2.0).

Enhanced the control logic discussion in Section 4.2.1 for clarification.

4 Updated per EC 84101 to include change in model number for time delay relays 2-1/1711 and 2-1/1712 (SIAS timer) with NTS Model 812 relays to improve accuracy. This revision also develops new allowable values, setpoints (as necessary), and as-left tolerances for relays 2-1/1711, 2-1/1712, 2-2/1711, and 2-2/1712. The new setpoints and allowable values are in support of a change to Technical Specification Table 3.3-4 necessitated by the issues described in NTM AR 511890/456740 with respect to the design bases for these relays.

CALCULATION NO. E2-0005.09 PAGE iii , REV. 4

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. List of Effective Pages ..............................................................................................................i Revision Summary ................................................................................................................... ii Table of Contents .................................................................................................................... iii 1.0 PURPOSE .....................................................................................................................1 2.0 REFERENCES ..............................................................................................................2 3.0 ENGINEERING ANALYSIS SOFTWARE ......................................................................5 4.0 BODY OF CALCULATION.............................................................................................6 4.1 EC Screen .............................................................................................................6 4.2 Setpoint Calculation ...............................................................................................6 4.3 Bases and Assumptions ......................................................................................15 4.4 Required Cross-Discipline Reviews .....................................................................16 5.0 CONCLUSIONS ..........................................................................................................17 5.1 MST-E0045 Settings............................................................................................17 5.2 Analytical Limits for Use in Voltage Study E-6000 ...............................................18 5.3 Setpoint Data for PassPort EDB ..........................................................................18 ATTACHMENTS Pages Attachment A “Telecon Memo - Setpoint Drift for ABB UV Relay Cat # 211T0375” ......1 Attachment B “Information Bulletin IB 7.4.1.7-7 for ABB Type 27N UV Relay” ............12 Attachment C “Degraded Voltage Relay Calibration Data” ............................................1 Attachment D “Selected Pages from Vendor Manuals” ...............................................10 Attachment E “Multi-Amp Pulsar Test Set Instruction Book Excerpts”...........................5 Attachment F “Potential Transformer Information”.........................................................2 Attachment G “Harmonic Distortion Report for Pulsar Test Equipment” ........................2 Attachment H “Excerpts from FSAR and Technical Specifications” .............................10 Attachment I “EGR-NGGC-0153 Setpoint Forms” .......................................................10 Attachment J “ECCS Response Time”.........................................................................31 Attachment K “Document Indexing Table” .....................................................................2 Attachment L “Reviews”...............................................................................................21 Attachment M “Branch Technical Position PSB-1”.........................................................4 Attachment N “OCR 511890-10 / 458376-20”..............................................................26 Attachment O “Accident Timelines”……………………………… …………...…………..16

CALCULATION NO. E2-0005.09 PAGE 1 , REV. 4

1.0 PURPOSE

The results of this calculation for relays 2-1/1711, 2-1/1712, 2-2/1711, and 2-2/1712 are only valid after EC 84101 has been installed. The purpose of this calculation is to:

1. document setpoints and allowable values for the 6.9kv Emergency Bus degraded grid voltage protection scheme under-voltage and time-delay relays as listed below1:

27A-1/1711 UV Relay For Bus 1A-SA 27A-2/1711 UV Relay For Bus 1A-SA 27A-3/1711 UV Relay For Bus 1A-SA 27A-1/1712 UV Relay For Bus 1B-SB 27A-2/1712 UV Relay For Bus 1B-SB 27A-3/1712 UV Relay For Bus 1B-SB 2-1/1711 6.9kv Emergency Bus 1A-SA Under-voltage Relay TD Relay 2-2/1711 Time Delay Pickup Relay 2-1/1712 6.9kv Emergency Bus 1B-SB Under-voltage Relay TD Relay 2-2/1712 Time Delay Pickup Relay 2. provide setpoints and as found/as left tolerances for use in MST-E0045 (6.9kv

Emergency Bus 1A-SA and 1B-SB Under-voltage Relay Channel Calibration) to ensure that Technical Specification Table 3.3-4 “trip setpoint” and “allowable value” requirements are met

3. provide “analytical limits” for DGVR pickup & dropout and first time delay for use

in Voltage Study E-6000

1 This calculation documents setpoints and associated tolerances for the DGVR under-voltage and time delay relays.

Evaluation of the settings considering tolerance is performed in Calculation E-6000. Calculation E-6000 evaluates the dropout setting by demonstrating that, at the dropout “analytical limit”, voltage criteria at all levels of the emergency power system are met. Calculation E-6000 evaluates the pickup (reset) setting by demonstrating that the 6.9kv emergency bus voltage recovers above the pickup “analytical value” after experiencing voltage transients during motor starting.

CALCULATION NO. E2-0005.09 PAGE 1a , REV. 4

4. provide setpoint and tolerance data for use in PassPort EDB.

NOTE For purposes of this calculation, the terms “Degraded Grid Voltage Relay”, “DGVR”, and “Emergency Bus Secondary Under-voltage Relay” are synonymous.


2.0 REFERENCES 2.1 6-B-041 0045, R14 “6.9kv Emergency Bus 1A-SA” 2.2 6-B-041 0046, R14 “6.9kv Emergency Bus 1B-SB” 2.3 6-B-401 1711, R12 “6.9kv Emergency Bus 1A-SA Secondary Under-Voltage Relays” 2.4 6-B-401 1712, R13 “6.9kv Emergency Bus 1B-SB Secondary Under-Voltage Relays” 2.5 6-B-401 1731, R24 “6.9kv Emergency Bus 1A-SA Under-Voltage Trip” 2.6 6-B-401 1732, R23 “6.9kv Emergency Bus 1B-SB Under-Voltage Trip” 2.7 Technical Specification 3 / 4.3.2 and Table 3.3-4 (see Attachment H) 2.8 FSAR Section 8.3.1.1.2.11 (see Attachment H) 2.9 NRC Branch Technical Position PSB-1, April 17, 1981 (See Attachment M) 2.10 CSP-NGGC-2505, R14 “Software Quality Assurance and Configuration Control of

Business Computer Systems” 2.11 EGR-NGGC-0017, R08 “Preparation and Control of Design Analyses and

Calculations” 2.12 EGR-NGGC-0005, R32 “Engineering Change” 2.13 MST-E0045, R24 “6.9KV Emergency Bus 1A-SA and 1B-SB Under-voltage Relay

Channel Calibration” 2.14 DBD-202, R26 “Plant Electrical Distribution System” (Sections 2.1.1.3, 2.1.1.4,

2.1.2.1.4, 2.1.3.2.3, 2.2.2.1.2 & 2.2.2.1.3) 2.15 6-S-0302 0020, R10 “6900V Auxiliary Emergency Bus 1A-SA” 2.16 6-S-0302 0024, R10 “6900V Auxiliary Emergency Bus 1B-SB” 2.17 E-6000, R11 “Auxiliary System Load Study” 2.18 E2-0001.01, R1 “Overcurrent Protection for 6.6kv Motors - Comp Cooling Wtr Pmps” 2.19 E2-0001.02, R1 “Overcurrent Protection for 6.6Kv Motors - H2O Chiller

Compressors”


2.20 E2-0001.03, R1 “Overcurrent Protection for 6.6kv Motors - Emerg Serv H2O Pumps” 2.21 E2-0001.04, R1 “Overcurrent Protection for 6.6kv Motors - Aux Feedwater Pumps” 2.22 E2-0001.05, R1 “Overcurrent Protection for 6.6kv Motors - Charging Safety Injection” 2.23 E2-0001.09, R0 “Overcurrent Protection for 6.6kv Motors - Normal Service Water” 2.24 E2-0001.12, R0 “Overcurrent Protection for 6.6kv Motors - Heater Drain Pumps” 2.25 E2-0001.13, R0 “Overcurrent Protection for 6.6kv Motors - Cooling Tower Makeup” 2.26 9-RAB-006A, R3 “Switchgear Room A Ventilation System Served by AH-12” 2.27 9-RAB-006B, R3 “Switchgear Room B Ventilation System Served by AH-13” 2.28 VM-BLV, R7 “Multimeters” (excerpts included in Attachment D) 2.29 EGR-NGGC-0153, R11 “Engineering Instrument Setpoints” 2.30 Instruction Bulletin IB 7.4.1.7-7 Issue D, “Instruction Manual for Brown Boveri Type

27N Voltage Relay” (Attachment B) 2.31 Instruction Book B-3 PULSAR MA-8141 7.95 “Multi-Amp Pulsar Universal Protective

Relay Test System” manufactured by AVO International. (excerpts in Attachment E) 2.32 Telecon Memo Between Jim Deitrick and Steve Hawkins on PT Accuracy

(Attachment F) 2.33 Report on Harmonic Distortion Measurement for PULSAR MA-8141 7.95 “Multi-Amp

Pulsar Universal Protective Relay Test System manufactured by AVO International Model No. 10E3T3G-1/60 (Attachment G)

2.34 CAR-SH-E-006A, R8 “Metal-clad Switchgear - Removable Circuit Breaker Type 6.9

kv Switchgear” (excerpts in Attachment F) 2.35 1364-018995, R0 “Normal Service Water Pump Motors Time-Current Curve” 2.36 VM-PEM, R15, “Relays” (excerpts in Attachment D) 2.37 E-6003, R7 “Minimum & Maximum Operating Voltages Required for Class 1E Buses” 2.38 EC 52295, R0


2.39 EC 71172, Rev. 2 (and associated Child ECs 73216 & 73217) 2.40 AR 456740 2.41 AR 458376 2.42 AR 511890 2.43 6-B-401 1729, R15 “6.9kv Emergency Bus 1A-SA Relays and Instruments Potential” 2.44 6-B-401 1730, R15 “6.9kv Emergency Bus 1B-SB Relays and Instruments Potential” 2.45 6-B-401 1737, R8 “6.9kv Emergency Bus 1A-SA Under-Voltage Lockout Relay

Developments (86UV/SA and 86T/SA)” 2.46 6-B-401 1740, R9 “6.9kv Emergency Bus 1B-SB Under-Voltage Lockout Relay

Developments (86UV/SB and 86T/SB)” 2.47 EC 84101, R0 2.48 ANP-3011, R0, “Harris Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Realistic Large Break LOCA Analysis”,

Tables 3-2, 3-3, 3-5, and 3-6 2.49 6-B-401, Sh. 1103, R13, “Emergency Load Sequencer ESS Cabinet 1A-SA” 2.50 6-B-401, Sh. 1107, R7, “Emergency Load Sequencer ESS Cabinet 1A-SA” 2.51 6-B-401, Sh. 1108, R4, “Emergency Load Sequencer ESS Cabinet 1A-SA” 2.52 HNP FSAR, Section 8.3.1.1.1.5, Standby AC Supply 2.53 6-B-401, Sh. 270, R18 “Charging/Safety Injection Pump Miniflow Isolation Valve 1-

8106” 2.54 6-B-401, Sh. 271, R17 “Charging/Safety Injection Pump to RCS Isolation Valve 1-

8107” 2.55 6-B-401, Sh. 272, R19 “Charging/Safety Injection Pump to RCS Isolation Valve 1-

8108” 2.56 6-B-401, Sh. 273, R19 “Charging/Safety Injection Pump A Miniflow Isolation Valve 1-

8109A”


2.57 6-B-401, Sh. 274 R17 “Charging/Safety Injection Pump B Miniflow Isolation Valve 1-

8109B” 2.58 6-B-401, Sh. 275, R19 “Charging/Safety Injection Pump C Miniflow Isolation Valve 1-

8109C” 2.59 6-B-401, Sh. 407, R25 “BIT Outlet Isolation Valve 1-8801A” 2.60 6-B-401, Sh. 408, R24 “BIT Outlet Isolation Valve 1-8801B” 2.61 6-B-401, Sh. 2286, R14 “Service Water Return Header A Shutoff Valve to Auxiliary

Reservoir 3SW-B15-SA-1” 2.62 6-B-401, Sh. 2287, R17 “Service Water Return Header B Shutoff Valve to Auxiliary

Reservoir 3SW-B16-SB-1” 2.63 6-B-401, Sh. 2207, R11 “Normal Service Water Supply Header A Isolation Valve

3SW-B5SA-1” 2.64 6-B-401, Sh. 2208, R12 “Normal Service Water Supply Header B Isolation Valve

3SW-B6SB-1” 2.65 6-B-401, Sh. 2280, R14 “A Service Water Header Return to Normal Service Water

Header 3SW-B13SB-1” 2.66 6-B-401, Sh. 2282, R15 “B Service Water Header Return to Normal Service Water

Header 3SW-B14SB-1” 2.67 6-B-401, Sh. 2284, R14 “Reactor Auxiliary Building Return Service Water Main

Header Isolation Valve 3SW-B8SA-1” 2.68 6-B-401, Sh. 1030, R13 “Containment Spray Header A Isolation Valve 2CT-V21SA-

1” 2.69 6-B-401, Sh. 1031, R15 “Containment Spray Header B Isolation Valve 2CT-V43SB-

1” 2.70 FSAR Section 8.3.1 2.71 SHNPP Technical Specifications, R151, SR 4.8.1.1.2.f 2.72 FSAR Section 7.3.1.5.1

CALCULATION NO. E2-0005.09 PAGE 4b , REV. 4

2.73 6-B-401, Sh. 1102, R13, “Emergency Load Sequencer ESS Cabinet 1A-SA” 2.74 6-B-401, Sh. 1743, R12, “6.9KV Emergency Bus 1A-SA To Transf 1A3-SA BKR

1A3A-SA 2.75 HNP-M/MECH-1008, Section 4, R7 “Revised Containment Analysis for an Increase

in the Initial Temperature from 120°F to 135°F” 2.76 EST-301, R17 “Engineered Safety Features Response Time Evaluation Safety

Injection” 2.77 E5-0001, R10 “Analyses of Motor Output Torque for AC MOVs” 2.78 E-6001, Attachment 186, R9 “EDS Load Factor Study Report” 2.79 6-B-401, Sh. 317, R9 “CVCS Miniflow Valve 2CS-V757SA-1” 2.80 HNP-M/MECH-1018, R1 “ESW Two Phase Flow Following a LOCA and LOOP

Event” 2.81 Altran Technical Report No. 12-1027-TR-001, Rev. 0, “DGVR/LOCA Waterhammer

Evaluation” 2.82 HNP-I/INST-1010, Rev 5, Table 3-2 “Evaluation of RTS/ESFAS Tech Spec

Setpoints, Allowable Values, and Uncertainties”


3.0 ENGINEERING ANALYSIS SOFTWARE Per Procedure EGR-NGGC-0017, Section 9.5, personnel using a computer for

calculations are responsible for understanding the Software Quality Level and the computer system required to perform calculations for systems, structures or components that are considered safety related or are assigned safety classifications such as Safety Classes 1, 2 or 3, or Seismic Class 1 or 2, or Seismic Category I. See Procedure CSP-NGGC-2505 to determine the requirements (such as benchmark test) and limitations of computer generated calculations. Confirm that the computer software and version is listed and approved for use by checking the Equipment Database in PassPort. Update PassPort to reflect the software and version in accordance with CSP-NGGC-2505, if necessary. Determine if the software version being used has any software errors which may adversely impact the calculation and evaluate their impact on completed or ongoing work, as appropriate. For new software installations, review and evaluate Action Requests written for software errors with keyword type “FI”. Computer output design information used in the preparation of calculations should be added to the calculation package as an attachment. Software used in the calculation should be listed on the Document Indexing Table.

No engineering analysis software has been used in the development of this

calculation. Therefore, no benchmarking or software error evaluations are required.


4.0 BODY OF CALCULATION 4.1 EC Screen

Calculation changes are subjected to the “EC screens” as defined in Procedure EGR-NGGC-0005 unless the changes are the result of “rollup” to incorporate previously approved design changes (ESRs, ECs, etc). For calculation changes which are not the result of “rollup”, changes screened as impacting other plant/design documents or other plant programs, procedures or processes are processed via an EC2. Those screened as not impacting the aforementioned items are processed without an EC. Revision 4 incorporates changes planned by EC 84101. This EC will identify and control updates of other plant programs, procedures and processes impacted by changes to this calculation. Therefore, a separate EC to update this calculation is not required.

4.2 Setpoint Calculation 4.2.1 Background Information

Control Logic Discussion

The DGVR control logic scheme is documented in Control Wiring Diagrams 6-B-401 Sheets 1711, 1712, 1731 & 1732 as discussed in detail within the following paragraphs. Associated undervoltage relay and time delay relay setpoints are controlled by Technical Specification Table 3.3-4 and implemented via MST-E0045. Settings are documented in Drawing 6-S-0302 sheets 20 &24 and in PassPort EDB.

The purpose of the DGVR logic is to isolate the affected emergency power system from the preferred source of power (offsite) upon detection of sustained voltages below the level at which damage to safety-related equipment could occur or safety-related equipment may not be capable of performing their design functions. Degraded Grid Voltage Relays 27A-1, 27A-2 & 27A-3 monitor A-to-B phase, B-to-C phase and C-to-A phase voltage respectively at the 6.9kv emergency buses via 7200/120vac potential transformers. See CWD Sheets 1729 & 1711 (A-Train) and 1730 & 1712 (B-Train). The output contacts of the three undervoltage relays are connected in a two-out-of-three logic as shown on CWD Sheets 1711 and 1712. Upon meeting the two-out-of-three logic, Timing Relays 2-1 (a.k.a. SI timer, 13 second timer) and 2-2 (a.k.a. non-SI timer, 54 second timer) are energized and begin to “time out”. Upon expiration of the Relay 2-1 time delay, tripping actions are

2 Other documents, programs, procedures and processes impacted by changes to the calculation being revised must

be listed on the EC module ADL along with the calculation being revised.


initiated immediately if an SI signal is present. If an SI signal is not present, annunciation will occur. Upon expiration of the Relay 2-2 time delay, tripping actions are initiated. See CWD Sheets 1731 & 1737 (A-Train) or 1732 & 1740 (B-Train). Under the aforementioned tripping conditions, the DGVR logic initiates actuation of the 6.9kv Emergency Bus 86UV undervoltage lockout relay which, in turn, initiates tripping of the Emergency Bus main breaker and all load breakers (except for the breaker supplying Power Center 1A2-SA or 1B2-SB). The 86UV actuation also initiates starting of the associated emergency diesel generator and safeguards sequencer. The bus shedding logic is blocked when the emergency power system is being supplied by its associated Emergency Diesel Generator.

Control Logic Bases and Setpoint Bases Discussion

The bases for the DGVR logic and undervoltage relay and time delay relay settings are found in FSAR Section 8.3.1.1.2.11 (8), Branch Technical Position PSB-1, DBD-202 Section 2.2.2.1.3 and Technical Specification Table 3.3-4 as discussed below: FSAR Section 8.3.1.1.2.11 (8) states (see Attachment H): The electrical power distribution system design complies with the following guidelines as recommended in BTP PSB-1:

a. A second level of undervoltage protection will provide protection for the class 1E power system against a sustained degraded voltage condition on the offsite power system.

b. The undervoltage relay scheme will utilize a coincident logic (i.e. 2 out of 3 logic).

c. The voltage settings of the undervoltage relays will be consistent with the minimum permissible voltage levels at the various distribution buses.

d. The time delay associated with the undervoltage relays will be consistent with the maximum time delay considered in the design basis accident analysis and shall prevent spurious tripping due to short time transient conditions.

e. The system design and hardware selection will be consistent with the requirements of IEEE-279-1971 "Criteria for Protection System for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."

f. A trip initiation will be provided to disconnect the offsite power sources from the safety system whenever voltage setpoints and time delay limits exceed the preset value.


To assure no spurious operation of the undervoltage initiated load shedding scheme during operation on the Main Generator and the Unit Auxiliary Transformers, a worst case condition was studied. With the auxiliary system fully loaded and the generator at minimum voltage, the starting of the Normal Service Water Pump (NSWP) (3000hp) was studied. This was determined to be the worst case based on studies previously performed.

The secondary under-voltage relays (27A) are connected to two distinct time delay relays. Upon expiration of the first time delay (Device 2-1), which is long enough to accommodate the starting of the motor which has the longest starting time (NSWP - 10 seconds at 90% voltage), an alarm is actuated at the main control board to alert the operator of this condition and to permit operator actions to restore the system voltage. However, should a safety actuation signal be present after the expiration of the time delay, automatic tripping actions as described for the primary protection are initiated, namely, upon sensing a loss of voltage, automatically disconnect the offsite source from the Class 1E bus, initiate load shedding and start the diesel generator as described in FSAR Section 8.3.1.1.2.8. When the diesel generator has attained rated speed and voltage (within 10 seconds after the start signal), the diesel generator breaker to the Class 1E buses is closed and the Class 1E loads are connected to the buses automatically by the emergency load sequencer in accordance with the loading sequence shown in the FSAR Table 8.3.1-2c. Once the loading of the diesel generator has begun, operation of the undervoltage relays is blocked. If no safety actuation signal is present, a further time delay (Device 2-2) is allowed before automatic tripping actions are initiated. This second time delay is based on the maximum time for which the most sensitive load can perform its safety function without impairment at the degraded voltage.

NUREG 0800, Chapter 8, Branch Technical Position PSB-1, Section B.1 requirements for the DGVR undervoltage and time delay relays include (see Attachment M): a) The selection of undervoltage and time delay setpoints shall be determined from an

analysis of the voltage requirements of the Class 1E loads at all onsite system distribution levels;

b) Two separate time delays shall be selected for the second level of undervoltage

protection based on the following conditions:

1) The first time delay should be of a duration that established the existence of a sustained degraded voltage condition (i.e., something longer than a motor starting transient). Following this delay, an alarm in the control room should


alert the operator to the degraded condition. The subsequent occurrence of a safety injection actuation signal (SIAS) should immediately separate the Class 1E distribution system from the offsite power system.

2) The second time delay should be of a limited duration such that the

permanently connected Class 1E loads will not be damaged. Following this delay, if the operator has failed to restore adequate voltages, the Class 1E distribution system should be automatically separated from the offsite power system. Bases and justification must be provided in support of the actual delay chosen.

DBD-202 Section 2.2.2.1.3 states that “backup” undervoltage relays (i.e. degraded grid voltage relays) will trip the Class 1E 6.9kv main and feeder breakers if a degraded voltage condition exists on the bus for > 54 seconds and that annunciation is provided after 13 seconds. It also states that the main and feeder breakers will be tripped after > 13 seconds if a LOCA signal is present in conjunction with the degraded voltage condition. Tech Spec Table 3.3-4, Item 9.b provides specific requirements for the DGVR settings. It specifies the DGVR dropout “trip setpoint” as > 6420v with < 16s time delay (w SIAS) and < 54s (w/o SIAS). It also specifies an “allowable value” of > 6392v with < 18s time delay (w SIAS) and < 60s (w/o SIAS). Revision 4 to this calculation derives new setpoints (as necessary) and allowable values for the “w SIAS” timer to address issues identified in NRC Inspection Report 05000400/2011008 (described below) and NCR 511890 for coincident accident and degraded voltage. Revision 4 also establishes new setpoints (as necessary) and allowable values for the “w/o SIAS” timer to address lack of margin for measurement uncertainty between the Technical Specification allowable value and the analytical limit for motor damage. There are no Harris Plant commitments to include the time delay(s) associated with the Degraded Grid Voltage relays in the ESF equipment response times documented in Procedure PLP-106, Attachment 2. (Response timelines consider initiating signals with offsite power available and initiating signals coincident with loss-of-offsite-power). NCR 511890 & 458376 Discussion NRC Inspection Report 05000400/2011008 (resulting from the Harris Plant 2011 Component Design Basis Inspection) identified a performance deficiency for failure to properly control degraded voltage time delay setpoints, specifically, the licensee had not analyzed whether electrical equipment needed to respond to an accident would be energized by the emergency diesel generators within the time considered in the accident analysis if a degraded voltage condition existed concurrent with an accident.


Refer to Attachment N. These timelines demonstrate that the Safety Functions of Relay 2-1 are met with the existing 13 second nominal setpoint. The 13 second setpoint ensures that analyzed ESF component response times will be met (or resultant conditions are acceptable if not met) assuming concurrent occurrence of the SIAS process parameter setpoint being reached and degraded grid voltage conditions. This setting also ensures that spurious tripping will not occur during starting of the largest motor with longest acceleration time (NSWP) and that spurious tripping will not occur during safeguards sequencing with the 230kv Switchyard at the “administrative voltage limit”. The setting also ensures that safety related equipment supplied from the emergency power system will not be damaged by sustained exposure to degraded voltage conditions. The Licensing Bases for Relays 2-1/1711 and 2-1/1712 are met with the existing 13 second nominal setpoint as discussed above. However, the existing T/S Table 3.3-4, Item 9.b “allowable value” of ≤ 18 seconds is non-conservative and will not support the Licensing Bases (as established by NRC NRR subsequent to the 2011 CDBI). EC 84101 proposes to replace the existing 2-1/1711 and 2-1/1712 relays with new models having superior accuracy/repeatability. The EC will also modify Engineered Safeguards Sequencer logic to bypass the SAB 10 second timer for conditions where degraded voltage is concurrent with an accident (i.e., degraded voltage starts at the same time as the pipe break) and increases the time delay for relay PG/SA (PG/SB) by 1 second. Attachment O includes modified timelines considering elimination of the SAB 10 second delay, increase in the PG relay time delay, considering that the degraded voltage condition starts at the same time as the pipe break, and recognizing that Reactor Coolant System pressure will be too high for low head safety injection to inject sufficient flow to generate a close signal for the RHR mini flow valves until after relay 2-1 times out (Assumption 4.3.2.e). New timelines were developed in an iterative fashion to determine an analytical limit (i.e., maximum allowable delay). Attachment O includes the final time lines that consider the time delay at the upper analytical limit. The new timelines demonstrate that the accident analysis response times can be met at the upper analytical limit for the degraded voltage with safety injection time delay relay (i.e., 2-1 timer).

4.2.2 Application of the Above Criteria 4.2.2.1 Undervoltage Setpoints (Relay 27A)

See Section 4.2.1 “Control Logic Bases and Setpoint Bases Discussion”. Per PSB-1, the selection of undervoltage and time delay setpolnts shall be determined from an analysis of the voltage requirements of the Class 1E loads at all onsite system distribution levels. Per FSAR Section 8.3.1.1.2.11 (8), the voltage settings of the undervoltage relays will be consistent with minimum permissible voltage levels at the various distribution buses.

The DGVR dropout setpoint analytical limit is that voltage on the 6.9kV Emergency Bus which results in just meeting steady-state voltage criteria at the “most limiting” downstream safety-related power supply (i.e. power center, MCC or power panel).

CALCULATION NO. E2-0005.09 PAGE 8c , REV. 4

Emergency Power System criteria voltages are determined in Calculation E-6003 and compared to worst-case calculated voltages in Calculation E-6000. In addition, Technical Specification Table 3.3-4, Item 9.b. states that the DGVR dropout setpoint be > 6420v with an “allowable value” of > 6392v. To ensure that the DGVR dropout setpoint analytical limit and Technical Specifications are not violated, this calculation establishes a minimum allowed “as-left” dropout setting for use in DGVR Calibration Procedure MST-E0045. During calibration, if a DGVR is left at the minimum allowed “as-left” dropout setting, it is ensured that the setpoint will not end up outside the analytical limit or Technical Specification “allowable value” due to drift or tolerance. Calculation E-6000 evaluates the dropout setpoint analytical limit by calculating downstream power supply voltages which would result if the 6.9kv Emergency Bus voltage was at the analytical limit and then ensuring that voltage criteria is met at each level of the emergency power system. The DGVR pickup (reset) setpoint analytical limit is that voltage on the 6.9kV Emergency Bus required to “reset” the DGVR after it begins “timing” due to bus voltage falling below the dropout setpoint during large motor starting. There are no Technical Specification requirements for the pickup setting. To ensure that the pickup setpoint analytical limit is not violated, this calculation establishes a maximum allowed “as-left” pickup setting for use in DGVR Calibration Procedure MST-E0045. During calibration, if a DGVR is left at the maximum allowed “as-left” pickup setting, it is ensured that the relay setpoint will not end up outside the analytical limit due to drift or tolerance. Calculation E-6000 evaluates the DGVR pickup analytical limit by calculating 6.9kv Emergency Bus voltages during safeguards sequencing with the 230kv switchyard voltage at the lowest allowed voltage. It is then ensured that 6.9kv Emergency Bus voltages recover to an adequate voltage to reset the DGVR prior to “timing out”. The Harris Plant 230kv switchyard lowest allowed voltage during postulated LOCA conditions is documented in a memorandum included as an attachment to Calculation E-6000 as required by Transmission Department Inter-organizational Agreement NGGM-IA-0003, Paragraph 8.2.4. This memorandum assures that both Harris Nuclear Plant and Transmission Department are using the same switchyard required voltage. Transmission Department uses this voltage requirement to determine the proper “mix” of transmission system area load and generating facility availability necessary to ensure that the Harris Plant switchyard voltage will not fall below this minimum value in the event of a postulated LOCA.

4.2.2.2 First Time Delay Setpoint (Relay 2-1)

See Section 4.2.1 “Control Logic Bases and Setpoint Bases Discussion”. The first time delay (i.e. the time delay associated with Relay 2-1) should be: 1. of a duration long enough to establish the existence of a sustained degraded

voltage condition (i.e., something longer than a motor starting transient)

CALCULATION NO. E2-0005.09 PAGE 8d , REV. 4

2. of a duration long enough to ensure spurious actuation will not occur, e.g. a. during starting of motors large enough to cause the bus voltage to dip below

the undervoltage relay dropout setting b. during safeguards sequencing (to ensure ability to “reset” prior to timing out)

3. of a duration short enough to ensure electrical equipment needed to respond to

an accident would be energized by the emergency diesel generators within the time considered in the accident analysis if a degraded voltage condition exists concurrent with an accident

To ensure that the Relay 2-1 setpoint analytical limits (derived in this calculation) are not violated, this calculation establishes the allowable setpoint range, field setpoint, and allowable values to support a License Amendment Request (LAR). The LAR will change the existing Technical Specification Table 3.3-4 setpoint range and allowable values for the time delay relay and eliminate the non-conservative Technical Specification. This revision will also determine new as left calibration values for use in DGVR Calibration Procedure MST-E0045. During calibration, if Relay 2-1 is left at the minimum or maximum allowed “as-left” setting, it is ensured that the relay setpoint will not end up outside the analytical limits or Technical Specification “allowable values” due to drift or tolerance. Criteria 1 and 2 above establish the analytical limit for minimum time delay. A review of References 2.18 through 2.25 shows the longest motor acceleration time is 10s (Normal Service Water Pumps) [Criteria 1 and 2a]. Calculation E-6000 (Reference 2.17), Tab A contains a graphical representation of 6.9kV safety bus voltage versus time for the safeguards sequencing transient with minimum switchyard voltage (Criteria 2.b). The graph shows that the bus voltage decreases below the maximum dropout of the degraded voltage relay multiple times during the sequence, but recovers above the maximum reset value before the next load starts in all cases. This minimum load sequence interval is 4.5 seconds, so the 10 second Normal Service Water Pump start time is bounding and establishes the minimum time delay analytical limit for the degraded voltage with safety injection actuation signal timer. Margin in the amount of 0.5 seconds is added to this minimum time delay value to account for the potential for future plant changes. The analytical limit for the minimum 2-1 relay time delay is 10.5 seconds. Attachment O contains timelines for various accident scenarios. These time lines were used to develop the analytical limit for the maximum time delay. The time lines incorporate logic changes and time delay changes expected to be made by EC 84101. The logic changes bypass the SAB 10 second time delay relay for a safety injection signal coincident with a degraded voltage signal (from the “w SIAS” timer). The time delay change is for relay PGSA (PGSB) from 1.5 seconds to 2.5 seconds. A value of 1 second is included in the individual accident time lines (it is not included in the composite time line) to account for operating times for relays and circuit

CALCULATION NO. E2-0005.09 PAGE 8e , REV. 4

breakers in the control logic path based on Assumption 4.3.2.c. The new time lines demonstrate that a relay 2-1 time delay of 13.3 seconds results in all equipment response times being met. A small amount of margin to the current maximum response times exists in the 13.3 second value included in the time lines. This margin allows for the potential for future changes in the accident analyses or to plant design. The value of 13.3 seconds is selected as the maximum acceptable time delay. Therefore, the analytical limit for the maximum 2-1 relay time delay is 13.3 seconds.

4.2.2.3 Second Time Delay Setpoint (Relay 2-2) See Section 4.2.1 “Control Logic Bases and Setpoint Bases Discussion”. Per PSB-1, the second time delay (i.e. the time delay associated with Relay 2-2) should be of a limited duration such that the permanently connected Class 1E loads will not be damaged. The second time delay (Relay 2-2) is only applicable if a SIAS is not present. The second time delay should be < 60 seconds (analytical limit) since Harris plant motors have been specified to be capable of “riding through” voltage transients of 75% of motor nameplate voltage for a minimum of 60 seconds. See DBD-202, Sections 2.1.2.1.4 & 2.1.3.2.3. In addition, current Technical Specification Table 3.3-4, Item 9.b. states that the second time delay setpoint be < 54s with an “allowable value” of < 60s. With the current Technical Specification allowable value being equivalent to the analytical limit, there is no allowance for measurement uncertainty in the allowable value. To ensure that the second time delay setpoint analytical limit is not violated, this calculation derives new allowable values to support a License Amendment Request and new as-left tolerance values for use in DGVR Calibration Procedure MST-E0045. During calibration, if the second time delay (Relay 2-2) is left at the maximum or minimum allowed “as-left” setting, it is ensured that the relay setpoint will not end up outside the analytical limits or Technical Specification “allowable values” due to drift or other uncertainties. The criteria for minimum time delay for the 2-2 relay are equivalent to those for the 2-1 time delay relay. However, from a practical standpoint there should be separation between the setting for the 2-1 and 2-2 relay to make application of separate time delays useful. The second time delay should only cause separation from the offsite source when necessary to protect equipment and should provide at least minimal time for operator action if possible. Based on these criteria and the current setpoints, a minimum analytical limit of 50 seconds is selected for the 2-2 relays by Engineering Judgment. This value is less than the 60 second ride through capability of motors, is consistent with the current relay setpoint, provides some very minimal response time for the operators following a degraded voltage alarm, and is sufficiently separated from the upper analytical limit to allow for instrument uncertainties. Based on the above: The analytical limit for the minimum 2-2 relay time delay is 50 seconds. The analytical limit for the maximum 2-2 relay time delay is 60 seconds.

CALCULATION NO. E2-0005.09 PAGE 8f , REV. 4

4.2.2.4 Setpoint Criteria Summary

The setpoints for the DGVRs necessary to meet the above criteria are documented in PassPort EDB, Procedure MST-E0045 and Drawings 6-S-0302 sheets 0020 & 0024 as:

Device Setpoint + Tolerance - Tolerance DGVR (dropout) 107.0 volts 0.3 volts 0.0 volts DGVR (pickup) 107.5 volts 0.3 volts 0.0 volts

The DGVR dropout nominal setpoint of 107.0v corresponds to 6420v on the 6.9kv Emergency Bus which is within the Technical Specification required trip setpoint of > 6420v. Evaluation of minimum and maximum allowed “as-left” settings as specified in Section 5.0 of this calculation and as used in MST-E0045 vs. the analytical limits and Technical Specification “allowable values” is performed in the following sections taking drift and tolerances into consideration.

4.2.2.5 Time Delay Relay Analytical Limit Summary The analytical limits for the 2-1 and 2-2 time delay relays that are used in Section 4.2.4, 4.2.5, and Attachment I of this calculation to derive new setpoints (as necessary), allowable values, and as found/as left values are as follows:

Device Minimum Delay Maximum Delay 2-1 10.5 seconds 13.3 seconds 2-2 50 seconds 60 seconds


4.2.3 Undervoltage Relay (Relay 27A) Setpoint Evaluation

The following calculation of device uncertainties and tolerances are based on measuring dropout voltage and are used in Attachment I, pages I1 – I3. These values are then modified for measuring pickup/reset voltage and used in pages I4 – I6.

Per PassPort EDB, Relay 27A is an ABB model 211T0375, type 27N “high accuracy undervoltage relay” set at 107.0v dropout and 107.5v pickup with a + 0.3v / - 0.0v tolerance. The relay has a 70 to 120 volt range, i.e. a 50 volt span. Per Attachment B, page B5, repeatability at constant temperature and control voltage is +/- 0.1% of setting. Control voltage effect is +/- 0.1% of setting over a control voltage range of 100 to 140 vdc. Temperature effect is +/- 0.2% of setting over a temperature range of 0 to 400C (32 to 1040F). The temperature effect over the actual temperature range in the switchgear room where the equipment is located (600F to 880F per Calculations 9-RAB-006A and 9-RAB-006B) can be interpolated as follows:

RT88F = (88-77) / (104-77) x 0.2% = + 0.0815% of setting RT60F = (77-60) / (77+32) x 0.2% = - 0.0312% of setting

Therefore, RT (temperature effect) is conservatively assumed to be +/- 0.0815% of setting. The repeatability, control voltage and temperature effect values provided above in “percent of setting” can be converted to “percent of span” values as follows:

RA(27A-do) = (100 x 0.001000 x 107.0v) / 50v = +/- 0.2140% of span RV(27A-do) = (100 x 0.001000 x 107.0v) / 50v = +/- 0.2140% of span RT(27A-do) = (100 x 0.000815 x 107.0v) / 50v = +/- 0.1744% of span

A factor is included in the uncertainty calculation for relay drift based on the following

analysis of calibration data from Attachment C. Statistical analysis of the data gives the following results based on eighteen delta values for the individual relay setpoints:

Mean = - 0.0289 volts standard deviation = 0.144 volts voltmeter accuracy = 0.20%

The mean would represent a systematic drift of the setpoints. Since the mean value is

- 0.0289 volts and the uncertainty due to the calibration voltmeter is 0.002 x 120 = 0.24 volts, the systematic drift is not statistically significant. The conclusion that no systematic drift is occurring is supported. For conservatism a 0.1% factor is included in the uncertainty calculation for random drift over an 18 month period based on conversation with the relay supplier (see Attachment A). The standard deviation is a measure of the variability of the calibration data. Can the variation in the calibration data be accounted for by the characteristics of the relay and the calibration equipment or should some other factor be suspected? If a three-sigma confidence interval is taken as representative of the maximum expected variation in the calibration data, the


maximum setpoint variation would equal 3 * 0.144 = 0.432v. This tolerance envelopes

all data points in the attached data. It is also less than the calculated setpoint uncertainty. Thus, the variation in the data can be accounted for by the expected variation due to relay and the calibration voltmeter. The conclusion that no other factors are involved in the variation of the calibration data is supported. The drift in “percent of setting” provided above can be converted to a “percent of span” value as follows:

DR(27A-do) = (100 x 0.0010 x 107.0v) / 50v = +/- 0.2140% of span

Potential Transformer (ITE model number FP-7200-1) The following data associated with the 7200/120 v potential transformers was obtained

from PassPort EDB, and the nameplate of a spare PT located in the HNP warehouse:

CP&L Part # 724-134-12 (from EDB) Siemens-Allis Part # 61-300-010-072 (from EDB) Siemens-Allis SO # 1-1800-90365 and 1-1800-88460 (from EDB) ITE Model # FP-7200-1 (from EDB) Type FPXFMR (from spare PT in whse) Primary Volts 7200 (from spare PT in whse) Voltage Ratio 7200 / 120 (from spare PT in whse) Insulation Class 15kV (from spare PT in whse) BIL 95kV (from spare PT in whse) Frequency 50 - 60 Hz (from spare PT in whse) Thml Burden 1000 va (from spare PT in whse) Accuracy Class 0.3Y 0.6Z (from spare PT in whse) PO # NY-435112 (from EDB), 6D9472 (from spare PT in whse) Specification # CAR-SH-E-006A T/L # 88-1209-VI (from EDB) Note - Serial Number of spare PT in HNP Warehouse Bin 8RR1A2 is 61-00205-4. Per Purchase Specification CAR-SH-E-006A, the accuracy classification of the

7200/120 v potential transformers is to be not less than 0.6 (i.e. 0.6%). Other documentation reviewed (Attachment F) indicates that the PTs have an accuracy class of 0.3 (0.3% of the 120v rating) when lightly loaded. This value can be converted to “percent of span” as follows:

PE(27A) = (100 x 0.003 x 120.0v) / 50v = +/- 0.7200% of span


Test Equipment Two different types of test equipment will be evaluated and the final determination of

the allowable dropout setting will be based upon the “worst case” test equipment. Therefore any of the following two test equipments may be used to monitor voltage in the performance of MST-E0045.

Digital Voltmeter (Fluke 45) Per Vendor Manual VM-BLV, pages S10b-113 and S10b-116, accuracy of the Fluke

45 DMM while reading ac voltage using the medium reading rate is 0.2% of the reading and 10 “digits”. Per page S10b-38, TABLE 3-2, the auto-ranging feature of the meter would select the 300V range which reads to “hundredths” of a volt. Thus the 10 “digits” would introduce another 0.1 volts of tolerance. When measuring 107.0v, accuracy in “percent of span” would be:

MTE(F45-do) = 100 x [(0.002 x 107.0)2 + (0.1)2]1/2 / 50v = +/- 0.4724% of span

Digital Voltmeter (Fluke 8600A) Per Vendor Manual VM-BLV, page S1b-26, accuracy of the Fluke 8600A DMM is 0.2%

of input and 0.015% of meter range. When measuring 107.0v on the 200v range, accuracy in “percent of span” would be:

MTE(F8600A-do) = 100 x [(0.002 x 107.0)2 + (0.00015 x 200)2] 1/2 / 50 =

+/- 0.4322% of span Calibration Tolerance

Per PassPort EDB, the allowable as-left calibration tolerance is + 0.3v / - 0.0v which can be converted to “percent of span” as follows:

CAL(27A) = (100 x 0.3) / 50 = + 0.6 / - 0.0% of span


Summary of Undervoltage Relay Tolerances / Uncertainties DGVR Dropout Setting The above tolerances and uncertainties have been calculated for the dropout setting

using a “measured value” of 107.0vac and are summarized below for convenience:

RA(27A-do) = (100 x 0.001000 x 107.0v) / 50v = +/- 0.2140% of span RV(27A-do) = (100 x 0.001000 x 107.0v) / 50v = +/- 0.2140% of span RT(27A-do) = (100 x 0.000815 x 107.0v) / 50v = +/- 0.1744% of span DR(27A-do) = (100 x 0.0010 x 107.0v) / 50v = +/- 0.2140% of span PE(27A) = (100 x 0.003 x 120.0v) / 50v = +/- 0.7200% of span MTE(F45-do) = 100 x [(0.002 x 107.0)2 + (0.1)2]1/2 / 50v = +/- 0.4724% of span CAL(27A) = (100 x 0.3) / 50 = + 0.6 / - 0.0% of span

As can be seen from Attachment I, Page I3, the DGVR dropout setpoint (6420 / 107.0 volts) and tolerance (+ 0.3 / - 0.0 volts at the relay) supports the Technical Specification Table 3.3-4 “trip setpoint” (> 6420v / 107.0 volts) and “allowable value” (> 6392 / 106.534 volts). The “analytical limit” for use in Voltage Study E-6000 is provided in Section 5.2. DGVR Pickup Setting

The above tolerances and uncertainties (which have been calculated for the dropout setting) must be corrected to the “measured value” of 107.5vac for use in the pickup setting evaluation:

RA(27A-pu) = (100 x 0.001000 x 107.5v) / 50v = +/- 0.2150% of span RV(27A-pu) = (100 x 0.001000 x 107.5v) / 50v = +/- 0.2150% of span RT(27A-pu) = (100 x 0.000815 x 107.5v) / 50v = +/- 0.1752% of span DR(27A-pu) = (100 x 0.0010 x 107.5v) / 50v = +/- 0.2150% of span PE(27A) = (100 x 0.003 x 120.0v) / 50v = +/- 0.7200% of span MTE(F45-pu) = (100 x [(0.002 x 107.5)2 + (0.1)2]1/2 / 50v = +/- 0.4742% of span CAL(27A) = (100 x 0.3) / 50 = + 0.6 / - 0.0% of span

As can be seen from Attachment I, Page I6, the DGVR pickup setpoint (6450 / 107.5 volts) and tolerance (+ 0.3 / - 0.0 volts at the relay) results in an “analytical limit” as shown in Section 5.2 for use in Voltage Study E-6000. There are no Technical Specification requirements for the DGVR pickup setpoint.


4.2.4 First Time Delay Relay (Relay 2-1) Setpoint Evaluation

Per Reference 2.47, relay 2-1 is a NTS 812-1-3-08-A relay with a range of 1.5 to 15 seconds. Per vendor manual VM-NTS, Pages 9 & 13, accuracy is +/- 2% of setpoint over the entire temperature and voltage range (00F to 1400F and 90vdc to 140vdc respectively).

Accuracy of the NTS relay is given in percent of setting. The maximum relay setting

(analytical limit) of 13.3 seconds will be used to calculate reference accuracy in seconds. This is appropriate since the new setting, including as left tolerance, must be less than the analytical limit.

RA(2-1) = .02 x 13.3 s = ±0.266 seconds

Per Attachment E, the accuracy of the Multi-Amp Pulsar Universal Relay Test Set

timer is + 0.005% of reading over the temperature range of 0°C - 50°C (32°F - 122°F). This temperature range envelopes the actual range of the switchgear room (600F to 880F per Calculations 9-RAB-006A and 9-RAB-006B). The reading is taken as the analytical limit (13.3s):

MTE(2-1) = 0.00005 x 13.3 s = ±.000665 seconds

The calibration tolerance for the new NTS relay is selected as equal to the reference

accuracy. The analytical limit of 13.3 seconds is used to calculate calibration tolerance:

CAL(2-1) = .02 x 13.3 s = ±0.266 seconds

Per assumption 4.3.2.d, drift is ±1% of the maximum relay setting (15s) over 18 months. Allowing for a 25% grace period for Technical Specification surveillances: DR(2-1) = .01 x 15 s x 1.25 = ±0.19 seconds

The above data has been used in the Procedure EGR-NGGC-0153 forms found in Attachment I. The results are summarized below and in Section 5.0.

Relay 2-1 Settings, Allowable Values, and Tolerances The following setpoints, allowable values and tolerances are determined in Attachment

I, Page I8 for the 2-1 Relay: Allowable Value - ≥10.59 seconds and ≤ 13.21 seconds Setpoint - ≥10.92 seconds and ≤ 12.88 seconds The actual setpoint selected for these relays is 12s. This setting includes suitable


margin to both the maximum and minimum allowable setpoints as shown on Page I8. As-left tolerances for input to MST-E0045 are ±0.266 seconds 4.2.5 Second Time Delay Relay (Relay 2-2) Setpoint Evaluation

Per PassPort EDB, Relay 2-2 is an NTS Model 812-1-6-06-A (Cat Id 9220187153) time-delay pickup relay set at 54 seconds delay with a + 0.0 / - 5.4 second tolerance. The relay has a 10 to 100 second range, i.e. a 90 second span. Per Vendor Manual VM-NTS Pages 9 & 13, accuracy is +/- 2% of setpoint over the entire temperature and voltage range (00F to 1400F and 90vdc to 140vdc respectively). Accuracy of the NTS relay is given in percent of setting. The upper analytical limit (60 s) will be used to calculate reference accuracy in seconds. This is appropriate since the setpoint, including as left tolerance, must be less that the upper analytical limit.

RA(2-2) = 0.02 x 60 = ±1.20 seconds

Per Attachment E, the accuracy of the Multi-Amp Pulsar Universal Relay Test Set

timer is + 0.005% of reading over the temperature range of 0°C - 50°C (32°F - 122°F). This temperature range envelopes the actual range of the switchgear room (600F to 880F per Calculations 9-RAB-006A and 9-RAB-006B). The reading is taken as the upper analytical limit:

MTE(2-2) = 0.00005 x 60 = +/- .003 seconds

The calibration tolerance for the new NTS relay is selected as equal to the reference

accuracy of the relay:

CAL(2-2) = 0.02 x 60 = ±1.20 s

Per assumption 4.3.2.d, drift is ±1% of the maximum relay setting (100s) over 18 months. Allowing for a 25% grace period for Technical Specification surveillances: DR(2-2) = .01 x 100 s x 1.25 = ±1.25 seconds The above data has been used in the Procedure EGR-NGGC-0153 forms found in Attachment I. The results are summarized below and in Section 5.0.


Relay 2-2 Pickup Settings, Allowable Values, and Tolerances The following setpoints, allowable values and tolerances are determined in Attachment

I, Page I10 for the 2-2 Relay: Allowable Value - ≥50.38 seconds and ≤ 59.62 seconds Setpoint - ≥52.11 seconds and ≤ 57.89 seconds The actual setpoint selected for these relays is 54 seconds, equivalent to the current

setpoint. This setting includes suitable margin to both the maximum and minimum allowable setpoints as shown on Page I10.

As-left tolerances for input to MST-E0045 are ±1.20 seconds


4.3 Bases and Assumptions 4.3.1 Bases a. Procedure EGR-NGGC-0153 is used as “guidance” in the development of this

calculation. As stated in EGR-NGGC-0153, Section 9.1, this procedure is intended to be used in the development of process instrument setpoint calculations. It is also stated that protective relay calculations are excluded from the scope. However, the methodology is acceptable for use in deriving setpoints and allowable values for devices other than process instruments and is used as the bases in this calculation for determining setpoints and allowable values.

b. The bases for the DGVR voltage and time delay settings are DBD-202, Section

2.2.2.1.3, Branch Technical Position PSB-1, FSAR Section 8.3.1.1.2.11, paragraph 8 and Technical Specification Table 3.3-4. See Section 4.2.1 for specific information.

c. DGVR under-voltage relay setpoints and tolerances are documented in

PassPort EDB (under “parameters”) and in Drawings 6-S-0302 0020 & 0024. The current information for the time delay relays are also included in these locations, but will be changed by EC 84101, as necessary and as supported by Revision 4 of this calculation, to eliminate non-conservative technical specifications.

d. The bases for the ITE model number 27N undervoltage relay accuracy are

revision 0 to this calculation and Attachment B e. The bases for the Fluke model numbers 8600A and 45 digital multimeter

accuracy is Vendor Manual VM-BLV (Attachment D). f. The basis for the PT tolerance is Purchase Specification CAR-SH-E-006A,

revision 0 to this calculation and Attachment F. g. The bases for the Multi-Amp Pulsar Universal Relay Test Unit accuracy is

Reference 2.31 (Attachment E). h. In response to NRC Information Notice IN 95-05 “Undervoltage Protection

Relay Settings Out of Tolerance Due to Test Equipment Harmonics”, the harmonic output from the Multi-Amp Pulsar Universal Relay Test Sets at HNP was measured (Attachment G). The measurements show that the harmonic content of the output waveform is negligible (< 0.1%).

i. The bases for the relay 2-1 and 2-2 accuracy data is Vendor Technical Manual

VM-NTS.


4.3.2 Assumptions a. It is assumed that “equivalent” test equipment, as allowed by MST-E0045,

includes equivalent test equipment accuracy. The Fluke 8600A DMM or the Fluke 45 DMM may be used interchangeably.

b. Not used

c. The cumulative response time for relays and circuit breakers in the logic path for valve actuation, pump start, etc. is assumed to be 1.0 seconds. This assumption is used for the determination of the 2-1 timer maximum time delay analytical limit and is considered in the total response time for each of the scenarios in Attachment O (i.e., 1 second has been added to the end of each time line, with the exception of the composite timeline). The value is conservative for the following reasons: 1) the Attachment O time lines already include an add on for worst case device tolerances for the sequencer and other time delay relays; 2) the longest response time for any individual component is the circuit breaker closing time at approximately 5 cycles (83 ms) allowing for greater than 10 individual devices to function in series when compared to the 1.0 second allowance; and 3) review of related CWDs found that the number of devices required to function in series for any individual cumulative equipment response time <10. This assumption does not require further verification.

d. The manufacturer for the NTS 812 relay does not specify a value for drift. The

relay has only been used in this application for a very short time at HNP and does not have sufficient calibration history to develop a value for drift. Per guidance in EGR-NGGC-0153, a value of ±1% of maximum time delay setting for the relay over 18 months is assumed.

e. It is assumed that low head safety injection flow is not sufficient to actuate the hi

flow switch (1500 gpm setpoint) that initiates closure of the RHR mini flow valves 1RH-31 and 1RH-69 before the degraded voltage timer (2-1 relay) times out. The low head safety injection time line in Attachment O uses this assumption as the bases for not considering that the 1RH-31 and 1RH-69 valves go through a complete close-open-close cycle as the RHR starts, trips, and restarts (i.e., the valve begins to close on the second RHR pump start and remains closed thereafter). This assumption is based on Reference 2.48, Tables 3-2, 3-3, and 3-6. These tables show that RHR does not start injecting into the RCS until RCS pressure is less than 125 psia. At 125 psia, total low head safety injection flow is <1000 gpm. Flow from the accumulators to the broken leg begins at 600 psia and does not start until 8 seconds in the broken loop and 11.9 seconds in the intact loop. The degraded voltage with SIAS time delay will actuate at approximately 12 seconds. The above data supports a conclusion that RCS pressure in the intact loops will not drop below 125 psia until after the degraded voltage relay has timed out and that flow in the broken loop will not exceed the 1500 psia setpoint.


f. Signal processing time for the Safety Injection Actuation Signal and Containment Spray Actuation Signal is assumed to be 2 seconds following the time where the process parameters are met. This is a standard assumption typically used in accident analyses and is conservative with respect to time response testing results.

g. The Hi-3 setpoint of 12 psig (Reference 2.82) is assumed to be reached 3

seconds after the pipe break. Based on the containment temperature and pressure analysis (Reference 2.75), the containment pressure rises above the setpoint prior to 3 seconds for all of the double ended Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) cases considered, with the exception of the 0% power cases. Containment pressure rises above 12 psig within 3 seconds for all of the LOCA cases considered. For the double ended MSLBs at 0% power, containment pressure rises to 12 psig at just over 3 seconds (approximately 3.1 seconds). The exact time is not important since the containment spray pumps are tripped when the degraded voltage time delay relay times out and do not start for another approximately 5 seconds after power is restored from the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG). This provides ample margin around the 3 second period assumed for containment pressure to reach Containment Spray Actuation Signal (CSAS) setpoint. Several split MSLBs considered in Reference 2.75 do not result in containment pressure exceeding 12 psig for over 40 seconds. These cases are not bounding for containment pressure or temperature. By the time CSAS is initiated the EDGs will already have connected and containment spray system response will be equivalent to the same case with offsite power available (i.e., the pumps will start and the discharge valves will begin opening immediately after CSAS initiation).

h. NCR 569846 describes a scenario where the undervoltage relays associated

with 480V Power Centers 1A2-SA and 1B2-SB may not trip the motor loads connected to the bus prior to the EDG output breaker closing following a degraded voltage actuation with a concurrent safety injection actuation signal. If this happens, the motors loads will restart immediately following the EDG output breaker closing rather than being sequenced on by the load sequencer. The issue would impact the residual heat removal, containment spray, and service water booster pump start time in the Attachment O time lines. EC 84101 will correct this issue by increasing the PG/SA (PG/SB) time delay from 1.5 to 2.5 seconds to delay EDG output breaker closure until after power center undervoltage relay actuation. The Attachment O time lines assume that the undervoltage relay trips the pumps just prior to EDG breaker reclosing. Tripping the pumps at this time is conservative as it maximizes the overall time response for the various time lines.


4.4 Required Cross-Discipline Reviews Revision 4 will require cross-discipline reviews from the following departments:

Nuclear Fuels Mechanical Design Engineering System Engineering Operations Maintenance

Reviews from Nuclear Fuels and Mechanical Design Engineering are included in

Attachment L. Systems Engineering, Operations, and Maintenance reviews will be performed as part of the EC 84101 review process and will be documented in EC milestone signatures.


5.0 CONCLUSIONS 5.1 MST-E0045 SETTINGS

5.1.1 DGVR UNDER-VOLTAGE RELAY DROPOUT SETTING

RELAY TECH SPEC MST-E0045

TAG NUMBER

TABLE 3.3-4 “AS-FOUND” ALLOWED

“AS-LEFT” ALLOWED

SETPOINT ALLOWED SETPOINT MIN MAX MIN MAX 27A-1/1711 > 107.000 > 106.534 107.0 106.7 107.3 107.0 107.3 27A-2/1711 > 107.000 > 106.534 107.0 106.7 107.3 107.0 107.3 27A-3/1711 > 107.000 > 106.534 107.0 106.7 107.3 107.0 107.3 27A-1/1712 > 107.000 > 106.534 107.0 106.7 107.3 107.0 107.3 27A-2/1712 > 107.000 > 106.534 107.0 106.7 107.3 107.0 107.3 27A-3/1712 > 107.000 > 106.534 107.0 106.7 107.3 107.0 107.3

5.1.2 DGVR UNDER-VOLTAGE RELAY PICKUP SETTING


TAG NUMBER



SETPOINT ALLOWED SETPOINT MIN MAX MIN MAX 27A-1/1711 N/A N/A 107.5 107.2 107.8 107.5 107.8 27A-2/1711 N/A N/A 107.5 107.2 107.8 107.5 107.8 27A-3/1711 N/A N/A 107.5 107.2 107.8 107.5 107.8 27A-1/1712 N/A N/A 107.5 107.2 107.8 107.5 107.8 27A-2/1712 N/A N/A 107.5 107.2 107.8 107.5 107.8 27A-3/1712 N/A N/A 107.5 107.2 107.8 107.5 107.8

5.1.3 DGVR TIME DELAY RELAY SETTINGS


TAG NUMBER



SETPOINT ALLOWED SETPOINT MIN MAX MIN MAX 2-1/1711 ≥10.92s and

≤ 12.88s ≥10.59s and ≤ 13.21s

12 s 11.734s 12.266s 11.734s 12.266s

2-2/1711 ≥52.11s and ≤ 57.89s

≥50.38s and ≤ 59.62s

54 s 52.80s 55.20s 52.80s 55.20s

2-1/1712 ≥10.92s and ≤ 12.88s

≥10.59s and ≤ 13.21s

12 s 11.734s 12.266s 11.734s 12.266s

2-2/1712 ≥52.11s and ≤ 57.89s

≥50.38s and ≤ 59.62s

54 s 52.80s 55.20s 52.80s 55.20s


5.1.4 Voltage measurements may be taken with a Fluke 8600A DMM or a Fluke 45 DMM.

Time delay measurements and voltage source must be via a Multi-Amp Pulsar Universal Relay Test Unit.

5.2 ANALYTICAL LIMITS FOR USE IN VOLTAGE STUDY E-6000

PARAMETER VALUE REFERENCE

DGVR Pickup 6496.7 volts Attachment I, Page I6 DGVR Dropout 6391.4 volts Attachment I, Page I3 Time delay (Relay 2-1) 10.5 seconds Attachment I, Page I8

5.3 SETPOINT DATA FOR PASSPORT EDB

EQUIPMENT TAG NO EDB PARAMETER VALUE 27A-1/1711 27A-2/1711 Setpoint Process 107.0 volts 27A-3/1711 Reset Process 107.5 volts 27A-1/1712 As-Left Tolerance + 0.3 / - 0.0 volts 27A-2/1712 27A-3/1712

2-1/1711 Setpoint Process 12.0 seconds 2-1/1712 As-Left Tolerance + 0.266 / - 0.266 seconds 2-2/1711 Setpoint Process 54.0 seconds 2-2/1712 As-Left Tolerance + 1.20/-1.20 seconds

ATTACHMENT I CALCULATION E2-0005.09 EGR-NGGC-0153 SETPOINT FORMS PAGE I1, REV. 2

Listing Device Uncertainties Form

Device Type DGVR Undervoltage Relays Device Name(s) 27A Undervoltage Relays (Dropout Evaluation)

ERROR/EFFECT

VALUE

TYPE

COMMENTS

Ref. Accuracy

+/- 0.2140

Random

All values in % of span (50 volts)*

Cal. Tolerance (ALT)

+ 0.6000 / - 0.0000

Bias

ALT is one sided per PassPort EDB

M&TE Error

+/- 0.4724

Random

Drift

+/- 0.2140

Random

Temp. Effect

+/- 0.1744

Random

Pwr. Supply Effect

+/- 0.2140

Random

Readability

N/A

Seismic Effect

Acc. Temp. Effect

Acc. Press. Effect

Acc. Rad. Effect

Insul. Resist. Effect

Other

Total Device Uncertainty (TDU)

TDU = +/- 0.6253% + 0.6% / - 0.0% bias

(EGR-NGGC-0153-1-2) Note: All errors/effects must be converted to the same basis (i.e. units) prior to entering their values onto the form. * 27A UV relay range is 70v – 120v; therefore, span is 50v.



Device Type DGVR Potential Transformers Device Name(s) Primary Element - PE (Dropout Evaluation)

ERROR/EFFECT

VALUE

TYPE

COMMENTS

Ref. Accuracy

+/- 0.7200

Random



N/A

M&TE Error

Drift

Temp. Effect

Pwr. Supply Effect

Readability

Seismic Effect

Acc. Temp. Effect

Acc. Press. Effect

Acc. Rad. Effect


Other


TDU = +/- 0.7200

(EGR-NGGC-0153-1-2) Note: All errors/effects must be converted to the same basis (i.e. units) prior to entering their values onto the form. * 27A UV relay range is 70 – 120v; therefore, span is 50v.

CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION MEMORANDUM

DATE: July 14, 1993

TIME: 2:00 PH

Atl Ac k. V\e ,._;f- A PAsc AI CAl cu.(..,..:llt> .v EZ-ooo~.o9

Rev. l

ORIGINATOR: w. T. Helms

BETWEEN: (NAHE) I (COHPANY) I (PilON E)

Cliff Downs I ASEA Brown Boveri I 215-395-7333

SUBJECT: Setpoint Drift for ABB Instantaneous Undervoltage Relays catalog No. 211T0375

The following questions were posed to Mr. Downs of ABB:

1. Do these relays experience setpoint drift over time?

Response: Yes, there are some aging effects, but he said he expected the resulting drift to be very small due to the quality of components and feedback that he has received from other users.

2. Is the drift random or systematic (cumulative)?

Response: lie said that he did not kno,.,•.

3. Is the drift statistically significant when compared to the repeatability factors in the instruction manual?

Response: He said he was unsure if the drift would be negligible and again indicated that the drift would be relatively small.

4. Would O.l't he conservative to usc in an uncertainty calculation to account for drift?

Hcsponse: n.:~.;;ed on his experience he said h•• LhOuoJht O.l't woul<i bound the actual dr·i ft of the relays over an 18 mont.h period.

Alit It ,., .•.• ASEA BROWN BOVERI

CALC.t!L!:l,TtOIV £2-dJD5.09

IB 7.4.1. 7-7 Issue 0

A1Tf}CH/Y)~NT B PA G E Bl I Re..v. I

INSTRUCTIONS

Single Phase Voltage Relays -----------------------------------------------------------------------

Type 27N HIGH ACCURACY UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY

Type 59N HIGH ACCURACY OVERVOLTAGE RELAY

Type 27N Catalog Series 211T Standard Case

Type 27N Catalog Series 411 T Test Case

Type 59N Catalog Series 211U Standard Case

Type 59N Catalog Series 411 u Test Case

ASEA BROWN BOVERI

IB 7.4.1.7-7 Page 2

Single-Phase voltage Relays

Cal:. E.2.-ooos.oq Attod"lrne.t B P~e 'B2, Rev.l.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------~-----

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction •••.••..•....•.••. Page 2 Precautions .•.•.••••••••.•.••. Page 2 Placing Relay into Service ..•. Page 2 Application Oata .••••..•••.... Page 4 Testing ..•.•.••..•.•...•.••••• Page 10

IHTROOUCTIOO

Those instructions contain the information required to properly install, operate, and test certain single-phase undervoltage relays type 27H, catalog series 2ttT and 4t1T; and ovorvoltage relays, type 59N, catalog series 211U and 41tU.

The relay is housed in a case suitable for conventional semiflush panel mounting. All connections to the relay are made at the rear of the case and are clearly numbered. Relays of the A.ttT, and A.ttu catalog series are similar to relays of the 211T, and 211U series. Both series provide the same basic functions and arc of totally drawout construction; however, the 41tT and 411U series relays provide integral test facilities. Also, sequenced disconnects on the A.tO series prevent nuisance operation during withdrawal or insertion of the relay if the normally-open contacts are used in the application.

Basic settings are made on the front panel of the relay, behind a removable clear plastic cover. Additional adjustment is provided by means of calibration potentio-meters inside the relay on the circuit board. The target is reset by means of a pushbutton extending through the relay cover.

PRECAUTIONS

The following precautions should be taken when applying these relays:

1. Incorrect wiring may result in damage. Be sure wiring agrees with the connection diagram for the particular relay before energizing.

2. Apply only the rated control voltage marked on tho relay front panel. The proper polarity must be observed when the de control power ~onnoctions are mnde.

3. For relays with dual-rated control voltage, withdraw the relay from the case and check that the movable link on the printed circuit board is in the correct position for the system control voltage.

A.. High voltage insulation tests are not recommended. for additional information.

See the section on testing

5. The entire circuit assembly of the relay is removable. smoothly. Do not use excessive force.

Tho unit should insert

6. Follow test instructions to verify that the relay is in proper working or·der.

CAUTIOH: since troubleshooting entails working with onorgizQd equipmont, care should be taken to avoid f)6rsona1 shock. Only compotant tochnicitws £ami 1 itJr wit/J good safety practices should service those devices.

PI.ACIHO TilE HI:LAY ltHO !>f:WilCE

1. REC(!VING, liANOLIHG, 5TOOAGE

Upon receipt of the relay (when not 1ncludod as part of ~ swit~hboard) q~am1nn f0r shipping damage. If dam.,.ge or loss 1s •Jvld<!nt., filn a cla1m at once a,.-,d pnlmtlt.ir notify Asea Brown Oover·1. Use normal care in handlin') to avo1c1 mochllnlcal cj.-,magn. Koop cloan and dry.

GJc. E2..- 0005 .oq Atlachmenf :B P~e. .:B3 I Re..v. I

Single-Phase Voltage Relays IB 7.4.1.7-7 Page 3 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. INSTALLATION

Haunting: The outline dimensions and panel drilling and cutout information is given in Fig. 1.

Connections: Typical external connections are shown contact logic are shown in Figure 3. polarity.

in Figure 2. Internal connections and Control power must be connected in the proper

For relays with dual-rated con.trol power: before energlllng, withdraw the relay from its case and inspect that the movable link on the lower printed circuit board is in the correct position for the system control voltage. (For units rated ttOvdc, the link should be placed in the position marked 125vdc.)

These relays have an external resistor wired to terminals t and 9 which must be in place for normal operation. The resistor is supplied mounted on the relay.

These relays have metal front panels which are connected through printed circuit board runs and connector wiring to a terminal at the rear of the relay case. The terminal is marked MG-. In all applications this terminal should be wired to ground.

3. SETTINGS

PICKUP The pickup voltage taps identify the voltage level which the relay will cause the output contacts to transfer.

DROPOUT The dropout voltage taps are identified as a percentage of the pickup voltage. Taos are provided for 70X, SOX, 90X, and 99X of pickup, or, 30X, 40X, SOX, and 60X of pickup.

Note: operating voltage values other than the specific values provided by the taps can be obtained by moans of an internal adjustment potentiometer. See soct1on on testing for setting procedure.

TIHE DIAL The time dial taos are identified as 1,2,3,4,5,6. Refer to the time-voltage charac-teristic curves in the Application section. Time dial selection is net provided on relays with an Instantaneous operating characteristic. The time delay may also be varied from that provided by the fixed tap by using the internal calibration adjust-ment.

4. OPERATION INDICATORS

The typos 27N.and 59N provide a target indicator that is electronically actuated at the time the output contacts transfer to the trip condition. The target must be manually reset. ~he target can be reset only if control power is available, AND if the input voltage to the relay returns to the -normal- condition.

An led indicator is provided for convenience in testing and calibrating the relay and to give operating personnel information on the status of the relay. See F1gure & for tho oporation of this indicetor.

Units witha--l·· suffix on t_t!o C."'ltalog numt><:H. provid•J .~ gn!•Jn I•Hl to 1r1<1H:;!t•: Uh' presence of control pow~r ana Internal power supply volta~o.

Gtlc. E.2..-ooos.oq Airctc.h. B

IB 7.4.1.7-9 Page 4

Single-Phase Voltage Relays P~e :B4 , Rev. I

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------APPLICATION DATA

Single-phase undervoltage relaysand overvoltage relays are used to provide a wide range of protective functions, including the protection of motors and generators, and to initiate bus transfer. The typo 27N undervoltage relay and type 59N overvoltage relay are designed for those applications where exceptional accuracy, repeatability, and long-term stability are required.

Tolerances and repeatability are given in the Ratings section. Remember that the accuracy of the pickup and dropout settings with respect to the printed dial mark'ings is.generally not a factor, as these relays are usually calibrated in the field to ob-tain the particular operating values for the application. At the time of field cal-ibration, the accuracy of the instruments used to sot thA relays ts the tmoortant factor Hult1turn 1nternal cal1brat1on potent1ometors provide means tor accurate adjustment of the relay operating points, and allow the difference between pickup and drooout to be set as low asO.SX.

The relays are supplied with instantaneous operating time, or with definite-time delay characteristic. The definite-time units are offered in two time delay ranges: 1 - 10 seconds, or 0.1 - 1 second.

An accurate peak detector is used in the types 27N and 59N. Harmonic distortion in the AC waveform can have a noticible effect on the relay operating point and on measuring instruments used to set th~ relay. An internal harmonic filter is available as an option for those applications where waveform distortion is a factor. The harmonic filter attenuates all harmonics of the 50/60Hz. input. The relay then basically operates on the fundamental component of the input voltage signal. See figure 5 for the typical filter response curve. To specify the harmonic filter add the suffix -HF to the catalog number. Note in the section on ratings that the addition of tho harmonic filter does reduce somewhat the repeatability of the relay vs. temperature variation. In applications where waveform distortion is a factor, itmay be desirable to operate on the peak voltage. In these cases, the harmontc filter would not be used.

Type Pickup Range

27N 60 - 110 v

70 - 120 v

60- 110 v

SSN 100 - ISO v

CHARACTERISTICS OF COHHON UNITS

Dropout Range

70% - 99%

70% - 99%

30X - 60X

70X - 99%

Time Delay Pickup Dropout

Inst Inst lnst

Inst Inst Inst

Inst Inst Inst

Inst 1 - tO s

0.1 - I S

Inst I - 10 soc

0.1 - 1 sec

Inst 1 - 10 sec

0.1 - 1 sec

Inst 1 - 10 sec

O.t - 1 sec

lnst Inst Inst

Catalog Numbers Std Case Test Case

2t1T01x5 211T41x5 21tT61x5

21\T03x5 2t1T43x5 211T63x5

211T02x5 211T42x5 211T62x5

21 tUOtxS 211U41x5 211U6 txS

411TOtx5 411T41X5 411T61x5

41 IT03x5 411Tt.3x5 4IIT63x5

411T02x5 411T42x5 411T62x5

411UO 1 xS 411U41x5 411U61x5

IHf'tJRT~NT NOTES: 1. Each of tho listed cat~log numbers for the typos 27N and 59N

contains an "y" for the control voltage dos1gnat1on. To ccmol<~to th•1 c;atalog number, r.~plac~ the -,.- w1th Lhe Droo·~··

c::ont.rol '•"llt.a•Jtl codo d1g1t: .t!l/125 vac 7

?.50 vdc 5 220 vue 2

40/110 vdc 0

2. 1 o specifyy UHl IHJ<"l 1 t 1 <H> of tno harmon 1 c I i I t.<~r m<:><ju It), 3dd th'l suffl> ··-fH'-. For n>·amolo·: 411T4t75-HF. HarmoniC f 1lt•~r· f\t)t# .tV.lllat>l'l ()rl t_ytHl 27N Wlt.t\ lr\:..;t.'\ntiHl•H}lJ~j Chll.:ly

t iln!rl•l ·~~, .. .,, !l':r.~,- tst. t':.

Single-Phase Voltage Relays

Calc. E2-0005.o 09

Bs, \ Page 5--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

SPECIFICATIONS

Input Circuit: Rating: type 27N type 59N

150v maximum continuous. 1 6 0 v maximum conttnuous.

Burden: less than 0 . 5 VA at 1 2 0 vac.

Frequency: 50 /60 Hz.

Taos: available models include: Type 27N: pickup - 6 0 , 7 0 , 8 0 , 9 0 , 100 , 110· volt:;.

70, 80, 90, 100, ItO, 12(' VOltS. dropout- 60, 70, 80, 90, 99 percent of otckup.

30, 40, 50, 60 percent of otckup.

Type S9N: pickup- 100, 110, 120, 130, 140, 150 volts. dropout- 60, 70, 80, 90, 99 percent of otckup.

Operating Time: See Time-Voltage characteristic curves that follow. Instantaneous models: 3 cycles or less.

Reset Time: 27N: less than 2 cycles; 59N: less than 3 cycles. (Type 27N resets when input voltage goes above pickup sP.tttng.) (Type 59N resets when input voltage goes below dropout setttng.)

Output Circuit: Each contact It 120 vac

30 amps. 5 amps. 3 amos. 2 amos.

@ 125 vdc 30 amos.

5 amps. 1 amp.

0.3 amp.

@ 250 vdc 30 amos.

5 amos. 0.3 amo. 0.1 amp.

tripptng duty. continuous. break, reststtve. break. inducttve.

Operating Temperature Range: -30 to +70 deg. c.

Control Power:

Tolerances:

Hodels available for Allowable vartation: 48/125 vdc II 0.05 A max. 48 vdc nomtnal 38- 58 vdc 48/110 vdc II 0.05 A max. 110 vdc BB-125 vdc

220 vdc II 0.05 A max. 125 vdc 100-140 vdc 250 vdc @ 0.05 A max. 220 vdc 176-246 vdc

250 vdc 200-280 vdc

(u\thout harmonic filter optton, after 10 mtnute ~arm-up)

Pickup and dropout settings wtth respect to printed a•al marktngs (factory calibration) = +/- 2%.

Pickup and dropout settings, repeatability at constant temperature and constant control voltage=+/- O.lx. (see note below}

Pickup and dropout settings, repeatability over -allowable- de control power range: +/- 0.1X. (see note below)

Pickup and dropout settings, reoeatablility over· temoeratun~ range: -20 to +5S0C +/- 0.4X -20 to +700C +/-0.7'

0 to +4QGC +/- 0.2X (see note below!

Note: the three tolerances shown should be considered tndeo~naent ~nc may be cumulat1ve. Toleranc~s assumQ oure s1n~ wave 1r1nuL :;1gr1~\.

r I m·~ O•l 1 a y : Instantaneous moaels: f\ •.• i 1 ,,, te t 1m'! mode 1 s:

3 cycles or less. •1- 1r: n·~rr.•:nt ... OT •/·:?:~ :":>ll11•; .... r·:..

,....~\ l(.l\t!V•.!r 1 s. c;r·nater.

llarm<>n IC I 11 t.•~r i •)llt tona I l

A II r.lLH1•J'» :u·•' th•~ :;;1m·~ •.?•,:•JGt: P.lr::.J-•JP .1nr1 rlrGtlOUt. 5•~ltlng~;. r•~o~~.lt.:th•ltty tJ'J'\~r· t•.~mo·~r-.lt_ur··~ .ln·l•::

:) to +5soc +/- 0.75~ -:'0 t() .. ;OilC +/-1 _,.,,

• 1 •) to + 4 oo C + 1 - · 0 .. t 0'-

IB 7.4.t.7-7 Page 6


GJc. E.2..-0oo5.0'J A\t-achrreit B P~e :B6 , Rev. I

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ccl.l!201A HOLES 9.56

I 7 • I • ) 2 I

IZJ~~

t;iSI41)1 It 10 t O(i

STUD NUMBERS CSACKVIEWI

Figure 1: Relay Outline and Panel Drilling

52

£;11 y r It~

sa I· *9 Figure 2: Typical External Connections

T +

CONTROL F'OWC!f

SOURCE

1


GJc. E.2-0005.0'J Alt-o.chMetd- B p~ :B7, ~-1

IB 7.4.1.7-7 Page 7

------------------------------~------------------------------------------------------

Figure 3: INTERNAL CONNECTION DIAGRAM AND OUTPUT CONTACT LOGIC

The following table and diagram define the output contact states under all possible conditions of the measured input voltage and the control power supply. ·As SHOWN-means that the contacts are in the state shown on the jnternal connection diagram for the relay being considered. -TRANSFERRED- means the contacts are in the opposite state to that shown on the· internal connection diagram.

condition Contact State

Type 27N Type 59N

Normal Control Power Transferred As Shown

AC Input Voltage Below Setting

Normal Control Power As Shown Transferred

AC Input Voltage Above Setting~

No Control Voltage As Shown As Shown

+ .16D211H Std. or T~st Cas•

Input Voltage Increasing

Stan

Figure 4a: ITE-27N Operation of Dropout Indicating Light

Pickup Voltage Level

Dropout Voltage Level

Input Voltage Decreasing

Figure ~b: ITE-S9N Operation of Pic~up lndi~ating Light

Figure 4: Operation of Pickup/Dropout Light-Emitting-Diode Indicator

GJc. E..:L-0005.0'1

Att-o.ch~ :B

lB 7.4.1.7-7 Page 8

Single-Phase Voltage Relays p~ :B.8 1 Re.v. 1

I

------------------------------------------~------------------------------------------

1

rvo( IT( -Ufl oYE•""'-To« O(I.AY CKFINITI TIIOC

1,1 .-----,,-,,:-,.,-,-,.----.,----r---r--..., t••s

1A~----~--~·--+-----~-----+----~~--~

•.• ~--~--..J---+---+---+--4

• . r·· ····1--+--+---l----1:---i---1

•.• ~--~-!-..J---.;...--..;..--....;..---l

•~0~1f-~~~~----~~~~-----7u~----~u~----t,~~--~.~~ wr.A.TWUS ol""""" Tl# MTll4 .;

IMQIIIf 'ft..C CatA.1ot hf't•• JHUh .. ~ .tU'"ua TIME. OCU'I U IHOW'I

-· .. ·-1 ---·------ lt.-c:-

100 f\ ao \

' :; .. 1\

:r eo 0 ... •

'\ I \

!! .. I 40 0 z

i \ ' I r\ lO

" 0 lO 60 IN

n!..CE VOLTAGE CHARAC7'ERISTICS

TrO( IU-ZIN """'" ...... ' '" fi<I.AY CKFINITl Tli'C

ur---~----~--~----~~~--~~

I I I n"• "·'· LI~----_L------~----.L------~--=·--~----~

!_ .... . ~----~------~----~----~~--·~ ... • ~ ... ~-----r------~----.L----~~-----+------~ c .. . 0 .. c

!u~-----r------~----r---~~-----+-----1

o.ti-----..J------!-----~:....----.!...--~2--L-----I

oL--~---~~--~----L----~----_J 0 0.1 ... a.• ... 1..0

WIA.TIIfiLI.S et OftO,OI.IT ICTTIMO

Sf<WI;T fl~ C:UAIOt 'S4f"tM ltUtau 41'14 .tUtlan """on,..,. u JIO!otrt

lii€DZUM TJMf C.aU109 ,S.I'f•• 21tf4ua ..... •IIT••u ""UC.Tl~Y 1ltl< OCUT lfOMt, IY tO

.IMA~IO't"(fllll. - ....... ,

~plea I

~

I I I

I i

I I

u

t'- I I 180 300

Ftgure 5: Horm4lized Frequency Response- Optional Harmonic Filter Hodule

Single-Phase Voltage Relays IB 7.4.1.7- 7 Page 9 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Control Voltage Selector Plug

. ..., 0 Q..

c 0 ~G) «lal Lll .011) ..-L .-o «lC o ... >-0 ~~~ ,... G)): 00 Cl) E 1-

I -0 cu + ao -- IIIZJ

IIIVS 11 ltY·~ c =>

1111 -- --IIVI

• w ..

Pickup

I Voltage Calibration Pot.

27N: CCW to Incr . 59N: CW to Incr .

Dropout Voltage Calibration Po~.

CCW to Incr.

Figure 6: Typical Circuit Board Layouts, types 27H and 59N

Figure 7: Typical Circuit Board Layout -Harmonic Filter Hodulo

IB 7.~.1.7-7 Page 10


Co.k. £_2.-0005.0'} -Aflo..ch Met\+ :R, P~ .BIO,~.I

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------TESTING

MAINTENANCE AND RENEWAL PARTS

No routine maintenance is required on these relays. Follow test instructions to veri~y that the relay is in proper working order. .we recommend that an inoperative relay be returned to·the factory for repair; however, a circuit description booklet C07.4.1.7-7 which includes schematic diagrams, can be provided on reQuest. · Renewal parts will be quoted by the factory on request.

211 Series Units

Orawout circuit boards of the same catalog number are interchangible. A unit is identified by the catalog number stamped on the front panel and a serial number stamped on the bottom side of the drawout circuit board.

The board is removed by using the metal pull knobs on the front panel. Removing the board with the unit in service may cause an undesired.operation.

An 18 point extender board (cat 200X0018) is available for use in troubleshooting and calibration of the relay.

411 Series Units

Hetal handles provide leverage to withdraw the relay assembly from the case. Removing the unit in an application that uses a normally closed contact will cause an operation. The assembly is identified by the catalog number stamped on the front panel and a serial number stamped on the bottom of the circuit board.

Test connections are readily made to the drawout relay unit by using standard banana plug leads at the rear vertical circuit board. This rear board is marked for easier identification of the connection points. ·

Important: these relays have an external resistor mounted on rear terminals 1 and 9. order to test the drawout unit an equivilent resistor must be connected to

Jrminals 1 & 9 on the rear vertical circuit board of the drawout unit. The resistance value must be the same as the resistor used on the relay. A 25 or 50 watt resistor will be suffkient· for testing. If no resistor is available, the resistor assembly mounted on the relay case could be removed and used. If the resistor from the case is used, be sure to remount it on the case at the conclusion of testing.

Test Plug:

A test plug assembly, catalog number ~OOX0002 is available for use with the 410 series units. This device plugs into the relay case on the switchboard and allows access to all external circuits wired to the case. See Instruction Book IB 7 •. 7 .1. 7-8 for details on the use of this device.

2. HIGH POTENTIAL TESTS

High potential tests are not. recommended. A hi-pot test was performed at the factory before shipping. If a control wiring insulation test is reQuired, partially withdraw the relay unit from its case sufficient to break the rear connections before applying the test voltage.

3. BUILT-IN TEST FUNCTION

Be sure to take all necessary precautions if the tests are run with the main circuit energized.

The built-in test is provided as a convenient functional test of the relay and assoc-iated circuit. When you depress the button labelled TRIP, the measuring ·and timing circuits of the relay are actuated. When the relay times out, the output contacts

-ansfer to trip the circuft breaker or other associated circuitry, and the target is ~nl•v<>rl Th"' ~"'"'" hrrt'f'nn m11sr. hA hP.ld down continuously until operation is

Calc. E. 2 - DD05. o 'J Aiach~.B P~ .:Bll , 1<ev. I

Single-Phase Voltage Relays U IB 7.4. 1• 7_7 . Page 11 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------4. ACCEPTANCE TESTS

Follow the test procedures under paragraph 5. For definite time units, select Time Dial 13. For the type 27H, check timing by dropping the v. ltage to 50~ of the dropout voltage set (or to zero volts if preferred for si lification of the test) For the type 59N check timing by switching the voltage 105~ of pickup (do not exceed max.· input voltage rating.) Toleran be within those shown on page 5 . If the :settings required for the particular appli'cation are known, use the procedures in paragraph 5 to make the final -adjustments.

5. CALIBRATION TESTS

Test Connections and Test Sources; Typical test circuit connections are shown in Figure e. Connect the relay to a proper source of de control voltage to match its nameplate rating (and internal plug setting for dual-rated units). Generally the types 27N and 59N are used in applica-tions where high accuracy is reQuired. The ac test source must be stable and free of harmonics. A test source with less than 0.3~ harmonic distortion, such as a •tine-corrector· is recommended. Do not use a Voltage source that employs a ferroresonant transformer as the stabUizing and regulating device., as these usually have high harmonic content in their output. The accuracy of the voltage measuring instruments used must also be considered when calibrating these relays.

If the resolution of the ac test source adjustment arrangement using two variable transformers shown in •tine• adjustments is recommended.

means is Figu_re 9

not adeQuate, the to give ·coarse~ and

When adjusting the ac test source do not exceed the maximum input voltage rating of the relay.

LED Indicator: A light emitting diode is provided the pickup and dropout voltages. level and the direction of voltage Figure 4.

on the front panel for convenience in determining The action of the indicator depends on the voltage change, and is best explained by referring to

The calibration potentiometers mentioned in the following procedures are of the multi-turn type for excellent resolution and ease of setting. For catalog series 211 units, the 18 point extender board provides easier access.to the calibration pots. If desired, the calibration potentiometers can be resealed with a drop of nail polish at the completion of the calibration propedure. ·

Setting Pickuo and Dropout Voltages: Pickup may be varied between the fixed taps by adjusting the pickup calibration potentiometer R27. Pickup should be set first, with the dropout ·tap set at ssx {60X on ·1ow dropout .units-). Set the pickup tap to the nearest value to the desired setting. The calibration potentiometer has approximately a +/-Sx range. Decrease the voltage until dropout occurs, then check pickup by increasing· the voltage. Re-adjust and repeat.until pickup occurs at precisely the desired voltage.

Potentiometer R16 is provided to adjust dropout. Set the dropout tap to the next lower tap to the desired value. Increase the input voltage to above pickup, and then lower-the voltage until dropout occurs. Readjust Rt6 and repeat until the required setting has been made.

Setting Time Delay: Similarly, the time delay may be adjusted higher or lower than the values shown on the time-voltage curves by means of the time delay calibration potentiometer R41. On the type 27N, time delay is initiated when the voltage drops from above the pkl-:up value to below the dropout value. On the type 59N, timing is initiated when the voltage increases from below dropout to above the pickup value. Referring to Fig. 4. the relay is ~timing out- when the led indicator is lighted.

Ex!<~rngl Re~i~t,Qr Val!,!~§; Tho following resistor values may bo used when testing 4 ll series units. Connect to rear connection points l & 9.

Relays rated .CS/125 vdc: 5000 ohms; (-HF models with harmonic filter 4000 ohms) .CB/110 vdc 4000 ohms; (-HF models wi t.h harmonic f i 1 ter 3200 ohms)

250 vdc 10000 ohms; (-HF models with harmonic f i 1 ter 9000 ohms) ??0 vdc 10000 ohms: (-HF models with harmonic fi lt.or 9000 ohms)

All ASEA BROWN BOVERI

ABB Power Transmission Inc. Protective Relay Division 35 N. Snowdrift Rd. Allentown, Pa. 18106 215-395-7333

CoJc_. £2.- ooos. oCJ /tlt~l"'\el'\t B Pae .BI2., ~-,

Issue D (2/89) Supersedes Issue c

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

DC Control Source

l-J (+J

7 Q6 05

To Timer STOP Input

Figure 8: Typical Test Connections

To AC Test Source See Fig. 9

Timer START Input

T1, T2 T3

Variable Autotransformers Filament Transformer Accurate AC Voltmeter

(t.S amp rating) (1 amp secondary)

v

LINE CORRECTOR

(1.KVA)

X

Tl COARSE

T2 FINE

T'l

Figure 9: AC Test Source Arrangement

These instructions do not purport to cover all details or variations in eQuipment, nor to provide for every possible contingency to be met in conjunction with installation, operation, or maintenance. Should particular problems ar·ise which are not covered sufficiently for the purchaser's purposes, the matter should be referred to Asea Brown Boveri.

DEGRADED VOLTAGE RELAY CALIBRATION DATA

MST-E0035 BUS 1A-SA

DATE 27A-1 27A-1 . 27A-2 PICKUP DROPOUT PiCKUP

AS LEFT 05/22/92 107.46 107.00 107.50 AS FOUND 08/17/92 107.41 107.10 107.74 DELTA -0.05 0.10 0.24

AS LEFT 08/17/92 107.41 107.10 107.43 AS FOUND 11/04/92 107.36 106.92 107.42 DELTA -0.05 -0.18 -0.01

AS LEFT 11/04/92 107.36 106.92 107.42 AS FOUND 01/28/93 107.22 106.82 107;22 DELTA -0.14 -0.1 -0.2

27A-2 27A-3 27A-3 DROPOUT PICKUP DROPOUT

107.00 107.48 107.02 106.94 107.82 107.00 -0.06 0.34 -0.02

106.94 107.42 107.00 106.99 107.38 106.90

0.05 -0.04 -0.10

106.99 107.38 106.90 106.71 107.33 106.93 -0.28 -0.05 0.03

WR&A NUMBER

92SFP001 92SFP002

92SFP002 92BMY41

92BMY41 92SFP004

(\ ):, ::!l

·~ ""'\ r-.:D -\ C"\ (;') ~ <:. \11 (" .£ n :r -; - S' c

" ttl =< ~<tl\ ~ "i ~ - .

()~ "\ ' 0 \t)

·.t ... CALCULATION EZ-OOo>.o9 AITACHMENTD PAGE J>f , REV. i

8600A ;e;.utt-£ A

~~a:=~:::oCJ::=::=:= .s /h-:ll~

(battel)' power option) is configured :aTche facr5iji{(;r 1-9. SPECIFICATIONS I J S Vac, or 230 Vac, SO Hz or 60 Hz line power operation. The battcl)' power option must not be operated from :any other line voltage or frequency than that for which it is configured (see decal on bottom of.ease). The operation of the front panel controls is the same for all power configu· rations of the 8600A, 8600A.OI, :and 8600A.02 instruments.

J-10. Specifications for the Mode! 8600A :are presented

DC VOLTAGE THpUf- BiAs Cvr..otf-Ranges • • • • • • •

Accuracy:

200 mV range • 2V, 20V, and 200V ranges. 1200V range • • •

Temperature Coefficient: 200 mV range • • • 2V to 1200V ranges •

Input lmped_ance:

200 mV and 2V ranges • 20V, 200V and 1200V ranges

Normal Mode Rejection

Common Mode Rejection •

Zero Stability •

Ranging.

Polarity •

Overload

( 100% to 1% of range)

~

in Table J.J, under headings of DC VOLTAGE, AC VOLTAGE OCCURRENT, AC CURRENT, OHMS, and GENERAL. ' Specifications for each option are listed under the option heading.

Table 1·3. MODEL8600ASPECIFICATIONS

<so pA. ~ 3()<:/11-1($ @ l<i c. -b -"i? c. ±200mV.±2V,±20V,±200V,±1200V

6 Months (15"C to 3s"CI

• ±(0.04% of input i0.01% of range) • • • ±(0.02% of input -«1.005% of range)

±(0.02% of input i0.008% of range)

±(0.003% of input -«1.001% of rangei/"C ±{0.001% of input iO.OOOS% of rangei/"C

> 1000megohms tO megohms

• 60 dB minimum @ 50 Hz. 60 Hz

120 dB minimum@ de and SO Hz.-60 Hz (with 1k!l in either lead)

• Auto zeroed on all ranges

Full autoranging, or manual ranging

Automatic bipolar, -t or -display

±1200V de or 1700V peak ac applied continuously to any range. 1 second maximum to displayed input

• • 200.mV, 2V, 20V, 200V, 1200V

6 Months (15"C to 35"CI

30Hz· 50 Hz; ±.(0.5% of input i0.10% of range I 50 Hz· tO kHz:±.(0.2% of input +0.08% of range) 10kHz· SOkHz:±.(O.S% of input+ 0.10%of range I 50 kHz· tOO kHz; ±.(0.5% of input+ 0.5% of range)

50 Hz· 10 kHz;.;t(0.2% of input + 0.015% of range I I z and -....../"......_./

50kliz·100kllz; i_(l.O'lbol input • 0.05%of range)

'---------------lUBLY __ 1 ") tf17

.-.. CALCULATION Et.-ooo>.o 9 AITACHMENTD PAGE~REV.1

c/u~& . ,-,~ ecoo* Slh-:17

~=DEL6600ASPECIFICATJONS S600A

1200V ralllJe (100% to 1% of range). • • • • • lOV to 500V, 50 Hz· 10kHz; ±(0.2% of input -1{).03% of range)

Temperature Coefficient:

200 mV range • • • 2V to t200V ranges • •

Input Impedance • • • •

500V -1200V, 50 Hz· 10kHz:;! (0.37% of input+ 0.03%1 or range) tOV to 1200V, 30Hz to 50 Hz:, 10kHz: to 20kHz:, ±(0.5% of input +0.08% of range!

±(0.015% of input+ 0.005% of rangeJrC ±(0.01% of Input+ 0.002% of range),.C 2 megohms shunted by Jess than 100 pf

Response lime to Rated Accuracy Within Range • • 1.5 seconds maximum to displayed input

0>'erload

RangilllJ. •

OCCURRENT

Ransr-s •

Ranging.

Al:curacy:

~~~ ~~ :rx:o-::-. Temperature Coefficient:

All Ranges •

Voltage Burden

Overload • •

1200V rms, 1700V peak ac applied continuously to any range· not to exceed 2 x 101 V Hz: product (20kHz: max at tOOOVI

Full autoranging, or manual rangilllJ

• • • • • • 200 /LA. 2 rnA. 20 mA, 200 rnA. 2000 rnA

• • • • • • • Manual ralllJing

6 Months (1~C to 3~CI

+(0.1% of input+ 0.01% of range) t{o~of.;,.,t~o.ot, ... ~Mo-Je)

±(~of input+ 0.001% ~f ralllJelrc

0.25V maximum up to 200mA: 0.5V maximum up to 2A

Protected to 2A on all ranges: fused above 2A

Response lime to Rated Accuracy Within Range 1 second maximum to displayed input

ACCURRENT

Ranges •

Ranging. •

• • • • • • 200pA. 2 rnA. 20 rnA. 200 rnA. 2000 rnA

• • • • • • Manual ranging

Accuracy: (la::n., +o 11 • .,p~) 6 Months (l5°C to 3s"Cl

Temperature Coefficient:

All Ranges •

Voltage Burden

Overload

Response lime

OHMS

Ranges

Ra'?ging.

50 Hz:. 10kHz; ±.(0.3% of input+ 0.08% of range I all ranges (except 2000 rnA range 50 Hz· 5kHz) 30 Hz:. 50 Hz; ±.(0.6% of input+ 0.1% of range) all ranges

±.(0.015% of input+ 0.005%of range)/°C

0.25V maKimum up to 200mA: O.SV ma>:imum at 21>.

Protected to 2A on all range•. fu1ed above 2A

1 sec. max. to rated accuracy

2oon. 2kn. 20 ~en. 200 ~en. 2000 1:11. 20 Mn Full autoranging. or mJnual ranging

trcv 1 3

CALCULATION A1TACHMENT~2.-ooos:".o9 PAGED3 REV. 1

RANGING

3-G

CALCULATION €Z-oooS"".o"} ATIACHMENTD

VohsOC

~ Am~ps OC~Resis~tance Diode Test/Continuity

n *,.\ ' ' ' ' ' ' '

AJNCTION BUTTONS:

PAGE t>Zf:., REV. i

SIDb-.3g

' ' ' ' .Press to Se!ed lhc func(IOfl Designated

" ' ' ' r--T:~ VohsAC ', ' ' " " ' ........

ArnpsAC ', ........ .... ,

~-~~@.::. PU..ICG "\:-----

' ' ' ----A~ ' .:::... ~ ... 0- ·' ' 0 '

A.~ !E(Efl!i Ei! s G:l GJ """~

... • r='"' - tllli'U ~

-r ,!EJ El BiB~~ s s s '--·-~ .. Ull .......,._ .....

Frequency

~Ga.:...i

Figure 3-5. Function Selection Buttons

FAST READING RATE MEDIUM READIUG RATE SLOW READING RATE

Range . FuUScale Range full Scale Range FuUScale

300mV 300.0mV 300mV 300.00mV 100mV 99.999mV 3V 3.000V 3V 3.0000V 1000mV 999.99mV

30V 30.0011 30V 30.000V tOV 9.9999V 300V 300.0V 300V 300.00V 10011 99.999V

tooov• tooov• tooov• tooo.ov• tooov• 999.99v•

Table 3-3. Cuncnl Ranges and Full Scale Values

FAST REAOIIlG RATE MEDIUM READING RATE SLOW READING RATE

Range Full Scale Range Full Scale Range Full Scale

30mA 30.00mA 30mA 30.000mA lOrnA 9.9999mA IOOmA 100.0mA IOOmA 100.00mA IOOmA 99.999mA lOA IO.OOA• 10A IO.OOOA• lOA 9.9999A

-~ . )

• 20A for tn:>ximum of 30 =nds - -~

.· BLV

INTRODUCTION

CALCULATION ~2... C>oo$": 09 ATIACHMENT D PAGE J>S" REV. -1

S!Db-113

Appendix A

Specifications

Appendix A contains the specifications of the Fluke 45 Dual Display Multimeter.

Theses pecifications assume;

• A 1-year calibration cycle • An operating temperature of 18 to 28°C (64.4 to 82.4°F) • .Relative humidity not exceeding 90% (non-condensing) (70% for l,ooO kfl range

and above)

BLV A·l

SPECIFICATIONS- TRUE RMS AC VOLTAGE ;

TRUE RMS AC VOLTAGE, AC.COUPLED

Range Slow

300mV -:w -3f.N -300V -75fN -100mV 1P/ 1000mV 10P/ 10V 100P/ 100V 1mV 75fN 10mV

Accuracy

Unear Accuracy Frequency

Slow Medium

120-SO liz 1%•W. 1%•.Jll." ( ~z-10'1!_z -~•too_ <f2'.[ •10

10-<roknl" ml%+100 u::r-n• lu 20-50kHz 2%+200 2%+20 50-100kHz 5%+500 5%+50

Resolulion

Medium

10P/ 100P/ 1mV 10mV 100mV

-----

dB Accuracy

Fast Slow/Med Fast

J%•.&. 0.15 0.72 0.5%+2 ~ 0.08 0.17

"""'"'"" "£ 0.11 0.17

2%•3 0.29 0.34 5%+6 0.70 0.78

• Error in power mode will not exceed twice lhe linear accuracy specification

CALCULATION t2.-ooot:o") AITACHMENTD • PAGE PG., REV. t

Fast

100P/ 1mV . 10mV 100mV 1V

-----

Maxlnputal Power• · Uppcrfrcq . 2%+ 10 750V

0.4% + 10" 750V 1%+ 10 750V 4%+20 400V

10%+50 200V

Accuracy specirlcalions apply within the ronowing limits. based on reading rate:

Slow Reading Rate: Between 15,000 and 99,999 counts (lull range) Medium Reading Rate: Between 1,500 and 30,000 counts (lull range) Fast Reading Rate: Between 150 and 3,000 counts (lull range)

Decibel Resolution

Resolution

Slow & Medium I Fast

0.01 dB 1 0.1dB

:BLV

series.

7000 industrial electropneumatic timing relays

GJc. E2.- 0005.09 AitachrneA- D P~ D7, ~-1

S1a-8 ______________ _.....,.,. SPECIFICATIONS (AI values shown are at nominal opetating voltage and 25"C (77"F) unless Olherwise noted.) Operating Modes Model701217014: OrHlelay

(Delay on pick-up) Model 702217024: Off-delay

(Delay on drop-<)UI) Model 7032: OrHlelay, OH-d!lay

(Double head) Timing Adjustment llming Is set by slrilply turning the tarlbrated cflllllo the desired time value. In the zone or approximately 25• separating the high and low ends or timing ranges A. o, E. and K. instantaneous operation (no time delay) wiH occur. All OCher ranges produce an lnfltllte time delay when the dial is set in this zone.

Models 7014 and 7032 are available with lener-cafabrated cf.als only. The upper end or the time ranges in these models may ~ twice the values shOwn. Linear Timing Ranges

Time Range Code

A B c 0 E F H I J K

Models 7012, 7022, 7024

.1 to 1 Sec.

.51o5 Sec. 1.5 lo 15 Sec.

51o50Sec. 20 to 200 Sec.

11o 10 Min. 3to 30 Min. 6to 60 Min. 3 to 120 Cycle 1to300Sec.

Models 7014 7032

.21o 2 Sec.

.7to7Sec. 2to20Sec.

10 to 100 Sec. 30 to 300 Sec. 1.5 to 15 Min.

3to 30 Min. Not avaa. Not avail. Not avail.

For delays greater than 200 seconds: 7012:7022. 7014! 7024 :!:.10% 7032 :!:.15% • The fits! time delay afforded by Model 7012 with H (3 to 30 min.) and 1 (6 to 60 min.) lime ranges or Model 7014 With H time range win be approximately 15% longer than subs&-quent delays due to coil temperature rise.

Reset Time 0.050 sec. (except mo:let7032} Relay Release Time 0.050 sec. tor on-delay models (7012.'7014) Relay Operate Time 0.050 sec. lor off-delay models. (702217024)

Operating VoHage Coli Data Cell ()pelaling• Operating l'llt Code Raled ~ Rated ~ Number leiter ~ Range \llllage Range

060Hz 050Hz 7000 A 120 102·132 110 93.5-121

8 240 ~ 220 187.:!<42 c 4110 408.Q8 D 550 46&-605 E 24 20.5-28.5

AC F 1Z7 10&-140 G 240 ~ H 12 10.2·13.2 I & 5.1-6.6 J 206 176m K Dual~ Ceil (Combl"" A&B) l Special N; Cdls (lt,l2, etc.)

7010 M 28 22.5-13.5 N 48 38.5-57.5 0 24 19.2-28.8 p 125 tOO.tSO 0 12 9.6-14.4 R 60 48-74

DC s 250 20().3()() T 550 440Wl u 16 12.8-19.2 v 32 25.6-38.4 w 96 76.6-115 y & 4.8-7.2 z 220 ~~ X Special DC Coils lXI. X2. etc.)

Minimum operating voltages are based on vertically mounted 70t2 units. 70t2 horizon. tally mounted or 7022 wrtically or horlzoo. tally mounted units will operate satisfactorily at minimum voltages approximately 5% lower than those listed.

.AC.IKlils drop out at approximately 50% ol rated \'OIIage. DC units drop out at llppii)Ximalely 10% ol rated YOitage.

All units may ~ operated on lntermiltant duty cycles atwltages 10% above t11e &sted maximums (llllermiltent duty· maximum 50% duty cycle and 30 minutes "on"lime.) •Four Pole Models: .

Operationalwltage range 90% to 120% for .AC units; 85% to 120% tor DC units.

Power Consumption Approximately 8 watts power at rated whage (all unUs). Output/Life Contact Ratings Contact capacity in Amperes (Resistive Load) Contact Min. 100,000 Min. 1,000,000 Voltage Operations Operations

30 VDC ' 15.0 7.0 110 VDC 1.0 0.5 120 v 60 Hz 20.0 15.0 240 v 60 Hz 20.0 15.0 480 V 60 Hz 12.0 10.0

10 Amps Resistive, 240 VAC ) 1/4 Horsepower, 120 VN;/240 VM; Per. 15 Amps 30 VDC Pole', 5 Amps, General Purpose, 600 VAC

Series 7000 Surgeffransient Protection Option Characteristics (For D.C. Timers Only) Coli Voltage Nominal (DC) .12v 24v 2Bv 32v 48v 60v 96v

110v 125v 220v 250v

Temperature Range Operating: -30'C to + 75'C

(-22"F lo + 16T'f} Storage: -40"C to + 75'C

(-<IO'F to + 167"F)

Surge Current

Varistor Voltage

22v 47v 47v 6Bv 82v

150v 200v 200v 200v 390v 390v

I lime: The maximum current witllin the Varistor voltage range +1-tO"/o wi!ll tile standard impulse current (8/20US) applied onetime. 2 Tome: As above with an interval of S minutes.

Energy Max. clamping V (2mS) Vatl8120uS

0.4j 48v 1A 1.Bj 93v 2.5A 1.8j 93v 2.5A 2.5j 135v 2.5A 3.57j 145V SA 6j

10j 10j 10j 17j 17j

250v SA 34011 10A 340v tOA 340v 10A 366v lOA 366v tOA

Surge life Applied tOO,OOO limes continuously wi!ll the interval ol 10 sec. at room temperature. Below 68v: 12A (8/20US} ~ 6Bv: 35A (8/20uS)

PF.M

: .... '··

tr-·-·.:.;.. ...... ~-· !'

series

7000

industrial electropneumatic timing relays

:.~""~"':illl!Jilo"'·· ·'fG~ •<~:···""'" ~C~;~·.:~~~~J!-§..:..\.,;"l:::.r~";f~

•

i i I I

·····'1i . .

ORDERING INFORMATION catalog Humber Code

0

Contact Amngemenl 2 - Double Pole,

~ - -Double Throw

~ 2=0!i'JaY 3- On-Delay

O!f.l)elay (Double Head)

ColiVollage A- t20V EO Hz

110V56HZ 8-240VE0Hz

22fN50Hz C-480VEOHz D-550VE0Hz E-24VEOHz F-!27V50Hz G-240V50HZ H-12VEOHz I -6V60Hz J-208VEOHz K- Dual Voltage

(combines A & B) L- Sp&Cial AC

Coil$ (Lt. L2, etc.)

M-28VOC N-48VDC ,

~ R-EOVDC S-250VDC T-SSOVOC U-16VOC V-32VDC W-96VOC Y-&VDC Z-220VOC X- Special DC

WARRANTY Ttcs prod"4Ct is warranred a9_.11nst mecha-n.ca1 and e1ec1ncal detects tor a periOd of two years ''om oate of shipment from factory if it has been installed and used in accordance w•lh factory tecommendabons. Any ftetd repa1rs or rt'l()d.licatk>nS to the Of'iginal unit w•11 VOtl:t th•s warJanty Amerace Corporat•on·s laabll•ly is 1•mi1ed to replacement ot parts proved detee-tiYe in workmanship or matenals. (W·AB2)

Ccils (X 1, X2. etc.)

Time Range Modell 7012, 7022,7024

Code A- .11otsec. R e•,C.CAI'!;

t:-t.St01!!i.•'tC. D- olff":"o~ISJI"' .,. E - 20 rO 200 $eC. F- 1 to 10min. H- 3to30min. I - 6toEOmin. J- 3t0120cyc:. K - 1 to 300 sec.

~ode~ For Model 7032 specify separat" time rnnge code !Or each head. Exomple: AB. Arty two ranges may be selected .

GJc.. E2-ooo5.oq Athch~]) P~ DR, Rev.l

faetO<Y Instal~ Opllono (!)® A 1 - Ouick.connec:t T<!rminals.

Single. Male • .250 :1: .o32 ®:!> A2 - Quick.(;cMeel Terminals.

S1a-10

Double, Male, .250 :1: .o32 :t$@ B - Plug.ln Connector. Male ~ GZ -Total ~ wi1h Bottom Connection !'~ H - H&rm. Sealed (Consult Factory)

'i' It - Tamperprool Covet-Opaque ~ 12 - Tamperprool Covet-Transparent :!) K - ElqllosiOnProof Enc;losunt X L - Auxirl8f)' Switch

One lnslalltaneOUS Form C conlad (on-delay IIIOdel$ only)

:!;: LL - AuloliatySwitell lWo instantaneous Form C conlaCIS (orH!elay models only)

X\!'~ M - Dustlght l~ P -Octal Plug Adapter

(00) S - Dial siops • Specity minimum & ma>imum settings

3} T - Auxiliary Switch One Form C c:ontaCI (timed on on-<l&lay models; timed or instantaneOUS on oH-delay models)

CD V -Transient/Surge Proledion to suppress Internal con transients

:1) W - Watenight Enclosure 3):1) X - Panelmounl Kit (R&Iay is calibrated !Or

horizontal mounting) (!) Y1 - Calibraliop lot Horizontal J.lovnljng

:1)® Y2 -CompenSating Spring lor 2-way mounting. ~ Factory installed !Or vettieal ope<atJOO; remove

!Or horizontal operatim. (Not compatible will> H, M or P options)

(!) Not suaable lor panetmounted models (option X).

(f) Not available on Four Pole Model•. Q) Available with letter caribrated dials

only. Upper en<! of time rang<> may be twice lhe value st.own.

(!) Factory instaHed only. ~ NOl available if unit is equipped with

L. ll Ot T Auxiliary SwitCh or any type ot enclosure.

(~> Not ava~able on On·Delay. Otf·Delay (Oooble Head) models.

(l) Not available with AC voltago coils.

PEM

... ~ ..

I i"·.:::-:,-.~_'::':: r .. : .····

\ .... ~ ·':·: t

,.-.

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DC VOLTAGE

* T COIL VOL TACt

CODE i. 120 v 60111 ' 110 y 50111 B • 240 Y 60111

220 y 5,0111

Is u v v y

480 V 60HI 550 v 60111

24 y 60111 127 v 50111 240 y 50111

12·V 6oHI 6 V 60IU

208 v 60111

28 YDC

250 voc 550 voc

16 voc. )2 VDC 96 voc·

6 voc 220 VDC

0

* T TIME RANCE*

CODE (E 70Zo4) A ,1 TO I SEC, II ,5 TO 5 SEC,' c 1,5 TO 15 SEC, 0 5 TO 50 SEC, E zo.ro 200 sEc. F I TO 10 MIN, H :I TO '0 MIN, I 6 TO 60 MIH, .1 NOT· AVAILABLE K . I TO 300 SEC,

* HO!l£\.U Z7Q14 AHt AVAILABLE VITH LETTER•CA\. I BRA TED DIALS ONLY, THE UPPER END OF THE TIME RANC£5 IN THESE MODELS HAY BE TWICE THE VALUES llHOVH, G£ (E7o!9:> A ,2 TO 2 SEC, B

10 TO 100 SEC )0 TO )00 SEC,

F 1,5 TO 15 141N, II ) TO '0 MIN,

'""-"""~~L.~.----,.,!.;. .. -.. .,. ~~ ... ,: .. ;,\~'·'Vt0\&.'.1', • I•• ''• •• • ••"''~ •u ..

t ~-FACTORY INSTALLED . CUSTOM MOOIFICATIOH8

OPTIONS

PERFORMANCE SPECII'ICATIONS OH THIS SHEET .I.RE MDT VALID FDA MODELS VITH FACTORY INSTALLED OPTIONS, ON .AlL MODELl VITH FACTORY INSTALLED OPTIOHS 1 CUSTOMER ASSUMES RESP,oNSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING VALIDITY OF PERFORMANCE DATA IN UtOOO •.

CUSTOHU SPECIAL IIOOII'ICATIONI \IKICH DO NOT AFI'f:CT THE I'UNCTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNIT OR Tilt RELEVANCY OF PERFORMANCE DATA IN £11000 ARE CODED C2000 OR HIGHER,

. CUSTOMER SPEC I AL MODIFICATIONS \IHICH DD A"ECT TH' I'UNtTIONAL CHAR.I.CTERI ITI CB OF THE UNIT AND THE RELEVANCY OF PERFORMANCE DATA I H El1000 ARE COOED C1999 DR.BELDV. FOR

ru~~~.:.:~I:s~a RESPONSIBILITY OF ESTABI. I SHI NQ VALIDITY OF PERFORMANCE DATA IN EBtOOO.

........ 1 ' '

00

COHFICURo\TION COO'"•' (SEE PARA~ e.o)

Figure 1. Device Code Designations . . ''•:

·:···· ·. ': '· ·. ~ .. l~:

.-~.

~-o~ [) ~ g_r t~ ~ rn ..1) f'..> .. 46 r~§

0 -I)

r· ., __ .

·s.4.5

CoJc.. £.2-0005. O'}

A\1-0J:.h~t D P~ DtO, Rev. I

Fragility Level. (MOdel E7024 only) Device fragility level vas obtifned in the following manner: Using the Failure Criteria described in paragraph 5.4.4, all relays were first subjected to the artificial RRS acceleration level. If a relay failed to meet it• s Class 1E function, the testing vas continued, but at regressive increments (of approximately 10~ levels) until. the malfunction ceased. The level at which fault free operation of the relay had bee~ established vas documented as the fragility level of that relay.

5.1.~6 Test Response. ne test responses which exceed the artificial RRS level (.and are stated as .such) are not the device fragility levels but are highest values tested to.

6.0 DESIGN LIFE. (Non-Nuclear)

Tbe relays are actually designed to perform under the conditions given in the following paragraphs.

6.1 TEMPERATURE RANGE.

(a) Operating temperature range is -20•F to +165•F

(b) Storage temperature range is -67•F to +16S•F

I NOTE I The maximum shift·· in the average of three

f·. consecutive time delays taken at +77•F is '-../ -201. at -20•F and +2~ at ~165°F.

6.2~ACCURA~ 6.·2'!1 Repeat Accuracy at any fixed temperature is;

~) ± 5~ for time delays of 200 seconds or ~ (b) ± 1~ for time delays of 200 seconds or greater.

I NOTE I the first time delays afforded bv Model E7014 relays.with (1.5~15 min.) and (3-30 min.) time unges will be approximately 15~ longer than subsequent delays due to coil temperature rise.

6.3 COIL VOLTAGE. PEM 6.3.1 All coils may be operated on intermittent duty cycles at vol-

t~~es 101- above listed maxilllums. (Intermittent duty .. Maxitnum S9'o duty cycle and 30 minutes "ON" time.

6.4 CONTACT RATINGS. DOCUMENT NO. E7014/E7024 REV. E 1 SHEET20 or: 22

... !INDUSTRIAL EJ.ECrRlcALJ ~~PilOO.C!S

... ~~ PRODUCTS 530W.MLI'I..EA.W-6AWU ----- - . -· . I.J',IN;SlON. NJ 07039

EN 226- t/80

.. i :

....... ·. ~:~~~~:;:::.:·:

-· . •.

CALCULATION El-eoos.o~ ATIACHMENTE PAGEliLREV. 1

A COMPLETE THREE-PHASE RELAY TEST SYSTEM IN ONE PORTABLE PACKAGE . ......- . .

•

Now with150-VA Current-Amplifier Module

1~..-.-..... '"""l

. .l •·• J •·• ~ rlf-J

<?® ~~ ••

OESCRIPTIOM Thelimer.Monitorand Battery Simulator Module Is designed to slide Into one slot of the PULSAR· unit. The timer is specilicaliy designed to measure high-speed operation of electromechanical, solid-state and microprocessor-based protective relays. It incorporates three sets ot banana-plug receptacles. These receptacles can be programmed as: start gates, stop gates, monitor; all stop gates; or all contact continuity monitors. I

The programmable auxiliary contact can be opened or closed by soflware command. One application for this contact is to simulate breaker !allure contact closure. TI1e battery simulator has lour terminals providingthreevoltages:48.12Sand 2SO volts de. Tile primary application is to provide Josie voltage to solid-state and microprocessor-based relays.

-•

FEATURES AND BENEFITS • ltfodular, plug-in design: operator can easily reconligure test systems to meet changing test requirements. • lllgh resolution and accuracy: provides capability to accurately time high-speed relays. • Multiple continuity monitors: provides multiple contact monitoring without moving test leads. • Continuity light and audible tone generator: monitor operation of the trip contact or trip SCR In the relay under test. The monitor circuit can be repro-grammed easily to be volt:~ge-sensing and can monitor soli<» tate Josie sign.ili. This drcuit senses a positive-s<>ing signal ot ltoJOOvoltsacordc.lnaddition.the lower- tl ores hold voltage is adjustable I rom I to 4 volts to eliminate lalse triggering due to noisy environmencs. • l"rogranun3ble de-bounce: used in eliminating false triggeri11g and conl.lct bounce errors.

CALCULATION EZ -o6a5"~09 ATTACHMENTE PAGEEZ. REV. 1

MULTI-AMPs PULSAR 6

• Times high-speed relays

• Multiple continuity monitors

• Eliminates need for de voltage source

• Progr.unmable contacts: used to simulate the A/B contacts ol a breaker for automatic testing of breaker- failure relays. • Adjustable voltage thresholds: Lower threshold may be used to start and stop the timer Iron\ TTL vollage signals. • Battery simulator: eliminates need for additional de voltage source.

SPECIFICATIONS

Display Tile 6-digit, O.J.in.(7.62-mm). high-intensity lEO display ensures readability even in high-ambient light conditions.

Range and Resolution Timer will display in either seconds or cycles. and will autodecade up with the following range and resolution: Seconds ·

00.000 I to 99,999.9 Cycles

OO.OOG to 99.999.9 (at f.O liz) 00.005to 99.99~.9 (at SO liz)

-· ·---·-·-----------II AVO ltllf:RNATIONAI. ,. , .... 5 .. 11 .......... , .. ,

CALCULATION E"2.-ooos-.o' ATIACHMENTE PAGE ll, REV. 1

~rt/" .... .:;;;;;;;o..;;;;;;;~,:::;;;;:;;;;::=~III'-'---------PULSAR TIMfll. MONITOR.ANO OATTERY SIMULATOR MOOUL£

• Note: AC voltage accuracy is difCerent • atlowervoltages.Worstcasels:!Bms (I to 4 Vac rms adjustable threshold, just following wave shape peale).

Selectable lime Base 1be lime base used by the timer comes set from the factory at either 60 Ht or 50 Ht, depending on desired operating frequency. By computer control, the lime base can beanyfrequencyfromO.t Htto tOicHz:.. The typical programmable time base frequencies are 25, 50, 60 or 400Hz:.

Start/Stop!Monitor Gates Three Identical, Independent, programmable start. stop or monitor gate circuits permit simple selection ol the d~ired mode ol operation. To monitor operation of the contacts or trip SCR In the device under test, a continuity light Is provided for each gate. The gate circuit Is Isolated for voltage-sensing and can monitor solid· state logic signafs. Upon sensing continuify or a voltage signal, the continuity lamp will glow, and a tone generator will sound if desired. n.e following modes are provided for the Star1/Siop/Monitor Gates:

• Dry Contact Opens: A change or state starts or stops the timer or continuityls Indicated at the opening of normally closed contacts or when conduction through a semiconductor deviCe$uchasa triac ortran$istor is

. Interrupted. • Dry Contacts Oose: A change of state starts or :stops the timer or continuity Is Indicated at the closing of normally open contacts or upon conduction through a semiconductor device such as a triac or transistor.

• Application or Remooat of AC or Start/Stop 'Gale De-nounce DC Voltage: Tile tlmerstarts,stopsor 1be timer can be programmed to Ignore continuity is Indicated upon the temporary state changes that are less application or removal or either an than a set duration. This Is useful tor ac or de voltage. eliminating false triggering and contact The voltage threshold Is adjustable from 1 to -4 V, ac or de. A higher threshold voltage helps to eliminate false triggers due to a noisy source. Lower thresholds allow starting and stopping of timer from 111. voltage signals. The ~axlmum allowable voltage appliedls300Vacor300Vdc, limited by MOV transient protection. • Slart or slop with any se(eded generator module: The timer can be startedorstoppedwhentumlngonor orr any(or all) selected generators. . • 'lhelimera:ltlbestartetfsimuJJOncously with a change In frequency, phase angle, amplitude or a waveform step. • The timer can be stopped upon phase synchronization between two voltage channels (normally used to time autosynchronlzing relays).

Start Latch When LATCHED Is selected, the start latch allows liming to be Initiated by a start gate and to be stopped only by the selected sto~ gate. When UNLATCHED, the start latdt allows timing to be stopped when the start gate is reversed, such as when timing the closing and opening or a single contact, as tn measuring the trip-free operating time of a circuit breaker.

Stop Latch When LATCHED, the stop latch allows liming to be stopped at the first operation of any stop Gate, thus ignoring contact bounce. WhenUNI.ATOfED,thestoplatchallows timing to be stopped by any stop gate and then restarted II the stop gate reverses. provided a start gate is still energized, then stopped again when the gate reverses (total time including contact bounce).

bounce errors.·

()e..Bounce Period: 0 to 999 ms Resolution: 0.1 ms

Auxiliary Contatt A pair of banan"·plug receptacles provides access to the programmable dry contact. The contact maybe opened or closed by soltware command. Maximum Switchlng Voltages: 110 Vac or30Vdc. Maximum Switdung Currents: 0.3 A ac orl.OAdc Oosing lime: I ms typical Opening lime: 05 ms typical

OaHery Simulator Output Voltages

f'our banana-plug receptacles will provide the following voltages: 48, 125 and 250 Vdc. Only one output voltage may be used at a time.

Output Power. 60 W Accuracy::t20% max Ripple: ±10% max

Temperature Range Operating: 32 to 122• f' (0 to so• q Storage:-13to •ISS" f(-25 to •70• C)

Humidity Range 0 to 90% Rlf, noncondensing

Dimensions 7.8 H x 2.7W x8.2 0 in 198.6 Hx67.3 Wx 207.7 0 mm

llet Weight 2.93 Jb (1.3 kg)

FOR Ono~ntUG INI'Onr./IATIOU, REFER TO PAGES 17 ::>nd 10.

It Jf'vl,~n ...... ,., ~~ II.VO 11~1 r:nru,uor-rl\1 ••

Amplifier Module

The Voltage Amplifier Module Is designed toslideintooneslotollhef'L(.')oiR' unit. One module can provide either ac or de voltage output. 0 to 300 volts rms, or ac with de oflset. 425 volts peak. Two modules will provide a three-phase, opetKielta test source.. Three modules will provide a complete three-phase, four-wire test source. fot" higllel" test voltages (greater than 300 volts rms). two modules can be conn«ted In series to double the test potential to 600 volts l"ffiS.

for special applications, the voltage ampli(ier module can provide a sine wave with varying percentage of harmonics and exponential decay or periodic arbitruy waveforms from Digital fault Recorders or EMTP (Eicctro-Magnelic Transients Program) programs. Other special application waveforms also are available.

FEATURES AND BENEFITS • Modular plug-in design: provides flexibility to add to or reconfigure test system to meetc:hangingtest requirements. • High resolution and accut"acy: needed to test relays with higher sensitivity and accuracy requirements. • Oto300voltsnns: providescapabilityio test relays with high potential requirements such as directly connected or highly instantaneous ovcrvoltage. • OCto 10 kHz bandwidth: provides flexibility to test ac or de relays, either steady-state, dynamic or transient. • User-ddined waveforms: The operator can use a computer to create specific waveforms for special test applications.

---.,---=~=~--------------10 AVO INTErlN/\TION/\1.

CALCULATION t£2.-ooo>.o9 ATIACHMENT E PAGE J:.&#. REV ~

MULTI-AMP6

PULSARe

• Test potential to 600 V rms

• Tests high-inst'antancous and direct-connected ovcrvoltagc relays

SPECIFICATIO!~S

Output Frequency and Displayed Resolution

TI~e Voltage Amplifier t.todulepro,ides a variable frequency output featuring automatic decading. frequencyiscontinuouslydisplayed for each channel With large, high· intensity [£[)s with these ranges: DC 00.00 I to 99.99911z 100.01 to 999.99 Hz 1000.1 to 9999.9 Hz 10.000 to 20,000 liz

frequency Accuracy: ±10 ppm or :!.0.0006 liz at 60 liz at 23" ±2" C

CALCULATION €'t-Ooos-.oc AITACHMENT E . PAGE~~ REV. 1

------------------------~~~---------------------------------------------~-~--~·'--------PU~RVOLTACEAMPUnCRMODUl£

Output Power Output (continuous) RMS

SO/GO Hz (sine wave) At300V

(JOO.V range) At30V · · (jo.v range)

DC

JOOVA 200VA

7SVA JOOW

ISO VA

Totalltarmonic Distortion Less than 05% typical. 2% max. at 50/f/J Hz

Phase Angle Range: 0 to 359.9• Resolution: 0.1° Accuracy: Jess than :W.2° typical, :W.SO

max at 50 or GO Hz. full-scale voltage

Small-Signal Frequency Range DC to 20kHz Into J().lc{} load

Display Each VoltageAmplifierModulecontains a dedicated display to continuously show the output voltage (four digits), phase angle (lour digits), frequency (live most· significant digits), output status (on or off) and de offset when applicable.

Waveforms DC; sine wave; sine wave with various percent or harmonics at various phases; periodicarbitratywavclorrns from Digital FaultRecordersorEMTP/ATPprograms: triangle and square waves with variable duty cycle, hall wave, exponential decay. Arbitrary, nonperlodic waveforms from external analog Inputs.

Wavcfonn Storage Each Voltage Amplifier Module has dedicated RAM storage for waveforms and/or transient waveform events. Either 32 waveforms and/or events that are 4 1c samples long, one waveform event that Is 64 lc samples long. or one waveform event up to 128 ksamples long may be stored per channel and played back on command. ·

Temperature Ra'nge Operating: 32 to 122• F (0 to so• C) Storage:-13to •ISS• F(-25 to ·70"C)

Humidity Range 0 to 90% RH, noncondensing

Dimensions 7.8 Hx2.7Wx8.2 D ln. 198.6 Hx67.3 W x207.7 D mm

Net Weight 4.41b (2 kg)

ron OROC::niUG ltlf'ORMATIOtl, RC::FC::R TO PAGC::S 17 3nd 18.

p,..., ,:-:-,.,.-:-:,...::-::.,:-~c-:. ,:-:-:,,:-:, ,:-:::-••• ---------- -- ···-- . AVO INTHWI\TIONI\L II

Cc /{ EE"l. ·ooo$"".09 "'.?-z-A (./1 r-~c-.-v r E A7i'c t-A ,_ ...... t< F

A.f'c... // / /Zcv..1 A z!.-.., "l!,~·/ Ua.-.~ ,(_.,_~ .T...th SpeCK No. CAR-SH-E-6A Rev. 8 Page 5 of 25

.1 The following abnormal primary electrical supply conditions apply:

C DC

Normal Voltage Variation +/- 10~ Maximum l40V

Normal Frequency Variation +/- 2.St Nominal l25V

Transient Voltage Drop to 75\ of rated Minimum :osv recovering to 9o percent within 2 seconds

5 •

• 1 _Qng_ Set (3 per set) bus potential transformers, for each sw!tchgear Bus, rated 7200 volts primary, _120 volts sgcondary for open ~elta connections. AB-BC primary with B ~nase grounded on secondary, and CA primary with A phase grounded on secondary •

• 2 and .3 DEL~rED

.4 _Qng_ Set (2 per set} (for each incoming transformer supply feeder) potential transformer(s) rated 7200 primary, _!lQ_ volts secondary, AB-BC primary with B grounded on secondary •

power ·· volts phase

• 5 Low voltage fuses shall be furnished and mounted in the potential transformer instrument compartment •

• 6 Due to critical rear access in most areas, rear drawout potential trar.-formers shall not be provided without prior approval by Purchaser.

6. FEEDER GROUND FAULT ALARM OR TRIPPING

Feeder ~round fault alarm shall be provided for the feeders listed ~n the Power Oistribution and Motor Data Sheet(s) and described in Paragraph 10.18.

CALCULATION (; z ~coos-. o9 ATTACHMENT F PAGE F2, REV. 1

TELECON MEMORANDUM

BETWEEN

Jim Deitrick (CP&L I Harris Plant) Steve Hawkins (Siemens)

DATE/TIME

SUBJECT

(919) 362~2511 (919) 365-2379

May 13,1998/11:00am

ITE Model Number FP-7200-1 Potential Xfmr Accuracy

1 asked Steve how to interpret the accuracy class information obtained from the nameplate of a spare PT located in the HNP warehouse.

CP&LPart# Siemens-Allis Part # Siemens-Allis SO # ITE Model# Type Primary Volts Voltage Ratio Insulation Class BIL Frequency Thml Burden Accuracy Class PO# Specification # T/L#

724-134-12 (from SIS- found via EDBS} 61-300-010-072 {from SIS) 1-1800-90365 and 1-1800-88460 (from SIS) FP-7200-1 (from EDBS 440 Screen) FPXFMR {from spare PT in whse} 7200 (from spare PT in whse) 7200 /120 (from spare PT in whse) 15kV (from spare PT in whse) 95kV (from spare PT in whse) 50 - 60 Hz (from spare PT in whse) 1000 va (from spare PT in whse) 0.3Y 0.6Z (from spare PT in whse) NY-435112 (from SIS), 609472 (from spare PT in whse) CAR-SH-E-006A 88-1209-VI (from SIS)

Steve stated that the accuracy of the PT loaded to it's 1000 va rating is 0.6%; however, when lightly loaded (a few relays), the accuracy would be 0.3%.

CP&L

C.tc..c... £2~ IJ~S.o9 Rt:t~. 1

A1'r'IC#.,..t£rJ-i G

l'~t~c:: G f

To: LouGale

From: Sammy Roberts P~ Date:

Subject:

Lou,

June 15, 1998

Harmonic Distortion Associated with the Multi-Amp Pulsar Relay Test Sets atHNP

This letter is to document the results of the harmonic distortion measurements made on the voltage output wavefonns from the Multi-Amp Pulsar Relay Test Sets at the Harris Nuclear Plant on June 2, 1998. The instrument used to measure the harmonic output was a Fluke 41 Power Harmonics Analyzer, CP&L System Engineering Lab No. 5880.

The first Multi-Amp Pulsar Test Set that was sampled was SHNPPCT-1910, SIN 115509-00111 located in the Electrical Maintenance shop. The temperature was between 68 - 72 °F. The standard that was used to verify RMS voltage measurement of the Fluke 41 Power Harmonics Analyzer was a Fluke 45 DMM, SHNPPCT036, SIN 5735053. When the Pulsar Test Set was set to 107.5 AC volts output, the Fluke 45 and the Fluke 41 instruments measured 107.6 AC volts. The Fluke 41 measured 0.0% to 0.1% harmonic distortion for the 2nd and 3n1 harmonics and 0.0% for all other harmonics up to the 31" harmonic. The total harmonic distortion was 0.1% to 0.2% with a crest factor of 1.41-1.42. This indicates that the harmonic content of the output waveform is negligible .

. The second Multi-Amp Pulsar Test Set that was sampled was SHNPPCT-1863, SIN 102482-00I/1 located in Dan Lake's Cubicle. The temperature was between 74 - 78 °F. The standard that was used to verify RMS voltage measurement of the Fluke 41 Power Harmonics Anal~zer was a Fluke 45 DMM, SHNPPCT036, SIN 5735053. When the Pulsar Test Set was set to 107.5 AC volts output, the Fluke 45 and the Fluke 41 instruments measured 107.4 AC volts. The Fluke 41 measured 0.0% to 0.1% harmonic distortion for the 2nd and 3rd harmonics and 0.0% for all other harmonics up to the 31st harmonic. The total hannonic distortion was 0.1% to 0.2% with a crest factor of 1.41. This indicates that the harmonic content of the output waveform is negligible.

Memorandum Page2 CALC.. t%-DOD!:.09

A1"f?U.I'I""fri\J'f' ~

PA4€ ~ 'Z , Rev. l

June 15, 1998

Based on the above documented test results, it can be concluded that the hannonic distortion associated with the output of AC volt sine wave in the 107 rms volt range from a Multi-Amp

Pulsar Relay Test Set is negligible.

SR!sr

ATTACHMENTT rl Excerpts from FSAR and Technical Specifications

SHNPP FSAR

breaker is set high enough to trip only on faults on the feeder cable or ~:ithir: the transformer ~tself. thu::. ensuring that; fauits in the brancn circuits will trip only the affected secondary breaker and not the transformer feeder breaker.

5. 120V Uninterruptible AC Power Supply System Protection - The AC incoming feeder breaker (480V. 3 Phase Supply). 125V OC incoming feeder. 120V AC output. and 120V distribution breakers are of the thermal-magnetic type. The inverters contain the necessary undervoltage and overcurrent protection to maintain their uninterruptible service.

6. Ground Fault Protection - High resistance grounding is used on the 6.9 kV and 480V systems. Ground fault currents will be sufficiently low such that tripping of the affected breaker is not required. Thus. these systems are designed to alarm only. on occurrence of ground faults. Ground faults are detected locally and alarmed locally and/or in the Control Room.

The 208Y/120V and uninterruptible 120V AC systems are solidly grounded. so that ground faults are seen by the breaker as equivalent to phase-to-phase faults and tripping will occur.

7. Circuit Protection Criteria For Safety Systems/Equipment To Avoid Premature Trip Due To Protective Relay Trip Setpoint Drift - The criteria for protection of Class lE circuits utilizes a coordinated and selective relaying scheme. This allows faulted zone to be restricted and affecting minimum number of Class lE circuits or equipment. Although it is our experience that the type of relays utilized for the Shearon Harris plant have been successfully operating in various installations for many years without failure of th~ stated nature. the protective relays will be set with adequate m&rgin over the. expected range. so as not to permit spurious tripping. In addition. regular inservice inspection and maintenance during plant operation will ensure that the relay setpoints are maintained at the proper level.

8. The electrical power distribution system design complies with the following guidelines as recommended in BTP PSB-1:

a. A second level of undervoltage protection will provide protection for the class IE power system against a sustained degraded voltage condition on-the offsite power system.

b. The undervoltage relay scheme will utilize a coincident logic (i.e. 2 out of 3 logic).

c. The voltage settings of the undervoltage relays will be consistent with the minimum permissible voltage levels at the various distribution buses.

d. The time delay associated with the undervoltage relays will be consistent with the maximum time delay considered in the design

8.3.1-15 Amendment No. 48 - . ~)

ATTACHMENT" H

~ tt:l,t/IZ/1 Z

Excerpts from FSAR and Technical Specifications

SHNPP FSAR

CALCULATION E2-0005.09 . . PAGE~ REV.'¥' Ll dZ. , -{

(3?16 d'J-1<.. .Sp-;AJ ri/IZ/Il_

basis accident analysis and shall prfVPf'lt 'Pt~rious tripping d11~ try short tim:> transient conditions.

e. The system design and hardware selection will be consistent with the. requirements of IEEE-279-1971 "Criteria for Protection System for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."

f. A trip initiation will be provided to disconnect the offsite power sources from the safety system whenever voltage setpoints and time delay limits exceed the preset value.

To assure no spurious operation of the undervoltage initiated load shedding scheme during operation on the Main Generator and the Unit Auxiliary Transformers. a worst case condition was studied. With the auxiliary system fully loaded and the generator at minimum voltage. the starting of the Normal Service Water Pump CNSWP} (3000hp) was studied. This was determined to be the worst case based on studies previously performed.

The secondary undervoltage relays <27A) are connected to two distinct time delay relays. Upon expiration of the first time delay (Device 2-1). which is long enough to accommodate the starting of the motor which has the longest starting time (NSWP - 10 seconds at 90% voltage). an alarm is actuated at the main control board to alert the operator of this condition and to permit operator actions to restore the system voltage. However. should a safety actuation signal be present after the expiration of the time delay. automatic tripping actions as described for the primary protection are initiated.

Namely, upon sensing a loss of voltage, automatically disconnect the offsite source from the Class 1E bus. initiate load shedding and start the diesel generator as described in FSAR Section 8.3.1.1.2.8. When the diesel generator has attained rated speed and voltage (within 10 seconds after the start signal}. the diesel generator breaker to the Class IE buses is closed and the Class IE loads are connected to the buses automatically by the emergency load sequencer in accordance with the loading sequence shown in the FSAR Table 8.3.1-2c. Once the loading of the diesel generator has begun. operation of the undervoltage relays is blocked.

If no safety actuation signal is present. a further time delay (Device 2-2) is allowed before the automatic tripping actions are initiated. This second time delay is based on the maximum time for which the most sensitive load can perform its safety function without impairment at the degraded voltage.

8.3.1.1.2.12 Testing of power systems during operation. Operational and periodic tests. including in-service tests. are performed after installation on the power and control circuits and components. including protective relays. meters and instruments. Protective relays, meters and

~,_,,?.... ATTACHMENTY H Excerpts from FSAR and Technical Specif~tions

·CALCULATION E2-0005.09 , • / PAGE.f:3L_, REV., 1 d/1(-

. h'1 ' 1111 z./tl -~?C# {I

V:r/""~J

INSTRUMENTATION 314.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.2 The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation channels and interlocks shown in Table 3.3-3 shall be OPERABLE ~th their Trip Setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-4.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-3.

ACTION: a. With an ESFAS Instrumentation or Interlock Trip Setpoint trip less

conservative than the value shown in the Trip Setpoint column but more conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Value column of Table 3.3-4. adjust the Setpoint consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.

b. With an ESFAS Instrumentation or Interlock Trip Setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Value column of Table 3.3-4. either:

Where:

1. Adjust the Setpoint consistent with the Trip Setpoint value of Table 3.3-4. and determine within 12 hours that Equation 3.3-1 was satisfied for the affected channel. or

2. Declare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION statement requirements of Table 3.3-3 until the channel is restored.to OPERABLE status with its Setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.

Equation 3.3-1 Z + R + S s TA

Z = The value from Column Z of Table 3.3-4 for the affected -channel.

R = The "as measured" value (in percent span) of rack error for the affected channel. ·

S = Either the "as measured" value (in percent span) of the sensor error. or the value from Column S (Sensor Error) of Table 3.3-4 for the affected channel. and

TA = The value from Column TA (Total Allowance> of Table 3.3-4 for the affected channel.

c. With an ESFAS instrumentation channel or interlock inoperable. take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-3.

: .1-{fl,RON HARR J S - liN lT 1 .1/4 ~-lh j ' ' '

(D f, z../ ' z., ATT~CHMENTY H Excerpts from FSAR and Technical Specifications

ItiSTRUHENTATION

CALCULATION E2-0005.09 PAG~REV:Yt

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.2.1 Each ESFAS instrumentation channel and interlock and the automatic actuation logic and relays shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the ESFAS Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements specified in Table 4.3-2.

4.3.2.2 The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME of each ESFAS function shall be demonstrated to be within its limit specified in the Technical Specification Equipment List Program, plant procedure PLP-106, at least once per 18 months. Each test shall include at least one train iuch that both trains are tested at leasL once per 36 months and one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once per N times 18 months ~here N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific ESFAS function as shown in the "Total No. of Channels" column of Table 3.3-3.

SHEARON HARRIS - UNtT l 3/4 3-17

~

TABLE 3.3·3 (Continued). ENGINEERED SAFETY FEAJURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTBUMENTATION

FUNCTIONAL UN IT 8. Containment Spray Switch-

over to Containment Sump (Continued) · b. RWST--Low Low

Coincident With Containment Spray

9. Loss-of-Offsite Power a. 6.9 kV Emergency Bus--

Undervoltage Primary b. 6.9 kV Emergency Bus--

Undervoltage Secondary 10. Engineered Safety Features

Actuation System Interlocks a. Pressurizer Pressure.

'--1'! P-11 Not P-11

b. Low-Low Ta~· P-12 c. Reactor Trip, P-4 d. Steam Generator Water Level.

P-14

SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1

TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS

CHANNELS TO TRIP

MINIMUM CHANNELS APPLICABLE OPERABLE MODES ACTION

See Item 7.b. above for all RWST--Low Low initiating functions and requirements. See Item 2 above for all Containment Spray initiating functions and requirements.

3/bus 2/bus 2/bus 1. 2. 3. 4 Isa·

3/bus 2/bus 2/bus 1. 2. 3. 4 15a·

3 2 2 1. 2. 3 20 3 2 2 1. 2. 3 20 3 2 2 1. 2. 3 20 2 2 2 1. 2. 3 22

See Item S.b. above for all P-14 initiating functions and requirements.

3/4 3-25 Amendment 79 I

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Excerpts from FSAR ~n? Technical Specifications

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) TABLE NOTATIONS

*The prov; s1ons ot Spec 1 i iCat 1011 3. U . .: are riot app llcab le.

#Trip function may be blocked in this HOOE belm" the P-ll (Pressurizer Pressure Interlock> Setpoint.

**During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in containment. refer to Specification 3.9.9.

***Trip function automatically blocked above P-11 and may be blocked below P-11 when Safety Injection on low steam line pressure is not blocked.

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 14 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum

Channels OPERABLE requirement. restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 6 hours or be in at· least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours; however. one channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1. provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 15- With the number of OPERABLE channels one·less than the Total Number of Channels. operation may proceed until performance of the next required CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour.

ACTION 15a - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels. operation may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour. With less than the minimum channels OPERABLE. operation may proceed provided the minimum number of channels is restored within one hour. otherwise declare the affected diesel generator inoperable. When performing surveillance testing of either primary or secondary undervoltage relays, the redundant emergency bus and associated primary and secondary relays shall be OPERABLE.

ACTION 16 --With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels. operation may proceed provided the : inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed condition wi.thin 6 hours and the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met. One additional channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1.

ACTION 17 - With less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement. operation may continue provided the Containment Purge Makeup and Exhaust Isolation valves are maintained closed while in MODES 1. 2. 3 and 4 (refer to Specification 3.6.1.7). For MODE 6. refer to Specification 3.9.4.

ACTION 18 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minim~:.~m Cha·nnels OPERABLE requirement. restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within .the h,:; following 30 hours.

~;

..

.-' ,,· /'

/

.·

TABLE 3.3-4 (Contjnued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATIQN SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOJNTS

SENSOR TOTAL ERROR

FUNCTIONAL UNIT AL.LOWANCE tTA} z <SL __ TRIP SETPOINT ALLOWABLE VALU£ 9. Loss-of-Offsite Power

a. 6.9 kV Emergency Sus N.A. N.A. N.A. ~ 4830 volts ~ 4692 volts with Undervoltage--Primary with a s: 1.0 a time delays: 1.5

second time seconds delay.

b. 6.9 kV Emergency Bus N.A. N.A. N.A. ~ 6420 volts ~ 6392 volts with Undervoltage--Secondary with a s: 16 a time dela{ s: 18

second time seconds (wi h dela{ (with Safety Injection). Safe~ Inje ion). ~ 6420 volts ~ 6392 volts with wi th a s: 54 . 0 a s: 60 second time second time delay (without dela~ (with· Safety Injection>. out afet) Injection .

10. Engineered Safety·Features Actuation System Interlocks a. Pressurizer Pressure.

P-11 N.A. N.A. N.A. ~ 2000 psig ~ 1988 psig Not P-11 N.A. N.A. N.A. s: 2000 psig s: 2012 psig

b. Low-Low Tavg• P-12 N.A. N.A. N.A. ~ 553°F ~549.3°F

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. d¢ ATTACHMEtlffY II 11/tz/IZ-Excerpts from FSAR and Technical Specifications

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION

BASES

CALCULATION E2-0005.09 . ~ .... / PAGE P:B:_. REV:Y ¥ f&Y"

c;:J?D . 11/JZ./tL Jfo~J

~==========~~=-==========--·=mm=m==.~··======-~==========--====-~·~··=···==--

3/4.3.1 AND 3/4.3.2 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEI~ INSTRUt~ENTATION AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEAIOREs ACIUAIION SYSIEM INS1RUMENTAflON The OPERABILITY of the Reactor Trip System and the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System instrumentation and interlocks ensures that: (1) the associated ACTION and/or Reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its Setpoint (2) the specified coincidence logic and sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out-of-service for testing or maintenance consistent with maintaining an appropriate level of reliability of the Reactor Trip System and Engineered Safety Features Actuation System instrumentation. and (3) sufficient system functional capability is available from diverse parameters. The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability. redundancy. and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigat1on of accident and transient conditions. The 1ntegrated qperation of each of these ~stems is consistent with the assu~tions used in the safety analyses. The Surveillance Requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance tests performed at the m1nimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability. Specified surveillance intervals and surveillance and mai.ntenance outage times have been determined in · accordance with WCAP-10271. "Evaluation of Surveillance Frequencies and Out of Service Times for the Reactor Protection Instrumentation System." and SUP.plements to that report as approved by the NRC and documented in the SERs and SSER (letters to J. J. Sheppard from Cecil 0. Thomas dated February 21. 1985: RQQer A. Newton from Charles E. Rossi dated February_22. 1989: and Gerard T: Goering from Charles E. Rossi dated April 30. 1990). The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation Trip Setpoints specif1ed in Table 3.3-4 are the nominal values at which the bistables are set for each functional unit. A Set~int is considered to be adjusted consistent with the nominal value when the as measured" SetQoint is within the band allowed for calibration accuracy. For exa~le. if a bistable has a trip set-point of saoo%. a span of 125%. and a calibration accuracy of ±0.50%. then the bistable is considered to be adjusted to the trip setpoint as long as the "as measured" value for the bistable is sl00.62%. To accommodate the instrument drift assumed to occur between operational tests and the accuracy to which Setpoints can be measured and calibrated. Allowable Values for the Setpoints have been specified in Table 3.3-4_ · OPeration with Setpoints less conservative than the Trip Setpoint but within the Allowable Value is acceptable since an allowance has been made in the safet~ analysis to accommodate this error. An OQtional provision has been included for determining the OPERABILITY of a channel when its Trip Setpoint is found to exceed the Allowable Value. The methodology of this option utilizes the "as measured" deviation from the specified callbration P9int for rack and sensor components in conjunction with a statistical combination of the other uncertainties of the instrumentation to measure the process variable and the uncertainties in calibrating the instrumentation. In Equation 3.3-1.

C\HF ARON HARR l S - liN lT 1 B 3/4 3-1 Amendment No. 1 01 · 1

•• 1 ctfl1,, '£./ rz-~ ATTACHMENT~ff 1

Excerpts from FSAR and Technical Specifications

I NSTRUt1ENTAT I ON

BASES

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSIEM lNSIROMENIAliON (Continued) 0

Z + R + S ~TA. the interactive effects of the errors in the rack and the sensor. and the »as measured~ values of the errors are considered. Z. as specified in Table 3.3-4. in percent span. is the statistical summation of errors assumed in the analysis excluding those associated with the sensor and rack drift and the accuracy of their measurement. TA or Total Allowance is the difference. in percent s~n. between the trip setpoint and the value used in the analysis for the actuation. R or Rack Error is the "as measured" deviation. in the percent span. for the affected channel from the specified Trip Setpoint. S or Sensor Error is either the "as measured" deviation of the sensor from its calibration pqint or the value specified in Table 3.3-4. in percent SP.an. from the analysis assumptions. Use of Equation 3.3-1 allows for a sensor araft factor. an increased rack drift factor. and provides a threshold value for determination of OPERABILITY. The methodology to derive the Trip Setpoints is based upon combining all of the uncertainties in the channels. Inherent to the determination of the Trip Setpoints are the magnitudes of these channel uncertainties. Sensor and rack instrumentation util1zed in these channels are expected to be capable of operating within the allowances of these uncertainty magnitudes. Rack drift in excess of the Allowable Value exhibits the behavior that the rack has not met its allowance. Being that there is a small statistical chance that this will happen. an infrequent excessive drift is expected. Rack or sensor drift. in excess of the allowance that is more than occasional. may be indicative of more serious problems and should warrant further investigation.o The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the reactor trip and the Engineered Safety Features actuation associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the safety analyses. No credit was taken in the analyses for those channels with response times indicated as not applicable. Response time may be demonstrated byoany series of sequential. overlapping. or total channel test measurements P.roviaed that such tests demonstrate the total channel response time as oefined. Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either: (1) in place. onsite. or offsite test measurements. or (2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified response time. The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System senses selected plant param-eters and determines whether or not P.redetermined limits are being exceeded. If they are. the signals are combinea into logic matrices sensitive to combinations indicative of various accidents events. and transients. Once·the required logic combination is completed. the system sends actuation signals to those Engineered Safety Features components whose aggregate function best serves the requirements of the condition. As an example. the following actions may be initiated by the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System to mitigate the consequences of a steam line break or loss-of-coolant 0

accident: (1) charging/safety injection pumps start and automatic valves position. (2) reactor trip. (3) feedwater isolation. (4) startup of the emergency diesel generators. (5) containment spray p~s start and automatic valves position (6) containment isolation. (7) steam line isolation. (8) turbine trip. (9) auxiliary feedwater pumps start and automatic valves position. (10} containment fan coolers start and automatic valves position. {11) emergency service water pumps start and automatic valves position. and (12) control room isolation and emergency fi,ltration start .

..... 1 .... --~·- l,f.,.,._,.,,.,.. Amendment No. 101 1

c;?:/~( 11 o//Z(!Z-

ATTAcHMENT..P" ff CALCUlATION E2-oo~09 PAGE~,REV~;!-/ ~ Excerpts from FSAR and Technical Specifications

~-- I ll/!z/!z-:J~y6J

INSTRUHENTAT10N :...,.

cASES . , . .

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACiUATIOH SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System interlocks perfoMD the follow-ing functions: ·

P-4 Reactor tripped - Ac:tuates Turbine trip, closes main feedwater valves on Tavg below Setpoint. prevents the opening of the ma;n feedwater valves which were closed by a Safety Injection or High Steam Generator Water Level signal. allows Safety Injection block ~o that components can be reset or tripped.

Reactor not tripped - prevents manual block of Safety Injection.

P-11 On increasing pressurizer pressure, P-11 automatically reinstates Safety Injection actuation on low pressurizer pressure and low

. steam-line pressure, sends an open signal to the accumulator dis-charge valves and automatically blocks steam-line isolation on a high rata of decrease in r..eaar-line pressure. On decre~sing pressurizer pressure, P-ll allows the manual block of .safety Injection on low pressurizer pressure and low stem-line pressure and allows steam-line isolation, on a high rate of decrease in stem-line pressure, to become active upon unual block of Safety Injection front low steam-line pressure.

. . P-12 P-12 has no ESF or reactor trip functions. On decreasing reactor

coolant loop temperature,-P-12 autcalatically removes the arming signal fT'OIII the S~u Dump System.

P-14 On incnasing steu generator water level, P-14 automatically trips all feedwater isolation valves and inhibits feedwater control valve 1110dulation.

3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

3/4.3.3.1- RADIATION MONITORING FOR PLANT OPERATIONS

Tlw OPERABIUTY of the radiation 110nitoring instruMntation far plant opera-tions ensures that: (1) the associated action will be initiated when the radia-tion level 110nitond by each c:hann.l or c.ambination thereof naches its sat-point. (2) the specified. c:oincfdance log.ic. is maintained, and (3) sufficient redundancy is maintained -to perait a channel to be out•of-service for tasting or .aintananc:e. The radiation monitors for plant operations senses radiation levels in selected plant systllls and locations and ctatanaines whether or not pNdete1"111fned li11its are being exceeded. If they are, th• signals are comeined f~ ~ogic matrices sensitive to combinations indicative of various accidents and abnonaal conditions. Once the requind logic: cOJDbinatfon is c:ompleted, the systa. sends actuation signals to initiate alarms or automatic isolation action and ac:tl.lation of eargency systems • . -SHEARON HARRIS • UNIT 1 B 3/4 3•3

- .. -···· -·-· --·-'---- ........ '· ~ . 4 ZUW JQ » SCICW ....


Decreasing Setpoints Form (DGVR Dropout)

PE

+/- 0.7200

Bias1

+0.6000 / - 0.0000

PME

N/A

Bias2

N/A

TDUsensor

N/A

Bias3

N/A

TDU1

+/- 0.6253

Total Bias

+0.6000 / -0.0000

TDU2

N/A

TDU3

N/A

TLU = (PE2 + TDU1

2)½ + Total Bias Note – bias is 0.0000 in direction of interest! TLU

- 0.9536

Margin

+/- 0.000

GAFT = (DR1

2 + MTE12)½ + Total Bias Note – bias is 0.0000 in direction of interest!

GAFT

- 0.5186

LAFT = (GAFT2 + ALTsensor

2 + DRsensor2 + MTEsensor

2)½ LAFT

LAFT = GAFT

Operating Margin (580, 9.667)

Normal (7000, 116.667)

Calculated Min Allowable Setpoint (6420, 107.000) (T/S S i i 6420 MST S i i 6420)

TS Allowable Value (> 6392, 106.534

E-6000 Analytical Limit (6391.39, 106 523)

TLU (28.608, 0.4768)

GAFT (15.558, 0.2593)

Calc Min Allowable Value (6404.44, 106.741)

Note: 1 For decreasing process setpoints, only uncertainties in the negative direction apply. Since the calibration tolerance (+0.3 / -0.0) is one sided, it is a positive bias.

3 Since tabulated values are in “% of span”, they must be converted to volts as follows

Volts = % of Span values x (50 / 100) 3 Graph values are in volts on 6 9kv bus base and also on 120v relay base



Device Type DGVR Undervoltage Relays Device Name(s) 27A Undervoltage Relays (Pickup Evaluation)

ERROR/EFFECT

VALUE

TYPE

COMMENTS

Ref. Accuracy

+/- 0.2150

Random



+ 0.6000 / - 0.0000

Bias

ALT is one sided per PassPort EDB

M&TE Error

+/- 0.4742

Random

Drift

+/- 0.2150

Random

Temp. Effect

+/- 0.1752

Random

Pwr. Supply Effect

+/- 0.2150

Random

Readability

N/A

Seismic Effect

Acc. Temp. Effect

Acc. Press. Effect

Acc. Rad. Effect


Other


TDU = +/- 0.6279% + 0.6% / - 0.0% bias

(EGR-NGGC-0153-1-2) Note: All errors/effects must be converted to the same basis (i.e. units) prior to entering their values onto the form. * 27A UV relay range is 70v – 120v; therefore, span is 50v.



Device Type DGVR Potential Transformers Device Name(s) Primary Element - PE (Pickup Evaluation)

ERROR/EFFECT

VALUE

TYPE

COMMENTS

Ref. Accuracy

+/- 0.7200

Random



N/A

M&TE Error

Drift

Temp. Effect

Pwr. Supply Effect

Readability

Seismic Effect

Acc. Temp. Effect

Acc. Press. Effect

Acc. Rad. Effect


Other


TDU = +/- 0.7200

(EGR-NGGC-0153-1-2) Note: All errors/effects must be converted to the same basis (i.e. units) prior to entering their values onto the form. * 27A UV relay range is 70 – 120v; therefore, span is 50v.


Increasing Setpoint Form (DGVR Pickup/Reset) PE

+/-0.7200

Bias1

+0.6000 / -0.0000

PME

N/A

Bias2

N/A

TDUsensor

N/A

Bias3

N/A

TDU1

+/-0.6279

Total Bias

+0.6000 / -0.0000

TDU2

N/A

TDU3

N/A

TLU = (PE2 + TDU1

2)½ + Total Bias Note – bias is 0.6000 in direction of interest! TLU

+ 1.5553

Margin

GAFT = (DR1

2 + MTE12)½ + Total Bias Note – bias is 0.6000 in direction of interest

GAFT

+ 1.1207



2)½ LAFT

E-6000 Analytical Limit (6496.66, 108.278)

Calculated Max Allowable Setpoint (6450, 107.500) (Not a T/S Setpoint / MST Setpoint is 6450, 107.500)

TLU (46.659, 0.7777)

Normal

Operating Margin

T/S Allowable Value (N/A)

Calculated Max Allowable Value (6483.62, 108.059)

GAFT (33.62, 0.5603)

Note: 1 For increasing process setpoints, only uncertainties in the positive direction apply. Since the calibration tolerance (+0.3 / -0.0) is one sided, it is a positive bias.

2 Since tabulated values are in “% of span”, they must be converted to volts as follows Volts = % of Span values x (50 / 100) 3 Graph values are in volts on 6.9kv bus base and also on 120v relay base.



Device Type DGVR Time-Delay Relays Device Name(s) 2-1 Time Delay Relays

ERROR/EFFECT

VALUE

TYPE

COMMENTS

Ref. Accuracy

±0.266

Random

All values are in seconds


±0.266

Random

M&TE Error

±0.000665

Random

Drift

±0.19

Random

Temp. Effect

N/A

Pwr. Supply Effect

N/A

Readability

N/A

Seismic Effect

Acc. Temp. Effect

Acc. Press. Effect

Acc. Rad. Effect


Other


TDU ±0.42 seconds

M&TE Error and Cal Tolerance are random, but dependent and are summed algebraically before SRSS

(EGR-NGGC-0153-1-2) Note: All errors/effects must be converted to the same basis (i.e. units) prior to entering their values onto the form.


Increasing Setpoint Form (2-1 Time Delay Relay) PE

N/A

Bias1

N/A

PME

N/A

Bias2

N/A

TDUsensor

N/A

Bias3

N/A

TDU1

±0.42

Total Bias

N/A

TDU2

N/A

TDU3

N/A

TLU = (PE2 + TDU1

2)½ + Total Bias TLU

± 0.42

Margin

0.88 upper

1.08 lower

GAFT = (ALT1

2 + DR12 + MTE1

2)½ + Total Bias GAFT

± .33



2)½ LAFT

Max Allowable Setpoint (12.88)

Setpoint 12s

Min Allowable Setpoint (10.92)

TLU (0.42)

Upper Analytical Limit = 13.3 seconds

GAFT Upper Allowable Value (13.21s)

GAFT (0.33)

TLU (0.42)

Lower Analytical Limit = 10.5 seconds

Margin (0.88s)

Margin (1.08s)

GAFT (0.33)

GAFT Lower Allowable Value (10.59s)


Listing Device Uncertainties Form Device Type DGVR Time-Delay Relays Device Name(s) 2-2 Time Delay Relays

ERROR/EFFECT

VALUE

TYPE

COMMENTS

Ref. Accuracy (RA)

+/- 1.20

Random

All values in seconds


+/- 1.20

Random

M&TE Error

+/- 0.003

Random

Drift

+/-1.25

Random

Temp. Effect (RT)

N/A

Pwr. Supply Effect

N/A

Readability

N/A

Seismic Effect

Acc. Temp. Effect

Acc. Press. Effect

Acc. Rad. Effect


Other


TDU +/- 2.11

M&TE Error and Cal Tolerance are random, but dependent and are summed algebraically before SRSS.

(EGR-NGGC-0153-1-2) Note: All errors/effects must be converted to the same basis (i.e. units) prior to entering their values onto the form.


Increasing Setpoint Form (2-2 Time Delay Relay) PE

N/A

Bias1

N/A

PME

N/A

Bias2

N/A

TDUsensor

N/A

Bias3

N/A

TDU1

+/- 2.11

Total Bias

N/A

TDU2

N/A

TDU3

N/A

TLU = (PE2 + TDU1

2)½ + Total Bias TLU

+/- 2.11

Margin

Upper 3.89

Lower 1.89

GAFT = (ALT1

2 + DR12 + MTE1

2)½ + Total Bias GAFT

+/- 1.73



2)½ LAFT

Max Allowable Setpoint (57.89)

Setpoint 54s

Min Allowable Setpoint (52.11)

TLU (2.11)

Upper Analytical Limit = 60 seconds

GAFT Upper Allowable Value (59.62s)

GAFT (1.73) TLU (2.11)

Lower Analytical Limit = 50.0 seconds

GAFT (1.73)

GAFT Lower Allowable Value (50.38s)

Margin (1.89s)

Margin (3.89s)

ATTACHMENT J ECCS Response Time

CALCULATION E2-0005.09 PAGE J I , REV. 2

-

Two Worlolraoe Center. New York. N.Y. 10048

f"' -. 'CIpp 161985 EB-FC- 784 F i l e NO.:

Mr L I Loflin, Manager Engineering - Harris Plant Carolina Power 6 Light Company P 0 Box 101 New Hill, North Carolina 27562

Dear M r Loflin: . -

Sub j ect : SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLAkT ESFAS INSTRUMENTATION TECH SPEC

Attachment: 1) ESFAS Response Time 2) Time Charts f o r IESFAS-

Response Time? & Notes 3 ) Response to eP&L Comments

of 4/5/85 Telecon

11.C. 16

The engineered safety features"actuation system (ESFAS) initiates safety actions to mitigate the'consequences of desigir b a s i s events. The design basis accident analyses assume initiation of the engineered safety features within a specified time frame. Technical Specification 3/4.3.2 - ESFAS Instrumentation requires testing the subject instrument channels and their actuated com- ponen'ts for t h i s response time.

'

Attachment 1 is a tabulation of ESFAS response times recommended f o r incorporation into the Tech Specs. determining response times consisted of the following steps:

The methodology for

Review DBA% in the FSAR to determine limiting event for response time of the component to be tested.

Develop time charts (Attachment 2) for overall response of each ESFAS actuated component to these limiting events for both offsite power available and loss of offsite power cases as appropriate.

Review t i m e charts fo r impact on individual equipment response times and on analyses response times.

AlTACHMENT J ECCS Response Time

CALCULATION E2-0005.09 PAGEJZ ,REV.2

,.('.. Mr L I Loflin -2- EB-FC- 7 8 4

These response times were informally submitted to your Mr C Bohanan at a site meeting on Harch-13. Westinghouse and Ebasco was then held on April 5 at which comments from your staff were received.

A conference call among CPbL,

Attachment 3 provides responses to these comments.

If you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to call. -

Very truly yours,

RL:vhr Attachment

cc: All with Attachment

L I Loflin- M Thompson

. E Harris - I) McCarthy

N J Chiangi J L W i l l i s

. A T Parker

:.

R Santosuosso Project Manager P


CALCULATION E2-0005.09 PAGEJ3 ,RW.2

Page A o f 3

ATTACHMENT 1

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TUGS

INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION *

2. Containment Pressure-HI-1 a. Safety Injection (ECCS)

(I) Charging (2) RHR

b. Reactor Trip c. Feedwater Isolation d. Diesel Generators e. Containment Phase "A" Isolation

- f. Containment Ventilation Isolation

g. h. Emergency Sedice Water Pumps i. Containment Fan Coolers

Auxiliary Feedwater ktor Driven Pumps

3. Pressurizer Pressure - Low

Safety Injection (ECCS)

!

I

/

a.

b. C .

d. e.

f.

8- h. i.

Reactor Trip

Feedwater Isolation Diesel Generators -

Containment Phase "A" Isolation Containment Ventilation Isoration Auxiliary Feedwater Motor Driven Pumps Emergency Service Water Pumps

Containment Fan Coolers

14 . 5* 24.5*/ 14-5 2.0

7.0 12.0 22.5*/ 12.8*

1 5.5

* 61.4*/ 51.4 32.0*/ 22.0 27.0*/ 17.0

4. Steam Line Pressure - Low

a. Safety Injection -(ECCS)

RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS

14.5* 24.5*c/ 14.5 2.0 7.0 12.0 22.5*/ 12.&* 5m5l

-61.4" 151.4 32.0*/ 22.0 27.0*/ 17.0

14 . 5" 24*5* / 14.5

ATiACHMENT J CALCULATION E2-0005.09 ECCS Response Time PAGE Jy , REV. 2

Page 2 of 3

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES

INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION

4. Steam Line Pressure - Low (Cont'd) b. Reactor Trip

c. Feedwater Isolation

d. Diesel Generators

e. Containment Phase "A" f. Containment Ventilation Isolation

g.

h. Emergency Service Water Pumps i. Containment Fan Coolers j. Main Steam Line Isolation

Auxiliary Feedwater Motor Driven Pumps

5. Containment Pressure - HI-2 a. h i n Stiam Line Isolation


2.0 7.0 12.0 22-5*/ 12.0

**

5-5

61.4*/51.4 32.0*/ 22.0 27.0*/ 17.0 7-0

7.0 c ..

6. Containment Pressure - HI-3

a. Containment Spray 32.2*/ 18.5 * '

b. .Containment Phase "B" Isolation 22-5 / 12.0

. 7, High Negative Steam Pressure Rate a. Main Steam Line Isolation

8. Steam Generator Water Level - High Bigh a. Turbine Trip

7.0

2.5 b. Feedwater Isolation 7.0

9. Steam Generator Water Level - Low Low

a. Motor-driven Auxiliary Feedwater fumps 61.4*/30 4**

b. Turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 60.0*

10. Trip of Main Feedwater PUXU~B

a. Motor-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps 61.4*/30 . 4**

-.


CALCULATION E2-0005.09 PAGE JJ , REV. 2

-. L ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES \-

I

3 Page 3 of

INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION

11. High Steam Line Differential Pressure Coincident with Main Stew Line Isolation Signal

a. Isolate Auxiliary Feedwater to the Affected Steam Generator

12. RWST Low Low Level . a. Coincident with Safety Injection

ECCS Switchover to Containment Recirculation

b. Coincident with Containment Spray Switchover to Containment Recirculation .

13. 6.9Kv Emergency Undervoltage-Primary System

a.

b. Motor-driven Auxiliary' Feedwater Pumps c. Turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps

Loss of Offsite Power S i g n a l

14. 6.9Kv Emergency Undervoltage-Secondary System

a . Loss of Offsite Power Signal

15. containment Radioactivity - High a. Containment Ventilation Isolation

(1) Pre Entry Purge Valve . (2) Normal Purge Valve


Later .

.. 32.0

103

11.51 61.4 60.0**

- 71.4

20.0 5.5

Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays included.

Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays not included. Off-site power available.

*

**

1 Normal Containment Purge Valve.

--.


,,-- ..

~ \i;JI

l . ATTACHMENT 2

TIME CHARTS AND NOTES

CALCULATION E2-0005.09 PAGE J~ , REV. 2


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CALCULATION E2-0005.09 PAGEJ8 ,REV.2

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AITACHMENT J ECCS Response Time

CALCULATION E2-0005.09 PAGE J /0 I REV. 2

(~ Vl/il

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ATTACHMENT J CALCULATION E2-0005.09 ECCS Response Time PAGE J Z 3 , REV. 2

, . --.. I

. . NOTES TO T IMECHARTS FOR

ESFAS RESPONSE TIMES


CALCU LATl ON E2-0005.09 PPGE J 2,'; REV. 2

0 ...

I.

11.

1x1,

nr,

CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM

The limiting DBA for the CSS operation is a LOCA during loss of off-site power scenarios and a MSLB when off-site power is available- ( R e f . : FSAR Section 6.2.1.1-3.2 and 6.2.1.1.3,3), The CSS response time barchart includes time for CSAS processing, diesel generator/sequencer delays, spray pump acceleration, and an appropriate margin based upon the Chap. 6.2 Containment Accident Analysis. It should be noted that for Tech Spec surveillance test purposes, the spray header fill-up time need not be included in the response time, The spray header fill-up time has been calculated to be 32 sec. Also shown for information is the response time for opening the containment spray isolation valve relative to the pump response time.

CONTAINMENT FAN COOLERS

The limiting DBA fo r the operation of the containment fan coolers is a LOCA with a loss of off-site power. T h e response time barchart includes t h e f o r signal response, diesel generator/sequencer delay, sequencer load block delay, fan acceleration and an appropriate margin based upon the E-54 Maximum Containment Pressure/Temperature Analysis, For conservatism, a fan acceleration time based uEon 75% voltage is assumed,, The margin value was deter-. mined by subtractingothe 'actual ESFAS response time from the time assumed for containment fan cooler operation in the E-54 analysis.

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP-MOTOR DRIVEN

The Auxiliary Feedwater system is designed to mitigate the effects of low water level in a steam generator due to loss of normal feedwater or secondary system pipe rupture. both motor-driven and turbine-driven A F W pumps, a comfort- able margin exists between the actual response t i m e and the Chap. 15 Accident Analysis,

The actual response times indicate that for

CHARGING

The limiting DBA for Safety Injection (charging/RHR) is a ' LOCA with loss of offsite power. times are based on the FSAR large break LOCA analysis (See FSAR Table 15.6.5-3A). It should be noted that based

The required response

ATTACHMENT J CALCULATION E2-0005.09 ECCS Response Time PAGE J t r , REV. 3,

I

ZV. CHARGING (Cont'd) .

# , . -. on Table 15.6.5-1A's sequence of e v e n t s for t h e LOCA a n a l y s i s , t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e l y expec ted charging pump response t i m e . (16.42 sec) as i n d i c a t e d by t h e t i m e c h a r t will n o t m e e t the response t i m e on Table 15.6 . 5-1A (14 . 5 s e c ) .

V. RHR RECIRCULATION

The response t i m e f o r RHR R e c i r c u l a t i o n is dependent upon t h e opening of R e c i r c u l a t i o n Sump Valves 2SI-V570SB-1, V571SA-1, V572SB-1 and V573SA-1. The c a l c u l a t e d response t i m e is 22 sec. p l u s a c o n s e r v a t i v e margin of 1 0 sec. P l e a s e n o t e t h a t a l though t h e assumed s a f e t y margin may be based upon t h e RWST T r a n s f e r a l lowance f i g u r e s found i n FSAR Table 6.3.2-9, it would not be prudent t o use t h i s f o r response t i m e t e s t i n g .

-.


CALCULATION E2-0005.09 PAGE J 2 6 , REV. 2

ATTACHMENT 3

RESPONSE TO CPSL COMMENTS

OF APRIL 5, 1985 TELECON


CALCULATION E2-0005.09 PAGE J2? , REV. 2

CPbL COMMENT (15) /*-.

The containment spray response t i m e s f o r i n j e c t i o n from Table 6.2.1-9 are 62.4s (Worst case DECLB-LOOP); 49s (Worst Pressu re Case MSLB); 49s (Worst Temperature MSLB). T h i s d o e s n ' t f i t with e i t h e r t h e Westinghouse o r Ebasco i n p u t .

RESPONSE

As d i scussed i n Attachment 2 Note I,, t h e response t i m e does n o t i n c l u d e header f i l l - u p t i m e , S i n c e Table 6.2.1-9 and t h e d i s c u s s i o n s i n S e c t i o n 6.2D1.1D3,2 and 6.2.1.1.3,3 i n c l u d e t h e header f i l l - u p t i m e , a d i rec t comparison cannot be made wi thout s u b t r a c t i n g t h e f i l l t i m e .

CP&L COMMENT (10 )

How do t h e s e t imes compare w i t h t h e t i m e s assumed f o r t h e f a n coolers? W i l l t h e c o o l e r s be s e e i n g 1500 gpm of ESW i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e response times? Does t h e a n a l y s i s cover /cons ider

. . this d i f f e r e n c e or 5s t h e d i f f e r e n c e n o t s i g n i f i c a n t ?

RESPONSE \

The E-54 Containment Accident Ana lys i s assumed a f a n cooler response time of 27 sec.

Actual f a n c o o l e r response- time is c a l c u l a t e d t o be 25.4 sec. i nc lud ing all de lays f o r t h e d i e s e l g e n e r a t o r and sequencer .

The fan c o o l e r s will receive ESW flow i n 32 sec. (See b a r c h a r t for t h e Emergency Service Water Pumps), P l e a s e n o t e t h a t t h e 70 sec. response t i m e f o r ESW i n FSAR S e c t i d n 9.2DlD3Dl is i n c o r r e c t . The es t ab l i shmen t of full ESW flow and p r e s s u r e to the containment fan coolers is dependent upon the s t a r t i n g of ESW pumps and the SW b o o s t e r pump, w i t h t h e ESW pump be ing t h e most l i m i t i n g . There are no valve re-al ignments r e q u i r e d t o switchover from NSW t o ESW supply to t h e f a n coolers,

CP&L COMMENT (11)

The d i f f e r e n c e between the Ebasco and Westinghouse number 5.4s is n o t accounted for. The W number matches the v a l u e i n FSAR Table &2.1-62 which ha3 t h z minimum possible response t i m e for ECCS minimum containment back pres su re .

ATTACHMENT J CALCULATION E2-0005.09 ECCS Response Time PAGE J 2 0 , REV. 2

/- .. CP&L CO-WENT (11) (Cont'd)

RESPONSE

The basis for developing the fan cooler response time tD mitigate the effects of a LO- is not consistent with the philo- sophy of the ECCS minimum containment back pressure ana lys i s , A direct comparison cannot be made.

CP&L COMMENT (12)

Table 6.2.1-9 indicates that the minimum required fan cooler start is 28s. Why use 27s? Is the FSAR still current? What is the basis of the W number; is it also related to minimum containment back preFsure? .

RESPONSE

See response to (10) above.

CP&L COMMENT (7)

FSAR typically quotes a,response of 60s or less even though' some table such as Table 15.;2.7-1 indicates a response t i m e of 61.4s. T.S. uses 60s.

RESPONSE . .

P e r t h e April 5 telecon between CP&L, Ebasco and Westinghouse t h e FSAR discrepancies is to be addressed by Westinghouse.

CPbL COMMENT

0 9 .:. ...

FSAR Section 9.2.1.3.1 states that response of the system is basically 70s. The extra time is f o r valve alignment. Why wasn't 70s used (See Tech Spec definition 1-12)?

RESPONSE

The availability of the ESWS during a DBA is not dependent upon any valve re-alignments from normal service water to emergency service water as stated in FSAR 9.2.1.3.1. suction will always be aligned to the Auxiliary Reservoir. In the event that the Auxiliary Resex%oir water level is low, then the pumps will also be aligned to 'the Main Reservoir. FSAR 9.2.1.3.1 will be revised per 'SAR Change Request.

I

The ESW pump

ATACHMENT J CALCULATION E2-0005.09 ECCS Response Time PAGE JZS , REV. 2

CPbL COMMENT ( 1 ) & ( 2 ) F .

Westinghouse va lue used i n TS p e r FSAR page 6.3.3-8. N o basis found i n t h e FSAR f o r 14.5 sec,

RESPONSE

The RHR response t i m e of 24 ,5 sec. is based upon a c a l c u l a t e d t h e of 22.3 sec, p l u s a margin of 2,2 sec. The o v e r a l l response t i m e is i n accordance wi th t h e r e s u l t s of t h e l a r g e break LOCA a n a l y s i s d a t a on Table 15.6 .5-1A.

The RHR response t i m e , assuming a v a i l a b i l i t y of o f f - s i t e power, is c a l c u l a t e d t o be 12.3 sec, p l u s a margin of 2.2 sec, P e r t h e t e l econ between Westinghouse, Ebasco and CPbL, W informed t h a t they would update t h e - Sa fe ty I n j e c t i o n response Fime t o 27 sec, based on a new evalua t ion . This will r e q u i r e a SAR Change from E. CP&L COMMENT (19)

FSAR Table 6.23-9 s t a t e s - t h a t t h e sumpva lve opening t i m e is 17.1 sec. This doesn ' t appear in the Ebasco c a l c u l a t i o n ,

RESPONSE

Per W valve drawings (EMDRAC k1364-4478 and 11136404482 R2) t h e v a l v z opening t i m e was r e v i s e d from 17.1 sec, to ' 20 .0 sec..

CP&L-COMMENT ( 4 ) *

N o apparent reason fo r d i f f e r e n c e s between E and Ebasco nurnb'ers. .-

RESPONSE \.*

Ebasco c a l c u l a t i o n aksumes a t y p i c a l valite c l o s i n g t i m e of less than or equa l to 'J0 sec, in FSAR Table 6.24-1 qnd Table 7.3.1-7, W va lue is based uponia va lve cloaing t i m e of 15 sec, unaware of the source' for the input .

CPbL COMMENT ( 5 ) -,; Ebasco e n t r y only a p p l i e s t o t h e pre-en t ry purge opera t ion . These va lves w i l l no t be open when an automatic SI s i g n a l could be generated (Modes 1-3). Entry should be changed t o speci- f i c a l l y i d e n t i f y the normal "8 inch" purge l i n e s . The FSAR is i n c o n s i s t e n t on what an appropriate response t i m e should be. For i n s t a n c e FSAR Sect ion 6 . Z 0 1 , 5 , 8 states t h a t t h e normal purge va lves would close within 5s of t h e containment High 1

This is based upon d a t a conta ined It appears' t h a t t h e

We are -- .,'

ATTACHMENT J CALC U LATI0 N E2-0005.09 ECCS Response Time PAGE J30 , REV. 2

I

CP6.L COMMENT ( 5 ) (Cont'd)

,-- '.

8

..

p r e s s u r e s i g n a l (1.5s s i g n a l de l ay , 3.5s v a l v e c l o s u r e t i m e ) ; FSAR S e c t i o n 6.2.4.2.7 s ta tes t h a t t h e normal purge va lves w i l l be f u l l y closed w i t h i n 5.5s of a CIS wi th 2 s f o r s i g n a l p rocess ing and fur thermore FSAR'Table 6.2.4-1 l ists va lve c l o s u r e i n 5s f o r both t h e 8 " and 42" valves . None of t h o s e i t e m s ag rees wi th t h e Ebasco i n p u t ,

RESPONSE

W e have r e v i s e d t h e CVIS response t i m e s t o c o r r e c t l y reflect a c t u a l p l a n t ope ra t ion modes, That is, fo r o p e r a t i o n a l modes 1 t h r u 4; t h e response t i m e is based upon t h e 8" Normal Purge Valves and for o p e r a t i o n a l modes 5 and 6 , t h e time is based upon t h e 42" Pre-Entry Purge Valves. It i s assumed t h a t t h e 42" Pre-Entry Purge Valves will be s e a l e d c losed dur ing modes 1, 2, 3 and 4 p e r t h e c u r r e n t Tech Specs, The.incon- s i s t e n c i e s i n t h e FSAR are a p p a r e n t l y due t o t h e d i f f e r e n t d e l a y t i m e s assumed fo r s i g n a l response, For conservat ism, o u r response t i m e assumes 2 sec,

CP&L COMMENT (23)

P e r FSAR Sec t ion 15 . 7 . 4 . 3 2 t h e overall response t i m e should be 20 sec,

.

RESPONSE

O v e r a l l response t h e of 20 sec, from FSAR S e c t i o n 15,7.4.3,2 addresses.a pos tu l a t ed f u e l handl ing a c c i d e n t i n s i d e conta in- ment, This 20 sec, response time p e r t a i n s s p e c i f i c a l l y t o c l o s i n g t h e 42" Pre-Entry Purge Valves, However, s i n c e t h e Normal Purge.Valves a l s o close on High containment r a d i a t i o n du r ing Modes 1-4, t h e i r response t i m e is shown,

FSAR Sec t ion 15-7.4.3.2 assumes t h a t t h e response t i m e f o r t h e area r a d i a t i o n monitors is 5 sec. The a c t u a l response t h e for these monitors w i l l be i n t h e order of 1.2 sec, Ebasco c a l c u l a t i o n conserva t ive ly assumes 2 sec, for all s i g n a l response t i m e s , Assuming 5 sec. for monitor response would be i n t roduc ing a d d i t i o n a l conservat ism, To accommodate t h e Chap, 15 Accident Analysis time of 20 sec,, we have r e v i s e d t h e Pre-Entry Purge Valve response time t o i n c l u d e a 3 sec, margin,

CPSL COMMENT (21)

It appears t h i s value should be 12s t o be c o n s i s t e n t w i th other accident analysis w i t h LOOP,

ATTACHMENT J CALCULATION E2-0005.09 ECCS Response Time PAGE J3/ , RW. 2

1 I

CPbL COMMENT (21) (Cont'd)

RESPONSE

The 6.9Kv Emergency Undervoltage response time cannot be consistent with an emergency signal generated accident analysis. Per the latest revision of BTP PSB-1 study (Ref. Ea-C-18596) the undervoltage relay time delay setting is 1.0 sec. * 1%. We have conservatively include all time delay settings, tolerances and breaker closure times in our response time. The response time is 11.51 sec.

CP&L COMMENT (22)

Why shouldn't this number be 7 1 . 4 ~ 3 For degraded voltage and an accident signal present a similar total would be 28.5s.

RESPONSE . - We have corrected the secondary undervoltage response time to i-ndicate 71.4 sec.

ATTACHMENT K CALCULATION E2-0005.09 Document Indexing Table PAGE K1, REV. 3

DOCUMENT INDEXING TABLE

Document Type

(e.g. calc, dwg, tag, procedure, software)

ID Number (e.g. calc no, dwg no,

equip tag no, procedure no, software name and

version)

Function (i.e. IN for design

inputs or references; OUT for affected

documents)

Relationship to Calc (e.g. design input, assumption basis, reference,

document affected by results)

OUTPUT FROM CALCULATION E2-0005.09 IS USED IN THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS (revision of Calculation E2-0005.09 may also require revision of these documents)

Calculation E-6000 OUT DGVR dropout, pickup and time delay “analytical limits” (i.e. setpoints considering tolerances) as listed in Section 5.2 are evaluated against calculated values in Calculation E-6000.

Calculation E-6003 OUT DGVR pickup “analytical limit” (i.e. setpoint considering tolerance) as listed in Section 5.2 is considered in the determination of steady-state voltage criteria for Buses 1A-SA and 1B-SB.

Drawing 6-S-0302 0020 OUT Section 5.3 serves as the basis for the DGVR under-voltage and time delay relay setpoints and tolerances.

Drawing 6-S-0302 0024 OUT See comment for 6-S-0302 0020 above.

EDB 27A-1/1711 OUT See comment for 6-S-0302 0020 above.






EDB 2-1/1711 OUT See comment for 6-S-0302 0020 above.




ATTACHMENT K CALCULATION E2-0005.09 Document Indexing Table PAGE K2, REV. 4

DOCUMENT INDEXING TABLE

POM MST-E0045 OUT Section 5.1 serves as the basis for the DGVR under-voltage and time delay relay setpoints and allowed “as-left” values.

Technical Specifications

Table 3.3-4 OUT Setpoints and allowable values for time delay relays 2-1 and 2-2 are determined in this calculation.

INPUT FROM THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS ARE USED BY CALCULATION E2-0005.09 POM MST-E0045 IN Changes to MTE could impact the

tolerances / uncertainties used in E2-0005.09.

Calculation E2-0001.01 IN Increases in motor acceleration time could impact minimum analyzed value for first time delay (Relay 2-1). Worst case acceleration time analyzed was 10 sec.

Calculation E2-0001.02 IN See comment for E2-0001.01 above.







Calculation 9-RAB-006A IN Changes in switchgear room temperature can impact DGVR & TD Relay tolerance

Calculation 9-RAB-006B IN See comment for 9-RAB-006A above.

Calculation E5-0001 IN Changes in MOV stroke time can impact Attachment O time lines.

ATTACHMENT M Branch Technical Position PSB-1

Calculation E2-0005.09 Page M1, R3

BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION PSB-1

ADEQUACY OF STATION ELECTRIC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM VOLTAGES

A. BACKGROUND

Events at the Millstone station have shown that adverse effects on the Class lE loads can be caused by sustained low grid voltage conditions when the Class 1E buses are connected to offsite power. These low voltage conditions will not be detected by the loss of voltage rel~s (loss of offsite power) whose low voltage pickup setting is generally 1n the range of .7 per unit voltage or less.

The above events also determined that imporper voltage protection logic can itself cause adverse effects on the Class lE systems and equipment such as spurious load shedding of Class lE loads from the standby diesel generators and spurious separation of Class lE systems from offsfte power due to normal motor starting transients.

A more recent event at Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) station and the subsequent analysis performed disclosed the possibility of degraded voltage conditions existing on the Class lE buses even with normal grid voltages, due to deficiencies in equipment between the grid and the Class lE buses or by the starting transients experienced during certain accident events·not originally considered in the sfzfng of these cfrcufts.

B. BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION

1. In addttion to the undervoltage scheme provided to detect loss of offsite power at the Class lE buses, a second level of undervoltage protection ~th time delay should also be provided to protect the Class lE equipment; this second level of undervoltage protection shall satisfy the following criteria: .

a)

b)

The selection of undervoltage and time delay setpoints shall be determined from an analysis of the voltage requirements of the Class lE loads at all onsite system distribution levels;

Two separate time delays shall be selected for the second level of undervoltage protection based on the following conditions:

1} The first time delay should be of a duration that established the existance of a sustained degraded voltage condition (i.e., something longer than a motor starting transient). Following this delay, an alarm fn the control room should alert the operator to the degraded condition. The subsequent occurrence of a safety injection actuation signal (SIAS} should immediately separate the Class lE distribution system from the offsite power system.

2) The second time delay should be of a limited duration such that the permanently connected Class lE loads will not be damaged. Following this delay, if the operator has failed to restore

SA-13 Rev. 0 - July 1981



adequate voltages, the Class lE distribution system should be automatically separated from the offsite power system. Bases and justification must be provided in support of the actual delay chosen.

c) The voltage sensors shall be designed to satisfy the following applicable requirements derived from IEEE Std. 279-1971, "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations":

1} Class IE equipment shall be utilized and shall be phYsically located at and electrically connected to the Class lE switchgear.

2} An independent scheme shall be provided for each division of the Class lE power system.

3) The undervoltage protection shall include coincidence logic on a per bus basis to preclude spurious trips of the offsite power source;

4) The voltage sensors shall automatically initiate the disconnection of offsfte power sources whenever the voltage set point and time delay limits (cited 1n item l.b.2 above) have been exceeded;

5) Capability for test and calibration during power operation shall be provided.

6) Annunciation must be provided in the control room for any bypasses incorporated in the design.

d) Th~ Technical Specifications shall include limiting conditions for operations, surveillance requirements, trip setpoints with minimum and maximum limits, and allowable values for the second-level volt· age protection sensors and associated time delay devices.

2. The Class lE bus load shedding scheme should automatically prevent shedding during sequencing of the emergency loads to the bus. The load shedding feature should, however, be reinstated upon completion of the load sequencing action. The technical specificatio~s must include a test requirement to demonstrate the operability of the automatic bypass and reinstatement features at least once per 18 months during shutdown.

In the event an adequate basis can be provided for retaining the Joad shed feature during the above transient conditions, the setpoint value in the Technical Specifications for the first level of undervoltage protection (loss of offsite power) must specify a value having maximum and minimum limits. The basis for the setpoints and limits selected must be documented.

3. The voltage levels at the safety-related buses should be optimized for the max1mim and minimum load · conditions that are expected throughout the anticipated range of voltage variations of the offsite power sources by appropriate adjustment of the voltage tap settings of the intervening transformers. The tap settings selected should be based on an analysis

SA-14 Rev. 0 - July 1981



of the voltage at the terminals of the Class lE loads. The analyses performed to determine minimum operating voltages should typically consider maximum unit stea~ state and transient loads for events such as a unit trip, loss-of-coolant accident, startup or shutdown; with the offsite power supply (grid) at minimum anticipated voltage and only the offsite source being considered available. Maximum voltages should be analyzed with the offsfte power supply (grid) at maximum expected voltage concurrent with minimum unit loads (e.g. cold shutdown, refueling). A separate set of the above analyses should be perfo~ed for each available connection to the offsfte power supply.

4. The analytical techniques and assumptions used in the voltage analyses cited in item 3 above must be verified by actual measurement. The verification and test should be performed prior to initial full·power reactor operation on all sources of offsite power by:

a)

b)

c)

d)

loading the station distribution buses, including all Class lE buses down to the 120/208 v level, to at least 3~;

recording the existing grid and Class lE bus voltages and bus loading down to the 120/208 volt level at steady state conditions and during the starting of both a large Class lE and non-Class lE motor (not concurrently).;

Note: to minimize the number of instrumented locations, (recorders) during the motor starting transient tests, the bus voltages and loading need only be recorded on that string of buses which previously showed the lowest analyzed voltages from item 3 above.

using the analytical techniques and assumptions of the previous voltage analyses cited fn item 3 above, and the measured existing grid voltage and bus loading conditions recorded during conduct of the test, calculate new set of voltages for all the Class lE buses down to the 120/208 volt level;

compare the analytically derived voltage values against the test results. ·

With good correlation between the analytical results and the test results. the test verification requirement will be met. That is, the valfdfty of the mathematical MOdel used fn performance of the analyses of item 3 will have been established; therefore, the valfdf~y of the results of the analyses is also established. In general the test results should not be more than ~ lower than the analytical results; however, the difference between the two when subtracted from the voltage levels determined in the orfgfnal analyses should never be less than the Class lE equipment rated voltages. ·

C. REFERENCES

1. General Design Criterion 17, 11Electrfc Power Systems. 11

SA-15 Rev. o - July 1981



2.

3.

4.

IEEE Std. 279, "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Stations."

Millstone Unit No. 2, Safety Evaluation Supporting Amendment No. 16 to License No. DPR-65.

NRC Summar,y of Meeting for Arkansas Nuclear One Incident of September 16, 1978, dated Februar,y 9, 1979.

8A-16 Rev. 0 - July 1981

ATTACHMENT 5 Sheet 1 of 1

OCR FORMAT AND CHECKLIST

Note: OCR 458376-20 is a revision to the original OCR 511890-10. Changes have been marked with revision bars. Description of SSC: OCR 511890-10 is associated with the following PassPort EDB Equipment Tag Numbers:

2-1/1711 (6.9kv Emergency Bus 1A-SA Undervoltage Relay Time Delay Relay) 2-1/1712 (6.9kv Emergency Bus 1B-SB Undervoltage Relay Time Delay Relay)

Time Delay Relays 2-1/1711 and 2-1/1712 are the A-Train and B-Train “13 second timers” for the Emergency Power System degraded grid voltage protection scheme. When the Degraded Grid Voltage Relay two-out-of-three logic is satisfied (indicating a degraded voltage condition on the applicable 6.9kv emergency bus), independent time delay relays 2-1 & 2-2 begin timing. Relay 2-1 is known as the “SI Timer” (a.k.a. 13 Second Timer) and Relay 2-2 is the “non-SI Timer” (a.k.a. 54 Second Timer). Relay 2-1 is currently set at 13 seconds nominal. If there is a concurrent SI signal when Relay 2-1 “times out”, the 6.9kv emergency bus 86UV undervoltage lockout relay actuates shedding 6.9kv emergency bus loads, opening the emergency bus main breaker and sending a start signal to the associated emergency diesel generator. If there is no SI signal present, Relay 2-1 only initiates an alarm after timing out in which case, bus separation does not occur until Relay 2-2 times out at 54 seconds if the degraded voltage condition persists.

1.0 Description of Identified Concern

[X] Concern fully explained (including applicable Technical Specifications) [X] Impact on the operation and component function described

The concern is that an evaluation does not presently exist to demonstrate the Tech Spec Table 3.3-4, Item 9.b “setpoint” and “allowable value” for the Degraded Grid Voltage “13 second timer” supports analyzed ESF component response times as inferred by FSAR Section 8.3.1.1.2.11. (Note – this concern is not associated with meeting PLP-106, Attachment 2 ESF required component response times since those response times are associated with loss of offsite power, not degraded offsite power). THERE ARE CURRENTLY NO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION OR PLP-106 ESF COMPONENT RESPONSE TIME REQUIREMENTS FOR CONCURRENT LOCA/DGV).

OCR 511890-10 was the original assignment used to evaluate the Degraded Grid Voltage timer. The purpose of this OCR is to document any changes that may be required due to RFO17 impacts. Reviews obtained on impacts to the original OCR are contained in Attachment B. Changes made to the original OCR are marked with ‘revision bars’.

2.0 Safety Significance

[X] Determine required function(s) performed by the SSC [X] Include Safety functions, Importance to safety

The primary function of the Degraded Grid Voltage “13 second timer” (Relay 2-1) is to shed emergency bus loads as soon as possible when a degraded voltage condition exists in conjunction with a safety injection actuation signal such that the loads are not damaged and can subsequently be re-energized via the emergency diesel generators. A secondary function is to provide a Control Room alarm in about 13 seconds (without the tripping function) in the event of a degraded voltage condition without SIAS to give

Attachment N OCR 511890-10 / 458376-20

Calculation E2-0005.09 Page N1, R3

Operators time to implement measures to correct the problem prior to Relay 2-2 tripping the loads at about 54 seconds. Since the DGVR voltage setpoint is 93 percent of nominal bus voltage, the time delay relays can be energized and begin timing when large motors are started. For this reason, Time Delay Relay 2-1 must have a time delay longer than the acceleration time of the large motor with the longest acceleration time (3000hp Normal Service Water Pump with 10 second acceleration time).

3.0 Licensing Basis

[X] If applicable, use NOCS and available document search tools [X] Applicable active OCRs/NCONs are considered [X] Licensing basis and commitments are clearly understood

1. Technical Specification Table 3.3-4, Item 9.b provides the T/S Setpoint and T/S Allowable Value for Relay 2-1 as < 16 seconds and < 18 seconds respectively.

The existing setpoint of Relay 2-1 (13 seconds nominal) supports the above Technical

Specification requirements. 2. Procedure PLP-106 “Technical Specification Equipment List Program”, Attachment 2 provides

Engineered Safety Features Response Times for LOCA and for LOCA/LOOP. This table does not apply to LOCA/DGV.

Not Applicable 3. DBD-202 “Plant Electrical Distribution System”, Section 2.2.2.1.3 states that backup undervoltage

relays will trip the Class 1E 6.9kv bus breakers if a degraded voltage condition exists for > 54 seconds and that annunciation will occur after 13 seconds. It also states that tripping will occur after 13 seconds if there is also a LOCA signal present.

The existing setpoint of Relay 2-1 (13 seconds nominal) supports the DBD-202 statements. 4. DBD-313 “Time Response” - Section 1.0 states the methodology for determining response times

includes developing time charts for each ESFAS-actuated component for “offsite power available” and “loss of offsite power”. In support of this statement, Attachment 2 contains time lines for events associated with “loss of offsite power” and for “accident concurrent with loss of offsite power”. Note – Attachment 2 also includes a “degraded voltage timeline for re-energizing the buses but not for meeting ESFAS component response times with concurrent accident). In fact, the time line (shown in DBD-313 Attach 2 on page 15 of 18) specifically states “NO ACCIDENT SIGNAL”. The time delay shown for Relay 2-1 is 15 seconds with a 1.5 sec tolerance (10%).

The existing setpoint of Relay 2-1 (13 seconds nominal) supports the DBD-313 statements. 5. FSAR Section 8.3.1.1.2.11 “Electric Circuit Protection Systems”, Subsection 8 states the

electrical power distribution system design complies with the stated guidelines as recommended in Branch Technical Position PSB-1:

a. A second level of undervoltage protection will provide protection for the Class 1E power system against a sustained degraded voltage condition on the offsite power system.

b. The undervoltage relay scheme will utilize a coincident logic (2/3). c. The voltage settings of the undervoltage relays will be consistent with the minimum

permissible voltage levels at the various distribution buses. d. The time delay associated with the undervoltage relays will be consistent with the maximum

time delay considered in the design basis accident analysis and shall prevent spurious tripping due to short time transient conditions.

There are three “secondary undervoltage relays” for each 6.9kv emergency bus with output

contacts configured in the required “two-out-of three” logic. The “two-out-of-three” logic actuates

Attachment N OCR 511890-10 / 458376-20


two distinct time delay relays. Upon expiration of the first time delay (Device 2-1), which is long enough to accommodate the starting of the motor with the longest starting time (NSWP), an alarm is actuated. If a SIAS is present, automatic tripping actions are initiated. If no SIAS is present, a further time delay (Device 2-2) is allowed before automatic tripping actions are initiated.

Calculation E-6000, Tab A, Tables A6-1 & A6-2 demonstrate the dropout voltage setting will

provide protection for the safety related loads fed from the Emergency Power System. Tables A5-1 & A5-2 along with Charts A1-1 & A1-2 demonstrate that the combination of the pickup (reset) voltage setting and Relay 2-1 time delay setting will ensure that spurious tripping will not occur during safeguards sequencing.

No mention of degraded grid voltage or of the degraded grid voltage relays could be found in

Chapter 15. There are; however, discussions of loss of offsite power events including accident with loss of offsite power.

Attachment A demonstrates that the existing settings of the DGV relaying scheme will meet analyzed ESF equipment response times (or that the response times will be adequate) for concurrent DGV/LOCA.

Research of existing documentation indicates the existing 13 second time delay for Relay 2-1

was chosen to prevent spurious tripping during starting of the 3000 hp Normal Service Water Pump (10 second acceleration time at 90 percent voltage). The existing 54 second time delay for Relay 2-2 was chosen to prevent damage to safety related equipment (e.g. motors) due to sustained degraded voltage. Harris Plant safety related motors were procured to be capable of starting at 75% of rated nameplate voltage and running for a minimum of 60 seconds without damage at 75% of rated nameplate voltage.

6. Branch Technical Position PSB-1 “Adequacy of Station Electric Distribution System Voltages”,

Section B.1 requires a “second level” of undervoltage protection to protect Class 1E equip against damage due to sustained low grid voltage conditions. It also warns that improper logic can cause adverse effects as well (e.g. spurious tripping due to normal transients). PSB-1 requires:

a. Selection of undervoltage and time delay setpoints shall be determined from analysis of the voltage requirements of the Class 1E loads.

b. Two separate time delays shall be used. The first time delay shall be of a duration that establishes the existence of a sustained degraded voltage condition (longer than motor starting transients). Following this delay there should be an alarm. If there is a SIAS, this first time delay should trip the bus.

The existing setpoint of Relay 2-1 (13 seconds nominal) supports the PSB-1 requirements. The

voltage requirements are evaluated in Calculation E-6000 to ensure that safety related loads will be operable at the DGVR dropout setting. The time delay for Relay 2-2 (54 seconds nominal) was chosen to ensure that Class 1E equipment would not be subjected to degraded voltage conditions for more than 60 seconds since safety related motors were procured to be capable of running for a minimum of 60 seconds at 75% of rated voltage. (Note, if the voltage is less than this, the first level undervoltage relays will trip the bus immediately). The time delay for Relay 2-1 (13 seconds nominal) was chosen to ensure that spurious tripping would not occur when starting the Normal Service Water Pump (10 seconds acceleration time at 90% voltage).

7. NRC Inspection Report 05000400/2011008 (resulting from the Harris Plant 2011 Component

Design Basis Inspection) identified a performance deficiency for failure to properly control degraded voltage time delay setpoints, specifically, the licensee had not analyzed whether electrical equipment needed to respond to an accident would be energized by the emergency diesel generators within the time considered in the accident analysis if a degraded voltage condition existed concurrent with an accident. Harris Plant argued that concurrent accident with degraded grid voltage was not part of the original licensing basis of the plant and that it is

Attachment N OCR 511890-10 / 458376-20


apparent from the plant design (e.g. DGVR logic and Sequencer logic) that this was not intended. However, the NRC NRR has ruled that Harris Plant must comply with this design basis.

Attachment A demonstrates the existing setpoint of Relay 2-1 (13 seconds nominal) will

support analyzed ESF component response times. The 18 second T/S allowed value is non-conservative since the analyzed component response times would not be met.

4.0 Impact Analysis and Reliability Considerations

[X] Impact on Safety Function and Licensing Basis [X] Impact of identified concern (Section 1.0) compared against safety function (s) (Section 2.0)

and CLB requirements or commitments (Section 3.0) [X] Reliability Considerations of Component [X] Mission time explained and analyzed

The Safety Functions of Relays 2-1/1711 and 2-1/1712 are met with the existing 13 second nominal setpoint. The 13 second setpoint ensures that analyzed ESF component response times will be met (or resultant conditions are acceptable if not met) assuming concurrent SIAS and degraded grid voltage conditions as documented in Attachment A. This setting also ensures that spurious tripping will not occur during starting of the largest motor with longest acceleration time (NSWP) and that spurious tripping will not occur during safeguards sequencing with the 230kv Switchyard at the “administrative voltage limit”. The setting also ensures that safety related equipment supplied from the emergency power system will not be damaged by sustained exposure to degraded voltage conditions. The Licensing Bases for Relays 2-1/1711 and 2-1/1712 are met with the existing 13 second nominal setpoint as discussed in the preceding paragraph. However, the existing T/S Table 3.3-4, Item 9.b “allowable value” of < 18 seconds is non-conservative and will not support the Licensing Bases (as established by NRC NRR subsequent to the 2011 CDBI). The concern does not impact the reliability of the component (i.e. Equipment Tag Numbers 2-1/1711 and 2-1/1712). The components are fully qualified for their application. Mission Time 1. The degraded grid voltage protection scheme is only required to actuate once since it performs its

function and isolates the emergency power system from the degraded offsite source at that time and once on the EDGs, the relays become “non-functional” (further tripping actions are blocked).

2. The emergency power system conditions which could require actuation of the degraded grid voltage protection scheme “13 second timer” could occur at any time during accident scenarios; however, the Harris Plant licensing basis assumes that it is concurrent (simultaneous) with SI.

3. Based upon historical data from 2004, the stability (drift) of time-delay relay 2-1 has not caused the HHSI or LHSI response time to exceed the analyzed response times (e.g. 27 seconds calculated vs. 29 seconds analyzed). The average drift was 0.67 seconds with only two values above 1 second (1.04 seconds and 1.44 seconds).

Attachment N OCR 511890-10 / 458376-20


5.0 Operability Evaluation

[X] Mode of plant operation [X] Can it still perform its safety function and how? [X] What additional measures are required to enable this component to perform its function? [X] What is the aggregate effect?

Note: During RFO17 the original analysis provided was reviewed to determine if there has been any impact to the original conclusion based on changes during RFO17. The additional reviews are contained in Attachment B. It was determined that there was no impact to the original conclusions below.

The results of OCR 511890 cover all plant operating modes. Containment Spray, High Head Safety Injection, ac power and associated primary and secondary undervoltage relays are required for Modes 1 – 4. Motor Drive Auxiliary Feedwater is required for Modes 1 – 3. Degraded Grid Voltage Time Delay Relays 2-1/1711 & 2-1/1712 with their existing 13 second nominal setpoint can still perform their safety functions (even though the T/S Table 3.3-4, Item 9.b. “allowable value” is non-conservative). The detailed evaluation in Attachment A demonstrates that analyzed response times will be met (or resultant conditions are acceptable if not met) with the existing 13 second nominal setpoint. The analysis conservatively assumes that Sequencer timing relays are off by the manufacturer’s stated 10% tolerance in the same direction (additive). Five scenarios have been evaluated for a degraded grid voltage condition occurring concurrent with an accident initiating event: EXISTING SI / LOOP CONCURRENT SI / DGV SAFETY FUNCTION ACCIDENT ANALYSIS TIME TIME (FROM ATTACH A) 1. High Head Safety Injection 29s 27s 2. Low Head Safety Injection 37s (Note 3) 34s 3. Auxiliary Feedwater 61.5s 52s 4. Containment Fan Coolers 110s (Note 2) 110s (Notes 1, 2) 5. Containment Spray 56.4s (Note 4) 64.6s Note 1 Review of LOCA case shows maximum pressure and temperature occur before the 110s mission

time and therefore, any additional delay beyond 110s would be inconsequential with respect to the long term Containment pressure/temperature transient. For the MSLB case, temperature is reduced by Containment Spray (prior to crediting the Containment Fan Coolers). Similar to the LOCA case, an additional delay would be inconsequential with respect to peak pressure due to MSLB and, also, MSLB is not the limiting event for Containment pressure.

Note 2 110 seconds is the time used in the accident analysis conservatively assuming no ESW flow prior

to this point. ALTRAN Technical Report 12-1027-TR-001 (included in the NCR folder) evaluates the impact of an additional 14 seconds of “drain-down” (i.e. 14 seconds longer delay in starting the ESW pump as compared to the delay for concurrent LOOP/SI). Report 12-1027-TR-001 does not credit the faster closure time of 1SW-39 & 1SW-40 during a degraded grid voltage event. Report 12-1027-TR-001 concludes that it remains conservative to continue to assume 110 seconds with no prior ESW flow. The report concludes: a. The existing water hammer evaluation (LOCA and LOOP) calculates a magnitude of 89 psig

based on the assumption that a total drain-down of the ESW piping occurs. Therefore this is the maximum water hammer possible.

b. Even if Containment Fan Cooler flow restoration were delayed by 14 seconds, this would have no impact on Containment cooling analysis because the loss of Containment heat removal is covered by conservatisms in the existing calculation.

Note 3 The current analysis of record uses 29 seconds for this value. A revised analysis pending NRC

approval uses 37 seconds. Refer to Attachment A, Section 2 (RHR response time scenario).

Attachment N OCR 511890-10 / 458376-20


Note 4 For Containment Spray, the accident analysis time is 56.4 seconds, i.e. 58.4 seconds from the

time of the actual pipe break. See Attachment A, Pages A10 – A12. Therefore, there is a deficit of 8.2 seconds. A review was performed of the MSLB and LOCA cases that perform the basis of the maximum temperature and pressure. Generally the LOCA cases result in peak pressures and temperatures that occur well before the start of the Containment Spray Pump and Containment Fan Coolers. For these cases, the delay would have a small negligible impact on the long term response of the Containment pressure and temperature. Therefore, the response time of Containment Spray is acceptable.

No compensatory measures have been made (or are required) with respect to this OCR. Procedure MST-E0045, Sections 7.5 & 7.6 test Relays 2-1/1711 & 2-1/1712 respectively to ensure the 13 second nominal time delay is within the maximum allowed value of 14.3 seconds. Note, however, that QCE 511890-03 will create a CORR assignment to ensure appropriate changes are made (likely a combination of hardware, FSAR, T/S and procedure changes) such that it can be demonstrated that the T/S allowable value for Timer 2-1 will ensure analyzed ESF equipment response times will be met assuming coincident LOCA and degraded grid voltage. This work will be performed under EC 84101.

Attachment N OCR 511890-10 / 458376-20


6.0 Conclusion/Extent of qualification described:

[] OPERABLE, fully qualified [X] OPERABLE, but degraded (non-conformance)

o Use-as-is o Repair o Interim-use-as-is (Time commensurate with safety ) o Compensatory measures. (AR assignments required for each owner) o 50.59 evaluation required. Addressing each comp action o What actions are in place to address and restore full qualification?

[] INOPERABLE

Section 5.0 documents the conclusions of the Operability Evaluation with regard to the ability of Degraded Grid Voltage Time Delay Relays 2-1/1711 & 2-1/1712 to perform their required safety functions. 1. Relays 2-1/1711 and 2-1/1712 (Degraded Grid Voltage “13 Second Timers”) with their present 13

second nominal setpoint are capable of performing their required safety function, i.e. of ensuring analyzed ESF equipment response times will be met (or resultant conditions are acceptable if not met) assuming concurrent safety injection conditions and degraded bus voltage.

2. Technical Specification Table 3.3-4, Item 9.b < 18 second “allowable value” for Relay 2-1 is non-

conservative. 3. The status of Relays 2-1/1711 and 2-1/1712 is “interim-use-as-is”. EC 84101 will be used to

provide a permanent resolution. 4. Since there are no compensatory actions (procedure change, temporary facility change, etc.),

there is no need to perform a 10CFR50.59 review per Procedure REG-NGGC-0010. For further details, see last paragraph of Section 5.0 “Operability Evaluation”.

During RFO17 additional reviews were performed to determine

7.0 References

[X] Source document(s) identified where licensing basis is extracted

6-B-041 0045 R14 PD&MD - Emergency Bus 1A-SA 6-B-041 0046 R14 PD&MD - Emergency Bus 1B-SB 6-B-401 1101 - 1190 CWD – Emergency Load Sequencer ESS Cabinets 1A-SA & 1B-SB 6-B-401 1701 R13 CWD – Emergency Diesel Generator 1A-SA Breaker 106 6-B-401 1711 R12 CWD - 6.9kv Emer Bus 1A-SA Secondary Undervoltage Relays 6-B-401 1712 R13 CWD - 6.9kv Emer Bus 1B-SB Secondary Undervoltage Relays 6-B-401 1731 R24 CWD - 6.9kv Emer Bus 1A-SA Undervoltage Trip 6-B-401 1732 R23 CWD - 6.9kv Emer Bus 1B-SB Undervoltage Trip 6-S-0302 0020 R10 Medium Voltage Relay Settings – 6900V Emergency Bus 1A-SA 6-S-0302 0024 R10 Medium Voltage Relay Settings – 6900V Emergency Bus 1B-SB E-6000 R11 AC Distribution System Voltage / Load Flow / Fault Current Study E2-0005.09 R02 Degraded Grid Voltage Protection for Busses 1A-SA & 1B-SB EST-301 R16 ESF Response Time Evaluation Safety Injection EST-305 R18 ESF Response Time Evaluation Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps EST-307 R13 ESF Response Time Evaluation Containment Fan Coolers EST-309 R11 ESF Response Time Evaluation Containment Spray

Attachment N OCR 511890-10 / 458376-20


HNP-F/NFSA-0187 R2 HNP Cycle 17 Plant Parameters Document HNP-F/NSA-0215 R0 HNP Cycle 19 Plant Parameters Document ANP-3011 Harris Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Realistic Large Break LOCA Analysis HNP-M/MECH-1008 R5 Revised containment Analysis For an Increase in the initial temperature

from 120 – 135 degrees F NCR 458376 CDBI – FSAR Section 8.3.1.1.2.11 (8) Clarity Issues (Request #41) NCR 460601 Safety Bus UV & DGVR Relay Coordination – CDBI Requests 115 & 121 NCR 531951 1CS-748 Allowing Flow Through Valve NCR 532019 Noise and Low Amperage On ‘C’ CSIP During OST-1824 NCR 534767 CSIP Alt Miniflow Disposition Requires Update LRPF 514366 Design Basis – Degraded Grid Voltage with Safety Injection VM-PEB R13 Sequencer and Miscellaneous Panels ANP-3011 DBD-202 R24 Plant Electrical Distribution System DBD-313 R03 Time Response PLP-106 R51 Technical Specification Equipment List Program…. FSAR Section 8.3.1.1.2.11 FSAR Chapter 15 FSAR Table 15.6.5-3 Tech Spec Table 3.3-4, Item 9 Branch Technical Position PSB-1 NRC Inspection Report 05000400/2011008 “Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant Component Design

Bases Inspection” ALTRAN Technical Report 12-1027-TR-001 Note – Items above in bold and underlined were used in establishing the Design Bases in Section 3.0.

8.0 Attachments and Figures

[X] Diagrams/figures attached if applicable Attachment A “Detailed Evaluation”

Attachment N OCR 511890-10 / 458376-20


ATTACHMENT 6 Sheet 1 of 1

OCR / NCON Approval Form OCR / NCON APPROVAL FORM

NCR Number

Assignment Number

Description of SSC

Personnel Involved in Preparation

Print Name Title Signature

Shift Technical Advisor / Licensed Operator Review Signature

Date

Supervisor/ Additional Reviews (as required)

Supervisor Approval Signature

Title Date

Supervisor Signature

Title Date

Licensing Signature

Title Date

SM Closure/Approval Signature

Date

Performance Improvement Coordinator Approval Signature

Date

This document becomes a QA Record upon completion of final signature.

Attachment N OCR 511890-10 / 458376-20


ATTACHMENT A Detailed Evaluation

Existing nominal setpoints, T/S Setpoints and T/S Allowable Values for the subject DGVR relays:

PARAMETER NOM SETPOINT T/S SETPOINT T/S ALLOWABLE DGVR Dropout Voltage 6420vac > 6420vac > 6392vac DGVR Time Delay (w SI) 13s < 16s < 18s The five scenarios being evaluated are based upon simultaneous occurrence of plant parameters exceeding values requiring a Safety Injection and initiation of the DGVR “SI timer” (i.e. immediately following Degraded Grid Voltage Relay 2/3 logic being satisfied). This is consistent with the methodology used to evaluate equipment response to a simultaneous “LOCA/LOOP”. Sustained bus voltage below the DGVR dropout setting means that 6.9kv emergency bus voltage could be anywhere between the LOOP undervoltage relay dropout setting (5310vac nominal) and DGVR dropout setting (6420vac nominal). The LOOP undervoltage relay dropout setting of 5310vac helps ensure that safety-related motor terminal voltages will be at or above 75% of nameplate rated voltage. Safety related motors were procured to be capable of starting at 75% of nameplate voltage and running for a minimum of 60 seconds at 75% of nameplate voltage. For this reason, it is assumed that safety-related motors will successfully start and run even if the bus voltage is “degraded”. It is conservatively assumed that the CSIP, RHR, AFW, CS & CFC motors are at 75% terminal voltage during starting (to determine longest acceleration time) during initial sequencing, i.e. while the emergency bus is on the degraded offsite power source. It is not the intent of this document to demonstrate that PLP-106, Attachment 2 required equipment response times will be met assuming concurrent SI and Degraded Grid Voltage since PLP-106 does not address this scenario. (It currently only addresses SI and concurrent SI/LOOP). As such, this OCR will demonstrate that equipment response times meet the “analyzed” times in the accident analyses or there are reasonable arguments that the analysis results are acceptable. Following is the overall timeline for SI actuated equipment (for Containment HI-3 / Phase B Signal for the Containment Spray Pump scenario) with DGVR Relay 2-1 “timing out” at the nominal 13 second setpoint. 10% tolerance has been added to all Sequencer timing relays (and all in an “additive” direction for conservatism). For initial sequencing of loads (onto the “degraded” offsite source), the “75% of nameplate voltage” acceleration time is used for conservatism. For re-sequencing of loads from the EDG supplied bus, a slightly shorter acceleration time is used since the EDG voltage regulator will be restoring the bus voltage to 6900vac (nominally) within a short time frame. Values shown are in “seconds”. T = -2 Pipe break T = 0 a. Process parameter met for initiating SI (e.g. low Pressurizer pressure SI)

b. Degraded Grid Voltage occurs (6.9kv emergency bus voltage falls below 6420vac). Refer to 6-B-401 1711 & 1731. Two-out-of-three logic for Degraded Grid Voltage Relays 27A-1, 27A-2 & 27A-3 satisfied and “SI 13 second Timer” 2-1 energizes (starts timing).

T = 1 Process parameter met for initiating Containment Hi-3 setpoint T = 2 a. SIAS occurs two seconds after SI parameters have been met considering signal

processing time (or other “accident event” initiating signal occurs). Solid State Protection System (SSPS) Relays K609 & K635 contacts close and energize Emergency Safeguards Sequencer Relays LOCA-1/X, LOCA-2/X, LOCA-1/XS & LOCA-2/XS.

Attachment N OCR 511890-10 / 458376-20


b. EDGs receive start signal due to SIAS (even though offsite power still available). c. ESS Program C (LOCA) begins due to SIAS. Previously running safety related

motors continue to run (i.e. do not trip since offsite power available). d. CSIP and other LB 1 breakers close since there is no time delay for the LB 1 initiating

relays. e. SI initiated MOVs start to re-position.

1. 1SI-3, 1SI-4, 1CS-182, 1CS-196, 1CS-210, 1CS-214, 1CS-235 & 1CS-238 2. 1SW-270 & 271 (62s stroke) OPEN stroke initiated by K608. 3. 1SW-39, 40, 274, 275 & 276 (62s stroke) CLOSE stroke initiated by K609.

T = 3 a. Containment Spray Actuation Signal occurs

b. Containment Spray discharge MOVs CT-50 & CT-88 begin 10 second OPEN stroke T = 6 CSIPs fully accelerated. Per Calculation E-6000, Table A4-3, CSIPs accelerate in 1.5 seconds

at rated voltage and in 4 seconds at 75% of rated voltage. Four seconds acceleration time assumed for conservatism since bus voltage is degraded.

T = 7.5 a. RHR Pump, Containment Fan Cooler and other LB 2 breakers close (5 second timer with

0.5 second tolerance). b. CSP assumed to start (blocked from starting in LB 1 & LB3 / initiated by SSPS, not

Sequencer). Assumed to start in LB 2 based upon worst-case accident profile. T = 9.4 a. RHR Pumps fully accelerated. Per Calculation E-6000, Table A4-3, RHR Pumps

accelerate in 0.8 seconds at rated voltage and 1.86 seconds at 75% of rated voltage. 1.9 seconds acceleration time assumed for conservatism since bus voltage degraded. Note - full RHR flow is not achieved until RHR mini-flow valves 1RH-31 and 1RH-69 stroke towards the closed position. Based upon the results of EST-301, two seconds of stroke time will allow the RHR system to meet flow requirements. 2.6 seconds will be used for conservatism. These valves start their stroke based on pump output flow, not on SIAS or Sequencer and have a 10 second stroke time.

b. MOVs 1RH-31 & 1RH-69 begin to stroke closed. T = 10.1 CSP fully accelerated. Per Calculation E-6000, Table A4-3, CSP Pumps accelerate in 0.95

seconds at rated voltage and in 2.56 seconds at 75% of rated voltage. For conservatism, 2.6 seconds will be used for the acceleration time.

T = 12 a. MOVs 1SI-3, 1SI-4, 1CS-182, 1CS-196, 1CS-210, 1CS-214, 1CS-235 & 1CS-238 fully

stroked (< 10 second stroke time per Calculation E-6001, Attachment 186 and Calculation E5-0001, Table B2).

b. MOVs 1RH-31 & 1RH-69 closed enough to meet RHR flow requirements (2.6 seconds). c. EDGs ready to load (up to speed and voltage).

T = 13 a. DGVR “13 second timer” Relay 2-1 times out. The combination of Relay 2-1 contact and

either/or LOCA-1/XS and LOCA-2/XS contact closures picks up Undervoltage Lockout Relay 86UV which: 1. trips emergency bus main breaker 2. trips emergency bus feeder breakers supplying motors (load shedding) 3. trips emergency bus feeder breaker supplying non-safety Bus 1A1 (1B1) 4. trips emergency bus feeder breaker supplying Bus 1A3-SA (1B3-SB) supplying

MCCs – energized contactors will drop out 5. sends start signal to EDGs, however, they are already running for this scenario 6. sends start signal to ESS 10 second timer SAB (CWD Sheet 1102) 7. “de-energizes” ESS Program C (LOCA) to re-set the Sequencer 8. although not initiated by 86UV, Bus 1A2-SA (1B2-SB) fed motors will trip

b. SW MOVs in process of opening (1SW-270 & 271) will stop in mid-stroke and will resume

Attachment N OCR 511890-10 / 458376-20


opening when power is restored. Refer to 6-B-401 2286 & 2287. c. SW MOVs in process of closing (1SW-39, 40, 274, 275 & 276) will stop in mid-stroke and

will resume closing when power is restored. d. RHR MOVs 1RH-31 & 1RH-69 stop mid-stroke (about half way). e. LB 3 (ESW, etc.) does not begin since Sequencer stops. f. Containment Spray discharge MOVs 1CT-50 & 1CT-88 reach full open position.

T = 14.5 a Emergency Diesel Generator breaker closes after 1.5 second delay re-energizing the

6.9kv emergency bus and the MCCs. (Relay PGSA/1731) b. The 86UV undervoltage lockout relay resets as soon as the EDG breaker closes. c. RHR MOVs 1RH-31 & 1RH-69 will immediately begin to stroke back open since the RHR

pump tripped earlier. They had only stroked towards closed for about 3.6 seconds, so it will only take about 3.6 seconds to stroke back to open.

T = 18 RHR MOVs 1RH-31 & 1RH-69 stroke back to open completed. Exact time is not important since

it will be another 10 seconds or so until the RHR pump is re-started. T = 24 a. ESS begins Program B (LOCA/LOOP) after 10 second nominal delay (11 seconds

considering 10% tolerance of Relay SAB) after 86UV actuation. See SD-155.02, Section 2.1.3 (a) & VM-PEB, Page 39).

b. CSIP and other LB 1 breakers close since there is no time delay for the LB 1 initiating relays.

c. Note – CSIP MOVs are already in position since they would have “failed as is” after losing power at T = 13. Also, they will be re-powered at T = 14.5 seconds in the event that they did not complete their 10 second stroke time during initial sequencing.

T = 27 CSIPs fully accelerated. Per Calculation E-6000, Table A4-3, CSIPs accelerate in 1.5 seconds

at rated voltage and in 4 seconds at 75% of rated voltage. Three seconds acceleration time assumed for conservatism even though bus voltage should be near nominal due to the EDG voltage regulator. Valves are already in correct position.

T = 29.5 a. RHR Pump, Containment Fan Cooler and other LB 2 breakers close (5 second timer with

0.5 second tolerance). b. CSP assumed to start (blocked from starting in LB 1 & LB3 / initiated by SSPS, not

Sequencer) T = 31 a. RHR Pumps fully accelerated. Per Calculation E-6000, Table A4-3, RHR Pumps

accelerate in 0.8 seconds at rated voltage and 1.86 seconds at 75% of rated voltage. 1.5 seconds acceleration time assumed for conservatism even though bus voltage should be near nominal due to the EDG voltage regulator. Note - full RHR flow is not achieved until RHR mini-flow valves 1RH-31 and 1RH-69 stroke towards the closed position. Based upon the results of EST-301, two seconds of stroke time will allow the RHR system to meet flow requirements. 3 seconds will be used for conservatism. These valves start their stroke based on pump output flow, not on SIAS or Sequencer and have a 10 second stroke time.

b. MOVs 1RH-31 & 1RH-69 begin to stroke closed. T = 31.5 CSP fully accelerated. Per Calculation E-6000, Table A4-3, CSP Pumps accelerate in 0.95

seconds at rated voltage and in 2.56 seconds at 75% of rated voltage. 2 seconds will be used for the acceleration time since bus voltage should be near nominal due to the EDG voltage regulator. Note – there will be a 33.1 second delay before full flow at nozzles occurs.

T = 34 MOVs 1RH-31 & 1RH-69 closed enough to meet RHR flow requirements. T = 35. ESW Pump and other LB 3 breakers close (ten second timer with 1 second tolerance). The

Attachment N OCR 511890-10 / 458376-20


start of the ESW Pump will begin to clear to void formed in the ESW piping to Containment Fan Coolers AH-3 & AH-4.

T = 36.5 CFCs fully accelerated. Per Calculation E-6000, Table A4-3, CFCs accelerate in 5.58 seconds

at rated voltage and 8.07 seconds at 75% of rated voltage. Seven seconds acceleration time assumed for conservatism even though bus voltage should be near nominal due to the EDG voltage regulator. However, effectiveness of CFCs cannot be credited until ESW flow has cleared voiding in the supply piping to the CFCs and downstream piping is clear of “two-phase” fluid.

T = 39 ESW Pumps fully accelerated. Per Calculation E-6000, Table A4-3, ESW Pumps accelerate in

2.25 seconds at rated voltage and 5.9 seconds at 75% of rated voltage. Four seconds acceleration time assumed for conservatism even though bus voltage should be near nominal due to the EDG voltage regulator.

T = 40.5 LB 4 load breakers close (15 second timer with 1.5 second tolerance). T = 46 AFW Pump, SWBP and other LB 5 load breakers close (20 second timer with 2 second

tolerance). T = 47.5 SWBPs fully accelerated T = 52 AFW Pumps fully accelerated. Per Calculation E-6000, Table A4-3, AFW Pumps accelerate in

2.7 seconds at rated voltage and 8.00 seconds at 75% of rated voltage. Six seconds acceleration time assumed for extreme conservatism even though bus voltage should be near nominal due to the EDG voltage regulator

T = 64.6 Containment Spray reaches full flow a spray nozzles in Containment (33.1 second delay from

when CS Pump has fully accelerated). T = 65.5 a. MOVs 1SW-270 & 1SW-271 fully open

b. MOVs 1SW-39, 40, 274, 275 & 276 fully closed T = 110 ESW flow to CFCs has reached rated conditions (CFC downstream piping “two-phase”

conditions are cleared. Note: 110 seconds is used in the accident analysis assuming no ESW flow prior to this point. ALTRAN Technical Report 12-1027-TR-001 conservatively evaluates the impact of increasing this time to 114 seconds due to an additional 14 second delay in starting the ESW Pumps. Report 12-1027-TR-001 does not credit the faster closure time of 1SW-39 & 1SW-40 during a degraded grid voltage event. Report 12-1027-TR-001 concludes that if remains conservative to continue to assume 110 seconds with no prior ESW flow.

Attachment N OCR 511890-10 / 458376-20


Scenario 1 – High Head Safety Injection T = 0 a. Process parameter met for initiating SI signal

b. Degraded Grid Voltage occurs T = 2 a. SIAS occurs

b. EDGs receive start signal c. ESS Program C (LOCA) begins d. CSIP breaker closes e. SIAS initiated MOVs start to re-position (1SI-3, 1SI-4, 1CS-182, 1CS-196, 1CS-210,

1CS-214, 1CS-235 & 1CS-238)

T = 2.2 Alternate Miniflow valve strokes open

T = 6 CSIPs fully accelerated T = 12 a. Safety Injection System MOVs fully stroked

b. EDGs ready to load T = 13 a. DGVR “13 second timer” Relay 2-1 times out / 86UV Lockout Relay actuates b. ESS 10 second timer SAB starts c. Emergency bus main and load breakers trip d. Alternate Miniflow valve full open

T = 14.5 EDG breaker closes T = 14.6 Alternate Miniflow valve begins close stroke T = 24 a. ESS Program B (LOCA/LOOP) begins

b. CSIP breaker closes c. CSIP MOVs in position (two opportunities to complete 10 second stroke)

T = 24.5 Alternate Miniflow valve fully closed T = 27 CSIPs fully accelerated with MOVs in position

Analyzed response time is 29 seconds (PPD calculations for Cycles 17 & 18) This leaves 2 seconds margin for DGVR SI timer actuating higher than the desired 13 second

setpoint and/or other small variables such as operating time of the 86UV relay, etc. Notes 1. Timeline constructed by System Engineering team member (based on EST-301 testing results of individual components) resulted in 27.2 seconds for Train A and 27.4 seconds for Train B which adds confidence to the above analytical timeline. 2. The original OCR 511890-10 did not include the alternate miniflow valve operation. AR 531951 contains High Head Safety Injection analysis that includes the operation of the Alternate Miniflow Valve. This analysis was incorporated into the High Head Safety Injection scenario above. The results of the analysis show that including the Alternate Miniflow valve operation did not impact the CSIPs full acceleration timeline of 27 seconds.

Attachment N OCR 511890-10 / 458376-20


Scenario 2 - Low Head Safety Injection T = 0 a. Process parameter met for initiating SI signal


b. EDGs receive start signal c. ESS Program C (LOCA) begins (note - no “injection” MOVs are required to reposition for

RHR since all are normally open) T = 7.5 RHR Pump breaker closes T = 9.4 RHR Pumps fully accelerated & mini-flow MOVs 1RH-31 & 1RH-69 begin to close T = 12 a. Mini-flow MOVs 1RH-31 & 1RH-69 closed enough to meet RHR flow requirements

b. EDGs ready to load T = 13 a. DGVR “13 second timer” Relay 2-1 times out / 86UV Lockout Relay actuates b. ESS 10 second timer SAB starts c. Emergency bus main and load breakers trip T = 14.5 a. EDG breaker closes b. RHR mini-flow valves begin to stroke back open (since pump is not running) T = 18 RHR mini-flow valves are open T = 24 ESS begins Program B (LOCA/LOOP) T = 29.5 RHR Pump breaker closes T = 31 RHR Pumps fully accelerated & mini-flow MOVs 1RH-31 & 1RH-69 start to close. (As stated

previously, there are no MOVs required to open since all are normally open). T = 34 Mini-flow MOVs 1RH-31 & 1RH-69 closed enough to meet RHR flow requirements.

Analyzed response time is 37 seconds (ANP-3011 Cycle 18 PPD) The ANP-3011 analysis is performed using an NRC approved method, but use of the RLBLOCA method is pending NRC approval on the HNP docket. Because the analysis uses an otherwise

accepted method it qualifies a suitable analysis for this assessment. The differences between the Cycle 17 fuel inputs and the Cycle 18 fuel inputs are judged to be negligible. This leaves 3

seconds margin for DGVR SI timer actuating higher than the desired 13 second setpoint and/or other small variables such as operating time of the 86UV relay, etc.

Note – timeline constructed by System Engineering team member (based on EST-301 testing results of individual components) resulted in 32.9 seconds for Train A and 32.1 seconds for Train B which adds confidence to the above analytical timeline. (The main reason for the difference between the “analytical timeline” and test timeline is that the 32.9 / 32.1 second test results are the time to reach acceptable flow and does not indicate how far the min-flow valves had stroked towards closed).

Attachment N OCR 511890-10 / 458376-20


Scenario 3 – Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater T = 0 a. Process parameter met for initiating SI signal


b. EDGs receive start signal c. ESS Program C (LOCA) begins (Note - no MOVs required to reposition for AFW since all

are normally in correct position) T = 12 EDGs ready to load T = 13 a. DGVR “13 second timer” Relay 2-1 times out / 86UV Lockout Relay actuates b. ESS 10 second timer SAB starts c. Emergency bus main and load breakers trip T = 14.5 EDG breaker closes T = 24 ESS begins Program B (LOCA/LOOP) T = 46 AFW Pump breakers close T = 52 AFW Pumps fully accelerated and system at full flow. (As stated previously, there are no

MOVs to reposition since all are normally open).

Analyzed response time is 61.5 seconds (PPD for Cycles 17 & 18) This leaves 9.5 seconds margin for DGVR SI timer actuating higher than the desired 13 second

setpoint and/or other small variables such as operating time of the 86UV relay, etc. Note – timeline constructed by System Engineering team member (based on EST-305 testing results of individual components) resulted in 45.1 seconds for Train A and 46.8 seconds for Train B which adds confidence to the above analytical timeline. (The main reason for the difference between the “analytical timeline” and test timeline is that the “analytical timeline” has a conservative assumption of 6 seconds for the AFW Pump acceleration time).

Attachment N OCR 511890-10 / 458376-20


Scenario 4- Containment Fan Coolers T = - 2 Large pipe break occurs in Containment T = 0 a. Process parameter met for initiating SI signal

b. Degraded Grid Voltage occurs c. Voiding occurs in ESW piping to AH-3 & AH-4 due to heating of water in CFC

T = 2 a. SIAS occurs

b. EDGs receive start signal c. ESS Program C (LOCA) begins e. SIAS initiated MOVs start to re-position.

1. 1SW-270 & 271 (62s stroke) OPEN stroke initiated by K608. 2. 1SW-39, 40, 274, 275 & 276 (62s stroke) CLOSE stroke initiated by K609.

f. Opening 1SW-270 & 1SW-271 permits water to begin to drain from AH-3 & AH-4 increasing the voiding in the ESW piping

T = 7.5 CFCs get start signal, but lose power prior to fully accelerating T = 12 EDGs ready to load T = 13 a. DGVR “13 second timer” Relay 2-1 times out / 86UV Lockout Relay actuates b. ESS 10 second timer SAB starts c. Emergency bus main and load breakers trip d. Note - ESW Pump breaker did not close due to DGVR timing out T = 14.5 a. EDG breaker closes

b. SW MOVs in process of opening (1SW-270 & 271) had stopped in mid-stroke and will resume opening stroke when power is restored

c. SW MOVs in process of closing (1SW-39, 40, 274, 275 & 276) had stopped in mid-stroke and will resume closing stroke when power is restored.

T = 24 ESS begins Program B (LOCA/LOOP) T = 29.5 CFCs get start signal T = 35 ESW Pump breakers close. The start of the ESW Pump will begin to clear the void formed in

the ESW piping to Containment Fan Coolers AH-3 & AH-4 T = 36.5 CFCs fully accelerated; however, effectiveness of CFCs cannot be credited until ESW flow has

been obtained T = 39 ESW Pumps fully accelerated T = 46 SWBP breakers close T = 47.5 SWBPs fully accelerated T = 65.5 a. MOVs 1SW-270 & 1SW-271 fully open

b. MOVs 1SW-39, 40, 274, 275 & 276 fully closed T = 110 Two-phase condition cleared in ESW piping to AH-3 & AH-4. See Page A4 for details.

Attachment N OCR 511890-10 / 458376-20


Analyzed response time is 110 seconds from the time the mass and energy starts (break opens). (Note that the Containment analysis start timeline has a start that is 2 seconds before the scenario as shown above). Review of the LOCA and MSLB cases (HNP-M/MECH-1008) that have maximum pressure and temperature have been reviewed. For the LOCA cases the peak pressure and temperature occurs before the 110 seconds. The impact of the delay would be a fractional impact on the long term containment pressure/temperature transient. For MSLB the maximum temperature case is turned by the actuation of containment spray which occurs before 110s from the start of the break. For the peak pressure case, the maximum pressure occurs after 110s, but the pressure trend shows no inflection at the time for credit of the CFC and thus it is concluded that a small additional delay is not significant. The MSLB case is not the limiting peak pressure case. Notwithstanding this assessment the ALTRAN assessment that follows concludes that full credit for heat removal can be taken at 110s. ALTRAN has reviewed the impact of an additional 14 second drain-down time on the magnitude of column-closure water hammer (CCWH) and condensation-induced water hammer (CIWH) in the Containment Fan Cooler ESW piping. This evaluation is documented in ALTRAN Technical Report 12-1027-TR-001. The evaluation finds that the additional 14-second time delay for ESW pump start will not result in increased water hammer loads. Any water hammer resulting from a DGVR/LOCA will be bounded by the existing analyses of HNP-M/MECH-1014 and HNP-M/MECH-1018. Note – timeline constructed by System Engineering team member (based on EST-307 testing results of individual components) resulted in 60.5 seconds for Train A and 56.5 seconds for Train B which adds confidence to the above analytical timeline.

Attachment N OCR 511890-10 / 458376-20


Scenario 5 – Containment Spray

T = -2 Break occurs T = 0 a. Process parameter met for initiating SI signal

b. Degraded Grid Voltage occurs T = 1 Containment Hi-3 setpoint reached (3 seconds after actual pipe break) T = 2 a. SIAS occurs

b. EDGs receive start signal c. ESS Program C (LOCA) begins

T = 3 a. Containment Spray actuation signal occurs

b. Containment Spray Discharge MOVs 1CT-50 & 1CT-88 begin opening stroke T = 7.5 CSPs assumed to start T = 10.1 CSPs fully accelerated T = 12 EDGs ready to load (up to speed and voltage). T = 13 a. CS Discharge MOVs 1CT-50 & 1CT-88 reach full open position b. DGVR “13 second timer” Relay 2-1 times out / 86UV Lockout Relay actuates c. ESS 10 second timer SAB starts d. Emergency bus main and load breakers trip T = 14.5 EDG breaker closes T = 24 ESS begins Program B (LOCA/LOOP) T = 29.5 CSPs assumed to start T = 31.5 CSPs fully accelerated T = 64.6 Containment Spray reaches full flow at all nozzles.

Analyzed response time is 56.4 seconds (58.4 seconds from break opening) There is a deficit of 8.2 seconds. (Note that the Containment analysis start timeline has a start that is 2 seconds before the scenario as show above, thus total deficient is 8.2 seconds. The

significance is discussed below.

Attachment N OCR 511890-10 / 458376-20


Summary for impact on Containment Spray It is concluded that the impacts of the DGVR scenarios on the start of the Containment Spray Pumps and the effectiveness of the Containment Fan Coolers retains some margin between the limiting case(s) and design pressure and temperature for Containment. This conclusion is reached by assessing a penalty against the start of the Containment Spray Pump and examination of the limiting Containment temperature and pressure cases for MSLB and LOCA. In most cases no impact results because peak conditions occur before the actuation of these systems. In the case of the peak pressure for MSLB (currently non-limiting) a slightly higher result is projected, but the result is still bounded by the Containment design pressure.

Details of Assessment

With regard to the impacts on Containment pressure and temperature, the key inputs are the times when Containment Spray and Containment Fan Coolers are effective.

The analysis inputs are 58.4 seconds For Containment Spray and 110 seconds for Containment Fan Coolers. In the Containment analyses, Time T = 0 (T = -2 in above timeline) is the start of the mass energy release and there is a finite delay for the Containment pressure to build to the actuation setpoints for SI (Hi-1) and Containment Spray (Hi-3). The impacts of the DGVR scenario is to delay the Containment Spray Pump start and potentially delay the sweep out of two-phase fluid in the ESW lines to and from the Containment Fan Coolers. A review was performed of the MSLB and LOCA cases that perform the basis of the maximum temperature and pressure. Generally the LOCA cases result in peak pressures and temperatures that occur well before the start of the Containment Spray Pump and Containment Fan Coolers. For these cases, the delay would have a small negligible impact on the long term response of the Containment pressure and temperature. Response of the Containment Spray Pumps is divided into three parts: time to reach Hi-3 set point (~2 to 3 seconds), time for the pump to start (dependent on availability of offsite power) and time for the spray ring to fill. (33.1 seconds). The HI-3 set point is reached about 3 seconds after the break opens for the slowest pressure rise event that has near limiting consequences. Hi-3 is offset from Hi-1 (a signal that starts SI) by about 1 second. The spray pump would then start in LB2 and be subsequently stopped when the DGVR relay times out. The Containment Spray discharge valves would continue to travel to their fully open position when the EDG energized the MCCs. The first start of the spray pump (and opening of the discharge valves) allow some forced fill and then gravity fill of the spray header. The discharge header is normally assumed to be dry downstream of discharge valves 1CT-50 & 1CT-88 even though routine surveillance testing of these valves would allow some gravity filling. If the spray riser is at the level of the RWST, a credit of 4 seconds from the fill time can be applied (total fill time of 29.1 seconds). The second start of the spray pump is estimated to provide full flow at 31.5 seconds as shown above. This time combined with the analysis fill time of 33.1 seconds yields a total delay of 64.6 seconds Translated to the HNP-M/MECH-12008 timeline, this is 66.6 seconds. This time is 8.2 seconds longer than the time assumed in the analysis. Crediting the partial fill of the header yields an expected delivery time of 62.6 or an additional delay over the current analysis of 4.2 seconds. For MSLB case with maximum pressure (30% power double ended break) the peak pressure is 41.3 psig (FSAR Table 6.2.1-4)) 0.5 psig less than the peak LOCA pressure (DEHL break). The peak pressure occurs at 176.2 seconds (FSAR Table 6.2.4-1). This time is well after the expected start times of the spray pump and the Containment Fan Cooler. The graph of the Containment (HNP-M/MECH-1008, page 84) shows almost no inflection in the rate of pressure rise after the Containment Fan Cooler start. The start of the Containment Spray marks a clear change in trend. If the Containment Spray delivery is

Attachment N OCR 511890-10 / 458376-20


delayed by 4.2 seconds; it is conservatively estimated that the pressure increase would be about 1 psi higher when the spray initiated and this increase would an offset during the balance of the trend. The assessment of a 1 psi penalty is conservative relative to the rate of pressure rise immediately prior to the spray (calculated as 0.146 psi/s in the time interval between 50 and 55 seconds). This small increase does not consume the margin between the Containment design pressure (45 psi) and the base result for this case (41.3). For the MSLB peak temperature case, the actuation of Containment Spray turns the maximum Containment temperature (see HNP-M/MECH-1008 page 104 in the pdf file). To that point temperature is almost flat lining by review of the case output data (t > 54.0 s). Regardless of the delay in the Containment Spray Pump delivery the temperature has reached a maximum. Note – timeline constructed by System Engineering team member (based on EST-309 testing results of individual components) resulted in 30.6 seconds for Train A and 30.2 seconds for Train B which adds confidence to the above analytical timeline.

Attachment N OCR 511890-10 / 458376-20


Attachment O Calculation E2-0005.09 Accident Timelines Page O1, R4

Accident Timelines

The five scenarios being evaluated are based upon simultaneous occurrence of an accident (e.g., RCS pipe break) and initiation of the DGVR “SI timer” (i.e. immediately following Degraded Grid Voltage Relay 2/3 logic being satisfied). This is consistent with the methodology used to evaluate equipment response to a simultaneous “LOCA/LOOP”. Sustained bus voltage below the DGVR dropout setting means that 6.9kv emergency bus voltage could be anywhere between the LOOP undervoltage relay dropout setting and DGVR dropout setting. The LOOP undervoltage relay dropout setting helps ensure that safety-related motor terminal voltages will be at or above 75% of nameplate rated voltage. Safety related motors were procured to be capable of starting at 75% of nameplate voltage and running for a minimum of 60 seconds at 75% of nameplate voltage. For this reason, it is assumed that safety related motors will successfully start and run even if the bus voltage is “degraded”. It is conservatively assumed that the CSIP, RHR, AFW, CS & CFC motors are at 75% terminal voltage during starting (to determine longest acceleration time) during initial sequencing, i.e. while the emergency bus is on the degraded offsite power source. Following is the overall timeline for SI actuated equipment (for Containment HI-3 / Phase B Signal for the Containment Spray Pump scenario) with DGVR Relay 2-1 “timing out” at 13.3 seconds. The 13.3 second value has been identified as the maximum acceptable time delay through an iterative process . This value includes a small amount of margin to account for the possibility of changes to the accident analyses or plant design/performance. A 10% tolerance has been added to all Sequencer timing relays (and all in an “additive” direction for conservatism). For initial sequencing of loads (onto the “degraded” offsite source), the “75% of nameplate voltage” acceleration time is used for conservatism. For re-sequencing of loads from the EDG supplied bus, a slightly shorter acceleration time is used since the EDG voltage regulator will be restoring the bus voltage to 6900vac (nominally) within a short time frame. The timelines below differ from those contained in OCR 458376 (Attachment N) for the following reasons:

1. EC 84101 proposes to bypass the SAB 10 second timer for a concurrent degraded voltage and safety injection actuation signal. The results of this calculation and the timelines in this Attachment are dependent upon EC 84101 being implemented as currently planned.

2. The pressure in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is too high for the Residual Heat Removal Pump to inject sufficient flow to the RCS to actuate the “hi” flow switch and send a close signal to the RHR mini flow valves (1RH-31 and 1RH-69) until after the


degraded voltage relay “w SIAS” time delay relay has timed out. This prevents cycling of these valves as anticipated in the OCR time lines. [Assumption 4.3.2.e]

3. The degraded voltage relays drop out and the timing relays begin timing at the same time the accident “event” occurs (e.g., RCS pipe break), rather than when the setpoint for the process parameter (e.g., low pressurizer pressure) is reached. This approach is consistent with the UFSAR Chapter 15 accident analysis for events assuming a concurrent Loss of Offsite Power.

4. EC 84101 proposes to increase the time delay for relay PGSA (PGSB) from 1.5 to 2.5 seconds. This value ensures the loads fed from 480V Bus Sections 1A2-SA and 1B2-SB are tripped by the undervoltage relaying associated with these bus sections prior to the EDG breaker closing and restoring power to the bus.

The time lines below assume a maximum time delay of 13.3 seconds for the “w SIAS” time delay relays 2-1. This value has been identified as the upper analytical limit. Values shown are in seconds. Seconds T = 0 a. Pipe Break occurs

b. Degraded Grid Voltage occurs (6.9kv emergency bus voltage falls below setpoint, 2/3 logic is met and “SI Timer” Relay 2-1 begins timing) [References 2.3 and 2.5]

T = 0.4 Low Pressurizer pressure parameter met for initiating SI (shortest time

between pipe break and Pressurizer low pressure parameter being met) [Reference 2.48]

T = 2.4 a. SIAS occurs 2 seconds after SI parameter has been met

considering signal processing time (Relays K-609 and/or K-635 pickup) [Assumption 4.3.2.f]

b. EDGs receive start signal due to SIAS (even though offsite power is still available) [Reference 2.52]

c. ESS Program C (LOCA) begins due to SIAS (note - previously running safety-related loads do not trip) [Reference 2.49]

d. LB 1 breakers (including CSIP) close immediately since there is no time delay for the LB 1 initiating relays [References 2.50 and 2.51]

e. SIAS initiated MOVs begin to stroke initiated by K603 1. 1SI-3 & 4 and 1CS-182, 196, 210, 214, 235 & 238

[References 2.53 through 260]. 2. 1SW-270 & 271 (62s stroke) OPEN stroke initiated by K608.

[References 2.61 & 2.62] 3. 1SW-39, 40, 274, 275 & 276 (62s stroke) CLOSE stroke

initiated by K609. [References 2.61 through 2.67]


f. Alternate mini-flow valves begin to stroke open (10 second stroke time) [References 2.77 -2.79]

T = 3 Process parameter met for initiating Containment Hi-3 setpoint [Assumption 4.3.2.g]

T = 5 a. Containment Spray Actuation Signal occurs [Assumption 4.3.2.f]

b. Containment Spray discharge MOVs CT-50 & CT-88 begin 10 second OPEN stroke (References 2.68 and 2.69]

T = 6.4 CSIPs fully accelerated. Per Calculation E-6000, Table A4-3 [Reference

2.17], CSIPs accelerate in 1.5 seconds at rated voltage and 4 seconds at 75% of rated voltage. 4 seconds acceleration time assumed for conservatism since bus voltage is degraded.

T = 7.9 a. RHR Pump, Containment Fan Cooler and other LB 2 breakers

close (5 second timer with 0.5 second tolerance). [Reference 2.70 and 2.71]

b. CSP assumed to start (blocked from starting in LB 1 & LB3 / initiated by SSPS, not Sequencer). Assumed to start in LB 2 based upon worst-case accident profile. [Reference 2.72]

T = 9.8 a. RHR Pumps fully accelerated. Per Calculation E-6000, Table A4-3,

RHR Pumps accelerate in 0.8 seconds at rated voltage and 1.86 seconds at 75% of rated voltage. 1.9 seconds acceleration time assumed for conservatism since bus voltage degraded. Note - full RHR flow is not achieved until RHR mini-flow valves 1RH-31 and 1RH-69 stroke towards the closed position. Based upon the results of EST-301 (Reference 2.76), two seconds of stroke time will allow the RHR system to meet flow requirements. 2.6 seconds will be used for conservatism. These valves start their stroke based on pump output flow, not on SIAS or Sequencer and have a 10 second stroke time. Per Assumption 4.3.2.e, the RCS pressure is too high for the RHR pump to deliver sufficient flow to the RCS to actuate the hi flow switches that start the RHR mini flow valves. Therefore, these valves remain open.

T = 10.5 CSP fully accelerated. Per Calculation E-6000, Table A4-3, CSP Pumps

accelerate in 0.95 seconds at rated voltage and in 2.56 seconds at 75% of rated voltage. For conservatism, 2.6 seconds will be used for the acceleration time.

T = 12.4 a. Safety Injection MOVs fully stroked open (10 second stroke

time)[References 2.77 and 2.78]. b. EDGs ready to load (i.e. up to speed and voltage) – got start signal

2.4 seconds into event. PS-34A1 contact in EDG breaker closing


circuit closes (CWD Sheet 1701). Breaker does not close since 86UV undervoltage lockout relay has not sensed loss of bus voltage and also 2.5 second Timer PG contact has not closed.

c. Alternate mini-flow MOVs full open. Valve will have a close signal due to low RCS pressure w/SIAS signal by this time, but no credit is taken for the valve closing prior to the degraded voltage relay timing out.

d. ESW and other LB3 motors start, but will not completely accelerate before DGVR relay timer 2-1 times out (start signal may come anytime between 11.4 and 13.4 seconds based on 10 second ± 1 second timer) [Reference 2.70] The potential for an ESW pump “bump” was reviewed by Mechanical Design Engineering with consultation from Altran. Altran performed the original ESW GL 96-06 water hammer analysis for HNP found in HNP-M/MECH-1014 as well as the evaluation of a 14-second ESW Pump delay (12-1027-TR-001R0) referenced in OCR 458376. According to Altran Report No. 11-0275-TR-001 Rev.0 (see HNP-M/MECH-1014 Rev.3, Page 183/561), the CFC supply-side column closure time is 5 seconds and the return-side column closure time is approximately 10 seconds. If the initial void volume is equal to the worst-case (maximum) volume assumed in the Altran analysis, then a starting duration of approximately 2 seconds will only serve to partially fill the voided pipe and will not result in a water hammer. Even if the pipe were not voided to the limiting extent assumed by the analysis, any water hammer resulting from a 2-second pump start and shutdown would be clearly bounded by the current analysis due to the smaller void size and the reduced momentum caused by an early pump shutdown. (Per calculation E-6000, Table A4-3, the ESW pumps accelerate in 2.25 seconds at 100% rated voltage and 5.9 seconds at 75% rated voltage.)

T = 13.3 a. DGVR “SI timer” Relay 2-1 times out “rolling” the 86UV under-

voltage lockout relay [Reference 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7] 1. trips Emergency Bus main breaker and feeder breakers

except for the breakers supplying 480V Power Center 1A2-SA/1B2-SB

2. sends start signal to EDGs, however, they are already running for this scenario

3. Drops out time delay on dropout (2.5 seconds) relay PG/SA (PG/SB) [CWD Sheet 1731]

4. Drops out time delay on dropout (1 second) relay TC to reset the sequencer logic

5. sends close signal to EDG breaker (CWD Sheet 1701) however, breaker will not close until Relay PG “times out” (another 2.5 seconds after 86UV “rolls”).


6. energizes ESS 10 second timer SAB (CWD Sheet 1102); however the SAB relay is bypassed in this scenario

7. “de-energizes” ESS Program C (LOCA) to re-set the Sequencer (CWD Sheet 1703)

8. SW MOVs in process of opening (1SW-270 & 271) will stop in mid-stroke and will resume opening when power is restored. [References 2.61 and 2.62]

9. SW MOVs in process of closing (1SW-39, 40, 274, 275 & 276) will stop in mid-stroke and will resume closing when power is restored. [References 2.63 through 2.67]

10. Containment Spray discharge MOVs 1CT-50 & 1CT-88 stop in mid stroke and will resume opening when power is restored.[References 2.68 and 2.69]

T=15.7 Undervoltage relays for 480V Power Centers 1A2-SA/1B2-SB trip load

circuit breakers (RHR, containment spray, and service water booster pumps). The exact time is variable and dependent upon bus voltage at the time of the degraded voltage relay time delay pickup. The pumps are assumed to be tripped here to maximize the time line. [Assumption 4.3.2.h]

T = 15.8 a Emergency Diesel Generator breaker closes 2.5 seconds after

86UV undervoltage lockout relay actuation (due to Relay PG timing out) re-energizing the 6.9kv emergency bus. [CWD Sheet 1701]

b. 86UV undervoltage lockout relay resets as soon as the EDG breaker closes. [Reference 2.6]

c. ESS begins Program B (LOCA/LOOP) [Reference 2.73] d. LB 1 breakers (including CSIP breakers) close since there is no

time delay for the LB 1 initiating relays. [Reference 2.70] T = 16.3 a. ½ second delay after re-energization of the 6.9kv emergency bus

by the EDG at T = 15.8 seconds, the Emergency Bus breaker supplying Bus 1A3-SA/1B3-SB (MCCs) closes [Reference 2.74]

b. Alternate mini-flow MOVs begin to stoke close (10 second stroke). Valves are fed from Bus 1A3-SA/1B3-SB and will begin to close immediately after power is restored.

T=18.8 CSIPs fully accelerated. Per Calculation E-6000, Table A4-3, CSIPs

accelerate in 1.5 seconds at rated voltage and in 4 seconds at 75% of rated voltage. Three seconds acceleration time assumed for conservatism even though bus voltage should be near nominal due to the EDG voltage regulator. Full flow is not achieved until mini-flow valves complete their close stroke.


T=21.3 a. RHR Pump, Containment Fan Cooler and other LB 2 breakers close (5 second timer with 0.5 second tolerance). [Reference 2.70 and 2.71]

b. CSP assumed to start (blocked from starting in LB 1 & LB3 / initiated by SSPS, not Sequencer) [Reference 2.72]

T = 22.8 a. RHR Pumps fully accelerated. Per Calculation E-6000, Table A4-3,

RHR Pumps accelerate in 0.8 seconds at rated voltage and 1.86 seconds at 75% of rated voltage. 1.5 seconds acceleration time assumed for conservatism even though bus voltage should be near nominal due to the EDG voltage regulator. Note - full RHR flow is not achieved until RHR mini-flow valves 1RH-31 and 1RH-69 stroke towards the closed position. Based upon the results of EST-301, two seconds of stroke time will allow the RHR system to meet flow requirements (value inferred from EST-301 response of between 2.8 and 3.5s from pump start to rated flow). Three (3) seconds will be used for conservatism. These valves start their stroke based on pump output flow, not on SIAS or Sequencer and have a 10 second stroke time.

b. MOVs 1RH-31 & 1RH-69 begin to stroke closed. T = 23.3 CSP fully accelerated. Per Calculation E-6000, Table A4-3, CSP Pumps

accelerate in 0.95 seconds at rated voltage and in 2.56 seconds at 75% of rated voltage. 2 seconds will be used for the acceleration time since bus voltage should be near nominal due to the EDG voltage regulator. Note – there will be a 33.1 second delay before full flow at nozzles occurs.[Reference 2.75]

T=25.8 1RH-31 & 1RH-69 closed enough to meet RHR flow requirements

[Reference 2.76] T=26.3 Alternate mini-flow valves completely closed and CSIP flow

requirements met T=26.8 ESW Pump and other LB 3 breakers close (ten second timer with 1

second tolerance). The start of the ESW Pump will begin to clear the void formed in the ESW piping to Containment Fan Coolers AH-3 & AH-4. [References 2.70 and 2.71]

T = 28.3 CFCs fully accelerated. Per Calculation E-6000, Table A4-3, CFCs

accelerate in 5.58 seconds at rated voltage and 8.07 seconds at 75% of rated voltage. Seven seconds acceleration time assumed for conservatism even though bus voltage should be near nominal due to the EDG voltage regulator. However, effectiveness of CFCs cannot be credited until ESW flow has cleared voiding in the supply piping to the CFCs and downstream piping is clear of “two-phase” fluid.


T = 30.8 ESW Pumps fully accelerated. Per Calculation E-6000, Table A4-3, ESW Pumps accelerate in 2.25 seconds at rated voltage and 5.9 seconds at 75% of rated voltage. Four seconds acceleration time assumed for conservatism even though bus voltage should be near nominal due to the EDG voltage regulator.

T = 32.3 LB 4 load breakers close (15 second timer with 1.5 second

tolerance).[References 2.70 and 2.71] T = 37.8 AFW Pump, SWBP and other LB 5 load breakers close (20 second

timer with 2 second tolerance) [References 2.70 and 2.71] T = 39.3 SWBPs fully accelerated [Reference 2.17] T = 43.8 AFW Pumps fully accelerated. Per Calculation E-6000, Table A4-3, AFW

Pumps accelerate in 2.7 seconds at rated voltage and 8.00 seconds at 75% of rated voltage. Six seconds acceleration time assumed for extreme conservatism even though bus voltage should be near nominal due to the EDG voltage regulator

T = 56.4 Containment Spray reaches full flow at spray nozzles in Containment

(33.1 second delay from when CS Pump has fully accelerated). [Reference 2.75]

T = 67.4 a. MOVs 1SW-270 & 1SW-271 fully open

b. MOVs 1SW-39, 40, 274, 275 & 276 fully closed

T < 110 ESW flow to CFCs has reached rated conditions (CFC downstream piping “two-phase” conditions are cleared. Reference 2.80 determined that two phase flow is cleared for the LOOP/LOCA scenario at 100.5 seconds from the SIAS/LOSP signals (102.9 seconds from the pipe break). Reference 2.81 considers a 14 second delay in both ESW pump start and 1SW-39 (40) valve closure beyond the LOOP/LOCA timeline (i.e., from 25 to 39 seconds) and concludes that clearing of two phase flow is also delayed 14 seconds. In this timeline, ESW pump full acceleration is only delayed by 5.8 seconds and the 1SW-39 (40) valve closes earlier than in the Reference 2.80 analyses. Delaying the closing of valve 1SW-39 (40) in the calculation results in more flow directed through the NSW system and less flow through the ESW system, which is conservative for the evaluation of the CFC flow reestablishment and the CFC performance. From these references, it can be concluded that establishment of full ESW flow to the CFCs is less than 102.9+5.8 = 108.7s. Adding 1 second for relay/breaker response time (Assumption 4.3.2.c) results in a 109.7 second response time.


Scenario 1 – High Head Safety Injection Seconds T = 0 a. Pipe Break occurs

b. Degraded Grid Voltage occurs

T = 0.4 Process parameter for SI met T = 2.4 a. SIAS occurs

b. EDGs receive start signal c. ESS Program C (LOCA) begins d. CSIP breaker closes e. SIAS initiated MOVs start to reposition (1SI-3 & 4 and 1CS-182,

196, 210, 214, 235 & 238) f. Alternate mini flow valves begin open stroke T = 6.4 CSIPs fully accelerated T = 12.4 a. Safety Injection MOVs fully stroked open

b. EDGs ready to load c. Alternate mini-flow valves full open T = 13.3 a. DGVR “SI timer” Relay 2-1 times out/86UV under-voltage lockout

relay trips 1. Emergency Bus main breaker and feeder breakers trip 2. energizes ESS 10 second timer SAB (CWD Sheet 1102);

however the SAB relay is bypassed in this scenario 3. sends start signal to EDGs, however, they are already

running for this scenario 4. Drops out time delay on dropout (2.5 seconds) relay PG/SA

(PG/SB) [CWD Sheet 1731] 5. Drops out time delay on dropout (1 second) relay TC to reset

the sequencer logic 6. sends close signal to EDG breaker (CWD Sheet 1701)

however, breaker will not close until Relay PG “times out” (another 2.5 seconds after 86UV “rolls”).


T = 15.8 a Emergency Diesel Generator breaker closes

b. ESS begins Program B (LOCA/LOOP) c. CSIP breaker closes


T = 16.3 Emergency Bus breaker supplying Bus 1A3-SA/1B3-SB (MCCs) closes after ½ second delay and alternate mini-flow valves begin to stroke closed.

T=18.8 CSIPs fully accelerated T = 27.3 Alternate mini-flow valves (10 second stroke) full closed and CSIP flow

requirements met (1 second added to total response time to account for relay/breaker response time per Assumption 4.3.2.c)

Analyzed response time is 29 seconds.


Scenario 2 - Low Head Safety Injection Seconds T = 0 a. Pipe Break occurs



b. EDGs receive start signal c. ESS Program C (LOCA) begins due to SIAS (note – no “injection”

MOVs are required to reposition for RHR since all are normally open)

T = 7.9 RHR Pump breaker closes

T = 9.8 RHR Pumps fully accelerated. RHR miniflow valves do not close

because RCS pressure is too high to allow RHR flow above hi setpoint T = 12.4 EDG ready to load T = 13.3 DGVR “SI timer” Relay 2-1 times out /86UV under-voltage lockout relay

trips 1. Emergency Bus main breaker and feeder breakers trip








T=15.7 Undervoltage relays for 480V Power Centers 1A2-SA/1B2-SB trip RHR

pump breaker. The exact time is variable and dependent upon bus voltage at the time of the degraded voltage relay time delay pickup. The


pumps are assumed to be tripped here to maximize the timeline. [Assumption 4.3.2.h]


b. ESS begins Program B (LOCA/LOOP)

T = 16.3 Emergency Bus breaker supplying Bus 1A3-SA/1B3-SB (MCCs) closes after ½ second delay

T=21.3 a. RHR Pump breaker closes

T = 22.8 a. RHR Pumps fully accelerated b. MOVs 1RH-31 & 1RH-69 begin to stroke closed T=26.8 1RH-31 & 1RH-69 closed enough to meet RHR flow requirements (value

includes 1 second additional to account for relay/circuit breaker time response per assumption 4.3.2.c.

Analyzed response time is 37 seconds.


Scenario 3 – Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater

Seconds T = 0 a. Pipe Break occurs



b. EDGs receive start signal c. ESS Program C (LOCA) begins due to SIAS (note – no valves are

required to reposition for AFW since all are normally in the correct position)

T = 12.4 EDG ready to load T = 13.3 DGVR “SI timer” Relay 2-1 times out /86UV under-voltage lockout relay

trips 1. Emergency Bus main breaker and feeder breakers trip 2. energizes ESS 10 second timer SAB (CWD Sheet 1102);

however the SAB relay is bypassed in this scenario 3. sends start signal to EDGs, however, they are already

running for this scenario 4. Drops out time delay on dropout (2.5 seconds) relay PG/SA

(PG/SB) [CWD Sheet 1731] 5. Drops out time delay on dropout (1 second) relay TC to reset

the sequencer logic 6. sends close signal to EDG breaker (CWD Sheet 1701)

however, breaker will not close until Relay PG “times out” (another 2.5 seconds after 86UV “rolls”).




T = 37.8 AFW Pump breakers close T = 44.8 AFW Pumps fully accelerated and system at full flow. Value includes 1

second additional time to account for relay/breaker response time per Assumption 4.3.2.c (As stated previously, there are no MOVs to reposition since all are normally open).

Analyzed response time is 61.5 seconds


Scenario 4- Containment Fan Coolers



T = 0.4 Process parameter met T = 2.4 a. SIAS occurs

b. EDGs receive start signal c. ESS Program C (LOCA) begins due to SIAS e. SIAS initiated MOVs begin to stroke initiated by K603

1. 1SW-270 & 271 (62s stroke) OPEN stroke initiated by K608. [References 2.61 & 2.62]

2. 1SW-39, 40, 274, 275 & 276 (62s stroke) CLOSE stroke initiated by K609. [References 2.61 through 2.67]

T = 7.9 CFC get start signal, but do not fully accelerate before power is lost

T = 12.4 EDG ready to load T = 13.3 DGVR “SI timer” Relay 2-1 times out /86UV under-voltage lockout relay









8. SIAS initiated MOV stroke suspended until power restored T=15.7 Undervoltage relays for 480V Power Centers 1A2-SA/1B2-SB trip

Service Water Booster Pump breaker. The exact time is variable and dependent upon bus voltage at the time of the degraded voltage relay


time delay pickup. The pump is assumed to be tripped here to maximize the timeline. [Assumption 4.3.2.h]



T = 16.3 Emergency Bus breaker supplying Bus 1A3-SA/1B3-SB (MCCs) closes after ½ second delay. SIAS initiated MOVs resume stroke.

T=21.3 CFCs get start signal T=26.8 ESW Pump breaker closes. The start of the ESW Pump will begin to

clear the void formed in the ESW piping to Containment Fan Coolers AH-3 & AH-4

T = 28.3 CFCs fully accelerated; however, effectiveness of CFCs cannot be

credited until ESW flow has been obtained T = 30.8 ESW Pumps fully accelerated T = 37.8 SWBP breakers closed T = 39.3 SWBPs fully accelerated T = 67.4 a. MOVs 1SW-270 & 1SW-271 fully open

b. MOVs 1SW-39, 40, 274, 275 & 276 fully closed T < 110 “Two-phase” condition cleared in ESW piping to CFCs. Value includes 1

second additional time to account for relay/breaker response time per Assumption 4.3.2.c

Analyzed response time is 110 seconds from the time the mass and energy starts (break opens).


Scenario 5 – Containment Spray



T = 0.4 Process conditions for SI met T = 2.4 a. SIAS occurs

b. EDGs receive start signal c. ESS Program C (LOCA) begins

T = 3 Process parameter met for initiating Containment Hi-3 setpoint (3s after

break occurs) T = 5 a. Containment Spray Actuation Signal occurs

b. Containment Spray discharge MOVs CT-50 & CT-88 begin 10 second OPEN stroke

T = 7.9 CSPs assumed to start

T = 10.5 CSP fully accelerated. T = 12.4 EDGs ready to load T = 13.3 DGVR “SI timer” Relay 2-1 times out /86UV under-voltage lockout relay










8. Containment Spray discharge MOVs 1CT-50 & 1CT-88 stop in

mid stroke (almost full open) and will resume opening when power is restored.

T=15.7 Undervoltage relays for 480V Power Centers 1A2-SA/1B2-SB trip

Containment Spray Pump breaker. The exact time is variable and dependent upon bus voltage at the time of the degraded voltage relay time delay pickup. The pump is assumed to be tripped here to maximize the timeline. [Assumption 4.3.2.h]



T = 16.3 Emergency Bus breaker supplying Bus 1A3-SA/1B3-SB (MCCs) closes allowing Containment Spray Discharge MOVs to complete their stroke open.

T=18.0 Containment Spray Discharge MOVs 1CT-50 & 1CT-88 fully open.

Exact time is not important since CSP pumps do not start for an additional 3.3 seconds.

T=21.3 CSP assumed to start

T = 23.3 CSP fully accelerated T = 57.4 Containment Spray reaches full flow at spray nozzles in Containment

(33.1 second delay from when CS Pump has fully accelerated). Value includes 1 additional second to account for relay/breaker response time per Assumption 4.3.2.c)

Analyzed response time is 58.4 seconds from pipe break

Documents

License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification Table 3.3-4 Degraded Voltage