List of Abbreviations...Tehelka, as one of India’s leading alternative political newsweeklies makes a good comparison. John Elliott, currently a reporter with the Financial Times,

An Investigation of Alternative and Mainstream Print Media in India – Tehelka and The Times of

India Respectively – in Depicting the 2008 Amarnath Land Transfer Controversy in Kashmir

Natasha Somji

Thesis submitted for partial fulfilment for the degree of BACHELOR OF ARTS in DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

Development Studies

Brown University

April 16, 2010

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ABSTRACT This thesis sets out to compare and contrast the representation of the 2008 Amarnath land transfer controversy in Kashmir in alternative and mainstream news sources in India – Tehelka and The Times of India respectively. The main hypothesis that came about through investigating previous studies of alternative and mainstream news sources suggests that mainstream media, in the form of The Times of India, should serve as a polarising function through two means: victimising the self and demonising the other, and leaving silences in reporting. Alternative media, on the other hand, should serve to combat this linear representation of the conflict; thus Tehelka should fill silences by reporting on many different angles of the conflict and including a range of actors on both sides and should thereby be equally critical of all actors involved. The methodology used within this study was content analysis of thematic coverage – articles written throughout the course of the conflict – and discourse analysis of episodic coverage – articles surrounding periods of intense conflict. Within these two methodologies, different categories were observed: in content analysis, the categories were problem identification, attribution and victimisation, evaluation and prescription; in discourse analysis, the categories were headlines and leads, generalisation and specificity, level of certitude and literary techniques. Each article was examined according to these categories. It was found that while Tehelka did conform to the hypothesis about alternative media in representing situations of ethnic conflict, The Times of India conformed to the hypothesis about mainstream media to a lesser degree. In particular, both sources are critical of the Government of India, however Tehelka is much more open about its criticism than The Times of India. The results from this study have implications for the way in which readers interpret media in framing ethnic conflict, urging the audience to be more critical of representations within media sources and the ways in which this may be internalised.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS My sincere gratitude to the following people without whom this would not have been possible: Stephen Groening, Primary Advisor for going through multiple drafts of my thesis in excruciating detail. For being incredibly accessible both in-person and via email and responding to ‘crisis’ emails at odd hours telling me I had nothing to worry about. For answering all my questions, however minuscule and ridiculous they may have been. Professor Marcy Brink-Danan, Second Reader for offering insightful comments and relevant feedback and for the encouragement to get through this. Cornel Ban for his painstaking effort and dedication toward ensuring that this final product was of top quality. For being the most motivational person I know. For the support at all times and being the recipient of those occasional ‘crisis’ emails as well. For the constructive feedback that was extremely helpful in the writing process. For the wealth of knowledge that I had the privilege of accessing and someone I would like to emulate one day. For being a role model. And of course, my family without whom I would not be here, the wonderful Development Studies Class of ’10 for all the support and sticking this out, the entire Development Studies Program, all the wonderful faculty at Brown that I had the pleasure of interacting with throughout this process (Professor James Der Derian in particular for his relentless support in helping me find an advisor) and last, but certainly not least, my friends (particularly Sajjad Hasan for taking time out to read through my thesis in so much detail and for his insightful feedback) and suitemates for getting me through the worst of it. I am humbled by you all.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Abbreviations 1 Chapter One 2 Research Question Case Selection Value of Findings Literature Review Hypothesis and Observable Implications Methodology and Data

Chapter Two 18 History of Conflict in Kashmir Jammu & Kashmir Today 2008 Amarnath Land Transfer Controversy

Chapter Three 31 Tehelka Related to Literature Review Content Analysis Discourse Analysis Discussion of Results

Chapter Four 45 The Times of India Related to Literature Review Content Analysis Discourse Analysis Discussion of Results

Chapter Five 60 Comparing Coverage Within The Times of India and Tehelka Value of Findings Suggestions for Further Research

Works Cited 69 Appendices 75 Appendix A 75 Appendix B 76 Appendix C 77 Appendix D 78 Appendix E 79 Appendix F 80 Appendix G 82 Appendix H 84 Appendix I 85 Appendix J 87 Appendix K 89

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS Abbreviation Full Form AFSPA Armed Forces Special Powers Act APHC All Parties Hurriyat Conference AYSS Amarnath Yatra Sangharsh Samiti BSF Border Security Forces BJP Bharatiya Janata Party CM Chief Minister CRPF Central Reserve Police Force GOI Government of India INC Indian National Congress J&K Jammu & Kashmir JKLF Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front LOC Line of Control PDP People’s Democratic Party SASB Shri Amarnath Shrine Board VHP Vishva Hindu Parishad

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CHAPTER ONE Introduction During May to August 2008, the state of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) in India was yet again thrown into upheaval as protestors took to the streets in both Hindu-dominated Jammu and Muslim-majority Kashmir. This time, the conflict was based in religious politics – the Government of India (GOI) ordered a transfer of a significant portion of Kashmiri land for the purposes of a Hindu pilgrimage – the Amarnath yatra. The order added another layer and sparked new controversy to the already contentious Kashmiri politics. The media played a key role in documenting the Amarnath land transfer controversy. The representations of the conflict in mainstream and alternative media sources within India have been quite different. While some research exists that investigates the role of mainstream and alternative media in situations of ethnic conflict, this literature rarely offers a comparative framework within which to view these media sources. Thus, this thesis hopes to fill in the gap in the literature by comparing the roles of mainstream and alternative media in representing contentious politics. As noted by Maxwell McCombs, the media frames knowledge in a way that may have a significant effect on public opinion.1

Especially in a contentious political setting where views are often polarised between religious groups, it is important to investigate the framing mechanisms to understand how media may contribute to conflict.

Research Question How does mainstream print media – in this case the The Times of India – compare with alternative print media – specifically the newsweekly Tehelka – in the representation of the 2008 Amarnath land transfer controversy in Kashmir? More specifically, how does print media frame the conflict and represent different actors involved in Kashmir, Jammu and in Delhi? How does each source categorise events and diagnose the controversy? What media frames does each source use to express its point of view? Finally, if, indeed, alternative media serves to provide unconventional opinions that contest that of the mainstream, how divergent are the views in Tehelka? This thesis seeks to answer these questions by investigating the representation of the 2008 Amarnath land transfer controversy within The Times of India and Tehelka. There are several definitions for alternative media – media that is financially independent from corporations and structurally unique; media that represents disenfranchised voices within civil society and thereby promotes a radical political agenda; and media that is alternative based upon self-reporting, where a journalist defines his / her own vision as one that contests the mainstream.2 The one I will use here is specific to Tehelka and similar to that of Oren Meyers in his analysis of an alternative newspaper in Israel – as one that “challenge[s] [the] notions of what journalism is ‘supposed’ to be”3

. There are two main criteria that emerge from this that can be expected to be similar to Tehelka’s representation: 1) that of covering issues discussed in the mainstream in a different way or covering entirely different issues and 2) that of objectivity and balance by ensuring coverage from diverse angles, interviewing a range of people, and including all the sides of a debate or conflict. In contrast, mainstream media is defined as media that is well-known and widely read by people in the society it intends to cater to.

1 McCombs, Maxwell E. Setting the Agenda: the mass media and public opinion. Cambridge, UK: Blackwell Publishing Inc., 2004. 2 Meyers, Oren. Contextualizing Alternative Journalism: Haolam Hazeh and the birth of critical Israeli newsmaking. Journalism Studies. Vol. 6, No. 2, 2008. 3 Hindman, Elizabeth B. “Spectacles of the Poor”: Conventions of Alternative News. Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly. Vol. 75, No. 1, Spring 1998.

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In my research I will use the concept of media frames as defined by Robert Entman to understand the importance of representation in media. He states that, “[t]o frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation”4

. Thus media frames become evident in the analysis of selection of stories, the actors interviewed, and the way in which news is presented and can severely impact how individuals in civil society perceive certain occurrences.

Finally, a key term within the Kashmiri context and also relevant to the 2008 Amarnath land transfer controversy is that of separatism which will be defined as a desire for the region of Kashmir to break away from the Indian Union. While various scholars have argued where the basis of this desire stems from, the three leading theories are socioeconomic inequality compared to the rest of India, preserving a distinct cultural identity, and the contentious politics of oppression in the region.5

This will be elaborated upon in Chapter 2, providing necessary background on the history of politics in the region.

Case Selection My interest in India as a case study within which to examine ethnic conflict stems from my own ethnic background as an Indian. I have chosen to look particularly at the conflict in Kashmir because, upon visiting the region during the summer of 2008, I learnt, firsthand, about the complexities of the politics and wanted to continue studying the region. The Times of India is the largest mainstream newspaper in India.6 In order to address the research question and compare the representation of the 2008 Amarnath land transfer controversy in this mainstream outlet to an alternative source, it would be appropriate to select a national alternative newspaper. However, this does not exist in India; although there are several alternative newspapers, none of them are national and therefore may not discuss Kashmir. Thus, comparing The Times of India to a popular alternative newsweekly is a valid substitute. Tehelka, as one of India’s leading alternative political newsweeklies makes a good comparison. John Elliott, currently a reporter with the Financial Times, is confident that Tehelka fulfils its categorisation under alternative press: he describes alternative press in India as daring enough to criticise the government and quotes Tarun Tejpal, founder of Tehelka, as attempting to preserve the high level of journalism present in India’s history.7

I have chosen to look at print media in this study as this form of media has often been neglected with the advent of the age of technology. Yet, print media has not, as yet, become irrelevant; thus, it is important to continue examining the way in which it portrays ethnic conflict. In addition, the content within print media cannot be altered once it is printed and thus there is no chance of altering the way a certain article or issue is reported, making its content irreversible and thereby capturing the reactions and sentiments of the time. Value of Findings While there have been some studies investigating the role of print media in contentious politics, little attention has been paid to the representation of the situation in Kashmir within this type of media. In lieu of the unsuccessful attempts at conducting a plebiscite to assess the Kashmiri people’s desires regarding accession to India and the fact that few Kashmiri actors have been present in talks to resolve this

4 Entman, Robert M. Framing: Towards clarification of a fractured paradigm. Journal of Communication. Vol. 41, No. 4, 1993. 5 Widmalm, Sten. Kashmir in a Comparative Perspective: Democracy and Violent Separatism in India. London, UK: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002. 6 TOI Online is world’s No. 1 newspaper website. The Times of India. July 12, 2009. [Online] Available http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/NEWS-India-TOI-Online-is-worlds-No1-newspaper-website/articleshow/4769920.cms, January 21, 2010. 7 Elliott, John. Malign influences on India’s press from British Journalism Review, 2001.

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/NEWS-India-TOI-Online-is-worlds-No1-newspaper-website/articleshow/4769920.cms

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longstanding conflict, media represents one of the few existing venues through which Kashmiris can express themselves. Through protests and demonstrations, it is evident that the Kashmiri people are highly resistant to Indian rule.8

With little headway made toward a resolution, any factor that may alter this set-up should be given consideration. Thus it is imperative to investigate the role media may have in representing the controversy: it could allow readers to challenge their existing notions about the Kashmir conflict by presenting a different viewpoint from one that they have considered previously, or it could confirm and reinforce their opinions about the conflict by emphasising those elements that the reader already holds as true.

In addition, there have been few studies that offer a comparative perspective between the role of alternative and mainstream media in ethnic conflict; indeed, most studies only examine one of these media sources.9

Through this study, I hope to provide a comparative framework within which to examine alternative and mainstream media in political conflict. This will fill a gap in existing literature and provide a model for investigating these forms of media in other situations of political conflict. While it is important to recognise each political conflict as unique, the methods employed in this study are universal and can be replicated in other settings, enhancing the understanding of media’s role in politics and how it may contribute to ethnic conflict.

Finally, this study will have large implications for the way in which readers understand and interpret media, being more aware and critical of how a news source can represent or misrepresent a certain issue or actor. Particularly in situations of ethnic conflict, there can be a large degree of miscommunication among actors, an element that can be alleviated through media. Thus, in regarding the media critically, this study will offer a way for print media to be reformed or for certain practices to be expanded upon to achieve a fair representation of a conflict. Limitations It is important to recognise certain limitations that will exist in this study. In 2001, Elliott wrote about the state of India’s print media, describing mainstream print media as becoming increasingly less accurate and lacking investigative journalism. Although Elliott argues that “India’s print media is generally regarded as one of the most robust and free in the developing world” with “37,000 magazines and newspapers in 17 principal languages”10, he also claims that English newspapers are read by only a small minority of the population where more than one-third are illiterate and many do not speak English.11

Thus, in examining The Times of India and Tehelka in this study, I am only investigating what a small, English-speaking, and elite Indian population read.

I am comparing different layout structures and ideologies: The Times of India as a newspaper that serves to update readers on current events and Tehelka as a magazine that attempts to provide a more critical framework. In addition, I am not investigating the journalists’ intentions, the sponsors of each source, etc. Hence, I am not dealing with this aspect of media production, but limiting my study to examine what is printed and available for reading. I will also not be analysing pictures and will be working with the assumption that the content within the ePaper version of The Times of India and the online magazine of Tehelka reflect the printed versions of both sources.12

8 See Chapter 2 for background about the conflict and resistance from the people. 9 See Literature Review later in Chapter 1 that looks at the existing literature surrounding mainstream and alternative media in situations of ethnic conflict. 10 Elliott, John. Malign influences on India’s press from British Journalism Review, 2001. 11 Ibid. 12 The ePaper version of The Times of India is laid out in the same format as that of a newspaper, where readers can turn pages. The tehelka.com website contains a section titled ‘Web Exclusives’ and articles found within this were not included when retrieving articles relevant to the controversy.

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Finally, while I have attempted to survey a broad range of literature that relates to print media in situations of ethnic conflict, given the unfeasibility of accessing all documents that exist on this matter, there may be sources that I have missed. Therefore, while I believe the results from the studies to be generalisable, there may be exceptions and theories that I have not accounted for in this study. Structure of Report This research will be divided into five chapters. The rest of this introductory chapter will survey the existing literature surrounding alternative and mainstream print media’s involvement in ethnic conflict, as well as discuss the methodology and data that will employed in this study. Chapter 2 will provide background on the Kashmir conflict and highlight major events within the 2008 Amarnath land transfer controversy. Chapter 3 will summarise the findings when the methodology is applied to Tehelka, the alternative source being investigate. Chapter 4 will replicate this methodology on The Times of India, the largest mainstream print newspaper operating in India. Finally, Chapter 5 will offer a comparative analysis, summarising trends across the findings and provide concluding remarks. Literature Review Identity politics have long been the basis of wars and conflicts the world over. Often, this is driven by the politics of recognition, articulated well by Charles Taylor when he states that “our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others”13. Taylor argues that this may present a “confining or demeaning or contemptible picture” of a social group14, capturing well the Kashmiri sentiment and the demand for an autonomous nation: based on both what Kashmiris consider direct oppression by GOI and the need to recognise them as an identity distinct from that of the Indian identity, politics in Kashmir are also based on the politics of recognition.15

While there are many scholarly debates surrounding this aspect of Kashmiri politics, few sources examine the role of the media in the creation or propagation of ethnic identities in this region. Other studies make it clear that media has a large part to play: according to Jean Seaton, the media “often provide[s] the first, influential, definition of the social groups taking part in the conflicts”16

. Indeed, Seaton believes that media often acts as a sorting device, defining and solidifying categories within which it asks the readers to identify. Thus, in the context of the 2008 Amarnath land transfer controversy in Kashmir, it is important to examine the role of the media, particularly how it may construct different categories within which to view social groups – Muslims, Hindus, oppressor, oppressed, etc. – and thereby tell one story about the conflict.

However, while it is true that media plays a prominent role in framing identities, prior research that I have examined does not do a good job of distinguishing between the different kinds of media present, particularly with regards to mainstream and alternative print sources. Indeed, much of the time within past research, alternative media is defined primarily as sources that are available online mostly in the form of blogs and is rarely in the form of print media. However, the distinction between mainstream and alternative print media is important as each source may have different objectives and thus represent issues in vastly differing ways; if alternative media indeed serves to contest the mainstream, then it should offer diverse perspectives in the context of the Amarnath land transfer controversy. Furthermore, distinguishing between the types of media (e.g. print, broadcast, etc.) is important as they address very different audiences (literate versus illiterate; those who have access to newspapers versus those who do

13 Taylor, Charles. Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994. 14 Ibid. 15 Widmalm, Sten. Kashmir in a Comparative Perspective: Democracy and Violent Separatism in India. London, UK: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002. 16 Seaton, Jean. The New ‘Ethnic’ Wars and the Media from The Media of Conflict: War Reporting and Representations of Ethnic Violence. New York: St Martins Press, Inc., 1999.

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not, etc.); as the research question pertains to print media, for the rest of this literature review I will focus on the role of this type of media in ethnic conflicts. Because there is a dearth of literature examining the differing roles of mainstream and alternative media in ethnic conflicts, I cannot address this aspect directly. Instead, I will look at the way mainstream sources have framed ethnic identities and I will replicate this strategy with alternative sources, drawing upon my own analytical skills to assess the relation between these two kinds of media. Mainstream Media in Ethnic Conflicts There are two dominant views of how mainstream print media represents ethnic conflicts: the first suggests that it performs a peace-making function, attempting to bridge disagreements between distinct ethnic communities; the second, diametrically opposed to the first, claims that mainstream print media reinforces ethnic conflict by framing issues in a manner that polarises ethnic groups. Mainstream Media as a Peace-Making Function I will first examine mainstream media’s role in bridging differences. Brigitte Nacos and Oscar Torres-Reyna examine the role of print media in framing Muslim-Americans before and after the New York City attacks on September 11, 2001.17 Performing content analysis on the three largest US daily newspapers in Manhattan – the New York Times, New York Post and Daily News – and one mainstream national newspaper – USA Today – they find that post-September 11, there are more articles about Muslims, Arabs and Islam in these sources, and more positive than negative depictions of Muslim-Americans in the mainstream press both in total and when compared to pre-September 11 coverage. In fact, there were a rise of articles that discussed the “difficult life circumstances and identity problems of some American Muslims” and the need to understand Muslims as opposed to stereotyping them.18

Thus, this study found that mainstream print media served to encourage greater understanding of minority ethnic and religious identities, even while the ethnic conflict in question was believed to be propagated by Muslims.

Similarly, Cooke finds that in Northern Ireland, the mainstream press has helped to dispel the stereotypes about Protestants and Catholics both by not mentioning these labels and thereby not further dividing the religions, and by serving as the key instrument through which to bridge differences.19 Oftentimes portraying violence on the part of all paramilitary groups as negative, the press accurately reflected the disapproval of the government – whose main aim was to unify both religious groups and thereby dispel violence – and the community. In doing so, the press did not side with either Protestants or Catholics. It was noted that most of the population had access to more than one news source, even if particular newspapers catered to certain constituencies – thus, the media in Northern Ireland was different from most other sources in ethnic conflicts in that it was not “divided by language and [did not] speak to only one side of the conflict”.20

In this manner, mainstream print media in Northern Ireland served a peace-making function, helping identify commonalities between Protestant and Catholic communities.

However, while it is evident that mainstream media serves as a peace-making function in these two cases, this view has little relevance for the Amarnath land transfer controversy and the situation in Kashmir in general. Because the demands for separatism in Kashmir emerge out of a direct effect of policies emanating from India, Kashmiri demands are almost always directed at GOI; thus the first case study would be more valuable if it identified how US print sources depict Muslims in the Middle East, not just Muslim-Americans. With the emergence of terms like the ‘Axis of Evil’ in US politics, it is doubtful that US mainstream media would depict Muslims living in the Middle East positively. As for the second case study, while mainstream press in Northern Ireland may have served to bridge differences, this occurred 17 Nacos, Brigitte L. and Oscar Torres-Reyna. Framing Muslim-Americans Before and After 9/11 from Framing Terrorism: The News Media, the Government and the Public. New York: Routledge, 2003. 18 Ibid. 19 Cooke, Tim. Paramilitaries and the Press in Northern Ireland from Framing Terrorism: The News Media, the Government and the Public. New York: Routledge, 2003. 20 Ibid.

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only after the conflict was over; if and when the conflict in Kashmir ends, it would be interesting to investigate how mainstream media in both regions depict the issue and the solution, but, as it is still ongoing, the politics are still polarised. In addition, the mainstream print media in Northern Ireland is predicated on the fact that everyone has access to all sources and indeed practices this freedom of access; while in India it is true that the archives of both papers are online, not everyone may have Internet access, and not everyone speaks English or is literate and therefore most people, as noted by Elliott, are unable to read these newspapers. In addition, it may be predicted through the existence of special editions of papers for each state rather than an edition for the entire country, that most non-Kashmiri Indians are most interested in local politics than politics in other states. Finally, the conflict in Northern Ireland looked at ethnic violence within the same community; the Kashmiri conflict pertains to people living in different regions. Thus, the view that mainstream print media serves as a peace-making function building understanding across diverse ethnicities has little relevance for Kashmir. Mainstream Media as a Polarising Function The more dominant strand of discourse concerning the role of mainstream print media in the context of ethnic conflicts is that it has contributed to polarising identities, creating an exclusive identity for the ‘self’ in contrast to that of the ‘other’.21

According to the literature, there are many ways in which the media does this; the two that will be focused on here are 1) demonisation of the ‘other’ and victimisation of the ‘self’ and 2) construing facts by highlighting some aspects of the conflict and misreporting or silencing others. Before examining each of these individually, it should be noted that the same print media source may perform both of these functions.

Demonising the ‘Other’ and Victimising the ‘Self’ Some scholars claim that media in ethnic conflict serves to demonise the identity of the ‘other’ while constructing the ‘self’ as the victim. In doing so, mainstream media effectively dichotomises between two ethnic groups, making one seem worthy of sympathy while the other should be punished. Roza Tsagarousianou examines the role of media in Greece in establishing a sense of nationalism and creating ethnic antagonism among non-Greek populations.22 It was found that mainstream press had a tendency to portray Albanians as criminals, associating them with the mafia and creating an “atmosphere of terror and fear among the local population”23. In addition, when the perpetrator was Greek-Albanian they were always defined as ‘Albanian’ and always in conjunction with the word ‘criminal’ – thus they were “socially undesirable and dangerous”24

. In this manner, the mainstream media depicted the Greek identity as vulnerable and victim to the malicious acts of Albanians.

Spyros A. Sofos also proposes that this demonisation of the ‘other’ and the victimisation of the ‘self’ took place in a similar manner in Yugoslavia.25 In the 1980s in Serbia, “[t]he press featured articles in which Albanians, Croats, Slovenes, Muslims, the Vatican and the USA, were identified [...] as mortal enemies of the Serbian nation”26; thus, it was in the nation’s best interests to protect themselves from these ethnicities – they were the victims and non-Serbians the perpetrators. Mainstream press in Serbia paid much more attention to the rape of Serbian women by Albanian men, even though rapes of Albanian women by Serbian men also occurred frequently, thereby constructing Albanians as the ‘other’. These stories viewed the acts of Albanians as “premeditated attacks” against the Serbian nation and Serbians started defining themselves as victims of “genocide”27

21 Mutz, Diana C. How the Mass Media Divide Us from Red and Blue Nation? Characteristics and Causes of America’s Polarized Politics. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2006.

. Every time a story of rape came up against Serbian women, the sexual identity – that of women – was undermined in favour of a national identity –

22 Tsagarousianou, Roza. Nationalism, Ethnic Antagonism and Mass Communications in Greece from The Media of Conflict: War Reporting and Representations of Ethnic Violence. New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1999. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 Sofos, Spyros A. Culture, Media and the Politics of Disintegration and Ethnic Division in Former Yugoslavia from The Media of Conflict: War Reporting and Representations of Ethnic Violence. New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1999. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid.

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Serbian – to such a large extent that Serbians began to view Albanians as raping their nation.28

In this manner, the Serbian press was consciously describing themselves as the victims to this violent crime, while Albanians were depicted as rapists and therefore in the wrong. Through the Greek and Serbian examples then, it is evident that mainstream media serves to create a binary system of representation of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ – the former viewed as either the victim or superior, and the latter as the perpetrator – in this manner polarising ethnic identities.

Misrepresenting Facts – Highlighting Some Aspects, Misreporting / Silencing Others Another popular method that mainstream media uses to depict the polarisation of identities is through the presence of silences – not mentioning some key elements of the conflict to create a one-sided view in the mind of the reader that they see as the ‘true’ version of events. Again, according to research by Sopos, this was evident in the case of Serbian media, which polarised identities between Albanians and Serbs. While the media reported events, they did so in an “ultra-nationalist” fashion, and rumours were treated as facts that “needed no further investigation”.29

In this manner, information was either misreported or not mentioned at all, contributing to a one-sided perspective of the issue that seemed to be the ‘real’ story.

A similar tactic was noted to be used during Palestine’s second Intifada (uprising). Dor Danny found that in October 2000, mainstream “papers [in Israel] provided a one-sided, partial, censored, and biased picture of reality” and, by “suppress[ing] certain elements of reality and emphasiz[ing] and accentuat[ing] others”, they provided the “‘factual’ platform for the new narrative [that] has become ingrained in the Israeli collective consciousness ever since”.30

Thus, through misreporting facts and silencing certain elements of the conflict, the media was successful at representing only one view on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and any other version of the story was deemed untrue.

This version of events concerning the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was also dominant in the US according to a study conducted by Marda Dunsky.31 She found that the US mainstream print media published Israeli findings on the use of US aid in the region toward development projects such as the road construction, housing, military expenditures, etc. but none of these reports “questioned or implied a connection between Israeli settlement building and U.S. aid to Israel”.32 She claims that this is just one example – there were also silences about a range of other issues including the Palestinian refugee story, the violent spring of 2002, etc.33

Thus it is evident that US mainstream media adopted views similar to that of Israel’s in reporting the conflict, emphasising some aspects of it while silencing others to create a one-sided perspective. In all three examples – Serbia, Israel and the US – the mainstream print media sources, by only presenting one side of the story, effectively deny holistic reporting of the conflict and thereby represent their version of the facts as the ‘true’ one.

The examples used above have much more relevance for Kashmir than the first strand; the formation of a Greek community was based on both religious and ethnic elements and therefore it was predicated on the politics of exclusion. Furthermore, Greece is considered the larger, more dominant force than Albania. Similarly, Kashmiris have, for a long time, felt excluded from the dominant country of India both because of their religious identity and oppressive politics in the region. A parallel case was evident with Serbia, Albanians and Israel, the latter of which is arguably the most relevant case study to Kashmir. Although Palestine and Kashmir have different histories, both resulted in unwilling cohabitation with the more dominant power in their regions – Israel and India respectively – and both conflicts are based on religious and ethnic suppression brought about through colonisation. More tellingly, both Palestine and Kashmir

28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Dor, Danny. Intifada Hits the Headlines: How the Israeli Press Misreported the Outbreak of the Second Palestinian Uprising. Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2004. 31 Dunsky, Marda. Pens and Swords: How the American Mainstream Media Report the Israel-Palestinian Conflict. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid.

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want to establish their own nation-state as separate from the dominant countries that they are connected to, even if the manners in which they want this to occur are different – in Kashmir through secession and in Palestine through reclamation of land. Similar to Palestine, then, the GOI has attempted to retain Kashmir within the Indian Union; if mainstream media indeed caters to the national Indian population most of whom are non-Kashmiris, then they would logically side with the GOI and demonise the separatist attempts of the Kashmiris, portraying their resistance as unjustified. Thus, it would be expected that mainstream print media sources in India will attempt to polarise views and not serve a peace-making function. The manner in which they do this should be similar to the ones listed above: through the victimisation of the identity of the ‘self’ and demonisation of the ‘other’, and through the misconstruction of facts resulting in silences and misreporting. Alternative Media in Ethnic Conflicts It has been difficult to find studies that examine alternative print media in politically controversial situations and nearly impossible for how it pertains to ethnic conflict. Thus, I will only examine the former of these, analysing its applicability for situations of ethnic conflict. In particular, alternative media serves to provide a more complex representation of an issue through two methods: 1) by covering the same events as that in the mainstream in a different manner, and 2) by filling in the silences apparent in the mainstream by addressing that which is minimally covered or not covered. This section will look specifically at two alternative media sources – Aliran Monthly in Malaysia which is alternative in the first function, and Haolam Hazeh in Israel which performs the second function. Alternative Media as Representing Issues Found in Mainstream Media in a Different Manner In Malaysia where the mainstream press is heavily controlled by the government, the rise of alternative media presents an avenue in which to contest this opinion and present a more complex picture of similar events than the mainstream. Aliran Monthly is a magazine that attempts to do exactly this. It carries a “hostile tone toward the authorities”, has an agenda of “justice, freedom, and democratic rights” and presents “diverse dissenting viewpoints” 34, thereby taking into account different political standpoints within Malaysia and contextualising political events. In this manner, the alternative press aims to depict events present in the mainstream in a different manner. A prime example of this was when the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mahathir bin Mohamad, sacked the Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim. While mainstream sources presented this as a “brief chronology of events” without further analysis or comments, deeming the decision the “prime minister’s prerogative”, Aliran Monthly examined the developments that led to the dismissal, criticising the manner in which Anwar had been sacked and the mainstream media’s vilification of him before he had even been tried.35

In this manner, mainstream sources served to dichotomise the issue, presenting Mahathir as ‘right’ and Anwar as ‘wrong’, whereas alternative press provided a more rounded perspective, actively questioning the mainstream. Protests following this decision were portrayed by the mainstream as violent, “treacherous acts” that were incited by the opposition, and the police’s brutal response was only due to myopia; alternative press covered the protests as non-violent and provided details of the harsh tactics used by the police. Thus, through this example, it is evident that alternative media serves as a corrective to the representation of issues in mainstream sources by presenting the same events as the mainstream in vastly differing ways.

Alternative Media as Filling in Silences While Aliran Monthly discusses ways in which alternative media contests government power, Meyers36

34 Ling, Sharon. The Alternative Media in Malaysia: Their Potential and Limitations from Contesting Media Power: Alternative Media in a Networked World. Oxford, UK: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003.

presents an example in which alternative media counters mass opinion in Israel. Haolam Hazeh, an Israeli newspaper, tackled issues that were minimally or rarely covered within the mainstream, using an uncharacteristic reporting style and conducting investigative journalism directed at exposing social

35 Ibid. 36 Meyers, Oren. Contextualizing Alternative Journalism: Haolam Hazeh and the birth of critical Israeli newsmaking. Journalism Studies. Vol. 6, No. 2, 2008.

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inequities. The newspaper presented an avenue to discuss divergent political views, to the extent that it was “boycotted by mainstream Israeli newspapers” and “ostracized by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF)”37. It recognised the existence of the Palestinian people and supported their right to return – issues that are rarely mentioned in mainstream sources – while also providing criticisms of the IDF.38

Thus, Haolam Hazeh adopted topics that were part of the conflict with Palestine but that were not present in mainstream sources, demonstrating another characteristic of alternative media in that it attempts to fill gaps in mainstream reporting.

Thus, both sources of alternative print media attempted to contest the mainstream by providing a different viewpoint of contentious political issues or by covering issues not present in the mainstream. Both also were critical of the government and other powerful actors as hegemonic and democratically accountable. Applying this to a situation of ethnic conflict, it can be assumed that alternative media would serve to discuss the conflict in ways that are not prominent in the mainstream, presenting various viewpoints, and, in this manner, filling in silences and reporting from different angles. In including these diverse perspectives, alternative media would also serve to counter a binary view of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ in which the former is seen as the victim and the latter as the perpetrator and present a more rounded picture of both. In this manner, alternative media would directly counteract the polarisation that was found to be a key function of mainstream media in ethnic conflicts and provide a more rounded perspective of the debate; in the case of the 2008 land transfer controversy in Kashmir, providing balanced critiques of all sides of the conflict. In addition, it would be expected that, similar to Aliran Monthly and Haolam Hazeh, alternative media in India would provide critical remarks about the GOI, as a hegemonic, democratically accountable central actor, whose main function is that of peace-keeping and thus should be held accountable for failing to achieve this goal. In conclusion, Seaton makes it evident that media may influence political opinions through its framing of issues. Investigating mainstream print media’s involvement in ethnic conflict, I reject the notion that it serves as a peace-building function in view of the politics in Kashmir and turn to the argument that mainstream print media serves to polarise ethnic identities. It does this using two main methods: first, by presenting the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ as two distinct, binary identities where the former is viewed as the victim of the attacks of the latter; second, through misconstruing information by presenting only one side of the story (silences) or by misrepresenting the events. Alternative media, on the other hand, is constructed in direct opposition to the mainstream, and, in the case of Kashmir, it can be assumed that it serves to provide a rounded and critical perspective of all actors involved and reporting on issues that are rarely or minimally covered, thereby deconstructing the polarising viewpoints of mainstream media through filling in silences and presenting issues in vastly differing ways compared to the mainstream. Hypothesis and Observable Implications Primary Hypothesis From the survey of the literature, I would expect mainstream media to polarise among ethnic groups to a greater degree than alternative media, which I would expect to provide more complex coverage of the 2008 Amarnath land transfer controversy. Thus, mainstream media should reinforce to a greater degree the dichotomy of religious identities in Kashmir, while alternative media should be more balanced, yet critical in its coverage. Specifically, I will expect mainstream media to do this in two ways:

1. Presenting ethnic groups involved in a binary fashion to a larger degree than alternative media – depicting the ‘other’ as in the wrong who are propagating the conflict while simultaneously characterising the ‘self’ as those who are morally right and are victims to violence from the ‘other’.

37 Ibid. 38 Ibid.

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2. Through silences – presenting only one side of the story to a greater degree than alternative media through misconstruing information and misrepresenting the facts.

I will expect alternative media to present more complex coverage of the events by:

1. Filling in silences – representing issues that are covered to a lesser degree in the mainstream.

2. Taking a different spin on issues covered in the mainstream – representing these issues in a more complex manner than the mainstream.

Particularly, the observable implications within The Times of India I will expect to find are:

1. A more homogenous interpretation of the conflict than Tehelka – Kashmiris portrayed as instigators who have no basis for protesting and are only doing so to achieve their unreasonable demands for secession.

2. A more sympathetic opinion than that of Tehelka of the Hindu citizens of Jammu, as the benevolent victims to the accusations of Kashmiris; a justification for the land transfer; a neutral or uncritical stance toward the GOI.

The observable implications within Tehelka I will expect to find are:

1. Greater representation of a range of actors from interested parties on both sides than The Times of India including separatist groups, the government in J&K, the BJP, the AYSS, and the GOI representatives as well as citizens within the region of Jammu and the region of Kashmir, viewpoints from within Kashmir, within Jammu, and within the rest of India.

2. Responsibility placed on all actors with greater emphasis placed on the GOI as a hegemonic, democratically accountable actor which has failed in its peace-making function.

3. Adopting a perspective of events that provides more of a justification for the Kashmiri and Jammu people’s protests as compared to The Times of India.

In addition, being a daily, I would expect The Times of India to have a larger emphasis on facts and day-to-day reporting of the conflict than Tehelka, a newsweekly.

Alternative Hypothesis However, it is possible that mainstream media may serve as a peace-building function as it did in Northern Ireland and for Muslim-Americans after September 11, 2001. If this were true, mainstream media will not polarise the conflict, but instead present both sides of the argument through a critical lens. In this context, alternative media may serve to present the events even more critically, thereby countering the mainstream and taking on the role of an instigator. If this alternative hypothesis were to be true, I would find, in particular, that The Times of India would represent the conflict in a similar manner that covered both sides, while Tehelka would remain critical of the decisions and events that unfold. Both sources would:

1. Represent issues in a complex manner from all sides.

2. Be critical of all parties involved and of the conflict in a manner that allows for multiple actors to be held responsible.

Particularly, if this hypothesis were true, I would expect:

1. Equal representation of a range of actors from both sides who are part of the conflict from both sources including separatist groups, the government in J&K, the BJP, the AYSS, and the GOI

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representatives as well as citizens within the region of Jammu and the region of Kashmir; viewpoints from within Kashmir, within Jammu, and within the rest of India.

2. Responsibility placed on all actors with greater emphasis placed on the GOI as a hegemonic, democratically accountable actor who has failed in their peace-making function.

3. Taking a spin on events that provides a justification for the Kashmiri and Jammu people’s protests.

Methodology and Data Newspaper Selection and Time Period Newspaper reports of the 2008 Amarnath land transfer controversy were collected from The Times of India and Tehelka during the time period from May 26, 2008 to September 2, 2008.39

The Times of India, as the largest English newspaper in India, will allow for an understanding of what the English-speaking and therefore upper-class, literate population reads and how their impressions are formed. I will be using the Delhi editions of both newspapers for two reasons: first, there is no J&K edition and second, there was a large degree of involvement from Delhi, where the GOI is based, with regards to the Amarnath controversy. Tehelka was chosen because it is a renowned alternative press and is therefore a widely read source of print journalism. The histories of both these news sources will be elaborated upon in Chapters 3 and 4 when I analyse their coverage of the controversy.

Both news sources have online archives through which data will be collected. Articles will be identified by inspecting every edition during the time period from May 26, 2008 to September 2, 2008 for articles related to the conflict. Data Collection Data Collection for Alternative Media (Tehelka) It is important to recognise that while the mainstream source, The Times of India is a daily newspaper, Tehelka, the alternative source, is a newsweekly. Thus, I would expect there to be considerably less coverage of the 2008 Amarnath land transfer controversy Tehelka compared to The Times of India because it is only produced once a week. For this reason, it would be more reasonable to collect every single article about the 2008 Amarnath land transfer controversy that appears in Tehelka during the time period as the sample size will be small. Data Collection for Mainstream Media (The Times of India) Recognising that many articles about the conflict will appear within The Times of India, it is important to distinguish between types of articles in terms of episodic and thematic news frames. Episodic news frames discuss specific incidents that occur and present these as “illustrations of issues”40. Thematic news frames, in contrast, are broader, not pertaining to a specific issue but instead evaluating the general context.41

During the 2008 Amarnath land transfer controversy, I would expect there to be greater episodic coverage surrounding periods of heightened conflict where one of the primary parties involved was severely affected and thematic coverage to be present in articles throughout the rest of the time. The primary episodes to be examined for episodic coverage are detailed below:

39 The entire length of the conflict. 40 Iyengar, Shanto and Richard Reeves. Do the media govern?: politicians, voters, and reporters in America. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1997. 41 Ibid.

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Table 1: Primary Episodes for Episodic Coverage Event Date Time Frame

in Newspapers Reason for Selection

Decision to transfer land for the purposes of the Amarnath pilgrimage

May 26, 2008 May 27 to May 29, 2008

Beginning of conflict, severely affecting Kashmiri people, initial representation of anger

Jammu protests against separatist movement to revoke the land transfer

June 25, 2008 June 26 to June 27, 2008

Anger from Jammu, first representation of dissent from Jammu

Revocation of land transfer June 30, 2008 July 1 to July 3, 2008

Controversial decision; clear division between opinions in Jammu and in Kashmir

Massive protests in Kashmir in violation of orders, many killed including separatist leader; Jammu citizen commits suicide over cancellation of land transfer

August 11 to August 12, 2008


Death of separatist leader – surge of anger throughout Kashmir; further polarisation of conflict; clear division of opinion between GOI and Kashmiris over actions taken by GOI

Jail Amarnath Bharo – three-day protests in Jammu with many arrested



Arresting citizens – anger in Jammu; clear division of opinion between government and Jammu citizens over action taken by GOI

End of controversy by agreeing to temporary usage of land for Amarnath

August 31, 2008

September 1 to September 2, 2008

End of conflict; how are Jammu and Kashmir affected by the final outcome?; how does media represent this final outcome?

Recognising that data during heightened periods of the conflict needs to be investigated more thoroughly, I will employ different data collection methods for thematic and episodic coverage: Data Collection for Thematic Coverage of Mainstream Media: Random Selection of every nth article The random selection approach was chosen over the constructed week approach. Both of these methods take into account that the number of articles published over the time period for mainstream media is too great to examine each of them individually. The constructed week approach was used by Patricia Collins et. al.42 while examining the 2002 Canadian healthcare reform debate. The researchers first constructed two time periods during which to investigate the debate, both of which were distanced from periods when the debate was at its peak. They then searched through newspaper editions on a particular day of every week for articles about the issue. This allowed for “a broad sweep of newspaper coverage over the specified time periods”43

and accurately captured the general opinions surrounding the debate that were not affected by especially controversial events, while still limiting the number of articles that were read and providing a random selection. However, this method would be difficult to employ in my study as the The Times of India, being a national newspaper, has little coverage of the 2008 Amarnath conflict and may not feature an article in every issue generating a small sample size.

A better method, then, is to employ a similar technique to Kerry Moore, Paul Mason and Justin Lewis44 in their study of the representation of British Muslims in the everyday national print media in the UK between the years 2000 and 2008. These researchers used an archival website for newspapers and searched for key words related to Muslims in the UK. The initial search brought up 23,000 articles, a sample size too large to investigate. Because the researchers were aiming to analyse routine, everyday coverage of British Muslims, it was necessary for them to eliminate events that would have resulted in biases toward or against Muslims in the UK. Thus, they chose to narrow their search to every alternate year, effectively eliminating the years 2001 and 2005,45 which greatly reduced the number of articles. With the remaining articles, the researchers chose to randomly select every 20th one in their sample, “eliminating those that only referred to British Muslims in passing”46

42 Collins, Patricia A. et. al. Are we expecting too much from print media? An analysis of newspaper coverage of the 2002 Canadian healthcare reform debate. Social Science and Medicine. Vol. 66, 2006.

. The result was a random sample of

43 Ibid. 44 Moore, Kerry, Paul Mason and Justin Lewis. Images of Islam in the UK: The Representation of British Muslims in the National Print News Media 2000-2008. Cardiff School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies, July 7, 2008. 45 Both years featured certain large-scale events with wide coverage that were alleged to be perpetrated by Muslims. 2001 marked the September 11 attacks of the World Trade Center in New York, while 2005 marked the London train bombings. 46 Ibid.

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974 articles that also reflected the volume of coverage in each year – years with more coverage had a greater number of articles. A similar method can be employed within my study. After collecting all articles related to the conflict within the time frame, I will eliminate ones that fall within the periods of heightened conflict, thereby focusing on articles that employ everyday coverage. I will also eliminate op-eds from my sample as they are only representative of an individual’s viewpoint and, while significant in that the newspaper chooses to include opinions from a certain actor, they cannot be seen as representative of the views of the newspaper. I will then compile a list of articles from every news source, selecting every seventh article. My sample will be random, manageable, and representative of the volume of articles in each news source. Data Collection for Episodic Coverage of Mainstream Media: Special events approach Collins et. al.47

employed the special events approach in addition to the constructed week approach when examining the 2002 Canadian healthcare reform debate. They collected all articles about two crucial healthcare reform policy documents in all the newspapers they had chosen to investigate, several days following the release of the report. In this manner, they obtained press reactions on the issues.

Employing this method within my own research, I will look at the two longest articles (excluding op-eds) from each period of heightened conflict during the 2008 Amarnath controversy within The Times of India, allowing for an in-depth coverage of events that are highly controversial. I will selectively choose the articles that are longer, which would not only allow me to perform discourse analysis more thoroughly, but also reflect the events that the newspaper pays more attention. Thus, I will understand how the media represents these crucial episodes during the time of the conflict. Data Analysis Content Analysis In order to examine the content of the newspaper articles, I will employ a method similar to that of Steven Hook and Xiaoyu Pu’s in their analysis of the framing of Sino-US relations during the spy plane crisis of 2001 in major American and Chinese newspapers.48 With their sample size of approximately 300 articles from both US and Chinese sources, Hook and Pu identify “persistent patterns of problem identification, attribution, evaluation, and prescription that would indicate the presence of news frames”49

. For each of these four categories, Hook and Pu compiled a list of several frames which each article was placed into: under ‘problem identification’, they investigated what each article defined the problem to be; ‘attribution’ explored who the article held responsible; the ‘evaluation’ criterion involved examination of the article’s explanation for what happened; ‘prescription’ concerned what solution the article proposed. By tallying these figures up, the researchers were able to gauge a deep understanding of how each country’s press framed the same issue in starkly differing manners.

As Hook and Pu were looking at the newspaper representation of contentious politics between two countries with vastly differing agendas, this method could easily be replicated within my own research for all articles as I aim to investigate a similar trend within news sources with different agendas. However, I will rename the ‘attribution’ section ‘attribution and victimisation’ to correspond with my findings from the literature review and investigate whether there was, indeed, a demonisation of the ‘other’ and victimisation of the ‘self’ involved. Specifically, under each category I will look for: 47 Collins et. al. Are we expecting too much from print media? An analysis of newspaper coverage of the 2002 Canadian healthcare reform debate. Social Science and Medicine. Vol. 66, 2006. 48 Hook, Steven W. and Xiaoyu Pu. Framing Sino-American Relations under Stress: A Reexamination of News Cover of the 2001 Spy Plane Crisis. Asian Affairs. 49 Ibid.

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1. Table 2: Problem Identification Characteristics

Problem Identification

Definition (in context of Amarnath conflict) Example

Religious Assigning Hindu or Muslim dogma to the conflict, especially taking one of these sides

“While Muslims in the valley were opposed to the land transfer, Hindus have been protesting and demanding the allocation of the land to the temple trust”50

Oppression and unfair treatment

Identifying the conflict as one related to structural issues in which the inequality in political or socioeconomic status is defined as the primary reason

“If both Jammu and Kashmir appear at war with one another, it is because they have only been made hollow promises”51

Inflammation by Political Parties

Situation got out of hand because political parties made it bigger than what it ought to be.

“The BJP has decided to move the Amarnath land-for-pilgrims case onto the national stage”52

Not Applicable

Does not identify what the problem is

2. Table 3: Attribution Characteristics

50 The Times of India, Amarnath Sangharsh Samiti to boycott talks with all-party delegation, August 9, 2008. 51 Baweja, Harinder. Tehelka, Nine Ways Of Looking At A Crisis, August 30, 2008. 52 The Times of India, BJP will take Amarnath protests to national stage, August 8, 2008. 53 Sahay, Anand K. Tehelka, Playing With Fire, July 12, 2008. 54 Baweja, Harinder. Tehelka, Playing Nero Or Worse, August 16, 2008. 55 The Times of India, Amarnath land row: Jammu shuts down, July 1, 2008. 56 The Times of India, Clueless Centre adds to chaos, August 24, 2008. 57 Sahay, Anand K. and Peerzada Arshad Hamid. Tehelka. Shutdown In J&K. July 12, 2008. 58 Ghosh, Avijit. The Times of India, Unnecessary force? Several victims shot in the back, August 16, 2008. 59 Pandit, Saleem M. The Times of India, Amarnath row: 5 killed in firing at march to PoK, Aug 11, 2008. 60 The Times of India, Violence in Srinagar over land allotment to Amarnath board, June 23, 2008. 61 Sahay, Anand K. and Peerzada Arshad Hamid. Tehelka. Shutdown in J&K, July 12, 2008.

Actor Held Responsible Justification for Inclusion Example BJP Key, pro-Hindu (and anti-Muslim) actor;

stimulated mass protests in Jammu “the party is fanning sectional passions with a view to spreading the flames across the country”53

SASB / AYSS

Key advocate in the transfer of land and closely connected to the pilgrimage; organiser of protests in Jammu

“The Amarnath Sangharsh Samiti, spearheading the agitation in Jammu”54

Citizens of Jammu

Protestors, demanding for transfer of land

“protestors damaged buses and pelted stones at shopping establishments across Jammu and stalled traffic”55

GOI and other politicians from the Centre

Giving orders that began the controversy in the first place first to transfer the land and then revoking this decision

“ the Centre's approach to resolving the Jammu & Kashmir tangle has suffered from a multiplicity of approaches with no central ‘command’ assessing how to engage the principle players in both regions”56

Kashmiri Government

Responsible for ensuring peace and security to the region

“the Congress party – currently holding power in the state as well as at the Centre”57

CRPF

Paramilitary troops in Kashmir assigned by GOI with large degree of freedom in investigating domestic issues and used force against Kashmiri people during controversy

“They are some of the victims of the recent police and paramilitary firing in different parts of Kashmir”58

Citizens of Kashmir

Campaigning against the land transfer “defied curfew [...] continuing their march in the face of repeated warnings from security forces”59

Separatist political parties operating within Kashmir

Blowing conflict out of proportion and instigating the masses

“The protest was called by the hardline Hurriyat group led by...”60

PDP

That withdrew from Congress at the last minute “it is a government order cleared by the state forest minister, a PDP nominee, that had got the mobs started”61

Not applicable

No one assigned responsibility

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Table 4: Victimisation Characteristics

3. Evaluation What kind of piece the article is – thematic covering main themes of conflict or episodic

covering day-to-day events and more detail-oriented Recurring themes – religion, separatism, oppression / victimisation, attribution of

responsibility 4. Prescription

Employ land transfer decision Revoke land transfer decision Negotiations – if so, among whom? No solution suggested

Based on the options in these four categories, I will tally my results, effectively determining the key themes that run through the source, evaluating how media is framed, and determining what is left out of the coverage. Discourse Analysis While it would be difficult to perform discourse analysis for every article in the sample as the sample size will be too large, I will do so for all articles in Tehelka, the news source with a smaller sample size, as well as the two longest articles surrounding major episodes within The Times of India. In this manner, I will be able to assess the tone of each article and critically analyse how, during these times of heightened conflict, viewpoints are expressed. In addition, discourse analysis will allow me to identify silences surrounding the conflict, thereby addressing my findings from the literature review. I will construct many of my categories for discourse analysis similarly to that of Peter Teo’s in his rigorous examination of racism toward Vietnamese people in Australian mainstream newspapers as there are parallels that can be drawn between these studies – Vietnamese people as the ‘other’ who are citizens yet outsiders is reflected

62 The Times of India, 4 die in BJP-VHP bandh violence, July 4, 2008. 63 Baweja, Harinder. Tehelka, Nine Ways Of Looking At A Crisis, August 30, 2008. 64 Baweja, Harinder. Tehelka, Nine Ways Of Looking At A Crisis, August 30, 2008. 65 The Times of India, Curfew reimposed in Jammu, July 28, 2008. 66 Baweja, Harinder. Tehelka, The Kashmir Conundrum, September 13, 2008.

Victimised Actor Justification for Inclusion Example Citizens of Jammu Victims to a political game “At least 25 people were injured taking the total number

of injured in the region to 100”62

Kashmiri Pandits

Since the beginning of the conflict, forced to leave Kashmir

“I am scared of even stepping out of the General Post Office where we live under Central Reserve Police Force security”63

Pilgrims

Cannot complete religious duty “But unlike before, I did not feel safe this time.”64

CRPF

Killed in violence “At least 20 people including two cops and three media persons sustained injuries in sporadic incidents of violence”65

Citizens of Kashmir

Victims to a political game

“What followed his visit was the darkest the Valley has ever seen. Clamp down. Block the streets. Black out news channels. Disrespect media curfew passes. Polish your guns. Arrest the Hurriyat leaders. Impose stringent curfew. In other words, convert the entire Valley into one large prison.”66

Not applicable

No one victimised

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in how Kashmiris are viewed too. I will follow Teo’s use of Critical Discourse Analysis67

while also drawing upon categories from other research:

Table 5: Discourse Analysis Characteristics Categories Explanation Example Interpretation

HEADLINES AND LEADS68

Initial attraction for reader; can skew opinions at onset or provide a summary about the crux of the article for those who don’t read it

“The Missing State – Jammu and Kashmir is tearing into two dangerous halves and as the fires rage unabated, the Centre appears a hapless bystander”69

Creates idea that GOI is to blame for mishandling of situation

GENERALISATION AND SPECIFICITY70

Generalisation homogenises and stereotypes a group of people making them less complex; specificity personalises each experience

“While women in Jammu looked trendy but quiet, their counterparts in Srinagar, covered from head to toe in salwar-kameez, sang folk songs and shouted”71

Demonising all Kashmiris and positive characteristics associated with all Jammuites

LEVEL OF CERTITUDE Source of Quotation72

Grant a degree of legitimacy; characterise who is deemed important

Direct and indirect kinds – presented by politicians, lay-persons, etc.

If quotes do not acknowledge the speaker, they are deeming them as insignificant

Statistics73 Can be deceptive if only presented from one side; grant legitimacy by steeping something in facts

“nine people are injured in clashes between bandh supporters and cops in Jammu”74

Highlights the victims on the Jammu side of the conflict

LITERARY TECHNIQUES Adjectives75 To exaggerate or undermine

a event or idea “the Central Government and the

administration of Governor N.N. Vohra have so far failed miserably to come up with a solution”76

Highlights the uneffectiveness of GOI

Use of Metaphors77 To create a certain image “where every single party is simply

fanning communal flames”78Highlights inflammation by political parties

Negation79 To emphasise a particular concept

“Amarnath land row will be resolved in a manner that it does not hurt either people of Jammu or Kashmir regions”80

Emphasises the benevolence of the Union Home Minister and his dedication to both parties

I will then evaluate each article based on these categories, and present a comprehensive discussion of the results and how they relate to the content analysis. The next chapter will provide some background surrounding the conflict in Kashmir.

67 Teo, Peter. Racism in the news: a Critical Discourse Analysis of news reporting in two Australian newspapers. Discourse and Society. Sage Publications, Vol. 11, 2000. 68 Ibid. 69 Hamid, Peerzada Arshad. Tehelka, The Missing State, Aug 23, 2008. 70 Teo, Peter. Racism in the news: a Critical Discourse Analysis of news reporting in two Australian newspapers. Discourse and Society. Sage Publications, Vol. 11, 2000. 71 Pandit, Saleem M. The Times of India, Amarnath row: Women power on full display in J&K, Aug 21, 2008. 72 Teo, Peter. Racism in the news: a Critical Discourse Analysis of news reporting in two Australian newspapers. Discourse and Society. Sage Publications, Vol. 11, 2000. 73 Ibid. 74 The Times of India, Amarnath land row: Jammu shuts down. July 1, 2008. 75 Bednarek, Monika. Evaluation in Media Discourse: Analysis of a Newspaper Corpus. London: Continuum, 2006. 76 Hamid, Peerzada Arshad. Tehelka, The Missing State, Aug 23, 2008. 77 Ibid. 78 Baweja, Harinder. Tehelka, Playing Nero Or Worse, August 16, 2008. 79 Ibid. 80 The Times of India, Amarnath row to be resolved peacefully: Shivraj Patil, August 10, 2008.

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CHAPTER TWO Introduction This chapter aims to provide essential background material to construct a more nuanced and better understanding of the analysis of alternative and mainstream print media within the 2008 Amarnath land transfer controversy. The chapter is divided into three sections: the first section will comprise the largest part, discussing the history of the Kashmir conflict, starting from pre-independence, slowly advancing into the era of independence, and subsequent developments thereafter such as the rise of militancy in Kashmir. Within the second section, I will discuss the state of J&K today. Finally, I will highlight the main events of the 2008 Amarnath land transfer controversy. History of Conflict in Kashmir This section is divided into several categories. First, I will examine pre-1947 politics that dichotomised Hindus and Muslims in Kashmir, recognising them as distinct socioeconomic classes. The formation of political parties in response to this will also be mentioned. Next, I will examine the era of independence and the accession of Jammu & Kashmir to the Indian Union. Finally, I will investigate the heightened period of insurgency from 1989 onwards. It is important to note that the history of Kashmir is a long and complex one. Therefore, not all events can or will be covered in complete detail; rather, this section serves to provide a summary of events within the history of Kashmiri politics that are most relevant to understanding the 2008 Amarnath land transfer controversy. Recognising that the history of the Kashmir conflict may be different depending on who is composing the narrative, I primarily use two books – by Malik Iffat, a Pakistani and Sumantra Bose, an Indian – as two of the leading scholars on Kashmir. Pre-1947 Politics In 1846, when India was still under British reign, the ruling family in J&K were upper-caste Hindus from Jammu, the Dogras. Gulab Singh, a member of this ruling family who had vastly extended the region of J&K, colluded with the British to oust the Sikhs from the region. In exchange for money, gifts, and the use of the J&K military at any time that the British wanted, Gulab Singh and his heirs acquired possession of J&K.81

From 1846 till 1934, according to Michael Brecher, “the word of the Maharaja [(king)] was law and any effort to question such authority could be, and was, treated as sedition”82. The Maharaja was also biased in favour of Hindus and against Muslims in the state, despite the Muslim-majority population: cow slaughter was a crime punishable with ten years in prison, there were taxes imposed on slaughtering animals during Muslim festivals, if a Hindu converted to Islam, he / she was forced to give up their property, etc.83 Many primary sources noted that there was a large disparity between the conditions of Hindus and Muslims in the state, describing this latter group as living in “virtual enslavement”84. With a state that was, according to the 1941 British census “77 percent Muslim, 20 percent Hindu, and 3 percent other”85, these laws treated the majority of the state as second-class citizens. In addition, the largely autocratic Maharaja viewed “any semblance of a free press and public opinion as subversive”, thereby maintaining a large degree of control over the society.86

81 Bose, Sumantra. Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003. 82 Brecher, Michael. The Struggle for Kashmir. Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1953. 83 Ibid. 84 Bose, Sumantra. Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003. 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid.

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Until 1931, there was a lack of resistance in response to these oppressive policies. However, July 13, 1931 marked a culmination of Muslim frustration toward oppressive government policies and a turning point in Hindu-Muslim and state-Muslim relations. In response to a series of events that further highlighted the unfair treatment of the Muslim people and served to convince Kashmiri Muslims that Islam was being attacked by the state in Jammu, extensive public protests erupted. Foreshadowing the present-day situation in Kashmir, the police opened fire on protestors, killing twenty-one. The Maharaja, no longer able to ignore this, initiated the Glancy Commission, chaired by a British officer, to enquire into these events. The Commission found that there was a large degree of corruption within the state and supported Muslims in making use of education opportunities, suggesting that this community should have greater representation in the state.87 Some of the taxes instituted upon Muslims were lifted, and freedom of press was recommended. While the Maharaja accepted many of the Glancy Commission recommendations thereby eroding much of his dictatorial power, “the autocratic regime could not be reformed to the extent demanded by the increasingly mobilized, politically conscious population”88

.

In response to these protests, J&K’s first political party was born in 1932, spearheaded by Sheikh Abdullah from the Kashmir Valley and Chaudhary Ghulam Abbas from Jammu. Named the All-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, it called for political reforms in the state with greater representation of Muslims in the administration. However, these initial demands failed, and prompted the Maharaja to order mass arrests and employ a policy of total repression. This repressive response spurred an alteration in the Muslim Conference’s agenda in 1938 to permit a more inclusive membership comprised of Hindus and Sikhs “who believe[d] in the freedom of their country from the shackles of irresponsible rule”89. Consequently, in 1939 the party was renamed the All-Jammu and Kashmir National Conference. However, not all members agreed upon this change in course of action – Ghulam Abbas and his supporters broke away from Sheikh Abdullah’s National Conference to revive the Muslim Conference.90

The National Conference and the Muslim Conference, born from the same political party, now had vastly differing agendas and were actively competing against each other to achieve a popular base. The primary distinguishing characteristic was the fact that the National Conference was content with J&K being a part of India, while the Muslim Conference wanted J&K to be a “separate Muslim homeland”91, as per Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s92 suggestion.93 The former of these groups actively participated in the ‘Quit India’ movement, initiated by the Indian National Congress (INC), a national political party working to oust the British from India, while the latter condemned the National Conference for doing so, claiming that this movement would only serve to establish Hindu rule thereby further subjugating Muslims in India and eliminating the need for a Muslim homeland, Pakistan. Thus, the National Conference was closely tied to the INC, while the Muslim Conference had stronger ties with The Muslim League, the political group advocating for a Muslim homeland called Pakistan.94

The National Conference enjoyed widespread support in J&K, much more so than the Muslim Conference, especially in the Kashmir Valley for several reasons: they had a solid organisational structure, a progressive ideology with regards to social change, an inclusive membership while simultaneously being rooted in a Kashmiri Muslim identity, and a charismatic leader with an impressive team working with him. The Naya Kashmir95

87 Malik, Iffat. Kashmir: Ethnic Conflict, International Dispute. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

manifesto was a testament to the vision that Abdullah had for the future of J&K. Its main components consisted of a plan for “a representative legislature called the National Assembly and a cabinet government” and a decentralised government with districts being in charge of administrative responsibilities, advocating for Urdu as the lingua franca, supporting state-led, planned

88 Bose, Sumantra. Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003. 89 Ibid. 90 Ibid. 91 Malik, Iffat. Kashmir: Ethnic Conflict, International Dispute. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 92 Founder of Pakistan. 93 Ibid. 94 Bose, Sumantra. Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003. 95 New Kashmir.

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industrialisation and the end to the landlordism, and designing a program to empower Kashmiris who were of low socio-economic status and ensuring rights for women.96

In 1946, taking everyone – including the INC and his own National Conference – by surprise, Abdullah announced a ‘Quit Kashmir’ movement aimed at ousting the Maharaja from the state. Greeted with anger and embarrassment from the INC, this movement only exacerbated support for the National Conference even if the Muslim Conference refused to support it.97 Particularly, the movement countered the claims that the Muslim Conference made about the National Conference – that the National Conference advocated for Hindu rule. However, in refusing to support the National Conference, the Muslim Conference “found itself compelled to support the Hindu Dogra dynasty”.98

The Maharaja’s response to ‘Quit Kashmir’ in 1946 was to arrest many National Conference leaders while others fled to avoid punishment. However, the party continued as a strong underground movement and Abdullah remained popular. With the National Conference disbanded, the Maharaja turned its attention to the Muslim Conference, arresting key leaders. Thus, all opposition to the Maharaja was scattered through repression, and the Maharaja continued to enjoy autocratic power. This was the state of J&K on the eve of Partition: opposition to the Maharaja’s rule disbanded and continued suppression of the Muslim-majority population.99

Partition – August 15, 1947 and J&K Accession to India On August 14, 1947, Pakistan was formed and one day later, India was granted Independence. The princely states were given a choice – to accede to India, to accede to Pakistan, or to become independent. The last of these options was emphasised as only a theoretical one and Lord Mountbatten, the British administrator, urged states to choose between India and Pakistan. While most chose to accede to India, there were three that were more controversial. Two of these – Junagadh and Hyderabad – were ruled by Muslim princes with predominantly Hindu populations.100

In J&K, the exact opposite situation was in existence – a Muslim-majority population with a Hindu ruler. The non-Muslim community mainly supported continued rule by the Maharaja Hari Singh, while the Muslim population was divided among supporting the National Conference or the Muslim Conference. The latter of these parties advocated either for acceding to Pakistan or autonomy and the formation of a separate state. In both cases, the Muslim Conference’s general consensus was that J&K should be a Muslim state “in which the promotion and protection of Muslim interests would be a priority”101. The National Conference, on the other hand, backed accession to India.102

So, on August 15, 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh was still unsure about which country to accede to. According to Iffat, Hari Singh’s primary objective was to retain power in the state and all the privileges that came with his position, and, understanding that the INC and the National Conference were opposed to autocratic rule, he sided with Pakistan to maintain his control in J&K, letting them “[assume] charge of J&K’s post and telegraph system and […] supply the state with foodstuffs and other essential commodities”.103

It has been well-documented that Partition was a very violent period with Hindus and Sikhs moving east to India, and Muslims moving west to Pakistan. Being a border state, many Punjabi refugees landed in J&K, intensifying communal violence in this region. In fact, it was estimated that “at least 500,000

96 Ibid. 97 Malik, Iffat. Kashmir: Ethnic Conflict, International Dispute. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 98 Brecher, Michael. The Struggle for Kashmir. Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1953. 99 Ibid. 100 Bose, Sumantra. Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003. 101 Malik, Iffat. Kashmir: Ethnic Conflict, International Dispute. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 102 Ibid. 103 Bose, Sumantra. Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003.

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Muslims were displaced from Jammu: perhaps as many as 200,000 of them just disappeared”104, many fleeing to Kashmir and Poonch. Muslims responded to this backlash by employing violence toward Hindu and Sikh populations. Particularly in Poonch, an autonomous region within J&K ruled by its own king, the reaction to these killings was to levy a tax on the Muslim peasantry who revolted, resulting in Muslim killings by Sikh and Dogra troops. Poonch, being a region with a large number of Muslim soldiers, fought back and “gained control of almost the entire Poonch district except the town of Poonch”105. The pro-Pakistan leaders in western Jammu districts used this opportunity to accede to Rawalpindi, Pakistan in what became Azad Jammu & Kashmir in October, 1947.106

The violence in Poonch only served to harden the sentiments among the three different groups in J&K: the Hindu population realised that there was no future under Muslim rule and became even more convinced about their desire to accede to India; the Muslim Conference supporters became more eager to join Pakistan or become an independent Muslim state. Only Sheikh Abdullah changed his stance on the issue somewhat, becoming less convinced about acceding to India and chose to decide this “in the best interests of the Kashmiri people”.107

In addition to the accession of Poonch to Pakistan, “Punjab and the NWFP [(North-West Frontier Province – one of the four provinces of Pakistan)] were convulsed with violence August-September 1947”108. In September, armed insurgent groups in Pakistan began to infiltrate J&K, attacking Hindu and Sikh minorities. According to Bose, when the J&K government complained to Pakistan about the infiltration, Pakistan denied that these attacks were organised by the government and brought attention to the fact that many Muslims had died in Poonch which was what was primarily provoking this response. After several exchanges between the J&K government and Pakistan, it became clear that the latter’s strategy had failed. In mid-October, “several thousand Pashtun tribesmen […] began an offensive into J&K”109. Bose claims that it was evident that this attack was organised by the Pakistani government because it was highly organised and systematic and had very clear goals. These infiltrators took control of Muzaffarabad110 and proceeded to enter the Kashmir Valley. The Maharaja, fearing defeat, requested for help from India.111

India was willing to send help only if J&K acceded to India; without this agreement, Indian help would be considered invasion of neutral territory. The Maharaja quickly signed on to the Indian Union on the condition that “once law and order had been restored and the ‘invader’ expelled the accession should be ratified by ‘a reference to the people’”112. The Indian army gained ground because of two primary reasons: first, by looting and raping Muslim populations, the Pakistani infiltrators had ruined any possibility of support from their Muslim counterparts; second, the National Conference, recently appointed as an interim government headed by Sheikh Abdullah, was largely cooperative with Indian troops providing a large degree of assistance to India.113

In January 1948, New Delhi held true to its word and the UN Security Council established the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan to hold a plebiscite for the accession issue. However, this could only be done if Pakistan forces withdrew from J&K, but fighting continued throughout 1948 with Pakistan and India both looking to expand control over Kashmir. In January 1949, when a ceasefire finally came into effect, there was no plebiscite held, and, to this day, a plebiscite has never been held to determine the will of the J&K people. Thus, till today, Jammu & Kashmir remains a state in India and 104 Malik, Iffat. Kashmir: Ethnic Conflict, International Dispute. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 105 Bose, Sumantra. Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003. 106 Ibid. 107 Malik, Iffat. Kashmir: Ethnic Conflict, International Dispute. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 108 Bose, Sumantra. Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003. 109 Ibid. 110 Present-day capital of Azad Kashmir. 111 Ibid. 112 Ibid. 113 Ibid.

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the Ceasefire Line dividing Indian Jammu & Kashmir from Pakistan’s side – Azad Jammu & Kashmir – has remained relatively unchanged with only the name becoming the Line of Control.114

There are several points worth mentioning surrounding the issue of the plebiscite. First, is historical: mentioned earlier in this section is the controversy surrounding Hyderabad and Junagadh about deciding to join India or Pakistan: while both were Hindu-majority, they were ruled by Muslims who wanted to accede to Pakistan even if this option was geographically unviable. For India, Hyderabad joining Pakistan was unacceptable, so the GOI implemented an economic blockade, resulting in the state signing a Standstill Agreement. When this was violated, the GOI successfully used military force on Hyderabad and annexed the state to the Indian Union.115

It is important to note here that, India’s desires were paramount in the annexation of Hyderabad; because they wanted it as part of the Indian Union they stopped at nothing – including the use of force – to achieve this end, reflective of the strategy to be used later in Kashmir.

Perhaps more interestingly, however, is the case of Junagadh. The ruler of Junagadh controlled two other, smaller, states; when he chose to accede to Pakistan, the heads of the two smaller states reacted by declaring their independence from Junagadh and acceding to India. In response, the Junagadhi ruler imposed military rule in these two states, who then requested for help from the GOI. Believing that accession to Pakistan would exacerbate communal tension, the GOI refused the ruler’s choice and cut off supplies to Junagadh, discussing the issue of a plebiscite in the region with Pakistan, who agreed as long as India withdrew its troops. The GOI rejected this offer, instead taking over the State’s administration. Pakistan protested, claiming that the ruler had chosen and that if India could acquire Kashmir because its ruler had decided to accede to India, then Pakistan could claim Junagadh. India again rejected this, and when the plebiscite was held in February, the people voted overwhelming in favour of acceding to India resulting in Junagadh City in Gujarat, a state in present-day India.116

The Junagadhi situation parallels the Kashmiri accession issue if the religious status of the majority of the population and that of the leader are reversed. Particularly, it highlights India’s double standards: while a plebiscite has never been held in Kashmir – which would, undoubtedly, result in the decision to accede to Pakistan – a plebiscite that was favourable to India was held within Junagadh. Secondly, Pakistan makes a valid claim in that the issue of Kashmir’s accession was only decided upon based on the Maharaja’s choice; for Junagadh, the ruler’s choice, because it went against acceding to India, was unacceptable. Thus, combining this with the situation in Hyderabad, it is evident that India stopped at nothing in pursuing its political desires, bringing out the large degree of hypocrisy inherent in her political decisions. The plebiscite in Kashmir, then, has never been held and thus India has never even attempted to gauge the opinion of the public about Kashmir acceding to India. Indeed, multiple talks about Kashmir between India and Pakistan have rarely engaged leaders within Kashmir. The media, then, is one of the few existing means through which Kashmiris may document their resistance toward Indian rule by demonstrating to constituents outside of Kashmir their continued struggle; thus, in reporting on these protests, the media becomes a plebiscite by proxy. For this reason, the media is of utmost importance as one of the few means to broadcast the Kashmiri struggle. It is important to analyse the manner in which the media represents this ‘plebiscite’ and thereby affect the way in which non-Kashmiris form public opinions regarding the Kashmir issue. If a newspaper is constructed to side with the GOI, then it only serves to exacerbate the misrepresentation or lack of representation of the Kashmiri people and align much of popular opinion against that of Kashmiris; however, if it provides a balanced coverage, then the media can serve in a transformative capacity, urging the public to engage critically with the situation present in Kashmir.

114 Ibid. 115 Smith, Wilfred Cantwell. Hyderabad: Muslim Tragedy. Middle East Journal. Vol. 4, No. 1, January 1950. 116 Lumby, Edmond W. Transfer of Power in India: 1945 to 1947. London: Allen & Unwin, 1954.

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1947 to 1989 The Instrument of Accession document that had been signed by the Maharaja had a caveat for Kashmir – Article 306A (currently the contested Article 370) – stating that India would only have control over defence, communications and foreign affairs; everything else would be conducted by the jurisdiction of the state. And, even on the spheres controlled by the GOI, the state’s involvement was necessary. However, this was intended to be temporary till a plebiscite was held. With no plebiscite, Article 370 became a permanent clause within the Indian Constitution and “Article 1 of the same Constitution described Jammu and Kashmir as an integral part of the Indian Union, pre-determining the fate of accession within J&K”.117

In 1951, Abdullah began to convene a Constituent Assembly in Kashmir, which would, in effect, mandate that Kashmir belonged to India. Despite protests from Pakistan, this Assembly was allowed to form in a process that can be considered neither free nor fair. While Abdullah was not formerly elected, it was again, because of the GOI’s political interests, that he was instituted; he had little support from the Hindu and Ladakh factions and, when they attempted to resist by calling for Abdullah’s overthrow, they were arrested. The National Conference laid out its plan for its Assembly as one that would not only decide on matters within the state (particularly land transfers, compensation, and the Dogra dynasty), but would also reach a conclusion regarding accession.118

In 1952, the Delhi Agreement was held between India’s Parliament headed by Nehru, and Indian Jammu & Kashmir’s Constituent Assembly headed by Abdullah. In addition to preserving Indian Jammu & Kashmir’s autonomous status, it also demanded “financial and fiscal integration of IJK [(Indian Jammu & Kashmir)] with the Union, and the extension of the Indian constitution’s fundamental rights to the territory and people of IJK”119. All of this changed in 1953, when Sheikh Abdullah was arrested by order of New Delhi. New Delhi would remain supportive of Abdullah despite his authoritarian policies if he continued to profess his allegiance to India; however, it had become increasingly evident that this was not the case, particularly when urging for a plebiscite with a third option – that of full independence for J&K. Instead, a member of Abdullah’s own, recently divided cabinet, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, a Kashmir Valley Muslim, was instituted as prime minister. The relationship between Kashmir and India had changed from one based on an “honorable partnership of equals” to one that would ensure “criminalization” and a “swift passage to political oblivion” if there was “any defiance of New Delhi’s absolute supremacy”.120

In addition to installing an undemocratic and unrepresentative Bakshi, New Delhi also ensured that the supreme court had full jurisdiction over Indian Jammu & Kashmir and it, in effect, became a part of the Indian Union with one small caveat: that “civil liberties could be suspended at any time at the discretion of Indian Jammu & Kashmir authorities in the interest of ‘security,’ and no judicial reviews of the suspensions would be allowed”121

. This effectively spelt the death of Article 370 even if it was never dropped from the Constitution.

Bakshi’s government was marked by “rampant corruption” and “Mafia-style authoritarianism”122, banning any form of opposition. Both in 1957 and 1963, elections in J&K were heavily rigged to re-elect Bakshi and provide false evidence that the people of J&K had chosen to accede to India.123

India was trying to justify J&K’s presence within the Indian Union by using an installed government to convince the public that the Kashmiri people had settled the accession issue in India’s favour.

117 Malik, Iffat. Kashmir: Ethnic Conflict, International Dispute. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 118 Ibid. 119 Bose, Sumantra. Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003. 120 Ibid. 121 Ibid. 122 Ibid. 123 Ibid.

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In October 1963, recognising that Bakshi had failed, Nehru forced him to resign and replaced him with the former Revenue Minister, Khwaja Shamsuddin. In December of that same year, in a situation that parallels Hari Singh’s oppression of the Kashmiri people, the region finally reached its tipping point sparked by the theft of a religious relic from the Hazratbal shrine. Bakshi had become extremely unpopular, and it was assumed, at first, that he was behind the theft, serving to destabilise India’s role in Indian Jammu & Kashmir. In 1955, opposition had formed in J&K from a split within the National Conference. Called the Plebiscite Front, the political group was supported by Sheikh Abdullah and was adamant about holding a plebiscite. After the Hazratbal shrine incident, the committee that was organised to help find the missing relic became its own political party which later split in two between those who wanted a secular outlook and a high degree of autonomy from New Delhi – the Awami Action Committee – and those who wanted an Islamic J&K and accession to Pakistan – Mirwaiz-i-Kashmir. This split resembled the pre-1947 division of J&K with a third group – the National Conference which later became Indian Congress – also included, advocating for integration with India.124

Along with his two successors, G.M Sadiq and Mir Qasim, greater integrative measures were introduced, the most significant of which are Articles 356 and 357 of the Constitution becoming applicable in J&K which allowed for “the Governor to declare President’s Rule in the event of a ‘constitutional breakdown’ without consulting the State Legislature”.125 Again and again, opposition was suppressed, encouraging Pakistan to become involved again in 1965. Infiltrating J&K, the Pakistan army were relying on support from Muslims in the region. This support never came and Pakistan was soon defeated.126

In 1964, Sheikh Abdullah was released from prison and talks with Nehru resumed. However, less than two months later, Nehru died, marking the beginning of declining relations between New Delhi and Sheikh Abdullah. Nehru’s death also put greater power in the hands of those who believes that J&K should be fully integrated within India. Abdullah was arrested again in 1965, but, in 1967, after yet another rigged election in J&K, New Delhi, headed now by Indira Gandhi of the INC, felt it was safe to release political prisoners in Kashmir, including Abdullah. Abdullah yet again advocated for a plebiscite with the Plebiscite Front to determine the will of the Kashmiris which garnered popular support among citizens and other political parties within the state, but was ill-received in New Delhi. The New Delhi government decided to bar this political party from contesting the elections, declaring them an “unlawful organization”127. Abdullah was arrested again. Elections were ‘won’ by the Indian Congress who had little opposition with the Plebiscite Front banned from participating.128

In 1972, after another incursion by the Pakistan military into J&K, the Simla Agreement was held where both India and Pakistan came together to discuss their differences especially with regards to J&K. India pushed for the Ceasefire Line to become the international boundary, while Pakistan denied this in favour of possession of the entire state. However, with Pakistan defeated, they accepted the terms: both sides would accept the Ceasefire Line (which then became the Line of Control) and the two countries would meet to discuss a final solution to J&K. After this agreement, it was generally agreed that J&K had obtained a permanent place within the Indian Union and the need for a plebiscite to be held was discarded without ever consulting with the Kashmiri people. Abdullah could no longer pursue a plebiscite goal; instead, he had to succumb to changing his line of reason to determine what the role of J&K within India should be.129

After this agreement, New Delhi began to relax its hold on J&K, releasing political prisoners, including Abdullah. However, gradually protests began against the Indian administration, many refusing to accept that they were formally part of the Indian Union. These protests were widely supported by Pakistan, 124 Malik, Iffat. Kashmir: Ethnic Conflict, International Dispute. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 125 Ibid. 126 Bose, Sumantra. Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003. 127 Malik, Iffat. Kashmir: Ethnic Conflict, International Dispute. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 128 Ibid. 129 Ibid.

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which, according to Iffat, was also responsible for inciting some of them. Abdullah now changed his course yet again succumbing to all New Delhi’s demands with a small degree of autonomy with regards to welfare and social issues. In return, he became Chief Minister (CM) of J&K for Congress.130

Abdullah began making demands to revive the National Conference as a coalition with the Plebiscite Front, a vision that was realised 1975. He demanded that the Congress be dissolved and National Conference take its place, which was only granted in 1977 after Indira Gandhi was defeated by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a national party popular within India. Later that same year, the state’s first free and fair elections were held, with the National Conference winning a landslide victory. All parties in the state were divided regionally, with BJP coalitions winning in Jammu, the National Conference in Kashmir and monks running on a Buddhist platform for Ladakh.131

Abdullah’s government began ruling with a host of corruption issues and nepotism, quelling resistance in Jammu. These protests had taken a religious turn: Hindus accused the National Conference for being biased toward Muslims. In Kashmir too, Muslims were no longer prepared to follow Abdullah blindly and protests ensued. In 1982, with Indira Gandhi back in power, relations between New Delhi and Kashmir were hostile yet again, when Abdullah died of a heart attack and his son, Farooq Abdullah, was instated as CM.132

Farooq differed from his father in that he accepted J&K as part of India, not demanding autonomy or unification with Pakistan. Congress tried to form a coalition with the National Conference, but this failed; instead, Farooq called for the preservation of Article 370. Indira Gandhi, campaigning in Jammu, tried to win Congress seats by threatening Kashmiri Muslim domination, marking the 1983 elections as one heavily influenced by religious politics. The National Conference won by a landslide; but, Indira Gandhi, angered by the anti-Indira sentiment that persisted in Farooq’s government, disposed of Farooq as CM and instated Jagmohan the Delhi-appointed governor of J&K, in his place. A few months later, Indira Gandhi died and her son, Rajiv Gandhi took over. G.M. Shah, Farooq’s opposition, was instated as Chief Minister in J&K, but was unable to halt the communal violence that had ensued. Rajiv understood that reinstating Farooq was the only solution, but he would not do so without a Congress-National Conference coalition first.133

In 1987, two new political parties stood for elections – the Jamaat-i-Islami had formed a coalition with the Muslim United Front with a large pro-Pakistan agenda; and the Hindu BJP was competing in Jammu. Once again, there were clear signs of rigging, and, although the Muslim United Front were winning a landslide victory, the National Conference were declared as the winners to the election. This time, however, the National Conference had fallen out of favour with the public, no longer supporting state autonomy, instead, actively collaborating with Congress. The fact that there was no longer a ‘moderate’ party to attract the public’s support coupled with multiple fraudulent elections, turned people away from politics and pushed them into pursuing more radical demands through extreme measures. This was the set-up and the basis for the heightened insurgency that emerged in the 90s.134

The Azaadi135

The azaadi movement has had several distinct phases. The intifada phase lasted from 1989 to approximately 1995. As a pro-separatist militant organisation, the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front were anti-National Conference and began to assassinate those whom they considered to be pro-India. The majority of those they assassinated were Muslims, approximately one-quarter of those killed were Hindus; however, these killings served to severely weaken the National Conference. In January 1990, soon after

Movement – 1989 Onwards

130 Ibid. 131 Ibid. 132 Ibid 133 Ibid. 134 Ibid. 135 Freedom.

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the successful boycott of India’s parliamentary elections, Farooq Abdullah was dismissed from office and Governor’s Rule ensued with Jagmohan, once again, at the head.136

In order to control the increased riots, Jagmohan implemented a repressive strategy to both prevent militancy and to issue a stern response when it did occur. He ordered intensive house searches, angering the Kashmiri people.137 The second half of January was marked by massive protests in response to these policies, the strength of which surprised even the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front, the organising body of these. To quell the rebellion, the GOI implemented paramilitary forces – composed of the federal government’s Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and Border Security Force (BSF) – in every neighbourhood in Srinagar. Most of these individuals not only displaced local J&K police – who the GOI had grown increasingly distrustful of – but these troops were mostly non-Muslim Indians from outside J&K, unfamiliar with the language and local customs. Between January 21 and 23, 1990, approximately three hundred unarmed protestors were shot dead in Srinagar by these troops. In response, the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front increased violence upon paramilitary troops, who responded with greater aggression.138

Some of India’s most repressive policies are reflected in the martial law that was set up. While there were already regulations in place to arrest anyone on suspicion of involvement in terrorist activities prior to 1989, 1990 came with two extremely authoritarian acts: the Jammu & Kashmir Disturbed Areas Act and the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA). The former of these was installed in all districts of the Kashmir Valley, and forbade a gathering of more than five people, allowed the paramilitary forces to shoot anyone they even suspected of disturbing public order, and allowed for the destruction of buildings that were thought to contain arms or supply resources (including shelter) to militants. The latter of these handed over control of the ‘disturbed areas’ to the military, allowing them to arrest people on suspicion of terrorist activity and to search premises and vehicles, both of which they could do without a warrant.139 Both these acts resulted in severe abuses of human rights – rape and molestation, torture and custodial killings, extra-judicial killings, arson and destruction, theft of property, etc. – as the Indian military viewed the entire population of Kashmir as suspects and branded them all as terrorists.140

As crackdowns and curfews continued, approximately three-quarters of Kashmiri Pandits began to flee from the Kashmir Valley mostly to Jammu, both driven by Muslim violence and by Jagmohan’s urging.141 This “exposed a critical flaw embedded in the ‘independent Kashmir’ concept – its complete inability to accommodate the multiple political allegiances regarding sovereignty and citizenship that exist even in the Kashmir Valley”142

. The expulsion of Kashmiri Pandits from Kashmir was evidence of the solidified communal lines that had emerged as a result of the conflict, where religion had become equated with political allegiances and forms of oppression.

In addition, a Pakistan-sponsored group began to infiltrate the Kashmir Valley to promote a pro-Pakistan sentiment in Kashmir, opposing the pro-separatist movement of the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front. Called the Hizb-ul Mujahideen, they battled with the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front and eventually gained the upper-hand with popular support in 1993. So, in 1994, Yasin Malik, head of Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front, declared a ceasefire. The Hizb-ul Mujahideen continued with militancy but they were losing support as many Kashmiris were much more interested in the pro-azaadi struggle than in acceding to Pakistan. In addition, the Hizb-ul Mujahideen began killing off many prominent Jammu &

136 Bose, Sumantra. Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003. 137 Malik, Iffat. Kashmir: Ethnic Conflict, International Dispute. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 138 Bose, Sumantra. Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003. 139 Malik, Iffat. Kashmir: Ethnic Conflict, International Dispute. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 140 Bose, Sumantra. Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003. 141 This fact has remained GOI’s main tool of propaganda to brand Kashmiris as terrorists. Despite this, many Hindus agree that, while they may have been targeted by militants, Muslim neighbours often offered them protection and they were treated very well by Muslims. In addition, the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front did not specifically target Hindus, with three-quarters of its target being Muslims. 142 Ibid.

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Kashmir Liberation Front members as well as citizens, and, by 1995, many Kashmiri residents began siding with the Indian counterinsurgency campaign.143

For the first time, the Kashmiri people were actively helping India defeat a terrorist force. With the help of civilians, India managed to reassert a large degree of control over the Kashmir Valley. From 1996-1998, a new phase of the azaadi movement set in: that of atrophy and demoralisation. Distinct from its earlier stage, this one was marked by a “loss of morale”144, with the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front crushed and the Hizb-ul Mujahideen fighting a losing battle. Although violence persisted, the beginnings of a “superficial normalcy”145 emerged, with successful elections held in 1996 – nearly a decade later since the last elections – and the National Conference winning by a landslide.146

During the intifada phase, a successful attempt was made to consolidate all groups opposed to Indian rule operating in J&K under an umbrella organisation called the All Parties Hurriyat Conference. This included both pro-separatist groups – such as the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front – and pro-Pakistan groups – like the Jamaat-i-Islami and the Muslim Conference, excluding only the National Conference. Thus, during the elections, the All Parties Hurriyat Conference whose members were not allowed to stand as candidates mounted a massive boycott, resulting in low voter turnout and extreme rigging to feign a large number of votes.147

Between 1999 and up to the present-day, a new phase of the azaadi movement has set in – the fidayeen phase, marking the era of new resistance with a large number of suicide bombers and tactics of firing at sight. Instead of small-scale attacks against police, this stage marks the beginning of much larger-scale attacks, on parliamentary buildings, Srinagar airport, railway stations in Jammu, legislature’s premises in Srinagar, etc. For this phase, there was a large degree of support from Pakistan, particularly in the border districts of Rajouri and Poonch. While the districts are majority Muslim, the towns are majority Hindu and have long endured the worst violence because of their location. These distinct communities are also often at heads with one another, and all the major Pakistan groups are active in these areas. The location of these towns has been crucial in propagating the war.148

Jammu & Kashmir Today This section is divided up into three categories – the first discussing the various regions of Kashmir, second, India’s repressive policies and their consequences, and third political parties operating today. Regions Appendix A provides a detailed map of Kashmir today. Kashmir can be divided up into three parts that are governed by three different countries – India, Pakistan, and China. There are two regions controlled by China – the one further north is called the Shaksam Valley and was ceded to China by Pakistan in 1963 following declining relations between India and China after India’s collaboration with the United States in fighting China. In order to gain support from China with regards to Kashmir, Pakistan signed an agreement with China giving them access to Pakistan’s Northern Areas in J&K.149 The other area, further south, is called Aksai Chin and, while Chinese controlled, is disputed territory between India and China. Being remote and sparsely populated, India was not aware that China had made in-roads into the area until a decade later, and is responsible for much of the conflict between India and China.150

143 Ibid.

144 Ibid. 145 Ibid. 146 Ibid. 147 Malik, Iffat. Kashmir: Ethnic Conflict, International Dispute. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 148 Bose, Sumantra. Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003. 149 Ibid. 150 Easen, Nick. CNN.com, Aksai Chin: China’s disputed slice of Kashmir. [Online] Available http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/05/24/aksai.chin/, February 27, 2010.

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Within India, the Siachen Glacier is disputed territory that was not outlined by the British during Partition. After several wars between India and Pakistan, India now controls this area.151 Jammu & Kashmir is divided into three distinct areas – Jammu (primarily Hindu), the Kashmir Valley (primarily Muslim), and Ladakh (primarily Buddhist). 95 percent of the Kashmir Valley population is Muslim, with 4 percent being Hindu; 66 percent of Jammu is Hindu, with 30 percent Muslim and 4 percent other; in Ladakh, 50 percent of residents are Buddhist, with 46 percent Muslim and 3 percent other.152

Within Pakistan, Kashmir is divided into two areas – the Northern Areas and Azad Jammu & Kashmir. Both areas are 99 percent Muslim. Dividing India and Pakistan is the Line of Control (LOC), which India has proposed should be the international boundary, but Pakistan has refused.153

Along this border, India has installed a large number of BSF and it is heavily protected and regarded as a prime source of infiltration from Pakistan.

India’s Repressive Policies and their Consequences Once described as ‘paradise on earth’, Kashmir used to thrive on tourism. However, since the period of militancy, there has been a large drop in the number of tourists visiting this area as many fear for their safety.154 The Indian government’s policies do nothing to help this. To this day, the AFSPA155 and the Disturbed Areas Act156 are still enacted in J&K. These policies have resulted in a large degree of human rights violations that continue till today and are the cause of much of the uprisings within the Kashmir Valley. In addition, Kashmir is the most highly militarised area in the world with a civilian-military ratio of 7:1157 and much of the military is in the cities. This has been another cause of revolt within Kashmir. There has also been a large degree of psychological consequences in response to these human rights abuses, and, six years ago, it was reported that 17 percent of the population suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).158

Although Article 370 would soften the blows of all these oppressive policies, while it is still in existence in the Indian Constitution, it is rarely enacted.

Political Groups Operating Within India, the two major political parties are the Indian National Congress (INC) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Currently, the INC is in power in New Delhi led by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Sonia Gandhi. It has been the ruling party for the majority of the time since independence. Initially formed as a pro-independence party, post-1947 it became associated with the Gandhi-Nehru dynasty.159 The BJP was formed in 1980 and currently Nitin Gadkari is its president. Other influential party figures include Arun Jaitley, L K Advani and Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the latter two of whom were founding members. The BJP promotes Hindutva or the idea of a Hindu nationalism and advocates for conservative social policies and is generally less favoured in Kashmir.160

There are three influential, recognised state parties operating in J&K today. The Jammu & Kashmir National Conference is currently ruling, with CM Omar Abdullah161 at the head.162

151 Siachen Glacier / Operation Meghdoot. [Online] Available

The Jammu &

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/siachen.htm, February 27, 2010. 152 BBC News, The Future of Kashmir? [Online] Available http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/south_asia/03/kashmir_future/html/, February 27, 2010. 153 Ibid. 154 Expressindia.com, ‘Paradise on Earth’ struggles to seduce tourists. [Online] Available http://www.expressindia.com/news/fullstory.php?newsid=87049, February 27, 2010. 155 India: Parliamentarians must repeal the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Acts. Amnesty International. [Online] Available http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?id=ENGASA200222009&lang=e, February 27, 2010. 156 Jehangir, Inayat. Daily Excelsior, Withdraw troops from cities, towns: Mirwaiz. [Online] Available http://www.dailyexcelsior.com/web1/09dec19/news.htm, February 27, 2010. 157 Rafiq, Shoaib. Our History of Humiliation. [Online] Available http://www.worldpulse.com/node/17800, February 27, 2010. 158 MedIndia, Doctors Claim Decline in PTSD Cases in Kashmir. [Online] Available http://www.medindia.net/news/Doctors-Claim-Decline-in-PTSD-Cases-in-Kashmir-62299-1.htm, February 27, 2010. 159 Infoplease, Indian National Congress. [Online] Available http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/history/A0825112.html, February 27, 2010. 160 Encyclopedia Britannica, Bharatiya Janata Party. [Online] Available http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/64033/Bharatiya-Janata-Party, February 27, 2010. 161 Son of Farooq Abdullah.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/siachen.htm

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/south_asia/03/kashmir_future/html/

http://www.expressindia.com/news/fullstory.php?newsid=87049

http://www.dailyexcelsior.com/web1/09dec19/news.htm

http://www.worldpulse.com/node/17800

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Kashmir People’s Democratic Party (PDP) was founded in 1999 and is presently headed by Mehbooba Mufti.163 Finally, the Jammu & Kashmir National Panthers Party is based in Jammu and is currently headed by Bhim Singh.164

There are a number of political parties that are unrecognised by India operating within Kashmir as well under the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC). The most widely recognised ones are the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) headed by Yasin Malik, the Jamaat-i-Islami headed by Munawar Hasan, the Tehreek-e-Hurriyat headed by Ali Shah Geelani, the Awami Action Committee headed by Mirwaiz Umar Farooq and the Jammu & Kashmir Ittihadul Muslimeen headed by Mohammad Abbas Ansari.165

Many of these parties are responsible for the recurrent strikes in Kashmir in protest of Indian rule. Based on Kashmir’s past history with election rigging and with the rise in the number of parties within the APHC, elections are always a contentious time within the state with apprehensions about voter turnout and violence around this time.

2008 Amarnath Land Transfer Controversy Seen in the context of the history of Kashmiri politics, it is more understandable, now, why the 2008 Amarnath land transfer was so controversial. With Kashmiri politics growing increasingly divisive over religion, the smallest change in religious rules or regulations can spark massive riots. On May 26, 2008, the GOI decided to transfer 100 acres of forestland to the Amarnath board for the purposes of the annual Hindu pilgrimage.166 The Amarnath cave, recognised as the home of the Lord Shiva, the god of destruction, is located a little away from Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir, and every year, this pilgrimage attracts thousands of Hindus as “one of the holiest shrines in the Hindu faith”.167 In July and August, “his image is said to appear in ice”, which is why the pilgrimage takes place at this time.168

Initial resistance to the land transfer order came from environmental concerns: environmentalists argued that thousands of trees were being felled thereby disrupting the delicate ecological balance present in the region.169 However, the conflict gradually evolved into a communal one with actors divided along religious and regional lines. The PDP threatened to withdraw support to the INC if the land transfer order was not revoked and then did so. The revocation of the order by the state government came on July 1, which resulted in reactionary protests from the Jammu side for the order to be reinstated.170

In August, Kashmiri fruit-growers claimed that there was an economic blockade imposed along the Srinagar-Jammu highway. This was denied by the government, and, in response, on August 11, defying orders, Kashmiris marched to the LOC to protest.171

162 The Hindu, Omar Abdullah takes oath as Chief Minister of J&K. [Online] Available

The next few days marked a period of a large number of casualties as many Kashmiri protestors were fired upon and an APHC leader died in the

http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/000200901051606.htm, February 27, 2010. 163 Maps of India, Jammu and Kashmir People’s Democratic Party. [Online] Available http://www.mapsofindia.com/jammu-kashmir/government-politics/peoples-dempcratic-party.html, February 27, 2010. 164 Rediff.com, Delhi court dismisses PIL for deferring J&K poll. [Online] Available http://sports.rediff.com/news/2002/aug/21jk5.htm, February 27, 2010. 165 All Parties Hurriyat Conference. [Online] Available http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/Hurriyat.htm, February 27, 2010. 166 NDTV.com, The Amarnath land transfer controversy. [Online] Available http://www.ndtv.com/convergence/ndtv/story.aspx?id=NEWEN20080054680, February 27, 2010. 167 BBC News, The pilgrimage to Amarnath. [Online] Available http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2176165.stm, April 13, 2010. 168 Ibid. 169 Deshpande, Rajeev. The Times of India, Controversy over Amarnath land allotment poll gimmick?. [Online] Available http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/File_Controversy_over_Amarnath_land_allotment_poll_gimmick/articleshow/3173849.cms, April 13, 2010. 170 NDTV.com, Amarnath row divides Jammu and Kashmir. [Online] Available http://www.ndtv.com/convergence/ndtv/story.aspx?id=NEWEN20080060403, April 13, 2010. 171 BBC News, Police fire on Kashmir protestors. [Online] Available http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7553317.stm, April 13, 2010.

http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/000200901051606.htm

http://www.mapsofindia.com/jammu-kashmir/government-politics/peoples-dempcratic-party.html


http://sports.rediff.com/news/2002/aug/21jk5.htm

http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/Hurriyat.htm

http://www.ndtv.com/convergence/ndtv/story.aspx?id=NEWEN20080054680

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2176165.stm

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crossfire.172 Finally, on August 31, the agitation ended with both sides agreeing that the land would be used temporarily for the purposes of the Amarnath pilgrimage and then returned.173

Especially with state elections scheduled for the same year – always a contentious time in Kashmir – the conflict only heightened the agitation, bringing to the forefront the complex religious politics present in the state. Throughout the course of the land controversy, opinions became increasingly polarised with the GOI’s failure to handle things appropriately and hesitating on proposing and sticking to a solution, thereby only adding to the fragile political situation within the state. Based on the geographical divide along religious lines among the regions of Jammu and that of Kashmir, the conflict became increasingly more difficult to mediate between actors on either side. Conclusion Recognising that politics in Kashmir are contentious, how these diverse actors are represented in the press is important in determining how political views regarding the conflict may be shaped. Indeed, media represents one of the few, existing avenues through which the Kashmiri people can display their active resistance to Indian rule, with the plebiscite never held and India-Pakistan talks regarding Kashmir rarely involving a Kashmiri representative. In this sense, then, the media displays the will of the Kashmiri people and is their ‘plebiscite’ by proxy. In analysing this representation, a better understanding of how the media may be used to alter or harden opinions regarding Kashmir can be reached. Although only a small percentage of the Indian population read English press, the fact that this is an elite population attests to the fact that this strata of society may have some influence within political circles. Comparing The Times of India and Tehelka, it is important to analyse how the coverage of the 2008 Amarnath land transfer controversy converges and diverges and thereby the manner in which the press can influence these populations. The next chapter will look at the coverage of the controversy within Tehelka.

172 Times Online, Tensions rise as Kashmiri leader Sheikh Abdul Aziz shot dead. [Online] Available http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article4507868.ece, April 13, 2010. 173 The Economic Times, Amarnath land row: SASB can use land temporarily. [Online] Available http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/JK_Sangharsh_Samiti_agrees_to_peace/articleshow/3427212.cms, April 13, 2010.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article4507868.ece

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CHAPTER THREE Introduction Tehelka is the Hindi word for ‘sensation’, but, among Indian intellectual circles, it has become more commonly associated with a critical and analytical alternative newsweekly. While Tehelka was first started by Tarun Tejpal as the website Tehelka.com in March 2000174, it only rose to fame one year later in 2001 first by exposing a match-fixing scandal in professional cricket175 and later after the sting operation titled “Operation West End” renowned for catching, on video, a senior politician accepting a bribe in a defence deal leading to his and other party members’ eventual resignation.176 The consequences for Tehelka.com were dire: “the government embarked on a three-year-long vendetta against Tehelka, raiding its offices and those of its angel investors, ostensibly for investigating income tax compliance, and thus provoking a protracted legal battle between Tejpal and the government”177

.

But Tehelka’s success story comes from its ability to persist despite this setback; even without investors and having been run into the ground, in January 2004 it was re-launched as a national newsweekly with support from “India’s civil society elite […] who wanted to see the project survive” as it was an “independent voice”178. Since then, Tehelka has surged to success with the return of its website and the emergence of a new Hindi edition. In addition, its circulation is over 110,000 copies and its readership of its printed edition crosses 1.2 million per week.179

Tehelka was thus supported for being bold in its non-traditional and critical coverage of issues and groups not covered in the mainstream press. Kashmir is one such issue, especially during the 2008 Amarnath land transfer controversy which was analysed closely by Tehelka. Tehelka Related to Literature Review Previous studies180 have investigated the role of alternative media in political conflict, describing it as a venue through which to address silences in mainstream media and to cover issues from different perspectives than those portrayed in the mainstream. However, few of the academic sources I have examined have looked at alternative media in ethnic conflict in particular and how it relates to mainstream media. In this chapter, I explore the representation of the 2008 Amarnath land transfer controversy in Tehelka during the time period from May 27, 2008 to September 13, 2008181

. The data collection within this time period produced a sample size of eight articles on which I performed content and discourse analysis. Based on this analysis, I argue that Tehelka provides more complex coverage of the conflict compared to mainstream media through two means:

1. By covering a range of issues from a diverse set of actors from both sides of the conflict – Jammu and Kashmir; these actors include citizens of Kashmir, citizens of Jammu, the BJP, the AYSS, separatist factions within Kashmir, the Kashmiri government and the GOI, thereby not leaving out

174 About Us. Who’s Who@Tehelka. [Online] Available http://www.tehelka.com/about/team.asp, December 8, 2009. 175 Morrison, Dan. India’s cultural elite revive muckracking magazine. The Christian Science Monitor. July 26, 2004. 176 Khanna, Tarun. Billions of Entrepreneurs: How China and India are Reshaping their Futures – and Yours. Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing, 2007. 177 Ibid. 178 Morrison, Dan. India’s cultural elite revive muckracking magazine. The Christian Science Monitor. July 26, 2004. 179 Sinha, Ashish. Covert to get its first cover story. Business Standard. May 12, 2008. 180 See Sharon Ling and Oren Meyers from Chapter One. 181 Although the land deal was settled on August 31, 2008, I chose to include the next two editions in of Tehelka for a retrospective perspective of the entire conflict.

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important events and actors while simultaneously not trying to create rigid categories within which to place ethnic groups.

2. By not catering to only one party’s interests and being critical of all actors involved with greater

responsibility placed upon the GOI as a central, democratically accountable actor who has failed to fulfil its peace-keeping function.

The argument made in this chapter aligns with how existing research depicts the role of alternative media in political conflict – as one that attempts to fill in silences and approach issues in a more complex manner – but provides concrete data of this kind of media in a situation of ethnic conflict, which, according to my research, has not been investigated previously, thereby filling a gap in the literature. The remainder of this chapter is divided into five major sections: data collection, overview, content analysis hypothesis and results as related to each major category, discourse analysis hypothesis and results as related to each major category, and general discussion of the findings and how they relate to the hypothesis and research question. The data for this chapter is drawn from online archives of Tehelka’s English print editions during the time period of the conflict. Data Collection Going through every edition of the online archives of Tehelka from the start of the conflict on May 26, 2008 till September 13, 2008, I identified eight articles that directly discussed the politics of the conflict. Articles that only made a reference to the conflict or that looked at other aspects – economic, the impact of the conflict on other geographical areas, etc. – were removed from the sample. I chose the end date for data collection from Tehelka as September 13, 2008 as that would appropriately allow for reflections of the conflict one edition after it was over182

. For a summary of the articles gathered and an understanding of the article numbers mentioned throughout the rest of this chapter, refer to Appendix B.

Overview Before discussing the findings from the content and discourse analysis in greater detail, it is worth drawing attention to some key facts about the eight articles collected from Tehelka that relate to the 2008 Amarnath land transfer controversy. The first concerns the date that Tehelka started mentioning the issue; the second concerns the journalists of the pieces. Although the decision to transfer land was declared on May 26, 2008183, coverage by Tehelka only began on July 5, 2008. This fact is reflective of the characteristics of any newsweekly: while newspapers may have short articles about a variety of issues, newsweeklies have a limited number of editions and space and therefore will only cover issues that can be reported in-depth.184 Waiting until July to start reporting on the issue gave an analytical newsweekly like Tehelka a significant amount of time to reflect over what had transpired, thereby allowing them the potential to report more critically. In addition, although the decision to transfer land occurred as early as May 26, 2008, the conflict became more controversial only in late June and early July when there were protests in Jammu and the decision to revoke the transfer of land occurred.185

Thus, recognising that Tehelka covers issues across India as a country and Kashmir is not its sole focus, it can be inferred that it reserved reporting on the Amarnath land transfer conflict for a later date when the conflict intensified.

182 Although the final decision about the controversy came out on August 31, 2008, the next edition of Tehelka was on September 6, 2008; thus any reporting about the end of the conflict could only have come in this edition or subsequent editions 183 Aug 31 Amarnath accord improved on May order, but very similar. Thaindian News. September 3, 2008. [Online] Available http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/uncategorized/aug-31-amarnath-accord-improved-on-may-order-but-very-similar_10091916.html. 184 Gans, Herbert J. Deciding What’s News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek and Time. Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2004. 185 See Table 1 in Chapter 1.

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Another point to note is about the journalists who cover the Amarnath land transfer issue. The eight articles were written by only three people – two by Anand K. Sahay, two by Peerzada Arshad Hamid, three by Harinder Baweja, and one co-written by Sahay and Hamid. Once again, this may be reflective of a newsweekly – with a small staff, more journalists may not have been able to write about the issue with other staff members assigned to report on different regions. This is supported by the fact that all eight articles are in the Current Affairs section of the newspaper to which only a few journalists may have been assigned. Finally, it is important to note that article 4 was an interview and therefore spoken; thus the answers may be reflective of the interviewee and not the beliefs of Tehelka. Print journalism can be edited and therefore the journalists are conscious of the manner in which they are writing; interviews, while perhaps edited to remove content (and therefore may not reflect everything the interviewee intended), cannot be changed in terms of what the person said. Thus, the results from article 4 should be interpreted with these facts in mind. Content Analysis As discussed in the Methodology section in Chapter 1, content analysis was performed on every article by borrowing the four categories constructed under Hook and Pu’s research186

: problem identification, attribution, evaluation and prescription with the attribution category enlarged to encompass victimisation as well. The options under each category are elaborated upon in the Methodology section in Chapter 1, but it is important to note that articles for Tehelka did not necessarily fit neatly into one option, including several under each category; therefore options under the categories were not always mutually exclusive.

Problem Identification Hypothesis as Related to Tehelka Under the problem identification category for alternative media, I would expect Tehelka to present the 2008 Amarnath land transfer controversy as complex and related to a series of issues, thereby recognising that it is multi-causal. Diagnosing the root of the conflict as only one of the options – religious, oppression / unfair treatment or inflammation by political parties – would silence the other potential reasons for the controversy and therefore would run contrary to what I would expect from alternative media. In addition, I would expect Tehelka to attribute a problem nearly every single time, thereby looking at the conflict analytically. Results Table 1: Problem Identification for 2008 Amarnath Land Transfer Controversy in J&K by Tehelka, July – September 2008

No. Religious Oppression / Unfair Treatment


Not Applicable

1 X 2 X X 3 X X 4 X X 5 X 6 X 7 X 8 X

Total 4 3 4 0 Percent 50 37.5 50 0

186 Hook, Steven W. and Xiaoyu Pu. Framing Sino-American Relations under Stress: A Reexamination of News Cover of the 2001 Spy Plane Crisis. Asian Affairs.

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From the above results, it is evident that the problems discussed within the eight articles in Tehelka seem to be quite equally distributed with regards to the way it identifies the problem: in other words, it does not believe the conflict to be a result of any one factor, but a combination of different factors. For example, article 1 constantly mentions the words ‘Hindu’ and ‘Muslim’ and talks about how the conflict must be seen in this context; article 5 mentions in the first line how “politicians in Jammu and in the Kashmir Valley have opportunistically fanned the communal conflagration”; article 8 discusses the GOI’s strategy to “convert the entire Valley into one large prison”. Tehelka’s progression of coverage parallels the conflict in that it is at first defined as a religious issue but, over time, it becomes synonymous with the larger, historically related context of oppression by the GOI, thereby offering a realistic perspective of the conflict. Throughout, it seems, Tehelka believes the conflict to be inflamed by political parties thereby criticising many of the politicians involved. The results from this category seem to validate the hypothesis about alternative media presenting a host of factors as the problem of the Amarnath land transfer controversy as opposed to a deterministic, one-factor problem association. In addition, the fact that these three options are not mutually exclusive for many of the articles is significant in that it emphasises that Tehelka attributes more than one underlying cause for the controversy and reinforces the function of alternative media. Finally, Tehelka attributes a problem in every article, again confirming the hypothesis that it provides a critical outlook on the conflict. Attribution and Victimisation Hypothesis as Related to Tehelka Similar to the problem identification category, I would not expect Tehelka to attribute the conflict to any one actor as, if this were the case, then there would be polarisation of blame, feeding into what mainstream media allegedly does – demonise. Following the theory that alternative media serves to combat this one-dimensional view of attributing blame, I would expect Tehelka to be critical of many of the actors involved, even if it asserts that some play a more dominant role. In particular, I would expect Tehelka to become increasingly critical of the GOI as the conflict progresses because, as a democratically accountable actor whose function is to maintain peace and resolve conflict, the fact that the controversy is allowed to go on for such a significant length of time points to how the GOI fails to fulfil this function. In addition, I would expect Tehelka to view non-political actors as victims to the conflict who have been subject to policies from the GOI. I would expect this victimisation to be present equally on both sides of the conflict for citizens in Kashmir and in Jammu, thereby not taking up any one ‘side’ to the conflict. Results Table 2: Attribution of Responsibility for 2008 Amarnath Land Transfer Controversy in J&K by Tehelka, July – September 2008

No. BJP SASB/

AYSS

Jammu Citizens

GOI Kashmir Gov.

CRPF Kashmiri Citizens

Kashmir Separatist

Parties

PDP N/A

1 X X 2 X 3 X X X X 4 X 5 X X X X 6 X X X X 7 X 8 X X

Total 3 2 0 7 3 1 0 2 1 0 Percent 37.5 25 0 87.5 37.5 12.5 0 25 12.5 0

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Table 3: Victimisation for 2008 Amarnath Land Transfer Controversy in J&K by Tehelka, July – September 2008

No. Jammu Citizens

Kashmir Pandits

Pilgrims CRPF Kashmir Citizens

N/A

1 X 2 X 3 X 4 X 5 X 6 X X 7 X X X X 8 X

Total 2 1 1 0 4 4 Percent 25 12.5 12.5 0 50 50 As expected, attribution for the controversy was placed on multiple actors involved; indeed, almost every article had more than one actor in the attribution category. This conforms to the theory of alternative media in that it is critical of a range of actors, not demonising any one in particular, allowing for an analytical examination of all actors and not absolving any from responsibility. However, it should be noted that all the actors are within the political sphere, citizens are never attributed responsibility. Thus, this analysis seems to suggest that Tehelka validates the hypothesis about alternative media in that it places responsibility on a range of actors all of whom are involved within the political sphere and thus have a degree of agency in influencing the course of the controversy. This is also in line with Tehelka’s mission to provide critical analysis on political events. Important to mention is that the majority of articles – seven out of the eight – assign the GOI with a share of responsibility for the controversy. For example, article 6 constantly mentions how the GOI has “failed miserably to come up with a solution to the Amarnath row”; similarly, article 3 discusses how the GOI has “landed the country […] in trouble” by its failure to control the issue. While this does not serve to polarise between the two sides – Kashmir and Jammu – it does present the GOI in a negative light and criticises it for failing in its function of maintaining peace in the region. Thus, in attempting to provide an analytical perspective of the conflict, Tehelka demonises the GOI. However, most of the articles agree that the GOI is not solely responsible for what happened and there are other actors involved as well. It is also important to note that Tehelka does not seem to favour one side – Jammu or Kashmir; Hindu or Muslim – over the other. AYSS and BJP are both Hindu parties that operated in Jammu during this conflict; altogether, they are attributed blame five times. For example, article 2 mentions how the BJP “is playing with fire” and “placing the country in danger” and article 5 describes the AYSS as “spearheading the agitation in Jammu”. The separatist parties within Kashmir as well as the PDP are commonly perceived as having a pro-Kashmiri and anti-Hindu sentiment and they are also attributed blame three times, while the Kashmiri Government, which should serve as a bridge between the citizens and New Delhi, are also held responsible, with article 1 describing them as “neglectful”. Thus, it is evident that the attribution of responsibility for the controversy is equally spread out over a range of actors on both sides. In addition, Tehelka presents citizens from both sides as victims to their policies. Article 8 mentions how unarmed protestors were killed; article 7 includes perspectives from pilgrims and Kashmiri Pandits who are labelled ‘victims’. Again, it is important to note that all the victims are not directly involved in the political sphere. However, half of the articles do not mention a ‘victim’; instead, almost all the articles describe the citizens living within each region of the state as following the requests of their politicians and do not describe them at fault for their actions and thus the citizens from both Kashmir and Jammu are dissolved of all responsibility in the controversy. Whenever a victim is mentioned, it is not for the purposes of evoking sympathy, but, rather, to pinpoint a political actor who should be attributed

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responsibility for the situation. Thus, the purpose of victimisation within Tehelka is primarily to provide critical commentary about who should be attributed responsibility. This seems to conform to the hypothesis about Tehelka as an alternative media source in that it is arguing that the main actors are political and the consequences are suffered by the citizens. Thus, while I would expect mainstream media to polarise all aspects of the conflict including political parties and civilians in the two regions, alternative media seems to be attributing much of the problem to politics and instead polarises between politicians as the demons and the citizens as the victims. Indeed, this attribution of blame certainly seems to suggest that if politicians engage in negotiations, then perhaps the issue can be resolved. Evaluation Hypothesis as Related to Tehelka If alternative media indeed serves to be more critical about issues than the mainstream and provide a more analytical framework within which to view ethnic conflict, then I would expect the type of articles it covers to be more thematic in nature than episodic. Episodic articles would only serve to provide details of an event and therefore update readers on what is happening in the region as opposed to being critical; thematic coverage, on the other hand, will mention several episodes but will analyse these episodes more in depth, allowing for critique and locating themes in the text. I would also expect there to be a range of recurring themes in alternative media, serving to present the conflict from a variety of standpoints; thus the greater the spread in themes the more Tehelka would fulfil its alternative function. Results Table 4: Evaluation for 2008 Amarnath Land Transfer Controversy in J&K by Tehelka, July – September 2008

No. TYPE RECURRING THEMES Thematic Episodic Religion Separatism Oppression /

Victimise Attribution of Responsibility

1 X X X 2 X X X 3 X X X X 4 X X 5 X X 6 X X 7 X X X 8 X X X

Total 8 0 2 2 3 7 Percent 100 0 25 25 37.5 87.5 Indeed, the results seem to be in line with the hypothesis. Overwhelmingly – in fact 100% of the time – Tehelka’s news coverage is thematic. While articles often discuss several episodes within the controversy, this summary of events only serves to supplement the critical analysis. This suggests that Tehelka as a weekly, critical magazine is not concerned with the day-to-day happenings within J&K, but rather with how these can be viewed in a larger context. By avoiding episodic coverage, it can analyse the conflict in a more complex manner. However, not all of this should be attributed to the critical nature of Tehelka; part of it is also due to the fact that Tehelka, as a newsweekly, does not serve to update readers on day-to-day happenings in the conflict, but, rather, to provide more in-depth coverage which would involve analytical coverage. In terms of themes mentioned, there is a large spread, with articles covering all four options. However, seven of the eight articles attribute responsibility to an actor as a major theme. Combining this with the results from Table 2, it is evident that much of the time this is the GOI as the largest, democratically accountable actor who is failing to fulfil its peace-making function, thereby confirming the hypothesis. Additionally, as time progresses, there is a transformation in recurring themes beginning with religion and

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separatism and evolving into oppression. This reinforces the findings from Table 1 in which the conflict begins with being defined as religious and then transforms into one of oppression, viewed in the context of the history of the Kashmiri conflict as a whole. Thus, this category serves to primarily support the hypothesis in supporting the view that Tehelka provides critical coverage and includes a range of themes in its analysis of the conflict. Prescription Hypothesis as Related to Tehelka If alternative media serves to provide an analytical framework within which to view the conflict, I would expect it to present a more complex argument than that of just employing or revoking the land transfer for the purposes of the Amarnath yatra, a decision that would support only one side of the conflict – Jammu or Kashmir. Instead, negotiations among the different parties involved would be expected as a progressive solution the conflict, involving a range of actors and establishing dialogue. Specifically, if Tehelka is critical and views the controversy as a historic one, it would aim to resolve the conflict through encouraging negotiations between the GOI and Kashmir. Results Table 5: Prescription for 2008 Amarnath Land Transfer Controversy in J&K by Tehelka, July – September 2008

No. Employ Transfer

Revoke Transfer Negotiations Not Applicable

1 X 2 X 3 X 4 X 5 X 6 X 7 X 8 X

Total 0 1 4 3 Percent 0 12.5 50 37.5 It is important to recognise that for all four cases where negotiations were prescribed as the solution, it was not solely for the purpose of the land transfer controversy but, rather, negotiations at a higher level, urging dialogue between Kashmiris and the GOI as a resolution to the age-old conflict. Indeed, as time progresses, Tehelka increasingly advocates for negotiations rather than abstaining from suggesting a solution, as it becomes increasingly evident that the issue is a complex one. For example, article 5 points to the urgency of “political engagement” with the “troubled state” and article 7 mentions how New Delhi needs to communicate with Kashmiris “politically, not militarily”. All articles stated that the GOI has been dealing with Kashmir militarily from the beginning rather than politically or economically and has rarely engaged the citizens or political parties within Kashmir. These results, for the most part, conform to the hypothesis about alternative media. Only one article suggests revoking the land transfer agreement and it is surprising that three do not propose a solution at all. Half of the articles provide a more complex diagnosis of a solution than just to employ or revoke the land transfer and view discussions as a manner in which to involve diverse actors, providing a more sustainable resolution and does not take up any one side. This suggests that Tehelka views the land transfer controversy as one that has been historically unaddressed and deeper than just the conflicting desires of the people of Jammu and Kashmiri citizens.

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Discussion of Content Analysis Results The results of the content analysis confirm, to a large extent, the hypothesis about alternative media in Chapter One and the ones furthered within each category. Keeping in line with the hypothesis that alternative media serves to provide a more complex perspective than that of the mainstream, Tehelka represents those actors directly involved with Kashmiri politics in the 2008 Amarnath land transfer controversy in a critical manner, asserting that they all had a part to play in furthering the conflict, while also implying that the GOI played a larger role than other factions. Further, Tehelka dissolves all responsibility from actors who are regular citizens or who do not have the power to directly influence Kashmiri politics, describing them either as victims or following the demands of their leaders. In this manner, Tehelka serves not to divide between Muslim vs. Hindu and Kashmir vs. Jammu but instead to acknowledge that the problem emanates from the Centre and is mainly political. In addition, in terms of problem identification, Tehelka recognises that the conflict is far too complex for it to be attributed to any singular, deterministic cause. Similarly, for prescribing a solution, Tehelka’s suggestion of negotiations assumes that the problem cannot be tackled in terms of just a temporary resolution that deals with only the land transfer, but has to be seen in the broader context of the history of the conflict in Kashmir. The recurring themes in the articles reflect this in that there is a plurality of them. Thus, Tehelka serves to provide a complex picture of the controversy that does not pin blame on a particular actor on one side, thereby denying this polarisation. In the next section, I will investigate the articles in more depth through discourse analysis. Discourse Analysis As discussed in the Methodology section in Chapter One, the discourse analysis will focus on four major categories: headlines and leads, generalisation and specificity, degree of certitude implied and literary techniques implemented. The remainder of this section breaks the discourse analysis down into these categories. Headlines and Leads Hypothesis as Related to Tehelka Headlines and leads are what initially draws a reader to the article and provides information about the crux of the article; it may also steer the reader to interpret the text in a pre-determined manner. If Tehelka indeed serves the function of alternative media, I would expect headlines and leads to be critical of the range of actors involved and the degree of complexity of the conflict, with greater emphasis placed on the GOI. This would present a more rounded analysis of the conflict rather than addressing solely one issue, thereby filling in silences. Results187

Note: I included the questions in the interview with Rekha Chowdhary in article 4 as they were in bold and therefore would most likely be an aspect of the article that readers would be drawn to.

It is evident that Tehelka seems to affirm the hypothesis about the function of alternative media. First, almost all headlines pinpoint a political actor who is attributed responsibility and the range of actors is quite broad from both sides of the conflict – Jammu and Kashmir; Hindu and Muslim. At the national level, the articles point to the BJP (article 2: “The BJP’s communal stance), Congress and the GOI (article 6: “the Centre appears a hapless bystander”), and at the state level politicians in J&K (article 5: “Politicians in Jammu and in the Kashmir Valley have opportunistically fanned the communal conflagration”). Traditionally, I would expect that politicians within Jammu and the BJP188

187 For full results, see Appendix C.

would support the Hindu or Jammu side in employing the transfer of the land; I would also expect that Kashmiri

188 Based on its Hindutva ideology.

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politicians and Congress189 would support the Muslim or Kashmiri side of revoking the land transfer; and finally the GOI190

should aim to mediate the conflict. The fact that all these actors are attributed responsibility serves to reinforce that Tehelka provides a critical analysis of the conflict across the board and its belief that no one political party should take full responsibility or should be denied responsibility for their part. In doing so, Tehelka also goes against the hegemonic and powerful actors involved in the conflict at the state and party level, while simultaneously siding with the underdog – citizens who have little political representation – thereby confirming its alternative function in being critical of power. Very few of the headlines examine specific events within the controversy, reinforcing the view that the articles are thematic in nature and confirming Tehelka’s role as a newsweekly that does not update readers on day-to-day coverage but is analytical of events. This is also reflective of Tehelka as an alternative newsweekly in that it attempts to insert its own opinion not just cover facts, and opinion is more closely related with implicating individuals for their involvement in the conflict.

Second, the headlines and leads can be viewed as quite provocative in that they attribute responsibility to different actors, which, it is assumed, would get both the section of the population that supports the actor and the actor themselves riled up. In addition, most of the headlines provide an explicit reason for why they believe that actor should be attributed responsibility; hence Tehelka backs up its criticisms with concrete justifications. For example, article 8 notes that “New Delhi must start talking to Hurriyat”, while article 3 mentions how the problems in J&K have brought “little credit to the Congress-led coalition government in Kashmir”. The fact that they do this demonstrates that Tehelka is reasonable, lending them a large degree of legitimacy in its arguments. While this may seem to serve a polarising function in that Tehelka appears to go against the actions of a certain set of politicians, the fact that it does this across the board for many of the actors involved on both sides of the conflict supports the idea that it is presenting all actors equally and not siding with anyone – Jammu or Kashmir, Hindu or Muslim. Thus, while Tehelka may provoke angry responses, these are collected from all sides. Evidently, Tehelka’s aim is not one of peace-bridging, but, instead, to present all actors involved in a critical manner and therefore can sometimes be quite inflammatory. Generalisation and Specificity Hypothesis as Related to Tehelka Generalisations serve to homogenise a group of people and associate certain stereotypes or characteristics with this group making them appear less complex than they really are, and assigning meaning to what the group does. Specificity, on the other hand, serves to distinguish and differentiate one actor from another, presenting a group of people as complex. By asserting that not all members of a certain group are assigned the same characteristic, the journalist ascribes plurality to the group. If alternative media indeed serves to present a complex picture, it would attempt to avoid generalising the controversy and stereotyping actors as much as possible, and instead be as specific as it can when referring to various actors involved in the conflict. Results191

In general, there seems to be an equal split between generalising and specifying with earlier reports using specificity to a greater degree than later reports. This result does not reject or confirm the hypothesis – rather, if I were to scale how ‘alternative’ Tehelka is as a media source based on this data, I would uncover that it is not completely alternative but also does not fit into the category of mainstream media.

A particularly important article to examine is number 7, titled Nine Ways Of Looking At A Crisis. The article involves perspectives from nine actors, but each actor is given a label. For example, the journalist has the label of ‘the reporter’, while Syed Ali Shah Geelani, is given ‘the separatist’ label, Rattan Chaku, a Kashmiri Pandit, is given the label of ‘the refugee’, etc. The problem does not stem from the fact that

189 Who was in power in J&K during the time of the conflict. 190 Referred to as ‘the Centre’. 191 For full results, See Appendix D.

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this article employs perspectives from a range of different actors, indeed this fits in with the function of alternative media; more so, the problem is with the idea of labelling. Labelling is a large generalisation, implying, firstly, that distinct and neat categories of people do exist, taking away from the complexity of groups involved. Second, by documenting the opinions of one person under a label, it is implied that this actor is a spokesperson for the entire population. For example, Tehelka interviews an Amarnath pilgrim, Prince Khajuria who claims that there were no problems en route and that the Muslims took good care of the pilgrims. However, because Khajuria is placed under the label of ‘the pilgrim’, it is assumed that he speaks for all pilgrims when he says this. This grouping of opinions serves to stereotype. Finally, the labels that the article assigns are only sometimes objective and, when they are not, reflect the biases of Tehelka. For instance, under the label of ‘the moderate’, Farooq Abdullah’s viewpoints are voiced, while under ‘the agitator’ a member of the AYSS is quoted. In assigning these labels, Tehelka is inserting their personal convictions of the conflict into the reporting, framing each set of actors in a particular way and thereby lacking objectivity. Thus, the article presents the different actors in a simplistic manner, asserting that only one group of people can fit under each label, and making it seem as though all sides and angles of the conflict have been covered when, in fact, there are only nine views presented. Therefore, while attempting to present diverse viewpoints, the very concept of labelling is completely against the function of alternative media in that it stereotypes, suggesting that Tehelka may not be alternative in all respects. Level of Certitude – Quotations and Statistics Hypothesis as Related to Tehelka A newspaper article may assert a level of certitude through several means, but the two that I analyse within my research are that of the use of quotations and statistics. Quotations serve to grant the article a degree of certitude and express relevant actors’ opinions. In the context of Tehelka, I would expect articles to contain viewpoints from a range of actors on both sides of the conflict thereby presenting the controversy in a complex manner. In addition, if indeed Tehelka covers diverse perspectives, I would expect articles to contain quotes from both senior officials and lay-people alike and acknowledge all actors involved, thereby attributing them equal importance. Statistics serve to present a level of certitude about a particular situation. If Tehelka indeed serves to provide a complex view of the conflict, I would expect the statistics presented to not be biased toward any one side, mentioning facts from both Kashmir and Jammu. Results192

To a large extent, the results confirm the hypothesis. Many of the quotations within the articles come from officials and politicians; however, these politicians were from both sides of the conflict thereby covering all actors. For example, article 3 quotes the PDP leader, the BJP and the GOI, while article 8 quotes the Home Minister as well as Kashmiri politicians. In addition, almost every time that Tehelka quoted a citizen of either Jammu or Kashmir, their name was mentioned thereby personalising the quote and lending the newsweekly a degree of legitimacy.

In terms of statistics used, Tehelka acknowledges both sides of the conflict, once again validating the hypothesis. However, counter to what would be expected, many of the statistics within Tehelka are ambiguous. For example, article 6 mentions that “at least 12 people” were killed but does not give the reader an exact number. Similarly, article 3 mentions “the 5 percent or so Kashmiri (Hindu) Pandits”, once again not being entirely precise. This takes away from the legitimacy of Tehelka as it makes it seem as though it is covering for a lack of knowledge. There are many other categories that could have been investigated to assert the level of certitude within the articles. One that is worthy mentioning are the types of statements used: most of them are extremely deterministic. In fact, the pieces presented such a high degree of sureness that they could even be mistaken for op-eds, except for the fact that they mostly do not use the personalised pronoun. For example, article 7 uses phrases such as “would most certainly not have”, while article 8 mentions that 192 For full results, see Appendix E.

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“New Delhi is content” and that “few policy makers […] have any ideas”. This not only lends the articles a high degree of legitimacy in asserting that the journalist has authority over his / her claims, but it also serves to provoke the reader. Especially because many of the articles attribute blame to a particular actor, asserting such a high degree of certitude about who is held responsible can be rather confrontational; if alternative media indeed serves to contest the mainstream, then I would expect it to challenge and be critical of many of the actors involved, a role which it fulfils well. Thus in terms of level of certitude within the articles, Tehelka, for the most part, conforms to what I would expect from an alternative media source. However, counter to what I would expect, some of the statistics presented are estimates and not confirmed facts, thereby supporting the argument that perhaps there are some elements of Tehelka that are less alternative than I would expect. Literary Techniques – Adjectives, Metaphors, Negation Hypothesis as Related to Tehelka There are a variety of literary techniques that can be used in newspaper articles; the most relevant ones that will be examined here are that of adjectives, metaphors and the use of negation. The adjectives under examination are those that serve to exaggerate or undermine a particular idea or instance and infuse the text with opinion and subjectivity, shaping the manner in which the reader interprets a particular event. Metaphors allow the reader to develop an image in their head of the conflict using terms that they can relate to. If Tehelka indeed serves to present an alternative viewpoint and one that does not demonise or victimise any one side, I would expect the adjectives and metaphors used within this newsweekly to be directed at neither Jammuites nor Kashmiris nor Hindus nor Muslims, but rather at other actors who should have a more neutral stance toward the conflict such as the GOI, especially as a hegemonic, democratically accountable actor. If adjectives or metaphors are used to depict the two sides within the conflict, I would expect them to be neutral, portraying neither a sympathetic nor demeaning view of any one party thereby not dichotomising or presenting a ‘victim’ or ‘perpetrator’ of the conflict. Most of the time, sentences can be worded so that they use positive associations; the use of negation, then, serves to highlight an idea so that the reader focuses on that aspect of the argument. It may also perform two opposing functions: in the first instance, it may avoid specificity by not mentioning what is actually happening; it may also, however, be paired with a contrast to emphasise exactly what is and is not being done. In the context of Tehelka, I would expect the use of negation to be accompanied with specificity, avoiding abstract notions of what is happening thereby providing precise analysis of the controversy in order to be credible. In addition, I would expect negation to highlight critically what is not being done effectively by all parties involved. Results193

First, important to note, is that following from the content analysis attribution category, almost all the articles are critical of the GOI for not addressing the Kashmir conflict sooner and not engaging in dialogue with Kashmiris. Indeed, the use of negation serves primarily to highlight this aspect. In doing so, the articles strongly suggest that the GOI has not been performing its function of ensuring peace in the region. In addition, the use of negation is commonly used to contrast what is happening from what is not. For example, article 8 mentions how the CRPF fired straight into Kashmiris’ chest with real bullets and uses negation to emphasise the cruelty of this action – that it was not with rubber bullets and not in other parts of their bodies: “they opened fire. Not in the air, not on their legs, but straight into their chests. They did not use water cannons. They did not arm themselves with rubber bullets. They simply pulled the trigger.” The last line of this quotation serves to explicitly highlight the cruelty of the action by contrasting it with what should have been done instead. Article 5 similarly discusses how the prefab structures are not to blame for the conflict, but rather “political egos”. In this manner, the use of negation strongly confirms the hypothesis by highlighting what is not being done by the GOI and to specify the situation on the ground by contrasting it with what is not happening.

193 For full results, see Appendix F.

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Tehelka uses metaphors mostly to express, once again, the deficiency in the response of the GOI. For example, the metaphor of a “deep freeze” and “cold storage” is used in article 8 to describe the lack of dialogue between the GOI and Kashmir, while article 5 mentions how politicians are “fanning communal flames”. While this seems to validate the hypothesis quite strongly in that Tehelka does appear to be critical of the GOI, the use of adjectives does not always do so. Most adjectives used are reserved for the GOI and political actors and are almost always negative, portraying them as faulty. For example, article 7 mentions New Delhi’s “procrastination”, while article 6 mentions how the Centre has “failed miserably to come up with a solution”. Article 8, however, presents Kashmiris as the victims, contrary to what I would expect from alternative media. The constant reference to ‘peaceful’ protests on the part of Kashmiris, as well as the ‘overprotected’ streets makes it appear as though these citizens are doing no wrong. However, it is important to note that while many of these adjectives victimise Kashmiris with no equivalent for Jammuites, they are victims not to the other side – that of Jammu and Hindus – but rather to the GOI and its policies on the ground. The fact remains, however, that there is unequal victimisation only toward Kashmiri citizens. Hence, while the use of adjectives does validate the hypothesis to a large extent, there are some examples where adjectives also perform a function in opposition to what I expect. While I was looking primarily for these three literary techniques, there are several others used that are important to mention. In almost all the articles, Tehelka uses rhetorical questions mostly directed, once again, at the GOI, to highlight aspects of its argument and present the events and decisions made by different actors more critically, drawing attention to an idea that the reader may not have considered earlier. For example, article 1’s lead – “Why take over forest land for Amarnath pilgrims on the eve of a crucial poll?” – questions the motives behind the land transfer. In addition, rhetorical questions may also serve to strengthen Tehelka’s opinion about the conflict such as in article 6 which asks whether this is the point of no return for J&K. Thus, the use of rhetorical questions serves to add to the critical nature of Tehelka while also pointing the readers to think about the journalist’s claims. In addition, many of the articles use imperatives to depict what happened. Article 8, in particular, uses expressions such as “Clamp down. Block the streets.” etc. to emphasise the orders that came from the head. These imperatives serve to question the degree of agency that Kashmiris have in the decision, viewing Kashmiris as helpless and victims to orders from the Centre. This is counter to what I expect in that the articles only seem to victimise one side – Kashmiris – but again, this is set up in opposition to the GOI, not Jammu. Hence, the primary function of the literary techniques used within Tehelka is for the reader to analyse and regard the conflict – particularly the role of the GOI – more critically, and thereby appear to be an anti-establishment news source. In this manner, Tehelka puts forth opinions that are unconventional by being highly analytical and thereby assesses the situation in a manner that is less traditional and mainstream. Discussion of Results At the beginning of this chapter, I restated the hypothesis for Tehelka as an alternative media source: if it is indeed more complex than mainstream media in its coverage of events, I would expect it to portray a range of actors and events from both sides of the conflict – Jammu and Kashmir – and be equally critical of all. The content and discourse analyses demonstrate that, indeed, a range of actors and events are covered; in doing so, Tehelka fulfils its function as an alternative source by presenting the controversy as a whole and not ignoring elements of it to tell only one side. By mentioning that both Kashmir and Jammu are inflamed, Tehelka attests to the fact that this conflict affects all, not just people on one side. By embedding quotations from actors both within Jammu and Kashmir, the newsweekly depicts all actors as important. Having said that, there is greater focus on Kashmir as a region than Jammu and many headlines and leads portray the problem as a Kashmiri one. Thus, for the most part, Tehelka does fulfil its goal of attempting to present a series of events from both sides of the conflict, but it still biases its analysis more toward Kashmir than Jammu by analysing more events from Kashmir. This makes Tehelka seem less ‘alternative’ than it may, at first, appear.

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Tehelka also covers a range of actors involved on both sides. Quotations point to this, but the attribution category of content analysis also demonstrates that Tehelka places responsibility on a range of actors, critiquing them all. Interestingly, however, there is no critique of the citizens of either Jammu or Kashmir; they are viewed as victims to a political conflict. In this manner, while neither the regions of Jammu nor Kashmir are demonised or victimised, certain actors working within the political sphere in each region are demonised. Thus Tehelka fulfils its function of being equally critically of a range of actors from both sides of the conflict, while presenting citizens as the victims. Combining the results of the content and discourse analysis, the aspect that appears most prominent is that of attributing responsibility on the GOI. The results from the content analysis point out that seven of the eight articles pin a large degree of responsibility on the GOI. The discourse analysis results seem to support this particularly as part of the headlines and leads and when analysing literary techniques. Negation is used to emphasise what the government is not doing well and how they have controlled the situation on the ground, while adjectives and metaphors highlight the mishandling of the situation by the GOI. Headlines and leads point mainly to the Centre as responsible in mishandling the situation and allowing it to spiral out of control. While all the articles refer explicitly to the situation at hand, when they turn to the GOI as – at least in part – responsible for the conflict, it is important to note that they do so in the context of the history of the conflict. Thus, almost all the articles argue that the controversy would not have gotten out of hand had it not been for the GOI treating Kashmir militarily as opposed to politically or economically. In the case of the conflict, the two sides that do not seem to agree to the terms of the land transfer controversy are the region of Jammu and the Kashmir Valley. However, it is worthy to mention that, while Tehelka generally does not demonise or victimise either region in relation to each other, it does demonise the GOI. By maintaining across articles that the GOI has a large part to play in communal tensions in the region, Tehelka characterises the GOI as being the root cause for the conflict. In doing so, Tehelka also portrays the Kashmiri people as victims not to the actions of Jammuites, but, rather, to the decisions emanating at the Centre. This is clear from the adjectives and metaphors used when referring to the Kashmiri people and by constantly emphasising that peaceful protestors were killed by the CRPF, who take orders from the Centre. Thus, while Tehelka seems to affirm the hypothesis that it does not take sides between Kashmir and Jammu, it seems to quite strongly go against the GOI for mishandling the situation from the start of the conflict. While Tehelka does not mention that Kashmiris demands are justified, it does imply that they can be explained as a consequence of the actions of the GOI. This is expected of alternative media: if it intends to counter the mainstream, then it should be critical of a hegemonic, democratically accountable actor with a large degree of power who is failing in its function to maintain peace. In this manner, then, Tehelka provides critical analysis by constructing an additional dichotomy between the GOI and Kashmir and drawing attention to the fact that the GOI should be criticised for its failure to fulfil its role adequately. However, Tehelka offers a realistic solution – dialogue between the two actors. Thus, Tehelka can be classified as alternative media in that it does not take sides with respect to Kashmir and Jammu, but it does provide critical analysis by presenting the conflict in the context of its historical origins. This historical standpoint perhaps explains why Tehelka rarely presents Jammuites as victims of the conflict: because while relations between the Centre and the region of Jammu have been largely peaceful, those between the Centre and Kashmir have historically been regarded as diametrically opposed. In addition, if Tehelka is indeed set up to contest the mainstream version of events and to be critical, then it is logical that Tehelka would oppose the GOI as the core actor in determining the nation’s policies that is hegemonic and should be democratically accountable. Thus if Tehelka is analysing the controversy with regards to the history of the conflict, it is logical that it rarely represents actors from Jammu who have traditionally played a small role in the politics of this region.

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It is important to note that the categories constructed under content and discourse analysis were chosen to best answer the research question and to test the hypothesis; thus, while there may be a range of other categories that could have been included, for the purposes of this research, they were deemed less relevant. The discourse and content analyses are not attempting to find flaws within Tehelka as a newsweekly, but rather determine how it represents a particular episode and assess how ‘alternative’ it truly is. In all, it was found that Tehelka is largely alternative in its goals, but sometimes plays into the function of mainstream media especially with regards to labelling, generalising, and the use of adjectives and imperatives. To make the findings from this chapter more rigorous, future research could include interviewing the journalists to understand their intentions behind the articles. In addition, it would be beneficial to examine the sponsors for Tehelka to analyse its ideological commitments. Examining photographs used in the newsweekly would also add to the analysis of how the controversy is framed. In the next chapter, I will apply the same method of discourse and content analysis to The Times of India, the leading English newspaper within India, to compare and contrast the way the same conflict is represented in that news source.

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CHAPTER FOUR Introduction The Times of India is both the largest English newspaper in India,194 and, as of 2005, the largest English print newspaper in the world, certified by the Audit Bureau of Circulations.195 In that year, 2.4 million copies were sold daily, capturing thirty percent of the market for English readers in India.196

In addition to its print copies, The Times of India also has a website where newspapers can be found in ePaper format and boasts of editions catering to individual cities within India. Because of its wide circulation, The Times of India can be characterised as the leading mainstream newspaper in India, covering city, state, national and international issues.

As such, the 2008 Amarnath land transfer controversy was largely featured in The Times of India, and, with such a wide readership, many read this newspapers’ analysis of the conflict. As the majority of this population were not present in Kashmir during the conflict, The Times of India would serve as one of their main sources for acquiring knowledge about what happened, and thereby had the possibility of influencing opinions about the conflict. Analysing these articles will lead to a better understanding of the representation of the conflict in this largely read newspaper, thereby understanding how the controversy was presented to a large percentage of the English-speaking public. The Times of India Related to Literature Review Previous studies197

have investigated the role of mainstream media in creating or propagating a framework within which to view ethnic conflict. In this chapter, I explore the representation of the 2008 Amarnath land transfer controversy in The Times of India during the time period from May 27, 2008 to September 2, 2008. Based on my analysis of 22 articles for content analysis and ten articles for discourse analysis, I argue that, while The Times of India exhibits many of the characteristics of mainstream press, it does not conform to all the hypothesis about this type of media. This argument is based on the fact that:

1. While there is some evidence of the victimisation of Jammuites, the justification of the actions of the GOI and the demonisation of Kashmiris, The Times of India also represents a range of actors involved in the conflict, thereby inserting diverse opinions within its analysis.

2. While there is some evidence of The Times of India telling only one side of the story, the

newspaper also contains critical analysis of the GOI holding the Centre responsible for much of the controversy because of their mishandling of the situation.

This chapter investigates the validity of existing research about the role of mainstream print media in political conflict within the Indian setting: particularly as one that demonises the ‘other’ while victimising the ‘self’ and leaving gaps in the coverage. However, this chapter attempts to provide data of this kind of media in a situation of ethnic conflict, an idea that has not been investigated previously, thereby filling in a gap in the literature. In this case, the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ is defined based on the readership of The Times of India: operating primarily within large Indian states, I would expect the majority of readers to be favourable toward Indian politics which would be reflected in the coverage through a positive portrayal of

194 TOI Online is world’s No. 1 newspaper website. The Times of India. July 12, 2009. [Online] Available http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/NEWS-India-TOI-Online-is-worlds-No1-newspaper-website/articleshow/4769920.cms, January 21, 2010. 195 Times now Masthead of the World. The Times of India. June 26, 2005. [Online] Available http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1152489.cms, January 21, 2010. 196 Ibid. 197 See Literature Review in Chapter One.


http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1152489.cms

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the GOI and Jammuites – the former as a rational entity, the latter as ‘victims’ to the conflict – while the separatist Kashmiris would be demonised. The remainder of this chapter will be divided into five major sections: data collection, overview, content analysis hypothesis and results as related to each major category, discourse analysis hypothesis and results as related to each major category, and general discussion of all the findings and how they relate to the hypothesis and research question. The data for this chapter is drawn from online archives of the ePaper for The Times of India. Data Collection In order to find articles relevant to the 2008 Amarnath land transfer controversy, I looked at the title of every article in every edition of The Times of India ePaper between May 27, 2008 to September 2, 2008. This produced 150 articles that were directly related to the conflict, mentioning the words “Amarnath”, “Jammu”, and / or “Kashmir” or other major actors in the conflict. While there were other articles describing protests in Kashmir, it was not explicit that these were related to the Amarnath land transfer controversy; thus, these articles were not included. By choosing every seventh article for content analysis produced a random sample of 21 articles. For discourse analysis, I chose the two longest articles for each period of heightened conflict that directly discussed the specific incidents that had taken place. This produced a sample size of ten articles. Some of the articles in the content and discourse analyses overlap, but, altogether, I will be analysing 28 articles. For a summary of the articles gathered and an understanding of the article numbers mentioned throughout the rest of this chapter, refer to Appendix G. Overview Before digging deeper into the articles, it is necessary to mention two important facts: first, the trend of an increasing number of articles mentioning the Amarnath land transfer controversy; second, an increasing number of articles about Kashmir that are unrelated to this controversy. Almost all the articles were found in the Times Nation section of the newspaper, but, as the controversy progressed, The Times of India started paying more attention to it and included more articles discussing the conflict. The initial land transfer decision was not even mentioned in The Times of India, indicating that, importantly, it may not have considered this a significant event. It was only on June 17, 2008, after an upsurge of violence in Kashmir, that the conflict was first mentioned in The Times of India, describing J&K as a “terrorism-hit state”. As the conflict progresses, it becomes increasingly visible in The Times of India, and is attributed more importance, so much so that starting from August 13, 2008 till August 18, 2009 and again on August 21, 2009 there is an entire page in the Times Nation section of the newspaper called J&K on the Boil. Thus, it is evident that as the controversy is more drawn out, The Times of India begins to pay greater attention to it, featuring more stories about J&K in the newspaper. This is characteristic of a mainstream newspaper in that it does not look to report on events that are insignificant, but will seek coverage of events that attract a large amount of attention. Additionally, it is important to note that as the land issue becomes more prominent, there are an increasing number of articles in The Times of India about J&K that are unrelated to the controversy, from polls about whether J&K should remain a part of India to upcoming elections within the state. Once again, this seems to conform to the functions of mainstream press in that it only addresses issues when there is already popular interest in the region and will rarely represent the region in its coverage otherwise.

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Content Analysis As discussed above, content analysis was performed on every seventh article in the sample, generating a sample size of 21 articles. The four categories that were present in Hook and Pu’s research198

were then applied to the articles in this section: problem identification, attribution, evaluation, and prescription, with victimisation added to reflect the findings from the literature review. The options under these categories may not be mutually exclusive; thus, articles may fit under more than one category. Throughout the articles, the journalists referenced various people related to the conflict; the key below explains my coding for when a concept is directly stated by the journalist or included as the opinion of someone who is referenced, and this is used throughout the content analysis section of this chapter:

Key X = according to journalist O = quoting someone else who believes this is the reason Problem Identification Hypothesis as Related to The Times of India Under the problem identification category for mainstream media, I would expect The Times of India to present the 2008 Amarnath land transfer controversy as not deriving from any root cause and therefore problem identification to not be applicable. Because The Times of India is a daily newspaper, I would expect it to contain a large degree of episodic reporting with few articles that provide critical analysis about the cause of the controversy, thereby not viewing the conflict through a historical lens, attributing problems only to individual episodes. This lack of analytical reporting also conforms to the hypothesis about mainstream media. In addition, updating its readers on the conflict without defining any problem would leave silences in the reporting which is what I would assume of mainstream media, thereby portraying the Kashmiri protests as irrational and discrediting their actions, effectively siding with Jammu and / or the GOI. If, indeed, The Times of India does identify a problem, I would expect it to most likely be ‘inflammation by political parties’ or ‘religious’, denying that the Kashmiri people are oppressed by the GOI. Results Table 1: Problem Identification for 2008 Amarnath Land Transfer Controversy in J&K by The Times of India, June – September 2008

No. Religious Oppression / Unfair Treatment


Not Applicable

2 X 3 X 4 O X 6 X X 7 X 8 X 9 O 10 O O X 11 O X 12 X X 13 X 15 O X 16 O O 17 X 18 O O

198 Hook, Steven W. and Xiaoyu Pu. Framing Sino-American Relations under Stress: A Reexamination of News Cover of the 2001 Spy Plane Crisis. Asian Affairs.

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19 X 20 O O X 23 X 24 X 25 X 26 X

Total 5 7 13 6 Percent 24 33 62 28.5 The results from the problem identification category validate the hypothesis to a large degree. While it was predicted that the articles would not identify a root cause of the problem, much of the time the Amarnath land transfer controversy was attributed to an inflammation by political parties. For example, article 10 discusses how the BJP are attempting to bring about protests at a national level, thereby inciting greater violence. Article 26 clearly states that the claim that a Hurriyat leader was shot dead by police in Kashmir is not true and was put forth by Kashmiri politicians to garner greater support. This will be elaborated upon in the next category under attribution and victimisation when determining which actors the newspaper holds responsible for the conflict, but it is evident that The Times of India attributes the problem mainly to inflammation by political parties. In this manner, the newspaper seems to favour a superficial view of the conflict, not one that is rooted in historical oppression or because of unchanging religious beliefs. In doing so, The Times of India limits the conflict to the present controversy instead of viewing it through the long-standing history of the Kashmir conflict, thereby confirming the hypothesis. The next most popular problem identification category is that of oppression or unfair treatment. Importantly, every single time that the problem is attributed to this category, it is not the journalist’s opinion, rather, that of someone else. For example, article 16 quotes L K Advani, the leader of the BJP, as saying Jammuites have suffered a “gross discrimination”; article 18 quotes Arun Jaitley, the General Secretary of the BJP, as stating that “Congress is […] only responding to separatist pressure”. The fact that the journalist references or quotes another actor in defining the problem as oppression or unfair treatment dissolves The Times of India from responsibility in their assertions while also allowing the newspaper to voice its own beliefs. It is important to note that nearly every time there is a claim of oppression or unfair treatment it comes from the Jammu side and mostly from the BJP, with little claims from Kashmir. This makes Jammuites appear to be victims, suffering through no fault of theirs and affirms the hypothesis about mainstream media in that it victimises one side. Thus, the results from this category mostly validate the hypothesis. While the problem is identified as a host of different reasons and not just as ‘not applicable’ as hypothesised, the fact that a large portion of the time it is wholly or partly defined as inflammation by political parties is indicative of the newspaper’s superficial view of the conflict in that it is not seen in the larger context of the history of the conflict, instead isolating the 2008 Amarnath land transfer controversy. Additionally, the opinions represented for the oppression and unfair treatment seem to be biased toward the Jammu side and, every single time the problem is attributed to this category, it is through referencing a third-party and not directly a view of The Times of India, dissolving the newspaper from responsibility of its opinions. Attribution and Victimisation Hypothesis as Related to The Times of India As a mainstream newspaper, I would expect The Times of India to represent the Jammu side – including both citizens and politicians from the region – as victims in the conflict while the Kashmiri side are seen as perpetrators and attributed responsibility. I would also expect the GOI to be dissolved of responsibility, instead placing blame on Kashmiris as inciting communal passions. This would align with the hypothesis that mainstream media serves to demonise the ‘other’ while victimising the ‘self’.

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Results Table 2: Attribution of Responsibility for 2008 Amarnath Land Transfer Controversy in J&K by The Times of India, June – September 2008

No. BJP SASB/

AYSS

Jammu Citizens

GOI Kashmir Gov.

CRPF Kashmiri Citizens

Kashmir Separatist

Parties

PDP N/A

2 X 3 X X 4 X X 6 X X 7 X 8 O 9 O 10 O 11 XO 12 X 13 X 15 O O X 16 O 17 X 18 O X 19 X 20 O 23 O X 24 X 25 O O 26 XO

Total 3 0 3 8 1 2 2 6 1 3 Percent 14 0 14 38 5 9.5 9.5 28.5 5 14 Table 3: Victimisation for 2008 Amarnath Land Transfer Controversy in J&K by The Times of India, June – September 2008

No. Jammu Citizens

Kashmir Pandits

Pilgrims CRPF Kashmir Citizens

N/A

2 X X 3 X X 4 X 6 X X 7 X X 8 O 9 O 10 O 11 X 12 X X 13 X 15 O 16 O 17 X 18 O 19 X 20 XO X

50

23 X 24 X 25 O 26 X

Total 10 0 2 4 5 6 Percent 47.5 0 9.5 19 24 28.5 Contrary to the hypothesis, the GOI is attributed responsibility 38 percent of the time, more than any of the other actors. However, it is important to note that almost every single time this claim is made, it does not come from the journalist who is writing the piece, but from referencing another source. For example, article 23 mentions that the “BJP has criticised the government for lacking political will” while article 25 references the AYSS claiming that the Centre is not serious about resolving the conflict. This may reflect The Times of India’s viewpoint that the GOI should be attributed responsibility, but can only assert this blame indirectly because, being a mainstream newspaper, it cannot be openly critical – in doing so, it runs the risk of angering many powerful politicians. Conforming to the hypothesis is the fact that Kashmiri separatist parties are attributed responsibility the second most, 28.5 percent of the time. For example, article 13 states that Hurriyat “stoked the present unrest in the Valley” thereby attributing responsibility on a Kashmiri separatist party and supporting the theory that mainstream media sometimes demonises the ‘other’. However, it is important to note that the Jammu side is not completely dissolved of responsibility, but indeed, according to The Times of India, they, too, have a part to play, however small. Article 6, for instance, mentions that Jammu “protestors defied curfew”, thereby attributing these actors some degree of responsibility based on their inability to follow orders coming from the top. This quotation is also indicative of the newspaper’s view that the GOI should not be disobeyed, thereby siding with the hegemonic power and displaying tendencies of mainstream media. As expected, 47.5 percent of the time, Jammu citizens are victimised in the conflict, again contributing to setting up the dichotomy between ‘self’ and ‘other’. While much of the time it is the BJP or AYSS who claim that these citizens have been unjustly treated such as in article 25 which discusses police brutality on Jammu citizens, sometimes the reporter states this directly through constant mention of the death toll of Jammuites. Interestingly, in six of the articles, there is no mention of a victim, suggesting that the primary focus for The Times of India is in attributing responsibility rather than ascribing victimhood. This contests the idea of mainstream media: assigning responsibility for an act serves to instigate, while determining a victim only brings out the sympathy of the population; thus, the former is more critical than the latter. Through the results from this category, an important conclusion is reached: that The Times of India does not completely fulfil all aspects of the characteristics of mainstream media. While it does dichotomise between Jammuites and Kashmiris, this dichotomy is not presented as starkly as expected and much of the time the GOI is also attributed responsibility for their actions, while Kashmiri citizens are described as victims. Thus, The Times of India, while mainstream, may be less so than a typical mainstream newspaper because it does not fit all the functions of mainstream press, thereby reflecting India as a multiethnic and multicultural country by denying a binary representation of actors. Evaluation Hypothesis as Related to The Times of India As a mainstream daily newspaper, I would expect The Times of India to have more episodic than thematic coverage, updating readers on the latest happenings in the situation instead of being critical. I would also predict that The Times of India would lack critical perspectives that are usually present when the coverage is thematic. In addition, I would expect recurring themes to be confined to one category, thereby limiting the range of perspectives about the issue and resulting in a simplification of the conflict.

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Results Table 4: Evaluation for 2008 Amarnath Land Transfer Controversy in J&K by The Times of India, June – September 2008

No. TYPE RECURRING THEMES Thematic Episodic Religion Separatism Oppression /

Victimise Attribution of Responsibility

2 X 3 X 4 X 6 X 7 X 8 X 9 X X 10 X 11 X 12 X 13 X X X 15 X O 16 X O O 17 X 18 X 19 X 20 X 23 X X 24 X X 25 X 26 X

Total 6 15 0 2 2 4 Percent 28.5 71.5 0 33.5 33.5 66 Note: I only found recurring themes for those articles that are thematic in nature, as episodic news articles served primarily to update readers on the situation and reported facts. Thus, themes were difficult to identify and rarely fit into the four categories of religion, separatism, oppression / victimisation and attribution of responsibility, often mentioning the death toll and describing the violence instead, not looking at the conflict in the context of any larger picture. When the percentages were calculated, it was based upon the six articles that were thematic in nature, not the full sample size of 21 articles. The results from this category largely support the hypothesis. As expected, more than 70 percent of the articles are episodic in nature. Part of this is reflective of the fact that The Times of India is a daily newspaper and therefore serves to report on everyday occurrences, but, a large part of it is also that The Times of India does not attempt to be critical. In fact, the majority of the articles that are thematic are not because the journalist is analysing the situation, but because they are quoting a member of a political party who is sharing their views on the conflict. Out of the six thematic articles, four of them have the recurring theme of attribution of responsibility. Combined with the results from Table 2, half of the time the GOI is attributed responsibility while the other half is Kashmiri political parties (separatist or otherwise) with the BJP is also found guilty. However, when it is a Kashmiri political party that is held responsible, it is the journalist’s opinion, whereas if the BJP or the GOI are held responsible, it is mostly referenced by someone else. It seems that The Times of India avoids responsibility for deeming the GOI or political parties on the Jammu side as responsible by not directly infusing their opinions into the situation. 33 percent of the articles have a

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recurring theme of oppression or victimisation, and, combining this with Table 3, both times it is Jammu citizens who are deemed as oppressed, while one article also mentions the oppression of Kashmiri citizens. This serves to reinforce the fact that The Times of India attempts to dichotomise, however, less so than expected. Finally, while none of the articles mention a theme of religion, one-third of them have a recurring theme of separatism, which is worthy to mention in that this is only a Kashmiri concept. However, in both these articles, Kashmiri separatist parties are attributed responsibility thereby holding politicians accountable for their role in instigating conflict. To a large extent, then, the results from this category confirm the hypothesis about mainstream media in that it serves to dichotomise between the ‘self’ and the ‘other’. However, this dichotomy does not happen to the extent that is predicted: there is also mention of Kashmiris who are victims, while holding both the GOI and the BJP responsible as well. Thus, this serves to reinforce the findings from the previous category in that The Times of India may not be as typically mainstream as I would expect and that, perhaps the definition of ‘mainstream’ should be altered to be more flexible and encompassing. Prescription Hypothesis as Related to The Times of India If The Times of India is indeed a mainstream newspaper, then I would expect it to support the Jammu side and thereby encourage the employment of the land transfer. I would expect very little support for the revocation of the transfer – the Kashmiri claim – and some support for negotiations but primarily between the GOI and the Jammu side. I would also expect that many of the episodic articles may not prescribe a solution and remain uncritical. Results Table 5: Prescription for 2008 Amarnath Land Transfer Controversy in J&K by The Times of India, June – September 2008

No. Employ Transfer

Revoke Transfer Negotiations Not Applicable

2 X 3 O 4 X 6 X 7 X 8 O 9 X 10 X 11 X 12 X 13 X 15 O 16 O 17 X 18 O 19 X 20 X 23 X 24 X 25 X 26 O

Total 2 0 7 12 Percent 9.5 0 33.5 57

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It is important to note that, while many of the articles did not prescribe a solution to the conflict, they did include solutions to the episode at hand. For example, article 15 was written in the midst of the economic blockade; as a result, it advocates for ending the economic blockade through opening up the Muzaffarabad road, even if this does not spell an end to the conflict. Article 25 calls for a pause on negotiations to address the immediate demands of Jammuites – reducing the influence of the police in the region. Thus, many solutions do not address the historical basis of the Kashmir conflict, but provide suggestions to individual episodes within the conflict instead. As expected, none of the articles supported revoking the land transfer; however, there were very few articles supporting the land transfer as well. If the latter does occur, it is through referencing a third party, and, in both cases, this party is on the Jammu side. For example, article 3 quotes a senior BJP leader as saying, “If the government goes back on the decision, there will be backlash at the national level”. Thus, while there does seem to be a bias toward the Jammu side, it is not as large as expected. The majority of articles do not prescribe a solution. This could be because of two reasons – first, because, again, most of the articles are episodic in nature and only serve to update the reader on news from the region; second, because The Times of India wants to appear neutral, and, in doing so, cannot side with anyone. However, by fulfilling this second reason, the newspaper lacks analytical coverage of the situation, thereby conforming to the hypothesis about mainstream media. One-third of the articles do support negotiations, and all of the articles that advocate for this resolution look to involve the GOI. However, it is important to note, that many articles point to the necessity of the GOI engaging more with the Jammu side and, in some cases, keeping Kashmir out of discussions. For example, article 26 quotes an AYSS leader as saying, “The land issue is between the government and the Samiti; PDP, Mufti Mohammad Sayeed or any other Kashmiri leader has no role to play”, and article 18 references BJP politicians as proclaiming that the Centre needs to be more neutral on the issue and consider the demands from the Jammu side. Article 23 is the only one that argues for the involvement of Kashmiri politicians in negotiations; article 15 quotes the PDP leader asking for the GOI to negotiate with Pakistan. Importantly, there are fewer articles that are neutral, maintaining that both sides should be engaged in conversation, than there are articles advocating, through a third-party, negotiations with Jammuites, hinting at the newspaper’s belief that negotiations with Jammuites are more important than negotiations with both sides, even if this opinion does not come directly from the journalist. To a large extent, the hypothesis is confirmed through this category. While there is less support for the employment of the land transfer than expected, advocating for negotiations primarily between Jammu parties and the GOI can hardly be considered neutral reporting. It seems that The Times of India tries to dissolve itself of responsibility by expressing these viewpoints through referencing a third-party, thereby not directly supporting these opinions, but, by including them, representing voices that the newspaper aligns with. Discussion of Content Analysis Results The results from the content analysis section confirm, to some extent, the hypothesis about mainstream media. There are two main points to take away from this section: firstly, that many of The Times of India’s viewpoints and stances about issues are not directly expressed by journalists, but, instead, referenced through third-parties; second, that The Times of India can be characterised as mainstream but not to the degree expected. The former is evident through the large bias of opinions toward BJP sources that repeatedly refer to themselves as victims of the conflict, while simultaneously advocating for negotiations but mostly with Jammu actors. Additionally, attribution of responsibility, to a large extent, falls on the GOI, but nearly every single time, it is not the journalist who expresses this viewpoint, but third-parties.

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The latter point allows a form of critical analysis of the situation to be detected, even if The Times of India does not do this directly. By allowing for a large degree of representation of actors who are critical of the government, the newspaper does not assume a pro-GOI stance. Additionally, while there is a lesser degree of criticism of Jammu politicians and actors, the criticism still exists, and there is some sympathy for Kashmiri citizens, as well as a clear trend that negotiations should be held even if the newspaper wants these talks to remain between Jammu parties and the GOI. Thus, while The Times of India fulfils many of the expectations made about mainstream media, it does not do so to the full extent, inserting some degree of critical analysis. Discourse Analysis As mentioned before, discourse analysis was performed on the two longest articles that were directly related to episodes of heightened conflict and were searched for within a date range after these episodes occurred. This produced a sample size of ten articles because, as noted in the Overview section, no articles mentioned the start of the conflict in May, with coverage only beginning in mid-June. This section will perform discourse analysis on the ten articles based on four categories: headlines and leads, generalisation and specificity, degree of certitude implied and literary techniques implemented. Headlines and Leads Hypothesis as Related to The Times of India Headlines and leads provide a succinct summary of the article, and are used to entice the reader to continue reading. They may also direct the way the reader interprets the text by highlighting what is most important. If The Times of India is indeed a mainstream source, I would expect headlines and leads to be largely critical of the Kashmiri side, presenting them as instigators with irrational demands. In addition, I would expect headlines and leads that mention Jammuites and the GOI to be largely sympathetic, viewing their side and policies as fair. This would fulfil the primary hypothesss about mainstream media found in the literature review in that it would demonise Kashmiris as separatists while victimising Jammu citizens and siding with the GOI, while simultaneously leaving gaps in the story and not portraying a rounded perspective of the Kashmir issue. Results199

Note: Before delving into the analysis of the articles, it should be noted that many of the articles continued on a different page of the newspaper with a different headline; both headlines can be found in Appendix H.

The Times of India only partially affirms the hypothesis about mainstream media through this category. Article 1 uses the headline, “Srinagar mob attacks pilgrim family, 4 hurt”, depicting Kashmiris as violent and destructive; while article 14 also claims that, “Separatists manage to sway valley sentiments”, they do not generalise to the entire Kashmiri population and identify that it is only the separatists who do this. Article 2 mentions the impact of the land controversy on tourists through the headline, “Tourists flee Valley”, but, in doing so, frame the argument as one that is impacting innocent bystanders through the actions of the Kashmiri populace with no mention of a similar impact in Jammu. In terms of victimising Jammuites, The Times of India only partially seems to do this. Article 4 does state in its headline that “Jammu shuts down”, but does not reveal the journalist’s opinion associated with this view. Article 27 does not mention the reaction on the Kashmiri side to the end of the controversy, only claiming that the “Amarnath land deal ends stir in Jammu”. While this does present some evidence of silences in reporting, it is not across all articles. Thus, The Times of India can be viewed as mainstream but to a lesser degree than expected. Article 22 is the only one that contains a headline that studies both regions simultaneously, but does not mention how so in the title, only claiming that it is “a study in contrast”.

199 For full results, see Appendix H.

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Quite a few articles mention the (then) J&K Chief Minister in their headline, Ghulam Nabi Azad. Article 5, immediately after the revocation of the land transfer, credits Azad for making this decision as it claims that “Restoring Peace In The Valley Is Top Priority”, thereby representing him as fulfilling his duties as a government official in ensuring peace, and indirectly affirming his decisions. This validates the hypothesis that politicians emanating from the Centre are presented in a positive manner. Many of the other headlines about Azad are neutral. Unexpected is the headline for article 21, that criticises the GOI for “[failing] to bring protestors to talk table”, but then takes up a sympathetic viewpoint toward the AYSS, claiming that they want a “Clear-Cut Response”. Thus, the results from this category do not confirm or refute the hypothesis. While Kashmiris are demonised to some extent, it is not to the degree that is expected of mainstream media. Similarly, Jammuites are not portrayed as victims. Instead, many of the headlines analysed within The Times of India are neutral, and one even openly criticises the GOI, contrary to expectations. It is difficult to determine whether the results within this category affirm or reject the hypothesis, but what is clear is that they do not affirm the hypothesis to the extent that I would expect from mainstream media. Generalisation and Specificity Hypothesis as Related to The Times of India Generalisations serve to stereotype a group of people through homogenisation, thereby assigning a general characteristic to an entire group, making them appear less complex than they are. Specificity, on the other hand, serves to diversify and complicate, representing individuals and groups in their plurality and differentiating one actor from another. If indeed mainstream media polarises between groups, I would expect it to generalise to a much larger degree than it specifies, thereby presenting different actors in a simplistic manner. Results200

Generally, there is quite an even split between generalisation and specificity across articles. In particular, articles that identify a journalist – articles 14, 15 and 22 – specify much more so than articles that do not identify one and just mention the Times News Network. These three articles mention specific names and parties as sources of their quotations and thereby recognise the actors as individuals who should not be grouped together. Thus, particularly this group of articles seem to reject the hypothesis that I would expect from mainstream media in that they specify instead of generalising.

With regards to specificity, the articles tend to be equal on both the Jammu and Kashmir sides; however, generalisation is much more prevalent with Kashmiris. For example, article 1 mentions “Kashmiri mob fury”, thereby asserting that all Kashmiris are involved, to some degree, in the violence. Hence, in this manner, this category partially confirms the hypothesis; however, what I concluded from previous categories is also valid here: The Times of India does not appear to be mainstream to as large a degree as I would expect. Level of Certitude – Quotations and Statistics Hypothesis as Related to The Times of India A newspaper can assert a level of certitude in several ways, but the two I will examine here are quotations and statistics. Quotations may grant an article a level of certitude by inserting professional opinions. In addition, the source of the quotation helps identify who the newspaper considers as important actors and whose views should be represented. If The Times of India is indeed a mainstream newspaper, I would expect it to present a large number of quotations from the Jammu and the GOI sides, thereby deeming these actors as professionals who can provide a reasonable assessment of the situation. In addition, I would expect that The Times of India would represent the opinions of laypeople on the Jammu side, thereby identifying them as victims by making the reader sympathetic toward them. Statistics serve to ground reporting in facts and thereby make the analysis appear sounder. If The Times of India is indeed a 200 For full results, see Appendix I.

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mainstream newspaper, I would expect statistics mentioned to be much more weighted on the Jammu side in terms of casualties, representing them as victims; statistics about Kashmir would be expected to mention the number of protestors detained or arrested, portraying them as aggressors. Results201

One of the first trends observed is that, as the conflict progresses, fewer articles mention statistics. When statistics are mentioned earlier, they are mostly about injuries and the number of people arrested, but, as the conflict progresses, even this is not noted. One explanation for this is that arrests and casualties become so commonplace that they are emitted from coverage. Another explanation is that as the conflict is more prolonged, The Times of India are less interested in the details compared to the negotiations and solutions presented, and thereby cover these issues to a lesser degree. The second of these arguments is supported by Table 4 where it is observed that, as the conflict progresses, there are a greater number of articles that are thematic in nature compared to earlier when articles are more episodic.

Most important to note about the statistics is that when they are used, they seem to affirm the hypothesis: statistics about Kashmir highlight protestor arrests while statistics about non-Kashmiris highlight victims. For example, article 2 mentions how “hundreds of tourists” fled and is sure to mention that “six policemen and a CRPF jawan” are among the 30 people who are killed. However, this same quote does not specify who the rest of the people are and thereby the reader does not feel sympathy toward Kashmiris among the death toll because they are not explicitly mentioned. Again, in article 1, the statistics are noted similarly, mentioning how “100 others, including 22 cops, were injured”. If this is contrasted with article 4, it is evident that the article specifically mentions that “nine people are injured in clashes between bandh supporters and cops in Jammu”, thereby explicitly alluding to Jammuites who are also injured. Thus, the manner in which The Times of India covers statistics seems to comply with the hypothesis about mainstream media in that it leaves silences in reporting. Quotations do not validate the hypothesis as strongly as statistics did; in fact it is difficult to tell if they validate the hypothesis at all. For the most part, they seem to be equally spread out between those on both sides of the conflict and are mostly reporting facts. While quotations from laypeople do exist, most highlight political actors on both sides, deeming them as important in the conflict. In addition, while many quotations specify a source, there are some that are more general, as in article 14 mentioning “intelligence officials” or article 21’s mention of “highly placed government sources”. Even though these quotes do not come from a person and thereby dissolve these individuals from blame, their positions as professionals are trustworthy and thereby lend them a degree of credibility. In a manner, then, The Times of India affirms the hypothesis in its lack of specificity. It is worthy to further examine Article 2: the article quotes many tourists who are portrayed as innocent because they are unfairly subjugated to the violence in Kashmir and have had to postpone or cut their holidays short. Although the article is about tourists fleeing Kashmir and therefore it is reasonable to include these quotations, the very fact that this is the focus of the article demonises Kashmiri separatists as the cause of why tourists have to flee. Most other articles contain quotations from both sides, but article 22 is of deserves mention because, although it is a study in contrast between Jammu and Kashmir, it does not contain any quotations from Kashmir. However, for the most part, the results from the quotations category do not strongly validate the hypothesis about mainstream media: The Times of India contains quotations from both sides thereby representing a range of actors. The Times of India also uses a technique for quotations that is worth mentioning – sometimes it quotes just part of an individual’s speech, paraphrasing the rest. For example, article 28 mentions L K Advani talking to the Prime Minister about how Jammu will not succumb to “pressure from separatists”. Again article 14 reports, “A seeming normalcy, induced by a “popular” government, has been shattered as violently emotional reaction to the Amarnath land transfer issue and Hurriyat’s high-decibel protests 201 For full results, see Appendix J.

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against an ‘economic blockade’ have placed the separatists on the forefront of Kashmir politics.” Many of the articles employ a similar technique, and it is unclear whether this is a direct quote and if so, who the source of the quotation is; if this is not a quote, the reader is unsure if this is sarcasm on the part of the journalist. This serves to highlight only certain aspects of what an actor says, and, most of the time, these partial quotes emphasise the irrationality of the demands from Kashmiri politicians, thereby affirming the hypothesis that mainstream media demonises the ‘other’. It is also important to mention another literary technique not explicitly looked for but stood out when examining articles and adds to the analysis about level of certitude: types of statements used. It is only the articles that directly identify a journalist who wrote the article that claim a higher level of certitude than other articles in terms of types of statements used. However, this does not apply to all articles where a journalist’s name is mentioned. For example, article 14 claims that Geelani “wears the air of a man vindicated” while article 22 claims that “there is a careful attempt”. This makes it seem as though the journalists mentioned are more assured in their claims than the rest of the articles, and read more like op-eds in that they attempt to assert an opinion with their deterministic statements. These articles do not present evidence for or against the hypothesis as there are articles that are sympathetic to the Jammu side while being critical of Kashmiri politicians as well as those that are critical of both sides. However, the very fact that articles that discuss both sides are present provides evidence for the fact that the hypothesis about mainstream media – as demonising the ‘other’ and victimising the ‘self’ and including silences – is not as strong as I would expect it to be. Thus, the level of certitude category for The Times of India partially validates the hypothesis about mainstream media especially through statistics and the use of partial and anonymous quotations. However, as evidenced in previous categories, this validation of the hypothesis is not to the degree that is expected from mainstream media. Literary Techniques – Adjectives, Metaphors, Negation Hypothesis as Related to The Times of India There are a large range of literary techniques that could be analysed, but the three that I have chosen to evaluate in great detail are the use of adjectives, metaphors, and negation. Adjectives serve to highlight or undermine certain concepts and insert a degree of subjectivity in the text, thereby representing the subject manner in a particular way. Metaphors allow the reader to develop a mental image of the conflict and compare a situation to something with which they are already familiar, thereby steering the reader to think about events in a certain way. If The Times of India is indeed a mainstream newspaper, then I would expect the metaphors and adjectives directed at Jammuites and the GOI to be sympathetic, portraying them as victims in the conflict. On the other hand, I would expect these literary techniques to characterise Kashmiris in a harsh light, depicting them as instigators. While I would expect most sentences to be phrased in a neutral manner or with positive associations, sometimes a journalist uses negation. This can serve two purposes: first, to avoid mention of what is actually happening and second, to contrast one idea with another. If this technique were employed in The Times of India, I would expect there to be a large degree of criticism toward Kashmiri politicians by highlighting what they are not doing. Results202

The results from the adjectives category seem, in large part, to confirm the primary hypothesis. As expected, the articles do not use a large degree of adjectives and metaphors, but, when adjectives are used, they demonise the Kashmiri side, while presenting Jammuites and the GOI in a more positive light. For example, article 14 describes Geelani as “a man vindicated”, while article 15 claims that Mufti is “sitting easy in her Gupkar Road

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202 For full results, see Appendix K.

residence”, thereby highlighting her wealth and her lack of direct action despite the ongoing conflict. Article 22 juxtaposes the protests in the Kashmir region with that of Jammu: in Jammu, there are “peaceful demonstrations”, while in Kashmir, there are “high decibel protests”. In

203 A wealthy area of Srinagar.

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contrasting these two responses, the reader perceives Kashmiris as irrational while Jammuites as rational innocents. Article 1 describes the Amarnath yatra as an “arduous trek” thereby asserting that it is difficult for many of the pilgrims, but, in contrast, Kashmiris are described as a “mob”. Article 27, talking about the solution and the end of the controversy, describes how Jammu erupts in “wild celebrations”. In doing so, the reader imagines this as a positive solution; however, later this is juxtaposed with the fact that this solution has been reached “in spite of PDP chief Mehbooba Mufti’s defiant posturing” thereby deeming a Kashmiri spokesperson as irrational. The metaphors, to a small degree, confirm the hypothesis as well. While they are critical of the GOI mentioning how this actor is “on a sticky wicket in Jammu” in article 5, the GOI is also represented as “[failing] to cut much ice” in article 21, highlighting its failures. However, article 14 mentions how “PDP has made a U-turn”, making them appear inconsistent in their opinions and granting them a low degree of legitimacy, while the same article mentions that the GOI is “being painted the main culprits”, thereby asserting that it is not really at fault and just being represented in this way, victimising this actor. While most metaphors are neutral, the ones that are not serve to affirm the hypothesis. The use of negation, too, confirms the hypothesis to some degree, particularly through article 22. There is frequent mention of how the BJP and politicians in Jammu do not want the conflict to take a “communal turn” and that “it is not easy for a city” to go through what they are, thereby presenting Jammuites and Jammu politicians in a positive light and as victims to the conflict. Article 21 also states that officials mention that “there had been no blockade of Srinagar”, portraying Kashmiris as having irrational claims. For the most part, then, metaphors depict Kashmiris as perpetrators, while the GOI and Jammuites are viewed as victims. Thus, it is evident that the results from the literary techniques category for The Times of India seem to largely validate the hypothesis about alternative media in that they represent Kashmiris as instigators of the conflict who are irrational in their demands, and Jammuites and the GOI as victims to the conflict. As expected, however, being a daily and therefore serving to update readers on events, the articles are not populated with any of the literary techniques outlined and most occur infrequently. Discussion of Results At the beginning of this chapter, I restated the hypothesis for The Times of India as the largest mainstream print newspaper in India: if it were truly mainstream, I would expect it to present Kashmiri actors as instigators in the conflict and thereby demonise them based on their history of advocating for separatism, while portraying Jammu actors as victims and the GOI as rational, thereby agreeing with powerful figures at the Centre and actors who are interested in remaining a part of India, ‘supporting’ the nation. In addition, I would expect there to be silences in reporting, only presenting one side of the conflict, not telling the full story and biasing the reader to interpret only one version of events. Many of the articles within The Times of India do not serve to express an opinion, but, rather, as a daily newspaper, to update and inform readers about the details of the conflict. Thus, while many of the results do not explicitly state opinions, they can be inferred from the details of the articles. To a large extent, the results from the discourse and content analysis sections affirm the primary hypothesis. From the content analysis section, I concluded that, to a large extent in terms of victimisation, there is a bias toward the Jammu side, validating the hypothesis. Particularly, articles present the BJP as victims to the conflict, while also advocating for negotiations but primarily between the GOI and Jammu. However, when it comes to attribution of responsibility, the results do not affirm the hypothesis and, to a large extent, the GOI are deemed responsible for the conflict. Importantly, however, both victimisation and attribution of responsibility on the GOI, to a large extent, are conveyed through the use of third-party sources and not from the journalists’ perspective. In this manner, while The Times of India does not

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directly victimise or attribute blame, it uses quotations to represent its views, thereby dissolving itself of responsibility. Thus, The Times of India fulfils the hypothesis about mainstream media in that it is not always critical; however, it is still critical through the views it represents. Combining the results for the content and discourse analyses, it is evident the hypothesis about mainstream media is not supported as strongly as I would expect. Through content analysis, it was found that the attribution of responsibility rested, to a large extent, on the GOI, contrary to what I would expect from mainstream media. Even if this is represented through third-party sources, the fact that The Times of India included this viewpoint supports the idea that they believe, to some extent, that the GOI is responsible. From the discourse analysis I found that the headlines and leads do not support any one side in the conflict; rather, they are equally spread out across all sides, a characteristic that I would expect of alternative media, not a mainstream source. In addition, while generalisation tends to be prevalent when referring to Kashmir, specificity within articles is commonplace on both sides of the conflict with quotations being derived from actors on both sides of the conflict, and thereby representing a range of opinions, portraying the conflict as complicated and not telling only one story. The results from many of the categories seem to support the hypothesis. Particularly, the literary techniques employed provide strong evidence for the bias on the Jammu side of the conflict, often using techniques that portray Jammuites as victims and Kashmiris as perpetrators and instigators. The prescription of the conflict is largely attributed to inflammation by political parties rather than based on history, which would make the representation of the conflict appear more critical. Many other categories also support the hypothesis; however, the evidence that does so is not as strong as I would expect, often inserting critical remarks about the conflict, while also representing a range of actors. Thus, while the results confirm the hypothesis that The Times of India is a mainstream source, they do not do so to the extent I would expect based on the literature review about mainstream media. Important to note is the fact that the categories chosen for discourse and content analysis were decided upon as the best way in which to test the hypothesis. While other categories may have had some relevance for addressing the research question, I found them to not be as rigorous as the ones that are constructed. The content and discourse analysis with regards to The Times of India is not intended to criticise the newspaper; rather, I am attempting to determine how this mainstream source represents the 2008 Amarnath land transfer controversy, thereby assessing how ‘mainstream’ it truly is. In all, it was found that The Times of India can still be viewed as mainstream, but to a lesser degree than expected, often with blurred boundaries between whom it victimises and demonises and which story it tells. To make the findings from this chapter more rigorous, future research could include interviewing journalists about their intentions behind articles, as well as analysing pictures that appear in the articles to determine what kind of images are presented to the public. In addition, evaluating the motives of the donors and sponsors of The Times of India would add significantly in determining who the newspaper is accountable to and what view it tries to represent. In the next chapter, I will compare and contrast the results from The Times of India and Tehelka and arrive at conclusions about the way in which alternative and mainstream media in India represent the 2008 Amarnath land transfer controversy.

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CHAPTER FIVE Introduction In conducting this research, I set out attempting to examine the way in which mainstream print media compares with alternative print media in India – looking at The Times of India and Tehelka respectively – in representing the 2008 Amarnath land transfer controversy in Kashmir. In order to examine this question more closely, it was important to look at existing literature surrounding these two kinds of media in situations of ethnic conflict. Through my research, I became aware that, while there are some sources that examine either mainstream or alternative media, there is a dearth of literature that offers a comparative perspective. However, in looking at mainstream print media in ethnic conflict separately from alternative print media in political conflict (as there were few studies about alternative print media in ethnic conflict), I was able to detect some key strands, from which I formed my primary hypothesis. For mainstream media, I rejected the notion that it serves as a peace-building function in India, and instead turned to two key ideas:

1. A binary presentation of ethnic groups involved in the conflict – demonisation of the ‘other’ as those who are propagating the conflict and whose demands are unjustified, while victimising the ‘self’ as rational innocents subject to the violence from the ‘other’.

2. Silences – telling only one version of events, leaving out significant details which would portray

the ‘other’ as rational. I also found that the purpose of alternative media was to directly counter these two strategies of mainstream media in representing ethnic groups within political conflict. Specifically, alternative media should serve to:

1. Take a different viewpoint of events from the mainstream – portray issues in a more complex and critical manner than that of the mainstream.

2. Fill in silences – cover issues that are not present in the mainstream.

I identified several observable implications that I would look for within The Times of India and Tehelka. Within the former, these are:

1. A more homogenous interpretation of the conflict than Tehelka – Kashmiris having little or no justification for their actions, with unreasonable demands to revoke the land transfer agreement.

2. A more sympathetic opinion than that of Tehelka with regards to the Jammu side, portrayed as

victims in the conflict; a justification for the employment of the land transfer; a neutral stance taken toward the GOI.

Within Tehelka the observable implications I looked for are:

1. Greater representation of the range of actors from both sides of the conflict than The Times of India.

2. Responsibility placed on all actors with a greater emphasis on the GOI as a hegemonic,

democratically accountable actor which has failed in its peace-making function.

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3. A greater justification of Kashmiri protests as compared to The Times of India.

To detect these observable implications, I used both content and discourse analysis. Within Tehelka, I applied these methodologies to all the eight articles; for The Times of India, I employed content analysis on a random selection of thematic articles (22 in total), while discourse analysis was performed on the two longest articles of each episode of heightened conflict (ten in total). For content analysis, I used a method similar to that of Hook and Pu’s204 looking within four major categories: problem identification, attribution and victimisation205, evaluation and prescription. For discourse analysis, I used many of the categories constructed by Teo in his approach to Critical Discourse Analysis206

while also drawing upon categories from other research and came up with four: headlines and leads, generalisation and specificity, level of certitude, and literary techniques.

I then employed each of these methods to the articles selected within Tehelka and The Times of India, in Chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 2 provides a summary of the conflict and information about J&K today. The remainder of this chapter will present a comparison of the analysis between the representation of the 2008 Amarnath land transfer controversy within Tehelka and The Times of India. After investigating the conflict comparatively, I will then go on to discuss the value of these findings and suggestions for further research. Comparing Coverage Within The Times of India and Tehelka I will compare The Times of India and Tehelka within each category of discourse and content analysis and then provide an overall comparison between the two news sources from the findings from the discourse and content analyses. Overview Worthy to note is that within both The Times of India and Tehelka, the date that they start documenting the controversy is much later than when it actually started. While in the former of the sources, the first documented coverage was on June 17, 2008 after an upsurge in violence in Kashmir, the latter only began covering the issue on July 5, 2008. However, recognising that Tehelka is a national newsweekly, only political issues that are deemed most important would be represented within its coverage as there is no space for updating the reader on everyday events within India. With the passage of time, the land transfer controversy acquired this status as it became increasingly tense and not just a passing issue; thus, it is reasonable to expect that Tehelka would start covering this issue at a later date than when it began. However, this cannot be said to the same degree with The Times of India. Being a national newspaper, its main purpose is to inform readers about nationwide events, and, the land transfer, being met with resistance from Kashmir, would be expected to have even a small mention on the date when it began in May. Although coverage does begin half a month later, and The Times of India does report on all other key events, it is peculiar that there is no mention of the land transfer until half a month later. This partially supports the hypothesis about mainstream media including silences in its reporting especially when concerning the ‘other’ and, based on this category of start dates for the controversy, The Times of India can be viewed as mainstream.

204 Hook, Steven W. and Xiaoyu Pu. Framing Sino-American Relations under Stress: A Reexamination of News Cover of the 2001 Spy Plane Crisis. Asian Affairs. 205 While Hook and Pu only looked for attribution, I added victimisation to reflect the strands found within my literature review. 206 Teo, Peter. Racism in the news: a Critical Discourse Analysis of news reporting in two Australian newspapers. Discourse and Society. Sage Publications, Vol. 11, 2000.

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Problem Identification The results within this category confirm, to a large extent, the hypothesis about alternative and mainstream print media. While Tehelka identifies a problem every single time, it never ascribes a singular problem to the conflict, with an equal spread across all three categories – religious, oppression / unfair treatment and inflammation by political parties. While it is expected that many of the articles within The Times of India will not identify a problem as it is a daily newspaper and serves to update readers on events, the fact that the journalist does not display any opinion in approximately 30 percent of the articles points to the lack of critical commentary with regards to problem identification of the conflict. Additionally, there are a large number of articles that identify the problem as inflamed by political parties, limiting the analysis to the immediate conflict and failing to regard it in the historical context of Kashmiri politics. This categorisation of the problem – as inflamed by political parties – exists within Tehelka as well, but not to the degree it does in The Times of India. Whenever The Times of India assigns the problem to be one of oppression or unfair treatment, it is only through third-parties, dissolving them of responsibility of this view. In this manner, the newspaper’s attempt at being more critical is lessened because, while it may be representing critical views, it does not do so directly. Tehelka never once employs this method, instead stating the problem directly, making it appear much more critical without fear of repercussion. It is evident then that, while The Times of India does not assign a deterministic stance toward problem identification of the conflict, the fact that a large number of articles relate the conflict to inflammation of political parties demonstrates the superficial view of the conflict and attempts to be more critical are lessened by the fact that the newspaper does not do so outright; Tehelka, on the other hand, attributes the conflict to a range of factors all directly stated by the journalists. In this sense, Tehelka fulfils its role as an alternative source by appearing to be bolder and thereby more critical of events within the controversy than The Times of India, while The Times of India does so to a lesser degree, conforming to the hypothesis. Attribution and Victimisation The results within this category confirm what I would expect about alternative media to a large extent, but, for mainstream media, some results are unexpected. Both Tehelka and The Times of India attribute the largest degree of responsibility toward the GOI. While this assignment of blame occurs much more frequently in the former of the two sources (87.5 percent of the time), the latter also exhibits this characteristic (38 percent of the time) even if almost every single time it is through third-party sources. Thus, while less critical of the GOI both in terms of how many times they attribute blame to this actor and how they do so – through third-party sources – the fact that The Times of India is critical at all demonstrates that they are not completely neutral to the policies emanating from the Centre. Both sources also seem more bent on attributing responsibility than on victimising: indeed, within both sources, victimisation serves primarily to pinpoint a political actor who is responsible and in quite a few articles within both sources, there is no victim mentioned at all even when an actor is attributed responsibility. While this may appear to demonise, the fact that it is primarily toward the GOI demonstrates the critical nature of both sources. In addition, there are multiple actors on both sides of the conflict upon whom responsibility is attributed within both sources. This is expected of Tehelka inserting a level of instigation and criticism in their reporting; however, it is less expected of The Times of India; that it does this, points to evidence supporting the fact that it displays some elements of alternative press. While Tehelka seems to conform almost entirely to the hypothesis about alternative media, The Times of India conforms to the hypothesis about mainstream media to a lesser degree than expected. Even though the GOI is attributed responsibility the most, the second largest attribution of responsibility is upon separatist parties in Kashmir, and this source also primarily victimises Jammu citizens. Thus, while there

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are strong elements of The Times of India reporting as an alternative source does, it also exhibits aspects of mainstream press even if the degree of this is less than expected. Evaluation Within the evaluation category, Tehelka conforms to the expectation of alternative media, while The Times of India conforms to the expectation of mainstream media. In terms of type of coverage, as expected, all articles within the former of these sources are thematic in nature, sometimes to such a high degree that they display characteristics of op-eds. However, this does not necessarily reflect an element of alternative media just as the fact that there are more episodic articles within The Times of India than thematic does not reflect that it is mainstream media; rather, this serves to confirm the format of the sources – Tehelka, as a newsweekly, does not aim to report on day-to-day events, but rather analyse the conflict more critically; The Times of India, as a mainstream newspaper, serves to update readers on day-to-day events and thereby focuses on episodic coverage. However, the fact that the thematic articles within The Times of India serve mainly to share the point of view of an actor in the conflict as opposed to analyse the events through the journalist’s perspective, points to the fact that this news source lacks independent criticism and can only achieve this through third-parties. It is worthy to note, though, that as the conflict progresses there is an increase in the number of thematic articles within The Times of India, thereby inserting more critical perspectives within the coverage. Within both The Times of India and Tehelka, the primary recurring theme within thematic coverage is that of attribution of responsibility. Combining this with the previous category, it is evident that in both sources, this is placed on the GOI. However, while in Tehelka this criticism comes directly from the journalist, this is only true of The Times of India when a Kashmiri actor is held responsible; otherwise, when the BJP or the GOI are attributed blame, it is through a third-party. This provides evidence for the fact that The Times of India attempts to dissolve itself of responsibility when attributing blame on any actors on the Jammu or the GOI side of the conflict; however, the very presence of these critical perspectives indicates that The Times of India is critical to a degree. Thus, it is evident that Tehelka yet again conforms to the hypothesis about alternative media; while The Times of India does conform to its hypothesis about mainstream media, it also exhibits some characteristics of alternative press in that there are a range of recurring themes present thereby diversifying and complicating the conflict, and, that there is evidence of alternative viewpoints in terms of attribution of responsibility. Prescription The results from this category support The Times of India as a mainstream source, but do not entirely support Tehelka as an alternative source. Within both sources, when a solution is prescribed, it is mostly to support negotiations. However, even though this may appear to be an alternative characteristic for The Times of India, the negotiations suggested are primarily between the GOI and the Jammu side. In fact, there are fewer articles advocating for negotiations among the GOI and both Jammu and Kashmir, than there are for just negotiations among the GOI and Jammu. Within Tehelka, the opposite is present – when negotiations are suggested it is usually to engage Kashmir with the GOI. However, this is more alternative because Tehelka characterises the conflict not as individual episodes but rather in the framework of the Kashmir conflict as a whole, taking into account its lengthy history. In this sense, then, there are only two sides to the conflict – Kashmir and the GOI – and by taking neither side of the conflict but arguing that dialogue needs to exist a more complex perspective is offered. On the other hand, when The Times of India does prescribe solutions, it is usually to individual episodes and not to the conflict as a whole, thereby lacking the critical perspective present within Tehelka. While the majority of articles within The Times of India do not prescribe a solution, this is expected both because it is a daily newspaper that serves to update readers about day-to-day events, but also because, in attempting to be neutral, it lacks critical perspectives. However, the fact that approximately 40 percent of

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articles within Tehelka do not prescribe a solution runs counter to what I would expect because it seems as though this source lacks critical perspectives about the conflict for a large number of articles. Thus, it is evident that while, for the most part, The Times of India exhibits characteristics of mainstream media within this category, Tehelka exhibits characteristics of alternative media to a lesser extent than I would expect. Headlines and Leads While this category serves to confirm the hypothesis about alternative media, the results do not always do so for mainstream media. Within both sources, many of the headlines and leads mention political actors, but this is done to a much larger degree in Tehelka with almost all articles doing so. As expected, Tehelka places responsibility on a range of political actors within the conflict from both sides dissolving citizens of blame, and justifies its criticisms of these actors, lending it a large degree of credibility. In doing so, it offers a critical and unpopular perspective that could rouse tempers of hegemonic actors. The Times of India, on the other hand, contains headlines and leads that do not point to a clear pattern: while there is some evidence of vilifying Kashmiris, victimising Jammuites and remaining neutral toward the GOI, there also exists some criticism of the GOI and not all headlines and leads demonise or victimise. Thus, within this category, it is evident that Tehelka largely confirms the hypothesis about alternative media, while The Times of India neither refutes nor confirms it. Generalisation and Specificity The results from this category provide little evidence to confirm or refute the hypothesis for both The Times of India and Tehelka. It is worthy to note that the articles that are most specific within The Times of India are the ones that mention a journalist’s name – articles that are labelled Times News Network do not employ such a high degree of specificity. It seems, then, that the mention of a name adds a level of transparency to the journalist’s reporting. Within Tehelka, all articles specify a journalist, allowing for a greater accountability where information can be confirmed; however, even so, both generalisation and specificity exists within Tehelka. In particular, one of the articles uses labels to describe various groups present, and, in doing so, stereotypes members of these groups into distinct categories, thereby going completely against the function of alternative media. Within The Times of India, generalisation is much more prevalent when referring to Kashmiris, grouping them in one category and thereby fulfilling one of the characteristics of mainstream media in demonising the ‘other’. Thus, both news sources exhibit characteristics of both alternative and mainstream media and it is unclear whether they support or refute the hypothesis; in both cases, however, it is clear that they cannot be boxed into either category. Level of Certitude – Quotations and Statistics In terms of quotations, there seems to be quite an even spread with quotations from actors on all sides within both news sources. This is something that I would expect of alternative media, but the fact that it exists within The Times of India too lends credence to the possibility that this news source may not always exhibit characteristics of mainstream media. Within Tehelka, when citizens are mentioned, their names are also listed thereby giving this newsweekly legitimacy and acknowledging that the opinion mentioned is the viewpoint of one person and not an entire group of people, thereby fulfilling the characteristic of alternative media. However, this degree of specificity is not always present within The Times of India: many articles contain partial quotations that do not pinpoint a source and it is highly unclear who is speaking. These quotations absolve the newspaper of all responsibility, while also not allowing readers to pinpoint who to critique if they have concerns about a particular opinion. Clearly, then, this is a feature of mainstream media. In terms of statistics, within Tehelka statistics cover both sides of the conflict; however, some statistics are rather ambiguous giving only approximations and not exact figures. While this is not the case within The Times of India, there is a trend of a decreasing number of statistics as the conflict progresses, and, when they are used, they seem to either highlight Kashmiri arrests or non-Kashmiris as victims of the

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conflict. Thus, in this sense, The Times of India uses statistics to conform to the functions of mainstream media while it is unclear whether Tehelka fits neatly into the category of alternative media. Thus, in terms of level of certitude present, The Times of India seems to affirm the hypothesis about mainstream media to a large extent through its use of partial quotes and biased statistics, while Tehelka is largely alternative except through its lack of specificity in terms of statistics. Literary Techniques – Adjectives, Metaphors, Negation To a large extent, the literary techniques for the two news sources affirm the hypothesis about alternative and mainstream media. While adjectives within The Times of India appear to mostly demonise the Kashmiri side while presenting Jammuites and the GOI more positively, the adjectives present in Tehelka appear to be quite critical of the GOI with only some evidence of victimisation of Kashmiris (and no equivalent for Jammuites). In this sense, then, the examination of adjectives used strongly suggests that mainstream media presents a binary evaluation of the actors in the conflict victimising the ‘self’ while demonising the ‘other’ as is expected; alternative media, on the other hand, uses adjectives to critique a hegemonic, democratically accountable actor and both sources confirm to the hypothesis. The use of metaphors confirms this evaluation. While there are many neutral metaphors within The Times of India, those that are not appear to demonise the Kashmiri side while presenting Jammuites as victims and holding a largely uncritical stance toward the GOI policies. Within Tehelka, metaphors are used to criticise the GOI for its inadequate response to the situation, thereby appearing critical of the largest and most powerful actor within the conflict. Finally, the use of negation also confirms the hypothesis: within The Times of India, it is used to depict claims from Kashmir as irrational, while, within Tehelka, it is used to highlight the failure of the GOI by contrasting the situation to what needs to be done. The use of negation, then, as with the rest of the literary techniques, serves to validate the hypothesis and confirm that The Times of India exhibits characteristics of mainstream media while Tehelka conforms to what is expected of alternative media. Discussion of Results Comparing The Times of India to Tehelka in all categories, it is largely evident that The Times of India displays many of the characteristics that I would expect of mainstream media, while Tehelka largely conforms to the hypothesis about alternative media. However, this is not absolute and both sources display elements of both alternative and mainstream media. It seems, though, that Tehelka is much more alternative than The Times of India is mainstream. While The Times of India certainly exhibits characteristics of mainstream press, there are several times when it takes on a more critical approach. Mostly, this is not done directly, using third-party references to convey this sentiment; however, the fact that it exists at all within a mainstream newspaper points to the idea that it is not as mainstream as I would expect it to be. In addition, The Times of India does not always demonise the ‘other’ and victimise the ‘self’; perhaps this is attributable to the wide readership that The Times of India has being a national newspaper; Muslims, as the second largest religious group in India, may be rather offended by a negative portrayal of Kashmiris. Tehelka appears much more daring in its coverage, being openly critical of many political actors from all sides of the conflict and providing provocative remarks about these actors thereby attracting critical community voices. Perhaps it is this fearlessness that allows Tehelka to appear much more critical than The Times of India; however, it cannot be denied that the latter of these sources also exhibits some of these characteristics even if they do so in a less outright manner. Despite this, on the whole, it can be said that the hypothesis and observable implications surrounding Tehelka and The Times of India are validated. Particularly, with regards to the latter, I conclude that The Times of India is a mainstream print source because it does two things:

1. Demonise Kashmiris, thereby portraying them as irrational, while also victimising Jammuites.

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2. Offer a superficial / unanalytical view of the conflict that is not regarded with reference to the

history of politics in Kashmir but rather prescribing problems and solutions that just involve solving the problem at hand.

However, The Times of India represents a range of actors from both sides of the conflict and is also critical in terms of its stance toward the GOI as a central, hegemonic actor even if this is not expressed openly. In these respects, it does not conform to the hypothesis about mainstream media. Tehelka seems to fulfil its role of alternative media to a greater extent with regards to:

1. Representation of actors from both sides of the conflict, both citizens and political actors alike.

2. Responsibility placed on all political actors, with a large degree on the GOI, being openly critical toward them and their policies; viewing citizens as victims to politics and thereby, to some degree, justified in their protests.

However, Tehelka often seems to side much more so with Kashmir than it does with Jammu, sometimes neglecting to analyse the version of events from Jammu. While this may appear to make Tehelka less alternative, it is justified in who this newsweekly views as the ‘self’ and the ‘other’. As a critical, political newsweekly, it serves to counter the traditional dichotomy between Jammu as one side and Kashmir as the other, and instead view the conflict as a historical one that has always existed between Kashmir and the GOI. In this sense, then, it is, to a large extent, unconcerned with the Amarnath conflict in particular; rather, Tehelka uses the conflict as a way to engage the public in a discussion of the Kashmir conflict as a whole, in its historical context. As a democratically accountable hegemonic actor, mainstream sources are less critical toward the GOI and its policies and certainly do not do so directly often disguising their opinions behind third-party sources; however, it seems reasonable that an alternative source would offer an analytical perspective thereby filling in silences that are lacking in the mainstream. In this sense, then, portraying Kashmiris as victims serves to add to a critical perspective of the conflict, one that is lacking in the mainstream press. Through The Times of India, I found little evidence of a historical analysis of the Amarnath land transfer controversy. In addition, criticism toward the GOI was centred around the role they played in the specific context on the 2008 Amarnath land transfer controversy, and there was some evidence of demonising Kashmiris. Tehelka makes up for the lack of this critical perspective by appearing sympathetic toward Kashmiris; this does not serve to vilify Jammuites, rather, it reinforces the responsibility placed upon the GOI and thereby offers a counter-perspective to that in the mainstream. Thus, it is largely evident that, to a large extent, the hypothesis about alternative and mainstream print media – using Tehelka and The Times of India respectively as examples – are confirmed with regards to the 2008 Amarnath land transfer controversy in Kashmir through this study. Value of Findings While this research was only conducted on two print media sources within India regarding one specific incident in Kashmir, it fills in a gap in the literature. During my reading of existing literature, I did not find a study that compares the role of alternative to mainstream print media in ethnic conflict. Recognising that media is a key means through which to shape public opinion and that, in many developing countries, the English speaking population comprise a large portion of the elite, it is this portion of society which has the ability to alter politics. Thus, this study is important in examining the ways in which media may alter the public’s mindset. While for Kashmiris, media serves as an indirect plebiscite by proxy as one of the few remaining venues through which their viewpoints can be expressed, for media studies in the rest of the world, my research allows for an understanding of how different kinds

67

of media may shape public sentiments regarding ethnic conflicts and provides a framework in which to conduct this research. The findings from this study also call into question the labels of ‘alternative’ and ‘mainstream’ with regards to print media. While The Times of India can still be classified as a mainstream newspaper, it displays various elements of alternative press, and Tehelka, while affirming its categorisation under alternative press, also displays some elements of mainstream print media. Thus, the findings suggest that the boundaries between alternative and mainstream press are too rigid and need to be relaxed somewhat: instead of viewing these two types of media as distinct, it may be more pertinent to understand media along a spectrum with alternative on one end and mainstream on the other. Perhaps the question should not be whether a particular news source is alternative or mainstream but how alternative or mainstream it is and where it fits along this spectrum. In blurring the boundaries between these two types of media, the public may arrive at a better understanding of the range of news sources that exist and examine each without preconceived notions of elements that it would expect them to exhibit, giving them their unique place in the media sphere. Finally, this study offers a framework within which to examine print media in situations of ethnic conflict and finds that different types of media provide diverse perspectives. The study has implications for the ways in which news sources frame issues in the media and how this representation or misrepresentation may serve to construct certain ideologies about a community or a particular issue. This research calls for a closer scrutiny of media in situations of ethnic conflict as it can play a role in shaping public opinion. Through the study, the public is made more aware of the manner in which we process the media, allowing readers to become critical and wary of framing of news and urging the public to read a larger variety of print media to gain a multiplicity of perspectives. Thus the study holds important implications for the way in which the public read and interpret print media. Limitations There are certain limitations that I experienced while conducting this research, the largest of which was comparing a magazine with a newspaper. While this was necessary as I have not come across any alternative newspapers or mainstream political magazines at the national level in India, the difference in format and objectives of the two sources resulted in a comparative analysis that was difficult to conduct. Being a daily, The Times of India contained a much larger selection of articles to choose from about the conflict, but it was understood that not all of these would be critical as they served to update readers on day-to-day happenings; on the other hand, Tehelka, as a weekly, resulted in few articles that were rather lengthy and thoroughly analysed the conflict. Despite this, however, there was ample opportunity for The Times of India to insert critical perspectives within its analysis, which, to a large extent, it failed to do. Thus, The Times of India did not capitalise on its ability to be critical allowing me to appropriately characterise it as mainstream media. In addition, many of the categories I looked for did not depend on the format of the papers, thus the results from the study can be viewed as largely unaffected by this problem. It is also important to understand that this study was limited to the English press within India, as a constituency that holds a large degree of power owing to their literacy in English. Thus, this study only investigates the effect of the press on this population and is not representative of the way news is represented to the general public in India. Finally, it is crucial to note that there were many more categories that could have been chosen to investigate when conducting content and discourse analyses. While not all evidence fit neatly into any one category option, the ones that were chosen were done so based on their pertinence to the conflict; however, this research can be strengthened by examining more categories and a greater variety of options within each category.

68

Suggestions for Further Research This study could be furthered if it were to investigate, more closely, pictures within the media and how these may influence popular perception. Images are important in print media as they can represent a certain viewpoint; analysing these pictures in relation to the content of the articles would be beneficial in discovering whether the results would strengthen or weaken the findings of this study. In addition, interviewing the journalists within each source to discover their intentions behind the articles would serve as a way to gauge why the media chose to use certain techniques or phrasing and thus uncover why a certain group of people were represented in a particular manner. Looking at the sponsors for each source would point to the allegiances of the paper and perhaps uncover why a source may or may not insert a certain level of critical analysis or is more outspoken about certain issues than another new source. Finally, looking at press in regional languages, particularly within Kashmir, would serve to supplement this study in understanding how the conflict was represented to the ethnic minority population directly involved. Particularly, examining the representation of the conflict in Kashmiri press that Kashmiris produce would give me a more rounded perspective of the conflict by understanding who Kashmiri press characterise as the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ and how this is conveyed. If I were to understand the conflict throughout its history, looking at other controversial episodes within Kashmir would be beneficial in strengthening or weakening the findings from this study.

69

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Articles from Tehelka (listed by article number in Appendix B)

1. Sahay, Anand K. Tehelka, A Goof-Up in Kashmir, Vol. 5, Issue 26, July 5, 2008.

2. Sahay, Anand K. Tehelka, Playing With Fire, Vol. 5, Issue 27, July 12, 2008.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article4507868.ece



http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/000200901051606.htm

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http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1152489.cms



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3. Sahay, Anand K. and Peerzada Arshad Hamid. Tehelka, Shutdown In J&K. Vol. 5, Issue 27, July 12, 2008.

4. Hamid, Peerzada Arshad. Tehelka, ‘The deep-rooted alienation drove people to the streets’. Vol.

5, Issue 27, July 12, 2008.

5. Baweja, Harinder. Tehelka, Playing Nero Or Worse, Vol. 5, Issue 32, August 16, 2008.

6. Hamid, Peerzada Arshad. Tehelka, The Missing State, Vol. 5, Issue 33, Aug 23, 2008.

7. Baweja, Harinder. Tehelka, Nine Ways Of Looking At A Crisis, Vol. 5, Issue 34, August 30, 2008.

8. Baweja, Harinder. Tehelka, The Kashmir Conundrum, Vol. 5, Issue 36, September 13, 2008.

Articles from The Times of India (listed by article number in Appendix G, then others from Chapter One)

1. The Times of India, Srinagar mob attacks pilgrim family, 4 hurt, June 26, 2008.

2. The Times of India, Shrine Protest: Tourists flee Valley, June 27, 2008.

3. Pandit, Saleem M. The Times of India, Protests play spoilsport with weddings, June 29, 2008.

4. The Times of India, Amarnath land row: Jammu shuts down, July 1, 2008.

5. The Times of India, Under pressure, Azad revokes land allotment, July 2, 2008.

6. The Times of India, 4 die in BJP-VHP bandh violence, July 4, 2008.

7. The Times of India, Curfew reimposed in Jammu, July 28, 2008.

8. The Times of India, Sonia holds meeting over Jammu violence, August 5, 2008.

9. The Times of India, ‘J&K govt always bows to demands of Kashmiris’, August 7, 2008.

10. The Times of India, BJP will take Amarnath protests to national stage, August 8, 2008.

11. The Times of India, No one is listening to Patil, mission J&K fails, August 11, 2008.

12. The Times of India, March to PoK halted as 12 killed in J&K, August 13, 2008.

13. The Times of India, On stir, militants across LoC rally behind Hurriyat, August 13, 2008.

14. The Times of India, Separatists manage to sway valley sentiment, August 14, 2008.

15. The Times of India, ‘Azad polarizing state to strengthen Jammu base’, August 14, 2008.

16. The Times of India, Agitators, separatists not the same: LK, August 15, 2008.

17. The Times of India, Unnecessary force? Several victims shot in the back, August 16, 2008.

74

18. The Times of India, ‘No highway blockade, it’s only propaganda’, August 17, 2008.

19. The Times of India, Cong weights options to end Amarnath impasse, August 17, 2008.

20. The Times of India, Samiti calls for civil disobedience, August 21, 2008.

21. The Times of India, Centre fails to bring protestors to talk table, August 21, 2008.

22. The Times of India, Agitation in Jammu and Kashmir: A study in contrast, August 21, 2008.

23. The Times of India, Centre sees protests ebbing in Valley, August 22, 2008.

24. The Times of India, Clueless Centre adds to chaos, August 24, 2008.

25. The Times of India, Samiti suspends talks over police ‘excesses’, August 26, 2008.

26. The Times of India, ‘Hurriyat Leader Shot In Back, Not By Cops’, August 31, 2008.

27. The Times of India, Amarnath land deal ends stir in Jammu, September 1, 2008.

28. The Times of India, ‘Pact will clear differences’, September 1, 2008.

29. The Times of India, Amarnath Sangharsh Samiti to boycott talks with all-party delegation, August

9, 2008.

30. The Times of India, Violence in Srinagar over land allotment to Amarnath board, June 23, 2008.

31. Pandit, Saleem M. The Times of India, Amarnath row: Women power on full display in J&K, Aug 21, 2008.

32. The Times of India, Amarnath row to be resolved peacefully: Shivraj Patil, August 10, 2008.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A

Map of Kashmir Today207

207 The Future of Kashmir? BBC News. [Online] Available http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/south_asia/03/kashmir_future/html/, February 27, 2010.


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Appendix B

Summary of Articles for 2008 Amarnath Land Transfer Controversy in J&K by Tehelka, July – September 2008

No. Author Date Title Summary 1 Anand K. Sahay July 5, 2008

(Vol. 5, Issue 26) A Goof-Up In Kashmir

Questions the need to establish permanent structures in the forest for only a few months each year; explores the implications of this controversy for October elections in J&K and the communal politics that can arise as a result

2 Anand K. Sahay July 12, 2008 (Vol. 5, Issue 27)

Playing With Fire

The BJP does not have any solid basis for instigating protests in Jammu and that this may place India in danger

3 Anand K. Sahay and Peerzada Arshad Hamid

July 12, 2008 (Vol. 5, Issue 27)

Shutdown In J&K

Congress’ neglect and mishandling of the situation has given rise to the controversy; summarises the main aspects of the controversy in a historical perspective

4 Peerzada Arshad Hamid (interviewing Rekha Chowdhary)

July 12, 2008 (Vol. 5, Issue 27)

‘The deep-rooted alienation drove people to the streets’

Presents the controversy in light of the alienation of decades of the Kashmiri people who have no other option but to politicise every decision to voice their opinions

5 Harinder Baweja Aug 16, 2008 (Vol. 5, Issue 32)

Playing Nero Or Worse

Places the controversy in the larger context of the history of the Kashmir conflict; attributes responsibility to different political parties who create a scene out of small happenings without realising their consequences

6 Peerzada Arshad Hamid

Aug 23, 2008 (Vol. 5, Issue 33)

The Missing State

GOI has been largely unsuccessfully at pacifying the conflict; summary of events and why they transpired

7 Harinder Baweja Aug 30, 2008 (Vol. 5, Issue 34)

Nine Ways Of Looking At A Crisis

Contrast the end of the conflict with the situation 3 months earlier in the state when things were going well; interviews 9 actors from Kashmir with differing viewpoints on the controversy; argues that GOI has made hollow promises to Kashmiris and needs to start addressing the problem politically not militarily

8 Harinder Baweja Sept 13, 2008 (Vol. 5, Issue 36)

The Kashmir Conundrum

Argues that GOI needs to talk to separatist factions in Kashmir; summarises main events of conflict

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P ga

in?

5)

How

do

you

see

the

poll

boyc

ott c

ampa

ign

that

the

Hur

riyat

is p

ropo

sing

to la

unch

?

Attr

ibut

ion

of re

spon

sibili

ty (i

ndire

ctly

) on

GO

I who

are

co

mm

only

thou

ght o

f as t

he re

ason

for a

liena

tion

Gen

eral

ised

ques

tion

Fear

fact

or –

wha

t wou

ld h

appe

n if

mili

tanc

y is

rein

state

d?

Impl

ying

that

this

coul

d be

irra

tiona

l rea

ctio

n of

peo

ple

Impl

ies p

oliti

cal a

ims f

or P

DP

Hin

ting

at in

stabi

lity

and

polit

ical

gai

ns fo

r Hur

riyat

5

Curre

nt A

ffairs

; K

ashm

ir cr

isis

Play

ing

Ner

o O

r Wor

se; P

oliti

cian

s in

Jam

mu

and

in th

e K

ashm

ir V

alle

y ha

ve o

ppor

tuni

stica

lly

fann

ed th

e co

mm

unal

con

flagr

atio

n –

all f

or a

few

vot

es m

ore

Attr

ibut

ion

of re

spon

sibili

ty o

n po

litic

ians

for f

urth

er

infla

min

g th

e co

nflic

t for

a c

onsp

irato

rial r

easo

n –

vote

s 6

Curre

nt A

ffairs

; A

mar

nath

co

ntro

vers

y

The

Miss

ing

Stat

e; Ja

mm

u an

d K

ashm

ir is

tear

ing

into

two

dang

erou

s hal

ves a

nd a

s the

fire

s ra

ged

unab

ated

, the

Cen

tre a

ppea

rs a

hap

less

bys

tand

er

Attr

ibut

ion

of re

spon

sibili

ty o

n G

OI f

or n

ot d

evot

ing

enou

gh a

ttent

ion

to th

e iss

ue, m

ishan

dlin

g of

situ

atio

n,

not p

erfo

rmin

g w

elfa

re fu

nctio

n 7

Curre

nt A

ffairs

N

ine

Way

s Of L

ooki

ng A

t A C

risis;

Vio

lenc

e em

brac

ed K

ashm

ir in

the

1990

s and

in 2

008

it ha

s en

velo

ped

Jam

mu

in it

s fol

d. H

arin

der B

awej

a ca

ptur

es th

e co

nflic

ting

voic

es fr

om a

stat

e th

at is

on

a d

ange

rous

pre

cipi

ce

Both

side

s are

suffe

ring,

pro

vidi

ng d

iver

se p

ersp

ectiv

es

on th

e co

nflic

t

8 Cu

rrent

Affa

irs;

Kas

hmir

The

Kas

hmir

Conu

ndru

m; I

t’s ti

me

to th

ink

outsi

de th

e bo

x. N

ew D

elhi

mus

t sta

rt ta

lkin

g to

H

urriy

at […

] A g

roun

d re

port

from

Srin

agar

. A

ttrib

utin

g re

spon

sibili

ty o

n G

OI

78 A

ppen

dix

D

G

ener

alisa

tion

and

Spec

ifici

ty w

ithin

Art

icle

s for

200

8 A

mar

nath

Lan

d Tr

ansf

er C

ontr

over

sy in

J&

K b

y Tehelka,

Jul

y –

Sept

embe

r 200

8 N

o.

Ref

eren

ce

Eval

uatio

n 1

Whi

ch h

as to

be

seen

in th

e co

ntex

t of a

Hin

du sh

rine

in a

Mus

lim-m

ajor

ity b

orde

r sta

te in

the

thro

es

of se

para

tism

for s

ever

al d

ecad

es; s

epar

atist

pol

itici

ans i

n th

e V

alle

y ha

ve b

een

hand

ed o

n a

plat

ter

the

oppo

rtuni

ty to

pla

y th

e co

mm

unal

car

d; th

e so

-cal

led

Hin

du in

tere

sts in

J&K

; ove

r-the

-top

civi

l se

rvan

ts

Spec

ifies

as m

uch

as p

ossib

le –

Mus

lim-m

ajor

ity, n

ot sa

ying

eve

ryon

e in

th

e V

alle

y is

sepa

ratis

t, qu

estio

ning

whe

ther

that

is re

ally

wha

t Hin

dus a

re

inte

reste

d in

2 H

indu

tva

affil

iate

s are

blo

ckin

g th

e ro

ad to

Srin

agar

Sp

ecify

ing

who

the

affil

iate

s are

, not

tryi

ng to

gen

eral

ise a

ll of

Jam

mu

who

ar

e do

ing

this

3

The

sepa

ratis

ts –

man

y of

who

m a

re M

uslim

com

mun

alist

s; m

ostly

-Mus

lim K

ashm

ir V

alle

y as

wel

l as

the

flatla

nds o

f the

Hin

du-d

omin

ated

Jam

mu

regi

on; p

ortra

yed

in lu

rid c

olou

rs b

y th

e V

alle

y se

para

tists

and

the

Hin

du c

hauv

inist

s alik

e; n

early

all

of th

e K

ashm

ir V

alle

y po

pula

tion

is no

w

Mus

lim

Spec

ifyin

g –

sayi

ng th

e m

ajor

ity o

f peo

ple

not a

ll pe

ople

; poi

ntin

g to

a

certa

in g

roup

of p

eopl

e w

ho a

re in

flam

ing

the

conf

lict;

mak

ing

com

para

tive

state

men

ts

4 Th

e fe

ar p

sych

osis

amon

g th

e pe

ople

; the

Hin

duisa

tion

of K

ashm

ir; m

oder

ates

are

bei

ng fo

rced

to to

e a

radi

cal l

ine

for t

hey

have

bee

n m

argi

nalis

ed b

y N

ew D

elhi

; peo

ple

man

ifest

thei

r ang

er w

here

ver

feas

ible

Gen

eral

ising

– sa

ying

that

thes

e ch

arac

teris

tics a

re a

pplic

able

to a

ll pe

ople

, al

l mod

erat

es a

re to

eing

a ra

dica

l lin

e, a

ll pe

ople

man

ifest

thei

r ang

er

whe

reve

r fea

sible

5

Last

wee

k, it

was

diff

icul

t to

disti

ngui

sh Ja

mm

u fro

m S

rinag

ar, H

indu

com

mun

alist

from

Mus

lim

sepa

ratis

t Sp

ecify

ing

– im

plyi

ng th

at th

is is

not s

omet

hing

that

is c

omm

on; n

ot a

ll of

th

e pe

ople

in e

ach

regi

on a

re c

lass

ified

und

er th

is ca

tego

ry

6 Ja

mm

u re

gion

is c

ompl

etel

y fo

r the

tran

sfer

of f

ores

t lan

d to

the

Shri

Am

arna

th S

hrin

e Bo

ard

(SA

SB),

and

the

Val

ley

is co

mpl

etel

y op

pose

d to

it; K

ashm

iri le

ader

s app

ear t

o be

read

y fo

r a se

para

tion

from

Ja

mm

u In

Jam

mu

the

agita

tion

is sp

earh

eade

d by

the

[AY

SS] [

…] r

un b

y its

con

veno

r; no

adj

ectiv

es o

r as

soci

atio

ns w

ith a

ny p

rope

r nou

ns

Gen

eral

ising

– sa

ying

that

eve

ryon

e in

the

regi

on is

for /

aga

inst

this

trans

fer,

not d

istin

guish

ing

type

s of p

eopl

e Sp

ecify

ing

– pi

npoi

ntin

g pa

rties

that

are

invo

lved

, not

ass

ocia

ting

char

acte

ristic

s with

gro

ups

7 sm

ug P

atil;

stud

ents

are

wal

king

up

to th

e se

curit

y bu

nker

s; to

day’

s gen

erat

ion

has g

row

n up

with

th

em; a

sk a

seni

or o

ffice

r […

] and

he

will

tell

you;

mig

rant

s in

Jam

mu;

Hin

dus i

n th

e V

alle

y ar

e ho

used

nex

t to

bunk

ers a

nd M

uslim

s in

Jam

mu

have

bee

n sw

athe

d in

a se

curit

y bl

anke

t; an

d in

K

ashm

ir, th

ey a

re w

illin

g to

pay

the

pric

e fo

r wha

t the

y ca

ll az

adi;

proc

eeds

to h

ave

eigh

t diff

eren

t ‘v

oice

s’ fr

om d

iffer

ent a

ctor

s ne

ither

the

state

’s m

ains

tream

par

ties n

or th

e Ce

ntre

; tee

min

g w

ith h

olid

ay-m

aker

s, m

ostly

from

G

ujar

at a

nd M

ahar

asht

ra; t

hese

boy

s, m

ost o

f who

m g

rew

up

in v

iole

nce;

no

adje

ctiv

es o

r as

soci

atio

ns w

ith a

ny p

rope

r nou

ns

Gen

eral

isatio

n –

impl

ying

all

Hin

dus i

n th

e V

alle

y ar

e ho

used

nex

t to

bunk

ers;

all s

tude

nts a

re tr

ying

to st

and

up; e

very

one

is w

illin

g to

pay

a

pric

e, e

tc.;

the

‘voi

ces’

of d

iffer

ent a

ctor

s ste

reot

ype

that

ALL

peo

ple

who

fit

und

er th

is ca

tego

ry b

elie

ve th

is in

terp

reta

tion

of e

vent

s Sp

ecify

ing

– no

t ass

ocia

ting

char

acte

ristic

s with

gro

ups

8 M

en in

uni

form

; rel

ucta

nt G

hula

m N

abi A

zad;

jour

nalis

ts w

ho v

entu

red

out w

ere

beat

en

No

adje

ctiv

es o

r ass

ocia

tions

with

any

pro

per n

ouns

G

ener

alisa

tion

– im

plyi

ng a

ll jo

urna

lists;

ass

ocia

tion

of m

en w

ith u

nifo

rm

seem

s lik

e th

ey a

re d

oing

thei

r dut

y

79 A

ppen

dix

E

Leve

l of C

ertit

ude w

ithin

Art

icle

s for

200

8 A

mar

nath

Lan

d Tr

ansf

er C

ontr

over

sy in

J&

K b

y Tehelka,

Jul

y –

Sept

embe

r 200

8 N

o.

Men

tion

of S

tatis

tics

Sour

ce o

f Quo

tatio

n Ev

alua

tion

1 N

one

Non

e

Alth

ough

no

quot

es o

r sta

tistic

s 2

Non

e N

one

Alth

ough

no

quot

es o

r sta

tistic

s 3

Bar m

entio

ning

Cab

inet

Dec

ision

No.

94/

7 ab

out l

and

trans

fer;

the

five

perc

ent o

r so

(Hin

du) K

ashm

iri P

andi

ts ha

ve m

ostly

m

igra

ted;

up

to 7

0 pe

r cen

t of e

ligib

le v

oter

s ha

d ca

st th

eir b

allo

t tho

ugh

clos

e to

700

or

dina

ry p

eopl

e ha

d be

en k

illed

by

terro

rists

Dir

ect –

Cab

inet

Dec

ision

abo

ut th

e la

nd tr

ansf

er (a

doc

umen

t); M

oham

med

Isha

q K

han

(hist

oria

n); F

irdou

s Sye

d (p

eace

act

ivist

, pas

t ter

roris

t); N

oor M

oham

med

Q

alw

al (9

0s m

ilita

nt, n

ow w

ith JK

LF)

Indi

rect

– P

DP

lead

er M

ehbo

oba

Muf

ti; G

OI;

Cong

ress

; BJP

; Vas

undh

ara

Raje

(B

JP C

M in

Raj

asth

an);

Ghu

lam

Nab

i Taq

(sen

ior N

C le

ader

)

Lots

of q

uote

s mos

tly o

n th

e K

ashm

iri si

de;

alm

ost e

very

one,

eve

n la

ypeo

ple,

are

ac

know

ledg

ed b

y na

me;

som

e qu

otes

but

som

e do

n’t s

eem

to b

e su

bsta

ntia

ted

in fa

ct (o

r so,

up

to, e

tc.)

4 N

one

Entir

e ar

ticle

is a

n in

terv

iew

so a

ll qu

oted

by

Rekh

a Ch

owdh

ary

Mor

e in

tere

sting

to q

uesti

on w

hy Tehelka

in

terv

iew

ed h

er in

stead

of s

omeo

ne e

lse

5 A

fter 9

0 ya

tris w

ere

kille

d in

a te

rroris

t atta

ck;

loca

ted

14,0

00 ft

abo

ve se

a le

vel

Dir

ect –

Meh

boob

a M

ufti

Indi

rect

– S

K S

inha

(ex-

gove

rnor

of J

&K

); J&

K H

igh

Cour

t N

ot m

any

quot

es

6 K

illin

g at

leas

t 12

peop

le; t

hree

mor

e pe

ople

w

ere

kille

d D

irec

t – P

akist

an; I

ndia

; Lee

la K

aran

Sha

rma

(con

veno

r of A

YSS

); pe

rson

s in

Jam

mu;

Abd

ul M

ajee

d Bh

at (f

ruit

grow

er fr

om S

opor

e)

Gen

eral

ised

quot

es b

ut fo

r lay

pers

on

ackn

owle

dges

who

it is

7

The

area

is u

nder

10

feet

of s

now

; sta

te in

puts

put t

he n

umbe

r of t

he M

uzaf

fara

bad

Chal

o at

no

thin

g le

ss th

an 7

,000

, a sm

ug P

atil

told

a

seni

or p

oliti

cian

[…] t

hat t

he c

row

d co

mpr

ised

only

8,0

00 p

eopl

e

Dir

ect –

Prim

e M

inist

er N

aras

imha

Rao

; Prim

e M

inist

er D

eve

Gow

da; P

rime

Min

ister

Man

moh

an S

ingh

; mili

tant

s; Ja

mm

uite

s; K

ashm

iris;

Meh

boob

a M

ufti

(Pre

siden

t, PD

P); S

yed

Ali

Shah

Gee

lani

(Hur

riyat

Con

fere

nce

Lead

er);

Ratta

n Ch

aku

(Kas

hmiri

Pan

dit,

Srin

agar

); Y

usuf

Tar

igam

i (J&

K’s

sole

CPM

MLA

); Sh

idan

Lal

and

Sun

ita K

aul (

Kas

hmiri

Pan

dit m

igra

nts,

Jam

mu)

; Prin

ce K

haju

ria

(Am

arna

th Y

atri)

; Far

ooq

Abd

ulla

h (N

atio

nal C

onfe

renc

e le

ader

); Br

ig (r

etd)

Suc

het

Sing

h (M

embe

r, A

YSS

) In

dire

ct –

seni

or o

ffice

r; Sh

ivra

j Pat

il (U

nion

Hom

e M

inist

er)

Lots

of q

uote

s and

eve

n la

ypeo

ple

are

men

tione

d; m

any

of th

e pe

ople

are

labe

lled

(see

pr

evio

us se

ctio

n); d

isput

ed st

atist

ics

8 A

fter k

illin

g 40

peo

ple;

tran

sfer

ring

800

kana

ls of

land

to th

e A

mar

nath

Yat

ra S

hrin

e Bo

ard

Dir

ect –

Mirw

aiz

Um

ar F

aroo

q In

dire

ct –

Shi

vraj

Pat

il (H

ome

Min

ister

); SA

S G

eela

ni a

nd M

irwai

z U

mar

Far

ooq

Quo

tes f

rom

pol

itici

ans m

ostly

; all

statis

tics

can

be c

onfir

med

80 A

ppen

dix

F

Lite

rary

Tec

hniq

ues w

ithin

Art

icle

s for

200

8 A

mar

nath

Lan

d Tr

ansf

er C

ontr

over

sy in

J&

K b

y Tehelka,

Jul

y –

Sept

embe

r 200

8 N

o.

Adj

ectiv

es

Met

apho

rs

Use

of N

egat

ion

Eval

uatio

n 1

The

auth

oriti

es in

Kas

hmir

have

bee

n ne

glec

tful,

even

irr

espo

nsib

le; o

ver-

the-

top

civi

l ser

vant

s; h

areb

rain

ed sc

hem

e

Sepa

ratis

t pol

itici

ans i

n th

e V

alle

y ha

ve b

een

hand

ed o

n a

plat

ter;

the

first

to ju

mp

into

the

mud

died

wat

ers

[…] t

he se

lf-ap

poin

ted

guar

dian

s of t

he so

-cal

led

Hin

du in

tere

sts

The

Cent

re c

anno

t be

obliv

ious

of i

ts re

spon

sibili

ty

Emph

asise

s the

inco

mpe

tenc

e of

the

auth

oriti

es in

Kas

hmir

and

how

ther

e ar

e se

rious

co

nseq

uenc

es fo

r thi

s

2 R

ever

ed sh

rine;

vio

lent

con

trove

rsie

s; sp

ecta

cula

r vi

olen

ce b

eing

unl

eash

ed; t

he

extr

aord

inar

y th

ing

A w

orm

’s e

ye v

iew

; rea

ping

a

com

mun

al h

arve

st;

fann

ing

sect

iona

l pas

sions

w

ith a

vie

w to

spre

adin

g th

e fla

mes

acr

oss t

he c

ount

ry;

play

ing

with

fire

The

extra

ordi

nary

thin

g is

that

the

annu

al A

mar

nath

yat

ra to

the

reve

red

shrin

e is

not a

t the

slig

htes

t risk

. A

rrang

emen

ts fo

r pilg

rims

that

are

nor

mal

ly m

ade

in K

ashm

ir ha

ve n

ot b

een

ques

tione

d by

an

yone

, lea

st of

all

by V

alle

y M

uslim

s

Emph

asise

s tha

t the

vio

lenc

e ca

n be

exp

lain

ed

3 an

ext

raor

dina

ry e

vent

not

seen

bef

ore;

ex

trao

rdin

ary

oppo

rtuni

ty; p

utat

ive

insti

tutio

nal m

emor

y; fa

med

insti

tutio

nal

grip

; Hin

du c

omm

unal

pas

sion-

rous

ers;

viol

ent m

obs;

dete

rmin

ed m

obs;

oppo

rtun

istic

ally

qui

tting

the

gove

rnm

ent;

wise

eno

ugh

to ta

ke th

e fir

st ste

ps;

conf

iden

tly p

redi

cted

; por

traye

d in

luri

d co

lour

s; su

scep

tible

to e

xplo

itatio

n fo

r na

rrow

sect

aria

n en

ds; b

itter

ly o

ppos

ed;

ludi

crou

s tur

n-ar

ound

; dir

e w

arni

ngs;

sepa

ratis

ts m

ay h

ave

inst

antly

dro

pped

th

eir p

rote

st

Hel

m o

f affa

irs; f

or a

n an

atom

y of

disa

ster;

only

an

unus

ual c

onste

llatio

n of

sta

rs; h

eld

the

city

by

its

thro

at; c

once

rnin

g fa

cilit

ies

for t

he A

mar

nath

yat

ra th

at

lit th

e fu

se; a

ll he

ll br

oke

loos

e; th

is w

as li

ke a

de

clar

atio

n of

war

; plu

nge

the

coun

try in

com

mun

al

chao

s

For a

n an

atom

y of

disa

ster,

one

need

look

no

furth

er th

an K

ashm

ir;

not f

or d

ecad

es h

as su

ch a

line

-up

been

seen

in th

e po

litic

al sk

y; it

is

said

that

no

party

in th

e co

untry

kno

ws K

ashm

ir as

wel

l as t

he

Cong

ress

; thi

s is a

n ex

traor

dina

ry e

vent

not

seen

bef

ore;

such

an

outb

urst

of c

omm

unal

fren

zy h

as n

ot b

een

seen

in Ja

mm

u sin

ce; i

f th

e ch

ief m

inist

er d

oes n

ot su

ccee

d in

this

miss

ion;

Gov

erno

r’s ru

le

is no

t a p

rosp

ect K

ashm

iris t

ypic

ally

look

forw

ard

to; i

t was

not

a

viol

atio

n of

arti

cle

370

of th

e Co

nstit

utio

n; h

ad n

ot g

one

unno

ticed

; w

ill n

ot b

e “d

iver

ted”

to th

e SA

SB; n

ot b

e ab

le to

dra

w in

the

supp

ort o

f the

inde

pend

ent M

LAs;

and

they

did

n’t t

ake

long

to

deliv

er; n

o tw

o re

gion

s of a

stat

e; th

is is

an ir

ony

of n

o m

ean

orde

r; pi

lgrim

s to

the

Am

arna

th sh

rine

are

in n

o w

ay b

eing

den

ied

faci

litie

s; no

less

than

a th

reat

; not

find

ing

a su

itabl

e op

portu

nity

; no

obvi

ous m

ajor

pla

nk; n

o fa

rsig

hted

ness

; and

not

ear

lier;

didn

’t co

unt

on a

bac

klas

h in

the

Val

ley;

no

less

a fa

iling

of t

he C

entre

Use

of n

egat

ion

impl

icat

es th

e Co

ngre

ss in

bea

ring

resp

onsib

ility

for t

he

cont

rove

rsy;

adj

ectiv

es a

nd

met

apho

rs p

ortra

y th

e co

ntro

vers

y as

one

that

has

re

ally

split

Jam

mu

and

Kas

hmir

in a

har

sh m

anne

r an

d th

ere

is lit

tle h

ope

of

reco

ncili

atio

n

4 Se

nsiti

ve is

sue

of id

entit

y; fe

ar p

sych

osis

amon

g th

e pe

ople

; dee

p-ro

oted

alie

natio

n Se

ntim

ents

are

bein

g w

oven

ar

ound

it

Ther

e is

no st

rong

er is

sue

than

this;

but

[GO

I] is

not p

ayin

g at

tent

ion

to th

e K

ashm

ir iss

ue; h

ad n

o ch

oice

; sin

ce th

e ba

sic is

sue

is no

t be

ing

addr

esse

d; h

as m

ade

no d

iffer

ence

Emph

asise

s the

root

cau

se o

f pr

oble

m a

s hist

oric

al

oppr

essio

n of

Kas

hmiri

s 5

Opp

ortu

nist

ical

ly fa

nned

the

com

mun

al

conf

lagr

atio

n; b

een

smou

lder

ing

in th

e la

st

two

deca

des;

it w

ill b

e bo

th te

mpo

rary

and

te

nuou

s

The

devi

l lie

s in

the

deta

ils;

fann

ing

com

mun

al fl

ames

A

pilg

rimag

e th

at w

as a

ttack

ed, b

ut n

ot o

nce

stopp

ed th

roug

h al

l the

ye

ars o

f ins

urge

ncy;

but

it’s

not

the

pref

ab st

ruct

ures

that

are

re

spon

sible

for b

uild

ing

disc

ord;

not

whe

n it’

s ele

ctio

n tim

e; it

’s

mos

t def

inite

ly n

ot a

law

and

ord

er p

robl

em

Emph

asise

s tha

t the

co

ntro

vers

y is

steep

ed in

po

litic

s and

has

bee

n al

low

ed

to g

et o

ut o

f han

d

81 6

The

state

has

seen

bitt

erne

ss a

nd p

ain

in

the

past;

faile

d m

isera

bly

to c

ome

up w

ith

a so

lutio

n; a

sser

tive

Shar

ma;

bla

ndly

de

nies

; shr

ill v

oice

s fro

m th

e tw

o ha

lves

The

state

lies

torn

in tw

o ha

lves

; dee

pene

d th

e fis

sure

N

ever

eve

r in

two

deca

des o

f ins

urge

ncy

have

bot

h Ja

mm

u an

d K

ashm

ir be

en p

inne

d un

der a

cur

few

; the

poi

nt o

f no

retu

rn; w

ho h

as

not d

ispla

yed

the

abili

ty o

f bei

ng a

ble

to h

it ho

me

How

con

trove

rsy

is af

fect

ing

livel

ihoo

ds o

f peo

ple

and

appr

oach

ing

a po

int o

f no

retu

rn; G

OI b

een

larg

ely

inef

fect

ive

7 R

elax

ed fa

ces,;

pla

cid

wat

ers;

irat

e K

ashm

iris;

New

Del

hi’s

pro

cras

tinat

ion,

in

its r

eluc

tanc

e to

read

the

signa

ls on

the

grou

nd, i

n its

unw

illin

gnes

s; cr

itica

l erro

r; ap

pear

fear

less

; slip

pery

des

cent

; w

ater

shed

yea

rs

Non

e N

ot a

sing

le ta

xi w

as a

vaila

ble;

not

in th

e le

ast s

urpr

ised;

it w

ould

m

ost c

erta

inly

not

hav

e be

com

e A

mar

nath

Nag

ar; n

eith

er th

e sta

te’s

m

ains

tream

par

ties n

or th

e Ce

ntre

; not

hav

e go

ne to

gro

und

zero

; N

ew D

elhi

doe

sn’t

know

wha

t’s h

it it;

they

did

not

kno

w w

hat

coun

terin

surg

ency

mea

sure

s ent

aile

d th

en; t

he st

ate

I cov

ered

in

1990

was

not

a c

omm

unal

cau

ldro

n; w

ho h

ave

no p

robl

em w

ith

bein

g ca

lled

sepa

ratis

t; th

e G

ujar

ati t

ouris

ts w

ill n

ot c

ome

back

; not

on

ce si

nce

2000

; nev

er b

efor

e ha

s any

strik

e […

] in

Jam

mu

ever

go

ne in

to d

ay tw

o; th

e an

swer

will

not

flow

from

the

barre

l of a

gun

Emph

asisi

ng th

e ne

ed fo

r di

alog

ue a

nd th

at th

is m

istak

e by

GO

I in

the

past

has l

ed to

th

e em

erge

nce

of th

is co

nflic

t; co

mpa

rison

show

s how

GO

I ha

s allo

wed

situ

atio

n to

spin

ou

t of c

ontro

l

8 Fr

ight

enin

g tru

th; w

orst

nig

htm

are;

the

roar

of a

pea

cefu

l reb

ellio

n; r

eluc

tant

G

hula

m N

abi A

zad;

vio

lent

reac

tion;

kn

eeje

rk re

actio

n; a

ll-im

port

ant m

eetin

g;

sulle

n sil

ence

of t

he o

verp

rote

cted

stre

et;

peac

eful

revo

lutio

n

Sea

of p

rote

stors

; the

di

alog

ue w

ent i

nto

cold

sto

rage

; brin

g th

e di

alog

ue

proc

ess o

ut o

f the

dee

p fre

eze

They

hav

e ne

ver o

nce

enco

unte

red;

not

in th

e ai

r, no

t on

thei

r leg

s bu

t stra

ight

into

thei

r che

sts. T

hey

did

not u

se w

ater

-can

nons

. The

y di

d no

t arm

them

selv

es w

ith ru

bber

bul

lets;

the

hom

e m

inist

er w

as

not e

ven

pres

ent;

did

not n

eces

sitat

e a

visit

to G

roun

d Ze

ro; w

e ar

e no

t int

eres

ted

in th

e la

nd p

robl

em; h

e is

not o

ff th

e m

ark;

are

not

co

nfid

ent o

f fac

ing

the

elec

tora

te

Portr

ayin

g K

ashm

iris a

s vi

ctim

s, un

prec

eden

ted

firin

gs;

situa

tion

out o

f con

trol a

nd

need

for d

ialo

gue

betw

een

GO

I and

Kas

hmiri

s to

prev

ent

this

from

occ

urrin

g ag

ain

82

Appendix G

Summary of Articles for Content and Discourse Analysis for 2008 Amarnath Land Transfer Controversy in J&K by The Times of India, June – September 2008

No. Author Date Title Summary 1 Times News

Network June 26, 2008 Srinagar mob attacks

pilgrim family, 4 hurt Describes protests in Kashmir and Jammu and gives death toll

2 M Saleem Pandit

June 27, 2008 Shrine Protest: Tourists flee Valley

Tourists leaving Kashmir because of violent protests; describes protests

3 M Saleem Pandit

June 29, 2008 Protests play spoilsport with weddings

Weddings called off because of protests; describes violence and mentions death toll

4 Times News Network

July 1, 2008 Amarnath land row: Jammu shuts down

Describes protests in Jammu after revocation of land transfer


July 2, 2008 Under pressure, Azad revokes land allotment

Discussion of revocation of land transfer and reaction from Jammu


July 4, 2008 4 die in BJP-VHP bandh violence

Describes BJP-VHP violence across India as a result of Amarnath conflict


July 28, 2008 Curfew reimposed in Jammu

Protests re-emerge in Jammu and curfew as a consequence


August 5, 2008 Sonia holds meeting over Jammu violence

Summarises meetings of political actors in Delhi to find solution to conflict

9 M Saleem Pandit

August 7, 2008 ‘J&K govt always bows to demands of Kashmiris’

Kashmiri government catering to demands of people is worsening conflict


August 8, 2008 BJP will take Amarnath protests to national stage

BJP using conflict to increase vote bank


August 11, 2008 No one is listening to Patil, mission J&K fails

Patil’s failings in negotiating between Jammu and Kashmir – blockade and protests continue

12 M Saleem Pandit

August 13, 2008 March to PoK halted as 12 killed in J&K

Describes protests and mentions death toll


August 13, 2008 On stir, militants across LoC rally behind Hurriyat

Hurriyat and Pakistan militants working together

14 Subodh Ghildiyal

August 14, 2008 Separatists manage to sway valley sentiment

Describes protests in Srinagar and Hurriyat gaining upper hand

15 Subodh Ghildiyal

August 14, 2008 ‘Azad polarizing state to strengthen Jammu base’

Mufti claims Azad has political interests in land transfer; Kashmiris suffering as a result


August 15, 2008 Agitators, separatists not the same: LK

Advani claims that citizens of Jammu have suffered an injustice

17 Avijit Ghosh August 16, 2008 Unnecessary force? Several victims shot in the back

Describes innocents being shot and asserts that the force used is unnecessary


August 17, 2008 ‘No highway blockade, it’s only propaganda’

BJP accuses Centre of being ineffective in resolving conflict; Centre claims no economic blockade in Valley, counter to Kashmiri claims


August 17, 2008 Cong weights options to end Amarnath impasse

Informal talks with various actors to resolve conflict


August 21, 2008 Samiti calls for civil disobedience

AYSS calls for fresh protests; Jammuites committing suicide over controversy


August 21, 2008 Centre fails to bring protestors to talk table

GOI failing to provide a sustainable solution to the situation on both sides

22 Mohua Chatterjee

August 21, 2008 Agitation in Jammu and Kashmir: A study in contrast

BJP and Jammu’s successful handling of events, while Kashmir has been largely uncooperative


August 22, 2008 Centre sees protests ebbing in Valley

GOI witnessing fewer protests in Kashmir; mentions BJP demands


August 24, 2008 Clueless Centre adds to chaos

Centre needs coordination; they are adding to the situation by not delivering message clearly


August 26, 2008 Samiti suspends talks over police ‘excesses’

AYSS claims undue force on Jammuites, suspends talks as a result

26 Times News August 31, 2008 ‘Hurriyat Leader Shot In GOI claims Hurriyat leader not killed by police;

83

Network Back, Not By Cops’ AYSS wants talks to occur between them and GOI 27 Times News

Network September 1, 2008

Amarnath land deal ends stir in Jammu

Describes Jammu’s content with land transfer solution – temporary use of land for pilgrims

28 Bhaskar Roy September 1, 2008

‘Pact will clear differences’ Contrasts Azad with Mufti – Azad says solution is rational; Mufti thinks it it unilateral

Key Articles for content analysis Articles for discourse analysis Articles for both content and discourse analysis

84 A

ppen

dix

H

H

eadl

ines

and

Lea

ds o

f Art

icle

s for

200

8 A

mar

nath

Lan

d Tr

ansf

er C

ontr

over

sy in

J&

K b

y Th

e Ti

mes

of I

ndia

, Jun

e – S

epte

mbe

r 200

8 K

ey

Hea

dlin

e Le

ad

No.

Se

ctio

n; S

ectio

n Su

b-he

adin

g H

eadl

ine;

Lea

d Ev

alua

tion

1 Fr

ont P

age

and

Tim

es N

atio

n Sr

inag

ar m

ob a

ttack

s pilg

rim fa

mily

, 4 h

urt;

Azad

cal

ls fo

r all-

party

mee

ting

Dem

onisi

ng K

ashm

iris

2 Ti

mes

Nat

ion

Shrin

e Pr

otes

t: To

urist

s fle

e Va

lley;

You

th K

illed

; 100

Inju

red

So F

ar in

Pro

tests

Em

phas

ising

impa

ct o

n K

ashm

ir; u

nspe

cific

abo

ut w

ho is

in

jure

d an

d in

whi

ch re

gion

4

Tim

es N

atio

n Am

arna

th la

nd ro

w: J

amm

u sh

uts d

own;

Aza

d to

seek

trus

t vot

e by

July

7

Emph

asisi

ng c

onse

quen

ces f

or Ja

mm

u 5

Tim

es N

atio

n U

nder

pre

ssur

e, A

zad

revo

kes l

and

allo

tmen

t; Sa

ys R

esto

ring

Peac

e In

The

Val

ley

Is T

op P

riorit

y H

ighl

ight

ben

evol

ence

of p

olic

ies a

t the

Cen

tre

14

Fron

t Pag

e an

d Ti

mes

Nat

ion

Sepa

ratis

ts m

anag

e to

sway

val

ley

sent

imen

t; Ec

onom

ic b

lock

ade

is IS

I pr

opag

anda

, say

offi

cial

s; H

awks

may

mar

gina

lize

dove

s in

J&K

D

emon

ising

sepa

ratis

ts in

Kas

hmir

and

emph

asisi

ng th

e vi

olen

ce o

f the

regi

on

15

Tim

es N

atio

n –

J&K

on

the

Boil

‘Aza

d po

lariz

ing

state

to st

reng

then

Jam

mu

base

’; ‘T

he o

nly

solu

tion

to th

e pr

esen

t cris

is is

that

the

Prim

e M

inist

er sh

ould

spea

k to

Pak

istan

to fi

x a

date

for

open

ing

the

Jhel

um V

alle

y Ro

ad a

nd st

artin

g tra

ffic

acro

ss th

e bo

rder

’

Dire

ct q

uote

from

Muf

ti (n

ot p

arap

hras

ing)

but

doe

s not

sp

ecify

who

is q

uotin

g

21

Tim

es N

atio

n –

J&K

on

the

Boil

Cent

re fa

ils to

brin

g pr

otes

tors

to ta

lk ta

ble;

Shr

ine

Boar

d M

embe

rs D

eman

d Cl

ear-C

ut R

espo

nse

On

Resto

ratio

n of

Lan

d Cr

itica

l of G

OI a

nd re

cogn

ising

Jam

mu

dem

ands

22

Tim

es N

atio

n –

J&K

on

the

Boil

Agita

tion

in J

amm

u an

d Ka

shm

ir: A

stud

y in

con

trast

Com

paris

on o

f the

two

regi

ons,

deem

ing

them

as

oppo

site

but n

ot sp

ecify

ing

the

cont

rast

27

Fron

t Pag

e Am

arna

th la

nd d

eal e

nds s

tir in

Jam

mu;

Shr

ine

Boar

d Ca

n U

se F

ores

tland

D

urin

g Ya

tra

Doe

s not

men

tion

Kas

hmir

or re

actio

ns fr

om th

e re

gion

; po

rtray

s GO

I in

posit

ive

light

28

Ti

mes

Nat

ion

‘Pac

t will

cle

ar d

iffer

ence

s’

Dire

ct q

uote

from

Aza

d (n

ot p

arap

hras

ing)

but

doe

s not

sp

ecify

who

is q

uotin

g

85 A

ppen

dix

I

Gen

eral

isatio

n an

d Sp

ecifi

city

with

in A

rtic

les f

or 2

008

Am

arna

th L

and

Tran

sfer

Con

trov

ersy

in J

&K

by

The

Tim

es o

f Ind

ia, J

une –

Sep

tem

ber

2008

N

o.

Ref

eren

ce

Eval

uatio

n 1

Kas

hmiri

mob

fury

; fou

r mem

bers

of t

he fa

mily

; mob

vio

lenc

e; in

cide

nts o

f peo

ple

pelti

ng st

ones

at

polic

e an

d se

curit

y fo

rces

; cla

shes

bet

wee

n m

obs a

nd p

olic

e in

jure

d m

embe

rs o

f the

fam

ily fr

om H

arya

na w

ere

Yog

esh

kum

ar (2

0), B

umik

a (5

0) a

nd R

aj K

umar

i (4

0), s

aid

Haz

ratb

al b

lock

med

ical

offi

cer D

r. Pa

rvez

Kha

n; o

ne p

rote

stor –

iden

tifie

d as

Sam

ir A

hmed

Bat

loo

(24)

– w

as k

illed

in p

olic

e fir

ing;

Hin

du p

ilgrim

s in

a M

uslim

maj

ority

are

a; p

olic

e ha

ve a

rreste

d m

ore

than

two

doze

n pr

otes

tors

; PD

P an

d se

para

tist g

roup

s, in

clud

ing

two

fact

ions

of

Hur

riyat

Con

fere

nce;

one

per

son

was

kill

ed a

nd n

early

100

oth

ers,

incl

udin

g 22

cop

s, w

ere

inju

red

Gen

eral

ising

– n

ot m

entio

ning

whi

ch se

ctio

ns o

f Kas

hmir,

who

the

‘mob

’ is

com

pose

d of

, lac

k of

nam

es

Spec

ifyin

g –

men

tioni

ng in

noce

nts w

ho h

ave

died

, inv

okes

pity

and

co

ntra

sts th

is w

ith a

pro

testo

r who

is to

bla

me

for t

his v

iole

nce

2 H

undr

eds o

f tou

rists

fled

Srin

agar

; sto

ne-p

eltin

g m

obs

A 2

0-ye

ar-o

ld y

outh

, Zee

shan

Ahm

ad, w

as k

illed

and

abo

ut 3

0 pe

ople

incl

udin

g six

pol

icem

en a

nd a

CR

PF ja

wan

wer

e in

jure

d; th

ree

peop

le h

ad d

ied

and

mor

e th

an 1

00 in

jure

d; R

avi V

erm

a; D

hrub

Pa

inul

y; a

n SR

TC b

us c

arry

ing

pilg

rims e

scap

ed a

ttack

by

prot

esto

rs; J

amm

u ba

ndh

was

cal

led

by

saffr

on p

artie

s; ac

tivist

s tor

ched

effi

gies

of P

DP

lead

ers;

mor

e th

an 1

0 pe

ople

wer

e hu

rt; M

ian

Abd

ul

Qay

oom

Gen

eral

ising

– e

ither

to e

xagg

erat

e or

to d

esig

nate

Kas

hmiri

s as a

who

le a

s sto

ne-p

eltin

g Sp

ecify

ing

– m

ostly

to h

ighl

ight

the

num

bers

of i

nnoc

ents

who

are

kill

ed

on th

e Ja

mm

u sid

e or

to h

ighl

ight

the

Kas

hmiri

s res

pons

ible

4 Pe

ople

also

pel

ted

stone

s and

dem

onstr

ated

Sa

ffron

brig

ade

forc

ed a

com

plet

e sh

utdo

wn

in Ja

mm

u on

Mon

day;

BJP

and

its a

llies

; at l

east

nine

pe

ople

wer

e in

jure

d in

cla

shes

bet

wee

n ba

ndh

supp

orte

rs a

nd c

ops i

n Ja

mm

u; a

bout

70

BJP

and

Shiv

Se

na a

ctiv

ists w

ere

arre

sted;

four

peo

ple

wer

e ki

lled

and

arou

nd 2

50 in

jure

d ov

er th

e pa

st ei

ght d

ays

in c

lash

es w

ith th

e po

lice

acro

ss th

e va

lley;

pro

testo

rs

Gen

eral

ising

– d

oesn

’t m

entio

n w

hich

kin

d of

peo

ple?

Sp

ecify

ing

– ev

enly

acr

oss b

oth

regi

ons,

men

tion

spec

ific

inci

dent

s and

gi

ve st

atist

ics

5 BJ

P ha

s cla

imed

succ

ess w

ith it

s ban

dh c

alls;

stat

e go

vern

men

t wou

ld n

ot in

terfe

re w

ith th

e re

ligio

us

affa

irs o

f the

SA

SB; w

ith p

olic

e an

d pa

ra-m

ilita

ry fo

rces

; ove

r the

mov

emen

t of t

he p

eopl

e in

and

ar

ound

Jam

ia M

asjid

and

also

stop

ped

som

e of

the

sepa

ratis

t lea

ders

incl

udin

g H

urriy

at C

hairm

an

Mirw

aiz

Um

er F

aroo

q an

d Sh

abir

Shah

; Mai

n Q

ayoo

m, h

ead

of a

ctio

n co

mm

ittee

, the

gro

up

spea

rhea

ding

the

prot

ests

and

dem

onstr

atio

ns a

cros

s the

val

ley

Spec

ifies

as m

uch

as p

ossib

le –

muc

h of

the

spec

ifici

ty a

bout

who

is

insti

gatin

g th

e pr

otes

ts in

Kas

hmir

14

Stre

ets o

f Srin

agar

are

bac

k to

cal

ls of

“az

adi”

; the

mai

nstre

am p

oliti

cal p

artie

s; in

telli

genc

e of

ficia

ls

Hec

tic a

ctiv

ity a

t the

Hyd

erpu

ra re

siden

ce o

f Sye

d A

li Sh

ah G

eela

ni; t

he o

ffice

s of N

atio

nal

Conf

eren

ce, P

DP

and

Cong

ress

; Gee

lani

wea

rs th

e ai

r of a

man

vin

dica

ted;

the

Uni

on h

ome

min

istry

sa

id 2

36 tr

ucks

and

tank

ers c

arry

ing

oil,

gas,

med

icin

es a

nd fo

od it

ems c

ross

ed th

e Ja

wah

ar tu

nnel

fro

m th

e Ja

mm

u sid

e on

Wed

nesd

ay m

orni

ng; 8

2 re

ache

d Sr

inag

ar b

y af

tern

oon;

Ghu

lam

Nab

i Aza

d an

d fo

rmer

gov

erno

r S K

Sin

ha; s

ubve

rting

Arti

cle

370;

Mirw

aiz

Om

eer F

aroo

q-le

d H

urriy

at

Conf

eren

ce; P

DP’

s Meh

boob

a M

ufti;

Nat

iona

l Con

fere

nce

chie

f Om

ar A

bdul

lah;

Far

ooq

Abd

ulla

h;

Abd

ul R

ahim

Rat

her,

lead

er o

f the

opp

ositi

on a

ssem

bly

Gen

eral

ising

Sp

ecify

ing

– m

entio

ning

spec

ific

nam

es w

ithin

par

ties a

nd e

xact

num

bers

; di

scus

sing

Kas

hmiri

pol

itics

15

Cong

ress

led

UPA

; Meh

boob

a M

ufti

Spec

ific

refe

renc

es to

peo

ple

and

parti

es, n

o ge

nera

lisat

ion

86 21

Th

e go

vern

men

t’s re

luct

ance

; the

Cen

tre; p

ublic

opi

nion

supp

orts

a re

turn

to n

orm

alcy

; the

lead

er

Jam

mu

agita

tioni

sts; t

he se

para

tists

in th

e V

alle

y G

ener

alisi

ng –

littl

e m

entio

n of

spec

ific

nam

es

Spec

ifyin

g –

abou

t who

is in

stig

atin

g th

e co

nflic

t 22

Ja

mm

u’s a

gita

tioni

sts; a

pro

posa

l by

Baba

Ram

dev;

San

ghar

sh S

amiti

chi

ef L

eela

Kar

an S

harm

a; B

JP

lead

ers L

K A

dvan

i and

Raj

nath

Sin

gh; A

shok

Kha

juria

; a g

ood

num

ber o

f fie

ld le

vel N

atio

nal

Conf

eren

ce a

nd P

DP

wor

kers

in Ja

mm

u; S

ingh

Shi

ngha

ri of

NC;

53

days

Spec

ifyin

g –

nam

es a

nd n

umbe

rs a

nd w

hat p

artie

s peo

ple

belo

ng to

27

Jam

mu

brok

e in

to w

ild c

eleb

ratio

ns; a

con

glom

erat

e of

Hin

du g

roup

s; po

litic

al o

bser

vers

Se

t asid

e la

nd a

t Bal

tal a

nd D

omai

l com

prisi

ng 8

00 k

anal

; Shr

i Am

arna

th S

angh

arsh

Sam

iti,

spea

rhea

ding

the

agita

tion

in Ja

mm

u; W

hile

PD

P an

d N

atio

nal C

onfe

renc

e re

ject

ed th

e de

al, N

atio

nal

Conf

eren

ce g

ave

it a

thum

bs-u

p

Gen

eral

ising

– d

oes n

ot p

inpo

int i

ndiv

idua

l act

ors

Spec

ifyin

g –

deta

ils o

f the

fina

l res

olut

ion

are

spec

ified

and

the

reac

tions

fro

m d

iffer

ent a

ctor

s

28

The

acco

rd b

etw

een

the

gove

rnor

’s n

omin

ees a

nd th

e Sh

ri A

mar

nath

San

ghar

sh S

amiti

lead

ers

Seni

or B

JP le

ader

L K

Adv

ani

Gen

eral

ising

– n

ot g

ivin

g sp

ecifi

c na

mes

Sp

ecify

ing

87 A

ppen

dix

J

Leve

l of C

ertit

ude w

ithin

Art

icle

s for

200

8 A

mar

nath

Lan

d Tr

ansf

er C

ontr

over

sy in

J&

K b

y Th

e Ti

mes

of I

ndia

, Jun

e – S

epte

mbe

r 200

8 N

o.

Men

tion

of S

tatis

tics

Sour

ce o

f Quo

tatio

n Ev

alua

tion

1 4

hurt;

at l

east

four

mem

bers

of a

fam

ily,

incl

udin

g th

ree

wom

en, w

ere

serio

usly

inju

red;

on

e pr

otes

tor w

as k

illed

and

nea

rly 1

00 o

ther

s, in

clud

ing

22 c

ops,

wer

e in

jure

d; a

rreste

d m

ore

than

two

doze

n pr

otes

tors

; at l

east

one

doze

n pe

ople

wer

e in

jure

d in

the

clas

hes

Dir

ect –

Ghu

lam

Nab

i Aza

d ab

out v

iole

nce;

dep

uty

chie

f min

ister

and

PD

P le

ader

Muz

affa

r Hus

sain

Bai

g ab

out p

ullin

g ou

t of c

oalit

ion

Indi

rect

– m

edic

al o

ffice

r Dr.

Parv

ez K

han

abou

t pilg

rims i

njur

ed; B

JP a

nd

VH

P ab

out f

ailin

g to

pro

tect

yat

ris; P

DP

and

sepa

ratis

ts gr

oups

, inc

ludi

ng tw

o fa

ctio

ns o

f the

Hur

riyat

Con

fere

nce

abou

t con

struc

tion

at B

alta

l lea

ding

to

envi

ronm

enta

l deg

rada

tion

Stat

istic

s mos

tly a

bout

thos

e in

jure

d on

Jam

mu

or G

OI s

ide;

if a

bout

Kas

hmiri

s bec

ause

they

ar

e ar

reste

d; P

DP

dire

ct q

uote

hig

hlig

hts

irrat

iona

lity

and

Aza

d qu

ote

show

s his

fairn

ess;

indi

rect

quo

tes s

eem

to su

ppor

t bot

h sid

es

2 H

undr

eds o

f tou

rists;

A 2

0-ye

ar-o

ld y

outh

[…]

was

kill

ed a

nd a

bout

30

peop

le in

clud

ing

six

polic

emen

and

a C

RPF

jaw

an; U

ntil

Wed

nesd

ay,

thre

e pe

ople

had

die

d an

d m

ore

than

100

inju

red

in th

e ra

mpa

ge; m

ore

than

10

peop

le w

ere

hurt

Dir

ect –

Rav

i Ver

ma,

tour

ist, a

bout

hav

ing

to le

ave

earli

er th

an p

lann

ed,

viol

ence

tow

ard

fam

ily a

nd fe

ar; V

arun

a, to

urist

, who

pos

tpon

ed tr

ip to

K

ashm

ir be

caus

e of

vio

lenc

e; S

RTC

offic

ial a

bout

peo

ple

leav

ing

Kas

hmir;

Ja

mm

u le

ader

s abo

ut w

hy th

ey h

ave

calle

d a

band

h

Mos

t sta

tistic

s ass

ert t

hat J

amm

uite

s and

pi

lgrim

s are

hur

t, lit

tle re

pres

enta

tion

of

Kas

hmiri

s; al

l quo

tes a

re d

irect

and

are

abo

ut

the

suffe

ring

in th

e va

lley

of th

e to

urist

s, th

ereb

y de

mon

ising

Kas

hmiri

pro

testo

rs

4 A

t lea

st ni

ne p

eopl

e w

ere

inju

red

in c

lash

es

betw

een

band

h su

ppor

ters

and

cop

s in

Jam

mu;

ab

out 7

0 BJ

P an

d Sh

iv S

ena

activ

ists w

ere

arre

sted;

Fou

r peo

ple

wer

e ki

lled

and

arou

nd 2

50

inju

red

Dir

ect –

BJP

and

its a

llies

abo

ut st

ate

bow

ing

dow

n to

Kas

hmiri

dem

ands

; IG

P, Ja

mm

u, K

Raj

indr

a ab

out s

ituat

ion

bein

g un

der c

ontro

l; Bh

im S

ingh

ab

out j

udic

ial i

nqui

ry in

to m

inist

ers w

ho tr

ied

to fl

are

com

mun

al te

nsio

ns

Indi

rect

– J&

K N

atio

nal P

anth

ers P

arty

cha

irman

Bhi

m S

ingh

abo

ut d

ismiss

al

of A

zad-

led

regi

me

and

ridic

ulin

g PD

P; J&

K g

over

nor N

N V

ohra

abo

ut

aski

ng A

zad

to p

rove

maj

ority

No

quot

es fr

om K

ashm

ir sid

e bu

t exp

ecte

d be

caus

e ar

ticle

abo

ut Ja

mm

u; st

atist

ics a

bout

th

ose

inju

red

and

kille

d bu

t do

not a

ttem

pt to

sk

ew o

pini

ons i

n an

y on

e di

rect

ion

5 N

one

Dir

ect –

N N

Voh

ra a

bout

giv

ing

up la

nd; G

hula

m N

abi A

zad

abou

t rev

ocat

ion

of la

nd tr

ansf

er a

nd th

e de

partm

ent o

f tou

rism

’s ta

sk

Indi

rect

– C

ongr

ess s

ourc

es a

bout

bac

klas

h in

Jam

mu;

Mirw

aiz

Um

ar F

aroo

q ab

out e

ndin

g on

-goi

ng st

rike

and

wai

ting

for o

ther

pol

itici

ans r

eact

ions

bef

ore

mak

ing

deci

sion

Mos

tly q

uote

s fro

m G

OI a

nd re

porti

ng o

n fa

cts,

little

dem

onisi

ng o

r vic

timisi

ng

14

236

truck

s and

tank

ers;

of th

ese,

82

reac

hed

Srin

agar

by

afte

rnoo

n D

irec

t – G

eela

ni a

bout

free

dom

; Muf

ti ab

out d

enyi

ng th

e ba

ckin

g of

the

sepa

ratis

t’s a

gend

a In

dire

ct –

inte

llige

nce

offic

ials

abou

t eco

nom

ic b

lock

ade

a m

yth

crea

ted

by

Paki

stan;

Uni

on h

ome

min

istry

abo

ut d

enyi

ng e

cono

mic

blo

ckad

e; C

ongr

ess,

NC

and

PDP

abou

t pos

tpon

ing

actio

n un

til u

nder

stand

ing

the

situa

tion

bette

r; A

bdul

Rah

im R

athe

r abo

ut N

C be

ing

only

resp

onsib

le p

arty

Arti

cle

serv

es to

con

vinc

e th

e re

ader

that

ec

onom

ic b

lock

ade

is co

ncoc

ted

by G

eela

ni a

nd

does

not

real

ly e

xist

– in

flam

ing

polit

ical

sit

uatio

n

15

Non

e D

irec

t – M

ufti

abou

t Man

moh

an S

ingh

talk

ing

to P

akist

an a

nd A

zad’

s fai

lure

s In

dire

ct –

Muf

ti ab

out d

eman

ding

Man

moh

an S

ingh

take

cha

rge

of si

tuat

ion

and

open

Muz

affa

raba

d ro

ad a

nd h

oldi

ng A

zad

resp

onsib

le

Quo

tes a

re a

ll fro

m M

ufti

beca

use

entir

e ar

ticle

is

abou

t her

, but

pai

ntin

g he

r as i

rratio

nal

21

Non

e D

irec

t – S

ASS

seni

or p

arty

lead

er a

bout

insu

ffici

ency

of t

alks

; gov

ernm

ent

sour

ces a

bout

resp

onse

to c

ontro

vers

y an

d ab

out M

uzaf

fara

bad

road

reop

enin

g In

dire

ct –

hig

hly

plac

ed g

over

nmen

t sou

rces

abo

ut h

opes

for S

ASS

to p

ut st

ir

No

Kas

hmiri

voi

ces,

all f

rom

Cen

tre (w

hich

is

justi

fiabl

e be

caus

e th

is is

the

aim

of t

he a

rticl

e)

or fr

om Ja

mm

u sid

e

88 on

hol

d; C

entre

abo

ut re

solv

ing

issue

with

par

ties i

n J&

K; S

ASS

abo

ut

awai

ting

gove

rnm

ent’s

resp

onse

to th

eir d

eman

ds a

nd a

llegi

ng th

at G

OI i

s bl

amin

g SA

SS; g

over

nmen

t sou

rces

abo

ut M

uzaf

fara

bad

road

reop

enin

g 22

N

one

Dir

ect –

Ash

ok K

haju

ria a

bout

BJP

bei

ng p

ower

ful a

ctor

in Ja

mm

u; L

eela

K

aran

Sha

rma

abou

t will

ingn

ess t

o ta

lk to

GO

I and

Kas

hmiri

pol

itici

ans

Indi

rect

– B

JP le

ader

abo

ut n

ot p

layi

ng c

omm

unal

pol

itics

No

Kas

hmiri

voi

ces e

ven

thou

gh th

is is

a stu

dy

in c

ontra

st

27

Non

e N

one

Neu

tral a

rticl

e 28

N

one

Dir

ect –

Aza

d ab

out u

se o

f lan

d an

d fe

ar o

f the

peo

ple

Indi

rect

– A

zad

abou

t dea

l mar

king

the

end

of c

ontro

vers

y an

d fe

ar a

nd

base

less

app

rehe

nsio

n w

ere

to b

lam

e an

d se

tting

the

regu

latio

ns fo

r the

futu

re;

L K

Adv

ani a

bout

satis

fact

ion

of la

nd tr

ansf

er d

eal

Neu

tral a

rticl

e

89 A

ppen

dix

K

Lite

rary

Tec

hniq

ues w

ithin

Art

icle

s for

200

8 A

mar

nath

Lan

d Tr

ansf

er C

ontr

over

sy in

J&

K b

y Th

e Ti

mes

of I

ndia

, Jun

e – S

epte

mbe

r 200

8 N

o.

Adj

ectiv

es

Met

apho

rs

Use

of N

egat

ion

Eval

uatio

n 1

ardu

ous a

nnua

l tre

k; a

s mob

vio

lenc

e; se

riou

s con

cern

s N

one

Not

allo

w a

ny c

onstr

uctio

n on

the

cont

entio

us a

rea

Kas

hmiri

s as p

erpe

trato

rs

2 to

esc

ape

the

vola

tile

situa

tion;

New

ly-m

arri

ed D

hrub

Pa

inul

y; to

disp

erse

ston

e-pe

lting

mob

s N

one

Non

e H

ighl

ight

ing

opin

ions

from

Ja

mm

u, p

ortra

yed

as v

ictim

s 4

Non

e N

one

Non

e N

one

5 co

olin

g pa

ssio

ns in

the

Val

ley;

vio

lent

dem

onstr

atio

ns;

likel

y ba

ckla

sh in

Jam

mu;

app

ear f

airly

disi

ngen

uous

; ha

rdco

re se

para

tist l

eade

rs

is on

a st

icky

wic

ket i

n Ja

mm

u no

t pre

pare

d to

buy

the

Muf

ti’s a

rgum

ents;

his

plea

s th

at h

e di

d no

t kno

w o

f the

land

tran

sfer

app

ear

fairl

y di

singe

nuou

s; m

ade

it cl

ear t

hat t

he st

ate

gove

rnm

ent w

ould

not

inte

rfere

with

the

relig

ious

af

fairs

of t

he S

ASB

Not

com

pelli

ng e

vide

nce

that

TO

I is a

ttem

ptin

g to

supp

ort

one

side

14

seem

ing

norm

alcy

, ind

uced

by

a “p

opul

ar”

gove

rnm

ent;

viol

ently

em

otio

nal r

eact

ion;

the

resu

lt of

the

mon

thlo

ng

Jam

mu

vs K

ashm

ir po

lariz

atio

n […

] is o

min

ous;

help

less

ly se

e th

emse

lves

; unb

endi

ng st

ance

; a m

an

vind

icat

ed; s

toke

the

late

nt in

secu

ritie

s of t

he K

ashm

iri

peop

le; G

eela

ni &

Co

have

shre

wdl

y pr

ojec

ted;

su

cces

sful

ly fu

sing

it; in

a d

espe

rate

bid

has b

een

shat

tere

d; is

a lo

ng

haul

; squ

eeze

d ou

t of t

he

pict

ure;

com

e up

trum

ps; P

DP

has m

ade

a U

-turn

; bei

ng

pain

ted

as th

e m

ain

culp

rits

Non

e M

akes

Kas

hmiri

pol

itici

ans

seem

like

insti

gato

rs to

the

conf

lict w

hile

GO

I and

oth

er

‘ratio

nal’

polit

icia

ns ti

ed to

G

OI a

re v

ictim

s

15

sittin

g ea

sy in

her

Gup

kar R

oad

resid

ence

; str

ife-to

rn st

ate

strad

dlin

g th

e tw

o op

posit

e po

les;

buffe

ted

betw

een;

tig

htro

pe w

alk;

gav

e it

a gr

een

signa

l; PD

P se

nses

an

oppo

rtuni

ty to

retri

eve

grou

nd

the

party

is lo

sing

no o

ccas

ion

to sl

am; m

ay n

ot b

e go

od o

men

s for

Con

gres

s Po

rtray

ing

Muf

ti as

an

insti

gato

r and

GO

I as v

ictim

to

her

dem

ands

21

clea

r-cu

t res

pons

e; g

over

nmen

t’s r

eluc

tanc

e; th

e Ja

mm

u ag

itatio

nists

are

insis

tent

; is h

ighl

y un

likel

y; se

em to

be

misp

lace

d; su

spic

ious

of t

he C

entre

’s m

otiv

es; w

ere

still

relu

ctan

t

has f

aile

d to

cut

muc

h ic

e w

as n

eces

sitat

ed b

y SA

SS n

ot b

eing

will

ing

to ta

lk

to th

e go

vern

or; t

he C

entre

’s “

appe

al”

is no

t lik

ely

to m

ake

muc

h di

ffere

nce;

offi

cial

s sai

d th

at th

ere

had

been

no

bloc

kade

of S

rinag

ar

Criti

cal o

f GO

I whi

le a

lso

dem

onisi

ng S

ASS

and

po

rtray

ing

dem

ands

of

Kas

hmiri

s as i

rratio

nal

22

peac

eful

dem

onstr

atio

ns in

this

othe

rwise

bus

tling

city

in

star

k co

ntra

st to

the

high

dec

ibel

pro

tests

in S

rinag

ar;

rare

uni

ty to

be

seen

in Ja

mm

u; in

stitu

tiona

lised

neg

lect

; ca

refu

l atte

mpt

Goi

ng o

n th

e ba

ckfo

ot

ther

e is

a ca

refu

l atte

mpt

to e

nsur

e th

at it

doe

s not

ta

ke a

com

mun

al tu

rn; s

o th

at it

did

not

cre

ate

com

mun

al tr

oubl

e; H

e is

not t

he o

nly

one;

it is

not

ea

sy fo

r a c

ity

Hig

hlig

htin

g Ja

mm

u as

at

tem

ptin

g to

mak

e th

ings

pe

acef

ul

27

wild

cel

ebra

tions

; exc

lusiv

e us

e; th

e tr

ied

and

test

ed

troub

lesh

oote

r; in

spite

of [

…] M

ehbo

oba

Muf

ti’s d

efia

nt

postu

ring;

exp

losiv

e iss

ue w

hich

had

em

otiv

e va

lue

shap

ing

the

terra

in fo

r the

m

ain

priz

e: th

e Lo

k Sa

bha

polls

The

prop

rieta

ry st

atus

of t

he la

nd, h

owev

er, s

hall

not u

nder

go a

ny c

hang

e Ce

ntre

’s su

cces

s at d

evisi

ng a

so

lutio

n fo

r Jam

mu

28

Mov

ing

caut

ious

ly

rum

our a

nd b

asel

ess

appr

ehen

sion

had

play

ed

misc

hief

the

gove

rnm

ent w

ould

not

succ

umb

to “

pres

sure

fro

m se

para

tists”

N

ot c

ompe

lling

evi

denc

e th

at

TOI i

s atte

mpt

ing

to su

ppor

t on

e sid

e

Documents

List of Abbreviations...Tehelka, as one of India’s leading alternative political newsweeklies makes a good comparison. John Elliott, currently a reporter with the Financial Times,