Literature Review - GOV.UK

Scoping Study for a National Climate Change Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Analysis

Literature Review

Paul Watkiss

February 2009

Literature Review: Scoping Study for a National Climate Change Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Analysis Version 3. February 2009.

Metroeconomica, AEA group, Paul Watkiss Associates

Executive Summary

This literature review is part of a scoping study to support the progress towards the first UK Climate Change Risk Assessment, and the related Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) of adaptation. The aim is to review the relevant literature on climate change impacts, vulnerabilities and risks to the UK; the economic treatment of adaptation; similar studies undertaken in other countries; gaps in information; and from this to provide a synthesis of the existing UK evidence base. However, the document is intended as an initial overview, rather than a detailed review and synthesis. The review has investigated the information available on risks and impacts to the UK from climate change, considering health, energy, transport, infrastructure and the built environment, water resources and quality, biodiversity and ecosystem services (including forestry and fisheries), tourism, industry, business and services. Overall, the literature review shows that there is an extremely broad body of work on climate change risks and impacts. This spans all sectors. The studies range from national down to regional and even local studies. Nearly all of this work uses consistent climate projections, and usually consistent socio-economic scenarios, from the UK Climate Impacts Programme (UKCIP). Quantitative UK level assessments have been undertaken for health, flooding (coastal and river), water resources, energy supply and demand, agriculture, and biodiversity (at least in relation to species climate space). However, such quantification is still incomplete, and covers a sub-set of climate parameters, and a sub-set of risks/impact endpoints. Some other sectors are not as intensively studied in quantitative terms (e.g. transport, business, marine), and many areas remain extremely challenging (e.g. the full effects on biodiversity and ecosystem services). Moreover, there are many potential risks and impacts where only qualitative information is available. Very few studies have considered valuation. There is also a wide literature on adaptation, which now has an extremely large, stakeholder driven evidence base. However, the number of adaptation quantification and valuation studies is significantly lower, and there are only one two sectors (e.g. notably flooding) which have any analysis of costs and benefits. Overall, while there is considerable information, the knowledge of the risks and impacts to the UK from climate change can only be considered partial. Despite the large number of studies, there are significant gaps in the evidence. This includes potential effects that have not been scoped, and many more that have not been quantified. There is also considerable uncertainty around the risks and impacts that have been quantified. There remain challenges on the definitions of baselines, the precise nature of the impacts, the timing of impacts, the interpretation of existing socio-economic scenarios and assumptions, and the consideration of adaptation (autonomous and planned). There remains a fundamental issue for physical impact assessment, with differences over the function form, rates of change and threshold levels, which can result in different methods leading to very different results (even changing the sign). There are major gaps on major risks, on potential threshold effects, and on the limits of adaptation. There is also a major gap on the cross-sectoral and indirect effects of climate change, at the national level in particular, though this is not surprising given the complexity of such studies. Only a few sectors (flooding and health) have started to dis-entangle the distributional effects of potential changes. There is little information on the ancillary effects (positive and negative) of adaptation, at least in quantitative terms. Finally, almost no studies try to piece together the combined effects, particularly in relation to wider economic effects (multiplier effects through the economy, aggregated macro-economic effects on GDP, employment, and how international climate change will affect the UK). Related to this, there are no studies which look at the potential effects on the public finances from impacts or adaptation. All of these areas represent a gap in the evidence base.



There are also a number of policy gaps in relation to Government risks and adaptation.

First, while there is considerable information available, there has been no systematic analysis of the priorities for early action, and many studies focus on long-term impacts (2050s or 2080s) where impacts are larger. In contrast, policy time-scales usually work on much shorter time frames (2020s). There is therefore a need to identify the earlier short-term concerns, and at the same time, identify the long-term areas that require policy action now.

Second, it is clear that the effects of climate change on government policies has not been widely considered (outside of a few areas), even in areas where it is likely to be important (e.g. energy and GHG policy). At the same time, there is little knowledge of how Government sectoral policy might affect the UK‘s vulnerability in many areas, e.g. how policies might directly or indirectly increase risks. There is therefore a need for a policy mapping exercise, looking at both of these aspects.

Finally, there is a recognition that adaptation will involve multi-level governance, and different actors, but there has been no assessment of the specific justification for Government adaptation policy, and more general assessment of which organisations, and which aggregation levels, are best placed (and/or have the current responsibility) to implement adaptation.

In relation to the CCRA, key gaps exist for the socio-economic scenarios (SES), in relation to updated SES, the consistency with more recent Government projections, and the lack of a low-carbon SES, which is effectively the ‗with policy‘ scenario for the UK. A summary of the broad findings of the review, in the context of the CCRA (i.e. national level analysis), is shown below. The table lists the main potential risks and impacts at a UK level in the left hand column, by sector, based on the literature review findings. The central two columns report on the status of quantification and valuation of these. The final column reviews whether there are national level assessments of adaptation, and whether the analysis is qualitative or quantitative. Finally, it is highlighted that there a number of major sectoral studies starting; many which plan to use the new UKCP scenarios. These are potentially relevant for the CCRA, and could contribute to the evidence base (and avoid duplication of effort), though there may be issues of methodological consistency to address.



Summary of Coverage of Key Risks / Impacts to the UK, Status on Quantification and Valuation, and Information on Adaptation

Sector Analysis of risks/impacts

Valuation Consideration of Adaptation

Health

Temperature (cold/heat) and mortality / illness including extremes (heat waves)

quantification valuation qualitative

Food and vector borne disease some quantification qualitative (partial)

UV radiation and skin cancer, air pollution quantification

Other (floods, water borne disease, etc)

Energy

Demand (heating and cooling) quantification valuation quantitative

Supply technologies qualitative qualitative (partial)

Infrastructure qualitative qualitative (partial)

Transport

Infrastructure some quantification some valuation qualitative (partial)

Demand

Accidents

Infrastructure / Built Env.

Coastal flooding quantification valuation quantitative + economic

Coastal erosion, intrusion, etc quantification valuation quantitative + economic

River flooding quantification valuation quantitative + economic

Intra-urban flooding quantification valuation qualitative

Extremes (subsidence, storm damage) some quantification some valuation qualitative (partial)

Cultural heritage some qualitative

Agriculture

Crops (yield) quantification (partial) valuation (partial) quantification (partial)

Livestock qualitative

Multi-functionality (landscape, etc)

Water resources/quality

Water availability quantification qualitative

Water demand quantification some valuation some quant + economic

Water quality qualitative

Forestry

Yield quantification (partial) qualitative

Other services

Fisheries/marine

Species movement qualitative (partial)

Fish stocks/ fisheries

Biodiversity and E.S.

Climate space quantification (partial) qualitative (partial)

Biodiversity and habitats qualitative (partial)

Ecosystem services qualitative (partial)

Tourism

Tourism (visitor numbers) quantification some valuation qualitative

Infrastructure, natural resources, other qualitative (partial)

Business, industry, services

Business/industry qualitative (partial) qualitative (partial)

Service (inc. insurance) qualitative (partial)

Customer /demand qualitative (partial)

Public finances

Other

Major climate change (tipping points)

Cross-sectoral/indirect partial (national level)

Adaptation-mitigation linkages qualitative (partial)

Distributional partial (flooding/health)

Wider economic

International (on the UK)



Table of Contents 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 1

Previous UK National Climate Studies ...................................................................................................... 1 Objectives of the report .............................................................................................................................. 2 Definitions .................................................................................................................................................. 2 Outline of report ......................................................................................................................................... 3

2. Climate and Socio-Economic Change in the UK ...................................................................................... 4 Assessment of Climate Change in the UK ................................................................................................. 4 Socio-Economic Change in the UK ......................................................................................................... 10 Classification of Climate, Impacts, Coverage and Adaptation ................................................................. 11

3. Sectoral Analysis .................................................................................................................................... 15 Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 15 Health ....................................................................................................................................................... 16 Energy ...................................................................................................................................................... 21 Transport .................................................................................................................................................. 27 Infrastructure and the Built Environment (including Coastal Zones) ....................................................... 31 Agriculture ................................................................................................................................................ 42 Water Resources and Water Quality ....................................................................................................... 46 Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (including Forests and Fisheries) ................................................ 51 Tourism .................................................................................................................................................... 59 Business, Industry, Services (including Financial and Insurance) and Public Finances ......................... 62 Regional, National and International Studies........................................................................................... 63

4. Cross-Sectoral, Indirect, Distributional, Wider Economic and International Aspects ............................. 67 Cross sectoral and Indirect Effects .......................................................................................................... 67 Distributional Effects ................................................................................................................................ 68 Adaptation- Mitigation Linkages ............................................................................................................... 71 Wider Economic Effects ........................................................................................................................... 72 International Aspects (affecting the UK) .................................................................................................. 74

5. Review Synthesis: Coverage and Gaps ................................................................................................. 75 Discussion of Literature Review Findings ................................................................................................ 75 Gaps in the Evidence ............................................................................................................................... 82 Review Findings ....................................................................................................................................... 84

References .................................................................................................................................................. 86 Appendix 1: Definitions



February 2009 [email protected]

direct line: (+44) 0797 104 9682 This report was written by Paul Watkiss, The report or sections were reviewed and comments and inputs provided by: Sari Kovats, LSHTM (Health); Steven Wade and Paul Sayers, HR Wallingford (Water); Pam Berry, Environmental Change Institute, Oxford University Centre for the Environment (Ecosystems), Alistair Hunt, Metroeconomica (Overall review and Economics); Lisa Horrocks, AEA group; Robert Nicholls University of Southampton (Coasts); Roger Sylvester-Bradley, ADAS (Agriculture); and Stephan Harrison, University of Exeter/CCRM and David Stainforth, University of Oxford/CCRM (Major Events). We stress, however, that the views expressed in this paper do not necessarily represent the views of these individual contributors or their respective institutions. The literature review was undertaken as part of the scoping study for a National Climate Change Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Analysis. Defra Contract number GA0208, undertaken by Metroeconomica, AEA group, and Paul Watkiss Associates. This report should be cited as: Watkiss, P. (2009). Literature Review for the Scoping Study for a National Climate Change Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Analysis, Defra Contract number GA0208. Metroeconomica, AEA group, and Paul Watkiss Associates. Published by Defra, 2009.


Metroeconomica, AEA group, Paul Watkiss Associates 1

1. Introduction Warming of the climate system is unequivocal (IPCC AR4: Solomon et al 2007), and the impacts of climate change are already being observed globally (IPCC AR4, Rosenzweig et al, 2007) and in the UK (Jenkins et al., 2007). Without significant changes, the trend in global emissions of greenhouse gases and climate change will continue. These changes will lead to wide ranging impacts and economic costs across different sectors and regions (IPCC AR4, Parry et al 2007), including the UK. In 2007, the UK Government introduced the Climate Change Bill

1, which created a new legally binding

framework to managing and responding to climate change. The Bill became law in November 2008, and the Climate Change Act

2 sets out UK Government commitments to addressing both the causes and

consequences of climate change. Part 4 of the Act sets out the responsibilities in relation to the impact of and adaptation to climate change. This includes ‗the duty of the Secretary of State to lay reports before Parliament containing an assessment of the risks for the United Kingdom of the current and predicted impact of climate change’, hereafter referred to as the Climate Change Risk Assessment (CCRA). The Government

3 sees the CCRA

requirement as an exercise to identify, and where possible monetise, the key current and future climate change risks for the UK including risks to the natural environment. This will enable prioritisation, so that Government can take the necessary steps across all domestic policy areas to address these risks. This literature review is one of the deliverables from a research study

4 commissioned to scope out the first

Climate Change Risk Assessment (CCRA) for the UK, and an associated Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) of adaptation

5,6.

The aim is to review the relevant literature on climate change impacts, vulnerabilities and risks to the UK; the economic treatment of adaptation; similar studies undertaken in other countries; and gaps in current evidence. By doing so, this report can help inform Defra on the potential impacts relevant to the CCRA, and provide a synthesis of the existing UK material and evidence base, but also identify key gaps. The review also feeds into other tasks being undertaken in the scoping study, notably in relation to the development of options for the CCRA methodology.

Previous UK National Climate Studies The UK was one of the first countries to advance national assessment of climate change risks. In 1991 the CCIRG (Climate Change Impacts Review Group, CCIRG, 1991) published a report on the potential effects of climate change in the UK. This was updated in 1996 (CCIRG, 1996). Following the second CCIRG report, the UK Government set up the UK Climate Impacts Programme (UKCIP) in 1997 to help co-ordinate scientific research into the impacts of climate change, and to help organisations adapt to those unavoidable impacts. This programme has undertaken a large number of studies which are relevant to the risk assessment, summarised in the 2000 highlights report (McKenzie Hedger et al, 2000) and in the 2005 measuring progress report (West and Gawith, 2005)

1 The Climate Change Bill was introduced in Parliament on 14 November 2007 and completed its passage through the House of

Lords on 31 March 2008. The Bill became law on 26th November 2008. 2 The Climate Change Act 2008. http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2008/pdf/ukpga_20080027_en.pdf

3 As set out in the study terms of reference. CEOSA 0801. June, 2008.

4 Defra Project CEOSA 0801, being undertaken by Metroeconomica, AEA group, and Paul Watkiss Associates.

5 Initially this was for England only, but was extended during the study to include the UK.

6 Note that the Climate Change Act does not include a requirement for the CBA.



The UK Government also advanced research across a wide range of areas, through individual sectoral analysis (see later sections of this report) and cross-regional research. As part of the latter, a UK national study to quantify the costs of climate change impacts and adaptation was undertaken during 2005-6 (the Defra cross-regional project E, Metroeconomica et al, 2006). There has also been extensive work in the devolved administrations and regional and local administrative regions (see later), and work undertaken across a wide range of UK public and private sector organisations. Across this entire period, the UK has also had one of the most advanced and influential academic research bases, which has published extensively. This includes many studies specific to the UK, but also as part of European research programmes.

Objectives of the report The objectives of this document are to provide;

A listing of relevant impact and vulnerability studies;

A listing of relevant studies on costing impacts;

A listing of Climate Change Risk Assessments undertaken in other countries (particularly developed countries);

An identification of adaptation options associated with identified impact risks;

Suggestions for priority areas for further research by highlighting areas where current research results do not allow an assessment to be conducted of the risks posed by climate change to that sector/region.

It is intended to be relevant to both the CCRA and CBA projects

7.

Following discussion with Defra, it was agreed that it should be a short overview, rather than a detailed expert review (e.g. not an ‗IPCC- like‘ UK chapter). In order to keep the document size manageable, it was also agreed that the review would focus on risks, rather than on methods. The information on methods has been collated separately, and is reported in the main final report. Nevertheless, this still leaves an extremely large amount of information to review, given the wealth of studies in the UK. To help focus this report, we have concentrated on the most relevant aspects for Government national risk assessment. This shapes the focus of this study and the geographical coverage. In line with the expectation for the CCRA, it only considers the UK and surrounding waters, though a short section discussing international effects and how these might influence the UK is presented.

Definitions The Climate Change Bill outlines that the Government should assess the risks of climate change, but it is not explicit on the definition of what this might mean. In practice, ‗risk‘ is a multi-faceted term that may refer to specific hazards, but also a general approach to environmental governance, as well to more specific methods and tools for assessing hazards (Edson Jones, 2005). There is an existing and well established field of risk and risk assessment, which has a set of definitions. Historically, this analysis of risks, and risk assessment, has been associated with the analysis of major events or accidents, and this definition is still applied in relation to the National Risk Assessment and National Risk Register (see later). In such cases, risk usually comprises an element of the likelihood of an event (measured by probability), and also its magnitude (or impact). Risk-based approaches are routinely applied to environmental problems, including for flooding, pollution and industrial regulation. They are

7 The wider aims of the scoping study are to identify the key questions that can be answered through a CCRA and CBA, and the

benefits that these answers will provide, to identify the information that a CCRA and CBA would contain, to define how the two projects best inform each other, and to advise on the most appropriate methodology for undertaking each project.



also applied in the climate change context (e.g. UKCIP, 2003), which outlines the steps of risk assessment of hazard identification, identification of consequences, magnitude of consequences, probability of consequences, and significance of risk. However, risk is also often used to refer to other types of effects, which are not discrete major events as above, and which have been traditionally considered and analysed using different analysis, notably impact assessment. This includes many environmental problems, where there is a more continuous nature to the problem, such as with air pollution (a burden), and its effect on health or ecosystems (an impact). These are usually assessed using different frameworks, for example, as within the DPSIR framework (drivers – pressures – state – impacts – response). In such cases, the application of probability as applied to major events is not really relevant

8. These effects are also relevant for climate, for example where average

temperature change leads to higher cooling demand (the burden) and therefore impacts (increased energy use). Finally, there are a further set of explicit definitions of risks, as used in economics, including in relation to the Policy Appraisal (Green Book: HMT, 2007). These involve very different interpretations. In the context of this report, we do not use a specific definition of risk, but highlight that it has been used here to refer to probabilistic events and their impacts, i.e. from flood events, seasonal droughts, storm surges, extreme wind speeds, heat waves, but also the influence of climate change (as a burden) and resulting impacts

9.

There is also a wider set of terms that are relevant for climate change. Definitions of key terms (vulnerability, adaptation, etc), are provided by the IPCC TAR (2001) and IPCC AR4 (2007). However, with the rapid growth of literature in this area, concepts and definitions continue to be re-defined. Many definitions are emerging from different, organisations - some of these involve subtle variations on the IPCC - others are fundamentally different. Indeed, a recent OECD publication ‗Adaptation to Climate Change: Key Terms’ (Levina and Tirpak, 2006), found that definitions of the key climate change impacts / adaptation terms varied widely across institutions and groups of stakeholders. A summary of some of the key terms, and the differences in definitions between organisations, is presented in Appendix 1.

Outline of report The review is set out as follows. Chapter 2 summarises the information on climate and socio-economic projections for the UK, and provides some discussion of methodological frameworks for impacts and adaptation. Chapter 3 reviews the available information on climate change risks and adaptation by sector, synthesising the existing studies and identifying gaps. Chapter 4 considers additional areas of research that are relevant for a comprehensive risk assessment, notably cross-sectoral, indirect effects, etc. Chapter 5 provides overall findings and identifies key gaps.

8 though it is possible to assess these impacts using a probabilistic analysis to reflect the possible range or distribution of impacts.

9 In many cases, climate change acts in both ways on any specific endpoint, increasing the burden and also raising the probability of

a major event (e.g. increasing the likely cooling demand from warmer temperatures, and also the risk of heat-waves that may lead to wider events where cooing limits are exceeded, leading to a series of consequences affecting health, etc).



2. Climate and Socio-Economic Change in the UK In any assessment of climate change, assumptions have to be made on future conditions of the climate and of the natural and social systems that are potentially affected. These form the first part in any assessment of risks. Climate change involves long time-scales compared to most other environmental risks, and due to uncertainty, it requires scenarios. A scenario is a set of assumptions on future conditions that is coherent, internally consistent, and plausible. The IPCC (2007) makes a distinction between climate scenarios, and non-climate scenarios (socio-economic). Scenarios are often used to help explore plausible future worlds and so provide an aid to strategic planning by helping to understand risk and identify potential opportunities. Climate scenarios are usually derived from modelling experiments. Non-climate scenarios are centred on socio-economic scenarios, but also include land-use and land-cover. Both are essential in consideration of defining and quantifying risks.

Assessment of Climate Change in the UK The UK has been at the forefront of developing climate projections internationally. In parallel, it has also developed detailed climate change projections at the national scale for the UK

10. Several generations of

climate scenarios have been produced, including the widely used UKCIP02 scenarios (Hulme et al, 2002). The UKCIP02 technical report provides an overview of recent trends in the global and UK climate and projections for climate change across the UK. These are presented for four alternative descriptions of how the climate of the UK might evolve, ranging from rapid economic growth with intensive use of fossil fuels (High Emissions) to increased economic, social and environmental sustainability with cleaner energy technologies (Low Emissions). For each of the four UKCIP02 scenarios, changes are described for three thirty-year time-slices: 2011 to 2040 (the 2020s), 2041 to 2070 (the 2050s) and 2071 to 2100 (the 2080s). All changes in climate are given relative to the baseline period of 1961 to 1990. These relate to the IPCC SRES (IPCC Special Report on Emission Scenarios, 2001) scenarios as follows.

Figure 1. UKCIP02 – SRES scenarios

10

Commissioned by Defra, undertaken by the Hadley and Tyndall centres, and disseminated by UKCIP.



An overview of the findings are presented below (from West and Gawith (eds) 2005, based on Hulme et al, 2002.

Source West and Gawith (eds) 2005, based on Hulme et al, 2002.

A summary of the some of the key projections (temperature and precipitation) are shown in map form for the low and high emission scenarios below.



Figure 2. UKCIP02: Average temperature and Percentage change in Precipitation Source Measuring progress, 2005.

However, the climate models provide a very large number of outputs, as shown below for the UKCIP02 projections (Hulme et al, 2002: UKCIP02 technical report). These different parameters are important for assessing risks in different sectors. This is important, especially given the level of confidence in different risks (see right hand column).



Figure 3. UKCIP02 Variables and Confidence Level

Summary statements of the changes in average seasonal UK climate for the UKCIP02 climate change scenarios for which we can attach some confidence. Relative confidence levels: H = high; M = medium; L = low. Source: Hulme et al, 2002.

The observed climate of the United Kingdom has recently been updated (Jenkins et al, 2008) as part of the new UK Climate Projections, as presented below:

‘Warming of the global climate system is unequivocal, with global average temperatures having risen by nearly 0.8 ºC since the late 19th century, and rising at about 0.2 ºC/decade over the past 25 years.

It is very likely11

that man-made greenhouse gas emissions caused most of the observed temperature rise since the mid 20th century.

Global sea-level rise has accelerated between mid-19th century and mid-20th

century, and is now about 3mm per year. It is likely* that human activities have contributed between a quarter and a half of the rise in the last half of the 20th century.

11

IPCC terminology to express likelihoods: very likely = >90% probability, likely = >66% probability.



Central England Temperature has risen by about a degree Celsius since the 1970s, with 2006 being the warmest on record. It is likely that there has been a significant influence from human activity on the recent warming.

Temperatures in Scotland and Northern Ireland have risen by about 0.8 ºC since about 1980, but this rise has not been attributed to specific causes.

Annual mean precipitation over England and Wales has not changed significantly since records began in 1766. Seasonal rainfall is highly variable, but appears to have decreased in summer and increased in winter, although with little change in the latter over the last 50 years.

All regions of the UK have experienced an increase over the past 45 years in the contribution to winter rainfall from heavy precipitation events; in summer all regions except NE England and N Scotland show decreases.

There has been considerable variability in the North Atlantic Oscillation, but with no significant trend over the past few decades.

Severe windstorms around the UK have become more frequent in the past few decades, though not above that seen in the 1920s.

Sea-surface temperatures around the UK coast have risen over the past three decades by about 0.7 ºC.

Sea level around the UK rose by about 1mm/yr in the 20th century, corrected for land movement. The rate for the 1990s and 2000s has been higher than this.’

Defra, the Met Office Hadley Centre and UKCIP are also in the process of producing an updated package of climate change scenarios for the UK – The new UK Climate Projections - which will employ recent advances in climate science to better quantify some of the uncertainties associated with climate modelling through the development of probabilistic projections. The UK Climate Projections represent a development from UKCIP02 in at least three ways: First, the UK Projections will contain considerably more detail in terms of the spatial and temporal resolution and the provision of marine scenarios. Second, the scenarios will be presented probabilistically. Third, the information will be accessible through a dedicated user interface which will offer a wide range of outputs and products. The projections are due to be published in Spring 2009. Of course, the UKCIP02, and the new UK Climate Projections, are not the only predictions of climate change for the UK, and reflect the choice of a particular climate model and the choice of how to explore the uncertainties in that model (for the new UKCP). Different models do give different results, and some of these differences will be significant in relation to risks (see Stainforth, 2005). However, these issues are the subject of considerable current discussion within the UKCP review process and are not considered further in this report.

Longer-term Climate Risks

The focus in the UKCIP and UKCP scenarios, consistent with the IPCC, has been through to the year 2100. However, a number of the most important long-term, large-scale effects of climate change are on a potentially longer time scale. Indeed, the concept of such large-scale climatic events (Schellnhuber et al 2005; Lenton et al, 2006; Kriegler et al), often expressed in the climate literature as major irreversible events or ‗tipping points‘, is undoubtedly one of the major areas driving international concern over climate change. Importantly, these large scale effects are also influential for the economics of climate change (see Stern et al, 2006, Watkiss and Downing, 2008; Wetizman, 2008). A number of these large-scale long-term effects are particularly relevant for the UK (though this list is not exclusive), notably:

Major sea-level rise, from the onset of rapid melting (irreversible) of the Greenland ice sheet, or the collapse of the West Antarctic ice sheet.

The weakening or collapse of the Gulf Stream (thermohaline current).



The risk of extreme climate sensitivity12

. There is some emerging discussion of the potential relevance of these risks. The UKCIP02 technical report includes a discussion of possible changes to thermohaline circulation (THC) and the Gulf Stream, and the Stabilisation conference (2006) outlines the potential risks to the UK. The AR 4 (Parry et al, 2007) outlines some of the current discussion on major sea-level rise. These are reported in the box below, along with a discussion of the one short-term tipping point, artic sea ice.

Major Sea-Level Rise

The IPCC AR4 WGII (Parry et al, 2007) states that there is medium confidence that at least partial deglaciation of the Greenland ice sheet, and possibly the West Antarctic ice sheet, would occur over a period of time ranging from centuries to millennia for a global average temperature increase of 1-4°C (relative to 1990-2000), causing a contribution to sea-level rise of 4-6 m or more, and the complete melting of the Greenland ice sheet and the West Antarctic ice sheet would lead to a contribution to sea-level rise of up to 7 m and about 5 m, respectively. Thermohaline Circulation (THC) and the Gulf Stream

A ‗what-if‘ experiment using the Hadley Centre computer model shows that if the Gulf Stream did switch off, the UK annual temperature would cool by up to 5 °C in a matter of a decade or two. But the effect on extreme temperatures would be worse. Winter daily minimum temperatures in central England could regularly fall well below -10 °C or so. The model projects that the Gulf Stream would slow down by about 20% by the middle of the century, but by no means completely switch off, even with emissions projections at the high end of the range of possibilities. When climate was stabilised in the model at the end of this century following a high emissions scenario, there was a reduction in the current of about 30% by 2200. The same model experiment also predicts that one of the sinking areas — in the Labrador Sea — ceases to operate by about 2020. The switch off of one of the two ‗pumps‘ driving the Gulf Stream might be thought a large enough change in the physical climate system to be regarded as dangerous. However, the cooling effect on Europe of the decreased Gulf Stream flow was more than offset by the greenhouse-effect warming and has already been taken into account in the climate change scenarios we produced in 2002 for the UK Climate Impacts Programme. Other comprehensive climate models give different results, ranging from reductions of a few percent to nearly 50%, but none shows a complete switch-off over the century for this scenario of future emissions. However, this wide range of predictions shows that there is no single robust conclusion, reflecting our lack of understanding of ocean currents and their apparent stability. Artic Sea Ice

While many ‗climate tipping points‘ have usually been seen as a medium to long term issue, there has been recent speculation that the dramatic reduction in Arctic sea ice extent and area observed since 2005 may presage a dramatic shift in Arctic atmospheric and oceanic behaviour. Perennial Arctic sea ice extent underwent a systematic but gradual decline from the mid-1960s until 2005, with March ice extent reducing from 5.6 million km

3 to around 3.5 million km

3

over that time period. 2005, however, saw a major increase in ice loss, and this continued with total sea ice extent reaching a low during the period of instrumental data in September 2007( at 4.3 million km

3), some 50% below the

estimated mean extent during the 1950s-1970s. September 2008 ice extent was slightly above the previous year‘s minimum, but well below the long term average (Stroeve et al. 2008). Although there are difficulties in measuring ice thickness remotely, the recent ice loss is accompanied by progressive thinning of the winter ice coverage and a reduction of the age of the remaining ice, with little multi-year ice surviving (Rothrock et al. 2008; Maslanik et al. 2007). This is significant for understanding the likely future evolution of the sea ice; thinner, younger sea ice is likely to be less resilient than thicker perennial ice being less able to withstand short-term melting events and breaking up during storms. As Richter-Menge et al. (2008) warn, ―it is becoming increasingly likely that the Arctic will change from a perennially ice-covered to an ice-free ocean in the summer‖ Associated with this reduction in Arctic sea ice, decreased albedo, release of latent heat and regionally-increased water vapour form strong positive feedbacks which are expected to have impacts upon permafrost in the circum-Arctic and on glacial ice masses in the region. The impacts of these on oceanic and atmospheric circulation are likely to be considerable.

There is a question of whether these types of risk should be considered in the CCRA. They do pose potential risks to the UK, but the threat of these is largely unknown because the threshold points for these effects is unknown. However, they are generally anticipated to occur in a longer time frame (with the

12

Climate sensitivity is the equilibrium warming expected with a doubling of CO2 concentrations. The Third Assessment Report of the IPCC concluded that the range was 1.5 to 4.5 °C with a best guess of 2.5°C – the Fourth Assessment Report (2007) concluded that the ‗best guess‘ is 3°C, with a range from 2 to 4.5°C, though the chance of higher values cannot be ruled out.



exception of artic sea ice), and cannot be addressed through UK domestic action, i.e. they are beyond the limits of adaptation and require international mitigation effects to prevent them. Nonetheless, they do have implications for the rate of change, as well as leading to the possibility of crossing certain irreversible thresholds at a more specific local or sector level. As an example, more rapid climate change increases the demands on adaptation, and the risks of crossing limits of adaptation, especially for natural systems that are particularly sensitive to the required rate of adaptation. The review therefore includes discussion of potential major risks where information is available.

Socio-Economic Change in the UK The future effects of climate change are strongly influenced by socio-economic change. First, socio-economic factors (population, technological change and economic growth) determine future emissions, and in turn on climate change. Second, non-climate scenarios influence the vulnerability of social and economic systems to that climate change. Socio-economic scenarios will result in a change in vulnerability or exposure, even in the absence of future climate change. As an example, the aging of the UK population (the higher % of pensioners projected for the future) would alter the vulnerability of the population to heat related extremes, or ozone pollution, even if the current climate remained unchanged in the future (because older age groups are more susceptible to these effects). Socio-economic change will also influence the exposure to any future climate signal. To illustrate, the future impact of extreme events such as floods or storms will be determined by the increased wealth of individuals and assets (driven by socio-economic growth) but also changes in exposure from land-use changes, e.g. if there is development in areas that are more susceptible to flood risk. Indeed, the Foresight study (Evans et al, 2004) found that socio-economic change could be a more significant driver for future flood risks than climate change. In some cases, socio-economic changes may even affect the sign (+/-) of damages. There is therefore a need to consider socio-economic scenarios to assess future risks. It is also important to split out this socio-economic component to identify the ‗net‘ impacts attributable to climate change, rather than the ‗gross‘ impacts due to the combination of ‗climate + socio-economic change‘. This is because some of the future impacts due to socio-economic change would have occurred anyway, even in the absence of climate change. However, it is also important to recognise that adaptation responses need to address the combined effect of climate and socio-economic change together. There are also strong linkages between socio-economic development and adaptation. As an example, income and wealth are important in adaptive capacity. Note that there are also major uncertainties in future socio-economic trends, which affect the magnitude and probability of any potential impact. As the UKCIP acknowledges, there is far less experience of using socio-economic scenarios in vulnerability, impact or adaptation assessments. However, any UK risk assessment will be seriously flawed if it does not include them, as this implies that projected future climates will take place in a world similar to today. The UKCIP has coordinated the development of socio-economic scenarios for the UK (UKCIP, 2001), which link to the emission scenarios above

13, outlined below, with four socio-economic scenarios (global

sustainability, local stewardship, national enterprise and world markets). These are shown below. These scenarios build upon other exercises, such as the Foresight scenarios (DTI, 1999). The UKCIP SESs are provided for the time-slices centred on the 2020s and the 2050s. The BESEECH project (Dahlström and. Salmons 2005) has also further developed the UKCIP socio-economic scenarios.

13

Note, although there is no direct correspondence between the UKCIP02 scenarios and the SES, not least because the SES are specifically aimed at the UK whereas the emissions scenarios used in UKCIP02 are global emissions scenarios, an approximate correspondence can be drawn



Table 1. UKCIP Recommended climate - socio-economic scenario combinations

Over the course of longer time periods (the 2050s time-slice, or especially the 2080s) there can be significant differences between the various socio-economic scenarios. As an example, household occupancy / numbers of households varies between the LS and WM scenarios significantly by 2050, with 24 million households under the LS scenario and 33 million under the WM scenario, even though the population numbers are relatively similar for the two scenarios (62 and 66 million respectively). These very large differences will affect the size of the potential risks from climate change, for example in relation to energy use, as well as influencing vulnerability. The key drivers in the socio-economic scenarios that are most relevant in any future CCRA include:

GDP growth rates;

Income, and income distribution indicator;

Population, household, household size;

Land use;

Sector specific metrics (e.g. value added in economic sectors, passenger transport, etc) Unfortunately the development of the new UKCP has not been accompanied by an update of the socio-economic scenarios. This is a particular concern, not least because of the need to now consider potential mitigation scenarios, as in practice, this is now the planned policy baseline for the UK following the adoption of interim and long-term targets. This issue is discussed in more detail in the main study report.

Classification of Climate, Impacts, Coverage and Adaptation The means by which climate change risks are identified and grouped is important in determining their relevance to agents in the public or private sectors, who may use the information to determine their adaptation response. For some stakeholders, this is likely to mean that ‗place‘ (aggregation within a location) is more important than ‗sector‘. However, it is often the case that grouping is determined by the analysts (in terms of their typical groupings) or analytical aspects. Studies that run CGM models tend to group analysis by typical input-output conventions, and so collate information by households, industrial sectors, etc. Other studies (usually qualitative) group around climate effects (SLR, mean temperature, extremes). However, nearly all the impacts and valuation literature, and integrated assessment modelling, adopts a sectoral approach. This sector grouping is the main approach used in this literature review. However, cross-sectoral and indirect effects are considered in a separate chapter. At the same time, even when a sectoral grouping is used, it is important to capture the coverage of impacts by sector against the very wide list of climate parameters provided by the models (see the earlier



list of outputs from the UKCIP02 scenario), recognising that these different parameters have different levels of confidence associated (see box), and that the level of analysis possible in different sectors varies. The issues of coverage (making sure all potential effects are considered), and the attribution of risk in terms of likelihood, are both issues that are relevant for the CCRA. However, the coverage of any analysis will continue to be partial. This is important in identifying potential gaps in the knowledge of risks.

The use of a risk matrix for climate change impacts and valuation mapping

Previous work (Downing and Watkiss, 2003; Downing et al, 2006, Watkiss et al, 2006) developed a risk matrix to map the coverage of climate change parameters, against potential impacts and valuation. It covers:

1) The different types of climate change impacts and their uncertainty, covering:

- Impacts that can be predicted with relative confidence (e.g. average temperature or SLR), where the sign is known, i.e. it is known that this will increase, but it is not known by how much;

- Impacts where prediction is more uncertain, and where models often give different results (even a different sign) as with for example regional estimates of levels of precipitation, or frequency / magnitude of extreme events;

- Impacts where prediction is highly uncertain, notably around large-scale climate events, also known as ‗tipping points‘ or major climate discontinuities, and

2) The uncertainty in valuation, covering:

- Market effects (e.g. estimates captured through markets such as energy and agriculture);

- Non-market effects (e.g. estimates for health and ecosystems);

- A sub-category of non-market effects - termed socially contingent effects – defined as categories that are very poorly represented in cost values, e.g. regional conflict, famine, poverty. Previous work with more aggregated analysis has shown that many impact studies (and almost all valuation studies) do not have a particularly good coverage against these. This is certainly true for globally aggregated studies (shown in the figure below), but it also appears to be true even at a local scale. As an example, a recent review of international quantification studies at the city or regional level (Hunt and Watkiss, 2007) found that most studies only work with average metrics such as average sea-level rise or average temperature. Very few studies include analysis of extremes (the exception being the insurance based studies, which have a much greater obvious focus on this category). Moreover, most studies work within a narrow set of impact categories, mostly based around market sectors (e.g. agriculture and energy, or at most a partial coverage of health).

Market Non-Market

Projection

e.g. temperature

and sea level rise

Bounded

e.g. precipitation

and extremes

Major change

e.g. major

tipping points

Socially

contingent

One or two

studies

Limit of coverage

of many studies

None

Limits of

coverage for

most studies

None

None

NoneNone

Figure 4. The Coverage of Studies Against a Risk Matrix of Climate Impacts and Valuation14

. Source: Watkiss et al, 2006: Watkiss and Downing: 2008

14

It is highlighted that such an assessment can identify gaps, but it cannot not assess how important these gaps are, because the probability and consequences of the missing areas of the matrix are not known. It is also important to recognize that missing categories are likely to include both positive and negative effects.



Classification of Adaptation

When considering national risks, and the role for national government adaptation policy, it is necessary to specifically separate autonomous from planned adaptation, i.e. ‗planned‘ adaptation, i.e. as developed through public or private agents, versus ‗autonomous‘ adaptation, i.e. that occurs automatically, including in natural systems and human systems. Strictly speaking, some form of autonomous adaptation will occur for most potential ‗risks‘ in the UK, and there is therefore a question of whether risks should be presented for a theoretical ‗cost of inaction‘ scenario (without autonomous adaptation), or whether risks should be presented with autonomous adaptation including (which will usually mean lower risks) in the baseline risk assessment. In practice, the most appropriate approach will vary with sector. While planned adaptation is the major area where Government and related agencies will operate, and so is most relevant for the CCRA, in some cases there is a justification for Government action to target autonomous adaptation, e.g. due to a number of reasons such as where it leads to externalities. This will be an important area for the CCRA to consider, so where possible, information is given in the review on whether autonomous adaptation is included or not.

The Costs and Benefits of Adaptation

Adaptation has a cost, e.g. as defined in the TAR as the ―cost of planning, preparing for, facilitating and implementing adaptation measures, including transition costs‖, but also a benefit, expressed as ―the avoided damage cost or the accrued benefits following the adoption and the implementation of adaptation measures‖. In the simplest terms, if the economic benefits of adaptation outweigh the costs, then there are net benefits – if not, then this potentially leads to mal-adaptation. This can be expressed in the stylised framework below. Note that while adaptation reduces impacts, it does not reduce them entirely.

Future Impacts

‘with’ Climate Change

& no Adaptation

Projected Baseline

‘without’ Climate

Change & no

Adaptation

Time2002 2030 2050 2080

Gross benefit of

adaptation ΔAd.B

for comparison with costs of adaptation

ΔAd.cost

Future Impacts (‘with’

Climate Change) after

Adaptation

(e.g. reduction in predicted

return period)

Residual Impacts

of Climate Change

Impacts

(e.g. average annual total

market and non-market cost

of flood)

Figure 5. Stylized analytical framework for costing climate adaptation Adapted from Boyd R. and A. Hunt (2006) Climate Change Cost Assessments Using the UKCIP Costing Methodology. Report for Stern Review.

The approach first identifies the impact of the socio-economic signal (in blue), and then combines this with the additional impact of climate change to give overall future impacts (in red), illustrated in relation to a change in return period and the impacts of flood. It then assesses the net reduction that adaptation can achieve. Adaptation reduces the total impacts to the pink line, but it does not completely removal all impacts. The gross benefits of adaptation are the impacts avoided, but there will still be residual impacts of climate change (the cost of climate change impacts, after adaptation). These gross economic benefits of adaptation (ΔAd. Benefits) can be compared against the economic costs of adaptation (ΔAd.costs).



This overarching principle is important because resources need to be allocated efficiently between different adaptation strategies and between adaptation and mitigation strategies. This can be done only if costs and benefits of the different options are clearly determined. However, there is a need to balance this simplistic approach with the aims of adaptation policy (and some potential short-comings in narrow short-term cost-benefit analysis), outlined in the main report. The review does include a consideration of the costs and benefits of adaptation. However, there remains a very low evidence base in the UK, and more generally in the global literature. The IPCC AR4 reported that the literature on adaptation costs and benefits was ‗quite limited and fragmented’ (Adger et al, 2007in IPCC WGII), and the OECD study on the ‗Empirical estimates of adaptation costs and benefits‘ (Agrawala and Fankhauser, 2008) found little quantified information on the costs of adaptation, except in a few sectors (e.g. coasts).



3. Sectoral Analysis

Introduction This chapter presents the review findings on the potential climate change risks to the UK by sector. The focus is primarily on future risks. However, much of this knowledge is informed by growing evidence on recent trends at a global level (Rosenzweig et al, 2007) and in the UK (Jenkins et al, 2007), and also on the current risks from climate variability. The latter are already captured in sectoral assessments, and in the existing Government National Risk Assessment (described in the box below), which identifies coastal and inland flooding as priorities (top right hand part of the diagram)

The National Risk Assessment

The NRA is a cross government document that assesses the impact and likelihood of major risks, both hazards and threats, which the country could face over a five year period, enabling prioritization of the UK‘s planning for emergencies. The national risk register is based on this document and only includes risks which of sufficient severity that they would require central government to be involved in the response. The current high consequence risks are illustrated below. They include inland and coastal flooding, and also include severe weather.

Figure 6. Illustration of the high consequence risks facing the United Kingdom (NRA, 2008)

The sectoral review is presented below. This builds on the previous UKCIP measuring progress report (2005), recent IPCC (2007) and EEA (2007) documents, and the evidence in the UK literature.



Health Climate change is likely to affect human health, either directly such as with the effects of heat and cold, or indirectly, for example, through the changes in the transmission of vector-borne diseases or through climate change effects related to the production of allergenic pollen. There are also a wider set of potential impacts from climate change on health, which occur indirectly but are linked to other sectors discussed in this review (e.g. water quality, food safety, etc). All these health changes will have economic consequences, through the direct medical costs, health protection costs, lost time at work, and welfare changes (that can be captured by measures of willingness to pay to avoid associated pain and suffering). There has been limited work in the UK on the potential health effects of climate change. The Department of Health (2001/2002) reviewed some of the possible effects and concluded that there was likely to be an increase in heat-related deaths, a decrease in cold–related deaths, an additional burden of ill health due to increased flooding, and possibly a increase in health-damaging tropospheric ozone (DoH, 2002). The DoH study was updated in 2008 (Health Effects of Climate Change in the UK 2008, DoH/HPA, 2008), and had similar conclusions. However, a number of health outcomes were not included in either of these assessments, including asthma and other atopic diseases, and the broader impacts of climate change outside the UK. There has also been further work on health and climate change, particularly advanced by the World Health Organisation (the cCASHh project) European studies (e.g. INTARESE, PHEWE) and reviewed in IPCC AR4 (Confalonieri et al, 2007).

Heat and cold related mortality

One of the primary health concerns (risks) from climate change is heat-related mortality and morbidity, from heat extremes (heat waves). However, the annual temperature increases also lead to potential benefits, from the reduction in cold related mortality and morbidity. These potential effects are strongly influenced by socio-economic change from population growth, age distribution (the aging UK population) and other technical and behavioural factors. Most of the epidemiological research related to current climate variability has been undertaken on the effects of heat and cold exposures (e.g. Hajat et al, 2005; Johnson et al, 2005; Carson et al, 2006; Kovats et al, 2006; Hajat et al. 2007; Kovats and Hajat 2008). The effect of heat extremes on health was seen in the 2003 and 2006 heat waves. In 2003, there were approximately 600 all-age extra deaths in London (Kovats et al, 2004; Johnson et al, 2005; GLA, 2006), though by comparison, the effects in the UK in 2006 were small in relation to the estimated 35 000 attributable premature deaths across all of western Europe (EEA, 2008), as temperatures were not so extreme in England. Since 2004, the Department of Health has implemented measures to prevent heat –related mortality in England and Wales, including an early warning system that was triggered for the first time in 2006 (DoH 2008). The information from these events and from epidemiological studies on current climate variability has been used to quantify the potential risks from climate change in the future in the UK. Studies include DoH (2001), Kovats et al (2006), and DoH (2008). Earlier assessments estimated higher numbers of potential health impacts, for example, the earlier DoH report (2001) estimated that by the year 2050, excess cold weather deaths would decline significantly, perhaps by 20 000 deaths per year

15, and that heat-related deaths occurring in the summer would

increase from about 800 to around 2800 per year. More recent studies report lower effects due to the

15

Noting that the UK has the highest cold weather excess mortality in Europe, with an estimated 60 000-80 000 cold-related deaths (DoH, 2001).



inclusion of autonomous adaptation, as populations acclimatise to future temperatures. The results of Kovats et al, 2006, are summarised below, firstly in terms of physical impacts and then in terms of economic costs. These results were also produced at a regional dis-aggregated level.

Heat and Cold Related Mortality in the UK

Kovats et al 2006 (as part of the cross-regional research project, Metroeconomica (2006)) assessed heat and cold related mortality, for three 30-year time-slices centred on the 2020s, the 2050s, and the 2080s, and for 12 regions in the UK, using the UKCIP climate and socio-economic scenarios. The UK results are shown below, showing the change in years of life lost in the different time periods. The study assumed that populations acclimatise to a warmer climate, and also that some ―loss‖ of acclimatization occurs for winter mortality. Values were also produced by region. Table 2. Total numbers of annual Years of Life Lost (YLL) or Gained due to Climate Change [all ages] Heat (in red) and cold (in blue), WITH Autonomous Acclimatisation

All UK Scenario

Time period Low Medium Low Medium High High

Annual YLL

UK Heat effects

2020s 48 53 53 58

2050s 122 123 137 222

2080s 196 197 292 549

UK Cold effects

2020s -283 -324 -283 -330

2050s -1062 -558 -546 -816

2080s -544 -543 -675 -1023

One key assumption is that both heat and cold mortality effects are due to short term mortality displacement (effectively deaths brought forward). However, some evidence suggests this is negligible for cold related mortality, and a sensitivity was undertaken with this assumption, which increased the cold related benefits more than 50 times to above (e.g. so in the 2080s, benefits were -34815 to -66313. The study also estimated monetary valuation, using the Chilton et.al. 2004 and the Defra IGCB derived value of £15,000 per YOLY. As a sensitivity, a VSL value (DfT, £1.2 million) was also applied. Table 3. Valuation of annual Years of Life Lost (YLL) or Gained due to Climate Change [all ages] Heat (economic impacts) and cold (benefits), WITH Autonomous Acclimatisation. £ Million. (note no uplift, no discounting).

All UK Scenario

Time period Low Medium Low Medium High High

£ Million

UK Heat effects

2020s 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9

2050s 1.8 1.8 2.1 3.3

2080s 2.9 3.0 4.4 8.2

UK Cold effects

2020s -4.2 -4.9 -4.2 -5.0

2050s -15.9 -8.4 -8.2 -12.2

2080s -8.2 -8.1 -10.1 -15.3

The study concluded that the reduction in cold years of life lost (YOLL)

16 far outweighed the increase in

heat YOLL in the UK, due to the current high burden of winter mortality. However, the increase in heat effects is likely to be an underestimate as the impact of heat-waves, particularly severe heat-waves, are not included. London and South East are the most significantly vulnerable regions for both impacts. The

16

An alternative metric to ‗premature deaths‘, which looks at the reduction in life expectancy measured by years of life lost. This is important for subsequent alternative valuation approaches.



range of estimated impacts varies with the scenario (climate and socio-economic) and also the assumptions around acclimatisation and adaptation

17. Note, there is also an issue of cold-related de-

acclimatisation, i.e. whether the population will become less able to cope with low temperatures over the coming decades. The updated DoH (2008) report states that while summers in the UK have become warmer, there has been no change in heat-related deaths over the period 1971–2003. This suggests that the UK population is capable of adapting to warmer conditions. However, it also cautions that heat-waves present a serious risk. While estimation is acknowledged to be difficult, the report estimates that there is a 1 in 40 chance that by 2012, South-East England will have experienced a severe heat-wave that will cause perhaps 3,000 immediate heat-related deaths. In terms of conventional thinking about risks to health a risk of 1 in 40 is high. It also predicts that winter deaths will continue to decline as the climate warms. The risk of heat illness exists for the whole population. However, epidemiological studies have identified broad groups that are at higher risk of dying during a heat wave or from heat stroke, particularly the elderly. In the European population, the EUROHEAT project (Matthies et al 2008) showed that the elderly are the most effected by heat, as well as people with pre-existing illness. The evidence for this was seen clearly in the France 2003 heat-wave, where excess mortality rates rose dramatically for the 75-94 year age group, and even more for people over 94 years (Pirard, et al. 2005). Similarly, the effects of the 2003 heat wave were greatest amongst the elderly in London in terms of the number of deaths per head of population (GLA, 2006). As most deaths occur in the elderly, there are complicating factors such as whether people live on their own, their ability to look after themselves and apply risk reduction measures, the quality of care in care homes etc – these factors only partly relate to socio-economic status. It is highlighted that the increased risk in older groups is important given the future population trends predicted in the UK (i.e. the greater numbers of older people in future years), though working against this trend is the predicted increase in socio-economic status with growth in future years. Several environmental, social and healthcare-related risk factors also contribute to higher levels of mortality, such as living in cities, being alone, and living on high floors. Studies indicate that urban populations experience higher rates of heat-attributable mortality than rural populations. One reason is that temperatures are often higher in urban environments because of the urban heat island effect. The population in London seems particularly sensitive to heat related mortality and the reasons for this are not completely clear (Hajat et al. 2007). There is no strong socio-economic component to heat or cold related mortality in the UK. At present very few people have domestic air conditioning. As the proportion of the population with air conditioning increases, this is one mechanism that would be expected to cause differences in heat exposure by income group in the UK (as is currently the case in the US). There are also potential heat related risks associated with the health sector and health service provision, e.g. in relation to hospitals. With respect to cold mortality, it has been shown that poorly heated homes (with low energy efficiency) are a factor.

Food and Vector Borne Disease

Some work has been undertaken on the effects of environmental temperature on food borne disease (e.g. Bentham et al, 1995). The earlier DoH study (2001) predicted an increase of about 10 000 cases of food poisoning each year by 2050. Climate sensitive infectious diseases, such as salmonellosis, are directly affected by temperature (Kovats et al, 2004), and are therefore potentially affected by climate change. However, the impact of climate change will depend upon the prevailing incidence rate. That is, there may be an ―additional‖ impact on the number of cases due to climate change, but the overall incidence will be declining due to improvements in control measures.

17

The inclusion and degree of acclimatisation significantly reduces potential future impacts, though there is no evidence to know if such assumptions can be applied to the levels and rate of change of future climate projections with any confidence. This is important in relation to the rate of climate change and limits of (autonomous) adaptation, especially under different scenarios.



Some emerging work (PESETA, based on Kovats et al, 2004) quantifies and also values the potential future cases of salmonellosis, estimating extra 5000 cases per year by the 2030s in the UK, rising to 6000 to 9000 cases per year by the 2080s (for an A2 and B2 scenario respectively), with estimated economic costs of 20 to 185 million Euro/year by the period 2070-2100. It reports that potentially these values may underestimate the numbers, due to under-reporting of current cases, but that in turn, existing health care improvements, and autonomous adaptation (i.e. food hygiene measures), would be expected to reduce them dramatically, indeed many of these cases would be preventable through existing low cost measures. Climate change may also facilitate the introduction of new (emerging) vector borne diseases. The UK currently only has one vector-borne disease, Lyme Disese, which is transmitted by ticks. The ticks are already distributed throughout the UK and there is not potential for further expansion, although the seasonal window for transmission may increase. The IPCC health chapter (Confalonieri et al, 2007) concluded that, in general, climate change could lead to changes in vector geographic ranges, seasonal activity and population sizes, though socio-economic factors are important, including the movement of people and goods, and changes in land use. However, it is very unlikely that malaria could become re-established in the UK because of public health measures, though local transmission of a few cases may occur, and this would have implications. This conclusion was confirmed by a reappraisal in the recent DoH (2008) report, with the evidence suggesting that outbreaks of malaria or another emerging disease in the UK are likely to remain rare. However, Health Authorities need to remain alert to the possibility of outbreaks in other European countries and to the possibility that more effective vectors (e.g. different species of mosquito) may arrive in the UK: for example, similar to the recent Chikungunya virus outbreak in Italy. Rapid response to outbreaks of emerging infections will reduce the chances of the disease becoming endemic in the UK.

Flooding and Other Extreme Events

While flooding is the most frequent weather related risk in UK, the number of direct deaths and injuries is relatively low

18 (though still important), and likely to remain so even with projected increases in river and

coastal flooding. However, flood events do appear to have important effects on wider well bring (mental health, stress and depression) though this is based on limited work on flood-health effects (a single case control study of the Lewes floods: Reacher et al, 2004). Floods may also lead to wider indirect effects as a consequence (e.g. from infectious diseases, service provision). The numbers of people potentially at risk to floods are also extremely high (almost 2 million, see the later flood section). While there remains considerable uncertainty, the evidence does point to an increase in the frequency of heavy precipitation from climate change, with the greatest increases in frequency occurring for short-duration, high-intensity events. Flood deaths are primarily associated with such flash floods. There is also the risk of coastal flooding (from sea-level rise and storm surge) again discussed later, with a small increased risk of a very severe flood event (as in 1953). There are some studies which have started to link flood events to potential health consequences, for example linking coastal flood incidence with the indirect health effects (depression) in flooded populations (using health relationships based on Reacher et al, 2004). These indicate that these indirect health effects could have higher economic costs than direct fatalities and injuries. In relation to other extreme events, the DoH (2008) study concluded that direct health effects due to changes in windstorm intensity or frequency are likely to be small relative to other health effects of climate change in the UK. The Foresight study (2004) also assessed the potential effects of climate extremes on water related health issues, indicating potential health effects from pollutants in flood water, or mixing with foul water from drains and agricultural land, as well as an indirect health hazard by preventing sewage plant operation.

18

Only eight deaths have been reported since 2001 (note that these are not attributable to climate change), DoH (2008).



Other Health Risks

A number of other water related issues are also important for health, as highlighted by DoH (2008). Heavy precipitation has been linked to a number of drinking water outbreaks (from mobilising pathogens or water contamination), and waterborne diseases may rise with increases in extreme rainfall. Reductions in summer water flows may increase the potential for contamination. Higher water temperatures may also result in increased occurrence of harmful algal blooms, and increase the faecal bacteria and incidence of pathogens, which could affect drinking water intakes and water bodies used for recreation. However, the potential risks of these effects have not been assessed in quantitative terms. There may be changes in solar ultraviolet (UV) radiation from climate change and in turn changes in induced cortical cataracts, cutaneous malignant melanoma and sunburn. Higher ambient temperatures will influence clothing choices and time spent outdoors, potentially increasing UV exposure in some regions and decreasing it in others (Confalonieri et al, 2007) though this will be strongly influenced by behaviour. The early DoH (2001) study identified potential impacts and benefits from ultraviolet (UV) radiation and warming summers, investigating the potential threats in relation to risk of exposure to UV radiation (5000 extra cases of skin cancer each year by 2050 (assuming international policy) and 2000 excess cases of cataract), but also potential health benefits through changed recreational activity and exercise benefiting health. Note there are also health related effects, potentially beneficial, through changes in transport accident rates (see later section). Another potential risk relates to the effects of climate change on air pollution and health. Though concentrations of a number of important pollutants are likely to decline over the next half-century, the concentration of ozone is likely to increase. This will increase attributable deaths and hospital admissions. The DoH (2008) study estimates that for the UK that there could be around 800 additional ozone-related deaths and hospital admissions by 2020 per year due to climate change (and with no threshold and the least constraining assumptions up to about 1,500 extra deaths and hospital admissions per annum).

19

Finally, there are a number of other emerging health issues from climate change in the UK, where quantification and valuation have not been explored. There is the potential for the seasonality and length of allergic disorders (‗hay fever‘) to change under a future climate, with implications of direct costs in terms of over the counter medications for allergic rhinitis, and wider economic costs to individuals. Finally, there will be a range of indirect health effects from climate change acting on other health determinants.

Adaptation

There are adaptation strategies formulated that can be implemented (e.g. see the cCASHh project, Menne et al, 2006), most of which are likely to build on well-established public health approaches, though further work is needed to fully assesses the costs of adaptation. They include:

Strengthening of effective surveillance and prevention programmes

Sharing lessons learned across countries and sectors

Introducing new prevention measures or increasing existing measures

Development of new policies to address new threats Some of these are already emerging. Heat alert systems have been implemented across the UK (as with many other European countries following 2003) with the National Heatwave Plan (DoH), launched in 2004 (and triggered in 2006). There is some emerging cost information on these plans, though it is difficult at present to quantify their potential benefits in physical terms

20. Heat related health concerns themselves

19

Though note climate change will also affect particulate formation and transportation, which will potentially affect health positively or negatively depending on conditions and season, for example, winter episodes may decrease. 20

It is difficult to estimate the costs and benefits of measures because: first, there is a general lack of information concerning the potential costs of many interventions; second, it is often extremely hard to assess the reduction in physical health impacts that these measures will achieve; third, it is very difficult to disentangle the costs of adaptation to changes in health status induced by climate change from those related to change in health status per se. Note also that it can be argued that changes in health care expenditure are an impact of climate change rather than an adaptation to it.



are also likely to drive interactions with energy use and air conditioning (see energy section). The most important mechanisms to prevent food- and water-borne disease are surveillance and monitoring, microbial risk assessment, risk management and risk communication. Some mapping of these responses was undertaken e.g. Kovats et al, 2006, and other work has started to map these in terms of a qualitative description of potential economic costs and benefits.. Most adaptation measures appear to be low cost (e.g. provision of information), but there is the potential for some to involve potentially costly large-scale vaccination or other prevention programs against vector borne disease. The limited literature that does exist on the potential direct and indirect costs of health care (e.g. Bosello et al, 2006) show that costs are likely to be relatively small for Europe in terms of GDP. These studies also highlight that poorer countries will either be more exposed or more vulnerable, and so there the issue of climate change and health will be most relevant in relation to international aspects.

Energy Climate change is expected to have a direct effect on both energy supply and demand, as well as on energy related infrastructure. In many previous UK studies, energy has been considered as part of the building/built environment sector. However, it is considered separately here for two reasons. First, the effects of climate change on energy are potentially very large in economic terms, and dominate the economic cost estimates in global integrated assessment models (see Downing et al, 2005). This also appears to be the case in the UK, as found with the Cross regional research project (Metroeconomica, 2006). Second, unlike the analysis of floods and extremes, many of the changes affecting the energy demand are associated with gradual mean temperature change. This means the probability of risk is very high (though predictions remain challenging), and there are large cumulative effects of gradual temperature change over time.

Energy demand

Outside temperature affects space heating and space cooling requirements, and so influences energy demand. Energy demand increases with colder temperatures (heating) and with higher temperatures (cooling)

21. Data show higher energy consumption (gas and oil) in severe winters in the domestic sector.

In other European countries, there is also higher electricity consumption for summer temperatures, which would be expected to start to occur in the UK in the future. There is therefore likely to be a decrease in the demand for winter heating from climate change in the UK, but an increase is summer cooling (which can be described as an impact or an adaptation). Previous work (e.g. Watson and Woods, 1997; Watson and Majithia, 2005)) has investigated the relationships between temperature and energy demand in the UK. More recent work (the GENESIS project) has developed general relationships

22 which indicate a threshold point of around 20ºC for

temperature and electricity consumption in England and Wales: below this point energy demand increases with colder temperatures; above it, air conditioning increases energy demand due to warmer temperatures. Similarly, for space heating, there is also a strong relationship with gas demand and temperature (note gas is not used for space cooling power, so only increases with colder temperatures). The climate models and projections provide indicators of these changes in recent years and for the future, through Heating Degree Days (HDD) and Cooling Degree Days (CDD). These represent an annual measure of the requirement for building heating and cooling respectively

23. These can provide an

21

Note there are also other factors that affect the apparent temperature, and so the actual energy demand, including wind speed and chill, brightness/illumination and cloud cover, and other factors that affect demand including precipitation and snow. Also, space cooling relates to human comfort levels, but there is also cooling demand for appliances, including computers. 22

Source: genesis: A Generic Process for Assessing Climate Change Impacts on the Electricity Supply Industry and Utilities. http://www.ukcip.org.uk/resources/publications/documents/148.pdf 23

The definitions of these vary slightly, but in the UKCIP01, Heating Degree Days (HDD) are estimated by the number of degrees Celsius that the daily mean temperature is below 15.5 ºC is calculated for every day of the year (ignoring negative numbers, that is, when the mean temperature is above 15.5 ºC) and this is summed for all days of the year. For example, if the temperature on every day in a year were at 13.5 deg C, then you would have 2 x 365 = 730 HDDs. Cooling Degree Days (CDD) is a similar measure,



immediate and direct energy indicator, i.e. the risk of ‗exposure‘ to changes in temperature24

. However, to convert them to physical impacts of energy usage (kWh/Mtoe) and economic values, additional analysis is needed. Moreover, in practice energy demand is strongly influenced by technical, socio-economic and economic factors. The new Climate Projections trends analysis UK (Jenkins et al, 2008) reports on estimated changes in HDD and CDD over recent years. This shows a strong increase in CDD (in % terms), shown in the right hand figure below, but a much larger decrease in HDD in absolute terms (on the left hand side), as HDD dominate due to the UK‘s temperature climate (note the figure has different scales for HDD and CDD).

Figure 7. Filtered annual heating (left) and cooling (right) degree days by area, 1961 – 2006. Note different scales showing current dominance of HDD

Source Jenkins et al, 2008

Some care is needed in interpreting how these changes relate energy demand, and economic effects. It is not as easy to draw similar trends of falling winter energy demand (mtoe) and increasing summer cooling demand (kWh), because of the confounding effects of socio-economic trends, e.g. in relation to population, housing density, housing stock, insulation levels, technology, equipment penetration level, efficiency of heating or cooling units, behaviour, perceived comfort levels, energy prices, income, etc. Nevertheless, final energy consumption since the 1970s has been persistently below the calculated temperature-corrected consumption (EEA, 2008), related to warmer-than-average years. UKCIP02 also predicted changes in HDD and CDD for the UK in the future, shown in the box below. These indicate decreases of 10-15% in HDD by the 2020s, rising to a decrease of 15 to 35% by the 2080s – these are very significant reductions in relation to household heating demand. The relative rise in CDD is significant for Southern England, but still very low compared to the fall in the number of HDD. A number of studies have used such changes in HDD and CDD, or changes in mean seasonal temperature, to predict the effects of climate change on UK energy demand. The CCCIRG (1991) indicated that UK demand for fossil fuels might decline by 5-10% and electricity demand by 1-3% for a 2.2°C temperature rise by 2050. Watson and Woods (1997) concluded that a 2 degrees increase in temperature throughout the year would results in a saving of £688 million (1995 prices) to domestic gas consumers, and £142 million to public administration/commerce/agricultural users. Kirkinen et al., 2005 estimated a 2°C warming by 2050 would decrease fossil fuel demand for winter space heating by 5 to 10% and electricity demand by 1 to 3%. Fewer studies have considered the effects on cooling, though LCCP (2002) estimated in London, the typical air conditioned office building would increase energy used for cooling by 10% by the 2050s, and around 20% by the 2080s.

related to energy needed for cooling. To derive it, the number of degrees Celsius that the daily mean temperature is above 22 ºC is calculated for every day of the year (ignoring negative numbers, that is, when the temperature is below 22 ºC) and this is summed for all days of the year. 24

The advantage of these indicators is they separate out the temperature signal from other factors. The disadvantage is that they represent a ‗burden‘ or ‗exposure‘, and do not provide the actual change (impact) seen in final energy demand and economic effects



Future UK Heating and Cooling Degree Days

Under model-simulated baseline conditions, there are between 2100 and 2300 HDD in southern England and 3000–4000 HDD in Scotland per year. There are between 310 and 330 CDD in southern England and 20–50 CDD in Scotland per year. The relative reduction in HDD are shown below. The absolute numbers of CDD are shown, because of the very low absolute numbers. Table 4 Relative reduction in heating degree days

Relative reduction in HDD, as percentage of model-simulated baseline

L L

2020s SE England 10–15 2020s SE England 10–15

Scotland 10–15 Scotland 10–15





Table 5 Absolute change in Cooling Degree Days

Absolute number of CDD (number of days)

L M-L M-H H

baseline southern England 320

Scotland 30

2020s southern England 360 370 370 370

Scotland 40 40 40 40





Source Hulme et al, 2002

The cross-regional study looked at quantification and valuation of energy demand changes (Metroeconomica, 2006). This used Defra Energy Efficiency Scenarios from the Interdepartmental Analyst‘s Group (IAG), which calculated future energy demand under different future socio-economic scenarios in the UK

25) and then used relationships (Shorrock and Utley (2003) to update these scenarios

with the addition of climate change for the domestic and service sector. The study also valued the resulting changes in energy demand. The results reported that:

For all time periods, there is an overall benefit in terms of net energy demand, i.e. the reduction in space heating is far greater than the increase in air conditioning in the UK. The results show a significant reduction in energy demand by 2050 for domestic space heating due to climate, with a reduction in energy demand for domestic space heating of around 6 to 9% by 2020s, 15 to 20% by 2050s and 22% to 35% by the 2080s (depending on climate and socio-economic scenario). Note these predictions assume that the domestic sector can recognise and capture these potential benefits.

The analysis also predicted a significant increase in space cooling under all future scenarios, which increased by 15 to 100-fold according to the scenario by 2050. However, energy use for space cooling remained a fraction of total domestic energy use. This reflects the current climate of the UK which has a large winter heating demand, and low levels of summer cooling demand (though air conditioning forecasts are more uncertain, and the approach may not fully capture the impacts of additional air conditioning demand, or the full impact of future climate on uptake). Moreover, the values exclude additional energy needed for refrigeration in warmer temperatures, plus the potentially significant extra cooling demand in the transport sector in vehicles.

25

Interestingly, the socio-economic scenarios alone led to a -37% (LS) to +16% change (WM) in space heating demand by 2050. This emphasizes the need to take future socio-economic change into account for this sector.



The results were extremely significant in economic terms, with the total net changes estimated at over one billion pounds/year under some scenarios in the 2050s and 2080s. However, estimation of these costs is extremely uncertain, due to differences in energy sources and mitigation scenarios and associated prices. The results varied dramatically with the socio-economic scenarios.

Some other effects will also arise from these changes. There will be a reduction in the need for winter heating, which will have benefits in reducing fuel poverty, i.e. for vulnerable groups

26.

It is important to note that changes in winter heating demand vs. summer cooling demand involve many more issues than the net energy balance alone. Winter heating demand is primarily met from fossil fuel use, whilst summer cooling is from electricity. This leads to an issue in relation to the difference between energy (estimated above) and power, and on relative levels of carbon intensity. To meet electricity demand it is necessary to produce enough energy over the course of a year (e.g. total kWh), but also to be able to have enough power to meet the peak demand (e.g. kW peak production), because it is not possible to store electricity (in the same ways as for fossil fuels). Therefore, additional issues arise for electricity in relation to the maximum power needed across the network to meet peak demand, and the associated plant capacity and reserve margin. This might lead to concerns over peak summer demand, during heat extremes – for example, with higher summer temperatures, rising incomes, and saturation of mechanical air conditioning, there could be periodic electricity summer peaks during heat extremes. It seems unlikely that the UK will move from a winter to summer peak (which will occur in some regions of Southern Europe). These issues have been advanced in recent work on the GENESIS project (Generic Process for Assessing Climate Change Impacts on the Electricity Supply Industry and Utilities, one of the BKCC projects). This is assessing the impacts of climate change on the future Electricity Supply Industry, looking at load forecasts in the 2080s, the impact on specific generation technologies from extremes, and adaptation options. The project finds a potentially sharp rise in summer UK electricity demand under certain future scenarios (Walsh et al, 2007), as well as a much higher relatively level of daily demand (relative to winter) in the 2080s, such that summer demand is greater than winter demand during the central part of the day, shown below. These changes are driven by air conditioning, and have other implications, for example the scheduling of generation plant maintenance is traditionally carried out during the summer in the UK.

A comparison of England and Wales electricity consumption patterns under Low Emissions (LE) and the High Emissions

(HE) scenarios

England and Wales hourly demand patterns by season in the 2080s under the High Emission scenario.

Figure 8. Electricity Consumption patterns (left) and hourly demand patterns (right)

Source Genesis project, published in Walsh et al, 2007.

26

The Government definition of fuel poverty is when a household has to spend 10% or more of its income on energy to maintain a warm home (usually 21 degrees for the main living area, and 18 degrees for other occupied rooms).. The causes of fuel poverty are the cost of fuel, the income of the household and the energy efficiency of the home. In 2006, there were approximately 3½ million households in fuel poverty, http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/energy/fuel-poverty/index.html



Both heating and cooling demand changes will be driven by autonomous adaptation in the absence of planned policy, and will be affected by wider socio-economic and technical trends, as well mitigation policy, affecting demand. The implications of these changes are significant for mitigation policy; indeed, this is probably the single most important area for adaptation-mitigation linkages and maladaptation, i.e. the link between rising cooling (an adaptation) and the increase in emissions. Electricity required for cooling (currently) is far more carbon intensive than energy used for heating (e.g. gas, oil), and so under some scenarios the CO2 emission reductions might not be as great as might be expected from change in energy demand alone (Eskeland et al, 2008) – moreover, much of the potential increases could be avoided through alternatives (see later adaptation section). There is also another potential adaptation-mitigation linkage emerging, with the potential increase in energy use for increasing water supply (pumping, desalination, recycling, water transfers) in areas where water availability is declining due to climate change. This is already an issue in some regions of Europe, and is potentially important for the South-east of the UK. There is little information about these effects as yet, but they are strongly related to other sectors (cross-sectoral linkages between water availability, domestic supply, agriculture, tourism, etc) and are a major evidence gap.

Energy supply and infrastructure

The changing climate may also have significant effects on most energy technologies, particularly affecting hydro-electric resource, and water abstraction availability for cooling of thermal plants. There is emerging work on this (Eskeland et al, 2008 under the ADAM project) and the risks are outlined below. Power station cooling The generation of electric power in thermal (particularly coal-fired and nuclear) power stations often relies on large volumes of water for cooling. During heat waves and drought periods, the use of cooling water may be restricted if limit values for temperature are exceeded, which may lead to reduced capacity or even temporarily close plants. This may be exacerbated by decreased precipitation and river flow during these periods. Such effects may have a negative impact on the electricity generation sector where rivers provide cooling water, and electricity production has already been reduced in various localised locations in Europe during very warm summers (in 2003, see BMU, 2007). It is possible that such effects could occur in the UK. In addition, rising temperatures and lower river levels may combine to result in a lower efficiency of thermal power plants, due to higher power demand for pumps to maintain desired condensing temperatures and due to changes from wet to dry cooling towers (Eskeland et al, 2008). Hydropower Clearly precipitation affects hydropower resources and production, and will change with a future climate. However, in the UK, hydropower is a relatively small share of total supply, with large-scale hydro providing only around 1% of electricity generation (DUKES, 2007), and there is little additional capacity available to increase this. There is some possibility that dam and reservoir safety may be affected under changed climatic conditions with more frequent extreme flows, however, the effects will vary between small reservoirs or river weir (or other run of river schemes), but might not be as important for a large reservoir. Other supply technologies Climate has potential effects on other supply technologies (Eskeland et al, 2008):

Higher temperatures and atmospheric CO2 concentrations in moderate climates may be beneficial for the growth of biomass. This may favour electricity/fuel generation from agricultural crops, manure and wood chips. However, reduced water availability or extreme events in some regions, notably in Southern England, might have detrimental effects on crop yields and therefore the potential for growth of biomass for energy purposes.



Efficiency of photovoltaic plants could slightly be reduced due to higher temperatures, particularly during heat waves, though climate could also have other effects (e.g. increased or decreased cloud cover at different times).

Increasing average wind velocities improve the electricity output of wind converters. However, the extent of increasing wind velocities for the UK is still unknown, and higher frequencies of heavy storms may negatively affect total annual wind power generation.

Infrastructure There is the potential for some additional impacts from extreme events for the energy network and infrastructure, linked to heavy winter precipitation and floods, storms, and summer heat waves. Extreme weather events, including storms, can damage electricity transmission lines. These may be vulnerable to incidences of increased storm frequency or magnitude from climate change. Climate change is also likely to result in (albeit limited) electricity transmission losses due to higher average temperatures. Increased temperature and heat waves may increase the resistance of power lines. The vulnerability of electricity transmission may vary across regions depending on the age of this infrastructure, the nature (e.g. overhead or underground cabling) and the remoteness of regions. However, the quantification of impacts on from extreme events is difficult, as there is still not good quantitative information on the intensity or frequency of such events, and little quantified work in developing relationships from events to impacts on energy infrastructure. Some work on the existing vulnerability of the electricity network to extremes has been undertaken (Lunnon et al, 2003), as well as work on future extremes (Met Office, 2006). There is some evidence from the UKCIP02 climate change scenarios that the number of winter depressions crossing the British Isles may increase (from around 5 per winter in 1961-1990, to around 8 per winter in the 2080s medium-high emissions scenario). Extreme events such as the 27 October 2002 storm which are linked with deep depressions may also occur more frequently. However this projection is relatively uncertain given the lack of consistency between different climate models on this aspect. In all the above case, the electricity supply mix and distribution systems will be important, and could have potentially positive or negative effects, e.g. the availability of renewables for peak supply (intermittency) or decentralised energy might in some cases exacerbate these peak issues (though it might have other benefits in relation to lower vulnerabilities to other supply disruptions). There is also the potential for infrastructure risk to flooding, either river affecting plant and supply stations, as evidence by the near event in the summer of 2007 (Walham electricity station), or from sea-level rise and storm surge in relation to coastal flooding. The location of power infrastructure in the UK is well known, and this could be further mapped against these risks. What is clear is that any supply disruptions could have potentially large economic as well as political costs – modern economies rely on electricity, not least because of the heavy reliance on automated computers. Evidence from other countries shows large economic costs from supply outages (e.g. the California supply shocks in 2001 were estimated to lead to economic costs of tens of billions of dollars).

Adaptation

The consideration of adaptation is difficult for the energy analysis, and in many ways, much of the impact analysis is related to behavioural and non-behavioural adaptation. The key area for adaptation is for cooling demand. Previous work by UKCIP (Hacker et al, 2005) has assessed the potential for cooling buildings in the UK. The report considered the performance of 6 different types of building under projected climate scenarios. For each case study, carbon emissions from heating energy consumption were estimated, and the percentage of occupied hours per year when temperatures exceeded ―warm‖ and ―hot‖ thresholds was calculated. Options for cooling either through adaptive measures or through traditional air



conditioning were considered and the ―price‖ of each option in terms of carbon emissions was estimated. Examples of the findings are:

For a 19th century house. Cooling through passive adaptation measures (solar shading, ventilation) results in negligible additional energy consumption and reduces percentage of hours above ―hot‖ threshold in the 2050s to 3 %. Cooling through whole-house air conditioning system more than offsets the energy reductions from less winter heating (additional 20% carbon emissions by 2050s).

New build house. Cooling through shading and automated ventilation control (as above). Due to the better insulation, the adaptation measures are more successful in making emission savings.

For offices, to combine passive and mechanical systems, in such a way as to minimise energy use as far as possible (mixed mode approach).

The study implies that the costs of adaptation in new build could be low, however, given the long lifetime of the housing stock, these need to be factored into planning new developments as soon as possible, to avoid a possible over-reliance on air conditioning. In relation to storm risk, there have been recent reviews of the resilience of the electricity network to storm events (while these apply to current risks, they are also relevant for the future), particularly following the storm event of October 2002. In response to this, BPI (2002) review contingency plans in place. It found better performing companies were able to estimate accurately the amount of resources needed to restore supplies; they mobilised their resources early and were able to manage them effectively during the incident. BPI also concluded that some companies had not responded adequately to severe weather warnings issued by the Met Office (e.g. to initiate emergency procedures) and so were slower in reconnecting customers than the best performers. The better performing companies were more accurate in estimating the effects of the forecast bad weather in terms of network damage and the resources required to deal with that damage. These findings really reflect good (or bad) risk management and responses. One issue that was important was tree damage to overhead power lines. Companies that regularly checked and lopped trees close to the overhead power lines fared better in 2002 than those which had not properly implemented a tree maintenance schedule. The Network Resilience Working Group (NRWG (2003) stressed the fundamental importance of tree management to avoid disruption to electricity supplies in storms and made specific recommendations for increased investment in vegetation management (to include accurate vegetation surveys, three yearly tree cutting programmes, and proper risk assessment procedures for tree felling and line diversions). In response, OFGEM proposed to make a specific allowance of about £22.4 million a year for increased control of vegetation during the subsequent price control period, 2005-10.

Transport Previous UKCIP studies have identified transport as a key sector likely to be affected by future climate change (McKenzie et al, 2000). Most of the concerns relate to the vulnerability of the transport sector to extreme events: as examples, the exceptionally warm weather in 1995 and 2003, and the major floods in 2000, all had major impacts on transport infrastructure and services. Given the long lifetime of transport infrastructure, climate change is a real concern and adaptation has an important role in reducing future risks to this sector. There is also an increasing recognition that climate will have a much wider role affecting transport. Climate change will affect all modes of transport, though in different ways. This includes changes from average temperature as well as the (current) focus on extremes, which in turn impact across the range of transport demand, accident rates, as well as infrastructure. Importantly there are likely to be positive and negative effects across all modes.

Transport Infrastructure

In the UK, there have been some major effects on the transport sector from recent climate including:

The impacts of the hot summer of 1995 (Hornes, 1997) had a significant impact on the transport sector, for road, rail and water transport. These included major problems from rail buckling, rail-side fires and rail delays, problems with wheel rutting of roads, canal water shortages, and increased pedal



and motor cycle accidents. However, it also led to increases in internal flights and domestic rail journeys. The 1995 summer was estimated to lead to economic costs of £36 million for transport, but benefits of £20 million. The event resulted in new specifications for road design, guidance on conserving water in canals, and fire protection for the rail network.

Similarly the heat wave of 2003 was estimated (Horrocks et al, 2006) to have economic costs of £27 million from a combination of rail delays (from speed restrictions and rail buckling) and road deformation (wheel rutting/subsidence).

The floods of 2000 left parts of the country inaccessible for days, and the 2002 events flooded numerous London underground stations and mainline London stations. The economic costs of the autumn 2000 floods including delays were estimated at £51 million for the rail sector and £13 million (economic) / £73 (financial) for the road sector (Penning Rowsell et al, 2002). They also led to a review of these events by the Highways Agency (May and Todd, 2001). DfT provided £23 million in 2001 to 22 authorities (towards damage totalling £45 million) for flood damage.

Indeed, there are now a significant number of studies that have looked at previous transport related climate vulnerability, and the potential effects with climate change. These include assessments for the railways (Metroeconomica,, 2004 [floods], AEA, 2004; Defra Cross Regional research project B, Risk Solutions, 2005), on road subsidence (e.g. the UK CIP valuation case study on road subsidence in Cambridgeshire) and roads and future construction and infrastructure (Newton, 2001; Wilson and Burtwell, TRL Ltd 2002; Scottish Executive, 2005) . There has also been some overarching national level assessment (DfT, 2004). A number of these studies also progress to estimate economic costs, using the valuation of accidents and travel time delays adopted in standard UK transport appraisal (NATA, DfT)

27.

Transport has also emerged as a major issue in the devolved administration and regional climate impacts studies in the UK, for example with studies in London (LCCP, 2002: 2005: Atkins, 2005)) on flooding and heat effects on the railways and London underground, and in Scotland, in terms of the risk of disruption to ferries and ports especially for island communities such as the Hebrides (Kerr et al, 1998), the risk of flooding to infrastructure, including road and rail (e.g. Price & McInally, 2001; Werritty et al 2001),and the potential benefits from the reduced cost of clearing snow and ice from roads and delays. In many cases there is a mixture of positive and negative effects, for example in the East Midlands studies (Kersey et al, 2000; Entec, 2003), heat extremes and flooding are identified as being the main challenges to the railway system, but warmer winters are considered to benefit the system. There is also some specific regional vulnerability, for example with sea-level rise and inundation along some points along the Welsh coast line, where many railways are sited to utilise the relatively flat terrain (National Assembly for Wales, 2000). Many of these studies provide a qualitative assessment of risks, including the national assessments undertaken to date (e.g. DfT, Wooler 2004). The study of Horrocks et al (2006, used the evidence base listed above, as part of the Cross Regional Research project, Metroeconomica, 2006) and progressed quantification and valuation where possible. This provided quantification and valuation of future extreme weather (heat) on the rail network, particularly rail buckling and time delays, and quantification and valuation of extreme weather (flood and precipitation events) for road traffic disruption and railway network. The results are shown below for the projections for the 2080s (the range reflects the different UKCIP scenarios). The table also highlights the large number of gaps in the current knowledge.

27

though there are issues in the use of these values over the time periods of climate change predictions.



Table 6. Effects of Climate Change and Extreme Events on Transport in the UK in the 2080s

Mode Impacts Impacts With Adaptation

Extreme Heat

Rail

Speed restrictions: passenger delay £4.1 to £15.9 million Low residual impacts, adaptation costs low Rail buckles: additional maintenance £1.6 to £6.3 million

Speed restrictions: waiting for train services Speed restrictions: freight delay Rail buckling: time delays for maintenance Increased line-side fires Damage to other infrastructure (e.g. signals) Changes to journey ambience Changes in demand

Not quantified

Road

Wheel rutting/ Subsidence

Increased fuel use for air conditioning Incidence of break-downs from overheating Changes in demand

Not quantified

Under-ground

Changes in demand Not quantified

Health effects Not quantified

Passenger discomfort Not quantified

Bicycle Impact on accidents Not quantified

Flooding

Rail Speed restrictions: passenger delay £2.7 - £11.4 mill. for 1 in 50

Medium residual impacts, adaptation costs high

Other Not quantified

Road

Delays £11 - £81 mill. for 1 in 50 Medium residual impacts, adaptation costs high

Road conditions Not quantified

Landslides Not quantified

Source Horrocks et al, 2006.

Other work is emerging, either with a modal or specific climate focus. The BKCC programme (see Walsh et al, 2007) includes a study of the Impact of Climate Change on UK Air Transport, and a case study as part of the Climate change Risk Assessment: New Impact and Uncertainty Methods (CRANIUM) study on rainfall-induced landslide on a part of the railway network. Nicholls et al (2006) looked at the potential risks to transport infrastructure from coastal flooding, investigating the threatened areas of the current national transport network in relation to major sea-level rise (areas below 5 metres elevation) as an indicator of exposure, identifying those regions of the country most at risk. A focus in the UK has been on the London underground and the wider transport network in London, because of the volume of passengers, and because the LCCP (2002) study which identified that these networks were at risk of disruption of flooding and other extremes. International studies have shown that the costs of flooding of large city transport systems, particularly urban underground rail systems, do have large economic costs (Compton et al, 2002).



Transport Accidents

Transport accidents are a major source of risk in the UK28

, and there is some potential for these to be affected by climate change. Horrocks et al (2006) provides a qualitative analysis of average temperature changes relate to driving conditions from climate change. The key changes relate to driving conditions, and the reductions in driver difficulty, time delays and accidents associated with reduced cold related conditions (snow, ice). It also includes the potential benefits to winter safety regimes, e.g. the reduced operational costs of gritting. Note that any reductions in accidents will also include the reduced costs from vehicle repair and replacement (covered through insurance premiums). However, the analysis of the overall net effects on transport accidents is more uncertain. As well as cold related effects, there are potential increased risks arising from changes in extremes (heavy precipitation), cloud cover, fog, etc). This is currently a gap, but it would be possible to advance through analysis linking accident rates, transport volumes, and reported weather, to derive a set of useful relationships

Demand

The future socio-economic scenarios show strong variations in transport demand with scenario. On top of this, the changing climate will also influence transport demand, due to cross sectoral linkages. One area that is likely to be affected is tourism (see later section). These effects have been seen in recent warmer summers (e.g. see earlier discussion of 1995). However, the potential effects of climate change on overall transport demand have not been studied, and this represents an evidence gap.

Adaptation

The key aspects of adaptation/management for transport infrastructure and the transport sector are to increase resilience, resistance and adaptive capacity. Examples are (Horrocks et al, 2006):

Improvements in flood defences along some lengths of coastline and selected reaches of the river.

Restrictions on development in areas prone to flooding.

The use of more durable materials, such as more corrosion resistant metals.

Increases in the stability of telegraph poles, pylons and other structures prone to wind loading.

Better drainage systems, particularly along highways and railways.

The use of low maintenance vegetation to act as buffer zones, whilst not hindering the growth of other vegetation.

Other adaptation options may include changes in management or monitoring practices, for example:

Budgeting for more frequent maintenance of infrastructure and estate

More frequent monitoring of the condition of transport networks

Increasing flexibility of travel options to meet demand changes

Improvements in emergency and contingency planning This will involve a range of options with very different costs, for example, where the introduction of more resilient materials can be incorporated into routine upgrade and maintenance of the network at low costs, whilst the costs of major flood defence might be high. Some information is emerging on the potential costs, with DfT developing a transport strategy for climate change adaptation, new DfT guidance on climate change impacts and adaptation for highways, Highway Agency assessment of managing risks from climate change (to its roads network, with work on developing a risk methodology, implementation of improved drainage and road surface standards to increase resilience) and work undertaken by Network Rail to design increased resilience into its renewal work and produce hazard maps highlighting vulnerable areas.

28

Transport Statistics Great Britain reports that in 2007, there were 2,946 fatalities, 28 000 serious injuries and 217 000 slight injuries from road transport. DfT (2008).



As with many sectors, many of the adaptation options identified are associated with better management and maintenance (i.e. institutional issues, rather than hard adaptation options). An example is with the problems faced by the rail network during the hot weather in August 2003, which had more to do with general failures in management practices and monitoring at that time than with the weather conditions themselves (see Horrocks et al, 2006.). Significant changes have since been instigated in response. Similarly, the Highways Agency carried out a review of the flooding incidents that affected the HA network following the autumn 2000 flood episodes, which led to new guidance particularly in relation to allowing runoff from the natural catchment adjacent to the carriageway and the design of culverts. Alongside these technical / structural options, the review offered recommendations for improvements in maintenance methods and operational procedures.

Infrastructure and the Built Environment (including Coastal Zones) The main potential vulnerability of the built environment and infrastructure is from extreme events, such as floods, though infrastructure, buildings and the built environment are sensitive to climate in a variety of ways, for example from:

Risk of increased coastal flooding;

Risk of increased river flooding;

Increased urban drainage problems and risks of intra urban flooding;

Risk of increased subsidence;

Reduced comfort levels in hot summers (or risk of heat related damage or overheating);

Reduced damage from frost;

Damage from increased windstorm frequency &/or intensity. It is likely that some of these extreme weather events will increase in frequency and intensity in UK, though the estimated changes remain highly uncertain. This section addresses these potential effects, across the generic category of infrastructure and the built environment. It addresses coastal zones and river flood separately. The section also encompasses spatial planning (sometimes also classified as land use, though strictly speaking the two are very different). Note that the effects of heat and energy demand are covered as a primary sector above, though this can also be categorised within the built environment.

Coastal Zones including Sea-Level Rise, Storm Surge and Flooding

The effects of climate change on coastal zones are linked to many of the other sectors in this review. However, coastal zones are usually considered separately in the modelling analysis as they are subject to sea-level rise (e.g. in the IPCC). They are therefore presented separately in this review. The coastal zones of UK contain large human populations and significant socioeconomic activities. They also support diverse ecosystems that provide important habitats and sources of food, as well as providing other ecosystem services. The UK, as an island, has a high coast length (over 12000 km). Significantly inhabited coastal areas in parts of England (e.g. East Anglia) are already below normal high-tide levels, and more extensive areas are prone to flooding from storm surges. Of course, these are areas that are already vulnerable to the current climate and climate variability. The Environment Agency has undertaken detailed analysis of coastal flood risk, as part of the Environment Agency Indicative Flood Plain Map (IFPM) (2005), and has mapped the number of people exposed to different degrees of flooding (see EA/Walker et al, 2006), estimating some 2 million people at current high risk of coastal flooding in England and Wales (≥0.5 per cent annual probability of flooding), though note this takes no account is taken of flood defences and so is a worst-case view of the potential risk from flooding.



Climate change is an additional pressure and is likely to have significant impacts on coastal zones, particularly via sea-level rise and changes in the frequency and/or intensity of extreme weather events, such as storms and associated storm surges. The most threatened coastal environments are low-lying coastal plains, islands, beaches, coastal wetlands, and estuaries. Direct impacts from sea-level rise include inundation and displacement of wetlands, lowlands, coastal erosion, increased storm flooding and damage, increased salinity in estuaries and coastal aquifers, and rising coastal water tables and impeded drainage. Potential indirect impacts include changes in the distribution of bottom sediments, changes in the functions of coastal ecosystems and impacts on human activities. Rising sea levels and the potential additional effects of storm surge risk (noting these might arise from sea level but also potential changes in storm intensity or frequency) will lead to physical impacts and economic costs. Coasts are one of the more studied areas of climate impacts, and there are estimates of the physical impacts and economic costs to coasts from sea-level rise and flooding from storm events, both for current climate variability and for the future effects with climate change. Nonetheless, analysis is complicated, and there are many aspects that need to be considered

29.

The UK has progressed some of the most detailed and definitive studies, particularly with the Foresight Future Flooding study (OST, 2004; Evans et al, 2004; Hall et al., 2005), summarised in the box below. Foresight presented a national-scale assessment for England and Wales that predicted up to a 20-fold increase in expected annual losses by the 2080s in the scenario with highest economic growth (all flood risk). These results include sea level rise, greater storminess increasing surges and waves, increasing precipitation and increasing economic vulnerability, as well as factors such as degraded natural protection from geomorphic features. The Foresight analysis was recently updated (Evans et al 2008) as part of the Pitt review (2008), and this reports a change in risks from the earlier study. The Foresight project demonstrated that a ‗whole systems‘ approach that includes risk sources, pathways and receptors is required to quantify future flood risk. It also showed the extremely important effect that socio-economic development plays for future flood risk, indeed, in many scenarios, this was found to be more important than the risk of climate change. These socio-economic effects are difficult to assess and involve population growth, increased habitation of vulnerable areas, increased wealth and amount of vulnerable infrastructure. There is the ongoing work of the Environment Agency‘s National Flood Risk Assessment (NaFRA) and Defra‘s Long Term Investment Strategy, which uses the Risk Assessment for Strategic Planning (RASP) methodology that takes full account of defence reliability and provides the best available estimates of coastal and river flood risk in the UK, as well as other research studies.

29

For example, rates of regional isostatic uplift or land subsidence (readjustment of the land to the de-glaciation that followed the last ice age) to estimate relative sea level rise; the impacts of storm surge on extreme sea levels, caused by changes in sea level pressures, wind speed and coastal morphological conditions; the combined probability of extreme sea levels and high river flows in UK estuaries; the performance of existing flood defences and other flood risk management measures. Moreover, most studies in the research literature do not account for existing flood defences.



The Foresight Future Flooding study (2004)

The Foresight study estimated that currently, nearly 2 million properties in floodplains along rivers, estuaries and coasts in the UK are potentially at risk of river or coastal flooding. Eighty thousand properties are at risk in towns and cities from flooding caused by heavy downpours that overwhelm urban drains, i.e. ‗intra-urban‘ flooding. In England and Wales alone, over 4 million people and properties valued at over £200 billion are at risk. It also reported that flooding and management cost the UK around £2.2 billion each year: that around £800 million per annum is currently spent on flood and coastal defences; and, even with the present flood defences, there is an average of £1,400 million of damage experienced. Note these values do not include the flood events in more recent years, i.e. 2007. Table 7 Foresight summary of present day flood risks and flood management costs.

Source Foresight (2004). Foresight Future Flooding. Executive Summary

The study assessed the average annual damage in the 2080s, due to varying amounts of climate change, increases in the value of assets at risk and new development in flood-prone areas. The study estimated that the number of people at high risk (where high means a chance of flooding of greater than 1:75 in a given year)) from river and coastal flooding could increase from 1.6 million today, to between 2.3 and 3.6 million by the 2080s. The study found some parts of England and Wales were consistently affected – the Lancashire/Humber corridor, parts of the coast (particularly in the south-east) and major estuaries. It concluded that if flood-management policies and expenditure are unchanged, annual losses would increase under every scenario by the 2080s, from less than £1 billion under the Local Stewardship scenario (Medium-Low), to around £27 billion in the 2080s (World Markets / High emissions), equivalent to 0.1 to 0.4% of GDP. Note that these total costs are based on the combined effects of socio-economic and climate change, and include future growth. Table 8 Average annual damage for all of the UK (£ billion) assuming flood-management approach and expenditure remain unchanged – present day and 2080s

Source Foresight (2004). Foresight Future Flooding. Executive Summary



The study also estimated that coastal erosion will increase substantially (assuming spending on coastal defence continues at present levels) with annual average damage forecast to increase by 3 - 9 times by the 2080s, rising to an upper estimate of £126 million per year. While this growth is large, damage due to erosion is relatively small in a national context compared to the potential flood damage. The study also concluded that an integrated portfolio of responses could reduce the risks of river and coastal flooding from the worst scenario of £20 billion damage per year, down to around £2 billion in the 2080s, though noting that this would still be double present-day damage. To implement the portfolios of responses would require between £22 billion and £75 billion of new engineering by the 2080s, depending on scenario. Note these are costs over the next 80 years, not annual costs, and represent a compound increase in flood management expenditure of between £10 million and £30 million per year over the period, so for example, in 20 years, the annual expenditure would be between £700 million and £1.1 billion, compared to £500 million today. The study highlighted the lower costs from adopting an integrated approach – as opposed to just building higher defences. The Pitt Review (2008) updated the Foresight study (Evans et al, 2008). The study did not update the quantitative

analysis but looked at the changes in the driver multipliers. The key message from the update is the effects of climate change may be more extreme than had previously been estimated. In particular: the potential increases in rainfall volume and intensity are greater, and considered a more explicit risk of extreme sea-level rise. The update also highlighted the increased risk that we will face from surface water flooding in the future. With respect to the latter, the report concluded that communities living behind good coastal defences currently protecting them against a flood with a chance of occurrence of 1 in 100 each year could experience a drop in standard of protection by the end of the century to as low as 1 in 5 each year if we were to follow a business-as-usual flood management policy. This result has been found in many UK assessments and is considered robust. The ABI study (Dlugolecki, 2004) also considered the risk of flooding, considering weather insurance claims, with

results reported below. Table 9 Preliminary estimates of future costs of weather insurance claims (£ million, in 2000 prices)

Annual average (current)

Extreme year (current)

Annual average (2050)

Extreme year (2050)

Inland flood 400 1500 800 4500

Coastal flood - 5000 - 40000

Source: Dlugolecki, A., 2004. note coastal flood values in future years include London.

Lowe and Gregory (2005) assessed the change in height (metres) of a 50 year return period extreme water level event for the end of the 21st century, and this was used in the study by the ABI (2006) to assess changes in the 50-year return period water levels around the UK coastline - including three factors (change in storminess, rise in global sea level and vertical land movements) for three different global sea-level rise scenarios

30. The study also estimated that the number of properties at risk of flooding in eastern

England would rise by 48% from 270,000 to 404,000 following a rise in sea levels of 0.4m (even without additional building) and estimated a flood event could incur damages of £16-20 billion in London alone (assuming defences are not improved). They also note that the number of older people living in coastal communities is projected to rise in the first half of this century, particularly those over 75 years old. This is likely to increase the vulnerability of these areas to flood risk, and the human and financial cost of flooding when it occurs. The increased pattern of flooding predicted in the ABI (2006) study for 0.4 m of sea-level rise is shown below for the major regions of concern (London and Humberside).

30

The largest rise in surge height under the highest emissions scenario was up to 1.4 m along the southeast coast of England. The analysis also assesses an example at Immingham, on the east coast of England. Under the Medium- High Emissions scenario for the 2080s, this level could occur once every seven years; a seventeen-fold increase in frequency. Another implication is that a water level that occurs, on average, once every 50 years at present might occur as often as once every three years by the end of the century.



Figure 9 Extent of Flooding and affect critical infrastructure today (left) and with 0.4 m SLR (right).

Source, ABI, 2006.

Note adaptation (coastal defence) would have a strong role in reducing these impacts. Halcrow (2005) assessed the risks to coastal holdings due to sea-level rise and other climate change for the National Trust and the risks to countryside and historic buildings. It found that much of their coastal holdings are likely to experience erosion through the 21st Century, while many other coastal areas are at a growing risk of flooding. There has also been a recent Risk Assessment of Coastal Erosion (RACE: Halcrow 2007) undertaken to develop, test and disseminate a robust and consistent probabilistic method for assessing the hazard and risk of coastal erosion. The methodology developed by the project is being taken forward at a national level by the Environment Agency to produce draft coastal erosion risk maps (a Defra ‗Making Space for Water‘ Project). These are complimentary to the flood maps already mentioned. However the approach does not fully consider climate change and the ‗source‘ components of the model require further development. Much of the focus to date has been on London, not least because of the significant potential damage from flooding and damage to building and property/transport disruption. London has exceptional high asset values

31, and a significant area of the city lies within the floodplain of the River Thames and its tributaries,

as well as being at risk from storm surges. London does have an extensive flood defence system already in place against such risk (including the Thames Barrier), which provides a very high level of protection

31

The LCCP (2002) considered that climate change impacts could increase the costs of property insurance in London by raising premiums in flood and land subsidence risk areas. They found a typical UK premium in low flood risk areas is £300 in high flood risk areas, the premiums could be several orders of magnitude higher. Further, the ABI comment that: "the impact of such [premium] increases would be to reduce the level of protection afforded to low income households either because they can no longer afford insurance or because they must find the first £2,500 - £5,000 of each subsequent flood claim". The increases in the levels of uninsured assets is important as flood claims are typically of the order of £15,000 to £30,000 on a household policy



upstream of the Thames Barrier (greater than 1 in 1000 years or an 0.1% annual chance of flooding). In London, the LCCP (2002

32) estimated that climate change (sea-level rise) would reduce the existing high

level of protection against the risk of flooding by half as sea level rises by 2030, and further beyond this time

33.

The concerns have led to the Environment Agency's Thames Estuary 2100 project (TE2100, which is developing a tidal flood risk management plan for London and the Thames estuary, i.e. aims to determine the appropriate level of flood protection needed for London and the Thames Estuary for the next 100 years, and is considering a wide range of options including the construction of a new downstream Thames Barrier

34).

Recent work for the OECD (Nicholls et al., 2008) looked at current and future major coastal cities (including in the UK), with sea level rise (0.5 metres global average) and increased storm surge heights, and assessed the exposure to a 1 in 100 year flood event, looking at population and asset value exposed now and with sea level rise in the 2070s for London and Glasgow. For these cities, the exposed assets rise from $3 billion currently to $7 billion by 2100 for Glasgow and $60 to $200 to 300 billion for London. Other recent work using the DIVA database and model produced from the DINAS-COASTS DG research project ((DINAS-COAST Consortium, 2006; Hinkel and Klein, 2007; Nicholls et al., 2007a; Vafeidis et al., 2008) have been developed for Europe in the PESETA project (Richards and Nicholls, 2007) and have assessed the potential impacts and economic costs across the EU and down to Member State level including for the UK. This analysis is interesting as it extends to cover a much wider suite of potential impacts, including land loss, erosion, loss of wetlands, salinity intrusion, but also consider the economic costs of adaptation through beach nourishment and coastal protection (raising dikes). The study report shows impacts increasing dramatically without adaptation, and large predicted economic costs (e.g. 1.8 billion Euro/year (current prices), as well as the loss of large areas of coastal wetlands. Protection can greatly reduce these damages at much lower cost, both in the UK and across Europe. Work is also progressing at a higher level of dis-aggregation, for example sub-national/local level, with examples such as the RegIS study (Holman et al, 2005) and the Tyndall coastal simulator

35. Some of

these work with similar metrics and economic analysis to the national studies above, for example, the RegIS study estimates that without adaptation, for the high risk 1 in 75 year flood event, the area at risk of flooding under the 2050s High climate and Global Market scenario could reach around 300,000 and 110,000 hectares in East Anglia and North West, respectively, and cause estimated economic damages of around £8,600 million and £6,600 million in East Anglia and North West. Much of the Fens and The Broads in East Anglia and parts of the Lancashire coastal plain would be inundated by such an event. The Tyndall Coastal Simulator shows how erosion and flood risk can interact within a coastal sub-cell, raising important questions about how best to manage our coasts under a rising sea level (Dawson et al., 2009).

Adaptation

As well as advancing the knowledge of potential risks, the studies in this area have also progressed the most in the analysis of adaptation, indeed recent reviews of the economics of adaptation (Agrawala, and Fankhauser, 2008) report that the coastal sector has the greatest coverage of the costs and benefits of adaptation. These adaptation strategies include (Nicholls et al., 2007b): coastal defences (e.g. physical barriers to flooding and coastal erosion such as dikes and flood barriers); realignment of coastal defences landwards;

32

LCCP (2002). London‘s Warming. London Climate Change Partnership A Climate Change Impacts in London Evaluation Study. Final Report November 2002. Greater London Authority, London. 33

This increase in risk was anticipated in the original design of the Thames Barrier based on historic trends and has lead to additional freeboard in the design (Gilbert and Horner, 1984). 34

http://te2100.dialoguebydesign.net/ 35

http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/research/theme4/theme4_flagship.shtml



abandonment (managed or unmanaged); measures to reduce the energy of near-shore waves and currents; coastal morphological management; and resilience-building strategies. There is an extensive literature reporting the direct cost of adaptation to sea-level rise, the economic benefits, and even estimating the optimal levels of protection based on cost-benefit analysis (e.g. Tol, 2004; Anthoff et al., 2006; Richards and Nicholls, 2007). These studies show that adaptation has significant benefits. As an example, the recent work of Richards and Nicholls (see above) finds that with optimal adaptation, the potential economic costs of coastal flooding to the UK fall from 1.8 billion to around 40 million Euro/year. There are costs of adaptation (coastal protection), estimated at some 260 million Euro/year, but these achieve significant net benefits. Note that the Foresight study (see earlier box) estimates different annual costs. However, notwithstanding the uncertainties around specific estimates, a robust finding is that coastal protection appears to substantively reduce the threat imposed by sea-level rise at a relatively low cost

.

Distributional Effects

The area of coastal flooding is also one of the more studied in identifying potential distributional effects in relation to current vulnerability and inequalities. There are a number of UK studies which have advanced the analysis of inequality and coastal and river flooding (Walker et al, 2003; Fielding et al, 2005; Environment Agency (Walker et al) 2006). This discussion is included in the later distributional impact section, but in summary, there are strong correlations between deprivation index and risk of coastal flooding in the UK.

Other Cross Sectoral Effects

The coastal zones of the UK are important in tourism potential and recreational value (see tourism and industry section), and the role of seas and oceans are essential for ecosystem services including fisheries (see relevant section) and climate regulation, as well as for transportation. Coastal areas link to water availability, either from the potential risks of salinisation affecting water sources in coastal regions, or potentially in the future as a potential source (desalination). While it seems possible and indeed desirable to protect many areas of coasts through adaptation, this does not fully capture the full role of the UK‘s coastline. Under projected climate change and sea level rise, coastal ecosystems and habitats appear to be threatened (as found in a range of assessments such as Lee (2001) and the RegIS and the BRANCH projects, which assessed coastal grazing marsh, saltmarsh and low unvegetated zones/mudflats). Intertidal habitats could be severely reduced during the 21st century because of the limited scope for onshore migration due to had defences leading to coastal squeeze (Nicholls and Klein, 2005). Adaptation, especially engineered systems used for human settlements, has less potential, though there are some opportunities through managed realignment – the concept of leaving room for water (similar to rivers) is being considered as one way to partially offset some of the potential effects on coastal ecosystems, though it is unlikely to fully preserve the current balance of coastal wetlands and ecosystems in the UK. It will also lead to a decline in coastal grazing marsh and there is competition for space in many coastal zones (e.g. Gardiner et al., 2007). Due to the EU Habitats Directive, these losses need to be addressed, which raises more challenges for coastal management under a changing climate.

Major Sea-Level Rise

It is clear that even if emissions of greenhouse gases stop today, changes in climate will continue for many decades and in the case of sea level for centuries (the so called ‗sea level rise commitment‘). There is therefore a need to include a longer-term view (post-2100) when considering coastal zones as identified in the IPCC AR4 assessment (Nicholls et al, 2007). Moreover, the sea-level rise scenarios typically assessed in the studies above only consider ‗central‘ estimates associated with average temperature change – they do not include the discussion in relation to tipping extremes and large rises in sea level, as



outlined in the previous chapter. While these are very uncertainty, there are potentially large risks, which could have much higher impacts and economic costs (see Anthoff et al, 2006). Some analysis of these risks is emerging. Studies have explored the potential effects of major (>1m) sea level rise for London (e.g. Dawson et al., 2005; Lonsdale et al, 2005a; Lonsdale et al, 2008 and the TE2100 explored adapting to big changes as much as 5 metres), and there has been mapping work (of exposure) looking at the potential areas exposed along UK coastlines from 5 metres (e.g. Marbaix and van Ypersele (2004) and 5 and 10 metres (Nicholls et al, 2006); as an example, the latter assessed areas that will be below mean sea level after a uniform 5 metre rise in sea level and estimating the total land area that is threatened at 16,300 km2 (6.6% of land area, with a current population of around 3 million people).

Flood risk (River and Urban Flooding)

This section focuses on the risk of river (fluvial) and surface water/run-off floods (pluvial), with a focus on infrastructure, including the built environment. Note that flood risks are also relevant to other sectors, e.g. agriculture, but are discussed within other sections. As with coastal zones above, this is an area that is already important in relation to current climate variability and vulnerability. In the UK, floods are the most important weather related loss events, and can have large economic consequences, such as with the autumn 2000 Floods in England and Wales (See Penning Rowsell et al, 2002) and the more recent summer of 2007. The latter was the subject of the 2008 Pitt Review (lessons learned from the 2007 floods), which reported that 55,000 properties were flooded, around 7,000 people were rescued from the flood waters by the emergency services and 13 people died, as well as major failures in water treatment works. The ABI (2007) estimated the 2007 floods led to around £3bn of losses (from some 165,000 claims covered by insurance). There can also be risks associated with very localised events, such as the Boscastle 2004 or Carlisle 2005 events. Note that whilst all these recent flood events are weather related, there is no clear evidence for a climate-related trend during the last decades in the UK. Indeed, analyses of long-term records of flood losses (in Europe) indicate that societal and economic factors (land-use changes and increases in exposure, asset values rising over time, etc) play an important role, and probably the dominant role, in the observed upward loss trends (Höppe, and Pielke Jr, 2006; Barredo, 2007). The UK has developed a detailed flood risk mapping programme that has produced national maps of tidal, river and groundwater flooding. The Environment Agency Indicative Flood Plain Map provides detailed information on the risk of flooding for England and Wales, with flood extents mapped for different flood return periods. The IFPM supports policy on development and flood risk is made available to the public on the Environment Agency web pages and provides sufficient detail for national assessments that quantify the number of properties and vulnerable people located in floodplain areas. A similar approach has been adopted in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Following the floods in June and July 2007, greater emphasis has been placed on flooding in urban areas and pluvial flooding, which is defined as excessive runoff before it drains into rivers or sewer systems. Future mapping exercises, completed by the Environment Agency and Sepa will include flood from all sources. Significant progress has been made linking flood risks with development control through Planning Policy 25 of Development and Flood Risk

36 and supporting research projects and guidance for new

developments, promoting flood resilience and other alternative flood risk management measures related to a number of Government initiatives. The EA has also undertaken detailed analysis of current river flood risk, and has mapped the number of people exposed to different degrees of flooding (see EA/Walker et al, 2006), estimating some 1.4 million people at current high risk of river flooding in England and Wales (≥1.0 per cent annual probability of flooding).

36

http://www.planningportal.gov.uk/england/government/en/1021020428593.html

http://www.planningportal.gov.uk/england/government/en/1021020428593.html



Of course, these risks are likely to change in the future, from higher river flows in winter (from seasonal precipitation increases) but primarily from heavy precipitation extremes in winter, and also in summer for some parts of the UK. The climate scenarios for the UK, e.g. within UKCIP02, predict an increase in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather, such as heavy downpours of rain, potentially increasing the risk of flooding. These extreme events will affect all regions, but pose a specific threat to the urban environment, where infrastructure and the assets are most concentrated. However, prediction of these events is highly uncertain – whilst there is a confidence that climate-related hazards will mostly increase, the changes will vary geographically, and potential exposure is strongly driven by socio-economic scenarios. A number of studies have looked at the potential impacts and economic costs of river flooding in the UK, as part of definitive national assessments such as the Foresight study (OST, 2004), and the Pitt review update (Evans et al, 2008) - both covered in the box in the coastal section - and for research studies focusing on hydrological impacts. Werritty et al. (2001) assessed the risks in river flooding in Scotland, reporting that river flows may increase by 10-20% by the 2020s which may result in a doubling in the frequency of flood events, with a 1 in 50 year flood becoming a 1 in 20 year event by the 2080s. They estimated annual damage to property in Scotland (currently running at £20 million) could rise by 86% by the 2050s and 115% by the 2080s due to climate change (note this does not consider existing or future flood defences). The ABI (Dlugolecki, 2004) assessed the costs of future insurance claims for inland flooding (see previous box), estimating future claims increasing from £400 to 800 million a year on average for inland flooding, with estimates for extreme years rising from £1500 to £4500. The Foresight research programme also examined intra-urban flooding (caused by heavy downpours that overwhelm urban drains) separately to the analysis of coastal and river flood risk. The Foresight projections (OST, 2004; Evans et. al. 2004) future intra-urban projections are shown below, with estimates rising from 80,000 (currently) to 300 – 400,000 properties at risk by the 2080s (populations of 200 000 currently and 700,000 to 900,000 in the future), with estimated annual costs of 1.5 to 15 billion by 2100. Socio-economic factors are again extremely important in the vulnerability to climate impacts to these extremes, including changes to population growth, occupancy, land-use policy, economic growth, etc. Note also, that most studies do not account for existing flood defences. The Foresight study compared the drivers for changes in flood risk and found very large variations in future risks from different economic and social drivers.

Number of properties in the UK at high risk from intra-urban flooding – today and in the four future

scenarios in the 2080s

Average annual damage from intra-urban flooding for the UK in the 2080s (£ billion) the coloured bars show

the range of possible values for each scenario

Figure 10. Foresight Intra-urban Flooding Source Foresight (2004). Foresight Future Flooding. Executive Summary High risks is defined as a chance of flooding of greater than 1:10 in a given year.



Projects such as Adaptable Urban Drainage – Addressing Change in Intensity, Occurrence and Uncertainty Of Stormwater (AUDACIOUS) have looked at these urban risks in more detail, and the potential adaptation options to uncertain future scenarios, including the assessment of costs and benefits. The EA/Defra National Assessment of Flood Risk (NaFRA) can quantify the risks of river flooding taking account of changes in river flows, flood defences and the number of properties and people located in river floodplains. The risk assessment is run annually and informs Defra‘s Long Term Investment Strategy for flood risk management. Ongoing research, such as the NERC FRACAS project (next generation national flood risk assessment under climate change) may provide new methods for assessment the impacts of climate change that can be used with the latest climate change scenarios to link changes in rainfall to river flows and flood risk. It will be important for any future national flood risk assessment to take account of these studies and make use of national risk assessment tools such as NaFRA and RASP. There are potential distributional effects with flood risk. As highlighted in the coastal sector, there are a number of studies (Walker et al, 2003; Fielding et al, 2005; Environment Agency (Walker et al) 2006) that examine the inequalities in flood risk exposure between different social groups (using multiple deprivation indices) though these find less of a correlation for river flooding than for coastal flooding. Nonetheless, deprived individuals or groups will generally have higher vulnerability and lower adaptive capacity, because of lower levels of flood awareness, lower social capital (and resources), etc. It is also probable that more frequent, intense or unpredictable extreme climate events will increase insurance claims, which is likely to translate into higher risk premiums and possibly to increased levels of uninsured and under-insured assets. The rising cost of insurance is also likely to have significant inequality effects. Uninsured and under-insured households and businesses are likely to be those with lower adaptive capacity, further exacerbating the vulnerability of high-risk companies and communities. The autonomous response of insurance markets to reduce risks may therefore cause inequalities.

Other Effects on Infrastructure, the Built Environment and Planning

A number of other extreme event categories are important for infrastructure and the built environment. In relation to storm damages, there are projections that the losses from extreme European storms will increase by at least 5% to €25 – 30 billion by the 2080s (ABI, 2005), and Swiss Re estimate that in Europe the costs of a 100-year storm event could double by the 2080s with climate change ($50/€40 billion in the future compared with $25/€20 billion today). The effects of storm damage are captured in other sectors (e.g. energy, transport, forestry, etc) but are also potentially important in other sectors not covered, e.g. in telecommunications networks. The effects of heat extremes and drought

37 have important effects on buildings and infrastructure

(including transport infrastructure), and the recent hot summers have been linked to large economic damages associated with building and infrastructure from ground subsidence. The 2003 summer was also estimated to have increased building subsidence claims by 20 % in the UK, with estimated impacts of £30 to £120 million (Hunt et al, in Metroeconomica, 2006) arising from 22,000 extra cases of subsidence identified (over and above the long-term average trend). Climate change is projected to increase the frequency and intensity of droughts in some regions of the UK, at least in relation to higher temperatures, decreased summer precipitation, as well as more and longer dry spells. The potential for increased subsidence in the future has been assessed in a number of studies, including Dlugolecki (2004) and Hunt et al (2006) as part of the Defra cross regional research project E, both reported below.

37

Note drought is defined as a sustained and extended occurrence of below average water availability, and should not be confused with aridity, which is a long-term feature of low water availability, though clearly the consequences of drought are particularly important in arid areas.



Table 10 Preliminary estimates of future costs of weather insurance claims (£ million, in 2000 prices)

Annual average

current

Extreme year

current

Annual average

2050

Extreme year

2050

Subsidence 300 600 600 1200

Storm 400 2500 800 7500

Source: Dlugolecki, A., 2004

Table 11 Estimates of climate change induced subsidence costs in the UK (£ million, undiscounted)

Emission scenario

Low Med-Low Med-High High

2020s 6 5 6 15

2050s 26 41 119 185

2080s 162 114 213 316

Source Hunt et al (2006). Note that estimates are for the net additional impact of climate only, i.e. they adjust for socio-economic change, and only account for an extreme (2003 type) year, rather than more generally warmer temperatures or lower precipitation.

The issues of heat and the built environment (thermal discomfort in building) were discussed in the earlier energy section. An important issue is the linkage between the effects on energy and the electricity generation sector (the supply side), and the final demand for energy for cooling in buildings (the demand side), especially because mechanical cooling (air conditioning) is an adaptation response to an impact, and because there are alternatives (see earlier energy adaptation discussion). Heat extremes may be particularly important in larger urban areas, because of exacerbation of the existing ‗urban heat island effect‘. In some regions, there is also the potential for increased fire risks or wider fire risk areas, in relation to a potential increase of fire potential, an enlargement of the fire prone area and a lengthening of the fire season. Note the potential effects on the built environment also apply to buildings or areas of cultural or historic significance. Hunt et al (2006) explore the potential valuation of cultural heritage from climate change risks, using contingent valuation with a case study on a number of such buildings, and conclude these effects are potential significant, not least due to the high willingness to pay for protection of cultural heritage buildings from the impacts of climate change. Other projects are now looking at adaptation for this sector, e.g. Engineering Historic Futures (one of the BKCC projects, see Walsh et al, 2007). Recent work for DCMS has assessed the effects of climate change on cultural and sporting assets (Cassar and Cockcroft 2008) and there is ongoing work on climate change and the traditionally built environment (English Heritage), including guidance to help people understand the impact of climate change on traditionally constructed buildings

38.

Finally, there are studies that are considering the implications of a changing climate for development and adaptation responses, including the projects within the Building Knowledge for Climate Change (BKCC; Walsh et al, 2007), and particularly some of the BKCC projects such as Adaptation Strategies for Climate Change in the Urban Environment (ASCCUE) which includes consideration of climate change impacts on parks and green spaces, and other studies that are looking at the built environment and land-use (e.g. CIBSE, 2004, LCCP, 2006, land-use consultants et al, 2006, Shaw et al, 2007 (TCPA), Arup, 2008); There are also projects investigating the implications in relation to planning, e.g. the ESPACE Project (European Spatial Planning: Adapting to Climate Events (www.espace-project.org)). These highlight the need for creating or remodelling buildings, space and areas to ensure resilience in the face of future climates. There is also a move to introduce these issues into the planning environment, with for example,

38

http://www.climatechangeandyourhome.org.uk/live/



the recent introduction of a supplement to PPS 1 (Planning and Climate Change) which sets out clear expectations on how adaptation should be integrated into the preparation of regional spatial strategies (RSS) and local development documents (LDDs), and the determination of planning applications. This expects new development to be planned to minimise future vulnerability to climate change. It also places new emphasis on green spaces and urban cooling, and the importance of community infrastructure in adaptation. There is also a new Foresight study on land-use futures, including an analysis of how climate change will present challenges and opportunities for the way in which we use land over the next 50 years and beyond

39.

There is some emerging analysis on the potential costs of the various adaptations to climate change for infrastructure and buildings, for example Stern (2006) estimated the additional costs of making new infrastructure and buildings more resilient to climate change could range from 0.05 – 0.5% of GDP, with higher costs possible with the prospect of higher temperatures in the future. Given the long lifetimes of infrastructure, further work in this area is a priority.

Agriculture Agriculture is a climate sensitive sector, and will be affected by climate change, both positively and negatively. Temperature and other climatic changes will affect yield and growing season, and there is also a direct (positive) CO2 fertilisation effect. However, there are a number of complex interactions with other factors, e.g. extreme events (summer heat, winter rain, and storms), pests and diseases, and complex interactions with other key sectors, e.g. water availability for irrigation, which will affect the sector. Potential positive impacts of climate change on agriculture in the UK in general are related to longer growing seasons, potential increased CO2 fertilization of plants giving more efficient use of light, water and nutrients

40. These responses to a change of climate will have different impacts in different parts of UK

agriculture, but could result in increased yields for some species. There may also be new cropping opportunities from temperature change, such as increased opportunities to grow new types of arable crops, fruit crops (including wine) or vegetables. However, these possible benefits are counterbalanced by potentially negative impacts that include increased water demand and periods of water deficit, loss of soil carbon, potentially increased pesticide requirements, increased crop damage, and reduced cropping opportunities in some regions. There are likely to be more general negative effects from extreme events, especially from summer heat and drought, heavy precipitation giving winter water-logging and floods, and storms. The availability of water is likely to be a constraining factor in summer in the UK, particularly given the projections of reduced summer precipitation. The net effects of all these changes are extremely hard to predict, not least because increased frequencies of extreme events may well be more influential on agriculture than incremental changes over years and decades (e.g. summer droughts or high temperatures), and because of the importance of climate at specific critical developmental stages. Moreover, the impacts of medium and long-term climate change on agriculture are difficult to analyse separately from other influences (e.g. the effects of policies, market influences and technological development) related to management. Some care must also be taken when making general comments at the regional levels, due to the specific climate, soil, and agricultural management analysis, which are extremely diversified. Nonetheless, some broad trends in projections are emerging. Several studies show the likely spatial patterns outlined above, with a strong distribution of projected yield changes across Europe, and in turn for the UK. There is a significant literature in this area, indeed,

39

http://www.foresight.gov.uk/Drumbeat/OurWork/ActiveProjects/LandUse/LandUse.asp 40

Atmospheric CO2 is required for photosynthesis and atmospheric concentrations affect plant transpiration. As result, in theory (and in experimentally controlled conditions), plants growing in increased CO2 conditions produce more biomass and consume less water, and will therefore be less drought sensitive. In field conditions, the increases are smaller. In terms of analysis, most of the crop models used for climate change evaluations includes an option to simulate the effects of CO2 increase on crop yield and water use.



agriculture is one of the more studied areas among all the sectors here. A large body of UK research and specific UK studies exists. Earlier studies (e.g. the CCRA (1991 and 1996) and MAFF (2000) considered the effects of climate change on agriculture. Moreover, the UK Government has funded a large-scale research programme into impacts and adaptation of agriculture to climate change, with over 50 funded studies between 1991 and 2005 under the Climate Change Impacts & Adaptations Research Programme (CC03)(see Defra CC03 and update, Defra, 2005a). A study published by Defra on the programme summarises the potential impacts of climate change as follows (Defra, 2004). For arable and other crops:

Warmer temperatures will increase the potential growing season for current crops and make it possible to grow some new crops.

Earlier sowings can be made, with earlier germination.

Crops will grow faster and ripen earlier.

There could be increased risk of damage from radiation frosts.

Increased risk of soil erosion, especially on slopes, due to heavier winter rainfall.

Changes in pest, disease and weed problems are anticipated, e.g. earlier attacks of virus yellows in sugar beet; potato blight; aphids.

Crops such as sugar beet, potatoes and vegetables, which are particularly susceptible to adequate soil moisture in summer, are more prone to drought effects. In future the areas where these crops are grown could change, e.g. from East Anglia towards the Midlands and western Britain.

The area suitable for maize growing is expected to extend northwards, with a higher yield potential in an extended growing season, a potential for maize silage to replace grass silage on some grass-arable mixed farms, and for grain maize to be grown in southern England. There will be potential areas suitable for sunflowers in southern England but this crop requires too long a season for widespread adoption. Some minor marginal crops such as grapes for wine could be extended beyond their present narrow range.

For grassland and livestock farming:

Grass growth will commence earlier in the spring and continue longer into the autumn.

Potential herbage yields in summer will increase, but will be dependent on nitrogen use (and possibly irrigation in some areas).

There will be increased challenges for out-of-season utilisation (extended grazing) due to wet soils and increased poaching damage.

Grass reseeding in autumn could be affected by increased autumn rainfall preventing cultivations, though the consequences are less critical than on arable farms.

Summer drought is likely to reduce the yield of grass.

Climate change is likely to create more favourable conditions for forage legumes than for pure grass swards, due to warmer conditions in spring and better root development.

There are potential problems with new weeds, pests and diseases, or from existing ones being favoured by environmental change.

Warmer wetter winters may cause increased prevalence of bovine pneumonia.

Increased animal welfare concerns associated with heat stress and reliability of drinking water supplies.

Increased risk of wildfires, particularly on moorland and other rough grazing areas.

Increased storm frequency has implications for farm buildings A review of the overall CCO3 programme (Porter, 2005) concluded that the most important policy message from CC03 was that the negative impacts of climate change on UK agriculture’s productivity will be small and that in all likelihood the effects will be positive, with the exception of low lying areas



susceptible to flooding. The impacts of climate change on agriculture in the UK were further summarised by Defra (2005b), see box below. However, these conclusions appear optimistic and somewhat at variance with the large number of other major studies, often with broader geographic perspectives. These include European studies such as ACACIA (Parry et al, 2000) and studies by Audsley et al. (2006). Much of this literature is summarised in the recent IPCC report (Europe chapter 8: Alcamo et al, 2007; and Food, fibre and forest chapter 5: Easterling et al, 2007) which suggests that climate-related increases in crop yields are expected mainly in northern Europe, the south-central European plain and in the south of European Russia, while the largest reductions of all crops are expected in the in the Iberian Peninsula, the UK, Benelux countries, north-west France and the south-west Balkans. The PESETA project, (Iglesias and Garrote, 2008) also forecasts regional yield changes for 2020 to 2080, with indications of the spatial pattern of changes in agriculture yields across Europe under different scenarios, and show results under an A2 scenario by the 2080s that are similar to reported by Alcamo et al. (2007). While there is potentially an increase in yields in Nordic countries and in east-central Europe, these increases are unlikely to compensate for decreased production in the UK, Benelux and France, which are among the larger producers

41.

It is important to recognise that discrepancies in projections of climate change impacts are to be expected because they result from models of global weather which are uncertain, and models of crop performance which are also uncertain. There are also significant variations when comparing across different scenarios or time periods. Changes in yield or livestock can be valued in economic terms, using market prices, but most studies also consider them in relation to wider changes in global agricultural production/prices, i.e. arising from likely changes in supply and demand, and relationships with land price, using partial or general equilibrium models. Work as part of the cross regional research project (E) progressed to valuation studies for the UK, predicting increases in yield and also revenue in the 2020s, but with these declining by the 2050s and with revenue changes becoming negative in nearly all regions by the 2080s with expected economic losses up to £24 million/year (Hamilton et al, 2006) particularly in more southern areas where water becomes increasingly limiting. Note that agriculture accounts for only a small part of gross domestic production (GDP) in the UK, but is important in terms of the wider multi-functionality in relation to landscape, rural economies/society, etc, so that the full economic effects are much broader than a consideration of crop yield (and prices) alone. Moreover, there is also the external dimension and the linkages with international agriculture. Whilst the remit of the literature review is focused on the UK, numerous studies have shown that the impacts on agriculture in any one area are likely to be significantly affected by impacts at a global scale, especially in relation to prices, indeed, it is not really possible to isolate economic effects in the UK from such global effects. Some work has started to assess this for the UK (e.g. Parry et al, 1998), and there are an increasing number of international studies (see Easterling et al, 2007) which look at the agricultural and economic consequence from changes in agricultural productivity at the European and global scale

42.

41

Note that potential benefits in northern Europe will not always be fully realisable due to other limiting factors 42

Easterling et al, 2007, predicts decreased yields in seasonally dry and tropical regions with even slight warming) not just because of limitations imposed by current farming systems and varieties, but due to basic crop physiology. While impacts on world food prices are difficult to predict, due to uncertainty over future demand, emergence of new cultivars and production technologies, there is a general expectation that world food prices will tend to rise in response to a warmer climate. Under some scenarios and models, there could be significant declines in agricultural productivity in many world regions.



Defra Report on the impacts of climate change on agriculture in the UK

The impact of climate change on arable crops, horticulture, weeds, pests and diseases, grasslands and livestock includes changes in the location of agricultural activities, earlier development and growth, changed yields and quality. For arable crops, the overall effect on yield of increased CO2 and temperature will be broadly neutral. Nutrient requirements will increase relatively little (perhaps 10%).The range of current crops will move northward and marginal crops such as maize may increasingly penetrate southern UK. New crop varieties, suitable for the changed climate, may need to be bred. Greater extremes of climate pose threats that are difficult to predict and adjust to but will, as now, have large effects which may not be overcome easily by new crop varieties. A rise in sea level will have local but agriculturally important impacts. The quality of horticultural crops will be more susceptible to changing conditions than that of arable crops. Field vegetables will be particularly affected by changes in temperature. Those species most likely to benefit commercially from higher temperatures are phaseolus bean, onion and sweetcorn. The availability of water is critical to the production of quality fruit and vegetables; a decrease in supplies will focus attention on increased efficiency of water use. Intensive grassland agriculture will be affected by direct effects on grass yield and forage production and also indirectly by effects on other crops and their potential to provide economic and sustainable returns. The relative suitability for different types of livestock throughout the UK is unlikely to change significantly. Production systems involving ruminants at grass or in naturally ventilated housing are likely to adapt to the changes expected in the next 50 years. Intensive livestock (pigs and poultry) are at risk of increased heat stress. Thermal stress influences productivity and health. Disease transmission is likely to increase from greater exposure, e.g. from faster growth of pathogens in the environment and more efficient and abundant insect vectors. There are likely to be consequences for food quality as well as crop production. The potential for soils to support agriculture, and the future distribution of land use, will be strongly influenced by changes in the soil water balance. Where soil water deficits increase, crop productivity will suffer and, depending on economic margins, this is likely to result in increased use of irrigation. Conversely, drier soil conditions may favour more flexibility in cropping in the drier regions, with more potential for spring cropping, and more scope for arable agriculture in the currently wetter regions of the UK as a result of extended soil workability. There will be diminished poaching risk in grassland areas. Soil organic matter levels will depend on the balance between carbon inputs to soils and the rate of loss resulting from decomposition, but the expectation is for a decrease soil organic matter in warmer conditions and with an expanded area of tillage. In relation to weed control, more spring cropping should allow increased scope for cultural control measures, but on the other hand warmer conditions will decrease the persistence of residual herbicides. Weeds which most rapidly develop herbicide resistance are those with largest seed returns and greatest herbicide susceptibility. It is not feasible to predict with sufficient precision the balance between changes in weed spectra and changes in control measures to know whether herbicide resistance will develop more quickly. However, effects of climate change on weed control are likely to be less significant than effects of new pesticide regulations (e.g., under the Water Framework Directive). Predicted climate changes are likely to increase the UK range of many native pests and diseases but decrease the range of others. Native species that are not currently economically important may become so, while the significance of other pests and diseases may diminish. Surveillance and eradication procedures for some alien pests (e.g. the Colorado beetle) and diseases are likely to become increasingly important. Farm management will be affected by climate change. Soils, climate, markets, technology, capital and policy all influence the location and type of farming. In determining future cropping in a warmer climate, it is extremely important to take into account increased climatic variability and the pattern of rainfall (amount, distribution and intensity). Unfortunately, these are the hardest features of climate change to predict. Increased climatic variability will require closer crop monitoring, scheduling of work peaks to ensure that crops are harvested and established in the appropriate conditions, and provision for greater fluctuations in markets and income. Source: Defra, 2005



There is also an issue of the coverage of impacts within many studies. While agricultural impact studies generally consider the effects of projected changes in temperature and CO2 fertilisation, they do not fully consider issues of water availability, and rarely consider extreme events. These can be important. As an example, the hot summer of 1995 is estimated to have had economic costs (net losses) of £180 million (Subak, 1997). The more recent hot summer of 2003 had very large impacts in Europe, and is estimated to have led to $15 billion in economic losses to farming, livestock and forestry from the combined effects of drought, heat stress and fire (EEA, 2008), though the 2003 event is thought to have had overall positive effects for the UK agricultural, fruit and viticulture industries (Metroeconomica, 2005), with estimated economic benefits of £64 million

43. There have also been studies of the potential future effects of drought

from climate change on agriculture in the UK (assessing drought risk, Richter et al, 2002; 2004). Similarly, there is the potential for increased flood damage to agriculture. The total cost to agriculture of the wet weather and floods of 2000 was estimated at c. £600 million (Shepherd, 2003). The Foresight study on flooding (Evans et. al. 2004) assessed the future risks for agriculture, and suggested the annual economic damage for agricultural production would be relatively low (total for the UK of £34 to 64 million by the 2080s, rising from £6 million currently; note these values include GDP growth

44).

Finally, there are also cross-regional issues, particularly in relation to water demand and availability (see next section), where added pressure on limited water resources to increase irrigation to compensate for drought, and competition between sectors, may have direct (e.g. water prices) and indirect effects (effects on ecosystems).

Adaptation

The role of autonomous and planned adaptation is extremely important for agriculture – and has been studied intensively. While many assessments already consider short-term autonomous adaptation (to optimise production), there are also potential long-term adaptations in the form of major structural changes to overcome adversity caused by climate change

45. These are usually the result of a planned

strategy. There are a number of studies that show the benefits of adaptation to farmers in reducing negative impacts by at least 20 % (EEA, 2007), and even turning losses into gains (though it is highlighted that such studies rarely explicit provide a cost for adaptation). There have been adaptation studies within the Defra research programme (e.g. Hossel, 2002; Hopkins, 2002; Hughes et al. 2008) and European studies (e.g. AEA/UPM, 2007), and there is now a programme to provide adaptation advice to farmers on the challenges and opportunities of climate change, including suggested adaptations and mitigation measures (http://www.farmingfutures.org.uk/), as well as recent work to asses adaptations to agricultural management for extreme events (CHAMELEON project, Hughes et al, 2008).

Water Resources and Water Quality Freshwater resources have the potential to be strongly affected by climate change. Water is a critical sector and climate change will affect the whole water cycle and water ecosystems. Changes in river flow and groundwater systems will affect water availability and the function and operation of existing water infrastructure (including hydropower, inland navigation, irrigation systems, drinking water supply and waste water treatment). Water is also important in energy supply, agriculture, tourism, industry, etc. (see other sections).

43

Note this included a mix of positive and negative effects – and the authors note that it is not possible to conclude with any confidence that these gains / losses are wholly attributable to the weather conditions that prevailed in the summer of 2003. 44

The study by Handley et al, 2005 presented these values without GDP growth, and estimated annual damages of £2 to 21 million by the 2080s. Note it also adjusted the values to take into account socio-economic change (i.e. attributing to climate only) which reduced these values further. 45

Adaptation can also be undertaken at different scales i.e. farm level, regional level and national level. Note there are differences between models in the way that adaptation is included, e.g. between a spatial / Ricardian, or a structural approach.

http://www.farmingfutures.org.uk/



Water - whether in rivers, lakes, canals, wetlands, as groundwater, or in estuaries - is a natural asset, and its value lies in the ability to generate flows of services over time. These services include extractive services, e.g. for the sectors identified above in relation to water use, but also in-situ services, e.g. such as for navigation, recreation and amenity and other important ecosystem services (see later section). Changes in the demand for water strongly depend on economic growth and societal development, for example household water demand is affected by patterns of use, occupancy and ownership of water appliances. Climate change may exacerbate the impacts of already existing stresses, for example in parts of South East England where the Environment Agency regards many catchments as ‗over-abstracted‘ or ‗over-licensed‘ with no water available during summer months. Water-related climate drivers, such as floods, droughts and water scarcity, make ‗water‘ a clear cross-cutting issue affecting many sectors. The projections for the UK show wetter winters and drier summers, though with strong regional differences in changes in seasonal rainfall and river flows. These trends, along with rising temperatures, will have impacts on the demand for water, water supply and quality. Sea-level rise may also affect coastal water zones and resources (see earlier coastal section) due to saline intrusion into coastal aquifers. Limited water availability may pose a problem in some parts of UK if climate change is not fully considered in Water Resources Plans. Overall the percentage area under high water stress is likely to increase due to climate change, and further housing growth particularly in some areas on the UK. There is likely to be greater competition (and possibly conflict) over water resources with greater water scarcity and potential for rising costs as more marginal or energy intensive sources of water are exploited to maintain water supplies (desalinisation, effluent recycling). Climate change has been considered in the water resources planning process in England and Wales over the last decade. UK water industry and Environment Agency guidance is underpinned by a large number of research studies that have applied successive version of the UK‘s national climate change scenarios from the CCIRG91 and CCIRG96 scenarios by the Climate Change Impacts Review Group (CCIRG), through UKCIP98, UKCIP02 (Arnell, 2003; Wade, 2004) and most recently a set of climate scenarios based on six Global Climate Models (GCMs) (UKWIR, 2006). These studies show that river volumes and levels of low flow are affected by climate change projections for the UK. There is a strong seasonal element to these changes with increases in winter flows and reductions in summer flows. There are also strong geographical differences across the UK, as has been picked up by detailed regional studies, such as the RegIS Project (I and II; Holman et al, 2007). Indeed, the analysis of water availability and the effects on water resources and quality is extremely site-specific, and most research studies look at specific catchments. However, to assess the potential impacts of changing water resources, it is also necessary to consider water demand. This is challenging, not least because of the strong influence of socio-economic scenarios, but also because of the cross-sectoral nature of demand (i.e. multiple sectors). Very few studies have progressed to link availability and demand. Downing et al (2003) as part of the Climate change and the Demand for Water project (CC:DeW:) applied the UKCIP02 climate change scenarios to the EA water demand scenarios for domestic, industrial and agricultural sectors, and modelled changes in demand due to behavioural responses to climate change (e.g. from irrigation, garden watering, industrial activity etc.) in the 2020s and 2050s. The study estimated that that the additional impact of mean climate change (above the socio-economic scenarios) by the 2050s was to increase domestic demand by 2 to 4%, industrial and commercial demand by 4 to 6% and agricultural demand by 26%. The linked Defra Cross-Regional Research Programmes C and E, outlined in the box, assessed the potential water deficit to households in quantitative and economic terms, and also looked at the costs and benefits of adaptation.



Figure 11. Average changes in monthly flow for 70 catchments Multi-model, A2 scenario, 2020s

(UKWIR, 2007) The impacts of climate change on water supply and demand have been included in water company Draft Water Resources Plans that propose supply and demand measures between 2011 and 2035. Some water companies have also considered the impacts of other climate factors in their business plans, for example the impacts of flooding on water supply works or soil movement on leakage to make the case for further investment in climate change adaptation. The water industry regulator OFWAT recently published a climate change policy statement covering impacts and adaptation related to water resources, leakage targets, resilience and a range of other key issues for the industry, which provides a useful summary of areas of potential impacts and adaptation activities

46.

46

http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/aptrix/ofwat/publish.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/pap_pos_climatechange.pdf/$FILE/pap_pos_climatechange.pdf



Economic Costs and Benefits of Water Resource Deficits and Costs and Benefits of Adaptation

The Defra Cross-regional Research Programme (Project C, Wade et al, 2005) assessed the impact of climate change on the management of water resource zones and existing water infrastructure, including extreme events on water resources, with a focus on two regions (the South-East of England and the South-East of Scotland), both of which are under pressure from climate variability and population growth, and are vulnerable to drought conditions. The study assessed each of the catchments and assessed the 30-year average household water deficit each time period (2011-2040, 2041-2070 and 2071-2100) for each of the four UKCIP climate-socioeconomic scenarios. It found household demand for water over time is affected by socio-economic change, with factors that increase demand (e.g. population growth) outweighing the impact of those factors that reduce demand (e.g. environmental values). As a result, water demand increases over time. The entire deficit is not due to climate change however; some is due to socioeconomic change. For example, the estimated household water deficit in the SE England case study, on average, in the 2080s ranges from 25.6 to 104.4 Ml per day, under the GSLE and WMHE scenarios respectively. The cross regional research study (E) (Boyd et al (2006), in Metroeconomica et al. (2006) built on the water project above, and investigated the economic losses to households of foregone water use due to the anticipated water deficit by 2100. The study also extended the S-E England study to the Southern region (shown below). It used revealed preference approach to estimate the total (economic loss) value to households of any foregone water use that may result from the predicted supply shortfalls estimated by Wade et al (shown in the first column below), It then assessed the cost of addressing the water deficit, using information from Wade et al on the range of options for managing public water supply (including options that reduce demand and options that increase supplies), and by constructing indicative cost-yield curves, to estimate how to eliminate the household water deficit at minimum cost. The study then estimated the cost of the water deficit to households, by approximating the willingness-to-pay of households for each additional unit of water along their demand curves and in turn estimated the economic losses to households associated with foregone water use with adaptation. From this, the study then estimated the net benefits of adaptation, i.e. the net benefits of eliminating the predicted household water shortfalls. Table 12 Case Study for Southern Region.

(£ Million per year)

Scenario

Time Period

Economic Losses to Households of

Foregone Water Use Due to Water Deficit

Resource Costs of Eliminating the

Household Deficit

Economic Losses to Households of Foregone Water Use Due to Water Deficit (With

Adaptation)

Annual Net Benefits of Adapting to Household

Water Deficits (Net Benefit of adaptation)

GSLE

2020s 8.8 1.9 8.8 6.9

2050s 13.2 2.4 3.8 1.4

2080s 41.7 6.4 22.2 25.9

GSHE

2020s 7.9 1.7 7.9 6.2

2050s 19.1 3.3 9.6 6.4

2080s 68.4 10.0 36.0 2.0

WMLE

2020s 17.7 4.7 17.7 13.1

2050s 73.4 12.8 40.4 27.7

2080s 222.5 25.1 64.1 39.0

WMHE

2020s 30.3 10.2 30.3 20.2

2050s 128.8 23.4 58.7 35.3

2080s 388.0 39.3 78.8 39.5

Source Boyd et al, 2006 The results show economic impacts initially of between £41 and 388 million a year for the Southern Region (depending on scenario) as a result of climate change by the 2080s. The costs of largely (but not entirely) eliminating these deficits was estimated at £6 to £39 million/year for the same period.



While the impacts of climate on average demand and seasonal river flows has been studied in detail and incorporated into plans, the potential impacts of extreme droughts has not been fully considered with regard to water supply, agriculture and the environment. A number of studies have suggested that there may also be changes in the frequency of drought

47, as assessed in Wade, 2004 (for the Southern region)

and at the UK level (Goodess et al, 2004; Vidal and Wade, 2008). Wade (2004) estimated that by the 2080s, rainfall droughts could be more frequent with the frequency of short (6 month) ‗serious‘ droughts, such as that experienced in 1995, increasing from 1 in 9 years (present) to 1 in 7 years (under the Low Emissions scenario) or 1 in 3 years (High emissions scenarios). A more recent study has suggested a threefold increase in short rainfall droughts by the 2080s (Vidal and Wade, 2008)

47

Drought is defined as a sustained and extended occurrence of below average water availability, and should not be confused with aridity, which is a long-term feature of low water availability, though clearly the consequences of drought are particularly important in arid areas.



Figure 12. No of short rainfall droughts within a 30 year time-slice Source: Vidal and Wade, 2008

There are some estimates of the economic costs of previous droughts, e.g. in the summer of 1995 the costs of supplying additional water supplies during the hot summer was around £100 million (Waughray, 1997; UEA, 1997). However, there are no projections as yet of the future economic costs of changes in drought frequency from climate change. Poor water quality may also be exacerbated by climate change. For example, rising water temperatures and lower summer flows may affect aquatic ecosystems. High water temperature, low water flows and therefore less dilution of pollutants may have consequences for drinking water and recreation activities related to water. Because of sea-level rise, saline intrusion in coastal aquifers may increase, affecting the suitability for drinking water (see coastal section).

Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (including Forests and Fisheries) Climate change is likely to have major effects on managed and natural ecosystems and associated ecosystem services. The effects on forests, fisheries and ecosystems are discussed in this section. These sectors (natural environment) have been the subject of the recent call for adaptation evidence by the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution

48.

Forests

Forestry is a sector with long life-times: stands established now should be able to withstand the next 50-100 years. Estimates (EEA/JRC, 2008) forecast that according to a typical +4° scenario, the ecological conditions where a given tree species now grows will shift somewhere between 500 and 1000 km north by 2100, though this does not mean that forests will be able to make these shift. Woodland covers almost 9% of England‘s land area, just over 1 million hectares with around 1.3 billion trees, and timber and woodland management in England is associated with businesses estimated to contribute £2.1 billion to GDP and employing 64,000 people (Defra, 2007; EFIP, 2006), is even more important in the devolved administrations (Y% of Scotland). Projections of the net effects of climate change on forestry are complex. Tree growth may be enhanced by some processes (including CO2 fertilisation, warmer winter weather and longer growing seasons, and reduced cold related damage), but might be negatively affected by others (such as from reduced summer rainfall in some areas, wind-storm damage, spring frost damage and elevated ozone concentrations).

48

http://www.rcep.org.uk/climatechangeadaptation.htm



Alcamo et al (2007) report that forest area or suitability in Europe might be expected to expand in the north, but contract in the south. Forests, and related forest flora and fauna, will need to adapt to new climatic conditions (temperature, humidity, precipitation, winds) as well as to extreme events (storms, droughts, floods). Forests are likely to experience general stress caused by changing climatic conditions to which they are poorly adapted. The single most important determinant of the natural distribution of forests is climate, followed by soil conditions and hydrology (although the latter two are also heavily influenced by climate). Forests have evolved with the climate, gradually shifting their composition and structure as climate has changed over the millennia. Young forests that are adapted to today's climate will live under sub-optimal conditions in the relatively near future, and therefore may experience stress. This is likely to lead to changes (mostly negative) in growth, health, biodiversity and stability, and will be exacerbated by a projected increase in extreme weather events. Damage to forests will also occur due to extreme weather events. Projections indicate an increasing frequency of extreme weather events in the future. This is partly caused by changes in the mean climate (for example, with general warming, the frequency of hot days is likely to increase, resulting in increased fire risks or wider fire risk areas, and by increased variability (increased amplitude of changes, leading to unusual weather patterns). Extreme events such as storms can damage or destroy trees and stands, whilst droughts can make forests more vulnerable to secondary impacts (e.g. increased risk of fire and vulnerability to biotic damage). In the northwest of Europe, and in the UK, particularly in Scotland, where water supplies are, typically, non-limiting, growth rates are likely to be enhanced by a combination of rising carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere, warmer winters and longer growing seasons, and increased nutrient availability as a result of atmospheric deposition and increased soil mineralization, though a potential increase in storm extremes could be detrimental. This may contrast with southern areas, where more frequent summer droughts may lead to reduced productivity, and possibly increases in forest fires. Species choice and the biodiversity associated with forests will also be affected. A changing climate is also likely to mean that the levels of damage caused by existing forest pathogens and pests changes, while new pests and pathogens, whether introduced from other parts of the world or moving through from Europe as climate change progresses, have the capacity to cause potential damage to both protection and production forests. There are a large number of European forestry studies (see Alcamo et al, 2007), including a number several which include assessment for the UK. The recent Defra strategy for England's trees, woods and forests (2007) identifies ensuring resilience to climate change as a primary aim. The Forestry Commission has been investigating such issues, with a large programme of research

49 and has recently commissioned (2008

50) an independent report to assess

the ways in which trees and forests can help us tackle climate change. It will provide an up-to-date assessment of the contribution that forests and woodlands can make in mitigating and adapting to climate change. The changes in mean climate (especially temperature) will have implications for forests, but the increased variability (likely occurrence of extreme events and associated uncertainty) is probably more important: For example, even if long term precipitation projections are rather uncertain, more variability is very likely, and extended droughts or major floods are more likely to be caused by increased variability. Expected increase in the frequency of drought periods in southern England is likely to influence and alter the growth and competitive ability of certain tree species as was clear following the drought of 2003 for beech (see ICP Forests, 2004). Recent research (EU BALANCE project) indicates rare and extreme weather events have a major long-term effect on forestry-reliant communities in Northern Europe.

49

http://www.forestry.gov.uk/pdf/fcresearchcatalogue.pdf/$FILE/fcresearchcatalogue.pdf 50

http://www.forestry.gov.uk/forestry/infd-6vjhul



Fisheries

The future impacts of climate change are expected to result in a number of changes in the abiotic (i.e. sea level, sea temperature, acidity, salinity, stratification, light, and possibly thermohaline circulation) and biotic (i.e. primary production, food webs, etc) conditions of the sea. It is generally accepted that the reproductive success of marine organisms depends almost exclusively on these environmental conditions, and so these will affect fisheries. However, fishing is a "harvesting" activity and human activities affect the reproductive success and abundance and distribution of marine organisms. Climate change is an additional pressure on fish stocks whose resilience is low, because of the impact of fishing activities and, to a lesser extent, pollution or physical destruction of habitats. The impacts of climate change are already being observed in European Seas (Halpern et al., 2008). Sea surface temperatures in Europe are rising, and this increase has led to many marine organisms in the European Seas appearing earlier in their seasonal cycles than in the past (EEA/JRC, 2008), for example, some species have moved forward in their seasonal cycle by 4-6 weeks. These changes have important consequences for the way organisms within an ecosystem interact and ultimately for the structure of marine food-webs at all trophic levels, including fisheries. In addition, many species of fish and plankton have shifted their distributions northward, and sub-tropical species are occurring with increasing frequency in European waters whilst sub-arctic species are moving northwards, as reported in the recent EEA climate change indicators report (EEA/JRC, 2008). As examples: the report found there has been a major northward movement of warmer water plankton in the north-east Atlantic (1100 km over the past 40 years) and a similar retreat of colder water plankton to the north and this will have an impact on distribution of fish in that region; rate of north-ward movement of a particular species, the sailfin dory, has been estimated at about 50 km/year (high confidence). Such changes affect the composition of local and regional marine ecosystems. The Marine Climate Change Impact Partnership (2008) reported in their 2007/2008 summary:

A 1,000-km northward shift of warmer-water plankton, with a similar retreat of colder-water plankton, has been observed in the north-east Atlantic over the past 50 years, as the seas around the UK have become warmer.

In the North Sea, the population of the previously dominant and important cold-water zooplankton species Calanus finmarchicus has declined in biomass by 70% since the 1960s.

The seasonal timing of plankton production has altered in response to recent climate changes. Some species are occurring up to four to six weeks earlier than 20 years ago, affecting predators, including fish.

Abundances of warm-water fish species (e.g. red mullet, John Dory, triggerfish) have increased in UK waters during recent decades, while many cold-water species have experienced declines.

There has been a notable influx of snake pipefish to UK waters since 2004, and research is under way to explain this.

Poor ‗recruitment‘ of juvenile cod may be associated with a climate-related shift in the composition of zooplankton, but also by a reduction of the adult, parental population by fishing.

In some parts of the southern North Sea, cold-water species, such as cod and eelpout, have been shown to experience metabolic stress during warm years, as evidenced by slower growth rates and difficulties in supplying oxygen to body tissues.

These observed changes in distribution, and the ones that are likely to occur with future climate change, do not necessarily reduce the overall fishery potential, but might lead to changes by region, or changes in the commercial value by region. Recent studies have shown that the northward movement of southerly species has caused species richness to increase in the North Sea (Hiddink and Hofstede, 2008). However, this increase may have negative ecological and socio-economic effects; the three large species that have decreased their range the most in the North Sea are all commercially relevant species, while



only one of the five most increasing species and less than half of the all the species that expanded their range are of commercial value. A climate change induced shift from large to smaller species is thus likely to reduce the value of North Sea fisheries (Hiddink and Hofstede, 2008). The changes in distribution may also affect the management of fisheries and have implications for allocations of quotas. This is particularly important in relation to fish species distribution within UK waters (and UK quotes). The other impacts of climate change on fisheries potentially include food chain effects, diseases, and for marine ecosystems, increased ocean acidity, though the levels of catch (and sustainability) of commercial fisheries are likely to remain a more direct factor affecting fisheries. The changes from climate are therefore likely to increase the vulnerability of fisheries. Some studies are now considering the potential effects of these change, such as the recent analysis of climate change on Scottish fisheries (Turrell, 2006), and on the marine environment (Marclim project; Laffoley, 2005) but in practice, it is too early to ascertain any actual impact of climate change on abundance of commercial stocks, because fishing (resource exploitation) dominates the pressure exerted. It is also not currently possible to predict whether northward shifts in distribution will have a positive or a negative effect on total fisheries production. With time, such effects are expected to be more directly observable, though further changes in distribution and potentially the abundance of marine species are likely. These changes are likely to include:

Changes in the abundance and distribution of fishes and zooplankton, related to changes in sea temperature. Fish communities will move in order to reach areas where the temperature is within their tolerance range.

Rising sea temperatures could allow some invasive species to become more frequent in EU waters, related to changes in temperature too. New species may be better adapted and displace autochthonous communities.

Changes in the food webs' components, resulting in changes of geographical distributions: fishes migrate, following their prey.

In a few situations e.g. early retreat of sea ice in Arctic areas, there may be increases in fish catch, which would open up new international waters

These projected changes in the location and availability of fish stocks will have strong economic impacts, as well as localised employment and social consequences, in coastal areas where fishing activities constitute the most important source of revenue. However, the marine environment offers lower barriers to dispersal of species in response to climate change than the terrestrial environment, i.e. marine species generally have a larger potential for migration (autonomous adaptation). In addition to natural marine resources, there are potential effects on marine and freshwater fish and shellfish aquaculture. This represents a significant part of the total fishery production value, and warmer sea temperatures have increased growing seasons, growth rates, feed conversion and primary productivity, though increased temperatures may also increase stress and pathogens (Alcamo et al, 2007). As with fishing activities above, environmental drivers are important in aquaculture, and the environmental problems generated by aquaculture may be exacerbated as a result of climate change.

Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services

The impacts of climate change on UK biodiversity/ecosystem services are complex and arise from temperature increases, shifts in climatic zones, precipitation changes, melting of snow and ice, sea-level rise, and the risk of droughts, floods and other extreme weather events. Particularly vulnerable areas include the South-East (from water scarcity and heat stress), coastal zones due to pressure from sea-level rise, and mountain regions. Climate change will also act upon and often aggravate the impacts of other pressures on biodiversity/ecosystems, such as habitat fragmentation, degradation and loss, and invasive species.



These potential impacts will affect ecosystems and biodiversity. From an economic perspective, biodiversity provides benefits for present and future generations by way of ecosystem services, see box below. The functioning and ecosystem service provision from many natural and semi-natural ecosystems in the UK are also potentially under threat from climate change and other pressures.

Biodiversity Biodiversity is defined as ‗the variability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems’ (Convention on Biological Diversity)

Ecosystem services

It is now widely recognised that ecosystems provide multiple benefits to human society, that these in turn have economic benefits (although these are rarely captured by markets). These benefits are generally known as ‗ecosystem services‘ (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005) and can be divided into provisioning, supporting, regulating and cultural services

The provisioning services include ability of ecosystems to provide food (agriculture, fisheries), fibre (timber) and fresh water to the population.

The supporting services include soil formation, photosynthesis, and nutrient cycling.

The regulating services affect climate regulation, flood protection, disease regulation, and water quality regulation (water purification);

The cultural services provide recreational, aesthetic, educational and spiritual benefits. The human species, while buffered against environmental changes by culture and technology, is fundamentally dependent on the flow of these ecosystem services. Provisioning services can be valued at market prices. Other services, such as regulating and cultural services, such as the ability of an ecosystem to provide natural habitat for flora and fauna and biodiversity loss, have no direct market price, though it is possible to approximate the value of these functions by the use of direct or indirect valuation methods. Conversely, while these services have an economic value, loss or degradation of such ecosystem services has economic costs (Kettunen and Brink, 2006).

One of the main determinants is the availability of suitable habitat in the future to allow dispersal under a changing climate. However, future socio-economic scenarios are also important, and very few studies (exceptions are projects such as RegIS, ACCERLERATES and ALARM) look at the combined effects of climate, socio-economic change, and cross-sectoral effects. Climate change has already led to a shifting of species in the UK (see figure below) and will continue to cause climatic zones to move. In consequence, the potential distribution of species is projected to shift by tens to hundreds of kilometres by the end of the century (depending on the scenario used). The success of this movement will depend on various factors: the capacity of a species to migrate (e.g. migration will be easier for birds than for plants), the connectivity within the landscape structure (i.e. availability of stepping stones and/or habitat networks), and the presence of receptor habitats within the new climate range of a species. These are essentially issues for the leading edge of the distribution. At the trailing edge there are issues to do with persistence of populations, phenotypic plasticity and evolutionary change (Thuiller et al, 2008). This is obviously problematic in densely populated areas and highly fragmented agricultural landscapes.



Figure 13. Latitudinal shifts in northern range margins in the UK for selected groups of animal species over the past 40 years. Hickling et al, 2006, in EEA/JRC, 2008.

Climate change and its consequences present one of the most important threats to biodiversity/ ecosystems and their functions and services. However in the short-term, species are already vulnerable to decreases in abundance and range, which could lead to extinction, as a result of human activities such as land use/land cover change, habitat fragmentation and exotic invasive species. On the short-time scale (1-10 years) many of these other pressures are likely to have a greater local impact on vulnerability, but climate change will increasingly contribute to longer-term stresses on plants and ecosystems (Parmesan and Yohe, 2003). The current rate of change is far beyond that imposed by global climatic changes occurring in the evolutionary past. The rate of change will exceed the ability of many species to adapt, especially as landscape fragmentation may restrict movement. Natural systems are vulnerable to such changes due to their limited adaptive capacity. The potential future range for many UK species is likely to be smaller in extent than their current range, though this will depend on their capacity to fill new suitable climate space. Some species will have no potential range by the end of the century. For certain species, there will be no overlap between their potential future range and their current range, making the threat of extinction more likely. The area of appropriate climate space range for many alpine species will decrease dramatically. The biodiversity of the UK‘s mountain tops, particularly in Scotland, has been identified as being very vulnerable to climate change (Kerr et al, 2001), as snow cover reduces and ambient temperature increases. The snow pack on many mountains is close to its melting point and particularly sensitive to temperature change. Northerly & montane species and habitats are likely to decline in range/extent; increasing risk of extirpation, and there are concerns over the loss of sensitive rare arctic-alpine species. Changes in ecosystem composition and structure have important implications for the interactions between the biosphere and the climate system, as well as for ecosystem services on which society depends (see box above). Climate change is disrupting species interactions and ecological relationships, and also threatens managed ecosystems on which many sectors, including provisioning (e.g. agriculture, forestry, fishery) and cultural (e.g. tourism), rely. Warm winters and extended growing seasons have resulted in large population increases of pests. Normally, ecological processes keep predator-prey relationships in balance, but asynchrony in these relationships may result in a breakdown of this delicate balance and an explosion in pest species. Weakened by drought and wilted by heat, crops become more susceptible to pests. For example, climate-



stressed forests are infested faster and widespread climate and disease-induced forest dieback is a plausible scenario in many areas. As biodiversity is impacted by climate change, so the resilience of the ecosystems can decline. Ecosystems with low resilience may reach thresholds at which abrupt change occurs. Biodiversity loss, ecosystem degradation and consequent changes in ecosystem services can lead to a decline in human well being. For example the decline in the resilience of the salt marsh ecosystems will results in the loss of coastal protection services against storm surge that together with the sea-level rise, could create socio-economic impacts in low lying coastlines (see earlier coastal section). Furthermore, the degradation of the associated wetland habitats will have negative implications for resident and migratory bird populations, and may result in the loss of tourist potential and the subsequent decline in economic benefits for coastal communities. Temperature increase exerts further stress on freshwater and marine ecosystems (see other sections), compounding current over-exploitation and pollution. In the oceans acidification adds an additional pressure. Ecosystems play a direct role in climate regulation through physical, biological and chemical processes that control fluxes of energy, water, and atmospheric constituents including greenhouse gases. Peatlands and wetlands provide the largest below ground store of carbon and tropical forests dominate above ground storage in biomass. The oceans and terrestrial ecosystems are currently providing an important service to humanity by absorbing about half of the anthropogenic CO2 emission. However, the combined effects of climate change and associated disturbance and other drivers of change including pollution, land-use changes and over-exploitation may reduce the resilience of many ecosystems during this century and affect their role in climate regulation. Although our detailed knowledge is limited, there is certainty about the existence of multiple positive and negative feedbacks between biodiversity-ecosystems and climate. These feedbacks are generally non-linear and have the potential to produce large undesirable effects, particularly at the regional level. Ecosystem impacts from climate change across Europe have been studied by several projects already, including the concerted action ACACIA and the larger Integrated Project ATEAM (Schröter et al 2005) and its successor, ALARM (http://www.alarmproject.net/alarm/). There are some emerging estimates of potential ecosystems loss in Europe for coastal and terrestrial habitats from climate change (e.g. Thuiller et al, 2005; Araújo et al ,2006; including the potential impacts of human-induced climate change on birds in Europe, RSPB, 2008). There is compelling evidence that the extent and rate of climate change observed has already affected species and ecosystems already (see EEA, 2004: EEA, 2008). The most recent report of the IPCC (Alcamo et al, 2007) has pointed out that many areas are facing either increased flood risks (mainly in coastal wetlands) or drought. A number of studies have assessed the impacts of climate change on biodiversity in the UK (habitats and species) included literature reviews (e.g. Hossell et al., 2000; Brooker et al., 2005) and modelling studies (e.g. Harrison et al., 2003; Berry et al., 2003). More recently there have been a number of regional studies (see regional section of UKCIP website, and Berry and Harley, 2006). The modelling of the impacts of climate change on species has focused on climate envelope or niche models that simulate changes in the suitable climate space for species under different climate scenarios. Earlier quantitative assessments (see UKCIP, 2005) used the SPECIS model show mixed effects on species distribution, with the ranges of some species shrinking and others expanding. The MONARCH project (phases 1, 2 and 3 [Harrison et al , 2001; Berry et al., 2004; Berry et al./Walmsley et al 2007 respectively), modelling natural resource responses to climate change. The project concluded that (in general) species with northerly distributions will lose suitable climate space in Britain and Ireland. The species in this category are amongst the most vulnerable, because these losses are likely to be realised and will lead to fragmented habitats and decreased populations. Balanced against this are species with more southerly distributions that could expand their climate space. For these species the issue is their ability to migrate and the availability of suitable habitat, as vulnerability can occur where there will be little or no overlap between the current and future distribution. The collective results for



species provide an indication of the response of habitats. Montane heaths and to a lesser extent upland hay meadows and pine woodland are seen as being vulnerable to climate change. Upland oak woodland, beech woodland and peat bogs could also be susceptible due to species' losses in southern and eastern England. The species' response in other habitats was much more variable and this may lead to changes in the species' composition of habitats. The MONARCH 3 projections for the 32 Biodiversity Action Plan (BAP) species illustrate the severe threat posed by climate change to biodiversity. The majority of species studied in MONARCH are likely to experience changes in the location and/or extent of their suitable climate space. Of the 32 species in this report, 29 are projected to see significant shifts in suitable climate space. Eight are projected to lose substantial climate space: in the case of six of them, all suitable climate space – or the vast majority of it – is lost by the 2080s under a High climate change scenario. The projections also show a northward shift in climate space for six species, while 15 have the potential to extend their range within Britain and Ireland without significant loss. The BRANCH study (Branch, 2007) - Biodiversity Requires Adaptation in North West Europe under a CHanging climate, has shown that the UK‘s fragmented landscape is likely to prevent many species from moving with shifting favourable climate conditions into new areas. How well a species can adapt to climate change will depend largely on how easily it can disperse and whether suitable habitat is available to move through and into. At the European scale, BRANCH results show that species become more vulnerable the greater the change in climate. By the 2080s, six of the 389 species modelled could lose all suitable climate space, and 11 could lose more than 90% whilst only 28 could double their suitable space. BRANCH also undertook a number of specific UK studies (the coastal one was referenced earlier). Another of these looked at how climate change might affect chalk grassland and lowland heath (important and characteristic habitats of Hampshire and the South Downs) during the 21st century, as well as measures available to help the species of these habitats adapt to climate change. It found these habitats could gain and lose climate space in varying amounts. The response of these species to climate change is also likely to change over time. Some could find new climate space in the short and medium term. But they could have no climate space under the 2080s high emissions scenario of climate change. Some may disappear unless they can adapt to new conditions. Berry et al (2006, in the Defra Cross regional research project E), ran the SPECIES and looked at selected results for 60 species (11 priority habitats), i.e. species and habitats of national and regional significance, sensitive to climate change (gains and losses in suitable climate space), including some which have a direct economic value. The results show that the mean number of species experiencing change in their suitable climate space alters as climate change progresses. Losses almost double under the 2050s scenarios, compared with the 2020s (shown below). Some regional level differences were significant, for example the northern parts of England, Northern Ireland and Scotland could have a net gain of species, with the latter having the highest potential gain (though at the same time, some specific species in Scotland, such as arctic alpines, might be particularly threatened). Such changes have important implications for biodiversity, though there may be positive and negative aspects between threats to native species versus opportunities for increased species richness (if the new species can be accommodated).



Figure 14 Changes in the mean number of species experiencing changes in suitable climate space,

under UKCIP02 scenarios. Source Berry et al, 2006

The analysis of habitat changes in the same study showed that montane habitats are the most sensitive to climate change, though moisture dependent fens and lowland bogs were also sensitive (particularly affected in the southern part of Britain). Beech woodland could also be affected through the loss of the dominant tree in parts of south east England. Coastal and agriculturally related habitats are more dependent on management, though coastal regions could be particularly affected by flood defences (coastal squeeze, preventing movement), see earlier coastal section. The study went on to investigate valuation of these changes, estimating restoration and re-creation costs for each habitat (for the area degraded or lost). The analysis showed total annual habitat restoration costs under low and high scenarios of climate change for the habitats studied (£2004 constant price) of £0.3 to 0.8 million by the 2020s, and £1.4 to £2.5 million by the 2050s, though it is highlighted that these do not reflect WTP values to avoid these damages (and the study does not consider the results to be robust enough for policy guidance). What this does emphasize is the major gap that exists on full quantitative and economic analysis of biodiversity and ecosystem services. There are some Defra funded studies in this area which are progressing work in this area on effects and valuation, notably the Defra ecosystem services project (NR0107, www.ecosystemservices.org.uk/) and Economic Valuation of the Benefits of the UK Biodiversity Action Plan (SFFSD 0702), and large European projects looking at ecosystem services (RUBICODE

51).

There is also an increasing focus on adaptation, e.g. with the recent published guidance (Hopkins et al, 2007), on behalf of the UK Biodiversity Partnership, for those delivering conservation, summarising how existing plans and projects can adapt to climate change

Tourism Tourism is closely associated with climate, for both the source of tourists and their preferred destination. This is particularly true for mass summer tourism where at present, the dominant (summer) tourist flows are to the Mediterranean coastal zone. With growing income and increasing leisure time, the tourism industry in the UK is expected to continue to grow. However, temperature rise is likely to change summer destination preferences in Europe, with strong distributional effects. This is clearly an area where international effects are important.

51

http://www.rubicode.net/rubicode/



Seasonality is a key issue in tourism, and the summer months are the dominant period for the Mediterranean region and Europe as a whole. The effect of climate change is likely to make outdoor activities in northern Europe including the UK more attractive, while summer temperatures and heat waves in the Mediterranean, potentially exacerbated by limited water availability, may lead to a redistribution or a seasonal shift in tourism away from the current summer peak, either to a bi-modal distribution either side of the summer peak, or a transfer to other more northerly regions of Europe, which become more attractive. This potentially includes higher levels of domestic tourists. The suitability of destinations for summer-time types of tourism can be addressed by using the Tourism Comfort Index (TCI)

52. The TCI supports other research that suggests the Mediterranean (Amelung and

Viner, 2006) has the optimum climate for tourism during the summer months, whilst major source regions (i.e., Northern Europe including the UK) do not. Thus, the UK currently shows limited potential for (summer) tourism when defined with the TCI and only for specific limited periods within the summer months. Changes in climate, primarily driven by increases in temperature are already starting to impact upon the TCI of many of the Mediterranean‘s major resorts, whilst at the same time the TCI for many of the source regions including the UK is improving. These trends are likely to continue and TCI projections for the future show that the Mediterranean will decline in suitability during the key summer months, though there will be an increase in suitability during the shoulder (spring and autumn). At the same time, the TCI of countries such as the UK will increase, and outdoor activities in northern Europe may become more attractive (Viner, 2006; Amelung et al, 2007)). Data from climate change model experiments show the shift northward during the 21st Century and the increasing bi-modal distribution of tourism in the Mediterranean, whilst at the same time northern European locations (the current source area for most tourism) shows an increasingly beneficial increase in the TCI. To understand potential changes in the UK, it is necessary to take a European perspective. The figure below (Martens et al, 2007) shows the direction of potential tourism shifts towards the end of the century (2071-2100) under a high emission scenario. The maps indicate significant potential shifts in the climatic suitability for tourism, with the belt of excellent summer conditions moving from the Mediterranean towards northern Europe. Southern parts of the UK become ‗very good‘ or ‗excellent‘. However, in the shoulder seasons (spring and autumn, not shown here), TCI scores are generally projected to increase throughout Europe and particularly in Southern Mediterranean countries, which could compensate for some losses experienced in summer. However, such assessments reflect the changes in tourism suitability only. Projections of actual changes, and the economic implications, are much harder to assess. Much will depend on the flexibility of tourists and institutions such as school holidays. If summer remains the predominant season for tourism activities in Europe, major shifts of tourist flows may eventually occur from the Mediterranean to more northern areas in Europe, including the UK. If, on the other hand, societal changes (e.g. ageing) allow for a more flexible timing of holidays among a large share of the population, then some of these shifts may be offset.

52

The TCI is an index, ranging from 0 to 100, based upon a range of climate variables that reflects the suitability based upon an individual‘s bioclimatic comfort. The TCI can be constructed for different temporal and spatial scales (data permitting) and the variability between locations and regions can be examined. The TCI can be constructed on a daily monthly, seasonal and annual basis and can be driven by observational or modelled climate data.



1961-1990

2071-2100

Figure 15 Simulated Conditions for Summer Tourism in Europe for 1961-1990 (left) and 2071-2100

(right) according to a High-Emissions Scenario (IPCC A2) Source: PESETA project. http://peseta.jrc.es/docs/Tourism.html. (P. Martens/B. Amelung/A. Moreno).

Shifts in the holiday season may be the dominant form of adaptation. Climate change may be beneficial for the Mediterranean tourist industry if it levels out demand, reducing the summer peak, while increasing occupancy in the shoulder seasons. If this latter compensation does not occur sufficiently, however, the Mediterranean tourist industry will be among the losers, whilst the UK could actually be a winner. Recent work (Hamilton and Tol, 2006), as part of the Defra Cross Regional study (E), estimates tourism flows in the UK with climate change, and compares to other countries. For all of the countries and scenarios, the number of inbound tourists increases. Assumed population growth and economic growth in the rest of the world cause the shift in the balance. The impact of climate change is either to increase the rate of growth of tourism – for example, the UK– or to decrease the rate of growth – for example, Spain and Italy. The analysis also shows changes in country specific patterns. For example in the UK, climate change amplifies the shift towards more inbound tourists relative to outbound

53. By the 2050s, for all of the

climate change scenarios, there are more tourists arriving from abroad than there are tourists leaving the UK. Table 13 The number of inbound tourists to a selection of European countries for the High scenarios both with and without climate change for the time slices 2020s, 2050s and 2080s.

Inbound tourists

With climate change Without climate change Difference

2020s 2050s 2080s 2020s 2050s 2080s 2020s 2050s 2080s

UK 42 87.9 175.9 45.6 88.5 162.8 -3.6 -0.6 13.1

Source: Hamilton and Tol, 2006.

53

This is because the UK becomes more attractive for the UK citizens and so holidays abroad are replaced by domestic holidays and secondly, it is because the UK becomes more attractive for tourists from abroad.



Tourism has also been studied extensively in the regional studies (particularly in some regions, such as the North-West, McEvoy et al, 2006), and there is a recognition (West and Gawith [UKCIP], 2005) that tourism leisure and recreational activities would generally benefit from the warmer summers associated with climate change. There are also localised case studies looking at impacts and costs, such as the Heritage Gardens case study (Metroeconomica, in UKCIP, 2005). There are some potential negative effects on tourism, mostly related to extreme events (flood risk and heat extremes as short-term events), though also additional seasonal pressure in relation to water availability and drought, which might in turn have cross-sectoral linkages to water availability and possibly water quality. There is also a small winter sports tourism industry in the Scotland, though this is low in relation to the dominant European winter sports economy of Alpine countries. Mountain tourism (including winter sports) is one of the segments that are most vulnerable to climate change. There are projected reductions in snow-cover over the 21st century for Scotland, which will affect the winter sports industry and its financial viability, because of the availability of natural snow or suitable conditions for making snow and a need for the industry to adapt (Kerr et al, 1999; 2001; SNIFFER, 2005). There are additional tourism segments that are less affected by climate change, such as city breaks and tourism. For these sectors, thee are potential threats of climate change (which includes but is wider than tourism alone), for example in relation to extremes or cultural heritage, though there is little information.

Business, Industry, Services (including Financial and Insurance) and Public Finances The most vulnerable industries to climate change are (Wilbanks, 2007) those in coastal and river flood plains, those whose economies are closely linked with climate-sensitive resources (such as agricultural and forest product industries, water demands and tourism), and those in areas prone to extreme weather events (see infrastructure section). This may lead to an increased risk for buildings and production assets, further needs in insurances and increased related financial costs. Water scarcity is likely to increase the difficulty and cost of using water resources, with important consequences for resource-intensive industries such as food and paper industries in affected regions. Small and Medium-sized Enterprises may have more difficulties than larger companies to assess the risks and consequences of climate change for their business. There are also a set of wider issues related to the concentration of economic activity in the industry sector. These include potential effects that climate change may have on the physical assets used for economic production and/or services, on the costs of raw materials and inputs to economic production, on the subsequent costs to businesses, and thus on competitiveness (or comparative advantage) and wider economic performance, and employment patterns. There are also the wider issues for the financial service and insurance sectors. There are some emerging but general (qualitative) studies that start to outline the potential effects of climate change on business and adaptation responses, e.g. UKCIP (2005); CBI (2007); Met Office (2007); City of London (2006), Firth and Colley (2006) as well as on specific sub-sectors such as the supermarket industry (Risk Solutions, 2005), building industry (Vivian et al, 2005) or finance (LCCP, 2006). These raise the issues of climate change as a risk, but also increasing for some sectors, as an opportunity. However, the coverage of many sectors is low, and the previous UKCIP measuring progress report (West and Galbraith), highlighted the gaps in waste management, emergency planning and telecommunications sectors. The long time-scales involved in climate change are outside the usual business planning cycles, though there is an increasing recognition of risks and reputational aspects. The exception is the insurance sector,



which is actively investigating these issues for the UK (ABI, 2004 (Dlugolecki, 2004), 2005; 2006; 2007), and across Europe (e.g. Swiss Re, 2002; Allianz 2005; 2006, Munich Re, 2004). There is also some emerging work on the potential occupational risks of climate change, and other work and pension related impacts for Government (Met Office, 2007). Climate change will also alter patterns of consumption. Analysis of short-term trends from recent extreme summers (e.g. UEA, 2007; Metroeconomica, 2005) shows patterns in consumer demand towards certain goods or services, though some care must be taken in interpolating these trends through to warmer average temperatures. In terms of adaptation, there maybe some potential for services, expertise and technologies to support adaptation measures throughout the world - including financial expertise (for funding adaptation, but also for new types of insurance). This creates many opportunities for UK companies to develop, export or transfer technologies and know-how. There is also an increasing recognition that the economic impacts of climate change, and adaptation responses, could be important in relation to public finances. There are a number of reasons for justifications for public interventions in adaptation by Governments, including: market failure in private insurance systems; public good aspects of natural and human capital infrastructure; equity; market regulation for adaptation services; externality regulation and macro-economic stability (e.g. see Berkhout, 2007). Thus, adaptation may require significant public spending. In particular, it may be needed to repair exceptional damage to infrastructures or to act preventatively and proactively for infrastructure protection, to prevent new health threats, to compensate or act as ultimate source of reinsurance for sectors most adversely affected by climate change, etc,. These pressures may arise at a time when climate-related disruptions to economic activity may weaken the generation of tax revenues. There may also be European implications (solidarity funds) in relation to the financing of adaptation in Europe (and likely strong distributional effects), as well as wider issues in relation to international aid and global climate change. There is a major gap on the implications of adaptation on the UK public finances (and revenues), and potential macro-economic implications for growth and sustainable development, as well as national to local finance implications.

Regional, National and International Studies

UK Regional Studies

There is now a very large body of UK regional studies that provide additional information on risks. The main regional studies are summarised in the figure below. The key messages are reported in the UKCIP measuring progress report (UKCIP, 2006), which provides regional specific issues for each impact category. There is also an emerging body of studies at a local level (not shown below) which provide an even more localised context. These studies are a rich and useful source of information, particularly for the risk assessment. However, whilst these studies are extremely valuable in advancing knowledge, and in engaging relevant stakeholders, the approach they have taken is primarily qualitative, i.e. identifying potential risks, their magnitude and probability (in many cases using the UKCIP tools) and identifying potential adaptation options. At this stage they do not (generally) provide quantitative information, and almost none have an economic consideration – though we highlight that this has not been their primary aim.



North-East

Warming up the Region: The Impacts of Climate Change in

the Yorkshire and Humber Region, 2002

(Yorkshire Forward and Yorkshire and Humber

Assembly, 2002)

North East (Sustainability North East 2002)

Scotland

Kerr et al, 1999, Climate Change: Scottish

Implications Scoping Study Scottish Executive Central

Research Unit.

Kerr, A., McLeod, A., University of Edinburgh, 2001

Potential adaptation strategies for climate change in

Scotland,

Werritty et al , Scottish Executive Central Research

Unit 2001 Climate Change: Flooding Occurrences

Review.

Galbraith et al / Scottish Executive (2005) Editors:

Scottish Road Network Climate Change Study. The

Scottish Executive. 2005.

SNIFFER (2006) Business Risks of Climate Change

to the Public Sector in Scotland.

Everybody has an Impact: Climate Change Impacts in the

North West of England –Sustainability North West,.

(Shackley et al., 1998; Sustainability North West, 1998)

Northern Ireland

(SNIFFER, 2002)

SNIFFER (2007). Preparing for a Changing

Climate in Northern Ireland

Midlands

The Potential Impacts of Climate Change in the East

Midlands, East Midlands Sustainable Development Round

Table, July 2000. (Kersey et al., 2000)

West Midlands, Entec 2003

London

LCCP (2002). London’s Warming..

LCCP (2006a). London Climate Change Partnership.

Adapting to Climate Change.

LCCP (2006b). LCCP Finance subgroup. Adapting to

Climate Change. Business as Usual.

GLA (2006). London’s Urban Heat Island:

Mayor of London and the Environment Agency (2007) Draft

Regional Flood Risk Appraisal.

BRE (2004). Understanding thermal comfort on London

Underground trains and stations

Atkins (2005). Climate change and London’s transport

systems

City of London (2006). Rising to the Challenge. The City of

London

South West (South West Climate Change

Impacts Partnership, 2003a, 2003b)

Wales: Changing Climate, Challenging Choices. The

Impacts of Climate Change in Wales from now to 2080

National Assembly for Wales (2000a, 2000b)

South and South East

Rising to the Challenge: Impacts of Climate Change in the South

East in the 21st Century, November 1999

South East (Wade et al., 1999)

East of England (Sustainable Development Round Table

for the East of England, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c)

REGIS: Regional Climate Change Impact Response

Studies in East Anglia and North West England, Defra,

2002: 2005 (Holman et al)

Figure 16. Selection of UK Regional Studies

Other National Studies

At the same time that the UK has advanced the studies described above, other countries have been undertaking similar activities. These studies also provide additional analysis of potential risks, and methodological approaches for assessment. A large number of these studies have taken place in Europe. The main studies are shown below.



FINADAPT Carter, T (2007). Assessing Adaptive Capacity

of Finnish Environment and Society

Sweden facing climate change - threats and opportunities (2007) Swedish

Commission on Climate and Vulnerability Stockholm 2007

Preliminary Assessment of the Impacts in Spain due

to the Effects of Climate Change (ECCE) (2005)

Climate Change in Portugal: Scenarios, Impacts, and

Adaptation Measures - SIAM (2002)

The Netherlands: Climate changes Spatial Planning (CcSP)

WL Delft Hydraulics (2007). Flood risks in the Netherlands under climate change

Marbaix, P. and J.P van Ypersele (ed.), 2004. Impacts des changements

climatiques en Belgique. (Greenpeace

Germany: Climate Impact and Adaptation (KomPass

France: National Strategy for Climate Change

Adaptation

Hungary: VAHAVA Changing (VÁltozás) Impact

(HAtás) Response

UK CCRIG, 1991

UK CCRIG, 1996

Potential Effects of Climate Change

UK Climate Impacts Programme (UKCIP)

Defra-Cross Regional research Project E

(2006). Metroeconomica et al (2006).

Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation

Figure 17. Selection of European National Studies There are also a large number of other international studies, particularly developed in the US, Australia and Canada, but also country or regional studies in other parts of the world emerging, including a number focused on quantification and valuation (part funded by the UK, either through Defra and the Stern team, or DFID). A selection of such studies is shown below.



Boston (CLIMB)

New York studiesIndia

California

2004: 2007

Key

Quantitative impacts

Stern mini-review/DFID/FCO

Western

Cape

Nile Egypt/

Alexandria

Canadian country

- Environment Canada

US country

- US NAS

-CIER

Australia country

- GHG office

- CSIRO

- Garnett review

Mexico

Central America

Caribbean

Brazil/South America

South-East Asia

East Africa

Saudi Arabia

Afghanistan

China

Figure 18. Selection of International Studies



4. Cross-Sectoral, Indirect, Distributional, Wider Economic and International Aspects An important aspect of the risk assessment is to consider different levels of aggregation, and associated risks. This section reviews a number of other issues that arise as a result of chains of interactions from initial climate change effects as described in the previous section, including:

Cross-sectoral effects, including the indirect effects of climate change.

Distributional (inequality) aspects.

Adaptation – mitigation linkages.

Wider economic effects (sometimes also referred to as indirect economic effects).

International effects. These are not necessarily exclusive categories. The findings of the literature review are presented below.

Cross sectoral and Indirect Effects The use of sectoral analysis, as advanced in most studies, and presented above, does not fully capture the cross-sectional impacts of climate change. There is a growing recognition that these cross-sectoral linkages and impact chains are extremely important. However, there is a lack of studies in this area – cross-sectoral impacts were not considered in the cross-regional project E, and there are no studies at national level that quantify cross-sectoral effects, though such studies have been undertaken at regional level. Various stakeholders interpret cross-sectoral or indirect effects in different ways, and there are no clear definitions or categorisations. Nonetheless, some work is emerging on types of cross-sectoral or indirect effects that might be important, for example:

Where several sectors are considered together in the process of normal planning processes, e.g. the built environment and its inter-dependencies with water resources, building design, transport and energy, noting that socio-economic interactions across all these areas need to be considered.

To address multiple cross-sectoral demands. For example, there are clearly cross-sectoral demand effects in the water sector, in regions where water availability (resources) are likely to reduce as a result of declining precipitation (e.g. the South-East of England). In this case, the multiple sources of individual sectoral demand need to be considered, set against socio-economic projections by sector. Thus the effects of changing demand conditions from e.g. domestic supply, irrigation for agriculture, increased water for tourism, need to be considered together alongside projections show decreasing (summer) precipitation. This is needed to capture effects on water availability and price that would be missed in any one sector alone, i.e. potential cumulative effects.

The emergence of new cross-sectoral linkages. An example is in the energy and water sectors. At present, there is relatively little linkage between the water industry and electricity demand (though note there are already linkages with water abstraction and cooling for power generation). However, under certain socio-economic futures, increasing water demand could drive increased electricity demand, the main example being the energy requirements of desalination plants.

Where impacts on one sector have knock-on effects in others. There are a large number of potential indirect effects that can result from direct, primary, impacts. It is very difficult to capture these effects through a traditional sector analysis. An example would be the indirect effects on health arising from flooding, where flooding events are associated with increased psychological impacts in the affected population (see earlier health section), and associated treatment costs. There is some work on mapping these types of interactions, and some emerging estimates of quantification, but they are amongst the least



known risks in the existing literature. There is some UK work looking at cross-sectoral issues at the regional level, notably the RegIS project (Holman et al, 2002: 2007), which assessed the impacts of climate and socio-economic change on water resources, agriculture, biodiversity and coastal zone in two regions. There are also limited examples of quantification and valuation of an indirect effect, where results from sectoral coastal model on the population affected by coastal flood have been taken and indirect health effects associated with wider health effects (well-being, and depression) quantified and monetised (see health section). However, applying these types of analytical approaches to all cross-sectoral and indirect effects is time consuming, and in most cases is not possible due to the lack of functional relationships linking the initial cause to the final indirect consequence. A related issue is that here is little information on the ancillary effects (positive and negative) of adaptation, at least in quantitative terms. Adaptation to climate change often has benefits beyond a reduction of residual damages of climate change. One important benefit of many adaptation measures is that it also reduces vulnerability with respect to current climate variability (See Fankhauser, 2006), i.e. the reduction of damages due to current climate variability is an ancillary benefit of adaptation to climate change. However, in many sectors there are also other ancillary effects (non-climate) that are potentially important, including positive or negative externalities. As an example, in some cases, adaptation policies are explicitly targeted to provide ancillary benefits in the areas of nature and landscape protection, recreation, and a host of other policy areas. These are rarely captured (at least quantitatively) in studies.

Distributional Effects Previous vulnerability mapping studies have shown the strong potential distributional effects of climate change, indeed this has been one of the major focuses of such studies. A number of elements are relevant here, in relation to exposure, susceptibility, adaptive capacity and thus vulnerability.

First, there are often differences between groups or areas in their exposure to the potential impacts of climate change. These can arise from existing or future changes in climate across different geographical areas, e.g. the south-east of England is likely to get a greater warming signal than Scotland, as well as a greater reduction in summer precipitation. Differences in exposure can also arise from complex correlations with wider circumstances, for example correlations of location and certain socio-economic groups.

Second, there can also be greater susceptibility amongst certain groups to the same climate change signal. As an example, the elderly population is more at risk of health impacts due to ozone pollution, or heat extremes, and so disproportionately affected by any change in risk. Likewise, certain socio- economic groups (e.g. socially deprived groups) may be more susceptible to certain effects (e.g. due a lower level of existing health status) or may bear greater relative impacts from say rises in water prices associated with demand shortages (as a proportion of household income), affecting welfare.

Finally, in relation to adaptation, there is usually a positive correlation between adaptive capacity (which is also part of vulnerability) and wealth or economic development, thus access to efficient adaptation is usually greater for high-income groups and richer areas, and less for the poor or socially deprived (e.g. upfront investment in adaptive capacity and adaptation actions will be financially constrained for those on low incomes). Such effects are often compounded by levels of awareness and access to information (as well as insurance) in lower income or socially deprived groups, i.e. there are technical, economic and institutional limitations. These inequalities can occur at different aggregation levels, between areas of the UK, between groups within areas. There are also strong distributional elements with respect to the socially deprived (low incomes) or certain vulnerable groups (e.g. the elderly). Aggregated UK analysis may miss these effects, and these could be particularly important where multiple sectoral effects affect specific areas or social groups cumulatively (and dis-proportionately). For some



particularly vulnerable groups, these issues are likely overlap. This may have impacts at macro level, e.g. climate change could alter the distribution of economic activity in the UK, through to the micro level e.g. down to disproportionately impacts on small dis-advantaged communities within local areas). There is emerging consideration of these issues in the health sector, driven by the wider interest in health impact assessment and recognition and explicit treatment of inequality. However, the most studied area in the UK is in relation to flooding. This work is summarised below, as an example of the potential approaches and findings of such studies.

There have been a series of studies in the UK that have looked at the issue of flooding and deprivation. This has been possible by the extremely good data sets that exist, both in relation to flood risk (the Environment Agency Flood Map, see earlier section), and the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD), which is available at ward level. This is an indexed measure covering different aspects of deprivation such as income, employment, housing, and education. The relative indices are reported as deciles (1 to 10) of relative deprivation. Using this information a number of studies have been undertaken.

Walker et al. (2003) found different relationships for tidal and fluvial flooding using these two data sources. When both types of floodplains were combined, a general relationship with deprivation was observed. Of the population living in a floodplain, 13.5 per cent were in the most deprived decile compared with 6.1 per cent in the least deprived decile. However, when examined separately, the relationship was dominated by tidal floodplain populations. Of the population living within the tidal floodplain for England, 18.4 per cent were in the most deprived decile compared with only 2.2 per cent in the least deprived. In contrast they found an inverse relationship for fluvial floodplains. They considered the latter was due to the rural nature (often more affluent) of many fluvial floodplains, and the fact that riverside locations often have a premium value in terms of property prices. The higher share of deprivation in tidal floodplains was considered to be due in part to the large size of the population at risk in London and the Thames Estuary.

Fielding et al. (2005a) examined the distribution of flood hazard (fluvial and tidal combined) against social class for England. Using a grid method to distribute the population within a Census enumeration district area, they found that those people at significantly increased risk are the lower social classes (Class 3 and 4 at 9 per cent increased risk) and the unemployed (3.4 per cent increased risk); those in Class 1 and 2 have a significantly lower risk of flooding (8.5 per cent decreased risk).

The most recent study, by the Environment Agency (2006), undertook a similar analysis using the updated Environment Agency flood map and the index of deprivation. Their findings are similar to that of Walker et al, i.e.

More deprived populations are more likely to be living within zones at risk from flooding.

For river flooding and when considering England as a whole, the proportions of population at risk are approximately equal across the different deprivation bands. However, this masks considerable variability at a regional level

54.

The relationships of deprivation and flood risk are dominated by sea flooding. Within the English regions shows that there are disproportionate concentrations of deprived populations in zones at risk from sea flooding across nearly all of the affected regions. They go on to suggest that a common factor (or set of factors) may have influenced the development of areas near to the coast and along estuaries which has, over time, led to them being occupied predominantly by deprived populations.

The study also provides a useful illustration as to how vulnerability manifests itself for flooding.

Deprived neighbourhoods contain concentrations of vulnerable individuals. These groups have lower levels of flood awareness and so are likely to be less well prepared when a flood arrives. Social

54

Analysis of river flooding shows different patterns. There are concentrations of the most deprived populations living at risk of river flooding in some regions and concentrations of the least deprived in others (reflecting the underlying highly uneven geography of deprivation).



capital is also thought to be weaker in deprived areas and so provides less of a resource to deal with the flood and its aftermath.

The most immediate risks of flooding on health involve the direct risk of injury (or even death), and the damage to property and possessions. However, much wider effects on well being and health are associated with flooding. Psychological health impacts associated with the flood itself but also the aftermath of the flood (stress and anxiety) can also be considerable. Recent work shows a much higher incidence of depression in flooded communities – up to fourfold normal rates (Reacher et. al. 2004. Health impacts will also be more extensive in neighbourhoods already characterised by poor health (as these are).

Deprived areas have lower levels of insurance which means uninsured people will have more difficulty in repairing houses and replacing goods. Research by the Association of British Insurers (ABI) has found that 50 per cent of households in the lowest income decile do not have contents insurance

55.

There can also be additional elements (e.g. availability of water, increased health risks) in flooded areas immediately following flood events, as well as longer term economic impacts.

The social issues are summarised in the table below.

Table 14. Differential experience of the social impacts of floods

Source EA, 2006

The summary findings for the EA study for deprivation and flood risk for coastal areas is shown in the figure below. This shows the data for flood risk and deprivation: Zone 2 (low to medium, 1 in 1000 year floods, >0.1%) and Zone 3 flood risks (0.5%), and mapped against deprivation decile (where decile 1 is the most deprived and 10 the least deprived). The data also shows a strong regional pattern. For sea flooding, the overall population at risk within zone 2 is strongly concentrated within two regions – London, and Yorkshire and Humberside. The strong inequality and concentration of deprived populations is also dominated by the two regions of London, and Yorkshire and Humberside. In the most deprived decile, Yorkshire and Humberside has just the higher proportion of population (40 per cent) but, when combined with London at 38 per cent, over three-quarters of the population at risk in this decile is found just within these two regions. Thus, for sea flooding, the population at risk is dominated by two regions, which also contain in absolute and relative terms, a disproportionate number of deprived people at risk.

55

note the UK has a different system to many other European countries, where insurance risk to individuals is largely through private agreements, i.e. there is not state or regional insurance).



Figure 19. Percentage of total population within zones 2 and 3 for sea flooding by deprivation decile

Source EA, 2006.

Adaptation- Mitigation Linkages The main CCRA is being accompanied by an adaptation cost-benefit analysis. In reviewing the literature that is relevant for both studies, it is also important to consider adaptation-mitigation linkages. Chapter 18 of IPCC WGII (Klein et al, 2007) addresses the inter-relationships between adaptation and mitigation and identifies four relevant areas:

Adaptation actions that have consequences for mitigation,

Mitigation actions that have consequences for adaptation,

Decisions that include trade-offs or synergies between adaptation and mitigation,

Processes that have consequences for both adaptation and mitigation. This is an area that is now receiving greater attention. Perhaps the most obvious example of an adaptation – mitigation linkages is in relation to cooling and energy use (see energy section). In this case, an assumption of mechanical air conditioning involves a potential trade off, as the adaptation response (cooling) increases energy and emissions (which under some definitions is called maladaptation). However, this can be avoided with alternatives (e.g. passive ventilation). A related issue also exists on the demand side, with potential conflict between mitigation objectives towards less carbon intensive cities (e.g. through higher density, etc. ) and the development of an adaptation agenda, as mitigation policies intensify urban heat island effects, and reduce infiltration capacity (McEvoy et al, 2006). Again, synergistic options are available to increase the climate resilience of the built environment, as well as ensuring greater energy efficiency of the building stock. In these cases, conflicts seem to arise where autonomous responses or private sector responses make non-optimal choices for society as a whole, and specifically where adaptation responses might lead to increases in GHG, working against mitigation policy. To address these, there is a need for planned policy intervention (planned adaptation). These planned adaptation responses often require early consideration, because they involve infrastructure or planning (spatial or other), both of which involve extremely long life-times.



However, there are examples of these linkages that span across all sectors, and are likely to become increasing important as mitigation policy is applied to all sectors (consistent with stricter emission reduction targets), and as adaptation policy is mainstreamed, for example, there are studies of adaptation – mitigation linkages, scoping out the potential linkages and effects – an example is shown below from the MACIS project (Berry et al, 2008) for biodiversity.

Figure 20 Known and potential relationships between mitigation and adaptation measures and their impacts on biodiversity.

The position of the boxes on the biodiversity axis is based on a literature review of the biodiversity impacts of various mitigation and adaptation schemes and represents the typical outcome; the whiskers demonstrate the potential range of impacts Source Berry et al, 2008 MACIS

Perhaps one of the most important conclusions is that creating synergies between adaptation and mitigation can increase the cost-effectiveness of actions and make them more attractive to stakeholders. There is, however, relatively little quantitative work that has been done at a practical level on adaptation-mitigation linkages. Clearly these adaptation-mitigation linkages are important for UK policy, in relation to the dual aims of long-term low carbon trajectories (the 80% reduction in CO2 by 2050) and effective adaptation. They are therefore a priority for early policy investigation.

Wider Economic Effects Economic impacts (of climate change) can be divided into direct impacts and indirect impacts.

Direct impacts concern primary effects from climate change on production or consumption, and are generally captured by the sectoral type assessments above.

Indirect impacts reflect changes in production or consumption in one or more sectors on the whole



economy, through their effects on relative prices, including factor prices (income). This requires assessing how climate change impacts will affect sectors or regions (that are different from those initially impacted) and the feedbacks between sectors. Most UK studies have only estimated direct costs under the assumption that indirect effects would be negligible. Whether through the use of market or non market techniques, impacts are assessed multiplying a ―price‖ by a ―quantity‖ (e.g. price of land per km

2 multiplied by the area of land lost; value of

statistical life multiplied by additional cases of mortality, etc.). However, this is likely to miss several categories of potential effects, particularly relevant in the context of a UK CCRA. Firstly, this includes cross sectoral effects where changes in one sector have knock on or multiplier effects to another. Second, in some cases, however, an impact may result in ―non-marginal‖ effects, which may in turn change the price in that market by changing the underlying demand and supply conditions. Third (and potentially arising from both the previous elements), there will be macro-economic effects from larger changes that impact as a national level in terms of GDP, employment, etc. These indirect costs are more complex to assess, and requires some modelling of sectoral interdependencies, but can be undertaken using a partial equilibrium or general equilibrium approach

56.

The review has not found examples of this type of modelling in a specific UK context, though there are a number of international studies – note that because of the wider economic effects, most of these studies need to consider international aspects anyway to capture such effects properly. A limited number of studies have used a partial equilibrium approach to assess climate change effects, which includes the indirect effects for the sector or market in question, but do not look at wider economy effects. Specific examples are in the agricultural sector, where country level analysis is linked to global models of production and prices. General equilibrium analysis has only recently received attention in climate change modelling of impacts (though have been used more in analysis of mitigation). There have been a number of studies that look at the wider economic costs of extreme events, notably with several studies looking at Hurricane Katrina and New Orleans, see box below

57, which highlight that these indirect effects could be almost at important as

direct effects.

New Orleans and Hurricane Katrina

There are a number of estimates of the damages of Hurricane Katrina. Norhaus (2006) cites damages of $81 billion, while the 4

th Assessment Report estimates total economic costs are projected to be significantly in excess of US$100

billion (Wibanks et al, 2007). However, a number of studies have considered the wider economic effects of this event. In a recent analysis, Hallegatte estimates that the full macro-economic costs of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans were roughly 25% more than direct costs alone, bringing related damage costs for this incident to roughly $130 billion (Hallegatte 2007 forthcoming). The significance of these estimates is put in perspective when compared to the size of the Louisanna gross domestic product, which stood at about $168 billion in 2005. Other studies find even larger macro-economic cost. For example, Kemfert (2006) reports full macro-economic costs of Katrina were double direct costs, from the additional effects of oil price increases, increased energy costs, and other factors). Wibanks et al, 2007 highlight that reconstruction costs have driven up the costs of building construction across the southern U.S., and federal government funding for many programmes was reduced because of commitments to provide financial support for hurricane damage recovery.

56

Partial equilibrium approaches/models are constructed around one specific sector (or a few sectors) of the economy. The strength of these models is that enable a relatively high degree of dis-aggregation and a detailed representation of the specific economic and institutional factors. The drawback is their inability to capture the effects on other markets and other feedbacks. General equilibrium approaches (and computable general equilibrium models, CGEs) take account of all sectors of the economy, and the links between them. Their advantage is that they allow consideration of effects from one market sector to all others (i.e. the entire economic system, for example from a localised shock onto the global context via price and quantity changes and vice versa. The weakness of CGE models is over the assumptions and calibration made, the lack of a detailed bottom-up representation and the inability to include non-market impacts. 57

Note Katrina did not occur as a result of climate change, though climate change may have influenced the probability of a high intensity storm hitting the area at some point.



There are also the wider macro-economic effects of climate change (and adaptation) within multi-sector, multi-region GN models. A number of recent studies have examined the economy-wide implications of sea-level rise, climate change impacts on tourism, and on health (e.g. Kemfert, 2006; Roson et al, 2008; Bosello et al, 2008). These suggest indirect effects of climate change can have both positive and negative effects on climate change

58, and will also lead to changes in the distributions of gains and losses,

i.e. whereas direct costs are limited to those directly affected, markets would spread the impact to their suppliers, clients, and competitors as to financial markets. The consideration of these effects is therefore a current gap in the UK literature, and might be potentially important.

International Aspects (affecting the UK) The final aspect considered here are international effects. The original ITT specification constrained the scoping study to the consideration of UK effects only (‗Defra expects that the CCRA should be limited to the UK and its immediate surrounding waters’). However, clearly international effects will affect the UK, and are therefore potentially important as part of any risk assessment. The range of potential effects from global climate change, and the effects on the UK, is extremely large. A possible initial taxonomy of effects might include the following:

Impacts on economic, and other, resources within a country or world region that may potentially lead to internal or external conflicts, with security implications for the UK (or for UK aid)

Impacts on economic, and other, resources within a country or world region that may lead to movement of these resources, with e.g. associated pressures on UK migration policy

Impacts on economic and other resources within a country or world region that may lead to changes in trade conditions, with associated implications for UK terms of trade with that country/region.

Wider macro-economic effects associated with one or a combination of the above.

Note some of these might involve positive (e.g. financial sector opportunities) as well as negative aspects. There is some emerging work on some of these aspects, e.g. Met Office for MOD

59 looking at where

conflict and security threats might emerge in future years, though the full range of potential effects across all areas above is extremely broad. Some indicative work is being undertaken for Defra to investigate these potential risks.

58

For example, a loss of land due to sea level rise would reduce overall productivity of the economy, a negative effect that is not captured in the (change in) land price. In such cases, the direct costs are an underestimate of the true economic impact. However, direct costs also ignore that markets would adapt to minimize the adverse effects; for example, a loss in agricultural production may be compensated by an increase in imports. As any adaptation, this would work to reduce the negative direct impact, at least in the short term. 59

http://www.mod.uk/defenceinternet/defencenews/defencepolicyandbusiness/metofficeclimatechangestudycouldhelpidentifyfuturesecuritythreats.htm



5. Review Synthesis: Coverage and Gaps This section summarises the literature review findings, and highlights the potential evidence gaps.

Discussion of Literature Review Findings

Climate Change and Socio-Economic Scenarios

There is a comprehensive coverage of trends and projections of climate change for the UK, and this report has not investigated these aspects in detail, not least because of recent reviews and the forthcoming UKCP scenarios. In relation to climate projections, there has been less focus on major events and the risks posed by these to the UK in the literature reviewed (e.g. higher levels of sea-level rise, or faster rates of temperature change associated with higher climate sensitivity). In general, the timing of these events is likely to be outside the time-scales for consideration by most stakeholders, though arguably, there is a greater need for Government to consider these very long-term effects. Moreover, they do have important implications for the rate of change, and so the risks posed by such events, or the implications for the rates of change for risks below. The probabilistic nature of the UKCP scenarios should allow some consideration of such effects, but this area is highlighted as a major gap. There is also an issue of whether post 2100 risks should be considered. The greatest risks of climate change arise in the longer-term (especially for a country such as the UK, given the current climate), and so only outlining risks before this period may be mis-leading. At the same time, trying to scope these effects (let alone quantify) on this time-scale is hugely uncertain, and for most activities, is well outside the time-frame for influence. Nonetheless, in some areas, notably in relation to long-term planning, natural habitats, etc these could be important, especially where they might pass limits for adaptation (an example might be the potential for sea-level rise in the longer-term, which might exceed the viable limits of coastal protection in some areas). The coverage of socio-economic scenarios has also been advanced through the UKCIP. These scenarios are likely to be the subject of further update, to allow consistency with the new UK Climate Projections. However, at present, there are gaps in knowledge, particularly in relation to later time slices (2080s), though projecting out to these periods is extremely challenging. There are some other issues highlighted, notably the need for consistency between the socio-economic scenarios used in the climate modelling (e.g. UKCIP02) and Government projections: as an example, in many areas, there does not appear to be directly comparable projections (to illustrate, the transport demand projections vary significantly between UKCIP02 and DTI for example). This is an area that will need to be reconciled, particularly as the CCRA will need consistency with specific Government policy areas. In many areas, sectoral-specific data sets are contentious and susceptible to frequent up-date e.g. GDP assumptions, energy prices. There is also a fairly limited quantitative data set for socio-economic scenarios, which does need expanding. In the short-term, one concern is the development of new probabilistic UKCP climate projections, without associated (and consistent) UKCP socio-economic scenarios. However UKCIP are currently reviewing the current set of UK socio-economic scenarios. A more pressing concern is the lack of a ―low-carbon future‖ socio-economic projections. This is likely to be a major problem, because the UK has a specific mitigation scenario as part of Government policy, including mandated 2020 and interim targets, and a long-term carbon reduction goal. The low carbon future is therefore the policy business as usual scenario, i.e. the with current policies scenario.



Sectoral Impacts

The earlier chapter outlined the key studies and risks for the UK across sectors. This section summarises this information.

For health, there is information on risks and impacts, including quantification and valuation studies, and an overarching Government (Department of Health) review, which has been updated on a regular basis, though the evidence base is still considered low. These studies predict a mixture of positive and negative effects in relation to temperature changes, with positive effects reducing winter mortality, but negative effects increasing summer mortality (at least in relation to heat extremes). For other climate variables and health endpoints, the studies generally predict impacts, e.g. increased heat related (food borne) disease, vector borne disease, UV related cancers, indirect health effects from flood risk, etc.

For energy, there are a number of good projects, which again show a mix of positive and negative effects. It is likely that the reduction in winter heating demand (a benefit) will be greater than the impacts of additional summer cooling (impact), at a net level, however, there are additional issues in relation to peak demand that are important. There are also potential positive and negative effects on supply technologies, both positive and negative for biomass, wind power, etc. A number of these are potentially important due to the recent adoption of ambitious renewable targets. What is also clear is that socio-economic scenarios are extremely important in determining impacts, and that there are strong mitigation-adaptation linkages. The risk of increases in frequency or magnitude of extreme events does have potential negative impacts on supply and transmission infrastructure. Unlike health (above), there has been no Government led analysis of risks. In many ways, this is surprising, and it does not appear that the effects of climate change are reflected in Government projections of energy demand, nor in recent climate change mitigation analysis. This seems a major gap. There is also a need to link up the demand side and the electricity supply industry with consideration of the built environment and housing. Finally, there are a number of potential other demand changes for the energy sector, notably associated with energy for water from climate change, which are not yet scoped.

In the transport sector, there have been several modal studies, but no integrated transport assessment. As with other sectors, there does seem to be a mix of positive and negative risks, only some of which are well understood and analysed. The risk of increases in the frequency or magnitude of many extreme events does have potential negative impacts for transport infrastructure. There will also be changes from average temperature and extremes in relation to transport accidents, and demand, though the net effects are not yet understood.

There is also a significant evidence base emerging on the built environment and infrastructure, noting that this has cross sectoral linkages with many of the other sectors discussed here. There is an extremely large body of work on the future risks of coastal, river and, to a lesser extent, intra-urban flooding, building on existing studies of current climate variability. These risks have been assessed at national level, notably in the Foresight study, and this and many other studies include quantification and valuation, often including the costs and benefits of adaptation. These show large increases in risk, though these are driven by a combination of climate and socio-economic change, and potentially economic costs, though studies indicate that adaptation could significantly reduce these risks. There is also a significant body of insurance based assessments for this area. There are also assessments of the potential risks of heat/drought (subsidence) and storm related damage to buildings and infrastructure, though the potential risks of climate change on cultural and historic buildings is less well covered. The assessment of adaptation options in this area has also progressed cross-sectoral responses in relation to design and planning for adaptation (spatial planning is an important adaptation).

The agricultural sector has been one of the most studied areas, with a large UK Government funded programme, as well as many other studies. These show mixed effects, with both positive and negative effects predicted, varying according to time period, variables considered, and modelling approaches. While there are likely to be benefits from enhanced yields (fertilization effects, longer growing season),



and diversification into some new crops or horticulture, there are also potential impacts from constraints on water resources (including from annual and seasonal changes, and patterns of extremes such as drought and the risk of other extreme events (flooding, heat extremes).

There is also a large evidence base on the effects of climate change on water availability (resources), with many studies at national, regional and local level. These generally show potential impacts in certain regions of the UK, notably with reductions in water availability predicted for the south-east (especially in summer) where demand is currently concentrated. There is also a smaller literature that links through to water demand, the effects on prices, and the costs and benefits of adaptation. There are some studies on the potential effects of climate change on water quality, though less quantitative analysis.

There are studies of the potential effects of climate change on forests (natural as well as managed), which show potentially positive and negative effects. Growth rates are likely to be enhanced by a combination of carbon dioxide levels, warmer winters, and longer growing season, but reduced rainfall and drought periods could negatively affect forests in southern England. There is also the additional effect of extreme weather events, notably floods and storm damage, which will have negative effects.

There are some emerging studies that consider the potential effects for the marine environment, in relation to species migration, and some qualitative discussion of other changes. However, there is very little quantitative analysis, and no specific assessments on marine resources in relation to fish stocks.

There are some emerging studies that consider the potential effects for biodiversity and habitat, in relation to climate space and species migration, with quantitative analysis. There is less assessment of the wider effects on ecosystem services, and very little coverage on valuation.

There are a number of studies on the tourism sector, some segments of which are very climate sensitive. These show potential benefits for the UK in relation to general (summer) tourism demand (though note this may be partially offset from some local aspects). There will, however, be detrimental impacts for the winter tourism industry in relation to winter sports.

The potential effects on business, industry, and the service sector have not been extensively studied. There are some studies emerging, though these tend to be qualitative (with the exception of a large literature on the risks faced by the insurance sector). There are also no studies of the potential effects of climate change and adaptation on government public finances.

Overall, the literature review shows that there is an extremely broad body of work on climate change risks for the UK. This spans all sectors and ranges from national level down to regional and even local studies. Moreover, a very large part of this work is based on consistent assumptions in relation to climate and socio-economic scenarios. This is unprecedented amongst country literature, and is undoubtedly the results of the UKCIP programme and scenarios. Many of the primary risks and impacts to the UK have been considered, and many of these have had some assessment, including major studies in health, flood risk (coastal and river), water availability, energy supply and demand, agriculture, and biodiversity (at least in relation to the species climate space). However, some sectors are not as intensively studied, at least in quantitative terms (e.g. transport, business), and some areas remain extremely challenging (e.g. the full effects on biodiversity and ecosystem services). It is also highlighted that the literature base on quantitative studies (e.g. physical impact estimation) is much smaller, and there are many potential risks where only qualitative information is available. An even smaller base exists on valuation. There is also a wide literature on adaptation, which now has an extremely large, stakeholder driven evidence base. However, the number of quantification and valuation studies is significantly lower for adaptation, and there are only ore two sectors (e.g. flooding) which have any detailed analysis of costs and benefits.



Nonetheless, there remain challenges on the definitions of baselines, the precise nature of the impacts, the timing of impacts, the interpretation of existing socio-economic scenarios and assumptions, adaptation (autonomous and planned), as well as many other areas. Moreover, there remains a fundamental issue, in physical impact assessment, on the extent to which climatic variables can be identified as determining physical impacts – for example, through the use of historical analogues and/or simulation modelling – and how the resulting impact function can robustly applied to different spatial contexts and under combinations of alternative future climatic and socio-economic scenarios, outside the range of observation to date The field of assessment for climate change is still evolving. There remain important differences in methodology between studies, particularly in relation to physical impact assessment. This can take the form of differences in the functional form of relationships that link given levels of climate change with impacts (e.g. the temperature – mortality relationships linking temperature change with mortality in the case of health effects), but also more fundamentally different approaches in relation to approach (e.g. the difference in the use of crop models vs. ricardian approaches in the estimation of agricultural impacts). The level of uncertainty introduced can be very significant. In the case of agriculture, the difference in fundamental approach can alter the very sign of the impact. There are also other factors that are simply missing in many approaches, i.e. how the functional form changes with the rate of climate change, as well as in relation to the absolute level of change. Thus, while there is considerable information, it should only be considered partial. One important final issue raised here is that many studies may overstate risks. First, most studies do not consider autonomous adaptation, which will reduce risks (noting that planned adaptation will reduce risks further)

60. Failure to take autonomous adaptation into account will therefore overestimate the national

risk. A good example is with the health effects of climate change from increased temperature. The application of temperature-mortality functions derived from current epidemiological studies, which are then applied to future temperatures, leads to the estimation of high numbers of mortality. However, it is known that there will be autonomous adaptation (strictly speaking, acclimatisation) of individuals and populations over time to heat. If this acclimatisation is included, then the risks of climate change are significantly reduced. Second, many studies include socio-economic and climate change together. Strictly speaking, they therefore overestimate the risks attributable to climate change. In Government policy appraisal, it is usual to consider the business as usual scenario, taking into account changes in baseline conditions, and existing policies and plans, i.e. what would happen in the absence of the policy. Under this framework, clearly socio-economic change would occur anyway, and this would lead to changes in vulnerability While it is the combined socio-economic and climate change risk that is relevant in formulating responses, some care should be taken to ensure that these two components are split out in analysis. This is a key aspect for any later CCRA. The review has also considered a number of other categories of effects.

There is a major gap on the cross-sectoral and indirect effects of climate change at national level, especially in relation to impact assessment (and almost nothing on valuation), though this is not surprising given the complexity of such studies.

There are only a limited number of studies on the distributional effects of climate change, looking specifically at inequalities, and these are either in relation to flood risk, with some considerations in the health sector.

60

Noting that not all autonomous adaptation will reduce risks at the societal level, see later discussion



There are no significant studies of the wider economy effects to the UK of climate change (and adaptation), either in relation to the wider multiplier effects through the economy from impacts in specific sectors, in relation to linkages between sectors, and for aggregated macro-economic effects on GDP, employment, etc. This is a major gap. Similarly, to date there are few studies of how the impacts of climate change felt internationally will affect the UK

There is also a need to identify potential threshold effects, and limits of adaptation, and to identify vulnerability hot-spots, either with extremely high susceptibility to a climate signal, or subject to multiple signals which lead to cumulative effects.

Valuation (Monetisation of Impacts)

In accordance with the terms of reference for the CCRA, Defra expects that, where possible, CCRA risks should be framed and assessed both in physical and monetised terms, allowing comparisons across sectors on an equivalent basis. A key issue of the literature review has been to consider the literature on valuation. Overall, the review has found a small number of studies that undertake monetary valuation. The evidence is summarised below. A key focus here is whether the lack of studies is due to the lack of monetary estimates, particularly in relation to non-market valuation. A summary is included below, which shows that for most areas, monetary values exist that could be applied to the outputs of physical impact studies – with the exception of some of the more difficult non-market areas (biodiversity and ecosystem services). Therefore a key conclusion is that valuation is not the limiting step, but the earlier step of physical impact quantification. This is an important conclusion in relation to the subsequent CCRA, i.e. that valuation is possible in most areas. What perhaps is more of a problem is making the measure of physical impacts align with available unit values, i.e. making the metrics comparable so that impacts and valuation align. One issue that is highlighted is that in physical impact, and especially economic terms, there will be benefits and costs from climate change in the UK. Indeed, in economic terms, net effects may be positive, certainly in the short-term, and even in the medium to long term. Indeed, this was one of the findings of the previous cross regional study. This highlights the potential issue of whether a CCRA is only restricted to risks, or should also consider opportunities. The study found that in a number of sectors there are both benefits and costs, depending on the climate hazard. Notable benefits were projected in the tourism, health, energy and transport sectors. Losses were projected in the buildings sector, – particularly in the Medium-High and High emissions scenarios – and the transport sector (infrastructure). The finding of net benefits for the UK, at least in relation to major economic sectors, is not that surprising. In many sectors, the UK‘s climate is not optimal, and a warmer climate would have short-medium benefits in sectors such as tourism, energy, health, and potentially others. It is likely this finding will also emerge from the subsequent CCRA. These does not negate the need for adaptation, indeed, it would make sense for the UK to take advantage of any opportunities, at the same time as addressing threats.



Table 15 Coverage of Monetary Valuation Estimates for Physical Impact Endpoints Sector Valuation

Health

Temperature related mortality

Value of a Life Year Lost [VOLY] (Chiltern) or Value of a Statistical Life [VSL]. Note that key issue is period of life lost not known.

Temperature related illness

Values for restricted activity days, cases of salmonella (infectious disease), based on combination of costs of illness, lost time at work, and WTP estimates.

Energy

Energy demand Market prices. Different approaches taken in literature. Some studies use international prices consistent with e.g. DTI projections (e.g. primary or landed prices for oil, natural gas and coal), but others use domestic and industrial market prices (which are higher). The same issues arise for electricity, with differences between costs of generation (resource costs), wholesale market costs, and final consumer prices. The modelling framework can alter the prices that are considered most appropriate. Extremely difficult issues in relation to future energy and electricity price forecasts, partly because of energy price variation (e.g. oil price) but also because of the assumption on mitigation and how this changes energy and electricity prices.

Infrastructure Repair costs

Supply outages Implicit WTP

Transport

Time Value of time (DfT)

Accidents Value of Accidents (DfT) for fatalities, serious and slight incidents ()costs of illness, lost time at work, and WTP estimates

Infrastructure

Flood risk Relationships between flooding and damage. Repair costs and non-market WTP

Beach nourishment

Market prices

Subsidence Costs of repair

Storm damage Costs of repair

Cultural/ heritage

partial Non market WTP. Limited estimates

Agriculture

Crop yield Market prices (preferably international, to avoid issues of subsidies). However, issues over future market prices, especially under scenarios of climate change

Other partial Non market WTP. Limited estimates

Water resources

Water deficit Implicit WTP based on market information

Water quality partial Non market WTP, some studies.

Tourism

Revenue Revenue and costs (gross margin)

Biodiversity and Ecosystem services

Forest yield Market prices (international, to avoid issues of subsidies). However, issues over future market prices, especially under scenarios of climate change

Forest other partial Non market WTP

Fisheries Market prices

Marine Non market WTP. No estimates

Biodiversity partial Non market WTP. Very limited estimates

Ecosystem services

partial Some values for carbon sequestration, recreational activity, ecosystem regulation, etc partial coverage. Non market WTP. Very limited estimates

Note: use of repair costs effectively implies cost of reactive adaptation but is sometimes used as a proxy for true WTP.



Results of Project E – Quantifying the costs of impacts and adaptation in the UK (Metroeconomia, 2006).

Some areas of impacts are, however, not well covered. This includes wider economy and macro-economic effects, and the treatment of impacts that have non-marginal effects on the UK economy. There is also an issue with the treatment of distributional variations in impact and adaptation burden (see earlier sections). The final issue concerns assumptions in relation to costing, concerning the treatment and aggregation of cost estimates over regions, sectors and time. The valuation studies do not always present these assumptions explicitly, but they have a large bearing on estimates. The key element here is whether uplifts are applied to unit values over time, and the issue of discounting

61. These elements, along with

61

In order to directly compare economic costs and benefits at different times, a technique called discounting is used. This expresses all economic costs in a common base year. Discounting is different to inflation, and is based on the principle that, generally, people



equity, dominate the discussion of the global costs of climate change and have been a major source of debate following the Stern review (though note the equity issue is less important in a UK analysis). These issues will need to be addressed for the CCRA and the adaptation CBA

62.

Policy evidence

There are a number of gaps identified in relation to the CCRA and policy, specifically Government policy.

First, while there is considerable information available on risks, there has been no systematic analysis of the priorities for early action, and most studies focus on long-term impacts (2050s or 2080s) where impacts are larger. In contrast, policy time-scales usually work on much shorter time frames (2020s). There is therefore a need to pick out the earlier short-term concerns, and at the same time, identify the long-term areas that require policy action now (e.g. infrastructure, because of the long life-time).

Second, it is clear that the effects of climate change on government policies has not been widely considered (outside of a few areas), even in areas where it is likely to be important (e.g. energy and GHG policy)

63. At the same time, there is little knowledge of how Government sectoral policy might

affect the UK‘s vulnerability, e.g. how policies might directly or indirectly increase risks. There is therefore a need for a policy mapping exercise, to assess these two sets of influences.

Finally, there is a recognition that adaptation will involve multi-level governance, and different actors, but there has been no assessment of the specific justification for Government adaptation policy, and more general assessment of which organisations, aggregation levels, etc are best placed (and/or have the current responsibility) to implement adaptation. This is needed to investigate the rationale for intervention – in this case particularly whether adaptation intervention is most cost-effectively taken forward by national government (and agencies) rather than other public sector bodies or the private sector.

Gaps in the Evidence Given the extremely wide range of possible impacts, and multiple sectors, there are clearly many gaps in the evidence. The picture is even less well covered in relation to quantification analysis, and even less so for valuation. In relation to gaps, the UKCIP measuring progress (West and Galbraith, 2005) identified

Socio-economic drivers of change need further consideration in future impact and adaptation assessments.

Impacts in waste management, emergency planning and telecommunications need to be scoped, as do impacts for industry and financial activities, for which only some sub-sectors have been considered.

Cross-sectoral impacts are especially important and merit further attention.

(and society) prefer to receive goods and services now rather than later, and also that costs and benefits in the future count less because they affect a larger expected future income. A discount rate is used to convert economic costs to so called ‗present values‘. 62

The Stern review (Stern et al, 2006) led to an in-depth discussion on these issues, notably because of the particularly parameters

choices made, in relation to discounting and the pure rate of time preference (note that the stern review does still discount for future growth, but adopted a near zero pure rate of time preference). The UK Green Book recommends declining discount rates schemes for long-term considerations, and has also recently released a new sensitivity declining discount rate on intergenerational wealth transfers and social discounting. A related issue relates to the rate of uplift of values over time (in real prices). As an example, in the UK, it is typical in economic appraisal to uplift certain values, see for example the analysis of health effects in air quality appraisal or accident values, which uses a 2% real uplift. Note that the previous Defra national study (Metroeconomica, 2006) did not uplift or discount in the economic analysis. There is also an implicit assumption that the value of non-market goods - determined by individuals‘ preferences at the time of the original valuation studies - will stay the same in future time periods, even in the face of changes in quality and quantity of these goods. 63

As an example, the energy sector studies above show potentially 10% reduction in winter heating demand by 2020s and 20% by 2050s, yet these effects not included in UK energy projections, or even in recent Climate Change Committee‘s consideration of national budgets and marginal abatement costs for the UK.



Most commonly identified areas for work include water management, emergency planning, biodiversity policy, the rural economy, transport, coastal management, health and the financial sectors.

It also identified gaps and priorities in the areas of research, building adaptive capacity, tools, sustainability partnerships and communications. The research gaps are particularly relevant here, and were as follows:

Some gaps where further work is needed (e.g. emergency planning). For those activities which were scoped effectively and where key impacts have been identified (insurance, health, tourism), the research focus should move to more detailed, quantitative and costed risk based studies of impacts and adaptation.

New studies should be encouraged to use the risk and costings tools and could benefit from the experience of the BKCC portfolio by building integration and dissemination functions into the project design.

Some aspects of the adaptation process are poorly understood and work should be conducted with stakeholders to advance existing knowledge.

There is a need to move beyond sector- and region-based research to consider some smaller-scale research, exploring cross-sectoral issues in specific locations, or ‗hotspots‘ where several issues come together in particular regions.

In terms of this literature review, we add the following. In terms of climate change projections, the status is good, and will improve with the UKCP, though there is rather less information associated with major risks. However, such developments are not currently matched in relation to the socio-economic scenarios. Indeed, this remains a gap. While the UK has developed far more comprehensive socio-economic scenarios than almost anywhere else, the coverage is partial – generally restricted to the medium term (2050s) and for a fairly low number of key parameters. Moreover, in many cases, the existing data does not seem to square up to Government projections and forecasts. In many ways, there is a need to enhance the consistency (even mainstream,) the socio-economic scenarios between the climate and central government (and vice versa). There is also potentially the need for a protocol to be developed that can be agreed with Defra as to the need for, and form of, socio-economic data to be used in the forthcoming CCRA and CBA projects, and subsequent iterations. In the short-term the most worrying concerns are lack of new UKCP socio-economic scenarios, and the lack of a low-carbon growth scenario. There is also an issue of major risks, either from higher levels of climate change (e.g. associated with greater climate sensitivity, outside the boundaries considered within the UKCIP02 scenarios) or post 2100 risks, which are almost completely missing. There remain a small number of valuation studies. In respect of valuation, non-market values are a particular problem, specifically for some sectors (biodiversity and ecosystem services) though this mirrors a general evidence gap for these systems more generally (rather than from climate change alone). The UK is advancing this area, and this information base is growing. However, there is a lack of economic analysis for adaptation (outside of a few sectors). There is a major gap on the cross-sectoral and indirect effects of climate change, though this is not surprising given the complexity of such studies. Only a few sectors have started to dis-entangle the distributional effects of potential changes (flood and health are the notably exceptions). Finally, almost no studies try to piece together the combined effects, particularly in relation to wider economic effects (both multiplier effects through the economy, and aggregated macro-economic effects on GDP, employment, etc). Related to this, there are no studies which look at the potential effects on the public finances from impacts or adaptation.



Finally, there is little information on the ancillary effects (positive and negative) of adaptation, at least in quantitative terms.

Review Findings A summary of the broad findings of the review, in the context of the CCRA (i.e. national level analysis), is shown below. The table lists the main potential risks and impacts at a UK level in the left hand column, by sector, based on the literature review findings. The central two columns report on the status of quantification and valuation of these. The final column reviews whether there are national level assessments of adaptation, and whether the analysis is qualitative or quantitative. It is highlighted that there a number of major sectoral studies starting; many which plan to use the new UKCP scenarios. These are potentially relevant for the CCRA, and could contribute to the evidence base (and avoid duplication of effort), though there may be issues of methodological consistency to address.



Table 16 Summary of Coverage of Key Risks to the UK, Status on Quantification and Valuation, and Information on Adaptation

Sector Analysis of risks/impacts

Valuation Consideration of Adaptation

Health

Temperature (cold/heat) and mortality / illness including extremes (heat waves)

quantification valuation qualitative

Food and vector borne disease some quantification qualitative (partial)

UV radiation and skin cancer, air pollution quantification

Other (floods, water borne disease, etc.)

Energy

Demand (heating and cooling) quantification valuation quantitative

Supply technologies qualitative qualitative (partial)

Infrastructure qualitative qualitative (partial)

Transport

Infrastructure some quantification some valuation qualitative (partial)

Demand

Accidents

Infrastructure / Built Env.

Coastal flooding quantification valuation quantitative + economic

Coastal erosion, intrusion, etc quantification valuation quantitative + economic

River flooding quantification valuation quantitative + economic

Intra-urban flooding quantification valuation qualitative

Extremes (subsidence, storm damage) some quantification some valuation qualitative (partial)

Cultural heritage some qualitative

Agriculture

Crops (yield) quantification (partial) valuation (partial) quantification (partial)

Livestock qualitative

Multi-functionality (landscape, etc)

Water resources/quality

Water availability quantification qualitative

Water demand quantification some valuation some quant + economic

Water quality qualitative

Forestry

Yield quantification (partial) qualitative

Other services

Fisheries/marine

Species movement qualitative (partial)

Fish stocks/ fisheries

Biodiversity and E.S.

Climate space quantification (partial) qualitative (partial)

Biodiversity and habitats qualitative (partial)

Ecosystem services qualitative (partial)

Tourism

Tourism (visitor numbers) quantification some valuation qualitative

Infrastructure, natural resources, other qualitative (partial)

Business, industry, services

Business/industry qualitative (partial) qualitative (partial)

Service (inc. insurance) qualitative (partial)

Customer /demand qualitative (partial)

Public finances

Other

Major climate change (tipping points)

Cross-sectoral/indirect partial (national level)

Adaptation-mitigation linkages qualitative (partial)

Distributional partial (flooding/health)

Wider economic

International (on the UK)



References Introduction Cabinet Office (2008). National Risk Register. http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/cabinetoffice/corp/assets/publications/reports/national_risk_register/national_risk_register.pdf Carter, T.R., R.N. Jones, X. Lu, S. Bhadwal, C. Conde, L.O. Mearns, B.C. O‘Neill, M.D.A. Rounsevell and M.B. Zurek, 2007: New Assessment Methods and the Characterisation of Future Conditions. Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden and C.E. Hanson, Eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 133-171. CCIRG (1991). UK Climate Change Impacts Review Group, 1991. The potential effects of climate change in the United Kingdom, Department of the Environment, HMSO, London. CCIRG (1996). Climate Change Impacts Review Group, 1996. Review of the Potential Effects of Climate Change on the United Kingdom. Department of the Environment, HMSO, London. 247pp.. Dr Kevin Edson Jones (2005). Understanding Risk in Everyday Policy-Making. September 2005. Published by Defra. http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/risk/policymaking0509.pdf Jenkins, G.J., Perry, M.C., and Prior, M.J.0 (2007). The climate of the United Kingdom and recent trends. Met Office Hadley Centre, Exeter, UK. HMT (2007). The Green Book. Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government Treasury Guidance. Her Majesty‘s Treasury. London:TSO. HMSO (2007). Taking Forward the UK Climate Change Bill: The Government Response to Pre-Legislative Scrutiny and Public Consultation October 2007 http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm72/7225/7225.pdf) Levina, E. and D. Tirpak (2006), ―Adaptation to Climate Change: Key Terms‖, OECD/IEA COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2006)1. May 2006. McKenzie Hedger et al, 2000 Highlights of the first three years of the UK Climate Impacts Programme, UKCIP, Technical Report. Climate change: Assessing the impacts – identifying responses. Metroeconomica et al (2006). Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation: Cross-Regional Research Programme Project E Parry, M.L., O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof and Co-authors 2007: Technical Summary. Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden and C.E. Hanson, Eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 23-78. Rosenzweig, C., G. Casassa, D.J. Karoly, A. Imeson, C. Liu, A. Menzel, S. Rawlins, T.L. Root, B. Seguin, P. Tryjanowski, 2007: Assessment of observed changes and responses in natural and managed systems. Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden and C.E. Hanson, Eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 79-131. Solomon, S., D. Qin, M. Manning, R.B. Alley, T. Berntsen, N.L. Bindoff, Z. Chen, A. Chidthaisong, J.M. Gregory, G.C. Hegerl, M. Heimann, B. Hewitson, B.J. Hoskins, F. Joos, J. Jouzel, V. Kattsov, U. Lohmann, T. Matsuno, M. Molina, N. Nicholls, J. Overpeck, G. Raga, V. Ramaswamy, J. Ren, M. Rusticucci, R. Somerville, T.F. Stocker, P. Whetton, R.A. Wood and D. Wratt, 2007: Technical Summary. In: Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Solomon, S., D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K.B. Averyt, M. Tignor and H.L. Miller (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA. Stainforth, D. A. et al. 2005 Uncertainty in predictions of the climate response to rising levels of greenhouse gases. Nature 433, 403–406. (doi:10.1038/nature03301) UK Climate Change Impacts Review Group, 1991. The potential effects of climate change in the United Kingdom, Department of the Environment, HMSO, London. CCIRG (Climate Change Impacts Review Group), 1996. Review of the Potential Effects of Climate Change on the United Kingdom. Department of the Environment, HMSO, London. 247pp..



West, C.C. and Gawith, M.J. (Eds.) (2005) Measuring Progress: Preparing for climate change through the UK Climate Impacts Programme. UKCIP Technical Report. UKCIP, Oxford. Available online at: http://www.ukcip.org.uk/images/stories/Pub_pdfs/MeasuringProgress.pdf Chapter 2 Adger, W.N., S. Agrawala, M.M.Q. Mirza, C. Conde, K. O‘Brien, J. Pulhin, R. Pulwarty, B. Smit and K. Takahashi, 2007: Assessment of adaptation practices, options, constraints and capacity. Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden and C.E. Hanson, Eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 717-743. Agrawala, S. and Fankhauser, S. (Eds.) (2008) Economic Aspects of Adaptation to Climate Change: Costs, Benefits and Policy Instruments. OECD Dahlstrom, K., and R. Salmons, 2005, BESEECH Generic Socio-economic Scenarios. Final Report: London, Policy Studies Institute. EEA (2008). Impacts of Europe's changing climate - 2008 indicator-based assessment. European Environment Agency. EEA Report No 4/2008. http://reports.eea.europa.eu/eea_report_2008_4/en/ Evans, E., Ashley, R., Hall, J., Penning-Rowsell, E., Saul, A., Sayers P., Thorne, C. and A Watkinson (2004) Foresight. Future Flooding. Scientific Summary: Volumes I and II. Office of Science and Technology, London. Jenkins, G.J., Perry, M.C., and Prior, M.J.0 (2007). The climate of the United Kingdom and recent trends. Met Office Hadley Centre, Exeter, UK. Hulme,M., Jenkins,G.J., Lu,X., Turnpenny,J.R., Mitchell,T.D., Jones,R.G., Lowe,J., Murphy,J.M., Hassell,D., Boorman,P., McDonald,R. and Hill,S. (2002) Climate Change Scenarios for the United Kingdom: The UKCIP02 Scientific Report, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, School of Environmental Sciences, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. 120pp Hunt, A., and Watkiss, P. (2007). Literature Review on Climate Change Impacts on Urban City Centres. Published by the OECD, Paris. ENV/EPOC/GSP(2007)10. Published by the OECD at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/50/39760257.pdf Boyd, R and Hunt, A (2004). Costing the impacts of climate change in the UK: overview of guidelines, UKCIP Technical Report. UKCIP, Oxford, July 2004 Elmar Kriegler, Jim Hall, Hermann Held, Richard Dawson, John Schellnhuber. Probability of Crossing Tipping Points in the Earth: System Elicited from Experts. Maslanik, J. A., C. Fowler, J. Stroeve, S. Drobot, J. Zwally, D. Yi, and W. Emery, 2007: A younger, thinner Arctic ice cover: Increased potential for rapid, extensive sea-ice loss. Geophys. Res. Lett., 34, L24501, doi:10.1029/2007GL032043. Lenton et al (2006). Climate change on the millennial timescale. Technical Report 41. Tyndall Centre. http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/research/theme1/final_reports/t3_18.pdf Lenton et al, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. Richter-Menge, J., J. Overland, M. Svoboda, J. Box, M.J.J.E. Loonen, A. Proshutinsky, V. Romanovsky, D. Russell, C.D. Sawatzky, M. Simpkins, R. Armstrong, I. Ashik, L.-S. Bai, D. Bromwich, J. Cappelen, E. Carmack, J. Comiso, B. Ebbinge, I. Frolov, J.C. Gascard, M. Itoh, G.J. Jia, R. Krishfield, F. McLaughlin, W. Meier, N. Mikkelsen, J. Morison, T. Mote, S. Nghiem, D. Perovich, I. Polyakov, J.D. Reist, B. Rudels, U. Schauer, A. Shiklomanov, K . Shimada , V. Sokolov, M. Steele, M.-L. Timmermans, J. Toole, B. Veenhuis, D. Walker, J. Walsh, M. Wang, A. Weidick, C. Zöckler (2008). Arctic Report Card 2008, http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/reportcard Rothrock, D. A., D. B. Percival, and M. Wensnahan, 2008: The decline in arctic sea-ice thickness: Separating the spatial, annual, and interannual variability in a quarter century of submarine data, J. Geophys. Res., 113, C05003, doi:10.1029/2007JC004252. Schellnhuber et al (2005). Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change. Editor in Chief Hans Joachim Schellnhuber Co-editors Wolfgang Cramer, Nebojsa Nakicenovic, Tom Wigley, Gary Yohe. Cambridge University Press, 2005. ISBN: 13 978-0-521-86471-8 Stern . N., Peters, S., Bakhshi, V., Bowen, A., Cameron, C., Catovsky, S., Crane, D., Cruickshank, S., Dietz, S., Edmondson, N., Garbett, S., Hamid, L., Hoffman, G., Ingram, D., Jones, B., Patmore, N., Radcliffe, H., Sathiyarajah, R., Stock, M., Taylor, C., Vernon, T., Wanjie, H., and Zenghelis, D. (2006). The Economics of Climate Change. Cabinet Office – HM Treasury. Cambridge University Press. Stroeve, J., M. Serreze, S. Drobot, S. Gearhead, M. Holland, J. Maslanik, W. Meier, and T. S. Scambo, 2008: Arctic sea ice extent plummets in 2007. Eos, Trans. Amer. Geophys. Union, 89, 13. UKCIP, 2000, UKCIP Socio-economic scenarios for climate change impact assessment: a guide to their use in the UK Climate Impacts Programme: Oxford, UKCIP.



Paul Watkiss, with contributions from David Anthoff, Tom Downing, Cameron Hepburn, Chris Hope, Alistair Hunt, and Richard Tol. The Social Costs of Carbon (SCC) Review – Methodological Approaches for Using SCC Estimates in Policy Assessment. Final Report to Defra. Published January 2006. http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/carboncost/aeat-scc.htm Paul Watkiss and Thomas E. Downing, The Social Cost of Carbon: Valuation Estimates and their Use in UK Policy. The Integrated Assessment Journal, Vol 8, Issue 1 (2008), Weitzman, Martin L. (2008). On Modelling and Interpreting the Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change ( http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/weitzman/files/modeling.pdf ) Willows, R. I. and R. K. Cornell (eds.), 2003: Climate Adaptation: Risk, Uncertainty and Decision-making. UKCIP Technical Report, Oxford. Chapter 3 EEA (2007). Paul Watkiss, Francesco Bosello, Barbara Buchner, Michela Catenacci, Alessandra Goria, Onno Kuik and Etem Karakaya. Climate Change: the Cost of Inaction and the Cost of Adaptation. European Environment Agency Technical Report. Published December 2007. EEA Technical report No 13/2007. ISSN 1725–2237. ISBN 978-92-9167-974-4 EEA, Copenhagen, 2007. http://reports.eea.europa.eu/technical_report_2007_13/en EEA (2008) Impacts of Europe's changing climate - 2008 indicator-based assessment Document Actions , EEA Report No 4/2008. http://reports.eea.europa.eu/eea_report_2008_4/en/ Health Bentham G, Langford IH. Climate change and the incidence of food poisoning in England and Wales. Int J Biometeorol. 1995;39:81-86. Bosello, F., Roson, R., and Tol, R.S.J. (2004a). Economy-Wide Estimates of the Implications of Climate Change: Human Health. Research Unit Sustainability and Global Change FNU-57, Hamburg University and Centre for Marine and Atmospheric Science, Hamburg. Confalonieri, U., B. Menne, R. Akhtar, K.L. Ebi, M. Hauengue, R.S. Kovats, B. Revich and A. Woodward, 2007: Human health. Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden and C.E. Hanson, Eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 391-431. Carson C, Hajat S, Armstrong B, Wilkinson, P. Changing patterns of temperature-related mortality in London in the twentieth century. Am J Epidemiol 2006;164:77–84. cCASHh. Menne B, Ebi K.L. (eds) Climate change and adaptation strategies for human health, Steinkopff Verlag Department of Health (2001). Health effects of climate change in the UK. UK consultation document. Published by Department of Health, UK, 2001. Department of Health, 2008, Heatwave Plan for England - Protecting health and reducing harm from extreme heat and heatwaves, Department of Health, Department of Health and Health Protection Agency (2008) ‗Health Effects of Climate Change in the UK 2008 – An update of the Department of Health Report 2001/2002‘. Edited by Sari Kovats. www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_080702 Dessai, S. (2003), Heat stress and mortality in Lisbon Part II. An assessment of the potential impacts of climate change, International Journal of Biometeorology, 48: 37-44. Johnson,H, R S Kovats, G R McGregor, J R Stedman, M Gibbs, H Walton, L Cook, E Black (2005) The impact of the 2003 heatwave on mortality and hospital admissions in England. Health Statistics Quarterly. No. 25:6-11. Hajat S, Armstrong B, Gouveia N, Wilkinson, P. Mortality displacement in heat-related deaths. Epidemiology 2005; 16(4):1-8. Johnson,H, R S Kovats, G R McGregor, J R Stedman, M Gibbs, H Walton, L Cook, E Black (2005) The impact of the 2003 heatwave on mortality and hospital admissions in England. Health Statistics Quarterly. No. 25:6-11. Hajat S, Kovats RS, Lachowycz K (2007) Heat-related and cold-related deaths in England and Wales: who is at risk? Occupation Environ Med, 64:93-100 Kovats RS, Ebi KL (2006) Heatwaves and public health in Europe. European Journal of Public Health, 16(6): 592-599. Kovats, R.S.; Hajat, S.; Wilkinson, P.; Contrasting patterns of mortality and hospital admissions during hot weather and heat waves in Greater London, UK. Occup Environ Med, 2004; 61(11):893-8



Kovats, R.S., Edwards, S., Hajat, S., Armstrong, B., Ebi, K.L., Menne, B. (2004) The effect of temperature on food poisoning: time series analysis in 10 European countries. Epidemiology and Infection 132, 443-453. Kovaks, S, Lachowyz, K, Armstrong, B, Hunt, A, Markandya, A (2006) in Metroeconomica et al (2006). Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation: Cross-Regional Research Programme Project E Kovats, R.S.; Hajat, S.; Wilkinson, P.; Contrasting patterns of mortality and hospital admissions during hot weather and heat waves in Greater London, UK. Occup Environ Med, 2004; 61(11):893-8 Kovats RS, Hajat S (2008) Heat stress and public health: a critical review. Annu Rev Public Health. 29: 41-55. Matthies E, et al. (2008). Heat health action plans: Guidence, eds WHO, Copenhagen. Menne B, Ebi K.L. (eds) Climate change and adaptation strategies for human health, Steinkopff Verlag M Reacher, M., McKenzie, K., Lane, C., Nichols, T., Kedge, I., Iversen, A., Hepple, P. and T Walter, C. Laxton, J Simpson on behalf of the Lewes Flood Action Recovery Team (2004). Health impacts of flooding in Lewes: a comparison of reported gastrointestinal and other illness and mental health in flooded and non-flooded households. Communicable Disease and Public Health 7:1-8. Pirard P, Vandentorren S, Pascal M, Laaidi K, Ledrans M. (2005). Summary of the mortality impact assessment of the 2003 heatwave in France. Euro Surveillance 10(7/8). Stéphanie Vandentorren, Florence Suzan, Sylvia Medina, Mathilde Pascal, Adeline Maulpoix, Jean-Claude Cohen, and Martine Ledrans Mortality in 13 French Cities During the August 2003 Heat Wave Am J Public Health, Sep 2004; 94: 1518 – 1520 Watkiss et al (forthcoming). PESETA – Projections of economic impacts of climate change in sectors of Europe based on bottom-up analysis. Health, final report. PESETA project. http://peseta.jrc.es/docs/Humanhealth.html Energy BPI (2002). British Power International for Department of Trade and Industry. October 2002 Power System Emergency Post Event Investigation. Overview Report. BMU 2007. Time to Adapt Symposium: Climate Change and the European Water Dimension. Discussion paper on Electricity. Series Time to Adapt Symposium: Climate Change and the European Water Dimension. Discussion paper on Electricity. Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit. Climate Change Impacts Review Group, 1991. The potential effects of climate change in the United Kingdom, Department of the Environment, HMSO, London. Defra (2002a). Energy Efficiency: DEFRA Paper on Low Carbon Options for the Domestic Sector. Downing, T. Downing, David Anthoff, Ruth Butterfield, Megan Ceronsky, Michael Grubb, Jiehan Guo, Cameron Hepburn, Chris Hope, Alistair Hunt, Ada Li, Anil Markandya, Scott Moss, Anthony Nyong, Richard Tol, Paul Watkiss (2005). Scoping uncertainty in the social cost of carbon. Final project report. Social Cost of Carbon: A Closer Look at Uncertainty (SCCU). July 2005. Report to Defra. http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/carboncost/aeat-scc.htm Defra (2002b). Energy Efficiency: DEFRA Paper on Energy Projections for the Service Sector. DTI (2005), The role of fossil fuel Carbon Abatement Technologies (CATs) in a low carbon economy (Authors: Marsh G, Pye S and Taylor P) DTI (2006) .The Energy Challenge. Energy Review Report July 2006. Department of Trade and Industry. http://www.dti.gov.uk/energy/review/page31995.html DTI (2006) DTI Energy and CO2 Emissions Projections to 2020 UEP26) www.dti.gov.uk/energy/review/index.html DUKES (2007). Digest of UK Energy Statistics. Published by BERR. Egenhofer C., Gialoglou K., Luciani G., Boots M., Scheepers M., Costantini, V., Gracceva, F., Markandya A., and G. Vicini (2004) Market-based Options for Security of Energy Supply‖. INDES Working Paper 1. Centre for European Policy Studies. G. Eskeland, E. Jochem, H. Neufeldt, T. Mideksa, N. Rive, T. Traber. (2008). CEPS/ADAM Policy brief. The Future of European Electricity: Choices before 2020 Future Energy Solutions (2002) Options for a Low Carbon Future - Phase 1, AEA Technology plc, Oxfordshire. Hacker, J., Belcher, SE., and Connell, RK (2005). Beating the Heat; keepings UK buildings cool in a warming climate. UKCIP Briefing report, UKCIP Oxford.



IPCC 1996, Climate Change 1995. Impacts, Adaptations and Mitigation of Climate Change, contributions from WG II of the Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. IPCC, 1998 The Regional Impacts of Climate Change: An Assessment of Vulnerability - IPCC Special Report IPCC (2001) Climate Change 2001: Working Group II: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. IPCC Third Assessment Report (IPCC, 2001). Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report. Summary for Policymakers Kirkinen, J., A. Matrikainen, H. Holttinen, I. Savolainen, O. Auvinen and S. Syri, 2005: Impacts on the Energy Sector and Adaptation of the Electricity Network under a Changing Climate in Finland. FINADAPT, working paper 10, Finnish Environment Institute. LCCP (2002). London‘s Warming. London Climate Change Partnership A Climate Change Impacts in London Evaluation Study. Final Report November 2002. Greater London Authority, London. Robert Lunnon, John Fullwood, Claire Cooper, Ian Barrie (2003). Extreme Weather Events Likely to Cause Disruption to Electricity Distribution. Prepared for: Resilience Working Group. 28 August 2003. Met Office. Met Office (2006). A scoping study on the impacts of climate change on the UK energy industry. Final Report. Prepared for: National Grid, EDF Energy and E.ON UK. 26 May 2006 Network Resilience Working Group (2003) Proposals for Improved Storm Performance for Electricity Distribution Networks L D Shorrock and J I Utley (2004). Domestic energy fact file 2003. BRE Housing Centre. BRE. Garston, Watford, WD25 9XX Walsh, C.L., Hall, J.W., Street, R.B., Blanksby, J., Cassar, M., Ekins, P., Glendinning, S., Goodess, C.M., Handley, J., Noland, R. and Watson, S.J. Building Knowledge for a Changing Climate: collaborative research to understand and adapt to the impacts of climate change on infrastructure, the built environment and utilities. Newcastle University, March 2007. Simon J. Watson, and Shanti Majithia (2005). Analyzing the Impact of Weather Variables on Monthly Electricity Demand Ching-Lai Hor, Member, IEEE, IEEE Transactions On Power Systems, Vol. 20, NO. 4, November 2005 Watson, S. J. and Woods, J.C. Chapter 7. Energy In. UEA, 1997. Economic Impacts of the Hot Summer and Unusually Warm Year of 1995. Report prepared at the request of the Department of Environment. Editors Palutikof, J. P., Subak, S., and Agnew, M.D. Published by the University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. 1997. ISBN 0-902170-05-8. Watkiss, P, Horrocks, L, and Taylor, P (2006). Energy. in Metroeconomica et al (2006). Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation: Cross-Regional Research Programme Project E Transport AEA Technology (2004). Railway Safety Implications of Weather, Climate and Climate Change: Final Report to The Rail Safety and Standards Board. 04/T096/RSRP/05/SPERserv/269. Atkins (2005). Climate change and London‘s transport systems: Technical report for the London Climate Change Partnership, published by the GLA. Atkins (2005b). Climate change and London‘s transport systems: Summary report for the London Climate Change Partnership, published by the GLA. BRE (2004). Understanding thermal comfort on London Underground trains and stations – summer survey. Report No. 211738, for London Underground Limited. Compton, K., T. Ermolieva and J.C. Linnerooth-Bayer (2002): Integrated flood risk management for urban infrastructure: managing the flood risk to Vienna‘s heavy rail mass rapid transit system. Proceedings of the Second Annual International IASA-DPRI Meeting: Integrated disaster risk management: megacity vulnerability and resilience, Laxenburg, Austria, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 20 pp. http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/RMS/dpri2002/Papers/Compton.pdf DfT (2004). The Changing Climate: Impact on the Department for Transport. Sarah Wooller of the In-House Policy Consultancy, DfT. DfT (2008). Transport Statistics Great Britain: 2008. Published by Department for transport. http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/statistics/datatablespublications/tsgb/2008edition/ R M Galbraith, D J Price and L Shackman (2005) Editors: Scottish Road Network Climate Change Study. The Scottish Executive. 2005. HSE (2004). Health and Safety Executive‘s Annual Report on the safety record of the railways in Great Britain during 2004. Available from www.hse.gov.uk/railways/statistics.htm



Horrocks, L, Hunt, A, Watkiss, P, (2006). Transport. in Metroeconomica et al (2006). Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation: Cross-Regional Research Programme Project E Kerr et al, 1999, Climate Change: Scottish Implications Scoping Study Scottish Executive Central Research Unit. http://www.scotland.gov.uk/cru/kd01/ccsi-09.htm R W P May and A J Todd (2001). Highways Agency Review of flooding incidents in Autumn 2000. Report SR 584. March 2001 LCCP (2005). Climate change and London‘s transport systems Summary Report. LCCP. Published by Greater London Authority http://www.london.gov.uk/lccp/publications/docs/climatetransportsept05.pdf Newton W H (2001). Climate Change and the Highways Agency. TRL Limited Edited by Newton W H. Nicholls, R et al (2006). Metrics For Assessing The Economic Benefits Of Climate Change Policies: Sea Level Rise. OECD. Environment Directorate. ENV/EPOC/GSP(2006)3/FINAL. Penning Rowsell, E., Chatterton, J., Wilson, T., and Potter, P (2002). Autumn 2000 Floods in England and Wales. Assessment of National Economic and Financial Losses. Report of the Flood Hazard Research Centre. Middlesex University. Risk Solutions. Cross-regional Climate Change Impacts and Adaptations – Business. Railway Industry Case Study. Defra, 2005. TfL (2004). London travel report 2004. Thornes, J.E. Chapter 11. IN UEA, 1997. Economic Impacts of the Hot Summer and Unusually Warm Year of 1995. Report prepared at the request of the Department of Environment. Editors Palutikof, J. P., Subak, S., and Agnew, M.D. Published by the University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. 1997. ISBN 0-902170-05-8. UKCIP (2000). Highlights of the first three years of the UK Climate Impacts Programme, UKCIP, McKenzie Hedger et al. Walsh, C.L., Hall, J.W., Street, R.B., Blanksby, J., Cassar, M., Ekins, P., Glendinning, S., Goodess, C.M., Handley, J., Noland, R. and Watson, S.J. Building Knowledge for a Changing Climate: collaborative research to understand and adapt to the impacts of climate change on infrastructure, the built environment and utilities. Newcastle University, March 2007. Alan Werritty, Andrew Black and Rob Duck (University of Dundee) Bill Finlinson, Neil Thurston, Simon Shackley and David Crichton (Entec UK Limited) Scottish Executive Central Research Unit 2001 Climate Change: Flooding Occurrences Review. Wilson and Burtwell, TRL Ltd 2002. Prioritising Future Construction Research and Adapting to Climate Change: Infrastructure (Transport and Utilities). Wooler, S (2004). The Changing Climate: Impact on the Department for Transport. Sarah Wooller of the In-House Policy Consultancy, DfT. http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/scienceresearch/key/thechangingclimateitsimpacto1909 Coastal ABI, 2005, Financial risk of climate change. Association of British Insurers, London, UK ABI (2006). Association of British Insurers. Coastal flood risk – Thinking for tomorrow, acting today Summary report November 2006. Agrawala, S. and Fankhauser, S. (Eds.) (2008) Economic Aspects of Adaptation to Climate Change: Costs, Benefits and Policy Instruments. OECD Anthoff D, Nicholls R. J., Tol R.S.J., Vafeidis A.T., (2006). "Global and regional exposure to large rises in sea-level: a sensitivity analysis.." Research Report Prepared for the Stern Review. Tyndall Working Paper 96 on the Economics of Climate Change. Tyndall Working Paper 96 Alcamo, J., J.M. Moreno, B. Nováky, M. Bindi, R. Corobov, R.J.N. Devoy, C. Giannakopoulos, E. Martin, J.E. Olesen, A. Shvidenko, 2007: Europe. Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden and C.E. Hanson, Eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 541-580. Bosello, F., Lazzarin, M., Roson, R., and Tol, R.S.J. (2004b), Economy-Wide Estimates of the Implications of Climate Change: Sea Level Rise. Research Unit Sustainability and Global Change FNU-38, Hamburg University and Centre for Marine and Atmospheric Science, Hamburg. Dawson, R.J., J.W. Hall, P.D. Bates and R.J. Nicholls, 2005: Quantified analysis of the probability of flooding in the Thames Estuary under imaginable worst case sea-level rise scenarios. Int. J. Water. Resour. D., 21, 577-591.



Dawson R.J., Dickson M, Nicholls R. J., Hall J, Walkden M, Stansby P K, Mokrech M., Richards J., Zhou J., Milligan J, Jordan A, Pearson S, Rees J, Bates P.D., Koukoulas S, Watkinson A., (2009). "Integrated analysis of risks of coastal flooding and cliff erosion under scenarios of long term change." Climatic Change, in press. Deke, O., Hooss, K. G., Kasten, C., Klepper, G., & Springer, K. (2001), Economic Impact of Climate Change: Simulations with a Regionalized Climate-Economy Model, Kiel Institute of World Economics, Kiel, 1065. Dlugolecki, A., 2004. A changing climate for insurance. A summary report for Chief Executives and Policymakers. ABI, London. Environment Agency (2006). Addressing Environmental Inequalities: Flood Risk. SCHO0905BJOK-E-P Science Report: SC020061/SR1. Authors: Gordon Walker, Kate Burningham, Jane Fielding, Graham Smith, Diana Thrush, Helen Fay. Environment Agency, forthcoming, Thames Estuary 2100 project (TE2100), http://te2100.dialoguebydesign.net/ Evans, E., Ashley, R., Hall, J., Penning-Rowsell, E., Saul, A., Sayers, P., Thorne, C. and Watkinson, A. (2004) Foresight. Future Flooding. Scientific Summary: Volume I Future risks and their drivers. Office of Science and Technology, London Evans, E.P., Simm, J.D., Thorne, C.R., Arnell, N.W., Ashley, R.M., Hess, T.M., Lane, S.N., Morris, J., Nicholls, R.J., Penning-Rowsell, E.C., Reynard, N.S., Saul, A.J., Tapsell, S.M., Watkinson, A.R., Wheater, H.S. (2008) An update of the Foresight Future Flooding 2004 qualitative risk analysis. Cabinet Office, London. Fielding J, Burningham K and Thrush D, 2005a Flood warning for vulnerable groups: measuring and mapping vulnerability. R&D Report W5C-018/4. Bristol: Environment Agency. National Trust – South West - long-term future of the UK's coasts Foresight (2004). Foresight Future Flooding. Executive Summary http://www.foresight.gov.uk/Flood%20and%20Coastal%20Defence/executive_summary.pdf Gardiner S, Hanson S, Nicholls R. J., Zhang Z, Jude S.R., Jones A, Richards J. A., Williams A, Spencer S., Coggins P. C. C., Gorczynska M, Bradbury A. P., McInnes R, Ingleby A, Dalton H, (2007). "The Habitats Directive, coastal habitats and climate change - case studies from the south coast of the U.K.." In McInnes, R. (ed.) International conference on Coastal Management Proceedings of the two-day international conference, Cardiff 31 October-1 November 2007, Thomas Telford, London. Gilbert, S. and Horner, R. 1984. The Thames Barrier. London, UK: Thomas Telford Ltd, Halcrow (2005) National Trust Coastal Risk Assessment Phase 1. Report to the National Trust. Swindon: Halcrow Group Limited. Hall, J., Reeder, T., FU, G., Nicholls, R. J., Wicks, J., Lawry, J., Dawson, R. & Jim Hall, J., Reeder, T., Fu, G., Nicholls, R., Wicks, J., Lawry, J., Dawson, R. and D. Parker (2005) Tidal Flood Risk in London Under Stabilisation Scenarios. Poster at Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change Conference, Exeter. 1-3 February, 2005. http://www.stabilisation2005.com/postersession.html Hall, J.W., Sayers, P.B. and Dawson, R.J., 2005, National-scale Assessment of Current and Future Flood Risk in England and Wales. Natural Hazards, 36, 147-164. Hinkel, J. and Klein, R.J.T. 2007. Integrating Knowledge for Assessing Vulnerability to Climate Change. In McFadden et al (eds.) Managing Coastal Vulnerability, Elsevier, Oxford , pp. 61-77 Holman IP, Berry PM, Mokrech M, Richards JA, Audsley E, Harrison PA, Rounsevell MDA, Nicholls RJ, Shackley S, Henriques C (2007). Simulating the effects of future climate and socio-economic change in East Anglia and North West England: the RegIS2 project. Summary Report. UKCIP, Oxford 2007. Lee, M (2001) Coastal Defence and the Habitats Directive: Predictions of Habitat Change in England and Wales, The Geographical Journal, 167 (1), 39-56. Lonsdale,K., T.E. Downing, R.J. Nicholls, D. Parker, A.T. Vafeidis, R. Dawson and J.W.Hall (2005), Plausible responses to the threat of rapid sea-level rise for the Thames Estuary, FNU-77, Hamburg University and Centre for Marine and Atmospheric Science, Hamburg. http://www.fnu.zmaw.de/fileadmin/fnu-files/publication/working-papers/waislondonwp.pdf (Atlantis stuff – also done France and Netherlands) Lonsdale K., Downing T.E., Nicholls R. J., Parker D, Vafeidis A.T., Dawson R, Hall J, (2008). "Plausible responses to the threat of rapid sea-level rise in the Thames Estuary." Climatic Change, 91, 145-169 Lowe, J. A. and Gregory, J. M., 2005. The effects of climate change on storm surges around the United Kingdom. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series A: 363: 1313–1328. Marbaix, P. and J.P van Ypersele (ed.), 2004. Impacts des changements climatiques en Belgique. (Greenpeace) www.climate.be/impacts



Nicholls, R. J. (2004). Coastal Flooding and Wetland Loss in the 21th Century: Changes Under the SRES Climate and Socio-Economic Scenarios. Global Environmental Change, 14, 69-86. Nicholls, R et al (2006). Metrics For Assessing The Economic Benefits Of Climate Change Policies: Sea Level Rise. OECD. Environment Directorate. ENV/EPOC/GSP(2006)3/FINAL. Nicholls R. J., Klein R.J.T., Tol R.S.J., (2007a). "Managing Coastal Vulnerability and Climate Change: A National to Global Perspective." In McFadden et al (eds.) Managing Coastal Vulnerability, Elsevier, Oxford , pp. 223-241 Nicholls R. J., Cooper B., Townend I.T., (2007b). "The management of coastal flooding and erosion." In: Thorne, C., Evans, E. and Penning-Rowsell, E. (eds.) Future Flood and Coastal Erosion Risks, Thomas Telford, London , pp. 392-413 Nicholls, R.J.(1), Hanson, S. (1), Herweijer, C.(2), Patmore, N. (2), Hallegatte, S.(3), Corfee-Morlot, J.(4), Chateau, J.(4), and Muir-Wood, R. (2)Screening Study: Ranking Port Cities With High Exposure And Vulnerability To Climate Extremes Interim Analysis: Exposure Estimates. ENV/EPOC/GSP(2007)11 The Pitt Review (2008) Lessons learned from the 2007 floods. http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/pittreview/thepittreview.html Richards, J. and Nicholls, R.J. 2007. PESETA – Projections of economic impacts of climate change in sectors of Europe based on bottom-up analysis. Coastal Systems: Adaptation Assessment Results, final report. Tol, R.S.J. (2002a), ‗New Estimates of the Damage Costs of Climate Change, Part I: Benchmark Estimates‘, Environmental and Resource Economics, 21 (1), 47-73. Tol, R.S.J. (2002b), ‗New Estimates of the Damage Costs of Climate Change, Part II: Dynamic Estimates‘, Environmental and Resource Economics, 21 (1), 135-160. Tol, R.S.J., 2004: The Double Trade-Off Between Adaptation and Mitigation for Sea Level Rise: An Application of FUND. Research Unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University and Centre for Marine and Atmospheric Sciences, Hamburg, Germany Working Paper FNU-48. Walker G, Fairburn J and Smith G, 2003 Environmental quality and social deprivation. R&D Technical Report E2-067/1/TR. Bristol: Environment Agency. Vafeidis A.T., Nicholls R. J., Boot G, Cox J, Grashoff P.S., Hinkel J., Maatens R, McFadden L., Spencer T., Tol R.S.J., (2004). "A global database for coastal vulnerability analysis." Land Ocean Interactions in the Coastal Zone (LOICZ) Newsletter, No. 33, pp. 1-4. Vafeidis, A.T., Nicholls, R.R., McFadden, L., Tol, R.S.J., Hinkel, J., Spencer, T., Grashoff, P.S., Boot, G. & Klein, R.J.T., 2007 A New Global Coastal Database For Impact And Vulnerability Analysis To Sea-Level Rise. Journal of Coastal Research, accepted. Flooding ABI (2007). Summer Floods 2007: Learning the Lessons. December 2007. http://www.abi.org.uk/BookShop/ResearchReports/Flooding%20in%20the%20UK%20Full.pdf Barredo, J.I., 2007, Major flood disasters in Europe: 1950-2005. Natural Hazards, 42, 125-148. Evans, E., Ashley, R., Hall, J., Penning-Rowsell, E., Saul, A., Sayers, P., Thorne, C. and Watkinson, A. (2004) Foresight. Future Flooding. Scientific Summary: Volume I Future risks and their drivers. Office of Science and Technology, London Hall, J.W., Sayers, P.B. and Dawson, R.J., 2005, National-scale Assessment of Current and Future Flood Risk in England and Wales. Natural Hazards, 36, 147-164. Höppe, P. and Pielke Jr, R.A., 2006, Workshop Summary Report. In Workshop on Climate Change and Disaster Losses: Understanding and Attributing Trends and Projections, P. Höppe and R.A. Pielke, Jr (Eds.). Hohenkammer, Germany, 4-12. Environment Agency (2006). Addressing Environmental Inequalities: Flood Risk. SCHO0905BJOK-E-P Science Report: SC020061/SR1. Authors: Gordon Walker, Kate Burningham, Jane Fielding, Graham Smith, Diana Thrush, Helen Fay. Evans, E.P., Simm, J.D., Thorne, C.R., Arnell, N.W., Ashley, R.M., Hess, T.M., Lane, S.N., Morris, J., Nicholls, R.J., Penning-Rowsell, E.C., Reynard, N.S., Saul, A.J., Tapsell, S.M., Watkinson, A.R., Wheater, H.S. (2008) An update of the Foresight Future Flooding 2004 qualitative risk analysis. Cabinet Office, London. Fielding J, Burningham K and Thrush D, 2005a Flood warning for vulnerable groups: measuring and mapping vulnerability. R&D Report W5C-018/4. Bristol: Environment Agency. Foresight (2004). Foresight Future Flooding. Executive Summary http://www.foresight.gov.uk/Flood%20and%20Coastal%20Defence/executive_summary.pdf



Penning Rowsell, E., Chatterton, J., Wilson, T., and Potter, P (2002). Autumn 2000 Floods in England and Wales. Assessment of National Economic and Financial Losses. Report of the Flood Hazard Research Centre. Middlesex University. The Pitt Review (2008) Lessons learned from the 2007 floods. http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/pittreview/thepittreview.html Walker G, Fairburn J and Smith G, 2003 Environmental quality and social deprivation. R&D Technical Report E2-067/1/TR. Bristol: Environment Agency. Alan Werritty, Andrew Black and Rob Duck (University of Dundee) Bill Finlinson, Neil Thurston, Simon Shackley and David Crichton (Entec UK Limited) Scottish Executive Central Research Unit 2001 Climate Change: Flooding Occurrences Review. Other Effects on Built Environment ABI, 2005, Financial risk of climate change. Association of British Insurers, London, UK, p. 39. Arup (2008). Your home in a changing climate. Report for the Three Regions Climate Change Group. Professor May Cassar and Mr Nicholas Cockroft (2008). Full Review of the Literature consisting of 10 Matrices on the Effect of Climate Change on Cultural and Sporting Assets.Report to the Department of Culture, Media and Sport. 14 March 2008 http://www.culture.gov.uk/images/publications/FullLiteratureReview2.pdf CIBSE, 2004. Climate change and the internal environment: a guide for designers. CIBSE, London. Dlugolecki, A., 2004. A changing climate for insurance. A summary report for Chief Executives and Policymakers. ABI, London. ESPACE Project (European Spatial Planning: Adapting to Climate Events, www.espace-project.org.) Hunt et al, in Metroeconomica et al (2006). Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation: Cross-Regional Research Programme Project E Land use Consultants et al (2006). Adapting to Climate Change Impacts. A Good Practice Guide for Sustainable Communities. Report for the Three Regions Climate Change Group. Published by Defra 2006. LCCP (2006a). London Climate Change Partnership. Adapting to Climate Change. Lessons for London. Greater London Authority, London. Shaw, R., Colley, M., and Connell, R. (2007) Climate change adaptation by design: a guide for sustainable communities. TCPA, London Stern . N., Peters, S., Bakhshi, V., Bowen, A., Cameron, C., Catovsky, S., Crane, D., Cruickshank, S., Dietz, S., Edmondson, N., Garbett, S., Hamid, L., Hoffman, G., Ingram, D., Jones, B., Patmore, N., Radcliffe, H., Sathiyarajah, R., Stock, M., Taylor, C., Vernon, T., Wanjie, H., and Zenghelis, D. (2006). The Economics of Climate Change. Cabinet Office – HM Treasury. Cambridge University Press. UKCIP (2002). Building Knowledge for a Changing Climate. The Impacts of Climate Change on the Built Environment. Walsh, C.L., Hall, J.W., Street, R.B., Blanksby, J., Cassar, M., Ekins, P., Glendinning, S., Goodess, C.M., Handley, J., Noland, R. and Watson, S.J. Building Knowledge for a Changing Climate: collaborative research to understand and adapt to the impacts of climate change on infrastructure, the built environment and utilities. Newcastle University, March 2007. Agriculture AEA/UPM (2007). Adaptation to Climate Change in the Agricultural Sector AGRI-2006-G4-05 AEA Energy & Environment and Universidad de Politécnica de Madrid. Report to European Commission Directorate -General for Agriculture and Rural Development Alcamo, J., J.M. Moreno, B. Nováky, M. Bindi, R. Corobov, R.J.N. Devoy, C. Giannakopoulos, E. Martin, J.E. Olesen, A. Shvidenko, 2007: Europe. Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden and C.E. Hanson, Eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 541-580. Audsley, E., Pearn, K. R., Simota, C., Cojocaru, G., Koutsidou, E., Rounsevell, M. D. A., Trnka, M. and Alexandrov, V. (2006) What can scenario modelling tell us about future European scale agricultural land use, and what not? Environmental Science and Policy 9, 148-162. Defra. Climate Change Impacts & Adaptations Research Programme (CC03)(Defra, 2003). Summaries Report 1987 – 2002 http://www.ukcip.org.uk/images/stories/Pub_pdfs/DefraCC03_Summaries_of_Research_2003.pdf Defra (2004) Publication of outputs arising from Defra CC03 and related programmes (CC0366).



Defra (2005a). Review of Defra‘s R&D on Climate Change Impacts & Adaptations (Agriculture) 20 July 2005. http://www.defra.gov.uk/science/documents/publications/CC03_Programme_Review.pdf Defra (2005b). ‗The Impacts of Climate Change on Agriculture‘ http://www.defra.gov.uk/farm/environment/climate-change/pdf/climate-ag.pdf Easterling, W.E., P.K. Aggarwal, P. Batima, K.M. Brander, L. Erda, S.M. Howden, A. Kirilenko, J. Morton, J.-F. Soussana, J. Schmidhuber and F.N. Tubiello, 2007: Food, fibre and forest products. Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden and C.E. Hanson, Eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 273-313. Hamilton, A. Tinch and Hanley, N. (2006). Chapter 3. Agriculture. In Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation: Cross-Regional Research Programme Project E – Quantify the cost of future impacts. Prepared for: DEFRA Prepared by: Metroeconomica Limited (UK) May 2006. Hopkins A (200). Defra project CC0365: Knowledge Transfer Initiative On Impacts And Adaptation To Climate Change In Agriculture Hossel, Jl (2002). Defra project CC0357: Identifying And Costing Agricultural Adaptive Responses Under Climate Change Scenarios (Carus) Hughes, G., Wilkinson, M., Boothby, D., Clarke, J., Perkins, S., Davies, M., Temple, M., Cheshire, D., Hossell J. & Gallani, M. (2008). Changes to Agricultural Management Under Extreme Events – Likelihood of Effects & Opportunities Nationally (CHAMELEON). Report to Defra on Project CC0361 http://sciencesearch.defra.gov.uk/Document.aspx?Document=CC0361_7539_FRP.doc MAFF (2000). Climate Change and Agriculture. Metroeconomica (2005). Report On The Costs Of The Hot Summer Of 2003 - Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation: Cross-Regional Research Programme Project E – Quantify the cost of impacts and adaptation Final Report Prepared for: DEFRA Prepared by: Metroeconomica Limited (UK) Parry, M., Jones, P., Rehman, T., Tranter, R., Carson, I., Mortimer, D., Livermore, M. and Little, J. (1998) Economic Implications of Global Climate Change on Agriculture in England and Wales. Report to MAFF. Department of Geography, University College London. Parry, M., Ed., 2000: Assessment of Potential Effects and Adaptations for Climate Change in Europe (ACACIA). University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK, 320 pp. Porter, J.R. (2005). Review of the Outputs of the Defra Programme Of Research on the Impacts of Climate Change On UK Agriculture from 1999 to 2005 CC0380. http://www.defra.gov.uk/science/documents/publications/Defra_CC03_review_030705_JPGamended__jrp%20FINAL.pdf Richter G. et al, 2002; 2004. Defra project CC0336 Assessing drought risks for UK crops under climate change. Richter G. et al 2004. Defra project CC0368 Re-assessing drought risks for UK crops using UKCIP02 climate change scenarios Semenov, M.A. (2008) Impacts of climate change on wheat in England and Wales. Journal of the Royal Society Interface 10.1098/rsif.2008.0285 Shepherd, M.A., editor (2002). A review of the impact of the wet autumn of 2000 on the main agricultural and horticultural enterprises in England and Wales. Defra project CC0372: The Wet Autumn of 2000: Implications for Agriculture. Subak, S (1997). Chapter 5. Agriculture. In UEA, 1997. Economic Impacts of the Hot Summer and Unusually Warm Year of 1995. Report prepared at the request of the Department of Environment. Editors Palutikof, J. P., Subak, S., and Agnew, M.D. Published by the University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. 1997. ISBN 0-902170-05-8. Water Arnell, N.W., 2003. The effect of climate change on river flows and groundwater recharge UKCIP02 scenarios. UKWIR, London. Arnell, N.W., 2004. Climate-change impacts on river flows in Britain: the UKCIP02 scenarios. Journal of the Chartered Institution of Water and Environmental Management, 18, 112-117 Boyd, R Wade, S. and Walton, H (2006) in Metroeconomica et al (2006). Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation: Cross-Regional Research Programme Project E Goodess, C.M., Osborn, T.J. and Hulme, M., 2002. The identification and evaluation of suitable scenario development methods for the estimation of future probabilities of extreme weather events, Tyndall Centre Technical Report 4.



Downing, T.E, Butterfield, R.E., Edmonds, B., Knox, J.W., Moss, S., Piper, B.S. and Weatherhead, E.K. (and the CCDeW project team) (2003). Climate Change and the Demand for Water, Research Report, Stockholm Environment Institute Oxford Office, Oxford. Holman IP, Berry PM, Mokrech M, Richards JA, Audsley E, Harrison PA, Rounsevell MDA, Nicholls RJ, Shackley S, Henriques C (2007). Simulating the effects of future climate and socio-economic change in East Anglia and North West England: the RegIS2 project. Summary Report. UKCIP, Oxford 2007. Vidal,.J.P. and Wade, S.D. 2008. A multimodel assessment of future climatological droughts in the UK. Int. J. Climatology. (Accepted JOC 07-0335) Vidal, J.P. and Wade, S.D. or UKWIR, 2006. The effect of climate change on river flows and groundwater recharge: Guidelines Report. UKWIR Ltd and Environment Agency research report CL\04\06\08. Wade, S. 2004. The impact of climate change on drought in the South East of England. HR Wallingford, Wallingford. 17pp. Waughray (1997) Chapter 6. Water. In UEA, 1997. Economic Impacts of the Hot Summer and Unusually Warm Year of 1995. Report prepared at the request of the Department of Environment. Editors Palutikof, J. P., Subak, S., and Agnew, M.D. Published by the University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. 1997. ISBN 0-902170-05-8. Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (including Forestry and Fisheries) Alcamo, J., J.M. Moreno, B. Nováky, M. Bindi, R. Corobov, R.J.N. Devoy, C. Giannakopoulos, E. Martin, J.E. Olesen, A. Shvidenko, 2007: Europe. Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden and C.E. Hanson, Eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 541-580. Araújo, M.B., Thuiller, W. and Pearson, R.G. (2006). Climate warming and the decline of amphibians and reptiles in Europe. Journal of Biogeography, 33, 1712-1728. ALARM. http://www.alarmproject.net/alarm/ Berry et al, in Metroeconomica et al (2006). Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation: Cross-Regional Research Programme Project E Berry, P.M., Harrison, P.A, Dawson, T.P. and Walmesley, C. (Eds.) (2005). Modelling Natural Resource Responses to Climate Change (MONARCH): A Local Approach. http://www.ukcip.org.uk/resources/sector/monarch_p2.asp?sector=3 Berry, P.M. and Harley, M. (2006). Climate change, biodiversity and regional policy development. English Nature report Pam Berry, James Paterson, Mar Cabeza, Anne Dubuis, Antoine Guisan, Laura Jäättelä, Ingolf Kühn, Guy Midgley, Martin Musche, Jake Piper and Elizabeth Wilson (2008). Mitigation measures and adaptation measures and their impacts on biodiversity. MACIS: Minimisation of and Adaptation to Climate change: Impacts on biodiversity. October 2008 Brooker, R. and Young, J. (2005) Climate change and biodiversity in Europe: a review of impacts, policy, gaps in knowledge and barriers to the exchange of information between scientists and policy makers. Report to DEFRA. BRANCH partnership (2007), ‗Planning for biodiversity in a changing climate – BRANCH project Final Report‘, Natural England, UK. Dera (2007). A Strategy for England‘s Trees, Woods and Forests http://www.defra.gov.uk/wildlife-countryside/pdf/forestry/20070620-forestry.pdf England Forest Industries Partnership (2006) Woodland and Forest Sector in England: A Mapping Study carried out by Jakko Poyry. EEA/JRC (2004) Impacts of Europe's changing climate - 2004 indicator-based assessment EEA/JRC (2008) Impacts of Europe's changing climate - 2008 indicator-based assessment Document Actions , EEA Report No 4/2008. http://reports.eea.europa.eu/eea_report_2008_4/en/ Fischlin, A: Ecosystems, their properties, goods, and services. Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of WG II to the 4th Assessment Report of the IPCC Halpern, B. S.; Walbridge, S.; Selkoe, K. A.; Kappel, C. V.; Micheli, F.; D'Agrosa, C.; Bruno, J. F.; Casey, K. S.; Ebert, C.; Fox, H. E.; Fujita, R.; Heinemann, D.; Lenihan, H. S.; Madin, E. M. P.; Perry, M. T.; Selig, E. R.; Spalding, M.; Steneck, R.; Watson, R., 2008: A Global Map of Human Impact on Marine Ecosystems. Science 319: 948–952. Harrison, P. A., Berry, P.M. and Dawson, T. P. (2001). Climate Change and Nature Conservation in the UK and Ireland: Modelling natural resource responses to climate change (the MONARCH project). UKCIP Technical Report, Oxford. Holman IP, Berry PM, Mokrech M, Richards JA, Audsley E, Harrison PA, Rounsevell MDA, Nicholls RJ, Shackley S, Henriques C (2007). Simulating the effects of future climate and socio-economic change in East Anglia and North West England: the RegIS2 project. Summary Report. UKCIP, Oxford 2007.



Hickling, R.; Roy, D. B.; Hill, J. K. and Thomas, C. D., 2005. A northward shift of range margins in British Odonata. Global Change Biology 11 (3): 502–506. Hiddink, J. G. and Ter Hofstede, R., 2008. Climate Change induced increases in species richness of marine fishes. Global Change Biology 14: 453–460. J.J. Hopkins, H.M. Allison, C.A. Walmsley, M. Gaywood, G. Thurgate (2007). Conserving biodiversity in a changing climate: guidance on building capacity to adapt. Published by Defra on behalf of the UK Biodiversity Partnership. http://www.ukbap.org.uk/Library/BRIG/CBCCGuidance.pdf Hossell, J.E., Briggs, B. and Hepburn, I.R. (2000). Climate Change and Nature Conservation: a review of the impact of climate change on UK species and habitat conservation policy. HMSO DETR MAFF, London 73pp + Appendices. Laffoley, D.d‘A., and others. 2005. The MarClim Project. Key messages for decision makers and policy advisors, and recommendations for future administrative arrangements and management measures. English Nature Research Reports, No. 671. MCCIP (2008). Marine climate change impacts Annual Report Card 2007–2008 www.mccip.org.uk/arc Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005. Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Synthesis. Island Press, Washington, DC. http://www.maweb.org/en/index.aspx Monarch (2001). Climate Change and Nature Conservation in Britain and Ireland MONARCH- Modelling Natural Resource Responses to Climate Change. Summary Report. Published by the MONARCH Partnership through the UK Climate Impacts Programme (UKCIP), 2001. Monarch (2004). MONARCH 2 – Modelling Natural Resource Responses to Climate Change A local approach. Summary Report. Published by the MONARCH Partnership through the UK Climate Impacts Programme (UKCIP), 2004. Parmesan, C. and Yohe, G., 2003. A globally coherent fingerprint of climate change impacts across natural systems. Nature, 421, 37–42 RSPB (2008). Climatic Atlas of European Breeding Birds. http://www.rspb.org.uk/news/details.asp?id=tcm:9-180304 Schröter et al (2004). ATEAM Final report 2004 Detailed report, related to overall project duration.Contract n°EVK2-2000-00075. Thuiller, W. , Lavorel, S., Araújo, M. B. Sykes, M. T. and Prentice, I. C. (2005). Climate change threats to plant diversity in Europe. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science U.S.A. 102, 8245-8250. Thuiller, W., Albert, C., Araújo, M.B., Berry, P.M., Guisan, A., Hickler, T., Midgley, G.F., Paterson, J., Schurr, F.M., Sykes, M.T. and Zimmermann, N.E. (2008). Predicting global change impacts on plant species distributions: future challenges. Perspectives in Plant Ecology, Evolution and Systematics, 9, 137-152 Turrell, W R (2006). Climate Change and Scottish Fisheries. Fisheries Research Services collaboration Report 12/06. August 2006. http://www.marlab.ac.uk/FRS.Web/Uploads/Documents/FRS%20SFF%20Climate%20and%20Fisheries.pdf Walmsley, C.A., Smithers, R.J., Berry, P.M., Harley, M., Stevenson, M.J., Catchpole, R. (Eds.). (2007). MONARCH – Modelling Natural Resource Responses to Climate Change – a synthesis for biodiversity conservation. UKCIP, Oxford. Tourism Amelung, B., Nicholls, S., & Viner, D. (2007). Implications of Global Climate Change for Tourism Flows and Seasonality. Journal of Travel Research, 45(3), 285-296. Amelung B and Viner D. 2006 Mediterrannean Tourism: Exploring the future with the Tourism Comfort Index Journal of Sustainable Tourism Vol. 14. Nos. 4 pp 349-366 Hamilton et al, in Metroeconomica et al (2006). Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation: Cross-Regional Research Programme Project E P. Martens/B. Amelung/A. Moreno (2008). PESETA – Projections of economic impacts of climate change in sectors of Europe based on bottom-up analysis. Tourism:, final report. Kerr et al, 1999, Climate Change: Scottish Implications Scoping Study Scottish Executive Central Research Unit. http://www.scotland.gov.uk/cru/kd01/ccsi-09.htm Kerr, A., McLeod, A., University of Edinburgh, 2001 Potential adaptation strategies for climate change in Scotland,



McEvoy, D., Handley, J. F., Cavan, G., Aylen, J., Lindley, S., McMorrow, J. and Glynn, S. (2006). Climate Change and the Visitor Economy: the challenges and opportunities for England‘s Northwest, Sustainability Northwest (Manchester) and UKCIP (Oxford). SNIFFER (2005). Business Risks of Climate Change to the Public Sector in Scotland. Paul Watkiss, Suzanne Evans, Catherine Wasilewski, and John Mayhew (AEA Technology Environment) in collaboration with Alistair Hunt, Metroeconomica, Eleanor Baker, Risk Solutions, Stephen Wade (HR Wallingford) and Pam Berry (Oxford University). Report to SNIFFER. Published at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2005/11/14083740 West, C.C. and Gawith, M.J. (Eds.) (2005) Measuring Progress: Preparing for climate change through the UK Climate Impacts Programme. UKCIP Technical Report. UKCIP, Oxford. Available online at: http://www.ukcip.org.uk/images/stories/Pub_pdfs/MeasuringProgress.pdf Viner D. 2006 Tourism and its interactions with Climate Change. Journal of Sustainable Tourism Vol. 14. Nos. 4 pp 317-323 Business and Industry ABI, 2005, Financial risk of climate change. Association of British Insurers, London, UK, p. 39. ABI (2006). Association of British Insurers. Coastal flood risk – Thinking for tomorrow, acting today Summary report November 2006. ABI (2007). Summer Floods 2007: Learning the Lessons. December 2007. http://www.abi.org.uk/BookShop/ResearchReports/Flooding%20in%20the%20UK%20Full.pdf Alllianz (2005) Climate Change and The Financial Sector: An Agenda for Action‖. http://www.allianz.com/en/allianz_group/sustainability/climate_change_and_environment/climate_change/index.html?hits=climate+change Alllianz (2006) ―Climate Change and Insurance: An Agenda for Action‖. http://www.allianz.com/en/allianz_group/sustainability/climate_change_and_environment/climate_change/index.html?hits=climate+change Frans Berkhout, The rationale for public policy: how well does the EU strategy address the objectives for public policy? In. Why We Will Need Adaptation And How It Can Be Implemented. Policy Brief draft, 8 October 2007 for ADAM-CEPS Seminar on Adaptation by Asbjørn Aaheim, Frans Berkhout, Zbigniew Kundzewicz, Carlo Lavalle, Darryn Mcevoy, Reinhard Mechler, Henry Neufeldt, Anthony Patt, Paul Watkiss, And Anita Wreford, CBI (2007). Climate change - everyone's business Report of the CBI Climate Change Task Force http://www.avtclient.co.uk/climatereport/docs/climatereport2007full.pdf Dlugolecki, A., 2004. A changing climate for insurance. A summary report for Chief Executives and Policymakers. ABI, London. Firth, J, and Colley, M (2006) The Adaptation Tipping Point: Are UK Businesses Climate Proof? Acclimatise and UKCIP, Oxford. Lloyds (2006). Climate Change. Adapt or Bust. http://www.lloyds.com/NR/rdonlyres/38782611-5ED3-4FDC-85A4-5DEAA88A2DA0/0/FINAL360climatechangereport.pdf Metroeconomica (2005). Report On The Costs Of The Hot Summer Of 2003 - Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation: Cross-Regional Research Programme Project E – Quantify the cost of impacts and adaptation Final Report Prepared for: DEFRA Prepared by: Metroeconomica Limited (UK) Met Office (2007) for CBI (2007). Climate change adaptation for UK businesses A report for the CBI Task Force on Climate Change. http://www.avtclient.co.uk/climatereport/docs/climatereport2007metapp.pdf Meteorological Office (2007). Study on the impacts of climate change on DWP. City of London (2006). Rising to the Challenge. The City of London Corporation‘s Climate Change Adaptation Strategy. City of London. LCCP (2006). London Climate Change Partnership Finance subgroup. Adapting to Climate Change. Business as Usual. Greater London Authority, London. Risk Solutions. Cross-regional Climate Change Impacts and Adaptations – Business. Supermarket Industry Case Study. Defra, 2005. Swiss Re Group, Munich Re Group, Allianz Group Swiss Re (2002), ―Opportunities and Risk of Climate Change‖, Risk Perception Series, Report. S Vivian, N Williams, W Rogers (2005). Climate change risks in building - an introduction (C638). CIRIA ISBN 978-0-86017-638-1



UEA, 1997. Economic Impacts of the Hot Summer and Unusually Warm Year of 1995. Report prepared at the request of the Department of Environment. Editors Palutikof, J. P., Subak, S., and Agnew, M.D. Published by the University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. 1997. ISBN 0-902170-05-8. UKCIP (2005). A changing climate for business: business planning for the impacts ofclimate change. UKCIP Publication. Gerry Metcalf and Kay Jenkinson. Paul Watkiss, Francesco Bosello, Barbara Buchner, Michela Catenacci, Alessandra Goria, Onno Kuik and Etem Karakaya. Climate Change: the Cost of Inaction and the Cost of Adaptation. European Environment Agency Technical Report. Published December 2007. EEA Technical report No 13/2007. ISSN 1725–2237. ISBN 978-92-9167-974-4 EEA, Copenhagen, 2007. http://reports.eea.europa.eu/technical_report_2007_13/en Wilbanks, T.J., P. Romero Lankao, M. Bao, F. Berkhout, S. Cairncross, J.-P. Ceron, M. Kapshe, R. Muir-Wood and R. Zapata-Marti, 2007: Industry, settlement and society. Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden and C.E. Hanson, Eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 357-390. UK Regional studies Atkins (1999) Rising to the Challenge: Impacts of Climate Change in the South East in the 21st Century, WS Atkins, The Met Office & ADAS, November 1999. Atkins (2002) Warming up the Region: The Impacts of Climate Change in the Yorkshire and Humber Region, WS Atkins 2002 Atkins (2005). Climate change and London‘s transport systems: Technical report for the London Climate Change Partnership, published by the GLA Atkins et al (2007). Preparing for a Changing Climate in Northern Ireland. http://www.sniffer.org.uk/Webcontrol/Secure/ClientSpecific/ResourceManagement/UploadedFiles/UKCC13_Final%20report.pdf BRE (2004). Understanding thermal comfort on London Underground trains and stations – summer survey. Report No. 211738, for London Underground Limited. City of London (2006). Rising to the Challenge. The City of London Corporation‘s Climate Change Adaptation Strategy. City of London. ECOTEC (2000) Wales: Changing Climate, Challenging Choices. The Impacts of Climate Change in Wales from now to 2080, produced by ECOTEC for The National Assembly for Wales, February 2000. Entec (2000). The Potential Impacts of Climate Change in the East Midlands, produced by Entec UK Ltd for the East Midlands Sustainable Development Round Table, July 2000. Entec (2003). The potential impacts of climate change in the West Midlands – technical report, 244pp, Sustainability West Midlands. Holman IP, Berry PM, Mokrech M, Richards JA, Audsley E, Harrison PA, Rounsevell MDA, Nicholls RJ, Shackley S, Henriques C (2007). Simulating the effects of future climate and socio-economic change in East Anglia and North West England: the RegIS2 project. Summary Report. UKCIP, Oxford 2007. Kerr et al, 1999, Climate Change: Scottish Implications Scoping Study Scottish Executive Central Research Unit. http://www.scotland.gov.uk/cru/kd01/ccsi-09.htm Kerr, A., McLeod, A., University of Edinburgh, 2001 Potential adaptation strategies for climate change in Scotland, Kersey, J., Wilby, R., Fleming, P. and Shackley, S., 2000. The potential impacts of climate change in the East Midlands: Technical report. 188pp. R M Galbraith, D J Price and L Shackman (2005) Editors: Scottish Road Network Climate Change Study. The Scottish Executive. 2005. GLA (2006). London‘s Urban Heat Island: A Summary for Decision Makers. http://www.london.gov.uk/mayor/environment/climate-change/docs/UHI_summary_report.pdf Mayor of London and the Environment Agency (2007) Draft Regional Flood Risk Appraisal. At: http://www.london.gov.uk/mayor/strategies/sds/docs/regional-flood-risk.pdf LCCP (2002). London‘s Warming. London Climate Change Partnership A Climate Change Impacts in London Evaluation Study. Final Report November 2002. Greater London Authority, London.



LCCP (2006a). London Climate Change Partnership. Adapting to Climate Change. Lessons for London. Greater London Authority, London. LCCP (2006b). London Climate Change Partnership Finance subgroup. Adapting to Climate Change. Business as Usual. Greater London Authority, London. National Assembly for Wales, 2000a. Wales: Changing climate, challenging choices: the impacts of climate change in Wales from 2000 to 2080. Technical report. 102pp. National Assembly for Wales, 2000b. Wales: Changing climate, challenging choices: the impacts of climate change in Wales from 2000 to 2080. Summary report. 10pp. REGIS: Regional Climate Change Impact Response Studies in East Anglia and North West England, Defra, 2002. South West Climate Change Impacts Partnership, 2003a. Warming to the idea: Meeting the challenge of climate change in the South West. Technical report. 197pp. South West Climate Change Impacts Partnership, 2003b. Warming to the idea: Meeting the challenge of climate change in the South West. Summary report. 22pp Sustainability North West, 1998. Everybody has an impact - climate change impacts in the North West of England: Summary report. 16pp, Sustainability North West, Manchester. SNIFFER, 2002. Implications of climate change for Northern Ireland: informing strategy development, 176pp. SNIFFER (2005). Paul Watkiss, Suzanne Evans, Catherine Wasilewski, and John Mayhew (AEA Technology Environment) in collaboration with Alistair Hunt, Metroeconomica, Eleanor Baker, Risk Solutions, Stephen Wade (HR Wallingford) and Pam Berry (Oxford University). Business Risks of Climate Change to the Public Sector in Scotland. Report to SNIFFER. Published at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2005/11/14083740 SNIFFER (2007). Preparing for a Changing Climate in Northern Ireland . http://www.sniffer.org.uk/Webcontrol/Secure/ClientSpecific/ResourceManagement/UploadedFiles/UKCC13_Final%20report.pdf Sustainable Development Round Table for the East of England, 2004a. Living with climate change in the East of England - businesses, 8pp. Sustainable Development Round Table for the East of England, 2004b. Living with climate change in the East of England – local authorities, 8pp. Sustainable Development Round Table for the East of England, 2004c. Living with climate change in the East of England. Summary report, 20pp. Sustainability North East (SustaiNE), 2002. And the weather today is.... 27pp, SustaiNE, Newcastle. Sustainability North West (1998) Everybody has an Impact: Climate Change Impacts in the North West of England – An Initiative of the North West Regional Chamber, Sustainability North West, December 1998. Wade, S., Hossell, J., Hough, M., and Fenn, C. (eds.), 1999, Rising to the challenge: the impacts of climate change in the South East: Technical report, 94pp. Alan Werritty, Andrew Black and Rob Duck (University of Dundee) Bill Finlinson, Neil Thurston, Simon Shackley and David Crichton (Entec UK Limited) Scottish Executive Central Research Unit 2001 Climate Change: Flooding Occurrences Review. Yorkshire Forward and Yorkshire and Humber Assembly, 2002. Warming up the region. Yorkshire and Humber Climate Change Impact Scoping Study. 22pp. European Country Studies Carter, T (2007). Assessing the Adaptive Capacity of the Finnish Environment and Society under a changing climate: FINADAPT. Summary for Policy Makers. CCIRG (1991). UK Climate Change Impacts Review Group, 1991. The potential effects of climate change in the United Kingdom, Department of the Environment, HMSO, London. CCIRG (1996). Climate Change Impacts Review Group, 1996. Review of the Potential Effects of Climate Change on the United Kingdom. Department of the Environment, HMSO, London. 247pp.. ECCE (20065). Preliminary Assessment of the Impacts in Spain due to the Effects of Climate Change (ECCE) (2005) http://www.mma.es/portal/secciones/cambio_climatico/areas_tematicas/impactos_cc/eval_impactos.htm



France: National Strategy for Climate Change Adaptation (http://www.environnement.gouv.fr/Adaptation-au-changement.html) Germany: Climate Impact and Adaptation (KomPass; http://www.anpassung.net) Hungary: VAHAVA Changing (VÁltozás) Impact (HAtás) Response (VÁlaszadás) Marbaix, P. and J.P van Ypersele (ed.), 2004. Impacts des changements climatiques en Belgique. www.climate.be/impacts Metroeconomica et al (2006). Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation: Cross-Regional Research Programme Project E The Netherlands: Climate changes Spatial Planning (CcSP, http://www.climatechangesspatialplanning.nl/) SIAM (2002) Climate Change in Portugal: Scenarios, Impacts, and Adaptation Measures - SIAM http://www.siam.fc.ul.pt/siam.html. 2002. F. D. Santos, K. Forbes, and R. Moita (eds.) Climate Change in Portugal. Scenarios, Impacts and Adaptation Measures - SIAM Project. Gradiva, Lisbon, Portugal (456 pp). Sweden facing climate change - threats and opportunities (2007) Final report from the Swedish Commission on Climate and Vulnerability Stockholm 2007. http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/574/a/96002 Sweden: Swedish Regional Climate Modelling Programme (SWECLIM); Swedish research programme on Climate, Impacts and Adaptation (SWECIA;) http://www.sei.se/index.php?page=newsitem&item=5616) WL Delft Hydraulics (2007). Overstromingsrisico‘s in Nederland in een veranderend klimaat (Flood risks in the Netherlands under climate change), report Q4290.00, Delft, Netherlands; in Dutch. Global Country or Regional Studies Australian Greenhouse Gas Office. (2003). Climate Change: An Australian Guide to the Science and Potential Impacts Edited by Barrie Pittock, http://www.greenhouse.gov.au/science/guide/pubs/science-guide.pdf Dan Cayan, Amy Lynd Luers, Michael Hanemann, Guido Franco, Bart Croes (2006). Scenarios Of Climate Change In California: An Overview. California Climate Change Center. February 2006. CEC-500-2005-186-SF, http://www.energy.ca.gov/2005publications/CEC-500-2005-186/CEC-500-2005-186-SF.PDF CIER (2007:8). The Economic Impacts of Climate Change and the Costs of Inaction. http://www.cier.umd.edu/climateadaptation CSIR (2005). A Status Quo, Vulnerability and Adaptation Assessment of the Physical and Socio-Economic Effects of Climate Change in the Western Cape. Midgley, G.F. , Chapman, R.A. , Hewitson, B. , Johnston, P. , de Wit, M. , Ziervogel, G. , Mukheibir, P. , van Niekerk, L. , Tadross, M. , van Wilgen, B.W. , Kgope, B. , Morant, P.D. , Theron, A. , Scholes, R.J. , Forsyth, G.G. (2005) CSRIO (2006). Infrastructure and Climate Change Risk Assessment for Victoria. Mr Paul Holper, Mr Sean Lucy, Mr Michael Nolan, Mr Claudio Senese, Mr Kevin Hennessy, http://www.greenhouse.vic.gov.au/CA256F310024B628/0/60772F5FF15F591ACA2573210020F7C0/$File/Infrastructure+and+Climate+Change+Risk+Assessment+Part+1.pdf Environment Canada (1997): The Canada country study: climate impacts and adaptation. Adaptation and Impacts Research Group, Downsview, Ontario. Katharine Hayhoe, Daniel Cayanc, Christopher B. Fieldd, Peter C. Frumhoffe, Edwin P. Maurerf, Norman L. Millerg, Susanne C. Moserh, Stephen H. Schneideri, Kimberly Nicholas Cahilld, Elsa E. Clelandd, Larry Daleg, Ray Drapekj, R. Michael Hanemannk, Laurence S. Kalksteinl, James Lenihanj, Claire K. Lunchd, Ronald P. Neilsonj, Scott C. Sheridanm, and Julia H. Vervillee (2004). Emissions pathways, climate change, and impacts on California. PNAS August 24, 2004 vol. 101 no. 34. 12422–12427. www.pnas.org Jollands, N., M. Ruth, C. Bernier and N. Golubiewski, 2005: Climate‘s long-term impacts on New Zealand infrastructure - a Hamilton City case study. Proc. Ecological Economics in Action, New Zealand Centre for Ecological Economics, Palmerston North, New Zealand, 30 pp Kirshen, P.H., Ruth, M., Anderson, W., Lakshmanan, T.R., Chapra, S., Chudyk, W., Edgers, L., Gute, D., Sanayei, M., Vogel, R., 2004. Climate‘s long-term impacts on metro Boston, Final Report to the US EPA (CLIMB). Office of Research and Development, Washington, DC. http://www.net.org/reports/CLIMB_Final.pdf OECD (2004) CD Development and Climate Change In Egypt: Focus on Coastal Resources and the Nile. Shardul Agrawala, Annett Moehner, Mohamed El Raey, Declan Conway, Maarten van Aalst, Marca Hagenstad and Joel Smith. COM/ENV/EPOC/DCD/ DAC(2004)1/FINAL Sheltair (2003). Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation Strategies for Urban Systems in Greater Vancouver. Volume 1: Preliminary Assessment.



US NAS (2000). Climate Change Impacts on the United States The Potential Consequences of Climate Variability and Change. National Assessment Synthesis Team, US Global Change Research Program. http://www.usgcrp.gov/usgcrp/nacc/ Cross-sectoral, indirect, linkages, wider economic and international Bosello, F. (2008), "Country and sectoral economic implications of climate change impacts: a general equilibrium approach", paper presented at the "University of Venice - European Investment Bank International workshop on impacts of climate change and biodiversity effect", preliminary results of the CLIBIO research project of the Department of Economics, Ca' Foscari University of Venice, funded by the European Investment Bank University Research Sponsorship (EIBURS) Programme 2006, 14 April 2008, Venice, Italy. Environment Agency (2006). Addressing Environmental Inequalities: Flood Risk. SCHO0905BJOK-E-P Science Report: SC020061/SR1. Authors: Gordon Walker, Kate Burningham, Jane Fielding, Graham Smith, Diana Thrush, Helen Fay. Fankhauser, S. (2006). The Economics of Adaptation. Sam Fankhauser, EBRD.12 April 2006. Supporting Research commissioned as part of the Stern Review. http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/5/B/stern_review_supporting_technical_material_sam_fankhauser_231006.pdf Fielding J, Burningham K and Thrush D, 2005a Flood warning for vulnerable groups: measuring and mapping vulnerability. R&D Report W5C-018/4. Bristol: Environment Agency. National Trust – South West - long-term future of the UK's coasts Klein, R.J.T., S. Huq, F. Denton, T.E. Downing, R.G. Richels, J.B. Robinson, F.L. Toth, 2007: Inter-relationships between adaptation and mitigation. Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden and C.E. Hanson, Eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 745-777. Holman, I.P., Loveland, P.J., Shackley, S., Berry, P.M., Rounsevell, M.D.A., Audsley, E., Harrison, P.A. and Wood, R., 2002. RegIS - Regional Climate Change Impact Response Studies in East Anglia and North West England. UKCIP Technical Report. UKCIP, Oxford. Holman IP, Berry PM, Mokrech M, Richards JA, Audsley E, Harrison PA, Rounsevell MDA, Nicholls RJ, Shackley S, Henriques C (2007). Simulating the effects of future climate and socio-economic change in East Anglia and North West England: the RegIS2 project. Summary Report. UKCIP, Oxford 2007. Kemfert (2006). Costs of Action and Inaction Prof. Dr. Claudia Kemfert Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Humboldt Universität Berlin Berlin, 10. April 2006. http://www.diw.de/deutsch/dasinstitut/abteilungen/evu/aktuelles/Kemfert_Claudia_CostofInacation_2006.pdf Hallegatte, S., Jean-Charles Hourcade, and Parice Dumas. 2007. Why economic dynamics matter in assessing climate change damages: illustration on extreme events. Ecological economics 62 (2):330-340. McEvoy D., S. Lindley & J. Handley (2006) Adaptation and mitigation in urban areas: synergies and conflicts Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers, Municipal Engineer, 159, No. 4, 185–191. Nordhaus, W.D. (2006) ―The Economics of Hurricanes in the United States,‖ Presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Economic Association, Boston, Massachusetts, January 5-8, 2006, available online at http://www.econ.yale.edu/~nordhaus/homepage/hurr_010306a.pdf, Walker G, Fairburn J and Smith G, 2003 Environmental quality and social deprivation. R&D Technical Report E2-067/1/TR. Bristol: Environment Agency. Wilbanks, T.J., P. Romero Lankao, M. Bao, F. Berkhout, S. Cairncross, J.-P. Ceron, M. Kapshe, R. Muir-Wood and R. Zapata-Marti, 2007: Industry, settlement and society. Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden and C.E. Hanson, Eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 357-390. Discussion Downing, T and Watkiss. P. (2005). Adaptation: Policy Perspectives. Presentation at the launch of the European Climate Change Programme (ECCP) II launch. Brussels, 24th October, 2005. Frans Berkhout, The rationale for public policy: how well does the EU strategy address the objectives for public policy? In. Why We Will Need Adaptation And How It Can Be Implemented. Policy Brief draft, 8 October 2007 for ADAM-CEPS Seminar on Adaptation by Asbjørn Aaheim, Frans Berkhout, Zbigniew Kundzewicz, Carlo Lavalle, Darryn Mcevoy, Reinhard Mechler, Henry Neufeldt, Anthony Patt, Paul Watkiss, And Anita Wreford West, C.C. and Gawith, M.J. (Eds.) (2005) Measuring Progress: Preparing for climate change through the UK Climate Impacts Programme. UKCIP Technical Report. UKCIP, Oxford. Available online at: http://www.ukcip.org.uk/images/stories/Pub_pdfs/MeasuringProgress.pdf



Appendix 1: Definitions

Risk is often used in the context of climate change, though Levina and Tirkpak (2006) identify that it has not yet been

defined, either by the UNFCCC or by the IPCC and that definitions vary. A number of definitions in the context of CC:

Risk - Is the probability that a situation will produce harm under specified conditions. It is a combination of two factors: the probability that an adverse event will occur; and the consequences of the adverse event. Risk encompasses impacts on human and natural systems, and arises from exposure and hazard. Hazard is determined by whether a particular situation or event has the potential to cause harmful effects. (Australian Greenhouse Office. 2003)

Risk (climate-related) – Is the result of interaction of physically defined hazards with the properties of the exposed systems – i.e., their sensitivity or (social) vulnerability. Risk can also be considered as the combination of an event, its likelihood, and its consequences – i.e., risk equals the probability of climate hazard multiplied by a given system’s vulnerability (UNDP, 2005)

AR4 Chapter 2 (Carter et al, 2007), reports in the text that: Risk is generally measured as a combination of the probability of an event and its consequences, with several ways of combining these two factors being possible. There may be more than one event, consequences can range from positive to negative, and risk can be measured qualitatively or quantitatively.

The UK Green Book, 2007 (Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government in central Government) defines risk as the likelihood, measured by its probability, that a particular event will occur.

A similar definition is also adopted by the UK national risk register, e.g. setting out risks by their likelihood and their impact. This also uses a matrix of the relative impact and relative likelihood to consider risks (and prioritise them). The UKCIP Risk, uncertainty and decision-making framework also uses the same format.

Other more complex definitions do exist, e.g. the ASCCUE project (Adaptation Strategies for Climate Change in the Urban Environment) define Risk = ƒ {Hazard, Exposure,Vulnerability} Where hazard is the extent, severity and probability of a climate related hazard; exposure is the extent and value of elements that would be affected were the hazard to be realised; and vulnerability is the susceptibility of the elements to the hazard. Similar definitions for risk management or risk assessment in relation to CC also vary:

Risk management - The implementation of strategies to avoid unacceptable consequences. In the context of climate change adaptation and mitigation are the two broad categories of action that might be taken to avoid unacceptable consequences. (Australian Greenhouse Office. 2003)

Integrated Risk Assessment - An approach to the management of risk that includes all sources of hazard, pathways and receptors, and considers a wide combination of risk management options. (UKCIP, 2003)

AR4 Chapter 2 (Carter et al, 2007), reports in the text that: Risk management is an approach that is being pursued for the management of climate change risks

The UK Green Book (2007) defines Risk assessment as: Risk assessment will inform an overall view of the viability of an option, i.e. whether its risk-adjusted benefits exceed its risk-adjusted costs, or whether (in the case of uncertainty) the costs of a possible adverse outcome are so great that precautionary action needs to be introduced to obtain a cost-effective solution.

The AR4 defines as (climate change) Impact assessment as The practice of identifying and evaluating, in monetary and/or non-monetary terms, the effects of climate change on natural and human systems.

The AR4 (Glossary, AR4, Working Group II) defines uncertainty as ‗An expression of the degree to which a value (e.g., the future state of the climate system) is unknown. Uncertainty can result from lack of information or from disagreement about what is known or even knowable. It may have many types of sources, from quantifiable errors in the data to ambiguously defined concepts or terminology, or uncertain projections of human behaviour. Uncertainty can therefore be represented by quantitative measures (e.g., a range of values calculated by various models) or by qualitative statements (e.g., reflecting the judgement of a team of experts). ‘

In the climate change literature, the related terms likelihood and confidence are closely related.

Likelihood, defined by AR4 as The likelihood of an occurrence, an outcome or a result, where this can be estimated probabilistically, is expressed in this Report using a standard terminology, defined in the Introduction.



Confidence. Defined by AR4, the level of confidence in a statement is expressed using a standard terminology defined in the Introduction.

Levina and Tirpak found very different interpretations for vulnerability: one interpretation views vulnerability as a

residual of climate change impacts minus adaptation, whilst another views vulnerability as a general characteristic or state generated by multiple factors and processes, but exacerbated by climate change. For example:

Vulnerability is defined by IPCC AR4 as: Vulnerability is the degree to which a system is susceptible to, and unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate change, including climate variability and extremes. Vulnerability is a function of the character, magnitude, and rate of climate change and variation to which a system is exposed, its sensitivity, and its adaptive capacity.

Vulnerability refers to the magnitude of harm that would result from a particular hazardous event. The concept recognises, for example, that different sub-types of a receptor may differ in their sensitivity to a particular level of hazard. Therefore climate vulnerability defines the extent to which a system is susceptible to, or unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate change, including climate variability and extremes. It depends not only on a system’s sensitivity but also on its adaptive capacity. Hence arctic alpine flora or the elderly may be more vulnerable to climate change than other components of our flora or population. (UKCIP, 2003)

Vulnerability assessment identifies who and what is exposed and sensitive to change. A vulnerability assessment starts by considering the factors that make people or the environment susceptible to harm, i.e. access to natural and financial resources; ability to self-protect; support networks and so on. (Tompkins, E. et al., 2005)

The Defra adapting to climate change website defines 'Vulnerability' as being open to or at risk of damage. In terms of climate change, it can be influenced by natural characteristics, the built environment, and socio-economic factors.

Again there are alternative definitions for adaptation from UNFCCC, UKCIP, and UNDP. AR4 defines as:

Adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities. Various types of adaptation can be distinguished, including anticipatory, autonomous and planned adaptation:

Anticipatory adaptation – Adaptation that takes place before impacts of climate change are observed. Also referred to as proactive adaptation.

Autonomous adaptation – Adaptation that does not constitute a conscious response to climatic stimuli but is triggered by ecological changes in natural systems and by market or welfare changes in human systems. Also referred to as spontaneous adaptation.

Planned adaptation – Adaptation that is the result of a deliberate policy decision, based on an awareness that conditions have changed or are about to change and that action is required to return to, maintain, or achieve a desired state.

Other definitions include

UKCIP as The process or outcome of a process that leads to a reduction in harm or risk of harm, or realisation of benefits associated with climate variability and climate change. (UK Climate Impact Programme (UKCIP, 2003)

The UK Government (the adapting to climate change website) reports that Adapting to climate change means adapting the way we do things - in all areas of our lives - to respond to the changing circumstances. It means not only protecting against negative impacts, but also making us better able to take advantage of any benefits. And that Adaptation to climate change involves making decisions that are sustainable, made at the right time, maximising the benefits and minimising the costs.

One related concept is that of an adaptation deficit. Formal definitions do not exist, but Tirpak and Levine report the definition offered by Ian Burton at the In-session workshop on adaptation (May 21, 2005, Bonn), as Failure to adapt adequately to existing climate risks largely accounts for the adaptation deficit.

There is also an emerging concept of maladaptation. The TAR (IPCC, 2001) describes this as any changes in

natural or human systems that inadvertently increase vulnerability to climatic stimuli; an adaptation that does not succeed in reducing vulnerability but increases it instead. An informal but widespread interpretation is that maladaptation involves conflict with mitigation, i.e. where an adaptation response increases greenhouse gas emissions.



However, a wider definition is emerging concept is that there are many forms of maladaptation, which might involve the following kinds of action (Downing et al, 2005):

• Inefficient use of resources compared to other options (e.g. the principle that all actions should be climate-proof through adaptation would be extremely expensive,(and there will be many cases where benefits will certainly exceed costs, and would not provide good value for society as a whole),

• Ineffective, e.g. relying on scenarios of future climatic risks that are not subsequently realised and actions that have no other benefits,

• Displacing vulnerability (from one actor to another) and/or

• Reducing the possibility for future adaptations.

In economic terms, if net of adaptation costs, the negative consequences induced by the climatic stimulus are reduced, or its positive consequences are enhanced, there are benefits from adaptation, otherwise there is the potential for maladaptation. It is important to stress that adaptation which can be successful at a specific temporal or spatial scale can become maladaptation at a different spatial and temporal scope.