Sir — Your Opinion article (“Distastefulbut necessary”, Nature 417, 673; 2002)does not explore in depth the morality ofexperimenting on non-human primates.You claim that the issue is “simple”, that“potential benefits must be weighedagainst the suffering caused”. But nobodywould apply a cost-benefit test to experi-menting on people against their will. Whatis the difference? Your argument can onlybe that non-human primates are one sortof primate and we are another, so it isacceptable for us to cause them pain.

That approach cannot withstand anyintellectual scrutiny. Primates are just ascapable of suffering as we are. Suffering,and its avoidance, lies at the heart of allmoral philosophy. If it is wrong to causesuffering to people deliberately —whatever the benefits to others — it mustalso be wrong to do so to other primates.

You also say that it is time to informpublic opinion about primate research. I agree. But that has to mean full

information, not simply such informationas researchers find it convenient todisclose. It should not take undercoverinvestigations, such as that recently carriedout by the British Union for the Abolitionof Vivisection (BUAV) into primateresearch at Cambridge University, to revealthe extent of suffering involved (causedboth by the experiments and the housingconditions) and to raise serious questionsabout the usefulness of the research.

BUAV is calling for an inquiry intoprimate research in the United Kingdomindependent of the Home Office, whichhas once again shown, in the Cambridgecase, that it is not up to its regulatory task.Will primate researchers support BUAV inthis call? If not, it will only strengthen thegrowing perception that researchers andgovernment alike would prefer to keep the public in the dark.Michelle ThewBritish Union for the Abolition of Vivisection, 16a Crane Grove, London N7 8NN, UK

correspondence

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Are results of primate researchworth the suffering it causes? Researchers must be honest about methods and goals.

Names: a historical orpolitical perspective?Sir — I have two questions in response toRognes’s Correspondence (Nature 417, 379;2002). First, has most of his research workbeen done before or after June 1967? The“occupied territories” have been withinIsrael’s borders since that date. If the majorpiece of research was performed after 1967,surely the territories should be referred toby their current names? Would anyone inthe scientific community nowadays callIndia a part of the ‘British Dominion’, orplace Ukraine in the ‘USSR’? Would anyoneuse the name ‘Rhodesia’ when referring toZimbabwe or ‘Ceylon’ instead of Sri Lanka?

As with any scientific nomenclature, ascientist is required by a journal to use thecurrent names of territories, regardless ofhis or her politics. It may be useful to addcomments regarding historical names ifthey are relevant to the research described.

Second is the issue of showing somerespect to the publisher’s country. If youknow that certain names are a sensitiveissue in certain countries, and you do notwish to take sides in a political debate localto the area, why not use the terms that areused by the country concerned and bymost of the world? I do not think Nature’spublishers in the United Kingdom wouldbe happy to review manuscripts referringto the Falkland Islands as the ‘Malvinas’.Sharona Even-RamNational Institute of Dental and CraniofacialResearch, National Institutes of Health, 30 ConventDrive, Bethesda, Maryland 20892, USA

Nature allows contributors to use theirown choice of name (if in standard use)for the region from which they are writing.This holds for the Falkland Islands/Malvinas as for other regions of the world,such as Taiwan — Editor, Correspondence

Only vital need justifiesprimate experiments Sir — In your recent Opinion article onwhen experiments with non-humanprimates can be justified (Nature 417,684–687, 2002), a relevant perspective can be found in US constitutional law. Anon-human primate can be regarded asbelonging to the ‘quasi-person’ classoriginally used in 1865 to define African-Americans, who were not accorded fullconstitutional personhood in law, but wereentitled to some natural rights under theUS constitution, including that of self-interest (see R. M. Lebovitz, St Thomas Law Review, 14, 561–600; 2002). But doesthis mean that primates are entitled

constitutionally to be free from the physicalabuse produced by experimentation?

No constitutional right is absolute, butthere must be an important and persuasivereason for abrogating it. In the UnitedStates, a person’s so-called ‘liberty interest’is a fundamental constitutional right, yetthe government can infringe upon it whenthe circumstances are important enough.A famous example is an early twentiethcentury case in which an adult manrefused to be vaccinated against smallpox,despite a Massachusetts state law requiringit. The case made its way to the USSupreme Court, where the justices wrotethat constitutional rights are notunencumbered, but may be infringedwhen necessary for the good of thecommunity, including for reasons ofpublic safety to protect the populationfrom a disease epidemic (Jacobson vsMassachusetts, 197 US 11; 1905).

Using the same rationale, it can beargued that, although most animal experimentation is not significant enoughto warrant violating a primate’s right of self-interest, some experimentation maymeet this high standard. For instance,research on a particular vaccine may beimportant enough as a societal concern toexcuse intrusion on the animal’s right ofself-interest. We must carefully scrutinizethe goals of experimentation to determine

when it justifies extinguishing a US animal’sconstitutional right of self-interest. Richard M. Lebovitz Interdisciplinary Bioscience PhD Program, George Mason University, 4400 University Drive,Fairfax, Virginia 22030-4444, USA

Little funding to developnon-animal testingSir — Your News Feature “The greatprimate debate” (Nature 417, 684–687;2002) did not discuss the potential of invitro and clinical studies to replace manyprimate experiments in drug development,neuroscience and AIDS research. Non-animal methods can — and should — besupported by all sides of the debate. Whileverbal support is often forthcoming,resources to develop such alternativemethods are not. Despite its responsibilityunder European legislation, the Britishgovernment’s budget for alternatives issub-divided into different areas, with theintention that developing replacements foranimal experiments should receive about£56,000 (US$85,500) a year — barelyenough to fund one research project. Gill Langley Dr Hadwen Trust for Humane Research, 84a Tilehouse Street, Hitchin, Herts SG5 2DY, UK

© 2002 Nature Publishing Group