B. Locus StandiDumlao vs. ComelecFacts:A petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injuction and/or Restraining Order filed by Patricio Dumlao a former Governor of Nueva Viscaya, seeking to enjoin Comelec from implementing section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, for being unconstitutional, discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection rights. Petitioner Dumlao join the suit filled by petitioner Igot and Salapatan to declare the said provision as null and void for being violative of the Constitution.

Issue:Whether or not the petition filed contains the requisite of actual case or controversy as a requisite for a review on certiorari?

Whether or not paragraph 1 Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 is constitutional?

Held:It is basic that the power of judicial review is limited to the determination of actual cases and controversies. The petitioner assails the constitutionality of the said provision and seeks to prohibit the respondent COMELEC from implementing such, yet the petitioner has not been adversely affected by the application of that provision. There is no ruling of that constitutional body on the matter on which the court is being asked to review on certiorari. Courts are practically unanimous in the pronouncement that laws shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt. It is within the competence of the legislature to prescribe qualifications for one who desires to become a candidate for office provided they are reasonable, as in this case.The constitutionality of paragraph 1 section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 is clear and unequivocal thus it does not discriminate and violate the equal protection rights of the petitioner.The first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is declared VALID.

De Guia vs. ComelecFacts:Petitioner Manuel T. De Guia is an incumbent member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Paranaque, Metro Manila. He prays, more particularly, for reversal of the position of respondent insofar as it affects the municipality of Paranaque and all the other municipalities in the Metro Manila Area. He Claims that the second proviso of par. (c), Sec. 3 of RA 7166, which requires the apportionment into district of said municipalities does not specify when the members of their Sangguniang Bayan will be elected by district. He would consequently lean on par. (d) of Sec. 3, which immediately succeeds par. (c), to support his view that the elected members of these municipalities mentioned in par. (c) should continue to be elected at large in the May 11, 1992 elections.Paragraph (d) states that “for purposes of the regular elections on May 11, 1992, elective members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large in accordance with existing laws. However, beginning with the regular elections in 1995, they shall be elected by district.” Petitioner therefore insists that elected members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Paranaque fell under this category so that they should continue to be elected at large until the 1995 regular elections.

Issue:WON petitioner has legal standing

Held:The Court observes that petitioner does not allege he is running for reelection, much less, that he is prejudiced by the election, by district, in Paranaque. As such, he does not appear to have a locus standi, a standing in law, a personal or substantial interest. He does not also allege any legal right that has been violated by respondent. If for this alone, petitioner does not appear to have any cause of action.

Oposa vs. Factoran Jr.Facts: The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents and Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to (1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country; (2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. On 22 June 1990, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. July 12, 1990, opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss due to the following: 1. That the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question. 2. Respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.

Issue:Whether or not the petition filed by the petitioner has a locus standi.

Held:The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right which is the right to a balanced and healthful ecology could be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. The Court affirmed the standing minors, represented by their parents, to challenge the validity of logging concessions on the basis of the concept of inter generational responsibility for and the right to a balanced and healthful ecology as guaranteed by Article II, Section 16.

Macasiano vs. National Housing AuthorityFacts:Petitioner seeks to have this Court declare as unconstitutional Sections 28 and 44 of Republic Act No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992. He predicates his locust standi on his being a consultant of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) pursuant to a Contract of Consultancy on Operation for Removal of Obstructions and Encroachments on Properties of Public Domain (executed immediately after his retirement on 2 January 1992 from the Philippine National Police) and his being a taxpayer. As to the first, he alleges that said Sections 28 and 44 "contain the seeds of a ripening controversy that serve as drawback" to his "tasks and duties regarding demolition of illegal structures"; because of the said sections, he "is unable to continue the demolition of illegal structures which he assiduously and faithfully carried out in the past." 1 As a taxpayer, he alleges that "he has a direct interest in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully disbursed." 2

On 14 May 1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment to the petition. He maintains that, the instant petition is devoid of merit for non-compliance with the essential requisites for the exercise of judicial review in cases involving the constitutionality of a law. He contends that there is no actual case or controversy with litigants asserting adverse legal rights or interests, that the petitioner merely asks for an advisory opinion, that the petitioner is not the proper party to question the Act as he does not state that he has property "being squatted upon" and that there is no showing that the question of constitutionality is the very lis mota presented. He argues that Sections 28 and 44 of the Act are not constitutionality infirm.

Issue:Whether or not Petitioner has legal standing

Held:It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that, question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be very lis mota presented. 8 To reiterate, the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law are: (a) the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, (b) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper property, (c) the constitutional question must be raised at the opportunity, and (d) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of the case. 9 A proper party is one who has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of.It is easily discernible in the instant case that the first two (2) fundamental requisites are absent. There is no actual controversy. Moreover, petitioner does not claim that, in either or both of the capacities in which he is filing the petition, he has been actually prevented from performing his duties as a consultant and exercising his rights as a property owner because of the assertion by other parties of any benefit under the challenged sections of the said Act. Judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. Judicial power is the "right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants."

Tatad vs. GarciaFacts:Petitioners filed to prohibit respondents from further implementing and enforcing the Revised and Restated Agreement to Build, Lease and Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA and supplemental agreement of the former. Petitioners are suing in their capacities as senators and taxpayers.The argument of the petitioners were: the winning bidder for the construction and operation of the LRT is a foreign corporation violating the constitution; build-lease-transfer is not defined nor recognized by the law nor its implementing rules and regulations; award of the contract on negotiated basis violates RA 6957; award of contract violates requirements provided in the implementing rules and regulations of the BOT law; agreement violate EO 380 for failure of bearing presidential approval; and agreements are grossly disadvantageous to the government.Respondents contend the petitioners have no legal standing; writ of prohibition as not a proper remedy and requires ascertainment of facts; scheme adopted is actually a Build-Transfer scheme allowed by BOT law; nationality requirement for public utilities does not apply; the presidentially approved agreements are not disadvantageous to the government; the negotiation granting the award of the contract and not through public bidding is allowed by BOT law; and direct negotiation as mode of award for infrastructure projects is supported by RA 7718.

Issue:Whether or not petitioner has legal standing on the petition.

Held:The prevailing doctrines in taxpayers suits are to allow taxpayers to questions contracts entered into by the national government or GOCC’s allegedly in contravention of the law and to disallow the same when only municipal contracts are involved. The Supreme Court upheld the legal standing of the petitioners as taxpayers.Agreements in question have been entered into by DOTC in the exercise of its governmental function. The discretion to award a contract is vested in the government agencies entrusted with said function. Petitioner’s claim that Build-Lease-Transfer scheme and direct negotiation of contracts are not contemplated by the BOT law has now been rendered moot and academic. RA 7718 Sec. 3 authorizes all government infrastructure agencies, GOCC’s and local government units to enter into contract with any duly prequalified proponent for the financing, construction, operation and maintenance of any financially viable infrastructure or development facilty.Ultimately, the petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court.

Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines vs. ComelecFacts:The Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines (TELEBAP) together with GMA Network filed a petition challenging the validity Sec. 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 (Comelec Time), on the grounds that the said provision (1) takes properties without due process of law and without just compensations; (2) it denies the radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or information during the period of election.According to GMA Network, Comelec Time violates the due process clause and the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by taking air time without payment or just compensation. That from the previous election GMA Network lost P22,498,560.00 in 1992 elections and stands to lose P58,980,850.00 due to the implementation of B.P. Blg. 881.

Issue:Whether or not, the petitioners have legal standing in the case at bar.

Held:The petition of TELEBAP was held of no merit. That TELEBAP failed to show that they have personally suffered harm as a result of the operation of Comelec Time.

The petition of GMA Network on the other hand appeared to have the required standing to bring the constitutional challenge. The legal standing of GMA Network was that they are greatly affected financially by the implementation of Comlec Time, for during elections they are forced to give away precious time slots for the fulfillment of the said provision.Despite of the legal standing of GMA Network it failed to contest the validity and Constitutionality of Comelec Time on the aforementioned grounds, the Supreme Court ruled that:(1) The broadcast companies does not own the airwaves they are merely leased from the government, thus no properties are taken by the requirement of giving COMELEC free air time during elections.(2) The difference between print media and broadcast media is that the latter uses a limited resource namely the broadcast bandwidth of which there is a need to allocated and distribute the same. Which the government spends money to allocate and distribute the resource, whereas in print media there is no need for such service from the government. Thus it is but fair for the broadcast media to provide free air time for COMELEC during elections.(3) The provision of Section 4 of Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution which give COMELEC the all the necessary powers to ensure equal opportunity, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed.

Kilosbayan vs. GuingonaFacts:Petitioner KILOSBAYAN Incorporated, and its Board of Trustees filed a petition as taxpayers and concerned citizens. Sen. Webb and Tañada and Rep. Arroyo are suing their capacities as member of the congress and as a taxpayers and concerned citizens of the Philippines.Pursuant to Sec 1 of the charter of the PCSO (RA 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42) which grants it the authority to hold and conduct “charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities,” The PCSO decided to establish an on-line lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its resources of funds. March 1993, after learning that the PCSO was interested in operating an on-line lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad in Malaysia became interested to offer its resources and services to PCSO. Berjaya Group Berhad organized a group of Filipino investors in March 1993 a Philippine Corporation known as the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC), which “was intended to be the medium, through which the technical management services required for the project would be offered and delivered to PCSO. Before August 1993, the PCSO family issued a request proposal for the Lease of Contract of an on-line lottery system for the PCSO. Considering the citizenship requirement, the PGMC claims that the Berjaya Group reduce its original 75% foreign stock holdings by selling to its local investors the 35%, making the 40% as the share of Berjada Group.

Issues:Whether or not the petition filed by the KILOSBAYAN has a locus standi.

Held:Wherefore the court resolved the issue on locus standi in favor of the petitioner. A party’s standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside the technicalities of the procedure in view of the importance of the issue raised. The right of the petitioners to challenge the validity of the lotto contract of the PCSO and for seeking a judicial review was granted by the Court on the argument that the case was transcendental importance

Kilosbayan vs. MoratoFACTS:This is a petition seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is substantially the same as the Contract of Lease nullified in G. R. No. 113373, 232 SCRA 110.Petitioners contended that the amended ELA is inconsistent with and violative of PCSO's charter and the decision of the Supreme Court of 5 May 1995, that it violated the law on public bidding of contracts as well as Section 2(2), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution in relation to the COA Circular No. 85-55-A.Respondents questioned the petitioners' standing to bring this suit.

ISSUE:Whether or not petitioners possess the legal standing to file the instant petition.

RULING:The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because some cases are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of the law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Petitioners do not in fact show what particularized interest they have for bringing this suit. And they do not have present substantial interest in the ELA as would entitle them to bring this suit.

IBP vs. ZamoraFacts:In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. The President directed the deployment of the Marines in a Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000, addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the PNP Chief.President expressed his desire to improve the peace and order situation in Metro Manila through a more effective crime prevention program including increased police patrols. The President further stated that to heighten police visibility in the metropolis, augmentation from the AFP is necessary. Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. Finally, the President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improvedA special civil action filed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines to join the Philippine National Police in visibility patrols around the metropolis.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has a legal standing to sue.

Held:The petition has no merit. First, petitioner failed to sufficiently show that it is in possession of the requisites of standing to raise the issues in the petition. Second, the President did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction nor did he commit a violation of the civilian supremacy clause of the Constitution.The IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case

Bagong Alyansang Makabayan vs. ZamoraFacts: In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US military bases agreement in 1991. The Philippines and US negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases agreement. On July 18 1987 Both sides discussed, among other things, the possible elements of VF. Negotiations by both panels on the VFA led to a consolidated draft text. Thereafter, President Ramos approved the VFA.On October 5 1998 President Estrada through respondent Secretary of Affairs Zamora, ratified the VFA. Officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines, the Instrument of Ratification, the letter to the VFA and the creation of a Legislative oversight its implementation. Debates then ensued.Respondents challenge petitioner’s standing to sue, on the ground that the latter have not shown any interest in the case. Petitioners on the other hand, counter that VFA is a matter of transcendental importance.

Issue: WON petitioners have legal standing?

Held: The court said that petitioners failed to show that they have sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result fo the enforcement of VFA. They also don’t have standing to sue as tax payers since VFA does not involve the exercise of Congress’ taxing or spending power. In a taxpayer’s suit. The act complained of should directly involve the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. The other petitioners who filed as petitioners-legislators do not have the requisite of locus standi to maintain this suit. According to the court, while it may be true that petitioners pointed to provisions of the VFA which may allegedly impair their legislative powers, they failed to show that they have in fact suffered direct injury. IBP, another petitioner also lacks standing since there is no board resolution from its Board of Governors authorizing the National President to commence the present action. The court, nevertheless decided to take cognizance of the issues raised. The court upheld its ruing in previous cases such as that of Gonzales vs Comelec and Kilosbabayan vs Guingona. Technicalities of procedure may be brushed aside in view of the transcendental importance to the public where cases are demanded to be settled promptly and definitely. The court may relax the standing requirements and allow a suit to prosper even when there is no direct injury to the party suing if the case is of transcendental importance.

Lim vs. Executive SecretaryFACTS: On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise.2 They were joined subsequently by SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both party-Iist organizations, who filed a petition-in-intervention on February 11, 2002.Lim and Ersando filed suit in their capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers. SANLAKAS and PARTIDO, on the other hand, aver that certain members of their organization are residents of Zamboanga and Sulu, and hence will be directly affected by the operations being conducted in Mindanao. They likewise pray for a relaxation on the rules relative to locus standi citing the unprecedented importance of the issue involved.

ISSUE:1.Whether or not petitioners have legal standing2. Whether or not issue is of Transcendental importance

HELD:In his Comment, the Solicitor General points to infirmities in the petitions regarding, inter alia, Lim and Ersando's standing to file suit, the prematurity of the action, as well as the impropriety of availing of certiorari to ascertain a question of fact. Anent their locus standi, the Solicitor General argues that first, they may not file suit in their capacities as, taxpayers inasmuch as it has not been shown that "Balikatan 02-1 " involves the exercise of Congress' taxing or spending powers. Second, their being lawyers does not invest them with sufficient personality to initiate the case, citing our ruling in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora.5 Third, Lim and Ersando have failed to demonstrate the requisite showing of direct personal injury. We agree.It is all too apparent that the determination thereof involves basically a question of fact. On this point, we must concur with the Solicitor General that the present subject matter is not a fit topic for a special civil action for certiorari. We have held in too many instances that questions of fact are not entertained in such a remedy. The sole object of the writ is to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion: The phrase "grave abuse of discretion" has a precise meaning in law, denoting abuse of discretion "too patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility."WHEREFORE, the petition and the petition-in-intervention are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of a new petition sufficient in form and substance in the proper Regional Trial Court.

Chavez vs. Public Estate AuthorityFacts:On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA which is tasked to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas, and to develop, improve, acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands and transferring to PEA the lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project. On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a total area 1,915,894 square meters. Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Parañaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as the Freedom Islands.On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding these islands to complete the configuration in the Master Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation Project-MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding.On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege speech in the Senate and denounced the JVA as the grandmother of all scams. The Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation and found out (1) that the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void (3) the JVA itself is illegal.On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez as a taxpayer filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations. Finally, petitioner asserts that he seeks to enjoin the loss of billions of pesos in properties of the State that are of public dominion.

Issue:Whether or not the petitioner has a locus standi to a bring suit.

Held:The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties. The petition raises matters of transcendental importance to the public. The Court ruled that the enforcement of the constitutional right to information and the equitable diffusion of natural resources are matters of transcendental importance which clothe the petitioner with locus standi.

AIWA vs. RomuloFacts: The Automotive Industry Workers Alliance (AIWA) and its Affiliated Unions filed a petition for Supreme Court to exercise its power of judicial review to declare Executive Order No. 185 unconstitutional. According to the petitioners, the said E.O. allegedly violated their rights and interests as labor unions and as taxpayers. By the said E.O., the administrative supervision over the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), its regional branches and all its personnel including the executive labor arbiters and labor arbiters was transferred from the NLRC Chairperson to the Secretary of Labor and Employment.The respondents, Hon. Alberto Romulo (Executive Secretary) and Hon. Patricia Sto. Tomas (Secretary of Labor and Employment), opposed the petition saying that it does not pose an actual case or controversy since the petitioners have not specifically cited how E.O. No. 185 has prejudiced or threatened to prejudice their rights and existence as labor unions and as taxpayers. Furthermore, they argued that the petitioners have no locus standi (legal standing) to challenge the validity of said E.O., not even in their capacity as taxpayers, considering that labor unions are exempt from paying taxes.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners have locus standi to assail the validity of Executive Order No. 185.

Held: Legal standing or locus standi is defined as a "personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged." Since petitioners have not shown that they have sustained or are in danger of sustaining any personal injury due to E.O. No. 185, it cannot be said that the aforementioned E.O. will prejudice their rights and interests. Only NLRC personnel, the subject of the Secretary of Labor’s disciplinary authority, have a direct and specific interest in this issue.As taxpayers, petitioners also don’t have legal standing on this issue since they have not established disbursement of public funds in contravention of law or the Constitution.The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

Jumamil vs. CaféFacts: In 1989, petitioner Vivencio V. Jumamil filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Panabo, Davao del Norte a petition for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and writ of restraining order against public respondents Mayor Jose J. Cafe and the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Panabo, Davao del Norte. Petitioner alleges that Resolution Nos. 7 and 49 were unconstitutional because they were passed for the business, occupation, enjoyment and benefit of private respondents who deposited the amount of P40,000.00 for each stall, and with whom also the mayor had a prior contract to award the constructed stalls to all private respondents who are close friends and/or relatives of some of the public respondents which makes the questioned acts discriminatory.  The questioned resolutions and ordinances did not provide for any notice of publication that the special privilege and unwarranted benefits conferred on the private respondents maybe availed of by anybody who can deposit the amount of P40, 000.00. Neither was there any prior notice or publication pertaining to contracts entered into by public and private respondents for the construction of stalls to be awarded to private respondents that the same can be availed of by anybody willing to deposit P40, 000.00 

Issue: Whether or not petitioner had the legal standing to bring the petition for declaratory relief;

Held: Petitioner had no standing to challenge the two resolutions/ordinances because he suffered no wrong under their terms. Consequently, it ruled that petitioner, who was not a party to the lease contracts, had no standing to file the petition for declaratory relief and seek judicial interpretation of the agreements. Legal standing or locus standi is a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act being challenged. Petitioner brought the petition in his capacity as taxpayer and not in his personal capacity. He was questioning the official acts of the public respondents in passing the ordinances and entering into the lease contracts with private respondents. A taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge its validity. Parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation. The expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. Petitioner also failed to prove the subject ordinances and agreements to be discriminatory.Furthermore, the policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid, absent a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers. This means that the measure had first been carefully studied by the legislative and executive departments and found to be in accord with the Constitution before it was finally enacted and approved.Therefore, petition was dismissed on the basis of petitioner’s lack of legal standing.

Prof. Randolf S. David vs. Gloria Macapagal ArroyoFacts:On Feb. 24, 2006, Pres. Arroyo declared a state of national emergency and orders the armed forces to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, and suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion. A lot of permits to form rallies were revoked and those who have already formed to gather were dispersed, and warrantless arrests were rampant. Among those arrested was the petitioner. Seven consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition was filed by the petitioners. Randolph David petitioner assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (a) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (b) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (c) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly.Petitioners Ninez Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. challenged the CIDG’s act of raiding the Daily Tribune offices as a clear case of "censorship" or "prior restraint." They also claimed that the term "emergency" refers only to tsunami, typhoon, hurricane and similar occurrences, hence, there is "absolutely no emergency" that warrants the issuance of PP 1017.Petitioners Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz et al., alleged that PP 1017 is an "arbitrary and unlawful exercise by the President of her Martial Law powers." And assuming that PP 1017 is not really a declaration of Martial Law, petitioners argued that "it amounts to an exercise by the President of emergency powers without congressional approval." In addition, petitioners asserted that PP 1017 "goes beyond the nature and function of a proclamation as defined under the Revised Administrative Code."

Issue: Whether or not the petition filed by the petitioner has Legal standing to sue.

Held: The petition filed by the petitioners David and Llamas G.R. No. 171396 and Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. G.R.No. 171409 does have a standing to sue. The petitioner has a personal and substantial interest in filing the petition. They have clearly sustained direct injury as a result of enforcing the PP 1017. The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396, particularly David and Llamas, is beyond doubt. The same holds true with petitioners in G.R.No. 171409, Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. they alleged "direct injury" resulting from "illegal arrest" and "unlawful search" committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so, the Solicitor General does not question their legal standing.The petitions, other than G.R. No. 171396 and 171409, which does not have a legal standing were still granted by the court to have a judicial review for the issue involved was of a transcendental importance

Demetria vs. AlbaFacts:Demetrio G. Demetria and its parties filed an instant petition as concerned citizens of this country, as members of the National Assembly/Batasan Pambansa representing their millions of constituents, as parties with general interest common to all the people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers whose vital interests may be affected by the outcome of the relief’s, prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction is the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as the Budget Reform Decree of 1977. On September 19, 1985, the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of petitioners, who were allegedly merely begging an advisory opinion from the Court, there being no justiciable controversy fit for resolution or determination. On February 27, 1986, the Court required the petitioners to file a Reply to the Comment, thus they did.

Issue:Whether or not the petitioners has the legal standing in assailing Section 44 of Presidential Degree No. 1177 otherwise known as the Budget Reform Degree of 1977.

Held: In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. Thus regarding the standing of the petitioner in this case, Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 not only affects their personal interest but also to the inhabitants of this county and thus it will sustain direct injury to both parties.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is granted. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is hereby declared null and void for being unconstitutional.

Gonzales vs. NarvasaFACTS:Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. Petitioner asks this Court to enjoin the PCCR and the presidential consultants, advisers and assistants from acting as such, and to enjoin Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora from enforcing their advice and recommendations. He also seeks to enjoin the Commission on Audit from passing in audit expenditures for the PCCR and the presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. Petitioner requests to furnish petitioner with information on certain matters. On January 28, 2009, respondent Hon. Andres R. Narvasa, impleaded in his capacity as Chairman of the PCCR, filed his Comment to the Petition. The rest of the respondents, who are being represented in this case by the Solicitor General, filed their Comment with this Court on March 7, 2000.

ISSUE:Does the case at bar qualify for the requisites for Taxpayers suit and concerned citizen suit regarding Legal Standing?

HELD:A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.Petitioners do not in fact show what particularized interest they have for bringing this suit. It does not detract from the high regard for petitioners as civic leaders to say that their interest falls short of that required to maintain an action under Rule 3, d 2.Coming now to the instant case, petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR. If at all, it is only Congress, not petitioner, which can claim any “injury” in this case since, according to petitioner, the President has encroached upon the legislature’s powers to create a public office and to propose amendments to the Charter by forming the PCCR.Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even any indirect, injury. Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of the PCCR’s activities. Clearly, petitioner has failed to establish his locus standi so as to enable him to seek judicial redress as a citizen. Therefore the legal standing on the requisites for the concerned citizens suitA taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution., Thus payer’s action is properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. It is readily apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O. No. 70. Under section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the amount of P3 million is “appropriated” for its operational expenses “to be sourced from the funds of the Office of the President.” It must be stressed that the Court retains the power to decide whether or not it will entertain a taxpayer’s suit. there being no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power, petitioner cannot be allowed to question the creation of the PCCR in his capacity as a taxpayer, but rather, he must establish that he has a “personal and substantial interest in the case and that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement.” In other words, petitioner must show that he is a real party in interest - that he will stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or that he will be entitled to the avails of the suit. Nowhere in his pleadings does petitioner presume to make such a representation.