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POL07189

Long in the Game : Elite Networks and the Local-Global Nexus in Consultative Tertiary Education Policy Making in a Small State.

Mino Polelo

University of Melbourne

Paper Presented at the Australian Association for Research in Education (AARE) Conference, Fremantle, Western Australia, University of Notre Dame Australia 25

29 November 2007.

ABSTRACT: In both developing and developed countries, education policies are shaped by socio-political and economic contexts in which they are constructed, and global discourses on education. In the context of the Third World, these discourses may be a product of an influence that international consultants bring into the policy making processes of such countries. Policy making is also a negotiated process that is highly political and contested. In Botswana, policy making is assumed to be an orderly process that is consensually driven. It is never problematised to dissect its politics. Drawing on critical theories of the state, this study, therefore seeks to examine the consultative tertiary education policy making process in Botswana, with a view to determine if it represents the interests of the participants in the consultation process or those of the state and other powerful social forces. This paper explores processes of consultative tertiary policy making and the power dynamics associated with it in the context of Botswana. Rooted within critical theory tradition, the paper, drawing from narratives of interview data, argues that consultation in policy making hegemonises policy through inclusiveness and participation. This policy legitimation is in the interests of the state and elite networks. Consultation is also motivated by the desire to diffuse and contain threats to the policy process. Furthermore, pressures of globalisation are central to policy making in a Third World state, albeit anchored on the local context, principally symbolised by the state interests and the relatively autonomous bureaucratic-academic network

Introduction The purpose of this paper is to explore processes of consultative education policy making in a small Third world state on the fringes of network capitalism or new capitalism (Carnoy & Castells, 2001; Castells, 2006; Fairclough, 2002). The paper proposes an integration of Network theory into critical state theory as an explanatory tool for policy making in a small Third world state. It uses the case of consultative tertiary education reform in Botswana to argue that in a small state on the periphery of network capitalism while the state may be relatively autonomous in policy making and moving towards corporatism in which there is shared governance with non-state actors, policy making is dominated by a policy community comprising bureaucratic and academic elites. Drawing from narratives of interview data of policy makers and stakeholders, the paper argues that in a small state, consultation in policy

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making often projected as inclusive and participatory, hegemonises and legitimates policy in which the interests of the elites coincide with those of the state. Consultation also serves as a policy conflict management process, both within and outside the policy community. Furthermore, this policy making process, while shaped by local factors, is located within and significantly influenced by the dominant global tertiary education reform agenda, the conduit of which is Multilateral agencies and policy experts.

In pursuing this argument, I structure my paper thus. First, I consider critical state theory in the study of education policy making and propose that given its limitations, if integrated with network theory, it has explanatory utility for understanding a small Third world state policy processes. I then argue that on account of the weaknesses and cooptation of the civil society into the Botswana state, policy networks function as networks of legitimation for the state. This then leads me to define the boundaries of an education policy community with specific reference to the policy initiative under the scrutiny of this paper. The second part examines consultation as a policy legitimation process. Three themes that relate to consultation as policy legitimation, threat containment in policy making, the role of education policy community elites and the local context of policy making are explored. The last part of the paper focuses on conflicts in policy making and consultation as a conflict management process. The paper closes with a projection of the global influences on this policy making.

Background to the Study The first post colonial education reform in Botswana was made through the first comprehensive study, which produced recommendations in 1977. It was anchored on consultation spread over fifteen months with key task forces commissioned to submit applied research on primary and secondary education (Weeks, 1993). A product of this process was a white paper or policy blueprint, titled Education for Kagisano (Social Harmony) adopted by government in 1977. In 1992 the government of Botswana appointed yet another Commission to review the education sector, marking the beginning of the second phase of policy evolution and reform. The commissions composition reflected diverse interests; politicians, international consultants, senior government s bureaucrats, corporate executives, academics and business. In its work the commission was guided by a clearly defined terms of reference drawn by the government. The Commission gathered its information through national consultation tours, study tours of a number of countries to get the experiences of their education systems, commissioned policy studies, visits to institutions, written and oral submissions by groups and individuals (Botswana, 1994). A final product of this process was a white paper, the Revised National Policy on Education (RNPE) of 1994. To date this document has guided policy development in the country.

The 1993 National Commission on Education (NCE) also made an observation that tertiary education had no policy and was uncoordinated. It thus recommended the establishment of a Tertiary Education Council (TEC) to formulate policy on tertiary education, coordinate planning, development, management, planning for funding of tertiary education in the country and accredit institutions (Botswana, 1993). Subsequent to these recommendations, the Tertiary Education Act (1999) established the TEC, with a mandate to formulate policy on tertiary education and oversee its management and development. The process of policy formulation started in November 2004 with the constitution of a Working Group on the Tertiary Education Policy for Botswana (WG) which produced a consultation document in February 2005. Following that a nine month consultation process ensued culminating with tertiary education policy report presented to the government in October 2006. Within government, a further nine months of consultation took place leading to the adoption of the

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policy by government in November 2007. It is this process that forms the core subject of this paper. It draws from a broader study that seeks to examine the consultative tertiary education policy making process in Botswana with a view to determine if it represents the interests of participants in the consultation process or those of the state and other powerful social forces.

First, the paper considers the State-centred approach to the study of education policy within the critical theory tradition, with a view to determine its relevance to the questions it addresses. In general, in policy sociology, the debate on the conceptualisation of the state and education policy making crystallizes around the positions taken by Roger Dale and Stephen Ball

(Tryona, 1994, p. 74) often labelled state-centred theory and the policy cycle approach respectively.

The State-Centred Approach Since the publication of Bowles and Gintis (1976) Schooling in Capitalist America, theorisation on the relation between education and the state, acknowledging deficiencies in the Correspondence principle, have sought to present the educational state as an arena of conflict. According to Power (1995) the state-centred approaches to the study of education policy, drawing from the work of Poulantzas (1973) and Offe (1975, 1984, 1985) represent an attempt to retain Marxist analysis of social relations while simultaneously taking account of the complex nature of social processes. They thus seek to unravel the tangled and contradictory relationship between the state, class, and capital as it pertains to educational policies and school practices (Power, 1995, p. 79).

These theorists argue that the point of departure for an informed education policy analysis must take cognisance of the relationship between the state and capital. But they reject structuralism represented by correspondence theories. They argue, functions of the state cannot be reduced to those of the economy

(Power, 1995, p. 79-80).

Education policy, according to the state-centred theorists, reflects the interests of the dominant group and class power. It is an agency through which the modern nation state seeks to manage capitalist crisis and legitimate itself. One of the enduring proponents of this approach, Dale (1989) argues that there are broad core problems of the capitalist state: Support for the capital accumulation process; Guaranteeing a context for its continued

expansion; The legitimation of the capitalist mode of production, including the state s own part in it (Dale, 1989, p. 28).

The core problems facing the modern capitalist state is the process of preserving itself and removing or eliminating anything that threatens that process, context, and the legitimation of capital accumulation. Extended further, the capital accumulation process implications for education are that it places certain demands on the system.

The resolution of the core problems of the state are not simple. Neither are they guaranteed as (i) these problems reflect contradictions (ii) what is possible for education systems to attain mediates the scope of policies (Power, 1995).

Carnoy and Levin (1985) on the other hand present the social conflict model arguing that Offe s view of the state locates the state and education somewhere, divorced from business interests and social movements, sectors that have major influence on state policy. They insist that in its quest to maintain ruling class hegemony, it is characterised by contradictions emanating from struggles taking place at its core. Furthermore, the state is not subjected to

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the tutelage of the dominant class. Neither is it possessing a reified power locating it outside class structure, but it is rather a site where the dominant class positions itself and organizes strategically in relation to other classes (Carnoy & Levin, 1985, p. 46). Carnoy and Levin attempt to move from reproduction and relative autonomy by infusing social conflict theory that recognises struggles and social movements in shaping both the state and education policy. In short social demands shape the state and education (Carnoy & Levin, 1985, p. 47).

Similarly, Morrow and Torres (1995) also advance a thesis that the state is shaped, though not mechanically, by struggles and intervenes in the interests of capital. Its modes and methods are allocative and productive and the pursuit of policy is not interest specific but system specific. Also policy making is never stable as there is always effort to reconcile contradictions. Furthermore, there is a gap between intended policy objectives and results. Most importantly, Torres and Morrow provide a schema for assessing policy formation.

The other sate model sees education as part of the nation building process (Green, 1990, 1997). Green (1997) argues that while national education systems have become porous over years, internationalising in some respects, there is scanty evidence, as postmodernist and globalisation theorists would want us to believe, to suggest that the nation state loses grip of the education system and national education systems are disappearing. On the contrary, state control of key areas of education is observable in advanced capitalist states.

The above theorists urge us to see the state as engaged in a continual process of negotiating policy to reconcile the interests of all elements contesting within it. The state therefore becomes a conglomeration of various interests and groups. This contest between various groups is coated with certain ideologies that require focus in policy analysis. Although the state is an arena of conflicts of classes, social movements, capital and other segments of the civil society its interest is more skewed towards maintaining capital and dominant group hegemony. Therefore while acknowledging the multiplicity of interests in the state arena, some interests emerge as supreme. It is these interests that subordinate those of other groups through state hegemony and legitimation processes.

But there are limitations of these approaches to the study of education policy. On the basis of her analysis of the link between the macro and micro interpretation of policy, Power (1995) argues that state centred theories do not provide an adequate framework for accounting for the detail, that is, there are difficulties in linking micro-investigation with macro analysis. This theory provides no guideline through which to link a specified state-agenda with a local practice

(Power, 1995, p. 87). Neither does it possess testability with empirical data, sophisticated as it may be in linking education and the economy (Power, 1995).

Further, state control theories (Dale, 1989) present policy making as remote and divorced from implementation (Ball, 1990; Ball & Bowe, 1992). Policy then gets done to people by a chain of implementers who are clearly defined by legislation (Bowe, R., Ball, S. J., & Gold, A., 1992, p. 7). The general argument is that the state control model distorts the policy process as it is a messy exercise from gestation to implementation. It is these weaknesses that have led to a reconceptualisation of policy analysis through the work of Stephen Ball, largely influenced by Foucault s ideas. However, Raab (1994) points out that the criticism of Dale as State-control is not justifiable. Raab argues for a synthesis of top-down and bottom up approaches to education policy as these are not necessarily diametrically opposed to each other but are different ways of explaining policy. Taking cue from Raab, I integrate Network

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theory with State theory. But first, let us consider the location of the state within global capitalism.

The Globalised Network State

The debate about relative autonomy of the state rages on, heightened by the dramatic changes that arise from globalisation. This debate is not new. It can be traced back to earlier decades, then exemplified by the exchange between Poulantzas and Miliband1. In an attempt to reformulate relative autonomy theory and advance our understanding of the state in a globalised world, Carnoy & Castells (2001) identify elements of the globalisation concept to place the state within these. The global economy comprises the globalized core that includes global financial markets, global trade, production of goods and services , integration of science and technology worldwide, a global labour market and the increasing role of international trade and investment in economic growth together with the

economy of criminal syndicates that are transnational in character (Carnoy & Castells, 2001, p. 4). One other aspect of the globalisation phenomenon, Carnoy and Castells, point out, is the media system and a technological paradigm shift that is not a cause but rather an agency of globalisation

the cause being a restructuring of capitalism, with the state and corporations as principal players in this. They further argue that while the state induced globalisation, it has lost control of the process. But this does not mark the demise of the state. On the contrary, it undergoes transformation.

In brief, globalisation is a process that was induced by the state in partnership with corporations, but in the process slipped out of control of the state as it lost control of the economy. However, the state does not wither. Instead, it transforms itself. It is on this basis that the concept of a globalised Network state is advanced.

One key theme in trajectories of radical social theory is the displacement of social class and the moving away from the nation state (Therborn, 2007). The network state falls within this realm. Globalisation is perceived as undermining the autonomy of the nation state in policy making and economic management (Carnoy & Castells, 2001; Salavisa, 2006). Facing challenges of globalisation, the state restructured itself in response by establishing supra-national and co-national institutions to collectively manage the globalisation process that overburden it; decentralising and devolving power and resources to legitimate itself and take account of its social constituency (Carnoy & Castells, 2001). The proliferation of NGOs worldwide, mostly state funded and subsidised, is part of expanding the sphere of the state into civil society and social movements, for purposes of muting conflict and legitimation (Carnoy & Castells, 2001; Castells, 2006). What emerges then is a network state, in which sovereignty is shared with institutions ranging from NGOs to multilateral agencies, taking its legitimacy and reproduction to a constellation of these agencies (Carnoy & Castells, 2001). In the final analysis, the relative autonomy of the state is disappearing. Certainly, this adds another important dimension to an understanding of the state and policy making in the contemporary world. Nonetheless the state is still a collective, and this collective extends to other states, multilateral agencies, the civil society and social movements.

1 The debate was initiated by Poulantzas, N. (1969) The Problem of the Capitalist State. New Left Review, 58 (Nov/Dec), 67-68 in reaction to Miliband, R. (1969) The State in Capitalist Society. London: Quartet Books. Also see the exchange that followed in Miliband, R. (1970) The Capitalist State: Reply to Nicos Poulantzas. New Left Review 59, (Jan/Feb), 53-60; Miliband, R. (1973) Poulantzas and the Capitalist State. New Left Review, 82 (Nov/Dec), 83-92; Poulantzas, N. (1976) The Capitalist State: A Reply to Miliband and Laclau. New Left Review, 95 (Jan/Feb), 63-83.

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This analysis like others preceding it (Poulantzas, 1973, 1975; Offe & Ronge, 1981; Offe, 1984) is historic specific and advanced capitalist state focused. That said, any state within this global network, loses out, according to Carnoy and Castells (2001), if it does not establish its place in different nodes of the network.

When and if captured by specific interest groups, states become predatory states losing all autonomy When captured by fundamentalist identity movements, be it religious or nationalist they lose all autonomy vis- a'- viz religions and ideologies. (Carnoy & Castells, 2001, p. 16).

It is here that we get a glimpse of the network state that is not necessarily restricted to the developed world. Thus the network concept is critical and essential to this paper. The notion of a restructured state is equally important in our analysis of education policy as the developing world is part of the global network. Shared sovereignty, as the state expands to local and global networks, similarly fits well within this paper. Where does the Third world state fit in all this?

The Third World State and Education Policy Radical expositions on the relationship between the conditioned state and education policy indicate that education is a vehicle for mass mobilisation and hegemonic tool in the capital accumulation process. Theorisation on the Third World state and education policy thus reflects strong influences from the work of Gramsci (1971) and relative autonomy theorists such as Clause Offe (1984). What these theorists have infused is a cultural twist and conflict that extend beyond class. Education reform performs a critical ideological role in conditioned states as its principal function is to legitimise inequality through the liberal notion of meritocracy (Jules & Apple, 1995).

In the Third World redistribution is pariah as it interferes with accumulation, limits individual effort and scares foreign investment while educational opportunity enhances social mobility and rewards achievement and application (Jules & Apple, 1995, p. 193). It is through this process that education serves to reproduce privilege through a selective elite class formation (Jules and Apple, 1995, p. 190). Schooling is the only available avenue to attain high income and status especially because those who graduate from universities constitute the bureaucracy of the state, an institution that propels bureaucrats to riches (Carnoy & Samoff, 1990). Although the authors indicate that in the 1970s and 1980s there were efforts to expand and democratise education, inequalities persist as there are no policies to balance income and economic opportunities. Therefore widened educational opportunities have had minimal effects on social equality (Carnoy & Samoff, 1990). In other words mass education has an ideological function of assimilating society into the meritocratic ideology of the state and the nationalist psyche (Carnoy & Samoff, 1990; Jules & Apple, 1995). Thus education policy formation and implementation are imbued with hegemony and balancing the state demands of capital accumulation and legitimation. They do not have any potential to democratise and open up the opportunities for the majority.

However, it is worth cautioning that in analysing education policy in the Third World, we must not seek to present the conditioned state as located in a remote corner of the globe. National differences and stages of development not withstanding, it is part of an international system. The Third World and First world are one world in which basic operational laws are found; they are two sides of the same coin (Amin, 1977). Separating them would be an exercise in futility. The argument I seek to advance here is that there is the Third World within the First World (Jules & Apple, p. 1995 emphasis in text). What we articulate on the

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state and education and the attendant pressures and contradictions that are brought to bear on it is applicable to both the North and South (Jules & Apple, 1995). But within the Third world there is yet another type of state.

The Small State Internationally, some nation states are classified as small. This concept denotes a certain type of state, acknowledged and recognised by multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and the Commonwealth (World Bank, 2005, World Bank/ Commonwealth Secretariat (CS), 2000) in their development and policy activities. These states have salient features that have a bearing on education systems and policy making processes. It is therefore essential to identify these and later relate them to Botswana.

While acknowledging that size is a relative concept, there is consensus that population and the economy can be used to define a small state2 (Bray, 1991; Bray & Packer, 1993, World Bank/CS, 2000). Economies of small states, like others in Third World, show some conditioning. Nonetheless small states economies are generally fragile and vulnerable (Bray & Packer, 1993). Bray and Packer point out that the small size of economies of small sates means that they have a narrow economic base. As such commodities are an Achilles heel for such states as they do not have control over world markets.

Regarding the social system, the social network is small enabling people to know each other in a range of settings, making these societies highly personalised (Bray, 1991). Relations then are more durable, leading people to develop managed intimacy (Bray, 1991, Bray & Packer, 1993). This concept of managed intimacy , according to these writers, implies that people learn to mute conflict given the fact they interact in different contexts and settings throughout their whole lives. The implication of all this for policy making processes is that there may be a thin line between social networks and policy networks, a subject that I will visit later. Policies may also be characterised by an effort to minimise conflict.

Politically, in small states societies, government is pervasive and it is a route through which many pass through to prestige and status (Bray, 1991). It is an agency through which elite formation takes place. This elite is class and ethnic based, reproducing itself through the education system, and is much more entrenched than in larger states (Bray & Packer, 1993). The outcome of all this is sharp class divisions and extremities of wealth and influence that may limit democracy (Bray, 1991). It is in such systems that the ideological manipulation of the population by the ruling elite to advance its interests becomes paramount. However, the positive is that small political systems draw the political leadership to the people, providing opportunities for inclusive decision making, equity and community spirit (Bray, 1991). Inclusiveness may be a major preoccupation of policy makers in policy formulation undertakings. Consultation then becomes a cornerstone of policy making. These are the features that will be explored in more detail in Botswana s consultative policy making.

Thus far I have elaborated on state theory and education policy. It has emerged that in reaction to criticism of the overdeterministic nature of classical theories of the state, those on the left have attempted to address the problem by placing emphasis on the political autonomy

2 Generally the population threshold of small states is 1.5 million although states with higher populations are included in this category, given their shared similarities. In this bracket of states there are micro states, island states with less than 100,000 people and vast territories with more than 1.5 million people e.g. Botswana (See Appendix) (Bray, 1991, World Bank, 2005, CS/World Bank, 2000).

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of the state. In part, this was a response to our present social era of a restructuring capitalism in which globalisation is at the centre stage. The development reflects that social theory is not static. It is not cast in stone. It therefore takes account of the historicity of our times. Social theories are not supposed to provide answers forever. Instead, their value is tested on the relevance of the questions they allow us to ask (Carnoy & Castells, 2001, p. 17). The theoretical sophistication that characterise state theory, while in part a reaction to the political defeat of the left, is an attempt to come to terms with the social transformations of nation states. Yet, an enduring conflict in social theory is the structure versus agency debate. As noted in my earlier discussion, the wedge between policy theorists stems from this conflict. This paper, in recognition of this reality and the value that both macro and micro approaches have in our understanding of policy processes, attempts to chart a middle ground. It is against this background that I shift focus to policy networks , a meso concept that has explanatory utility, if integrated with or located within state theory.

Integrating Policy Networks into State Theory There are contending views on the explanatory value of the policy network concept and its credentials as theory (Carlson, 2000; Howlet, 2002). But consensus over its ubiquity in policy science is beyond doubt (Carlson, 2000; Howlet, 2002; Keating & Robinson, 2003; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000; Marsh, 1998; Marsh & Rhodes, 1992; Rhodes, 1997; Robinson & Keating, 2005). Similarly, there is convergence that its explanatory power is enhanced by integration within state theory (Daubjerg & Marsh, 1998; Marsh, 1998; Marsh & Rhodes, 1992; Raab, 1994; Rhodes, 1997) although there are misgivings elsewhere (Carlson, 2000). Although it is a concept that originates in Western political science, its use in education governance and policy research is widespread (Arnot & Raab, 2000; Keating 2000; McPherson & Raab, 1988; Robinson & Keating, 2005). The concept of policy community has been utilised by McPherson & Raab (1988) and Keating (2000) to designate a closed type of network. Whereas McPherson and Raab (1988) employed the concept to locate dominant interest groups in education policy traditions of the Scottish system, Keating (2000) comparatively traced the historical evolution of secondary education systems in four state systems of the British union and Australian federation, marking salient features of policy in closed and open systems.

What are Policy Networks? An understanding of the concept requires us to delineate its key features. Networks have membership drawn from both within and outside government, including the private sector and civil society (Robinson & Keating, 2005). Elaborating further, Robinson and Keating note that networks embrace individual actors and persons drawn from organisations and institutions, in relationships that are horizontal as networks are not hierarchical. Furthermore, there is reciprocal interdependence between network actors. Thus interactions revolve around shared goals, sovereignty and resources. Therefore policy results rest on collective decisions of the public sector and network actors. The key point here is that in networks, actors have a common ground, the unitary force of which is shared goals and purpose. Policy then does not become an enclave of the state.

The network approach assumes that policy is made in complex interaction processes between a large number of actors which takes place within networks of interdependent actors. These actors are mutually dependent so policy can only be realized on the basis of co-operation. (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000, p. 139)

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In policy networks, interaction is the key agency through which network actors exchange resources (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000). Not only that, rules may work to the advantage and disadvantage of other players. Nonetheless, through evoking veto power and deploying their resources, Klijn, and Kopenjan (2000) argue that the less powerful network participants can block decisions, forcing powerful network players to make concessions to achieve convergence. In short, within networks, there is the core and the periphery , where some actors have more influence and resources than others (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992). The key resources at the disposal of the privileged groups in networks are knowledge and economic position (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992).

Networks show that government is not a preserve of one interest group as it is fragmented, coalescing different agencies and powerful interests which have similar policy interests. In the context of Britain, Marsh and Rhodes establish that such powerful and dominant groups include professionals, producers and government. Thus policy making here is elitist. It is therefore necessary to examine this aspect in policy making processes, especially if one has to integrate policy networks with state theory. Similarly Klijn and Koppenjan (2000) position governments uniquely, with immense resources at their disposal that they can deploy albeit with limitations in network situations.

Network Typologies Different typologies of networks have been developed over time, the most common of which is the Rhodes (1997) model. Approaches are varied, but their commonality is the continuum in which at one end is the closely integrated policy community and the lose issue networks (Robinson & Keating, 2005). Policy communities have stable relationships, closed membership, continuity in membership, shared values and are characterised by insulation from other networks, and equally the public (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992). In that way we can have a sectoral community such as education. In contrast, issue networks are generally large, with open fluctuating access, less value consensus and minimal continuity of membership (Marsh, 1998). However, it must be noted that this model is ideal and therefore not a tool kit for all policy areas (Marsh, 1998).

The above discussion illustrates that policy networks is one of the theoretical resources that one can draw from to explain policy making. It has been argued that for this to be realised policy networks need to be coupled with theories of the state. In processes where consultation is the main process through which policy is formulated, the groups and interests that converge with public figures and government constitute networks. Policy networks also link well with relative autonomy theories of the state discussed in earlier sections. The premise of relative autonomy is that the state is a configuration of various interests and is not necessarily a captive of capital or a particular fraction of the ruling block. As networks are constituted by actors within institutions, organisations, trade unions, civil society groups and government, they fall within the confines of a relatively autonomous state. Further, I have advanced the argument that the pressures of globalisation and the restructuring of the state increase this relative autonomy as governance now devolves upwards and downwards; upwards to supra national agencies and downwards to local interest groups. This phenomenon as I have and will proceed to show is not restricted to advanced post-industrial states. It pervades the whole global network, to which the small Third World state belongs. What may differ is the extent and degree to which the Third World state is relatively autonomous and responds to global pressures that have a bearing on policy making processes.

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Daugbjerg and Marsh (1998) hypothesise that policy networks can be integrated within the radical Weberian elite theory, Pluralism and Marxism. First, in elite theory some interests are more privileged than others. In policy, both professional and economic interests may dominate networks. Add to that political resources deployed to network membership as a source of privilege. In Third World countries as observed in features of small states, elites are at the centre of the broad social and political network. Considering Marxism, the changes in Marxist state theory have led to its emphasis on relative autonomy of the state and the need to disaggregate political structures and their importance, fitting well within network literature (Daugbjerg and Marsh, 1998).

Thus one can draw on both elitism and Marxism as they display similarities (Daugbjerg & Marsh, 1998). The task then is to subject this to an empirical test within the context of Botswana s consultative policy making processes. It is to the Botswana state that I now turn to determine how these processes are played out. The relative autonomy of the Botswana state is assessed together with its fit into the node of global networks. These questions are explored alongside the small state concept and the discerning of policy communities in relation to the state.

The State and Civil Society in Botswana The principal argument in this section is that one feature of the Botswana state is a weak civil society that strengthens the state in policy making. To put my argument more positively and more contentiously, the state, through its bureaucracy is not the sole proprietor of the public policy enterprise. Despite the weakness of the civil society, since the 1990s the state has modestly broadened its policy community beyond the traditional bureaucracy by engaging agencies outside government structures. The emerging corporatism (Holm, Molutsi & Somolekae, 1996; Maundeni, 2004; Molutsi & Holm, 1990) does not necessarily weaken the state. Instead, what emerge are networks of policy legitimation in which the civil society is coopted by the state

that is, the state becomes a dominant player through the strategic position it occupies and financial leverage. The civil society itself entrenches its weakness through a process of depoliticisation (Molutsi & Holm, 1990; Holm et al., 1996; Maundeni, 2004). The civil society seeks to play by the rules set by the state.

Policy Networks of Legitimation The weakness of the civil society aside, there is evidence that within the Botswana state some form of policy communities are emerging, broadening public policy making beyond the bureaucracy realm. In explaining this process, Maundeni (2004) coins the concept of mutual criticism in each other s presence , arguing that it defines the relationship between the state and civil society. This, according to Maundeni, entails sharing views in an open atmosphere, and minimising open confrontation. In this state-civil society relationship, shaped by mutual criticism, the civil society becomes embedded in the state. Thus strengthening the state rather than weakening it. The process has arisen through the cooptation of civil society into state policy making through joint councils and the distancing of NGOs from politics, including labour unions, which have financial autonomy in comparison with many state funded NGOs, according to Maundeni. Through centralised cooperation the state has established coordinating councils in which bureaucrats and NGOs sit replacing public bureaucracies (Maundeni, 2004). But the state dominates these through the secretariats of such councils, housed in Ministries, Maundeni adds.

In-house deliberations of public policies have expanded their meanings and are no longer limited to government units, departments and ministries. In-house deliberations of national

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councils are a new and popular way of making and implementing public policy in Botswana. Almost all socio-economic, environmental and cultural fields consist of two or more actors: a government unit, department or ministry on the one hand, and numerous NGOs on the other hand. (Maundeni, 2004, p. 72)

The participation of NGOs in these councils translates into legitimation of state policies (Maundeni, 2004). Undoubtedly, the sovereignty of the state expands to lower agencies in the social structure. But it is the state that occupies a position of strength in policy making. Further, in these policy communities some actors emerge stronger and closer to the state. Since the 1970s, the Botswana state began forging a close link with employers and business through an umbrella organisation of business interests, the Botswana Confederation of Commerce, Industry and Manpower (BOCCIM) (Tsie, 1996). BOCCIM wields enormous influence in wages policy formulation, employment and incomes policy, labour legislation and matters affecting localisation and training (Tsie, 1996, p. 606). It is one of the non-state structures that at times initiate policy, to the benefit of the state. For example in 1988 and 1991, BOCCIM convened two conferences in which a consideration of proposals for privatisation and reducing state control of the economy were tabled (Holm et al., 1996). Worth noting, Holm et al., remind us, is that these proposals were presented as a given. Here we see a major policy initiative by a powerful interest group outside government. By the time the government commissioned its own study on privatisation, both BOCCIM and labour had already initiated their own research on the subject, informing the position of government (Maundeni, 2004). As explained earlier, networks share resources, and information is one of them. In this instance both labour and business generated knowledge on privatisation, shared it with government, within the policy community. But it is these resources again that make certain network players powerful and influential. Notable in the present privatisation policy is the marginalisation of labour. In these networks of legitimation labour is often sidelined.

The cooptation of civil society is not restricted to the state s dominance in established policy sharing structures. It extends to the leadership of the NGOs, especially those led and dominated by the middle classes such as Women organisations. There is a pattern that is emerging where the state coopts such leaders through their appointment to senior lucrative positions within the civil service and the judiciary (Maundeni, 2004). This does not only deprive the civil society of active and able leadership, it also limits advocacy. This pattern extends to the political level where the state silences its critics through appointment to senior political positions (Good, 1992).

This subsection has demonstrated that there are a number of structural factors that account for the weakness of the civil society in Botswana. It has also emerged that while the Botswana state, like others in a global network, has repositioned itself in policy making by engaging non-state actors at a local level, the emerging policy communities are symbolic and translate into instruments of policy legitimation. I have argued that these policy communities are networks of policy legitimation . This section further shows that within these communities,

represented by joint and state established policy councils in which bureaucrats and interest groups sit, certain actors, in particular business and government, emerge stronger. The process of resource sharing reflects the power of employers as illustrated with the initiation of privatisation policy. What form does this then take in education policy making?

The Education Policy Community and Tertiary Education Reform This section defines the boundaries of Botswana s education policy community and teases out its role in this policy initiative. The lead figures in the tertiary education policy making

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were professionals who have a strong connection with the Botswana state bureaucracy and the only higher education institution, the University of Botswana (UB). Within the TEC itself, the policy makers were either former employees of the UB or retired senior government bureaucrats now working for the TEC at management level or serving in its Council. As the policy making process was played out, this network in policy making was clearly discernible. More importantly, these individuals have equally played a major role in previous education policy initiatives either as key figures driving the process or as authors of policy documents. These lead players therefore can be designated the Academic-bureaucratic policy community. In terms of the resource that each marshal, the bureaucrats bring in the experience of the inner workings of government. The academics power is the knowledge that they bring into the policy process and knowledge generation through research. Within this group, there are policy drivers, document writers and gatekeepers. Policy drivers are those who lead the consultation process, mobilise interest groups or coordinate the policy making process. Document writers are principally tasked with the drafting and writing of the policy texts. These can be in the form of reports and white papers. Gatekeepers are those with vast experience and influence. They are highly regarded and command respect within the policy making community. They are power brokers within their institutions. One such individual is from the academic background. His influence is reflected by the number of policy reference groups he sits in or chairs and his leading role in previous policy initiatives.

Agenda Setting as Policy Making As Figure 1 below shows, the consultation process evolved over three phases, each with different stages. In stage one of phase one, a TEC constituted WG produced a consultation document titled A Tertiary Education Policy for Botswana: Challenges and Choices (hereafter termed Discussion document or Challenges and Choices), the purpose of which was to facilitate a discussion on tertiary education policy. The WG was essentially a closed group. It comprised thirteen members drawn from diverse backgrounds such as the government bureaucracy, the corporate sector, and academics. However, there was the inner core group, comprising one gatekeeper, a document writer and a business representative.

Armstrong: As it is the case with the working group, I think originally there was a membership of twelve but as it happens with all working groups, the effective members shrunk to about six. People drop off or don t turn up. Eeh, it was in the end two or three men writing up the report. It was basically Tony, Chris, myself [sic] and Peter Edwards. He was the fourth man. Yaa, there were four of us in the end.

In the end it is this inner core group that crafted the first document, principally dominated by academics; one, a gatekeeper, the other a document writer and policy driver. The process at this stage is described as insular and self contained , revolving around a few individuals that constituted this inner core. The principal mode of consultation at this stage was closed meetings and workshops involving members of the WG.

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Figure 1: Key Phases in Botswana s Consultative Tertiary Education Policy Making

One of the traits of this policy process is the continual change of strategy or course in view of the emerging circumstances or perceived potential conflicts. At this stage, the initial understanding was that the WG would lead the policy making process. However, at its first seating, it settled for formulating a discussion document to facilitate stakeholder engagement. It is this group that also felt that following the production of the discussion document, the process should now be TEC driven. Part of this also had to with potentially conflicting dual roles of elites in policy making and an attempt to take these into account.

It is on this basis that the Challenges and Choices document was produced and used by the TEC. The document was then placed on the public domain such websites of the TEC and other institutions. Key stakeholders accessed it for discussion and contribution prior to the take off the consultation process. In addition, there were a number of meetings in which the background document was launched for purposes of guiding the process (REF: TEC/PPR 1/8 I (37). Generally, the launch was followed by workshops in which stakeholders were asked to bring along their institutions inputs as previously requested during the launch (REF: TEC/PPR 1/8 I (37)). The document was highly publicised in the media.

At face value, the purpose this stage of consultation was to produce a document that would facilitate stakeholder engagement. It is the WG that identified major areas that they thought a discussion was needed on. This idea generation principally set a framework for discussion. In essence it was agenda setting to define parameters within which stakeholders should discuss issues relating to TE. But at a deeper level, it served to legitimate policy as the second stage of policy making illustrates.

The second stage of the first phase of policy making is consultation through interest group targeted workshops. The principal players here were the TEC professional staff, tertiary education institutions and other stakeholders including students, the business community, local authorities, private tertiary education providers, the media and other sections of the civil society. The motivation for consulting here was the broadening of participation in the policy making process. The pervasive motif emerging from the interview data is to get a broad cross-section of stakeholders , reach as many people as possible , broadened consultation ,

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creating a basket of ideas , broad section of stakeholders and so on. Thus the main objective of consultation at this stage was to widen participation in the policy making process, with a view to move it beyond central echelons of bureaucratic power, as many interviewees assert.

Seemo: The consultation was broad based... But we also had to reach to other stakeholders especially through the district administration and the local authorities because at the end of the day let s remember that we are talking about the development of a national policy, and not a Gaborone policy.

MP: When you say Gaborone policy, what does that mean?

Seemo: Well, the common concern expressed about developments of this nature is that in the consultation process it is mainly the elites and bureaucrats who are involved in the consultation and we never really, in terms of policy formulation, go out to get input from the other stakeholders ([...])

MP: Is there validity in that perception?

Seemo: Well, it s a perception. It is a perception. But then again I don t think it s a perception that you can rule off hand in the sense that a policy of this nature should at the end of the day have wider ownership and it must be seen to be owned by all stakeholders [Emphasis mine].

Beyond extending the policy making process further than the Gaborone elite, Seemo adds two dimensions. The first is the concern to take account of public concern that policies are an enclave of elites and bureaucrats. The second and perhaps more significant, is policy legitimation. Widening participation in policy formulation is geared towards broadening ownership so that whatever ultimate decisions are taken and the outcome of policy, it can be claimed that it is a product of popular consensus. A more explicit view of this emerges here:

Siviya: Policy development in general, in the country, because there are so many policies that have been developed and all of them are couched in that language of consultation; that people are being consulted, you know, so that at the end of it all, whatever policy emerges it can always be claimed that the people own it. But most of the policies are really developed well in advance and people are just the consultation really takes the form of people being told what has been suggested but it is presented as if their input will matter. But in the majority of cases, the thing is almost like sealed when it s presented to the stakeholders or whoever those are.

MP: When you say that usually in the context of Botswana policies are crafted and then presented to people when and the word you used was sealed, what does that really mean?

Siviya: What does it mean? MP: Yes. Could you explain a bit on that?

Siviya: What I mean is that policies are conceived well in advance and normally what would happen is that consultants will be in some cases will be involved in that and once they have done that the thing has to be taken to the people or to the so called stakeholders. But in my view the aim really is not to have those people make input, you know, that would fundamentally alter what already has been crafted. To me it would appear that the entire exercise is meant to give legitimacy to the policy that has already been crafted.

MP: So, to co-opt people.

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Siviya: To co-opt people, ya. That s what I mean by giving legitimacy to it. Because by co-opting them you are basically saying to them you are party to this document, you are party to this policy and so you can claim ownership of this whilst in reality it may not be so.

Nonetheless, Siviya, like other stakeholders in this process admit that on this policy process, there was a genuine concern to have input from stakeholders as reflected by the output of that process in the final report. However, the view that policy consultation seeks to give legitimacy to the process and widen ownership is shared by many including the key participants driving the consultation process.

Mrs Badiri: You know what, when you do a policy, you do policy for people, the policy that is supposed to bring something of essence to people. If you want people to participate and you want people to own that, you should engage them from the beginning.

Selling Ideas An associated concept is that of selling ideas . Selling ideas refers to marketing the content of the discussion document; a product crafted by selected individuals through a closed, insular, and group contained process. The input of the participants is guided by this document, with some of its authors as the lead drivers, knowing which direction to steer to direct public opinion. As Odili, one of the participants familiar with previous policy initiatives notes:

It follows the Botswana tradition, I guess, where you know, before you come up with a policy, you have to sell the ideas to the people, whether its through the Kgotla3, through other gatherings, people give their views before you come up with policies. I think TEC took that direction; the traditional way of making policy in this country.

It is not just popular participation and legitimation, but still an attempt to escape public criticism that national consultancies are centralised and urban based. The common phrase for that popular participation is peoples policy .

A related idea is that of buying in , a concept that is synonymous with stakeholders who felt sidelined in the consultation process. Labour, in particular expressed discontent about the level at which it were to participate in policy consultation. Like the business community and other key stakeholders in the initial WG that crafted the discussion document, unionists desired a position at that level, for them to buy into the policy.

Fisch: Yes, because our view is that if you can take a representative of the community, if you can take a representative of the likes of BOCCIM, in whatever form or fashion, then you needed to have someone who is on the ground from the labour side. Because by creating that balance, you are basically saying you appreciate the role that labour can play and you also want labour to buy in and the buying in helps you know, in the process, to diffuse the tension of ownership.

3Kgotla refers to a meeting place for the community at ward or village level. It also denotes a meeting for the discussion of group matters of any importance. It is a court of the chief or headman for settling disputes according to customary law. In modern Botswana, it is used as forum for consultation but quite often for purposes of selling government policy and social control (See Good, 1992; Lekorwe, 1989; Taylor , 2003)

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So consultation also serves to diffuse tension over policy ownership. Those consulted hold a view that the level at which they participate in the process allays fears of conflicts over the final outcome. However, as it is common in networks, they are closed and exclude non-members. In this policy initiative, labour, a group outside the policy community was on the sidelines. However, its sidelining is also highly ideological. The position that the teacher unions had taken with regard to key macro policy initiatives such as privatisation made the policy makers wary of enlisting labour. I have also argued that the marginalisation of labour in policy making is historical and connected to the interests of the Botswana state that is pro capital. There appeared to be so much confusion as to who represented labour in this policy initiative. Labour representatives interviewed asserted that TEC had no interest in their representation and insisted that they are represented by a representative of a coalition of non-governmental organisations, BOCONGO. Meanwhile labour dismissed this arguing that besides not being an NGO, they do not belong to that coalition.

Despite these misgivings by labour, interview data reveals that participants in the consultative TE policy making are in general agreement on the inclusiveness of the process. But weaknesses were not in short supply. As observed in the previous sections, traditionally, education policy making is driven by commissions, with a clear set of terms of reference. In this context, the policy formulation process was initiated and driven by the TEC, a quasi state body mandated to advise government on TE. Therefore when the first WG convened to craft the discussion document, it set the policy agenda. Participants, both within the policy community and among stakeholders identified the limiting nature of using a discussion document instead of allowing an open discussion on TE issues. However, among policy makers, the view was that open consultation forums that were not guided were not productive. Where these were experimented with participants veered towards issues that were beyond the remit of TE. Problematic as this may have been, a significant portion of stakeholders felt that the document was limiting because in such forums of consultation: You have sort of worked out the answers. You just want people to build on it more or clarify

your answer

(Ndoda, October 17, 2006). The argument here is that this medium of consultation directs people as they are being asked to buy into the thoughts of the policy initiators, in this case, the elites. Stakeholders have no leeway to question what they are being asked to submit to. Put differently, if the point of departure is set on a wrong footing, there is minimal manoeuvre on the part of stakeholders. This is as opposed to where the process starts on a clean slate allowing people (...) to dream, just dream on their own without influence. And allow us to receive their dreams and look through their dreams (Masunga, November 1, 2006).

The product of the first stakeholder consultation was a report that synthesised stakeholder submissions. The report expanded or built on the original consultative document,

Challenges and Choices to produce the first draft of the policy report. The process of producing this draft was outside the public domain. It was an elite controlled process dominated by the Academic-bureaucratic network. The key players at this stage were the TEC internal reference group comprising the professional management group, and an external reference group consisting of professionals from different fields (henceforth Review Reference Group (RRG)), some of whom participated in the initial WG. Other participants were one gatekeeper, an academic who would otherwise be a member of the RRG but dropped out, an international external reviewer based in South Africa who played a major role in the restructuring of South African higher education in the 1990s. Both the gatekeeper and the external reviewer received and commented on drafts at different stages as the report writing was evolving.

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What motivates consultation at this stage of policy development still is the broadening of involvement and the endeavouring to ensure ownership. But at this stage issues of policy threats and risks emerge. Consultation also becomes part of containing or minimising threats. More revealing though is the fact that state and bureaucratic interests also take centre stage. The contextualisation of the policy within macro state policies and global trends in higher and tertiary education becomes paramount A negotiated process of balancing the local-global nexus that emerged during the formulation of the discussion document becomes even more critical at this stage.

Looking at Gatekeepers to Absorb Policy Threats As already alluded to, the consultation mode here entailed workshops for the TEC internal reference group, closed meetings of RRG, gatekeepers and the external reviewer receiving drafts and commenting on them. In setting up reference groups, issues of enlisting participants to absorb potential risks were paramount. Armstrong, a leading figure in this policy initiative succinctly puts the issue into perspective

Armstrong: Ya, we looked at who are the key stakeholders and the gatekeepers. But outside TEC for this one. So we called in Tony from UNIBO because if things get Tony s blessing, then that s UNIBO in the bag.

MP: Why?

Armstrong: Cause Tony is so powerful and influential.

MP: What makes him powerful?

Armstrong: Eeh (Sighs) {( )} I had advised the ES. I had said, You don t really have to deal with the Vice Chancellor in UNIBO, Chris . Cause we ve always turned to Tony and if Tony says it s ok, then its ok. That s the sort of politics at UNIBO at the moment. And Tony has a long experience. I mean, he s actually crafted the Revised National Policy on Education And he s been long in the game. You know, he s respected, influential and thinks strategically as well. So, Tony is a gatekeeper.

Tony s involvement here is informed by two strategic factors. One is the influence he wields within the institution with which he is associated. If he sanctions the draft document, then the threat from UNIBO is absorbed. As a former employee of the institution, Armstrong is also using his experience of the political networking within that institution. He knows where power and influence rests and who is widely connected in the institution. It is certainly not the Vice Chancellor. Second, Tony has a long history in the game of policy making and thus his expertise is not only essential but also stretches beyond the corridors of his institution. In this Armstrong is supported by two of his colleagues. The gatekeeper was not only in the first group that set agenda for policy making, but was also selected for the RRG. As Klijn and Koppenjan (2000) point out, within a network, interacting actors are strategically positioned. Furthermore, the resources that network members bring into the network include among others knowledge and economic position (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992). In this case, Tony brings his expertise, power and experience in policy making.

Mrs Badiri: Some people were in the first group and we picked them. I ll give the example of {( )} Humble. Ya, he is a Guru in this area. We know that we can tap so much from him.

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The process of enlisting participants in the consultation reference groups was not just expert focused. The net was cast to include other strategic key players without whose approval the policy would be grounded.

Armstrong: We brought in Ephraim. Clearly without his consent, the policy wasn t going anywhere because it talks about a merger between BOTA and TEC. So we got Ephraim involved. With all this principle, what you have to do, if you see a threat outside, don t leave it there, absorb it, ok.

MP: Ok, so that was the principle?

Armstrong: That was the principle. Absorbing threats (Laughs). You shouldn t quote me on this one (Laughs).

MP: (Laughs) So basically what this means is that the draft policy was presented to all these groups that you have mentioned?

Armstrong: Yaa, Yaa! And even deliberately because of the VC being on our Council. We saw UNIBO as a major threat to all this. So, before it went to Council, Chris and I went to talk to the UNIBO executive management. It was not a very nice meeting. Not very good at all!

Here threat containment moves beyond cooptation. Proactive meetings are geared towards diffusing conflict even before it emerges. These are processes that characterise this policy making. The above narrative also signals how elites coalesce in the education policy community. But alongside this, the phenomenon of elite recycling within the policy community where elites play dual roles, a feature of a small state, places them in conflicting positions that are times irreconcilable. This theme will be explored later.

Avoiding Policy Ambush

While the process of drafting the report was ongoing, with the drafts documents bouncing between the different bodies established by the TEC for that purpose, restrategisation in view of emerging circumstances ensued, largely informed by creeping signs of conflict between key participants and other national policy initiatives. One such initiative was the amendment of the Trade and Liquor Act. In 2005, the Ministry of Trade and Industry promulgated regulations to limit the trading hours of liquor outlets in view of the perception that many social ills in the country were a product high alcohol consumption emanating from ineffective regulation. When these regulations reached the Parliament, they were blocked by a Parliamentary motion following a strong lobbying by the liquor business community on account of lack of consultation. Subsequent to that the President and the responsible Minister embarked on a national tour to sell the regulations in the name of consultation. Effectively they counselled the nation on the harm that liquor has wrought on the population. My digression here is necessary. The event, so removed from education as it was, compelled the TEC to rethink its consultation. This view was reiterated by the TEC in all the second stakeholder meetings that the researcher attended. The second stakeholder engagement was therefore mooted at this stage.

Armstrong: I think what really influenced our thinking was that what happened in April with the Liquor Act when it went all the way to the National Assembly and then was ambushed there by stakeholders saying we have not been consulted . That really had to prompt the TEC to go back to the stakeholders.

MP: The experience of the Liquor Act?

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Armstrong: The experience of the Liquor Act. Believe it or not! Really brought it home within the TEC that Ya, we shouldn t end up like this , ok.

This is a process that replayed itself as the draft report moved from one stage to the other. At this stage, the second stakeholder consultation, which was not planned for, was seen as another escape window for a possible stakeholder backlash in the form of resistance. A Siamese twin of this process was aligning the draft policy report within the macro state policy context.

The Macro Policy Context The policy makers identify TE policy vacuum as one area within which they had to operate. Besides brief reference to tertiary education in major policy documents such as the 1993 NCE report and the 1994 RNPE, tertiary institutions operated within a policy vacuum. Even the only higher education institution, the UB, was conscious of this fact when it produced its growth strategy titled UB Beyond 10, 000 and a strategic plan called Shaping our Future (UB, 2000; 2004). Policy vacuum not withstanding, policy contextualisation within state interests or government policy thinking focused on political statements made by the political leadership, pronounced public policies and initiatives that signalled intentions with a bearing on TE.

Humble: I mean, there s a commitment the President had made to achieving universal senior secondary education. He said that in one of the State of the Nation Address of 2003. Now if you take that, it s a sort of policy declaration but immediately it has implications cause obviously you ve got all a 100% of your cohort going to senior secondary. Then the pressure! Just through social demand, and so forth, for expanding tertiary education, is obviously going to be there. There is also, again, statements about Botswana s position in the world economy and the need for greater competitiveness, and you know, therefore high levels of skills and so forth. So, there were things one could kind of interpret as having an implication for higher education. There was the emerging significance of the Ministry of Communications, Science and Technology and they are at the point of finalising a national science and technology plan which is clearly going to boost the importance of science and technology and research. You could say the decision to have second university with a science and technology orientation was kind of a sign. What I m saying is there were statements, there were intended directions, there were certain decisions like setting up a ministry of communications, science and technology which all you could interpret as having some future significance for tertiary education. But I wouldn t say they were really policies in the true sense of the word that we are leading towards the need for a coherent tertiary education policy.

Critically, policy makers were conscious of the fact that their recommendations sit well with the current policy wind in government. It had to articulate state interests as noted by Mrs Badiri, a key figure in the mobilising stakeholders for consultation points out: We had to align. We had to be proactive (Badiri, October 6, 2006). Previously, I argued that the state is a condensation of various social forces, all of which have a stake in policy. However, state control of strategic areas of education is observable in both advanced capitalist societies and peripheral states (Green, 1997; Jules & Apple, 1995). Education reform has an ideological function in conditioned states (Jules & Apple, 1995). It has already been argued that education policy formation and implementation are imbued with hegemony and balancing of state demands of accumulation and legitimation. Hence the need for makers of this policy to

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locate their recommendations within macro state policies. By aligning here she means locating recommendations of the report within the macro state policies. Prominent among these is the redefinition of the role of the Botswana state in which the popular discourse flying in government corridors is privatisation, rationalisation of public institutions, public-private partnerships, cost effectiveness, cost sharing and cost reduction (Botswana, 1997, 2000, 2002; Bank of Botswana, 2006; Public Enterprises Evaluation and Privatisation Agency (PEEPA), 2006).

Mrs Badiri: One thing that I want to mention is that when we were developing tertiary education policy, so many things came into place that we did not budget (sic) for. Like the rationalisation of the parastatals for them to be collapsed from 41 to something like 11. Somehow we were affected.

The word budget here has nothing to do with finance. It denotes planning or taking into account. That is, being proactive. When the policy took off, issues of state institution reform had not surfaced. But as the policy evolved, these surfaced and they were critical to the interests of the state. Hence the policy had to be located within these. They were a given as Mr Reginald McDade, a teacher education college lecturer picked this supreme state interest in the stakeholder consultations.

McDade: There were however, certain political assumptions again, that really led to a restriction; that we were working within a political framework. I ll give an example. A few of us, and I think it is a minority in all fairness, are quite concerned about the issue of private public partnerships. This seems to be a given and was presented to us as non-negotiable.

Clearly the recommendations of rationalisation of parastatals by PEEPA, the knowledge economy discourse and the utilitarian and economistic view of education informed the policy makers. Therefore they articulated state interests as reflected in recent market reforms.

During the policy formulation process, related policy developments that anchor on tertiary education and state policy initiatives also had to be taken into account. These initiatives are revealing in some ways. Firstly, policy makers had to closely monitor the work and recommendations of two consultancies; the National Qualifications Framework (NQF) study and the National Human Resource Development Strategy (HRDS) consultancy. The NQF was MoE driven through Australian consultants while the latter was a TEC initiative outsourced to a local consultancy firm. My reading of the NQF report reflects the pressure of state reforms that the consultants had to contend with, represented by the PEEPA rationalisation strategy that recommended a merger of three education regulatory bodies; Botswana Training Authority (BOTA), TEC and Botswana Examinations Council (BEC). It is against this background that while valuing the autonomy of a qualifications body, in view of state demands for public institutional rationalisation as suggested by PEEPA, it was at pains in finally recommending that the regulatory body should fall within the MoE (Botswana, 2006). This is the orbit within which the TEC also operated. Among the policy makers, there was a view that the tertiary education policy report recommendations should not be at odds with recommendations of these studies. Moreover, these parallel education policy initiatives reflect elite recycling within the education policy community in Botswana; the subject of the next section. They also illustrate the cohesiveness of this group.

The Education Policy Community, Networking and Elite Recycling Both Rhodes (1997), Daugbjerg & Marsh, (1998) opine that policy communities are closely knit and have as one of their defining features a tendency to purposely exclude some groups.

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Moreover, members of the policy community not only share resources but equally build a consensus around values in policy formulation. Within the Third World, as this study reveals, such a community is elite dominated. A Third World small state policy maker plays dual roles. The policy maker is like a teacher in colonial Africa: A classroom instructor during weekdays; an interpreter in courts and public meetings addressed by colonial officials; a Sunday school teacher and lay preacher on Sundays. In the village he/she is revered by all and sundry as an embodiment of advancement and social change. This is the elite, constructed then, and shadowed in elite policy networks of our time.

Individuals and groups participation was not only determined by their gate-keeping roles and key stakeholder status. Neither was it limited to the effort on the part of the TEC to broaden participation and widen policy ownership for purposes of legitimation. It was also a product of a web of relationships between elites and their networking. This process stretches way back to earlier policy initiatives and continues to play out in the tertiary education policy making process. The question on how individuals were selected to participate in different reference groups brought the policy community to the fore. Armstrong recounts on how he got into the WG:

I was buying Sunday newspapers on Western bypass at Wimpy and Moloto saw me and clearly hooked me to be a member. There must have been prior consultation and engagement with the chair, Tony Humble. I mean, I think Chris [(...)], must have talked through with Tony as to who should be on it. Certainly I think Moloto had come across Reginald Jarvis at Coopers and was impressed by some of the things he was saying and thought he could represent the business community.

Tony here is the knowledgeable and experienced gatekeeper. His opinion on the constitution of the primary group is essential. Indeed this is confirmed by the coordinator of the whole policy making process.

MP: You have just indicated that you constituted a group, a reference group that started the process. How did you identify these people who actually made the group?

Moloto: I sat back and reflected very carefully and of course later on even before I approached them I consulted my chairman [sic] who is a former Vice Chancellor of the University. I consulted with some of my people here, some of them former Permanent Secretaries in the Ministry of Education. I consulted with a few others in government, just to make sure that I get a broad section of the people. I also consulted with the private sector.

Consultation here entails contacting the recycled elites within the policy community. An illustration of this recycling is essential. The two former Permanent Secretaries oversaw the process of the establishment of the TEC itself. Upon its establishment, coincidentally or purposely, one retired and joined the TEC senior management. The other, a retired senior bureaucrat with vast international experience in policy making, joined the TEC at its governing Council level. The latter as the administrative head of MoE oversaw the crafting of the 1994 RNPE while the former coordinated its implementation.

This process of recycling elites from the bureaucracy to autonomous institutions like the TEC is also replayed among academics. The former local university Vice Chancellor was a senior colleague of the two TEC senior management staff. He was the first Chairperson of the TEC Council. Upon retirement from the Council, he was replaced by one of the former Permanent

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Secretaries of the MoE within TEC. Armstrong, a university academic initially recruited to serve in the initial WG, principally as a document writer, later joined the TEC as senior management staff.

Armstrong: They had advertised this job, twice or thrice, you know. And I had seen it in the papers and I had said this job fits me so perfectly but let me not apply because I really want to see people there... and engage citizens. They didn t and were about to advertise internationally and Moloto we bumped on each other and he said Armstrong... he just sort of dropped a hint that it would be good if we could have someone like you . So it coincided with eeh How can I say it?.. with my becoming a little disenchanted with UNIBO, ok. So I applied.

It is this hint that landed him in the policy driving seat alongside his two former senior colleagues.

In the preceding sections I made reference to the enlisting of gatekeepers in policy making to diffuse possible policy conflicts. I also identified one prominent gatekeeper within the policy community associated with the local university. This same individual chaired the MoE reference group for the NQF. He also chaired the WG that initiated the TE policy and produced the policy consultation document. The academic gatekeeper, in his words, has a history.

Humble: I have had a lot of involvement in committees in the Ministry, in terms of policy development, in terms of reference groups for consultancies I was appointed to the National Commission in 1991 and obviously as a commissioner I was heavily involved in the development of the policy and in the end I became chair of the Editorial committee that actually produced the report. So, I had a large hand in actually writing the report. And I ve been involved with quite a number of specific follow ups to the outcomes of the Revised National Policy on Education I ve got a long history.

As noted earlier, he was also selected for the RRG of this policy initiative but dropped out and still made extensive comments on the draft document as a de facto member. The education professionals know each other not only at professional level, but even at a personal level, the outcome of which is social cohesion (Bray & Packer, 1993) in which the policy community is congealed. In this process of elite recycling, a phenomenon characteristic of small states, this academic gatekeeper is not alone. The figure leading the HRDS consultancy represented the business community in the initial WG. Earlier on it was observed that he was part of the inner core of that group; a group that crafted the consultative document. In a sense, he falls within the document writer group. As Armstrong authored the TE policy reports, he authored the HRDS report.

Elite recycling within the policy community comes full circle. Undoubtedly, this is an interesting and informing aspect of this policy community s grip on education policy making. Key figures formerly associated with the MoE bureaucracy and the only higher education institution, are now the architects of the TE policy. The Academic-bureaucratic bond is still cemented. In a way quasi state bodies like TEC become an extension of the state bureaucracy and the academe. For example, the governing body of the TEC, Council, has 14 members. Out of these, 5 are bureaucrats or former bureaucrats, 4 come from the corporate/private sector, 2 are academics while tertiary students, the community and NGOs have one representative each. Here the scale may appear tilted in favour of bureaucrats and business. But when one considers the composition of the key reference groups in this policy process, it

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is the academics and bureaucrats who dominate, albeit with a significant presence of the private sector. It is also notable that some individuals representing the business sector are themselves former senior government bureaucrats. Further, this body demonstrates the presence of civil society in state or semi state policy making bodies, a phenomenon that I examined as joint policy councils. Nevertheless the predominance of bureaucrats clearly attests to the cooptation and policy legitimation thesis that was examined earlier and still abounds here.

In small states, as distinct from large or medium sized states decision makers are conscious of who is related to whom, who went to school with whom, who has what influence in parliament, town council, social club, church etc. (Bray, 1991, p. 58). Furthermore, a thin line exists between the bureaucracy and politics, challenging the notion of a politically neutral public service in Western democracies because individuals have to undertake multiple functions (Bray, 1991, p. 31).

The highly acclaimed Scottish novelist, Alexander McCall Smith gives an idyllic picture of Botswana but somewhat avidly captures the fluidity of information flow in a small state s social networks: That is what this place is like , sighed Mr J.L.B. Matekoni. I am always hearing about other people s secrets . Mma Ramotswe nodded. He was right: there were no secrets in Gaborone. Everybody knew everybody else s business (Smith, 2000, p. 48). It is within this context of information flow that policy networks operationalise. The connections between individuals at personal and institutional level weave and stretch to the national level.

It has been argued here that the process of policy agenda setting by a closed network of elite is in all intents and purposes, policy making. The consultation process that follows this agenda setting is a hegemonic process in which the views espoused by the policy makers in the discussion document are uncritically embraced by stakeholders and enacted in reports. In the foregoing analysis, it has been established that stakeholders submissions reflected the limiting nature of the deployment of a consultation document in policy consultation. Stakeholders essentially affirmed the views of policy makers articulated in that document. Policy legitimation aside, at one level, consultation serves to minimise threats and risks to the policy as it evolves. Gatekeepers and other interest groups are brought into the consultation process for purposes of muting conflict and containing possible stakeholder backlash. Part of this process involves considering the interests of the state. The contextualisation of policy within macro public policies was critical in the views of policy makers. This reflects the influence the state interests in TE policy making.

Here, it has been established that actors within this community are recycled in various policy initiatives. Individuals within and from academic background, the bureaucracy and business, predominate in these initiatives. An interesting but not surprising character of this community is its veiled ability to close out non-members on the basis of ideology. Labour stands out in this regard. The next section further examines the consultation process, focusing on the management of conflicts within and outside the policy community. I also argue that although policy making is projected as participatory and engaging non-state actors, once it moves to the bureaucracy realm, the state, through its bureaucratic arm, becomes the final arbiter.

Resistance, Threats and Bureaucratic Control of the Policy Process This section examines the second phase of Botswana s consultative TE policy making. A number of themes emerge from the analysed data. One is stakeholder anxiety and alienation from the consultation process. The other is bureaucratic resistance to the policy through

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parallel institutional restructuring within the ministries. Bureaucrats position themselves to protect their vested interests. This interest safeguarding is not necessarily restricted to the bureaucracy. Academic institutions objected to the draft report on the basis of interest protection veiled as non-consultation. Against this background of tuff protection , the paper also problematises consultation. It is argued that in part consultation is a public relations exercise which was also reduced to a ritualised academic undertaking by some participants. It also serves to diffuse policy tensions. Another theme analysed in this section is the conflicting dual roles of the education policy community actors. It closes by examining bureaucratic control of the policy making process to extend arguments advanced in the previous sections that regardless of the inclusive policy making in which non-state actors are involved, the state occupies a position of power and strength.

More than just a stakeholder

The second phase of the TE policy making process concludes with the revising of the draft report following a review by stakeholders and RRG. The draft report was then transmitted forward to the TEC Council. The principal players here are bureaucrats, business and academics. It is a closed process dominated by the policy community. However, the processes at this phase are still not without conflict and contestation. The conflicts largely revolved around the policy community itself

the bureaucrats, academics and some stakeholders represented by the institutions and the skills development sector.

Even before the draft policy reached the TEC Council, simmering discontent emerged. Although the magnitude of the tremors of dissent were not that big for panic buttons to be pressed, the policy making Richter scale picked these, forcing the TEC, once again to reconsider the path that the policy should take from Council onwards. The threats were first signalled by stakeholder anxiety and nervousness in view of some of the proposals the draft report was making. Principal among these was the proposed institutional reconfiguration through rationalisation. It is at this stage that some stakeholders registered alienation from the consultation process, Specifically, the tertiary sector union, ABOTEL and the skills training regulating body, BOTA, expressed reservations about their level of involvement in the consultation process. The common expression of these organisations was that they were treated just like any other stakeholder . Yet they are more than just a stakeholder .

This writer had the opportunity to attend the last round of stakeholder consultations prior to the presentation of the draft report to the TEC Council. The writer also attended a closed meeting of the RRG where the final draft was reviewed before it being forwarded to the Council. One of the contentious issues in that meeting was the definition of tertiary education, with BOTA expressing a strong reservation about how the policy precludes vocational education and skills training. Even on the interview that followed, the BOTA representative was still preoccupied with this matter, arguing that part of the problem stems from BOTA s level of involvement in the policy development process.

MP: Your view really is that BOTA should have been involved as a policy initiator rather than maybe as a stakeholder? As a partner...

Moruti: Yes, as a partner in the process of policy making.

MP: But in this case you were engaged as a stakeholder while in actual fact the view is that you are part of the whole thing?

Moruti: We are a crucial part of it, yes. That s the view. I think the reason why I am saying that is that as a stakeholder you are entitled to voice your inputs

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and opinions but because you are just one of the many stakeholders, they will take them on board but they don t have as much impact as if they understood that yes, if we are going to merge with this organisation, what they are doing, the Acts that they are enforcing, the policies that they are doing, are a very crucial part of what we are building. Therefore, it s more than just being a stakeholder. It s part and parcel of the new tertiary education policy.

It is this position that informs the view that lack of inclusiveness of tertiary education definition at the expense of skills development and training emerges from BOTA s lukewarm involvement in the policy making process. On the other hand, the unions felt sidelined as compared to employers who had representation at TEC Council level and in the policy agenda setting WG. BOCCIM, a consortium of business interests has representation on the Council. Labour has no representation. Clearly this supports the observation made by Tsie (1996) that business interests are highly protected and represented in state policy bodies. In that regard labour s dissent on this policy was not without substance.

Fisch: Then the other issue that emerged as very, very, key to us was that while the process of consultation was such that there were key stakeholders such as labour who were left out in terms of representation in the key committees, and they were in our view treated just like any other stakeholder (...)

It is this feeling of alienation that prompted union representation to the TEC, reflecting stakeholder anxiety about the evolving tertiary education policy. The TEC was compelled to reengage some of these organisations despite the advanced stage at which the policy was. This is despite the TEC s position that some of the organisations were complacent during the consultation period.

Armstrong: There is worry that people like ABOTEL feel while they were invited into our stakeholder consultation, they invariably didn t turn up because they didn t see the seriousness of this thing, ok. Then when they actually see the report, ok, or hear about it, then My God, there is going to be fundamental change. So now they are starting to say we need to be engaged .

Although the TEC held this position, in the interest of diffusing tensions and policy resistance, it reengaged ABOTEL and other stakeholders. A more detailed examination of this phenomenon and its character follows later.

At this stage, the reader might have discerned the messiness, fuzziness and unpredictability of this consultation process, which takes twists and turns as various interest groups pull their stakes and the policy makers attempt to forge a common ground that is also marked by elite conflict within the policy community. It is to the bureaucratic group within the education policy community that the analysis shifts to.

Protecting Tuff : Parallel Restructuring and Bureaucratic Resistance A significant threat to the policy making process at phase two of consultation was a process of reviewing governance and administrative structures known as the Organisation and Methods (O & M) reviews, a routine exercise performed in Ministries every five years. As the policy process evolved, the MoE and Ministry of Health (MoH), ministries with a number of institutions under their governance and jurisdiction, initiated the O & M review exercises, creating a potential conflict between what they will recommend and the recommendations of

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the TE policy. One of the key recommendations of the policy report is that in view of the fragmented nature of TE in Botswana, the governance structure should undergo a complete overhaul, principally relocating TE institutions scattered all over ministries to a single ministry. While some of these processes are routine and may not necessarily be connected to the policy, the establishment of task forces to decide the future of institutions in some ministries, pointed to bureaucratic and political machinations against a perceived threat of the policy recommendations on institutional rationalisation. The MoH epitomised this bureaucratic resistance, with political undertones.

Fisch: So, we have observed that there are lot of things which are proposed by the policy which effectively if they come into being will affect the current proposals which were made during the process of these Organisation and Methods and these Organisation and Methods is something that takes about 5 years, 10 years. And you can imagine if the policy is completed in two years, are we going to redo? Are we going to go back to the drawing board and restructure some of the things?

MP: What are some of the recommendations that are arising out of the O & M?

Fisch: I ll give an example. In the Ministry of Health, there is a concerted view now that Institutes of Health Sciences should be part of the university. A letter has been written to that effect. It s there in our office. And then the Ministry of Education; there is a proposal that our PS, the PS for the Ministry of Education should be upgraded to operate at a higher level. Then when our PS operates at a higher level, it means we are going to have deputy PSs who operates at the level of the current PS and then there is a Deputy PS who is going to be in charge of tertiary education.

The motivation of these initiatives is what interviewees label protection of tuff , that is protecting bureaucratic interests and power. Among interviewees, institutions are power bases for both the political and bureaucratic elites. There are structures within individual ministries associated with the institutions. Therefore the loss of such institutions would represent waning power for the bureaucrats within ministries.

Moruti: Because they will object to moving them. Because they would lose their power base. I mean there s a whole structure that is responsible for the management of the Health colleges in the Ministry of Health. If you say move them to education then you are touching on a lot of vested interests. They are basically There s a whole structure, I mean there s the Deputy Permanent Secretary, Undersecretary who is responsible for health training and has a staff and they run all these colleges and the colleges are linked to hospitals for purposes of medical training.

Part of this bureaucratic resistance and protection of vested interests has to do with the fear of job losses as empires shrink within ministries. This is where the bureaucratic interests are high on the agenda.

MP: Why do you think ministries will not let go their institutions?

Moloto: Well, it s because people are surviving on jobs created by the fact that those institutions are run from there. Some Directors, for instance, feel that their jobs are going to go away and their officers.

The protection of tuff can therefore be seen at three levels; the political, bureaucratic and institutional level. At political level, institutions give certain ministries the limelight and therefore their loss would signal the Ministry s declining significance. Further, institutions

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are not just under ministries. They are also located within constituencies where politicians have local political interests. Institutions are also connected to the ambitions of political figures.

Armstrong: Now actually, in anticipation of this, um, there is some parallel restructuring going on. Inevitably so, cause people naturally are going to have a look at this and say eeh, where am I in this? Ok. So, in the Ministry of Health in particular, even before we completed the report they started a task force on the future of the IHSs, and that has been going on for about three or four months or so.

MP: Prompted by what?

Armstrong: Prompted by the Minster of Health. Ok. Who seems to have a single view in her mind that the IHSs should be absorbed into the university?

MP: Was this in reaction to your work?

Armstrong: No! I mean, I suspected that there is some other motivation informing her thinking.

MP: What could be that motivation?

Armstrong: Aaaah (sighs). The next elections and her future.

MP: Politics?

Armstrong: Yes! Or her departure may be, from politics. You know you are just like a parachute when you are a politician. So, a very interesting scenario for someone like her will be to fall back into the faculty of Health Sciences in the University of Botswana. A large faculty of health sciences, with the IHSs incorporated [The Minister of Health is professor of Nursing Education and an employee of the University of Botswana on leave of absence for political office].

The policy making process therefore is not just being played out with the bureaucrats as strategic players in forward positions, to score winning goals for their group within the policy community. They are equally manning the goal posts to prevent what may be own goals against their interests. Therefore the parallel restructuring processes within the ministries typify an attempt not only to entrench bureaucratic interests, but to sway policy in their direction. However, the protection of vested interests is also observable at institutional level. When the draft policy reached TEC Council, some tertiary institutions, principally the UB, whose members are the core of the policy community, equally had a dissenting voice, couched in the language of non-institutional consultation. The argument was that the TEC made recommendations with reference to the university and other institutions without having consulted them as institutions to obtain their views.

Humble: Certainly as an institution we saw the version that was going to go to the TEC and we were unhappy about it because we didn t feel we had been consulted as an institution. Some of our people have been in workshops, like Peter Siviya.

MP: But the same would apply to other institutions.

Humble: Sorry.

MP: The same would apply to other institutions.

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Humble: I believe so. I believe the Ministry representative in the TEC meetings, in Council meetings, objected on the same ground that things were being said which have not been at least discussed with the responsible I mean, take, for example, I think the proposal in the draft that the number of colleges of education was unviable and they have to be amalgamated and so forth. The way that was put, was in a kind of a definitive way and the Ministry of Education said, but look, you haven t discussed this with us. So the final version that is currently being produced, I believe, takes those kinds of objections into account. Cause you can write in a completely different way. You can say there should be a consideration of whether it s important to amalgamate colleges . That s different from saying the colleges must be amalgamated. So, the tone and the style in which it was written, I think, was too definitive and therefore, certainly offending a number of institutions and bodies, like ourselves, like the Ministry of Education, which felt that it s quite legitimate to suggest something about UB, but how you do it, its got to be done in a way that indicates that that s got to be subject to further discussion etc.

Humble goes on to specify their objection to recommendations relating to a research institution under their governance and the proposal for an establishment of an open university and closes with a revealing statement on tuff protection.

Humble: And obviously we had a vested interest in that with regard to our own nature as a dual mode institution offering distance learning through the Centre for Continuing Education, and seeing that as really a growth area for us in the future.

In this protection of institutional interests, the university is not alone. Another degree awarding institution, Botswana College of Agriculture (BCA) - associated with the university, similarly displayed resistance tendencies and expected representation to the TEC for further consultation. Its bid was to be absorbed by the newly established university of science and technology, and therefore escape the pangs of policy governance restructuring. Part of this also had to do with bureaucratic resistance as the college is another ministerial empire under the Ministry of Agriculture. Sentiments similar to those of the UB emerge here:

MP: The other thing that one would be interested in knowing is that as an institution are you happy with the way the TEC went about this process of policy making?

Tebo: (Laughs) Why do you want to put me on the spot? (Laughs) As I said we are still expecting the TEC to come and make a presentation to the institution on what the policy document has in store so that some concerns that we have as an institution can be raised.

In brief, what the above demonstrates is that even before the policy report was approved, entrenched interests threatened it, often with some institutions inadvertently distancing themselves from the policy making process despite the central role they played in it. At this stage, institutional representatives or key policy participants, in the interests of their institutions, distance themselves from institutional representation in the consultation forums that gave birth to the policy report. It is this aspect of policy making that necessitates a further problematisation of consultation.

Problematising Consultation In the preceding pages, it was noted that the TEC, in a proactive bid to avoid stakeholder backlash and diffuse policy tensions in relation to the evolving policy, embarked on a second

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stakeholder consultation in which policy participants reviewed the draft policy report. A weakness of that exercise as identified by the stakeholders interviewed is that institutional and individual participants had no prior access to the document. In that regard, they had not digested the content of the document at institutional level to see how it impacted on them and determine the extent to which their views were accommodated. It is this reality that partly accounted for contestation once the document reached Council. My observation of these second workshops revealed that they were essentially briefings on policy progress. Participants responded to a PowerPoint presentation by one of the key policy drivers. Even following the workshops, participants did not obtain the draft to share it with their institutions and make representations to the TEC if they saw fit. The position of the TEC was that it was limited by protocol. The document could not be made public before the Minister received it. The second stakeholder consultation was therefore, in all respects, a public relations exercise.

Another intriguing problem with this policy consultation centred on representation. Although the stakeholders were divided regarding their representation status in consultation forums or key policy reference groups, the majority were of the view that they were attending the meetings on their individual capacity, therefore not necessarily articulating the views of their institutions. Yet the TEC policy driving team holds a different view. Paradoxically, it reengaged the institutions to diffuse policy tensions.

MP: Was it very clear to the people that you invited to your forums for consultation that they were coming in as representatives of organisations/institutions, not as individuals? Was this made very clear?

Moloto: Well, yes and no. When we wrote we wrote explicitly that we were inviting them because we could not have invited them as individuals because we did not know them. They were sent to us. We wrote to the head of each office, to say this is what we are doing; this is what we request you to help us with and we would like you to send your people to come and assist us in getting information on the subject matter. So if there were a few cases where certain names were isolated, it would have been simply because the offices did not respond. I was obviously not on the forefront as the communicator in terms of correspondence. My officers were. But we wrote to institutions. We didn t write to individuals and therefore they were seconded or sent to the meeting as representatives of institutions.

Yet, many of these individuals seemed to have no clear mandate from their institutions. Thus there was this missing link in institutional representation. The missing link was that many institutions sent representatives who did not even solicit their constituencies positions or submissions to be transmitted to the consultation forums. Neither did they report back to their institutions on issues that were emerging in the consultation process. This problem pervaded the whole tertiary education sector, from the university to the smallest institutions, including the ministries themselves. It would appear attendance of the meetings was an academic exercise. The problem was further compounded by the unsystematic nature of representation in which whoever was available was selected for the next meeting, in the event of the absence of the first representative. Worse still the new representatives often were not briefed for the next meeting. This problem was even notable among high ranking officers of some autonomous institutions and it is avidly captured by two research participants.

Modise: The problem, I think, in most cases lies with the representation. If I may use an example, suppose I m picked from an institution. Well, a savingram would be sent to say Tertiary Education Council wants to have a stakeholders' workshop on such and such a day. Each institution is required to send a representative, two or three.

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Then the representatives would go obviously. On coming back, instead of reporting back and carrying the mission as agreed, it is not done. It just dies a natural death. Then, when a follow up is made, you ll find that maybe the management or the person who will receive the document doesn t even know who had gone for the first workshop. Then they will say but there s this document from TEC. It needs people to go in. Who had once gone? And maybe those people who had gone are not there or they are there. They are lying low because they know they didn t even report what was said there. Then somebody else would be picked. Then there is a missing link there and at the end of the day, the people in that particular institution would say we have not been consulted. We just hear of TEC and whatever .

Odili: You are aware in Botswana that there is always a tendency of individuals attending

these meetings and never reporting back to the institution so that the institution can have its own viewpoint. But in this case really the person who attended these workshops was I don t recall any moment when he called us together to brief us about the forthcoming tertiary education policy for Botswana. I don t remember.

In reality though, the TEC did make effort to engage institutions and ministries throughout the process. Letters written to institutions by the TEC secretariat show that institutions were requested to make representation and bring their inputs as previously as previously requested (TEC, REF: TECPPR 1/5 I (37)). But it would appear, after making submissions to the initial consultation document, Challenges and Choices

individuals who represented institutions in subsequent meetings, reduced participation to an academic exercise. Nonetheless a more fundamental reason for resistance at this level is the protection of vested interests.

Another aspect of this conflict is the web of recycling elites in which the academic and bureaucratic elites perform dual, conflicting and contradictory roles in the policy making process. Where their interests are supreme and appear threatened by the policy; an exercise they were engaged in, they detach themselves from that process. It is to this issue that the analytic lens now turns.

Wearing Two Hats : Dual Roles and Elite Recycling Conflict Earlier on, I examined the theme of elite recycling in Botswana s consultative tertiary education policy making. I also alluded to its attendant conflicts that threaten the policy itself. This conflict comes to the fore when academics and bureaucrats have to protect their interests in the face of a perceived threat emanating from its recommendations. The smouldering of this seemingly dormant volcano was in phase two of the consultation process, a stage where the policy report was approved by the TEC Council. The dual role of elites presented a problem to those leading the policy initiative.

Isaacs: Well, it is a worry because I ve heard this and I was told about it. And to tell you the truth, I personally am annoyed with it because some of these ministries are represented in the Council. Why are they not open? Why can t they make it public that this is what we are doing? Now, if people don t go public. We just here there s a task force which has been set up to look at the future of this institution and we are looking at the future of these institutions as per the Act {Tertiary Education Act}.

Both the MoE and the MoH have their senior bureaucrats in the TEC Council, the highest decision making body that approved the policy report to be forwarded to central government. The UB equally has its Vice Chancellor as a Council Member. The chairperson of that Council as noted earlier is a former Vice Chancellor of the same institution. Most importantly, throughout this process, personnel from the university and ministries sat in

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strategic reference groups, some as chairpersons. Ironically, they also presided over committees in their institutions of organisations, making decisions that are at odds with the policy report they approved in the TEC.

Armstrong: Paradoxically, the chair of that task force is Mrs Matome, who is also a member of our Council.

MP: Who has inside information about what s going on?

Armstrong: Who has information about what is going on but also totally conflicted with interest in that she is now sitting on our Council approving that report which recommends one thing and now she is sitting on a task force in the Ministry of Health which is being told to do something else, ok.

This elite recycling conflict plays out at different levels of the consultation process. It does not only present contradictions of this process but also enables the policy making community to navigate their way around the policy through technical legal jargon. In reference to the role that the UB Vice Chancellor plays in the TEC Council, one of the key academic participants in this policy argued that the institution has not been consulted because technically by being a member of the TEC Council he is not representing his institution. Rather, legally he represents Vice Chancellors in terms of the Tertiary Education Act. This figure therefore distances himself and his colleagues from the consultation process and its outcome. Yet he was a lead figure in crafting the consultation document. Further, as the document went through draft stages, he made inputs as a de facto member of the RRG. It is important to note that in the interests of both the policy and their institution, along with his senior colleagues and others who had access to key documents in the consultation process, they would have articulated their positions. That being the case, untangling these elites from the policy making process would be an exercise in futility. Put differently, in this policy initiative as it is the case with previous ones, they are the centrifugal force around which it revolves. But in the interest of territoriality, they seek to blur that relationship. However, as observed here and in the previous pages in this policy community there is a morass of contradictory and conflictual relationships. This conflict had to be diffused even after the approval of the policy report.

Consultation as Diffusing Policy Tensions In view of the impending threats to the policy formulation process, even before it moved out of TEC, and the warning signals of dissent from major stakeholders such as the unions and the local university, the TEC policy making team, despite its ambivalent position over whether it had consulted institutions or not, had second thoughts on reengaging stakeholders at institutional level. The exercise was neither anticipated nor planned for. It arose out of conflicts between the groups in the policy community. Thus it still served to harmonise relationships in the policy community and balance the interests of network members for the sake of the policy.

Armstrong: I mean, we consulted broad stakeholders, including the institutions that will be impacted by this. But they were not really consulted as institutions. So, for example, TEC did not got to IHS in Lobatse and get their views into this or he college in Tonota and get their views into this.

As noted earlier, another leading figure in the policy making process was adamant that they consulted institutions and not individuals. The ambivalence at this stage is a product of apprehension over the policy future. But it is not shared by all.

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Isaacs: You see, that is the thing. You see we have consulted them. I mean when we were talking with this guy we were sitting and I looked at Chris and I looked at Kitso. I said But didn t we talk to these people? They said We did . But if we did, why are you worried? Unless they said

something and we didn t cover it. But the reports which you gave us, I hope they are telling the truth because the reports said that this is the general consensus .

Indeed as Isaacs maintains, among all the policy makers interviewed, there was unanimity over the view that there was broad consultation and policy convergence among stakeholders. No only that. Some within the protesting institutions held the view that the institutions were consulted. They argued that as the academic and bureaucratic elites allied in the policy initiation stage and review of the various drafts of the report, it was difficult for them to divorce themselves from their institutions. In particular the UB is cited as an example that falls within this category.

Siviya: But yes, I would say it s difficult to say UB did not make its voice heard since the people who were involved in the initial drafting of the working document were UB people even though they were not doing it as UB people. But it s very difficult to say that they did not think of their institution when they were doing that.

What was really important was not the substantive issue of non-institutional representation. The policy makers were conscious that interest protection was supreme and they therefore had to act to contain a possible skirmish with institutions and ministries over this. The TEC therefore charted yet another road of reengaging stakeholders, this time at institutional level. The path, meandering as it was, had different lanes. On one lane, the TEC read the riot act to some contending parties. It flexed its muscle by invoking the statutes that give it the authority over tertiary education institutions.

Moloto: In fact, I have to begin writing letters to some people [Ministries] reminding them of the role and function of the Tertiary Education Council vis- a'- viz some of the actions that they themselves are undertaking.

The Tertiary Education Act here becomes symbolic of power at the disposal of the policy drivers, power that can be used to call some stakeholders to submission. In fact the TEC successfully convinced the MoE to suspend its O & M reviews pending the conclusion of the policy process. But it was not successful with other ministries. In answering a question as to whether one institution, the BCA, would fall under the new science and technology university, Assistant Minister Peter Siele told Parliament that a feasibility study was being conducted and will inform that decision ( Study to decide, 2006). The Ministry of State President through the Department of Public Service Management (DPSM) also announced the transformation of BIAC, an institution under its mandate, prompting the TEC Executive Secretary to decry this.

The normal thing will be to inform TEC about the transformation. DPSM as owners of the institution know about the Council and its function. We cannot stop the owners from restructuring their institution but they cannot do that without informing us even though they are not registered as yet. (Baputaki, 2006)

However, the Act is not the only available tool. On the second lane and perhaps more significant, once the TEC had transmitted the final report to the MoE, it embarked on a parallel consultation process, with the institutions and the bureaucracy within ministries as its

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targets. Here, the consultation process entails presenting the report to the contending stakeholders, essentially marketing a packaged product to sceptical customers, some of whom are not that enthusiastic.

Armstrong: So, I m starting to get out to the institutions. I think it s been a deficiency in a way, in the consultation process. We engaged the broad stakeholders but we didn t deliberately engage the institutions. So that s the gap and I m filling it.

Language use here is complex; broad stakeholders versus institutions . It is not clear as to what broad entails. The assumption is that it means inclusive, encompassing and wide. If wide then, institutions would not have escaped the net. They are part of the broad stakeholders. Another lane in this road led to the bureaucracy.

Moloto: I m now going round to ministries presenting to the senior management of each ministry, especially those ministries which have to do with the sector in the sense of having small institutions that they supervise because through the policy we are going to ask them to forget about that responsibility.

At issue here is the power play between the bureaucratic and academic elite within the policy community. The policy making team does not underestimate the power of the bureaucratic elite in determining the shape and direction of the policy. They are aware that without the enlistment of this bureaucratic axis, the policy would be grounded once it reaches the bureaucracy. It has already been noted that the academic-bureaucratic policy community s power is not only at the policy making level. It is also seen at the level of guarding goal posts at institutional level. This is the power that the TEC was grappling with at this point as acknowledged by the policy making coordinator.

Moloto: No, we are just trying to minimise the level of resistance by making sure that we inform them. You know with a lot of them, with due respect, if you give them reports of this nature, they don t read them. They don t have time. So, I m only speaking to the report to them and not asking for new input.

Another aspect of dealing with policy threats entails tinkering with the wording of the policy report and revising some recommendations to accommodate the dissenting voices, at the level of the policy approval within the TEC, that is, Council. Conflict superficially arose over definitive and strong language used in some recommendations, without having taken into account the views of the affected institutions and organisations. Thus following its approval by the TEC Council, the report document was revised to tone down the language and retract some recommendations especially those related to the UB; one of the major power brokers in this process. In that way, the academic group within the policy community partially scored a major victory in the protection of its vested interests. The following narrative captures how this power was played out, highlighting the complexity of the elite cycling phenomenon.

Moloto: But people felt that sometimes we were too strong in our language. So that was the type of modification that people put.

MP: So, in some instances you were asked to tone down the language.

Moloto: Yes.

MP: What about at Council level?

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Moloto: At Council, it was not easy. There was the issue of the language. But also the issue of substance. The issue of principles as well and issues of interest, and issues of protection of tuff, where people were saying, Look, this is a territory that you can t approach that way because its mine . If you like, I m putting it crudely. But remember in our Council, there is the Vice Chancellor of the only university, there are people coming from some of these institutions, there are people coming from the private sector, people coming from government, and the Ministry responsible itself. So, there were tensions and disagreements and in some cases we had to do a number of corrections and modify statements.

MP: In the end does the policy in any way make recommendations to take into account these potential threats to the policy?

Moloto: ... Some of those people protested to say, Sorry, this is not within your territory and therefore you cannot say that . So we had to modify such a statement to mellow it down, to moderate it down, to make it very acceptable. But there is no question that there are mixed messages coming through government and that there is a lot of pressure. Some institutions want to be this and not that. Others don t want to be this but not that and therefore there is definitely going to be a lot of debate and discussion.

Here the policy makers are still trying to forge a middle ground by balancing the interests of the policy moving forward as well as accommodating views of some within the network, and acceding to their power.

Thus far I have attempted to sketch the different stages of the policy making process through the eyes of both the key policy makers and the consulted interest groups. The preceding phases were not generally clear cut. Up to this stage, they were outside Botswana government enclave. Now, following the approval of the draft policy report, Towards a Knowledge Society: A proposal for Tertiary Education Policy for Botswana , the policy making process moves strictly into the bureaucratic-political domain. The academic group within the policy community now takes the back seat.

Bureaucrats take control: The State as the final arbiter At the end of phase two consultations, The TEC produced two sets of documents; the main policy report and an executive report that was transmitted to the MoE as a product of consultation and a policy proposal, that is, a set of recommendations for consideration by the state. Within government, another process of consultation took place in three stages. First, the Minister sets up a consultative team within the MoE, comprising senior government officials. It is this team that assesses the document and drafts the white paper. The key participants are the Minister and the Permanent Secretary as coordinators of the exercise. Furthermore, within the Ministry, there is the policy advisory group constituted by Heads of departments. The policy makers indicate that the MoE will form its own reference group to get the key players within government to go through the recommendations. It is at this stage that aspirations of the state are supreme.

Seemo: Basically that s where the reference group needs to be sensitive to the aspirations of government vis-à-vis the terms of reference that would have guided the commission.

With regard to this policy, it is not the commission but the TEC that is mandated to develop the policy. Primarily, at this stage, the focus is on recommendations. The ministerial

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reference group would therefore, in consideration of the interest of the state, accept some recommendations as they are presented, amend, defer or reject others. Following the draft, an inter-ministerial consultation followed, still dominated by senior bureaucrats.

Seemo: But before Cabinet we have what we call the Economic Committee of Cabinet, where basically you are talking about all the role players in terms of the government structures, in other words, you are talking about all Ministries represented by their Permanent Secretaries. And then of course Cabinet would also be part of that Economic Committee of Cabinet.

The above seems to suggest that the process is smooth and devoid of any contestations. On the contrary, from the MoE to Parliament, there are trade offs, mainly between bureaucratic and state interests. Once the consultation document reaches government, threats from the bureaucracy are significant.

Isaacs: When it gets there its going to be circulated under secret, now [emphasis his] to other ministries. Now this is where now we have to be careful. The input from the ministries!

This is the stage that some policy makers term rationalisation where senior civil servants play a leading role as guardians of the state and its interests.

MP: In the end does it not mean that it is really the top brass, the bureaucracy within the ministries that make the ultimate decisions?

Molwantwa: Naturally that s what it is, that policy making is an elite thing. This is why many people call it a game of the elites. Those on the ground talk. They say their views. But then those views are shaped by the others who put in other issues, who rationalise. That s the process we call rationalisation, now. [( )]

Those issues that ultimately shape the ones articulated by stakeholders are economic, ideological and state-centred as many participants observed that the policy has to be consistent with other public policies and reflect priorities of the state. In general, those interviewed conceded that in the final stages of the policy making process, it is the senior bureaucrats in ministries who dominate the policy formulation process. They draft the final document and comment on it. This bureaucratic dominance in the policy community is epitomised by the MFDP.

Armstrong: So, I think, the only obstacle I see in the way is the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning. In central government, that s the only obstacle.

MP: Is that so?

Armstrong: That ministry!

MP: Why?

Armstrong: It s a culture and mindset within that ministry, ok. It has a culture and a mindset, and I m not saying this alone. Quite a number of people have been saying this, which I think set in the 70s and early 80s, driven and being principally responsible for the success in Botswana as it is right now.

MP: What makes it powerful?

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Armstrong: No, I mean it controls purse strings. It has been the driver of this country for so long, I mean the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, traditionally, everything goes through them.

MP: Are you in a way saying that the Ministry of Finance is the main powerhouse in development policy issues?

Armstrong: Yaa! Extremely so, Yaa. I mean I label it the Taliban. If you want to really get it into context.

This power and dominance is historical. But it also has to do with determining the depth and breadth of the policy in terms of financial implications. If it does not pass the MFDP costing litmus test, then it s bound to faulter. There is also an element of conservatism involved; maintaining the status quo

Talibanism. All this has to do with the relative autonomy of the bureaucracy from the state as Moloto, the policy coordinator concedes:

In fact many people, including myself, have described this state as an administrative state, as a bureaucratic state, meaning that in fact the policy making process rests with the bureaucrats like myself rather than the politicians. If you look at all the previous studies in terms of government reports, government commissions, almost 90%, if not 95% of the recommendations made by the technical groups have always gone through. So, it will be a mystery for this one not to go through to that extent.

The last stage of the policy making process where contestations and conflicts were likely to play out is cabinet. But as I have already argued, at the political level, there is a tendency to accept policy documents worked out by bureaucrats, with minimal contestation. However, it must be noted that the consultation process within the MoE and among other ministries was also part of the policy tension diffusion. Therefore once conflict is contained at that level, there is bound to be minimal resistance at Cabinet level. According to the interviewees, if there was to be any form of contestation, through a process of isolating a dissenting ministry and majority rule in a democratic process, the policy can pass in Cabinet. Furthermore, the Head of State as the chairperson of Cabinet can intervene by summoning the architects of the daft white paper to appear before the Economic Committee of Cabinet, following which a final decision is taken on the basis of their defence of the policy. In the end Cabinet and Parliament do little or nothing to modify recommendations of bureaucrats. Therefore, the critical stage of policy making is the one where bureaucrats play out their roles. It has already been shown how their interests played out in different stages of the TE policy making.

The argument pursued here, is that consultative TE policy making entails managing conflict within and outside the policy community. Conflicts revolve around the protection of vested interests in which elites who play dual roles in education policy initiatives are implicated. At this stage of policy making, consultation serves two functions. At one level it is a public relations exercise. At another level, it is a conflict management process that seeks to diffuse tensions as the policy evolves. Conflict and its management not withstanding, as the policy making moves into state structures, bureaucrats dominate and state interests take centre stage albeit balanced with global perspectives on education policy. The next section explicitly explores the theme of global influences on policy making. The ideal is to further advance my thesis that while policy making appears to be apportioned to non-state actors, in a small state where the bureaucracy is relatively autonomous, policy networks patterned through consultation are networks of legitimation. In addition, the notion that policy making is also

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apportioned to multilateral agencies as the network state seeks to position itself in a global economy is projected.

Global benchmarking When the initial WG deliberated and brainstormed to set the framework within which the policy consultation process should take place, it was not just informed by the analysis of the internal situation. Globalisation represented by the benchmarking of Botswana with her peers in the region and globally, either in terms of access or other aspects of tertiary education, topical issues in higher education in other countries, and the literature emerging from Multilateral agencies like the World Bank and UNESCO. All policy makers interviewed unanimously attested to this influence in policy making. Preceding this of course were extensive travels to other parts of the world that some of the key participants undertook as learning exercises for purposes of benchmarking.

Humble: So, we certainly took into account the fact, for example, that fairly recently, the World Bank literature has shifted. The World Bank as a major institution which affects global policies and national policies traditionally has been fairly antagonistic well, I think antagonistic to governments investing, and the World Bank itself supporting higher education, on the argument that the essential is to get primary and junior secondary education on a good foundation and that in some ways higher education was a luxury, largely. But the World Bank has changed its views on that, partly, I think obviously because of economic imperatives that modern economies have changed so completely.

Policies of multilateral agencies like the World Bank therefore bear pressure on nation states regardless of how such nation states perceive them. The policy making process had to follow the tide of shifts in policies of theses agencies. It is not just these agencies selling their solutions for states in the periphery; there is the learning curve through international visits.

Moloto: We also collected a lot of literature including making files for the reference group on material from UNESCO going far back to the mid 90s, material from the World Bank on tertiary education. I had had the privilege of travelling extensively prior to this decision to start the policy. I had visited the Irish Republic Higher Education Authority, The Scotland Funding Council, England Funding Council, New Zealand Tertiary Education Commission, South African Council on Higher Education. I had of course been consulting with the Ghanaian Tertiary Education Commission and several others.

Ball (1998) states that policy globalisation spans through countries partly through policy experts who sell their fix it solutions. The making of TE in Botswana, although not outsourced to international consultant as it is the case in many developing countries, had influence from external experts. South Africa, Botswana s southern giant neighbour, had recently undergone a major higher education restructuring process resulting in mergers of institutions and the breaking of racial boundaries between these institutions (Sehoole, 2005). This process was led by experts of the South African Council on Higher Education (CHE). One such expert acted as peer reviewer of the TEC as it was being drafted.

Moloto: We also had an advantage of an external reviewer. Somebody who had been working with similar processes in South Africa did make input by reading through our drafts and commenting and making suggestions.

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So, he brought in the South African higher education influence to the tertiary education policy making. The key question then is what was that influence? Asked about how and why the authorities at the TEC sought his input into the document, the expert revealed that he is the Director of the Centre for Higher Education Transformation in South Africa, and coordinates the network of higher education expertise in Africa as well as teach in one South African university and the University of Oslo European Higher Education Erasmus Mundus programme (Cloete, Personal communication, April 19, 2007). Added to that he was the research director of the South Africa National Commission on Higher Education set up by the then new Mandela government in 1994 and hence wrote the new Higher Education White paper of 1997 (Cloete, Personal communication, April 19, 2007). Thus he brought in the global perspective to the policy and the South African experience of higher education restructuring.

In short, policy makers were conscious that they cannot make tertiary education policy for Botswana without reference to and an understanding of international trends. Thus a negotiated balance between the local and the global started at the policy initiation stage.

Critical Commentary In small peripheral states like Botswana where the civil society is weak and has been subordinated to state structures, policy cannot be constructed and reconstructed in the manner in which Postructural theorists suggest. Instead, through ideological integration in which consultation is a hegemonic tool, elite crafted policy is legitimated. Policy making is presented as agenda setting. In reality though, the education policy community, constituted by academics, bureaucrats and the business elites frame TE policy. Consultation then orbits within the parameters set by this group. Neither does it extend beyond these confines and frame. The broadening of participation widely articulated by policy makers is a legitimation function in which policy makers sell their ideas . TE interests groups then have to buy into these ideas. Superficially consultation is a democratisation process as policy making is opened to a myriad of interest groups. It extends beyond the state bureaucracy and the political elites. But as observed here, the TE policy making is principally an affair of the policy community. As the marginalisation of labour in this policy demonstrates, non-members of this community are shut out. Thus the tradition of a closed alliance between the state and business is sustained. This confirms observations made by other Botswana s public policy analysts (Molutsi & Holm, 1990; Mogalakwe, 1997; Tsie, 1996). The notable difference with this policy is the pronounced role of academics in its initiation. Education unlike other public policies has always been an enclave of academics in universities. In the context of Australia even on matters like the curriculum and examinations, professors have a history of pulling the strings (Teese, 2000).

A second element of policy consultation is managing conflicts within the policy community and among stakeholders. The enlistment of individuals and groups in the consultation process is a proactive bid to contain possible policy threats and engage strategic players in the policy community. In the interests of the policy moving forward, key strategic players, without whom the policy may be jeopardised, are recruited into reference groups. And all this is couched as broadening participation.

Another feature of policy making in a small state is the personalised and managed intimacy (Bray, 1991) in policy making whereby individuals have multiple social networks that blur professional and personal relationships. Actors within the education policy community are recycled in state, quasi state institutions and bodies in a range of policy

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ventures. In this paper, it has emerged that network actors move forth and back in different policy undertakings. But this elite network actor recycling and dual roles are fraught with controversies and conflicts.

Even before the TE policy was approved, there was disquiet among stakeholders and groups within the policy community. As network theorists point out, professional and economic interests dominate in the policy communities, where interaction entails bargaining between members, and the balancing of power that is not necessarily evenly distributed, but in which actors perceive themselves in a positive sum game (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992; Rhodes, 1997). Policy community actors therefore seek to establish a common ground and strive towards a common goal of balancing their interests for the sake of the policy. The parallel restructuring within the ministries reflects the power of bureaucrats and their attempt to circumvent the policy. This power is linked to the multiple roles of policy makers; a defining trait of small states. Conflict in policy making is embedded in the duality of roles as policy pronouncements clash with professional, institutional, political and personal interests of key participants. This conflict is not inconsequential. Consultation in this context then serves to diffuse policy tensions. The reengagement of institutions, ministries and the toning down of language or the modification of the policy report by the TEC is part of the trade offs and bargaining in the interests of this policy. But in the end, the more powerful and strategically positioned group within the policy community is the bureaucracy, and by extension, the state. Consultation within state structures is highly insulated from non-state actors and interests. It is also premised on aspirations of the government.

Yet another feature that emerged in this process is the intent of policy makers to align the policy with macro public policies of the Botswana state. Policy makers are unequivocal in taking into account the interests of the state when crafting policy. They argue that they considered pronouncements made by the political leadership, the restructuring of the state towards market forces and other parallel policy initiatives such the NQF and HRDS. But as it is the case in other developing regions such as Latin America the notions of neoliberalism and the neoliberal state appear to be exported from the center to the periphery and semiperiphery (Torres, 1995/996, p. 292).

Conclusion A critical reader must have noted the twists and turns that this policy making process has taken, and left wondering if a presentation of such a messy enterprise answers the questions that this study set out to answer. Well, it is a deliberate effort designed to bring to the fore the complexity of policy making in a small Third world state on the fringes of global capitalism. It is also meant to capture a power play that characterise the process and therefore in the end answer questions relating to the interests that the policy represents and the ones that are predominant. Furthermore, through a focus on the non-linear process of policy evolution, by design and intent, I sought to mark within the outlined phases, the conception of policy and the three year labour it went through, showing how stakeholder submissions based on an elite crafted document evolved in the midst of policy power brokers, to deliver a national policy blueprint. To what extent this has been achieved thus far, is for the reader to pass the final verdict.

This paper attempted an integration of network theory with critical state theory to explore processes of consultative tertiary education reform in a small Third world state of Botswana. It has been argued that this superficially democratic process is elite dominated and controlled. Right from policy agenda setting by a closed network through to consultation with various

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stakeholders, academic and bureaucratic elites predominate. The consultation process that follows this agenda setting is a hegemonic process in which the views articulated by the policy community through a discussion document are sold to stakeholders and enacted in reports. Beyond policy legitimation consultation serves to minimise threats and risks to the policy as it evolves. It is a conflict management process that seeks to diffuse tensions as policy making unfolds. Gatekeepers and other interest groups are brought into the consultation process for purposes of muting conflict and containing possible stakeholder backlash. Part of this process involves considering the interests of the state. This process begins at policy initiation stage, and is much more pronounced as the policy making moves into state structures, where bureaucrats dominate and state interests take centre stage albeit balanced with global perspectives on education policy.

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