Would a greater reliance on Loyalisttroops as an offensive force have madea difference in the outcome of the war?

Viewpoint: Yes. An early, concerted, and protracted utilization of Loyalists inthe South and the divided states of New York and New Jersey could havemade a difference in the outcome of the war.

Viewpoint: No. Loyalist strength in America was never as large as Britishofficials believed.

The lure of Loyalist support influenced British strategic plannersthroughout the war. It played a part in their decision to shift military operationsfrom New England to New York in 1776, and it had a part in luring some ofMajor General John Burgoyne's men into a disastrous raid on Bennington,Vermont, in August 1777. An estimated fifty thousand Americans fought forthe British throughout the course of the Revolutionary War (1775-1783). Still,Loyalists did not figure prominently in British military strategy until 1778. Con-fidence among British officials that the war would be brief and their lack ofconfidence in the fighting ability of colonials partially explain their underutiliza-tion of Loyalists early in the war. However, the Franco-American alliance inearly 1778 forced Britain into fighting a world war and, concomitantly, forced itto adopt a military strategy that depended more heavily on Loyalist troops. Inthis new "Americanization" plan, the British turned their attention to the hith-erto neglected South, alleged to be filled with many pugnacious Crown sup-porters. As it turned out, this assumption was erroneous and costly. Blame forthis mistaken assumption must rest with Secretary of the State for the Colo-nies Lord George Germain and other London officials, all of whom continuedto believe in strong royal support despite warnings from Sir William Howe thatrelatively few Tories anywhere in America would take up arms for the Crown.

Howe's warnings aside, British officials planned to employ Southern Loy-alist units in conjunction with British regulars to pacify the South. Specifically,this Southern strategy involved deploying British regulars to first conquerGeorgia and raise Loyalist units; afterward, the British redcoats would leavebehind a Loyalist force to police the "liberated" region and reintroduce royalgovernment before moving North to repeat the process throughout theremainder of the South. Once they had suppressed the rebellion from Geor-gia to Virginia, the British military would once again direct its attention to NewEngland.

The Southern strategy gave the British high hopes for success early onwith the capture of Savannah in December 1778 and Charleston in May1780. Disheartened Whigs in the lower South offered little opposition to theadvancing redcoats, who appeared to be on their way to resecuring the entireSouth. Instead of savoring the sweet taste of victory, however, the Britishwere given a bitter dose of defeat. In the end, Tory military units failed to fulfilltheir part of the strategy.

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Viewpoint:Yes. An early, concerted, andprotracted utilization of Loyalists inthe South and the divided states ofNew York and New Jersey couldhave made a difference in theoutcome of the war.

When historians consider why the Britishlost the Revolutionary War (1775-1783), inevita-bly, attention turns toward loyal Americans. Formuch of the conflict the British administrationunder Prime Minister Frederick North believedthat most Americans were loyal and that therebellion was the work of a determined few.Though this assessment was grossly inaccurate,the Revolution did depend on the support of aminority of the American population. The mostreliable studies estimate that about one-fifth ofthe American population was loyal; anothertwo-fifths most likely was neutral. Thus, a Britishstrategy that incorporated the Loyalists andstrived to win the allegiance of neutrals andregain the allegiance of lukewarm Rebels stood areasonable chance of success.

The first major effort to utilize the Loyalistsas a military force occurred in early 1776. Optimis-tic reports from royal governors led the Britishministry to believe that the Southern provincescontained large numbers of Loyalists. Accordingly,an expedition under Major General Henry Clin-ton sailed to the coast of North Carolina andplanned to conduct operations with Loyalists.When the British ships reached the Cape FearRiver in March, Clinton learned that a Loyalistarmy had prematurely marched toward the coastand had been routed at the Battle of Moore'sCreek Bridge (27 February). This bad news effec-tively ended any hope of military collaborationwith Southern Loyalists. After an unsuccessfulattack on Charleston Harbor, the British fleetreturned North to join the operations to take NewYork City.

Sir William Howe, commander in chief of theBritish forces, believed victory could be achievedby defeating the American Continental Army in adecisive battle. Because officers like Howe deemedthe Loyalists capable only of holding areas alreadyconquered, the king's friends played no part in theBritish plans to seize New York City. Even afterthe capture of the city in September, Howe madelittle effort to incorporate the Loyalists into hisplans, though Governor William Tryon urged himto make New York a stronghold for Loyalist activi-ties. Hoping to end the war quickly through acombination of military victories and negotiation,Howe paid little heed to the Loyalists. To be sure,he did establish winter posts in New Jersey to pro-

tect Loyalists, but George Washington's successfulattacks on Trenton (26 December 1776) andPrinceton (3 January 1777) forced the British com-mander to retract his lines. These defeats sappedLoyalist morale and created the feeling that theBritish could provide no protection from vengefulRebels. Howe lost the momentum he gained withthe capture of New York City and his best oppor-tunity to organize and use Northern Loyalists.

To make matters worse, British commandersdid not allow a transition from military to civilianrule in New York, even though they held the cityfor the duration of the war. In Queens County(the present borough of Queens and NassauCounty), a majority of the inhabitants were neutraland could have been won over by a royal civil gov-ernment that allowed them to pursue their privatehappiness without interference. Instead, Britishmilitary rule alienated these residents, who particu-larly resented the arbitrary seizure of their privateproperty to supply the occupying army. Britishmisrule, in effect, made the undecided of QueensCounty "Patriots by default."

During the first two years of the war, the Brit-ish ministry and the commanders in the fieldexpected Loyalists to rally to the royal bannerwhenever the redcoats appeared. Beyond this naivehope, no systematic plans existed to utilize theLoyalists as a fighting force. The British ministry,like General Howe, expected a quick victory andthus concluded that efforts to organize Provincialforces would incur unnecessary expenses. Loyalistswho wanted to serve often found frustration. Mostof them preferred to enlist in Provincial units anddisdained temporary service in the militia. If theywere to commit openly and risk reprisals, theywanted the security and status of regular servicerather than the second-class condition of militia-men relegated to patrolling and foraging. Onlyafter France entered the war in 1778 did Britainoffer inducements, such as adequate pay and enlist-ment bounties, to increase the number of Loyalistsserving in provincial regiments. By then, not sur-prisingly, the initial enthusiasm of Northern Loy-alists had declined.

The Franco-American alliance turned a colo-nial rebellion into a world war. Lord North'sadministration faced growing opposition in Par-liament. To continue fighting in America, theministry proposed a Southern strategy that uti-lized Loyalists to hold areas won by British red-coats. If the Loyalists served as a police force,fewer British regulars would be needed, thus sav-ing expenses in what had become a costly and pro-tracted war. Operations in the South, moreover,placed the army and navy close to British posses-sions in the West Indies, which were now threat-ened by a French attack. A Southern strategybased on Loyalist support appealed both to mem-bers of Parliament who worried about military

182 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 183

expenditures and to those who considered it dis-honorable to abandon loyal Americans to Rebelvindictiveness. Left unasked was a vital question:How could the British army expect widespreadsupport from Southern Loyalists who had beenignored for more than two years?

British operations in the South began auspi-ciously enough with the capture of Savannah,Georgia, in December 1778. The British com-mander, Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Campbell,held discretionary orders to conduct further opera-tions once Savannah was secured. In late January1779 he marched to the backcountry town ofAugusta and organized 1,400 Loyalists into militiacompanies. When Campbell felt threatened byRebel forces on the other side of the SavannahRiver in South Carolina, he decided to retreattoward Savannah. His departure dispirited theLoyalist militia and the men disbanded, despiteCampbell's entreaties. At the same time a force of700 Carolina Loyalists on its way to join Campbellin Augusta was surprised and routed at KettleCreek (14 February).

These dual setbacks foreshadowed Britishoperations in the South for the next two years.Rather than securing and administering territorythat had been won, the British Army prematurelymoved into areas and called on the Loyalists toswear allegiance and take up arms. Once Loyalistsdeclared themselves openly, the redcoats often leftthem unprotected. Potentially loyal Southernersgrew increasingly skeptical of British intentionsand wondered if the redcoats could be trusted tohold any area for long. This practice undercut theBritish efforts to pacify the rebellious provinces intwo ways. If Loyalists were to be used effectively,they needed the protection that only a stable Brit-ish presence offered. Neutrals, meanwhile, tendedto respond to brute force, to the army that wasclosest and seemed to hold the upper hand.

In early 1780 the British finally followedthe capture of Savannah with a concerted effortto take South Carolina. Clinton, now com-mander in chief of the British Army, led an expe-dition that captured Charleston in May.Subsequent British efforts to organize Loyalistmilitia units proved a mixed success. In someareas of the Carolina backcountry, particularly inNinety-Six district, Loyalists enlisted and per-formed effectively in their designated function,holding outposts in secured areas.

Much of the interior of the province, how-ever, remained in Rebel hands. Loyalists neverturned out in the large numbers that royal gover-nors had predicted and the British ministry hadenvisioned. Part of the problem stemmed fromthe five-year gap between the beginning of theRevolution and the arrival of the British. In 1775South Carolina's revolutionary government wor-ried about the allegiance of the backcountry and

used force to quell a Loyalist uprising. At thattime, many backcountry settlers were staunchLoyalists. Others, properly classified as neutrals,simply wanted to be left alone and distrustedRebel leaders who appeared to be intrusive. By1780 many of these Loyalists had been cowed byfive years of Rebel rule and British neglect. Neu-trals, on the other hand, had grown accustomedto the revolutionary government and now saw theBritish as the intruders. Obviously, the Britishmade a mistake in neglecting their Southern prov-inces for so long.

British commanders compounded thatneglect with mistakes of their own. Instead ofsecuring the allegiance of Carolinians through aconciliatory policy, Clinton issued a proclamationthat required that Rebel prisoners on parole takean oath of allegiance to the Crown. Forced tochoose rather than remain on the sidelines, manyof these Rebels, formerly subdued by the captureof Charleston, now took up arms again. Charles,Earl Cornwallis, the British commander in theSouth following Clinton's departure, eventuallydecided that resistance in South Carolina hingedon support from North Carolina. In particular, hebelieved that the Carolinas could never be securewhile a Continental Army remained in the South.

This thinking informed his foray into NorthCarolina in early 1781 to catch Major GeneralNathanael Greene's army. Twice, just before andafter his costly victory at Guilford Court House(15 March), Cornwallis called on backcountryNorth Carolinians to declare their loyalty. Fewresponded, leaving Cornwallis to conclude thatthe estimates of large numbers of Loyalists hadbeen gross exaggerations. He later claimed that hefailed to subdue North Carolina because the Loy-alists did not provide help, even though Britain'sSouthern strategy had been based on using theLoyalists defensively, not offensively. Before theLoyalists could be employed, the British Armyfirst had to conquer and pacify an area. That situa-tion never developed during Cornwallis's time inNorth Carolina, and the British only secured partsof South Carolina and Georgia. It is not accurateto assert that the British strategy to utilize the Loy-alists to patrol conquered areas was a failure.Instead, the strategy was never fully implemented.

Evidence from North Carolina suggests thatLoyalists could have been used offensively to sub-due rebellious areas, but in a different mannerfrom Cornwallis's ineffectual attempts to rally sup-port. When Cornwallis prepared to invade NorthCarolina in 1781, he dispatched a small forceunder Major James Craig to capture Wilmington,the province's principal port. Cornwallis hoped touse the town as a supply depot. The Cape FearRiver, however, proved too shallow, and Craig wasunable to ship supplies inland. After the battle ofGuilford Court House, Cornwallis retreated to

184 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

Wilmington, where he rested his army before ven-turing to Virginia. Craig remained in Wilmington,and during the late spring and summer of 1781 theBritish garrison became the focal point of Loyalistactivity that threatened the revolutionary govern-ment's tenuous hold on North Carolina.

Craig recognized, more clearly than mostBritish officers, the triangularity of the war, that hewas combating the Rebels for the allegiance of thelarge middle ground of neutrals. In most of Amer-ica the Rebels held the advantage because contin-ued fighting proved that the British wereincapable of restoring order. North Carolina, how-ever, was different. After both Cornwallis andGreene departed, Craig's force was the main bodyof regulars in North Carolina. By assisting Loyal-ists, he undermined the revolutionary govern-ment's ability to maintain order. As NorthCarolina degenerated into internecine civil war,many inhabitants longed for stability above all else.For a few months Craig, assisted by a talented Loy-alist officer, David Fanning, seemed better able topromise that stability than North Carolina's gov-ernment. When Fanning captured and transferredto Wilmington Rebels accused of murdering Loy-alists, he and Craig demonstrated that they, notthe revolutionary government, could restore orderto a lawless province. Their activities culminated ina September raid on Hillsborough, in which Fan-ning's force captured Governor Thomas Burke.One Loyalist, Colonel Robert Gray, concludedthat "with only the countenance of 300 Brit,troops in Wilmington the Loyalists had like tohave over turned the rebel govt."

Unfortunately for the British, Craig's suc-cesses coincided with the decisive campaigns inVirginia and South Carolina that effectively endedthe war. The British thus were unable to determinewhether posts held by redcoats could support Loy-alist offensive operations in other areas. HenryClinton, ordered to implement the Southern strat-egy of organizing Loyalists to defend territory wonby redcoats, had always suspected that the Loyal-ists could be effectively utilized as an offensiveforce, but only if the British occupied and main-tained bases from which the king's friends couldreceive protection and supplies. The Loyalistresponse to the British occupation of Wilmingtonproved him right.

Toward the end of the war Southern revolu-tionaries worried that the Continental Congresswould negotiate with the British on the principleof uti possidetis, allowing each side to keep the terri-tory it controlled. Had the British decided earlierto focus attention on the South, a strategy that uti-lized the Loyalists both offensively and defensivelymight have produced a different outcome. An earlyimplementation of this strategy, even if it did notproduce a British victory, could have produced a

truncated United States, a nation without the Car-olinas and Georgia.

-GREGORY D. MASSEY,FREED-HARDEMAN UNIVERSITY

Viewpoint:No. Loyalist strength in Americawas never as large as Britishofficials believed.

To understand the role that Loyalists playedin the American Revolution, it is necessary to dis-pel a commonly accepted myth concerning theirnumbers. The old formula of one-third of theAmerican population being each Patriot (Whig),Loyalist (Tory), and neutral is discounted by mod-ern scholars. It is currently estimated that Loyalistscomprised only 20 percent of white Americans.Nevertheless, before and during the Revolution-ary War (1775-1783) British authorities wereunder the impression that the majority of the pop-ulace was loyal to King George III. Of those fewLoyalists who did serve in the military, manylacked enthusiasm and able leadership. Indeed,their few aggressive commanders tended to drivemany neutral Americans into the Patriot campthrough the use of terror.

Throughout the conflict Loyalist troopsoffered a good opportunity for the British Army toaugment its forces cheaply and quickly. Between1775 and 1781 the British raised fifty Loyalist regi-ments, amounting to approximately 19,000 officersand men. (This total does not include militiamen; itrepresents only Royal Provincials, soldiers trained,equipped, and uniformed like British redcoats.) Yet,while these figures may seem impressive, they beliethe realities of the situation in the Thirteen Colo-nies. The ministry of Prime Minister FrederickNorth lacked accurate information on colonial con-ditions and chronically overestimated the Loyalistresponse. More importantly, according to historianPaul H. Smith in Loyalists and Redcoats: A Study inBritish Revolutionary Policy (1964), North had toreconcile "Loyalist demands for positions in thearmy and the accepted standards of military admin-istration." Until 1779 Provincials received "a sec-ond-rate status in the army which they often foundmore disconcerting than gratifying." With the aug-mentation of the British Army that year, new incen-tives appeared. Nearly all Provincial regimentsreceived red uniforms (as opposed to green ones),which fostered a sense of belonging to the regulararmy. All recruits also received a bounty of threeguineas, while each Provincial unit obtained anannual allowance of £40 for hospital expenses. Ineach Loyalist corps completing its full comple-

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 185

ment, moreover, officers would receive permanentrank in America and half pay benefits upon retire-ment. Finally, five Loyalist regiments received spe-cial distinction by being enumerated as "AmericanRegiments." Eventually one of these, the Volun-teers of Ireland, received a further honor by beingplaced on the regular British military establish-ment as the 105th Regiment of Foot.

Nonetheless, the distinction of being calledAmerican Regiments and other incentives did nothave the desired effect on the Provincials' psycheand morale. Government officials had fostered thenotion for too long that the Loyalists were anunnecessary military expense in a war supposed tobe of short duration. Yet, by the middle of the con-flict the government's argument for continuing thewar was to protect these people. In 1779 the total

strength of Provincial corps increased from 7,400to 9,000 rank and file, a change of less than 20 per-cent. In 1780 and 1781 enlistments barely coveredlosses caused by casualties, disease, and desertions.

Those few regiments that did attract a lot ofrecruits did so because of their leaders. Sir HenryClinton, British commander in chief from 1778 to1781, observed that the charisma of such men asLieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton of the Brit-ish Legion and Lieutenant Colonel John GravesSimcoe of the Queen's Rangers helped them filltheir regimental ranks. Yet, these individuals arethe exception to the rule: the vast majority of Loy-alist units remained undermanned. Even the Brit-ish Legion's maximum strength never exceeded550 of all ranks, although it had a wartime estab-lishment of 754 officers and men. By 1782 themanpower shortage was so acute that one Loyalistformation, the King's American Dragoons, offeredthe considerable sum of 10 guineas to any recruit.

The shift in British strategy following theFranco-American alliance in 1778 meant thatgreater reliance would be placed upon Loyalist sol-diers at a time when their numbers were notincreasing. Clinton had to dispatch thirteen Britishregiments to England, Nova Scotia, Florida, andthe West Indies, and therefore needed as manyProvincial troops as possible. In addition, Clintondetermined to shift British efforts in the Southbecause of the supposed enormous Loyalist sup-port there. Many Crown officials believed that themere appearance of a royal army would induce theentire region south of the Susquehanna River toreturn its allegiance; they were mistaken.

Overall, Crown authorities relied on the Loy-alists too late in the war. By the time of major Brit-ish expedition to the South in late 1779, the civilwar there had caused many true Loyalists to leavethe region. Although some returned, they neverdid so in the numbers that the British expected.Moreover, a cruel cycle of revenge had alreadybeen in place long before the appearance of themain British Army in the area. The BritishLegion's massacre of Virginia Continentals at theWaxhaws, South Carolina, on 29 May 1780 andthe depredations committed by troops under Cap-tain Christian Huck and Major James Wemyssonly inflamed passions and weakened loyalties.

One factor limiting the Loyalist response inthe Southern colonies was official Crown policyfollowing the surrender of Charles Town on 12May 1780. In the course of just three days Clintonalienated the king's friends. On 1 June, Clintonissued a decree that granted Rebels full pardons ifthey returned to their allegiance. Two days lateranother proclamation declared that all paroledcivilians who "neglected to return to their alle-giance" would be considered Rebels and "treatedaccordingly." All others were expected to "holdthemselves as restored to all the rights and duties

186 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

VOLUNTEERSOF IRELAND

One of the belter known Loyalist regiments was the Volunteers of Ireland,commanded by Lord Francis Rawdon. Like many military organizationsof the eighteenth century, it had a strong esprit de corps. This song wasexpressly written for the regiment:

Success to the Shamrock, and all those who wear it;Be honor their portion wherever they go:May riches attend them, and stores of good claret,For how to employ them sure none better know.Every foe surveys them with terror,But every silk petticoat wishes them nearer;So Yankee keep off, or you'll soon learn your error,For Paddy shall prostrate lay every foe.

This day, but the year I can't rightly determine,St. Patrick the vipers did chase from the land;Let's see if like him, we can't sweep off the verminWho dare 'gainst the sons of the shamrock to stand.Hand in hand! Let's carol the chorus-As long as the blessings of Ireland hang o'er us,The crest of Rebellion shall tremble before us,Like brothers, while thus we march hand in hand.

St. George and St. Patrick, St. Andrew, St. David,Together may laugh at all Europe in arms.Fair conquest her standard has o'er their heads waved,And glory has on them conferred all the charms.War's alarms to us arc a pleasure.Since honour our danger repays in full measure,And all those who join us shall find we have leisureTo think of our sport even in war's alarms.

Source: Frank Moore, ed., Diary o( the American Revolution. FromNewspapers and Original Documents, 2 volumes (New York: Scrib-ner, 1860), 11:261-262.

belonging to citizens." Among the various dutiesof citizenship was service in the royal militia.

Not surprisingly, these two decrees inflamedthe antagonisms between Whig and Tory in SouthCarolina. Paroled Rebels looked upon the 3 Junepronouncement as treachery because they couldnot live as neutrals; while some fled to the back-country, others took the loyalty oath without anyintention of obeying it. Meanwhile, Loyalistsdeserted the royal cause in droves because the proc-lamations allowed the king's enemies to resume the"rights and immunities" they had formerly enjoyedunder British rule by making a mere gesture.According to historians Franklin and Mary Wick-wire in Cornwallis: The American Adventure (1970),the Loyalists felt that "all their past sufferingseemed to count for nothing. The British appearedintent on rewarding the bad instead of the good."

A major defeat involving Provincial troopsalso played a role in dampening Loyalist spiritsand the desire to profess their loyalty to theCrown. As Inspector of Militia in the Southernprovinces, Major Patrick Ferguson seeminglyenjoyed considerable initial success in recruiting.Although he enlisted approximately four thousandLoyalist militiamen in the Ninety-Six District ofSouth Carolina, this figure was on paper only. Hisdefeat at King's Mountain on 7 October 1780 didnothing to encourage a strong Loyalist turnout,especially after the Whigs killed some of the sur-rendering Tories and executed several of theirofficers following drumhead trials. In addition,several attempts by substantial groups of SouthernLoyalists to assemble and join British forces werethwarted by the Patriots. The defeats at Moore'sCreek Bridge (27 February 1776), Kettle Creek (14February 1779), and the Haw River (25 February1781) disheartened many Tories.

As Lord Cornwallis marched through CrossCreek, North Carolina, following his Pyrrhic vic-tory at Guilford Court House in March 1781, thesupposedly loyal Scots of the Cape Fear River Val-ley did not flock to his army. As one area residentobserved, most people in the area had Loyalistfeelings, but

they had been so often deceived in promises ofsupport, and the British had so often relin-quished posts, that the people were now afraidto join the British army, lest they should leavethe province, in which case the resentment ofthe revolutioners would be exercised withmore cruelty; that although the men mightescape, or go with the army, yet, such was thediabolical conduct of these people, that theywould inflict the severest punishment upontheir families.

By 1781 it became abundantly clear to theBritish that they had seriously misread Loyalistsentiment and overestimated their numbers.King's Men would have proved their value, but

they were ignored for too long. When royalauthorities began to seriously court them, manyLoyalists had already become diehard neutralsor, worse, lukewarm Patriots.

-ANTHONY J. SCOTTI JR.,MIDLANDS TECHNICAL COLLEGE

References

Clyde Ferguson, "Carolina and Georgia Patriotand Loyalist Militia in Action, 1778-1783,"in The Southern Experience in the AmericanRevolution,, edited by Larry E. Tise and Jef-frey J. Crow (Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1978), pp. 174-196.

Ira D. Gruber, "Britain's Southern Strategy," inThe Revolutionary War in the South—Power,Conflict, and Leadership: Essays in Honor ofJohn Richard Alden, edited by W. RobertHiggins (Durham, N.C.: Duke UniversityPress, 1979), pp. 205-238.

Robert Stansbury Lambert, South Carolina Loy-alists in the American Revolution (Columbia:University of South Carolina Press, 1987).

Gregory D. Massey, "The British Expedition toWilmington, January-November, 1781,"North Carolina Historical Review, 66 (Octo-ber 1989): 387-411.

Anthony J. Scotti Jr., Brutal Virtue: The Mythand Reality of Eanastre Tarleton (Bowie,Md.: Heritage, 2002).

John Shy, "The American Revolution: The Mili-tary Conflict Considered as a RevolutionaryWar," in Essays on the American Revolution,edited by Stephen G. Kurtz and James H.Hutson (Chapel Hill: University of NorthCarolina Press, 1973), pp. 121-156.

Paul H. Smith, "The American Loyalists: Noteson Their Organization and NumericalStrength," William and Mary Quarterly, 25(1968): 259-277.

Smith, Loyalists and Redcoats: A Study in BritishRevolutionary Policy (Chapel Hill: Universityof North Carolina Press, 1964).

Joseph S. Tiedemann, "Patriots by Default:Queens County, New York, and the BritishArmy, 1776-1783," William and MaryQuarterly, 43 (January 1986): 35-63.

Franklin and Mary Wickwire, Cornwallis: TheAmerican Adventure (Boston: HoughtonMifflin, 1970).

Robert M. Weir, Colonial South Carolina: A His-tory (New York: KTO, 1983).

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