Loyalty & Richard III

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Laurence Gottlieb

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Introduction

As much as loyalty bound Richard III its scarcity in others undid him. Noted for his service to

crown and country Richard failed to inspire such sentiments at a critical juncture, the battle for

England’s crown at Bosworth. Power and prestige accrued with Richard’s steadfast loyalty to his

brother, Edward IV, yet when he was king, Richard failed to bring out such loyalty in others,

especially in the Stanleys. Desmond Seward argued that Richard’s loyalty to his brother,

Edward, knew no limits, even “enthusiastically (partaking of) political murder” to support the

crown.1 His nemesis, the Stanleys, made no such commitment, instead idly waiting for that

opportunity which would benefit them, regardless of its outcome for the country. When Richard

took the crown Charles Ross wrote that Richard’s violent past motivated immediate loyalty to

himself. Titulus Regius, an act recognizing Richard as monarch did not stand on its own. Ross

asserted that parliament had been suitably “packed in the royal interest or was in healthy fear of a

king who had carved through slaughter to a throne.” According to Ross the insertion of William

Catesby as the speaker, a favourite of Richard’s who had not sat in parliament before,

emphasized Richard’s coercive nature.2 Ross, however, cited no evidence to support these

contentions of coercion. He did say that upon Richard’s entry into London after taking charge of

his nephew, Edward V, part of the Protector’s procession included four cart loads of arms,

prominently displayed with Woodville heraldic devices. Unsaid by Ross was the implication of

Richard’s possible subterfuge in attributing those arms to the Woodvilles. With less subtlety

Ross described Richard’s efforts to ratify his inherited position of protector to the young king.

This placed him in a strong position to dispense patronage and attract interested parties to his

affinity.3 J. E. A. Jolliffe, however, mitigated these assertions by stating that there was no doubt

that Richard had assembled a parliament favourable to himself, yet that parliament had been

weakened in Edward IV’s reign and the council as well had been similarly weak, Edward IV

having taken most decisions, a practice that led parliament (as a rubber stamp) to approve

Richard’s kingship. Jollife wrote that based on its previously induced vulnerability the House of

Commons could not do otherwise.4 Even more supportive of Richard, A. R. Myers regarded him,

compared to his brother Clarence, as “faithful to his brother (King Edward IV) … known to be a

good soldier and a capable administrator.”5 At the beginning of Richard’s reign support was

given to what appeared to be the continuance of Edward’s reign by his brother Richard in the

hope that he was “a king ‘who gave good lordship.”6 Even Richard’s strike at the unpopular

Woodvilles had general support from people “heartily tired of weak government and civil war.”

The populace generally regarded Richard as “an upright and pious prince.” The legend of

Richard’s unpopularity was attributable to later Tudor propaganda. Despite this initial

acceptance, Myers claimed that the subsequent disappearance of the two princes from the Tower

in which they were housed made adherence and loyalty to Richard problematic, contributing to

the weakening of his affinity.7

1 Seward, Desmond, Richard III England’s Black Legend, Franklin Watts, New York, (1984), p. 54 – 55 2 Ross, Charles, Richard III, University of California Press, Los Angeles, (1981), p. 185, This denied his nephews

claims, branding them as illegitimate. 3 Ross, p. 74 - 76 4 Jolliffe, The Constitutionional History of Medieval England from the English Settlement to 1485,

W.W. Norton & Company, New York, (1961), p. 491 - 493 5 Myers, A. J., England in the late Middle Ages, Penguin Books, Middlesex, (1982), p. 201 6 Jolliffe, J.E.A., p. 493 7 Myers, A. J., p. 201 - 202

Loyalty & Richard III

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Laurence Gottlieb

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Patronage & Bastard Feudalism

Despite arguments for Richard’s loyalty to his brother, Edward IV, the Shakespearian legend

originating from Thomas More’s Biography of Richard III asserted that, on the one hand,

Richard’s loyalty was solely based on self-interest.8 On the other hand, Jeremy Potter asserted

that Richard’s legislation promoting justice, law, and order, incited self-interested magnates to

treachery against Richard.9 Potter attributed Richard’s failure to retain loyal adherence to himself

due to an introverted, reserved and an uncharismatic personality.10 This slender thread of loyalty,

Potter claimed led to the Duke of Buckingham’s rebellion, which collapsed, itself the victim of

waning loyalty.11 Claims that Buckingham also suffered from a dearth of charm to hold a loyal

following are not forthcoming as a support for Potter’s theories on nurturing loyalty.

Instead, a school of thought developed a social and economic explanation for failures of loyalty,

especially at the waning of the middle ages. Since loyalty did not rest on a solid foundation of

recognized kingship during the third quarter of the fifteenth century in England, lordship and the

pragmatism of attaching oneself to a powerful patron buttressed those walls of loyalty that might

founder on an otherwise weak base. Professor Helen Cam attributed to the Paston Letters counsel

to seek out a powerful patron to provide one with good lordship.12 She wrote that influence was

more effective than a good cause, a referral to bastard feudalism which had sullied the name of

true feudalism.13 Michael Hicks pointed to Professor W.H. Dunham who argued that the

exchange of feudal duties for fee and eventually good lordship “was an essential part of Yorkist

and Tudor government.” However, this situation became more applicable as trusted retainers

took positions in civil government rather than in the military component of an affinity. Pointedly,

Dunham had argued that bastard feudalism had flourished in the fifteenth century, not as a cause

of civil strife, but concomitant with change. He had argued that it was weak kings who had lost

control of the lords which had led to political instability.14 According to Christine Carpenter,

William Stubbs, after looking at fifteenth century writings on the subject,15 concluded that

‘overmighty subjects,’ some wealthier than their monarchs, as well as weak kings, had

contributed to unstable fifteenth century English governments. These situations fell under the

term ‘bastard feudalism.’16 This state of affairs in the late fifteenth century had, according to

Stubbs, commenced in the fourteenth century when Edward III, in need of money had given

parliament greater power over taxation, while Edward had allowed too much power to devolve

upon the nobility.17 One could characterize the deterioration of feudalism as the relinquishing of

regal power into the hands of parliament, the increasing dominance of kings by their nobles and

the increasing use of troops for hire. This ‘bastard feudalism,’ some claim lent itself to the

conflicts in England between the Lancastrians and the Yorkists, as well as the final abandonment

of Richard III by his increasingly flighty affinity.

8 Potter, Jeremy, Good King Richard? Constable, London (1983), p. 10 9 Potter, p. 194 10 Potter, p. 142 - 143

11 Potter, p. 45

12 Examination of the Paston letters does not readily reveal such advise, although the Pastons, plagued by legal

disputes, no doubt availed themselves of what suitable influence was accessible. 13 Cam, Helen, England before Elizabeth, Hutchinson University Library, London, (1967), p. 143

14 Hicks, Michael, Richard III and His Rivals: Magnates and their Motives in the War of the Roses, The Hambledon

Press, London, (1991), p. 9 - 10 15 Stubbs had been influenced by Charles Plummer who had reissued Sir John Fortescue’s, The Governance of

England, written during Edward IV’s reign. 16 Carpenter, Christine, The War of the Roses: Politics and Constitution in England, c. 1437 – 1509, Cambridge

University Press, (1997), p 8 17 Carpenter, p. 8

Loyalty & Richard III

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Laurence Gottlieb

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The Context

Such a premise would seem to explain how civil unrest embroiled fifteenth century England and

spilt the blood of kings whereas the approaching centuries were relatively free of contention and

regicide with the exception of Charles I and the Civil War. Even a cursory examination of

previous monarchies, however, brings such an explanation for conflict and disloyalty into

question. Three hundred and fifty years earlier Henry I’s daughter Matilda dogged King Stephen

most of his reign until he finally accepted her son, Henry, as heir. Henry II exercised strong

kingship, although he too had to counter efforts against him by his queen, as well as his sons.

Henry II’s younger son John, had plotted against his brother, Richard I, gained the throne after

Richard’s death and turned the barons against himself to the point of having them force the

Magna Carta upon him in 1215. Henry III, John’s eldest son, had to contend with the civil war he

had inherited from his father. His son Edward I, however, proved to be a stronger and more

ruthless king than he had been. Edward I’s son Edward II allowed favouritism to sway him, lost

a war to the Scots and had his queen, Isabella overthrow him and have him killed. In turn her

son, Edward III took control after ascending the throne and with strong kingship captured most

of France. Richard II inherited a weak throne, but eventually built a power base from which he

was struck down and most likely murdered by Henry Bolingbroke. Henry IV (Bolingbroke) did

not take on a peaceful reign. His administration had to cope with a Welsh rebellion, insolvency

and a contentious commons. His son Henry V succeeded through strong kingship and French

conquests in holding the throne, but his infant son Henry VI, epitomizing weakness, vacillation

and overmighty magnates, a condition that led to civil war. This conflict was interrupted by

Edward IV’s short reign, loyally served by his brother, Richard Duke of Gloucester. The

contention that royal weakness, a phenomenon of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, referred

to as ‘bastard feudalism,’ could account for waning loyalty to the sovereigns of the period does

not hold water. Such conditions had been relentless through most reigns previous to those at the

end of the middle ages. The War of the Roses, and Richard’s contentious usurpation remains

unique solely because of the ages of Edward IV’s sons not because of the usurpation, an event,

up to that point, more common in its practice than in its exception.

What remains unique is the steadfast loyalty Richard gave his brother Edward, a habit foreign to

Richard’s other brother, George, Duke of Clarence. Here again dynastic rivalries raised their

heads and Richard Neville, 16th Earl of Warwick, Clarence’s father in law won out. Shortly

thereafter Clarence realized that Warwick placed the Lancastrians ahead of him, having married

Anne Neville, his daughter, to the son of Henry VI and Margaret of Anjou. Opportunism had

ruled in the front of Yorkist ranks, but no more than it had in past quarrels over the throne of

England. One reason one may posit for Richard, in his turn, taking the throne from Edward V

was the concern that under Woodville influence Edward would threaten his uncle’s wealth and

power. Latterly in Richard’s reign, his claim lay nearly in tatters with the death of his wife and

son, not because he lacked a clear entitlement through royal blood, but because his dynastic

options were limited, at least at the point when the Henry Tudor, Earl of Richmond challenged

him. Just as Clarence had looked opportunistically in the direction of Warwick, the Stanleys had

looked no less eagerly at Henry Tudor, Duke of Richmond. The irony is that Thomas Stanley

who decamped to support Richmond later committed treason against him, and like Clarence also

suffered death for his treason.

Loyalty & Richard III

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Laurence Gottlieb

4

Conclusion

One might argue that Richard III’s usurpation was unique, but it was so only in regard to the age

of the incumbent. It is possible also that his usurpation was a continuation of loyalty to his late

brother. As much as Richard had supported his brother, Edward IV, he had also supported

England against the ravages of civil war, a direct consequence of the weakness of Henry VI. One

could propose that rather than allow his nephew to be manipulated by Woodville machinations

Richard chose to take the throne and preserve a strong monarchy that a young king could not

maintain. If such was the case no suitable evidence to support this contention is extant. As was

the case with a variety of monarchs from Matilda to Henry Bolingbroke, motive, opportunity and

usurpation coalesced. That the Stanleys, were opportunistic, especially Thomas Stanley, is self-

evident. However, Thomas Stanley switched sides one time too many. His opportunism was no

less evident than that of King John against Richard I or Isabella against Edward II. Richard’s

opportunism did not follow with a blood heir as had the usurpation and murder of Edward II. It

did not suite Henry VII to let history deal with his acquisition of the throne by conquest. His

claim required the diminution of his precursor. Consequently we question Richard and his

legacy, while academics and amateurs alike seek explanations. One is bastard feudalism.

Another is motive and opportunity.

Bibliography

Primary Sources:

Paston family. Paston letters and papers of the fifteenth century, Electronic Text Center, University of Virginia

Library, http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/toc/modeng/public/PasLett.html, (01, 16, 2006, 03:00)

Titulus Regius, An Act for the Settlement of the Crown upon the King and his Iffue, with a recapitulation of his Title.

Rotuli parliamentorum; ut et petitiones, et placita in parliamen,. 6 vols. folio, [1783], and index vol., folio, 1832.

Secondary Sources:

Cam, Helen, England before Elizabeth, Hutchinson University Library, London, (1967)

Carpenter, Christine, The War of the Roses: Politics and Constitution in England, c. 1437 – 1509, Cambridge

University Press, (1997)

Dockeray, Keith, Richard III: A Source book, Sutton Publishing, Gloucster, (2000)

Hicks, Michael, Richard III and His Rivals: Magnates and their Motives in the War of the Roses, The Hambledon

Press, London, (1991)

Jolliffe, J.E.A., The Constitutionional History of Medieval England from the English Settlement to 1485, W.W.

Norton & Company, New York, (1961)

Kendall, Paul Murray, Richard The Third, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, (1956)

Myers, A. J., England in the late Middle Ages, Penguin Books, Middlesex, (1982)

Potter, Jeremy, Good King Richard? Constable, London (1983)

Ross, Charles, Richard III, University of California Press, Los Angeles, (1981)

Seward, Desmond, Richard III England’s Black Legend, Franklin Watts, New York, (1984)