Lt Col Raymond Lane

Officer Commanding

Ordnance School

Defence Forces Training Center

Unclassified Releasable to

NATO/PfP

EOD Spectrum of Operations

Explosive

Ordnance

Disposal

C-IED/IEDDConventional

Munitions

Disposal CBRNeIDD

Unclassified Releasable to

NATO/PfP

International EOD Co-operationThe Ordnance School has trained EOD/CIED/IEDD/CBRNe

personnel (CIV-MIL) from the following countries: (Students from 33 Countries since 2010)

Spain Denmark Germany

Romania Malaysia USA

Netherlands Luxembourg Italy

Finland Russia Switzerland

Kazakhstan Estonia Austria

Canada Sweden Belgium

Israel UAE Poland

Turkey Jordan Checz Republic

France

Bulgaria

Cyprus

Portugal

Norway

Lithuania

United Kingdom

Estonia

Malta

•

NATO/PFP unclassifiedUnclassified Releasable to

NATO/PfP

C-IED core activities 2015-2020

Unclassified Releasable to

NATO/PfP

Unclassified Releasable to

NATO/PfP

VNCF by Luxembourg

Ireland/Germany/Netherlands/Estonia/Austria/Italy/Sweden/Belgium

Multi-Agency/Multi-Disciplinary and Multi-National Comprehensive

response - VNCF (Luxembourg)

Unclassified Releasable to

NATO/PfP

MTA - Terrorist(s) fully armed –

wants to inflict maximum casualties

and wants to die

Unclassified Releasable to

NATO/PfP

Course Objectives:

•Develop relevant operational/tactical knowledge involving MTA Threats (future

proof)

•Prioritise effective and flexible responses to the MTA threat

•Develop dynamic/resilient CIV-MIL structures at the Strategic /Operational and

Tactical levels to support the development of timely and effective Courses of Action (COA)

---------------------------- ---------------------------------- ----------------------------

Students/Staff – Military (EOD, Air,SOF,Medical) Police

(Firearms,SOF,Medical,Search) Fire Service, Airport police

Course included academic/theoretical and operational inputs

Detailed lessons learned process was undertaken throughout week

Unclassified Releasable to

NATO/PfP

Marauding Terrorist Attack

(MTA)• Increasing frequency as a tactic by Terrorists

– Complex Assault – Brussels , Belgium – 22/3/16

– Complex assault - Jakarta, Indonesia – 14/1/16

– Complex assault – St Bernardino ,USA - 2/12/15

– Complex assault - Paris , France – 13/11/15

– Single shooter – Sousse, Tunisia 2015– Twin shooter – Paris, France 2015

– Multiple shooters – Westgate, Kenya 2013

– Complex assault – Mumbai, India 2008

• Weapon options

– Simple – acid, car, knife, fire– Firearms – pistol, SMG, assault rifle

– Explosives – Grenades, RPG, IED (Suicide Belts -TATP),

• Tactical impact

– Dynamic situation – difficult to coordinate, poor situational awareness

– Mass casualties – catastrophic injuries, large crowds, panic/fear

– Media focus – immediate and global, social media, political pressure

Unclassified Releasable to

NATO/PfP

Unclassified Releasable to

NATO/PfP

Probable components of MTA

• Well trained terrorists ,tactically competent and

willing to die (possibly drugged)

• Multiple attackers working in small tactical units

• Effective internal and external coordination

• Deliberate attack on first responders to inflict

maximum casualties

• Use of fire (smoke) to complicate first responder

operations and cause more damage

• Use of high powered military weapons and

explosives (HME-TATP) and (suicide belts)

Unclassified Releasable to

NATO/PfP

DVD

Unclassified Releasable to

NATO/PfP

DVD

Unclassified Releasable to

NATO/PfP

DA_1181.jpg

DVD

Unclassified Releasable to

NATO/PfP

Countering Adversary

threat Networks(CAtN)

From C-IED AtN Lessons Learned use similar

approaches in Countering Adversary threat

Networks

Narcoterrorism

Human Trafficking

Criminal Gangs

C-MTA

Illicit Arms Trade

Illicit Substances

IED Network

Piracy

C-IED AtN

Evolution

Countering

Adversary

threat

Networks

Unclassified Releasable to

NATO/PfP

Counter Adversary threat Network

Strategy

Defeat the Marauding terrorists(C –MTA) Protect

Prepare the Force (PtF)Doctrine, Training, Interoperability

Inte

llig

en

ce

Attack the Networks (AtN)Predict, Prevent, Pursue

Unclassified Releasable to

NATO/PfP

Planning AssumptionsDevelop Effective Interagency response (Synergies)

• MTA may cause many casualties

• Assault will have been planned and rehearsed– Friendly Force Response tactics predicted

• Police tactics generally aimed at containment not neutralisation (not suppression)

• Difficult for emergency services to operate in semi-permissive areas

• Delay to deploy SOF units for intervention

• Most casualties will die from blood loss within first 10 -15 minutes

• Terrorists will consider options for barricaded final action– Prolonged operation for greater media/political impact

– Hostages/siege

– Drugs

Unclassified Releasable to

NATO/PfP

Civilian and Military Approach

Requirement: To integrate holistically

(Comprehensive Approach)

• Principles of War

– Selection of the aim

– Maintain morale

– Offensive action

– Security

– Surprise

– Concentration of

force (suppressing

fire)

– Economy of effort

– Flexibility

– Coordination

– Sustainability

• Policing by consent

– Prevent crime &

disorder

– Public respect

– Public cooperation

– Minimum force

– Impartiality

– Public relationship

– Persuasion

– Legal actions

– Unobtrusive

Unclassified Releasable to

NATO/PfP

Counter Terrorism Capability Relationships

‘Comprehensive Approach’

Emergency Services

Military

Public

Police

Conventional

response may be

ineffective due to

threat from Small

Arms, IEDs, CBRN and Fire

Hybrid Military

support to the

Police will enable

effective

emergency service response

and provide a

tactical capability

for extreme

situationsPublic and private

sector need

information,

training and

emergency equipment to

improve

survivabilityUnclassified Releasable to

NATO/PfP

Unclassified Releasable to

NATO/PfP

Requirement to develop a coordinated Inter-Agency

Resilient Task Force response with following components

recommended:

•Unified Command and Control structure

•Tactical/Operational SOF (Military/Police) capability (incl: Search)

•Tactical /Operational Medical capability (10-15 minutes) to include

medical treatment for possible PBIED perpetrator

•Tactical/Operational EOD Capability( IED Defeat/assault)

•Tactical/Operational Fire fighting response (Fire used as tactic by

terrorists)

•Force protection

Significant Lessons Learned

(TAC-COM-MED)

Multi-agency Command and

Control (Hot/Warm/Cold Zones)• Unified Command

(Police/Fire/Medical/SOF/Military/EOD

– Establish Incident priorities/ ROE

– Joint decision making

– Dynamic risk assessments

– Situational Awareness (Intelligence sharing)

– Dynamic operational groupings

• Interoperability

Communications/equipment/TTPsUnclassified Releasable to

NATO/PfP

Incident Response Team(Scalable)

• No 1 - SOF –Fire support

• No 2 - SOF –Fire support

• No 3 - Assault IEDD Operator

• No 4 - Assault IEDD Operator

• No 5 - IRT Leader

• No 6 - Tactical Medical Operator

• No 7 - Tactical Fire Operator

• No 8 - SOF Force Protection

Unclassified Releasable to

NATO/PfP

Unclassified Releasable to

NATO/PfP

•Public awareness programme (designed not to

generate fear)

- State/Government /Security apparatus must never

lose confidence of their citizens/public during a crisis

•Private security sector engagement (first responder)

- Must be integrated into the planning process from

the start

Significant Lessons Learned

Whole of government and whole of society approach

Unclassified Releasable to

NATO/PfP

- Use of less than Lethal technologies to attack PBIED e.g. Acoustic devices

- Devices for Quick effective communications

- Advanced situational awareness training

- Dealing with MTA incident with addition of CBRN component

- Forensic evidence collection from casualties at scene

- Medical response in non permissive environment

Lessons learned

Search/Assault IEDD

• What do we mean by IEDD assault

• Military/police role?

• Philosophy /MNT

• ROE

• TTPs

• Equipment

Unclassified Releasable to

NATO/PfP

Unclassified Releasable to

NATO/PfP

•We need to be Pro Active as opposed to Reactive (CC-MTA

developed over 14 months ago) – Agile/Flexible response

•Very poor response to CC-MTA course from NATO/PFP

nations?

•Possible future collaboration with EU ?

•Develop CC –MTA programme of work 2016 and beyond

including LIKELY future threats -VNCF ???

COMMENTS/RECOMMENDATIONS

Developing a Resilient Response

• ACC-MTA - Ordnance School - 14 -18

November 2016

Unclassified Releasable to

NATO/PfP