ltd case to digest

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ALFREDO SAJONAS and CONCHITASAJONAS,petitioners, vs. THE COURT OFAPPEALS, DOMINGO A. PILARES, SHERIFFROBERTO GARCIA OF QUEZON CITY andREGISTER OF DEEDS OFMARIKINA, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

TORRES, JR.,J.:

A word or group of words conveys intentions. Whenused truncatedly, its meaning disappears and breedsconflict. Thus, it is written - By thy words shalt thou be

justified, and by thy words shalt thou be condemned.(Matthew, 12:37)

Construing the new words of a statute separately isthe raison detre of this appeal.

Essentially, the case before us is for cancellation ofthe inscription of a Notice of Levy on Execution from acertificate of Title covering a parcel of realproperty. The inscription was caused to be made by theprivate respondent on Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-79073 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, issued inthe name of the spouses Ernesto B. Uychocde andLucita Jarin, and was later carried over to and annotatedon Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417 of thesame registry, issued in the name of the spousesAlfredo Sajonas and Conchita R. Sajonas, whopurchased the parcel of land from the Uychocdes, andare now the petitioners in this case.

The facts are not disputed, and are herebyreproduced as follows:

On September 22, 1983, the spouses Ernesto

Uychocde and Lucita Jarin agreed to sell a parcel of

residential land located in Antipolo, Rizal to the spousesAlfredo Sajonas and Conchita R. Sajonas on installmentbasis as evidenced by a Contract to Sell datedSeptember 22, 1983. The property was registered inthe names of the Uychocde spouses under TCT No. N-79073 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Rizal. OnAugust 27, 1984, the Sajonas couple caused the

annotation of an adverse claim based on the saidContract to Sell on the title of the subject property,which was inscribed as Entry No. 116017. Upon fullpayment of the purchase price, the Uychocdes executeda Deed of Sale involving the property in question infavor of the Sajonas couple on September 4, 1984. Thedeed of absolute sale was registered almost a yearafter, or on August 28, 1985.

Meanwhile, it appears that Domingo Pilares (defendant-

appellant) filed Civil Case No. Q-28850 for collection ofsum of money against Ernesto Uychocde. On June 25,1980, a Compromise Agreement was entered into bythe parties in the said case under which ErnestoUychocde acknowledged his monetary obligation toDomingo Pilares amounting to P27,800 and agreed topay the same in two years from June 25, 1980. WhenUychocde failed to comply with his undertaking in thecompromise agreement, defendant-appellant Pilaresmoved for the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce

the decision based on the compromise agreement,which the court granted in its order dated August 3,1982. Accordingly, a writ of execution was issued onAugust 12, 1982 by the CFI of Quezon City where thecivil case was pending. Pursuant to the order ofexecution dated August 3, 1982, a notice of levy onexecution was issued on February 12, 1985. OnFebruary 12, 1985, defendant sheriff Roberto Garcia ofQuezon City presented said notice of levy on executionbefore the Register of Deeds of Marikina and the same


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was annotated at the back of TCT No. 79073 as EntryNo. 123283.

When the deed of absolute sale dated September 41984 was registered on August 28, 1985, TCT No. N-79073 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. N-109417 was ssued in the name of the Sajonas

couple. The notice of levy on execution annotated bydefendant sheriff was carried over to the new title. OnOctober 21, 1985, the Sajonas couple filed a Third PartyClaim with the sheriff of Quezon City, hence the auctionsale of the subject property did not push through asscheduled.

On January 10, 1986, the Sajonas spouses demandedthe cancellation of the notice of levy on execution upondefendant-appellant Pilares, through a letter to their

lawyer, Atty. Melchor Flores. Despite said demand,defendant-appellant Pilares refused to cause thecancellation of said annotation. In view thereof,plaintiffs-appellees filed this complaint dated January11, 1986 on February 5, 1986.[1]

The Sajonases filed their complaint[2] in the RegionalTrial Court of Rizal, Branch 71, against Domingo Pilares,the judgment creditor of the Uychocdes. The relevantportion of the complaint alleges:

7. That at the time the notice of levy was annotated bythe defendant, the Uychocde spouses, debtors of thedefendant, have already transferred, conveyed andassigned all their title, rights and interests to theplaintiffs and there was no more title, rights or intereststherein which the defendant could levy upon;

8. That the annotation of the levy on execution whichwas carried over to the title of said plaintiffs is illegaland invalid and was made in utter bad faith, in view of

the existence of the Adverse Claim annotated by theplaintiffs on the corresponding title of the Uychocdespouses;

9. That a demand was made by the plaintiffs upon thedefendant Domingo A. Pilares, to cause the cancellationof the said notice of levy but the latter, without

justifiable reason and with the sole purpose of harassingand embarrassing the plaintiffs ignored and refusedplaintiffs demand;

10. That in view of the neglect, failure and refusal of thedefendant to cause the cancellation of the notice of levyon execution, the plaintiffs were compelled to litigateand engage the services of the undersigned counsel, toprotect their rights and interests, for which they agreedto pay attorneys fees in the amount of P10,000 and

appearance fees of P500 per day in court.[3]

Pilares filed his answer with compulsorycounterclaim[4] on March 8, 1986, raising special andaffirmative defenses, the relevant portions of which areas follows:

10. Plaintiff has no cause of action against hereindefendants;

11. Assuming, without however admitting that they filedan adverse claim against the property covered by TCTNo. 79073 registered under the name of spousesErnesto Uychocde on August 27, 1984, the same ceasesto have any legal force and effect (30) days thereafterpursuant to Section 70 of P.D. 1529;

12. The Notice of Levy annotated at the back of TCT No.79073 being effected pursuant to the Writ of Executiondated August 31, 1982, duly issued by the CFI (nowRTC) of Quezon City proceeding from a decision
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rendered in Civil Case No. 28859 in favor of hereindefendant against Ernesto Uychocde, is undoubtedlyproper and appropriate because the property isregistered in the name of the judgment debtor and isnot among those exempted from execution;

13. Assuming without admitting that the property

subject matter of this case was in fact sold by theregistered owner in favor of the herein plaintiffs, thesale is the null and void (sic) and without any legal forceand effect because it was done in fraud of a judgmentcreditor, the defendant Pilares.[5]

Pilares likewise sought moral and exemplarydamages in a counterclaim against the Sajonasspouses. The parties appeared at pre-trial proceedingson January 21, 1987,[6] after which, trial on the merits

ensued.

The trial court rendered its decision on February 15,1989.[7] It found in favor of the Sajonas couple, andordered the cancellation of the Notice of Levy from

Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417.

The court a quo stated, thus:

After going over the evidence presented by the parties,the court finds that although the title of the subject

matter of the Notice of Levy on Execution was still in thename of the Spouses Uychocde when the same wasannotated on the said title, an earlier Affidavit ofAdverse Claim was annotated on the same title by theplaintiffs who earlier bought said property from theUychocdes.

It is a well settled rule in this jurisdiction (Guidote vs.Maravilla, 48 Phil. 442) that actual notice of an adverseclaim is equivalent to registration and the subsequentregistration of the Notice of Levy could not have any

legal effect in any respect on account of prior inscriptionof the adverse claim annotated on the title of theUychocdes.

xxx xxx xxx

On the issue of whether or not plaintiffs are buyers in

good faith of the property of the spouses Uychocdeeven notwithstanding the claim of the defendant thatsaid sale executed by the spouses was made in fraud ofcreditors, the Court finds that the evidence in thisinstance is bare of any indication that said plaintiffs aspurchasers had notice beforehand of the claim of thedefendant over said property or that the same isinvolved in a litigation between said spouses and thedefendant. Good faith is the opposite of fraud and badfaith, and the existence of any bad faith must be

established by competent proof.[8] (Cai vs. Henson, 51Phil 606)

xxx xxxxxx

In view of the foregoing, the Court renders judgment infavor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant Pilares,as follows:

1. Ordering the cancellation of the Notice of Levy onExecution annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title No.N-109417.

2. Ordering said defendant to pay the amount of P5,000as attorneys fees.

3. Dismissing the Counterclaim interposed by saiddefendant.

Said defendant is likewise ordered to pay the costs.
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claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of aperson over a piece of real property, and serves as anotice and warning to third parties dealing with saidproperty that someone is claiming an interest on thesame or has a better right than the registered ownerthereof. A subsequent sale cannot prevail over theadverse claim which was previously annotated in the

certificate of title over the property.[24]

The question may be posed, was the adverse claiminscribed in the Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417 still in force when private respondent causedthe notice of levy on execution to be registered andannotated in the said title, considering that more thanthirty days had already lapsed since it wasannotated? This is a decisive factor in the resolution ofthis instant case.

If the adverse claim was still in effect, thenrespondents are charged with knowledge of pre-existinginterest over the subject property, and thus, petitionersare entitled to the cancellation of the notice of levyattached to the certificate of title.

For a definitive answer to this query, we refer to thelaw itself. Section 110 of Act 496 or the LandRegistration Act reads:

Sec. 110. Whoever claims any part or interest inregistered lands adverse to the registered owner,arising subsequent to the date of the originalregistration, may, if no other provision is made in thisAct for registering the same, make a statement inwriting setting forth fully his alleged right or interest,and how or under whom acquired, and a reference tothe volume and page of the certificate of title of theregistered owner, and a description of the land in whichthe right or interest is claimed.

The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shallstate the adverse claimants residence, and designate aplace at which all notices may be served upon him. Thestatement shall be entitled to registration as an adverseclaim, and the court, upon a petition of any party ininterest, shall grant a speedy hearing upon the questionof the validity of such adverse claim and shall enter

such decree therein as justice and equity mayrequire. If the claim is adjudged to be invalid, theregistration shall be cancelled. If in any case, the courtafter notice and hearing shall find that a claim thusregistered was frivolous or vexatious, it may tax theadverse claimant double or treble the costs in itsdiscretion.

The validity of the above-mentioned rules onadverse claims has to be reexamined in the light of the

changes introduced by P.D. 1529, which provides:

Sec. 70 Adverse Claim- Whoever claims any part orinterest in registered land adverse to the registeredowner, arising subsequent to the date of the originalregistration, may, if no other provision is made in thisdecree for registering the same, make a statement inwriting setting forth fully his alleged right or interest,and how or under whom acquired, a reference to thenumber of certificate of title of the registered owner, the

name of the registered owner, and a description of theland in which the right or interest is claimed.

The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shallstate the adverse claimants residence, and a place atwhich all notices may be served upon him. Thisstatement shall be entitled to registration as an adverseclaim on the certificate of title. The adverse claim shallbe effective for a period of thirty days from the date ofregistration. After the lapse of said period, the

annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon
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meaning to be attached to any word or phrase usuallyto be ascertained from the context.[28]

Construing the provision as a whole would reconcilethe apparent inconsistency between the portions of thelaw such that the provision on cancellation of adverseclaim by verified petition would serve to qualify the

provision on the effectivity period. The law, takentogether, simply means that the cancellation of theadverse claim is still necessary to render it ineffective,otherwise, the inscription will remain annotated andshall continue as a lien upon the property. For if theadverse claim has already ceased to be effective uponthe lapse of said period, its cancellation is no longernecessary and the process of cancellation would be auseless ceremony.[29]

It should be noted that the law employs the phrasemay be cancelled, which obviously indicates, asinherent in its decision making power, that the courtmay or may not order the cancellation of an adverseclaim, notwithstanding such provision limiting theeffectivity of an adverse claim for thirty days from thedate of registration. The court cannot be bound by suchperiod as it would be inconsistent with the veryauthority vested in it. A fortiori, the limitation on theperiod of effectivity is immaterial in determining the

validity or invalidity of an adverse claim which is theprincipal issue to be decided in the court hearing. It willtherefore depend upon the evidence at a proper hearingfor the court to determine whether it will order thecancellation of the adverse claim or not.[30]

To interpret the effectivity period of the adverseclaim as absolute and without qualification limited tothirty days defeats the very purpose for which thestatute provides for the remedy of an inscription ofadverse claim, as the annotation of an adverse claim is

a measure designed to protect the interest of a person

over a piece of real property where the registration ofsuch interest or right is not otherwise provided for bythe Land Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 orthe Property Registration Decree), and serves as awarning to third parties dealing with said property thatsomeone is claiming an interest or the same or a betterright than the registered owner thereof.[31]

The reason why the law provides for a hearingwhere the validity of the adverse claim is to be threshedout is to afford the adverse claimant an opportunity tobe heard, providing a venue where the propriety of hisclaimed interest can be established or revoked, all forthe purpose of determining at last the existence of anyencumbrance on the title arising from such adverseclaim. This is in line with the provision immediatelyfollowing:

Provided, however, that after cancellation, no secondadverse claim shall be registered by the sameclaimant.

Should the adverse claimant fail to sustain hisinterest in the property, the adverse claimant will beprecluded from registering a second adverse claimbased on the same ground.

It was held that validity or efficaciousness of the

claim may only be determined by the Court uponpetition by an interested party, in which event, theCourt shall order the immediate hearing thereof andmake the proper adjudication as justice and equity maywarrant. And it is only when such claim is foundunmeritorious that the registration of the adverse claimmay be cancelled, thereby protecting the interest of theadverse claimant and giving notice and warning to thirdparties.[32]

In sum, the disputed inscription of adverse claim onthe Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-79073 was still in
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effect on February 12, 1985 when Quezon City SheriffRoberto Garcia annotated the notice of levy onexecution thereto. Consequently, he is charged withknowledge that the property sought to be levied uponon execution was encumbered by an interest the sameas or better than that of the registered ownerthereof. Such notice of levy cannot prevail over the

existing adverse claim inscribed on the certificate oftitle in favor of the petitioners. This can be deducedfrom the pertinent provision of the Rules of Court, towit:

Section 16. Effect of levy on execution as to thirdpersons- The levy on execution shall create a lien infavor of the judgment creditor over the right, title andinterest of the judgment debtor in such property at thetime of the levy, subject to liens or encumbrances then

existing. (Italics supplied)

To hold otherwise would be to deprive petitioners oftheir property, who waited a long time to completepayments on their property, convinced that theirinterest was amply protected by the inscribed adverseclaim.

As lucidly observed by the trial court in thechallenged decision:

True, the foregoing section provides that an adverseclaim shall be effective for a period of thirty days fromthe date of registration. Does this mean however, thatthe plaintiffs thereby lost their right over the property inquestion? Stated in another, did the lapse of the thirtyday period automatically nullify the contract to sellbetween the plaintiffs and the Uychocdes therebydepriving the former of their vested right over theproperty?

It is respectfully submitted that it did not.[33]

As to whether or not the petitioners are buyers ingood faith of the subject property, the same should bemade to rest on the findings of the trial court. Aspointedly observed by the appellate court, there is noquestion that plaintiffs-appellees were not aware of thepending case filed by Pilares against Uychocde at thetime of the sale of the property by the latter in their

favor. This was clearly elicited from the testimony ofConchita Sajonas, wife of plaintiff, during cross-examination on April 21, 1988.[34]

ATTY. REYES

Q - Madam Witness, when Engr. Uychocde andhis wife offered to you and your husband theproperty subject matter of this case, theyshowed you the owners transfer certificate,is it not?

A - Yes, sir.

Q - That was shown to you the very first timethat this lot was offered to you for sale?

A - Yes.

Q - After you were shown a copy of the title andafter you were informed that they aredesirous in selling the same, did you andyour husband decide to buy the same?

A - No, we did not decide right after seeing thetitle. Of course, we visited...

Q - No, you just answer my question. You didnot immediately decide?

A - Yes.

Q - When did you finally decide to buy thesame?
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inscribed at the back of the certificate of title as Entry

No. 3439.[4]

On June 1, 1992, respondent Ma. Angelica Paez-

Barrameda wrote HMDF, Mortgage and Loans Division

informing the office that they have purchased the

subject property from the Calingo spouses and that they

filed a notice of adverse claim with the Register of

Deeds of Paraaque. They also sought assistance from

said office as regards the procedure for the full

settlement of the loan arrearages and the transfer of

the property in their names.[5]

Respondents Barrameda moved into the property

on June 2, 1992.

On July 13, 1992, a notice of levy with attachment

on real property by virtue of a writ of execution was

annotated at the back of the certificate of title of the

property in question. The writ of execution was issued

by Judge Salvador Abad Santos, Regional Trial Court of

Makati, Branch 65 in connection with Civil Case No. 88-

2159 involving a claim by herein petitioners, Spouses

Francisco and Bernardina Rodriguez, against

respondents Calingo. Judge Abad Santos issued the writ

in favor of petitioners Rodriguez.[6]

On July 21, 1992, petitioners counsel, Atty.

Nelson A. Loyola, sent a letter to respondents

Barrameda inquiring about the basis of their occupation

of the property in question.

On August 21, 1992, respondents Barrameda

remitted to respondents Calingo the amount

of P364,992.07 to complete the payment of the agreed

purchase price. Respondents Calingo acknowledgedreceipt of said amount and waived all their rights to the

property in favor of the Barrameda spouses. They also

guaranteed that the property was clear and free from

any liens and encumbrances, except the real estate

mortgage assumed by respondents Barrameda.[7]

On October 7, 1992, respondents Barrameda

executed a joint affidavit stating that they are the

owners of the property in question by virtue of a deed of

sale with assumption of mortgage; that they registered

an affidavit of adverse claim with the Register of Deeds

of Paraaque; that the Sheriff of the Regional Trial

Court, Branch 65, Makati, Sheriff Manuel C. Dolor, levied
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said property despite their adverse claim; and that they

have acquired the property long before the levy was

made, and therefore, said levy was illegal. They served

a copy of the affidavit on petitioners counsel, Atty.

Loyola, who made a reply thereto on October 15, 1992.

In his letter to Christopher Barrameda dated

October 15, 1992, Atty. Loyola pointed out that the

alleged deed of sale with assumption of mortgage was

not registered with the Register of Deeds and that the

records of the HMDF show that the property is owned by

the Calingo spouses. He urged the Barrameda spousesto confer with the petitioners to amicably settle the

controversy.[8]

On November 9, 1992, respondents Barrameda

found a Notice of Sheriffs Sale posted on their front

gate, announcing the auction sale of their house and lot

on December 3, 1992 at 10:00 in the morning.[9]

On November 20, 1992, pursuant to Rule 39,

Section 17 of the Revised Rules of Court, respondents

Barrameda served a Notice of Third Party Claim upon

Sheriff Manuel C. Dolor, accompanied by their affidavit

of title.

On December 2, 1992, respondents Barrameda

filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati a petition

for quieting of title with prayer for preliminary

injunction. The petition prayed, among others, that the

execution sale of the property be enjoined, the notice of

levy and attachment inscribed on the certificate of title

be cancelled, and that respondents Barrameda be

declared the lawful and sole owners of the property in

question.[10]

The trial court ruled in favor of herein petitionersand dismissed respondents Barramedas petition for

quieting of title. It ruled that the annotation of

respondents Barramedas adverse claim at the back of

the certificate of title was insufficient to establish their

claim over the property. It said that respondents

Barrameda, as buyers of the property, should have

registered the title in their names. Furthermore,

respondents Barramedas adverse claim had lost its

efficacy after the lapse of thirty days in accordance with

the provisions of the Land Registration Act. The trial

court also found that there was collusion between

respondents Barrameda and respondents Calingo to
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Decree[13] requires that such document be registered

with the Register of Deeds in order to be binding on

third persons. The law provides:

Sec. 51. Conveyance and otherdealings by registered owner. An owner

of registered land may convey, mortgage,lease, charge or otherwise deal with thesame in accordance with existing laws. Hemay use such forms of deeds, mortgages,leases or other voluntary instruments as aresufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage,lease, or other voluntary instrument,except a will purporting to convey oraffect registered land shall take effectas a conveyance or bind the land, butshall operate only as a contractbetween the parties and as evidence ofauthority to the Register of Deeds tomake registration.

The act of registration shall be theoperative act to convey or affect the landinsofar as third persons are concerned, andin all cases under this Decree, theregistration shall be made in the office ofthe Register of Deeds for the province orcity where the land lies. (emphasissupplied)

It is admitted in this case that the deed of sale

with assumption of mortgage was not registered, but

instead, respondents Barrameda filed an affidavit of

adverse claim with the Register of Deeds. The question

now is whether the adverse claim is sufficient to bind

third parties such as herein petitioners.

In L.P. Leviste and Company, Inc. v.

Noblejas,[14] we explained when an inscription of an

adverse claim is sufficient to affect third parties, thus:

The basis of respondent Villanuevasadverse claim was an agreement to sellexecuted in her favor by Garcia Realty. Anagreement to sell is a voluntary instrumentas it is a wilful act of the registeredowner. As such voluntary instrument,Section 50 of Act No. 496 [now Presidential

Decree No. 1529] expressly provides thatthe act of registration shall be the operativeact to convey and affect the land. AndSection 55 of the same Act requires thepresentation of the owners duplicatecertificate of title for the registration of anydeed or voluntary instrument. As theagreement to sell involves an interest lessthan an estate in fee simple, the sameshould have been registered by filing it with

the Register of Deeds who, in turn, makes abrief memorandum thereof upon the originaland owners duplicate certificate oftitle. The reason for requiring theproduction of the owners duplicatecertificate in the registration of a voluntaryinstrument is that, being a wilful act of theregistered owner, it is to be presumed thathe is interested in registering theinstrument and would willingly surrender,

present or produce his duplicate certificate
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of title to the Register of Deeds in order toaccomplish such registration. However,where the owner refuses to surrenderthe duplicate certificate for theannotation of the voluntaryinstrument, the grantee may file withthe Register of Deeds a statement

setting forth his adverse claim, asprovided for in Section 110 of Act No.496. In such a case, the annotation of theinstrument upon the entry book is sufficientto affect the real estate to which it relates,although Section 72 of Act No. 496 imposesupon the Register of Deeds the duty torequire the production by the [r]egisteredowner of his duplicate certificate for theinscription of the adverse claim. The

annotation of an adverse claim is ameasure designed to protect theinterest of a person over a pieceof real property where the registrationof such interest or right is nototherwise provided for by the LandRegistration Act, and serves as anotice and warning to third partiesdealing with said property thatsomeone is claiming an interest on the

same or a better right than theregistered owner thereof. (emphasessupplied)

In the case at bar, the reason given for the non-

registration of the deed of sale with assumption of

mortgage was that the owners duplicate copy of the

certificate of title was in the possession of HMDF. It was

not shown, however, that either respondents Barrameda

or respondents Calingo exerted any effort to retrieve

the owners duplicate copy from the HMDF for the

purpose of registering the deed of sale with assumption

of mortgage. In fact, the parties did not even seek to

obtain the consent of, much less inform, the HMDF of

the sale of the property. This, despite the provision in

the contract of mortgage prohibiting the mortgagor

(respondents Calingo) from selling or disposing the

property without the written consent of the

mortgagee.[15] Respondents Calingo, as party to the

contract of mortgage, are charged with the knowledgeof such provision and are bound to comply

therewith. Apparently, there was haste in disposing the

property that respondents Calingo informed HMDF of

the sale only on October 2, 1992 when they served a

copy of their letter to said office regarding the transfer

of the property to respondents Barrameda. There was

no reason for the parties failure to seek the approval of

the HMDF to the sale as it appears from the letter of

respondent Angelica Paez-Barrameda to HMDF that they

were ready to pay in full the balance of the loan plus

interest. What is more suspect is that the judgment

against respondents Calingo ordering them to pay the

petitioners the sum of P1,159,355.90 was rendered on
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SPOUSES ARACELI OLIVA-DE MESA

and ERNESTO S. DE MESA,

Petitioner,

- versus -

SPOUSES CLAUDIO D. ACERO, JR. and

MA. RUFINA D. ACERO,

SHERIFF FELIXBERTO L. SAMONTE

and REGISTRAR ALFREDO SANTOS,

G.R. No. 185064

Present:

CARPIO,J.,

Chairperson,

PEREZ,

SERENO,

REYES, and

BERNABE,JJ.

Promulgated:

Respondents. January 16, 2012

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------x

DECISION

REYES,J.:

Nature of the Petition

This is a petition for review on certiorari under

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the SpousesAraceli Oliva-De Mesa (Araceli) and Ernesto S. De Mesa

(Ernesto), assailing the Court of Appeals (CA)

Decision1 dated June 6, 2008 and Resolution2 dated

October 23, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 79391

entitled Spouses Araceli Oliva-De Mesa and Ernesto De

Mesa v. Spouses Claudio Acero, Jr., et al.
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Accordingly, a judgment rendered in an ejectment

case is not a bar to action between the same parties

respecting title to the land or building. Neither shall it

be conclusive as to the facts therein. This issue is far

from being novel and there is no reason to depart from

this Courts previous pronouncements. In Malabanan v.

Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc.,18this Court had previously

clarified that a decision in an ejectment case is not res

judicata in an annulment of title case and vice-versa

given the provisional and inconclusive nature of the

determination of the issue of ownership in the former.

Forum-shopping exists where theelements oflitis pendentia are present,namely: (a) identity of parties or at leastsuch as representing the same interests inboth actions; (b) identity of rights asserted

and reliefs prayed for, the relief beingfounded on the same facts; and (c) theidentity in the two cases should be such thatthe judgment that may be rendered in onewould, regardless of which party issuccessful, amounts to res judicata in theother.

Petitioner and respondent are thesame parties in the annulment andejectment cases. The issue of ownershipwas likewise being contended, with sameset of evidence being presented in bothcases. However, it cannot be inferred that a

judgment in the ejectment case would

amount to res judicata in the annulmentcase, and vice-versa.

This issue is hardly a novel one. It hasbeen laid to rest by heaps of cases iteratingthe principle that a judgment rendered in anejectment case shall not bar an actionbetween the same parties respecting title to

the land or building nor shall it beconclusive as to the facts therein found in acase between the same parties upon adifferent cause of action involvingpossession.

It bears emphasizing that in ejectmentsuits, the only issue for resolution is the

physical or material possession of theproperty involved, independent of any claimof ownership by any of the party litigants.However, the issue of ownership may beprovisionally ruled upon for the sole purposeof determining who is entitled topossession de facto. Therefore, theprovisional determination of ownership inthe ejectment case cannot be clothed withfinality.
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one of these two modes of constitution willbar a judgment debtor from availing of theprivilege.

On the other hand, for family homes

constructed afterthe effectivity of theFamily Code on August 3, 1988, there is noneed to constitute extrajudicially or

judicially, and the exemption is effectivefrom the time it was constituted and lasts aslong as any of its beneficiaries under Art.154 actually resides therein. Moreover, thefamily home should belong to the absolutecommunity or conjugal partnership, or ifexclusively by one spouse, its constitution

must have been with consent of the other,and its value must not exceed certainamounts depending upon the area where itis located. Further, the debts incurred forwhich the exemption does not apply asprovided under Art. 155 for which the familyhome is made answerable must have beenincurred after August 3, 1988.21 (citationsomitted)

In the earlier case ofKelley, Jr. v. Planters

Products, Inc.,22 we stressed that:

Under the Family Code, there is noneed to constitute the family home judiciallyor extrajudicially. All family homesconstructed after the effectivity of theFamily Code (August 3, 1988) areconstituted as such by operation of law. Allexisting family residences as of August

3, 1988 are considered family homesand are prospectively entitled to thebenefits accorded to a family homeunder the Family Code.23(emphasissupplied and citation omitted)

The foregoing rules on constitution of family

homes, for purposes of exemption from execution, could

be summarized as follows:

First, family residences constructed before the

effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988must be constituted as a family home either judicially or

extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of the

Civil Code in order to be exempt from execution;
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Second, family residences constructed after the

effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 are

automatically deemed to be family homes and thus

exempt from execution from the time it was constituted

and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually

resides therein;

Third, family residences which were not judicially

or extrajudicially constituted as a family home prior to

the effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing

thereafter, are considered as family homes by operation

of law and are prospectively entitled to the benefits

accorded to a family home under the Family Code.

Here, the subject property became a family

residence sometime in January 1987. There was noshowing, however, that the same was judicially or

extrajudicially constituted as a family home in

accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Still,

when the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988,

the subject property became a family home by

operation of law and was thus prospectively exempt

from execution. The petitioners were thus correct in

asserting that the subject property was a family home.

The family homes

exemption fromexecution must beset up and provedto the Sheriffbefore the sale ofthe property atpublic auction.

Despite the fact that the subject property is a

family home and, thus, should have been exempt from

execution, we nevertheless rule that the CA did not err

in dismissing the petitioners complaint for nullification

of TCT No. T-221755 (M). We agree with the CA that the

petitioners should have asserted the subject property

being a family home and its being exempted from

execution at the time it was levied or within a

reasonable time thereafter. As the CA aptly pointed out:

In the light of the facts abovesummarized, it is evident that appellants did


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not assert their claim of exemption within areasonable time. Certainly, reasonable time,for purposes of the law on exemption, doesnot mean a time after the expiration of theone-year period provided for in Section 30of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court for

judgment debtors to redeem the property

sold on execution, otherwise it would rendernugatory final bills of sale on execution anddefeat the very purpose of execution toput an end to litigation. x x x.24

The foregoing disposition is in accord with the

Courts November 25, 2005 Decision in Honrado v.

Court of Appeals,25 where it was categorically stated

that at no other time can the status of a residential

house as a family home can be set up and proved and

its exemption from execution be claimed but before the

sale thereof at public auction:

While it is true that the family home isconstituted on a house and lot from the timeit is occupied as a family residence and isexempt from execution or forced sale underArticle 153 of the Family Code, such claimfor exemption should be set up and provedto the Sheriff before the sale of the property

at public auction. Failure to do so would

estop the party from later claiming theexemption. As this Court ruled in Gomez v.Gealone:

Although the Rules of

Court does not prescribe theperiod within which to claim theexemption, the rule is,nevertheless, well-settled thatthe right of exemption is apersonal privilege granted tothe judgment debtor and assuch, it must be claimed not bythe sheriff, but by the debtorhimself at the time of the levy or

within a reasonable periodthereafter;

In theabsence of expressprovision it hasvariously held thatclaim (for

exemption) must bemade at the time ofthe levy if thedebtor is present,that it must bemade within areasonable time, orpromptly, or beforethe creditor hastaken any step

involving further
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For all intents and purposes, the petitioners

negligence or omission to assert their right within a

reasonable time gives rise to the presumption that they

have abandoned, waived or declined to assert it. Since

the exemption under Article 153 of the Family Code is a

personal right, it is incumbent upon the petitioners to

invoke and prove the same within the prescribed period

and it is not the sheriffs duty to presume or raise the

status of the subject property as a family home.

The petitioners negligence or omission renders

their present assertion doubtful; it appears that it is a

mere afterthought and artifice that cannot be

countenanced without doing the respondents injustice

and depriving the fruits of the judgment award in their

favor. Simple justice and fairness and equitable

considerations demand that Claudios title to the

property be respected. Equity dictates that the

petitioners are made to suffer the consequences of their

unexplained negligence.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing

disquisitions, the petition is DENIED. The assailed

Decision dated June 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. CV No. 79391, which affirmed the Decision of

the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 22,

in Civil Case No. 1058-M-99 and dismissed the

complaint for declaration of nullity of TCT No. 221755

(M) and other documents, and the October 23, 2008

Resolution denying reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE TEOFILO MERCADO,

Petitioner,

G.R. No. 141019


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- versus -

VALLEY MOUNTAIN

MINES EXPLORATION, INC.,

Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

- x

HEIRS OF JUAN OLIMPIADAAND HEIRS OF SERGIO OLIMPIADA,

Petitioners,

- versus -

COURT OF APPEALS, HON.

ALFONSO GARCIA, Judge, RTC,

Branch 18, Tagaytay City,

VALLEY MOUNTAIN MINES

EXPLORATION, INC., represented

G.R. No. 164281

by its President, JOAQUIN

RODRIGUEZ, AND CITY

GOVERNMENT OF TAGAYTAY,

Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

- x

HEIRS OF JUAN AND SERGIO

OLIMPIADA, represented by

Fernando Olimpiada as Attorney-

in-Fact,

Petitioners,

- versus -

HON. GREGORIO M. MONREAL,

CITY ASSESSOR, TAGAYTAY CITY,

Respondents.

G.R. No. 185781

Present:

CORONA,C.J.,

Chairperson,

LEONARDO-DE CAST

BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO, and

VILLARAMA, JR.,JJ.

Promulgated:


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For failure to pay the real property taxes for

several years, the subject lots were sold by the City

Government of Tagaytay in a public auction held on

November 28, 1983, as evidenced by the Certificate of

Sale of Delinquent Property to Purchaser issued in favor

of Valley Mountain Mines Exploration, Inc. (VMMEI). Said

certificate of sale was registered on December 9,

1983.

To save their property, the heirs of Narciso

Olimpiada,[4] through their attorney-in-fact, Rosa

Cabrera Mendoza, executed a Deed of Sale of an

Unregistered Parcel of Land With Assignment of Rights

and Assumption of Obligations in favor of Jose Teofilo

T. Mercado (Mercado).[5] The heirs of Juan

Desengao[6] through their attorney-in-fact Primitivo

Mendoza likewise executed a similar deed in favor of

Mercado.[7]

On December 7, 1984, Mercado paid the sums

of P58,327.82 and P33,841.49 for the five parcels of

land. Consequently, a Certificate of Redemption

covering the subject properties was issued by the Office

of the City Treasurer of Tagaytay City.[8] Said office also

returned the purchase price plus interest thereon to

VMMEI on December 11, 1984.[9] However, the checks

issued by Mercado in payment of the aforesaid sums

when presented for payment to the bank, were

dishonored for the reason Refer to Drawer. Under

letters dated April 16, 1985 and October 8, 1985, the

Office of the City Treasurer advised Mercado to replace

the bounced checks.[10]

On April 14, 1986, VMMEI through its counsel

wrote then City Treasurer Concepcion C. Daplas

asserting its right to be reinstated as the highest bidder

during the public auction sale considering that no

effective redemption was made by the delinquent

owners, and expressed willingness to return the total

amount of P111,222.07 refunded to it and also to pay

additional sums to update the taxes due on the subject

properties.[11] Thereupon, under letter dated April 22,

1986, Daplas sought the advice/ruling of the Minister of

Finance on whether she can accept VMMEIs repayment
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for the total amount of tax delinquency of the auctioned

properties and costs without going through the process

of another public auction, and issue the corresponding

final bill of sale in its favor. [12] No written reply was

received from the Ministry of Finance regarding Daplas

query.

On August 7, 1986, Daplas accepted the amount

of P46,400.00 from Mercado as partial cash payment,

particularly for replacement of check covering payment

of tax receipts # 7495076, 7495036 & 7495075 as

evidenced by a handwritten temporary receipt she

issued to Mercado.[13] Said amount was immediately

deposited with PNB Cavite Branch under SJV No. 86-09-

21 dated September 5, 1986. On October 7, 1986, a

certain Mr. Francisco Zarate informed the City Treasurer

that he is withdrawing the payment he made in behalf

of Mercado because he realized that the transaction was

irregular since the 365 days redemption period allowed

by law had already expired when they paid the cash

replacement of the bounced check of Mercado.

[14] However, such money paid by Zarate was never

returned by the City Treasurers Office.

The repayment made by VMMEI was eventually

accepted and then OIC/City Treasurer Pio Baybay

executed the Final Bills of Sale [15] covering the subject

lots. Consequently, the previous tax declarations of the

Heirs of Narciso Olimpiada and Heirs of Desengao were

cancelled and new tax declarations for the year 1988

were issued in the name of VMMEI which likewise paid

the real property taxes due on the five parcels of land.

On May 15, 1988, the Heirs of Narciso Olimpiada

and Juan Desengao sought reconsideration of the

cancellation of their respective tax declarations on the

ground that it was illegal considering that the auctioned

properties have been timely redeemed. In his letter-

reply, then City Assessor Josefina De Castro informed

that their properties have already been sold at public

auction for non-payment of real property taxes in

accordance with existing regulations and procedure.

[16] Still, the said heirs reiterated their request for the
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revival or restoration of their tax declarations on

September 7, 1989.[17]

On September 26, 1989, Mercado filed separate

petitions for judicial confirmation of title over the

subject lots in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of

Tagaytay City (Branch 18), docketed as LRC Case Nos.

TG-354 (Lot 4867 - Olimpiada Property), TG-355 (Lots

7539, 7540 and 7541 - Desengao Properties) and TG-

356 (Lot 4831-B - Desengao Property).

The Republic of the Philippines through the

Solicitor General entered appearance and filed its

Opposition to the petitions filed in LRC Case Nos. TG-

355 and TG-356.[18] The Heirs of Narciso Olimpiada

represented by Atty. Dante A. Carandang (Carandang

Group) filed their Opposition in LRC Case No. TG-354,

having earlier filed on April 11, 1990 before the same

court Civil Case No. TG-1124 for the annulment of

public auction sale. The Heirs of Juan Desengao filed

their Opposition in LRC Case Nos. TG-355 and TG-356.

[19] VMMEI, on the other hand, filed its Opposition to all

three petitions filed by Mercado.[20] VMMEI likewise filed

a separate application for registration of the same

parcels of land before the same court, docketed as LRC

Case No. TG-383.

On April 23, 1991, the trial court issued a general

order of default with the exception of private oppositors

VMMEI and the Heirs of Narciso Olimpiada (Carandang

Group).[21] Civil Case No. TG-1124 was dismissed on

joint motion of the parties as the Heirs of Narciso

Olimpiada pursued their opposition in the consolidated

cases of LRC Case Nos. TG-354, TG-355 and TG-356.[22]

Heirs of Narciso Olimpiada[23] (Carandang Group)

These oppositors led by Teresa Olimpiada and

counsel Atty. Dante A. Carandang, claimed to be the

lawful owners of Lot No. 4867 as legal heirs of Narciso

Olimpiada who died intestate sometime in 1926. They

alleged that they were not notified of the public auction

sale conducted on November 28, 1983 wherein their
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(Soledad Umali Mendoza) of another heir, Marcelino

Mendoza, signed the document for herself and allegedly

in behalf of her children with Marcelino.[27]

Rosa and Primitivo presented the respective

receipts for the amounts (P200,000.00 for the heirs of

Olimpiada and P400,000.00 for the heirs of Juan

Desengao)[28]representing the purchase price they

received from Mercado, which were all deposited with

Mercados sister, Paulita Mercado Araas, for

safekeeping until the titles to the land are issued.[29]

Atty. Augusto Del Rosario testified that the

subject deeds were executed in his presence. He relied

on the representation of the heirs-signatories that they

are the only heirs of the declared landowners and it

being the custom in the rural areas to trust the word of

the eldest in the family. He also admitted there were

tenants on the subject properties but these tenants

already executed waivers in favor of Mercado.[30]

Loreta Luring Mendoza testified that it was not

her signature which appeared above the name Lorenza

Mendoza, which was not her true name, in the Special

Power of Attorney in favor of Primitivo Mendoza.

[31] Another witness, Cornelia Mendoza, likewise denied

it was her signature appearing above the name Aba

Mendoza and she always signed using the name

Cornelia Mendoza her full name. [32]

Macario Olimpiada testified that he is a great

grandson of Narciso Olimpiada, his father Dominador

Olimpiada being the son of Victor Olimpiada. He denied

the signature appearing above his name in the Special

Power of Attorney in favor of Rosa Cabrera

Mendoza. He does not know anything about the

execution of said document nor the sale in favor of

Mercado made by his co-heirs. He also did not make

any contribution for the payment of real property taxes

because it was only through Rosa Cabrera that he came

to know that they have a property in Tagaytay. Neither

is he aware that the subject land was sold in a public

auction nor of its redemption by Mercado. In fact, he

does not know anything of what was happening

regarding the property.

[33]
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VMMEI presented as its witnesses its Treasurer

Grace Ramos Abesamis, former City Treasurer of

Tagaytay Concepcion Daplas and Local Training

Operations Officer of the City Treasurers Office

Domingo Bayas.

Abesamis testified that the refund of the purchase

money paid by VMMEI at the public auction was

deposited in the companys account but on September

30, 1997, they paid it back to the City Government of

Tagaytay by issuing two checks duly receipted by the

City Treasurers Office. While the said payment

consisted of personal checks of Joaquin Rodriguez,

VMMEIs President, she explained that stockholders and

officers can make advances in behalf of the company.[34]

Treasurer Daplas testified that the payment

tendered by Mercado as redemption price was only

partial and she issued a temporary receipt

for P46,400.00 received only on August 7, 1986. They

earlier refunded the purchase price to VMMEI on

December 11, 1984 before they learned that the checks

issued by Mercado bounced. The Ministry of Finance

sent a telegram dated December 11, 1985 directing

then OIC/City Treasurer of Tagaytay Pio Baybay to

appear at said office in connection with the subject

properties. The Final Bills of Sale were executed by

Baybay in favor of VMMEI in Manila and she signed the

documents as witness. This was upon the verbal

instruction given by the officials of the now Department

of Finance (DOF) when on the same date she and

Baybay were called to a conference before said

officials. The return of the refunded purchase price was

made by Joaquin Rodriguez through checks.[35] She also

identified the signatures of Baybay and the other

witness in the Final Bills of Sale.[36]

GaudiosoPlatero,

Bonifacia

Platero,

Herminia

Platero-

Castro and

Elizabeth

Platero-
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In upholding the claim of VMMEI, the trial court

ruled that VMMEI acquired ownership rights over the

subject properties when it returned the refunded

purchase price to the City Treasurer. As confirmation of

such rights, the City Treasurer executed Final Bills of

Sale in favor of VMMEI which was attested to by witness

Daplas.

Heirs

of Juan

and

Sergio

Olimpia

da[42] (F

abella

Group)

On February 16, 1993, the heirs of Juan and

Sergio Olimpiada who are allegedly full-blood brothers

of Narciso Olimpiada, represented by their attorney-in-

fact Fernando Olimpiada and their counsel Atty. Gilbert

M. Fabella (Fabella Group), filed an Urgent Motion for

Reopening[43] of LRC Case No. TG-354. They pointed out

that in the approved plan of Lot 4867, Ap-04-

000778[44] dated April 29, 1976, it was clearly indicated

that the land described therein was surveyed for the

Hrs. of Narciso Olimpiada, et al. and that the words

et al. refer to the Heirs of Juan and Sergio Olimpiada,

the co-owners of Narciso Olimpiada.

In a Joint Order[45] dated April 20, 1993, the trial

court denied the said Urgent Motion as well as the

petition for relief from judgment and motion for

reconsideration filed by the Plateros. The trial court

said it no longer had jurisdiction to act on the pending

motions since it already approved the notice of appeal

filed by applicant Mercado.

On May 20, 1998, the Olimpiada Heirs-Fabella

Group[46] instituted before the same court (RTC of

Tagaytay City, Branch 18) Civil Case No. TG-1800 for

Annulment of Auction Sale. However, the named

attorney-in-fact was Macario Olimpiada. They prayed

that the tax delinquency sale conducted by the City
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Tagaytay and Hon. Alfonso Garcia, Judge, RTC Branch

18, Tagaytay City.[51]

CA-G.R.

CV No.

41164

and CA-

G.R. SP

No.

32309

Applicant Mercado filed a notice of appeal from

the adverse decision of the RTC in LRC Case Nos. TG-

354, TG-355 and TG-356, the appeal docketed as CA-

G.R. CV No. 41164.Before the CA, VMMEI filed a

motion for the issuance of writ of possession, which was

granted under its Resolution dated October 20, 1993.[52] In the same resolution, the motion for elevation of

the court records in LRC Case Nos. TG-354 and TG-383

and/or remand of the case to the trial court, filed by the

Olimpiada Heirs-Fabella Group (who represented

themselves as Heirs of Narciso, Juan and Sergio

Olimpiada, et al. was also denied. The CA noted that

LRC Case No. TG-354 was already decided while the

motion for consolidation was filed before the trial court

by the Olimpiada Heirs-Fabella Group only on February

5, 1993. As per the report submitted by the Sheriff, the

writ of possession was returned unserved for lack of

specification of the address of appellees.[53]

Meanwhile, the Olimpiada Heirs-Fabella Group

filed in this Court G.R. No. 110005, Appeal by

Certiorari, Prohibition and Injunction seeking to re-open

the proceedings in LRC Case No. TG-354. Citing the

pendency of said G.R. No. 110005, they filed an Urgent

Motion before the CA to hold in abeyance resolution of

the appeal (CA-G.R. CV No. 41164).[54]

VMMEI filed a motion to strike out the pleadings

filed by the Plateros (who filed a motion for

reconsideration of the resolution granting the motion for

issuance of writ of possession) and Olimpiada Heirs-

Fabella Group (who filed their opposition to the motion

for issuance of writ of possession and motion to hold in
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32309. Petitioners therein specifically prayed that said

case be consolidated with CA-G.R. CV No. 41164

pending with the appellate court.[59] In an obvious

attempt to evade the charge of forum shopping, Atty.

Fabella appended a Certification to said petition

attesting that they have withdrawn [their] action or

proceeding involving the same issues in the Honorable

Supreme Court in the case entitled, Heirs of Narciso

Olimpiada, et al., represented by Fernando Olimpiada,

in his capacity as attorney-in-fact, petitioners versus

The Hon. Judge, Eleuterio O. Guerrero, Presiding Judge,

Regional Trial Court Branch 18, Tagaytay City, Jose

Teofilo T. Mercado and Valley Mountain Mines

Exploration, Inc., represented by the President, Jack

Rodriguez, under CA-G.R. No. 110005. and even

attached the purported Motion to Withdraw signed by

Atty. Fabella filed before the Supreme Court on October

12, 1993.[60] As earlier mentioned, G.R. No. 110005 was

denied with finality by this Court on September 3, 1993.

On December 29, 1993, the CAs Thirteenth

Division ordered the consolidation of CA-G.R. SP No.

32309 with CA-G.R. CV No. 41164.[61]

On November 12, 1997, the CAs Special Seventh

Division issued the following Resolution[62]:

An examination of the rollo of SC

G[.]R. No. 119059 revealed that the heirs of

Narciso Olimpiada, et al., petitioners

therein, filed a Manifestation with the

Supreme Court on September 13, 1995 to

inform the said court that they sought the

assistance of the DENR to investigate the

identity and registrability of the subject

land. A certification marked as annex B (p.

260, Rollo) issued by the Department of

Environment and Natural Resources was

subsequently presented to show that the

land subject of this controversy falls within

the Unclassified Public Forest of Tagaytay

City per LC-CM 10 control map ofCavite. The petitioners argue that if the

land subject of this appeal is indeed forest

land and is thus, inalienable, the tax sale

conducted by the City of Tagaytay is void

and the said land cannot be the subject of

an application for registration. However,

when the DENR failed to submit a full report

on the matter on time, the Supreme Court


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made on December 12, 1997. VMMEI filed in said case

the following motions: (1) Motion To Recall Entry of

Judgment; (2) Motion To Resolve Petition, both dated

September 6, 1998; and (3) Motion to Clarify dated

October 6, 1998. In a Resolution[64] dated November

23, 1998, this Court said:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the

aforesaid Motions are all NOTED WITHOUT

ACTION and the Court of Appeals may now

judiciously proceed with the resolution of

CA-GR No. SP 32309 and CA-GR CV No.

41164, inasmuch as this present case isnow deemed finally resolved and

terminated. No further pleadings will be

entertained.

On May 31, 1999, the CAs Fourteenth Division

rendered its Decision[65] dismissing the appeal of

Mercado in CA-G.R. CV No. 41164 and sustaining the

trial courts findings and conclusions as to the defective

redemption made by Mercado, the validity of VMMEIs

acquisition of the subject lands by repaying the

purchase price to the City Treasurer, and the

undisputed open, exclusive and notorious possession of

the former owners of the lands since time

immemorial. The appellate court also dismissed CA-

G.R. SP No. 32309, noting that in dismissing without

prejudice G.R. No. 119059, this Court did not reverse or

modify the October 14, 1994 Resolution excluding the

Olimpiada Heirs-Fabella Group and the Plateros in CA-

G.R. CV No. 41164. Further, it was mentioned that

since G.R. No. 110005 also filed by the same Olimpiada

Heirs-Fabella Group was already denied with finality, the

CA can no longer entertain the petition in CA-G.R. SP

No. 32309 which questioned the RTCs order denying

their motion to re-open proceedings in LRC Case Nos.

TG-354, the same issues raised by said petitioners

cannot be litigated anew. Lastly, the CA held that even

if said petitioners were allowed to intervene in CA-G.R.

CV No. 41164, still their alleged rights are foreclosed by

the fact that VMMEIs mode of acquisition was not by

sale made by the Olimpiada heirs but by purchase in a

tax delinquency sale pursuant to P.D. No. 464. The

dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the

Court a quo dated November 26, 1992 is

affirmed in toto. Likewise, the petition
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docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 32309 is

DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Costs against applicant-appellant.

SO ORDERED.[66]

On October 12, 1999, Mercado filed a Motion for

New Trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence

consisting of the following: (1) the Notarial Report of

Notary Public Crisostomo G. Valle showing that

Document Nos. 809 to 987 appears on pages 67-101 of

Book XXI for the month of September 1987 whereas theFinal Bills of Sale indicated Document Nos. 977, 978 and

980, Book XXIII, pages 99 and 100, Book XVIII covers

only pages Nos. 73-101, series of 1987; Documents 978

and 980 are recorded not as the final bills of sale; (2)

Certification from the Clerk of Court, Notarial Section,

RTC of Manila which proves the spurious nature of the

Final Bills of Sale; and (3) Letter dated October 5, 1999

from Angelina M. Magsino, Deputy Executive Director

and OIC of the Bureau of Local Government Finance,

Department of Finance, in response to Mercados letter-

query if it is the practice of said office to give verbal

instruction to then Tagaytay City Treasurer Daplas

regarding the auction sale of the property redeemed by

him, and which states that as a matter of public policy,

all job-related instructions to local treasury officials are

usually made in writing and that whether somebody

might have given [Daplas] such verbal instructions, the

Bureau is not at all aware of the same.[67]

In its Resolution dated November 15, 1999, the

CA granted Mercados motion for new

trial. Subsequently, however, in its Resolution dated

December 1, 1999, the appellate court granted VMMEIs

motion for reconsideration and set aside its November

15, 1999 resolution.[68]

On February 4, 2000, Mercado filed a petition for

review before this Court to reverse the CA Decision

dated May 31, 1999 and Resolution dated December 1,

1999, docketed as G.R. No. 141019.

CA-G.R.

SP No.

74454
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While their petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 74454 was

still pending, the Olimpiada Heirs-Fabella Group filed a

petition for mandamus before the RTC of Tagaytay City

(Branch 23), docketed as Civil Case No. TG-2406.

[69]Impleaded as defendant therein was City Assessor

Gregorio M. Monreal. It was prayed that said defendant

be directed to correct the error committed in the

issuance of tax declaration as New in 1974 containing

the name Heirs of Narciso Olimpiada only instead of

the Heirs of Narciso Olimpiada, et al. as reflected in

the approved survey plan (Ap-04-000778).

On August 15, 2003, the Olimpiada Heirs-Fabella

Group filed an urgent motion to suspend proceedings in

CA-G.R. SP No. 74454 to await the final resolution of the

mandamus case (Civil Case No. TG-2406).[70] In its

Opposition, VMMEI contended that the petition in Civil

Case No. TG-2406 is defective as it did not also implead

the City Government of Tagaytay. Such non-inclusion of

the city government was deliberate and made to

conceal the forum shopping committed by the

Olimpiada Heirs-Fabella Group who had earlier filed Civil

Case No. TG-1800, in which the reliefs are similar to

those sought in Civil Case No. TG-2406. It was further

argued that the filing of Civil Case No. TG-1800 was

itself an act of forum shopping because the Olimpiada

Heirs-Fabella Group had previously filed an urgent

motion for reopening of Civil Case No. TG-354 before

the RTC. In view of this clear and blatant forum

shopping, the filing of the mandamus case could not be

invoked as legal basis for suspension of the proceedings

in CA-G.R. CV No. 74454.[71]

On March 31, 2004, the CAs Eighth Division

rendered its Decision[72] dismissing the petition for

certiorari finding no grave of abuse of discretion

committed by the respondent judge in dismissing Civil

Case No. TG-1800. It noted that petitioners failed to

offer satisfactory explanation for not complying with

Section 83 of P.D. No. 464, failing to appeal the final

orders of the respondent court, and resort to petition for

relief from judgment and other motions without

complying with procedural requirements. Additionally,

the court found that the alleged extrinsic fraud was not


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land is concerned; (2) declaring the Decision in LRC

Case No. TG-354 with respect to Lot 4867 confirming

ownership in favor of VMMEI as null and void at least to

the extent of 2/3 thereof; (3) declaring the order of

respondent judge dated January 14, 2000 as null and

void for having been rendered with grave abuse of

discretion and with gross misrepresentation for

excluding petitioners as co-owners of Lot 4867; and (4)

declaring the March 31, 2004 CA Decision as null and

void for having been rendered with grave abuse of

discretion as it did not await the final resolution of the

mandamus case.[85]

G.R. No. 185781

Petitioners seek the reversal of the CA Decision

dated December 27, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 89657,

setting forth the following arguments: (1) lands which

have not been issued patent and certificate of title

cannot be the object of an auction sale, and if sold by

the non-grantee is a violation of the law; (2) the only

bidder VMMEI is a mining corporation not allowed to

acquire agricultural land, besides being a dummy

corporation, its claim of ownership over the subject

land is a violation of the Corporation Code; (3) the

correction of a typographical or clerical error committed

by a City Assessor is a ministerial function and is purely

ministerial in character; (4) petitioners did not receive

any notice declaring them as delinquent taxpayers and

of the conduct of auction sale, and neither were

they parties to the land registration case; and (5)

under the Civil Code, VMMEI is only a trustee of the

petitioners when it bought at the auction sale the lot

owned in common. Petitioners thus prayed that the CA

decision be set aside and judgment be rendered

ordering the City Assessor to correct the erroneous

1974 Tax Declaration No. 09959-B.[86]

Ruling of the Court

The present controversy generated a prolonged

litigation on the issue of ownership. On the one hand is

the dispute between Mercado and VMMEI as to who had

validly acquired rights over Lot 4867 in the tax
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WHEREFORE the foregoing are 3 The Regional Technical Director


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WHEREFORE, the foregoing are

initially submitted to the Honorable Court

for its information, with the

recommendation that the rendition of

the decision be held in abeyance until

after the discrepancies are corrected

and the requested informations are

received. (Emphasis supplied.)

However, the trial court rendered its Decision

dated November 26, 1992 without waiting for the

receipt by the LRA of the abovementioned verification

reports on the correctness of the plan and status of the

land applied for registration.

On January 5, 1993, the LRA submitted to the trial

court a Supplementary Report,[89] as follows:

x x x x

2. LMB & CENRO informed that theparcel of land situated in Iruhin, Tagaytay

City, described in plan Ap-04-000778, Lot

4867, Cad-355 is not covered by any public

land application/land patent per its

1st Indorsement dated September 28, 1990

& letter dated September 6, 1990, copies

are attached hereto as Annexes A & B;

3. The Regional Technical Director,

Region IV, in its letter dated June 26, 1992,

in LRC Record No. N-51844, a copy is

attached hereto as Annex C, informed

that the correct tie line of Lot 4867 from

BLLM #1, Cad-355, Tagaytay Cadastre

should be N. 70 deg. 54E., 6543.57 m.;

4. When the furnished corrected tie

line was applied in the replotting of Ap-04-

000778, Lot 4867, Cad-355, in our Municipal

Index Sheet, it was found that Lot A, plan

Vs-04-000318, a portion of Psu-179428,

applied in LRC Case No. Tg-301, LRC

Record No. N-51844 by Primitiva

Landicho-Tenido, et. al., & decided on

October 21, 1988, is a portion of Lot

4867, Tagaytay Cadastre, applied in

the case at bar. Copy of plan Vs-04-

000318 is attached hereto as Annex D;

and

5. LRA letter dated July 24, 1990

addressed to the FMB remains unanswered

as of this date.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing report is

respectfully submitted to the Honorable

Court for its information & guidance with

the recommendation that (1) the

applicant be required to submit a

subdivision plan in tracing cloth of Lot

4867, Tagaytay Cadastre, Ap-04-

000478 together with the

corresponding technical descriptions resolution or order if any of the Honorable
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corresponding technical descriptions

duly verified & approved by the

Regional Technical Director, Region IV,

by excluding therefrom as a separate

lot the portion covered by plan Vs-04-

000318, Lot A, a portion of Psu-

179428, applied & decided in LR Case

No. Tg-301, LRC Record No. N-51844 &

the Forest Management Bureau to

submit a report to the Court on the

status of the land applied for, to

determine whether said land or any

portion thereof, is within the forest

zone.[90] (Emphasis supplied.)

Apparently, the LRA was not notified that a

decision had already been rendered as evident from its

letter[91] dated January 19, 1993 to the Clerk of Court,

RTC, Branch 18, requesting for confirmation of the

genuineness and regular issuance of said

decision. Concerned about the matters earlier

conveyed to the court and whether these have been

properly addressed, the LRA again wrote the Clerk of

Court, stating that

In connection with the examination of

the above-noted case/record, please furnish

this Authority with a certified copy of the

resolution or order if any, of the Honorable

Court relative to our Supplementary Report

dated January 05, 1993, for our record as

required by existing regulations.

In the negative, please include said

report in the calendar of cases for

consideration of the Honorable Court.[92]

By that time, however, the RTC had already given

due course to the appeal of Mercado, and hence the

records were being forwarded to the appellate court.

As to the other lots applied for in LRC Case Nos.

TG-355 and TG-356, though not subject of the petition

before this Court, we note that the LRA Report dated

August 10, 1990 submitted to th