RC 337th International Conference on Social Science MethodologyNapoli, Italia, 9.2008

Session: Complexity, vagueness, fractals and fuzzy logic: new paths for the social search

Luca CorchiaPisa University, Department of Social Sciencesluca.corchia@dss.unipi.it

Explicative models of complexity.The reconstructions of social evolution for Jürgen Habermas

Keywords: new model, complexity, social evolution

Abstract:

Habermas introduces the concept of “reconstructive science” with a double purpose: to place the“general theory of society” between philosophy and social science and re-establish the rift betweenthe “great theorization” and the “empirical research”.

The model of “rational reconstructions” represents the main thread of the surveys about the“structures” of the lifeworld (“culture”, “society” and “personality”) and their respective “functions”(cultural reproductions, social integrations and socialization). For this propose, the dialecticsbetween “symbolic representation” of “the structures subordinated to all worlds of life” (“internalrelationships”) and the “material reproduction” of the social systems in their complex (“externalrelationships” between social systems and environment) has to be considered. This model finds anapplication, above all, in the “theory of the social evolution”, starting from the reconstruction of thenecessary conditions for a phylogeny of the socio-culturallife forms (the “hominization”) until ananalysis of the development of “social formations”, which Habermas subdivides into primitive,traditional, modern and contemporary formations.

This paper is an attempt, primarily, to formalize the model of “reconstruction of the logic ofdevelopment” of “social formations” summed up by Habermas through the differentiation betweenvital world and social systems (and, within them, through the “rationalization of the lifeworld” andthe “growth in complexity of the social systems”). Secondly, it tries to offer some methodologicalclarifications about the “explanation of the dynamics” of “historical processes” and, in particular,about the “theoretical meaning” of the evolutional theory’s propositions. Even if the Germansociologist considers that the “ex-post rational reconstructions” and “the modelssystem/environment” cannot have a complete “historiographical application”, these certainly act asa general premise in the argumentative structure of the “historical explanation”.

Index

IntroductionTHE LESSON OF THE CLASSICS: THE GENERAL THEORY OF SOCIETY 2

1. THE THEORY OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION 3

2. SOCIAL SCIENCE AND HISTORIOGRAPHY 15

Basic bibliography 23

IntroductionTHE LESSON OF THE CLASSICS: THE GENERAL THEORY OF SOCIETY

Jürgen Habermas has devoted more than thirty years of his studies to socialscience, in order to define, through the reconstruction of its traditions of thought, a“theorical framework” which serves as orientation for “programs of historical-socialprograms”.

As well as the classics of the sociological thought, he has faced the “problems ofsociety as a whole”, explaining the “propositions”, “methods” and “aims” asindispensable pre-requisites for a research which widens the disciplinary borders ofthe philosophical reflection on one side, and of the historical research on the otherside. Within the long itinerary of his formation, this program represents a sort ofmain thread in the analysis of “cultural systems”, “social systems”, “personalitysystems” and, above all, in the “theory of the social evolution”, from thereconstruction of the necessary conditions for the anthropological genesis of thesocio-cultural living forms – the “hominization” – until the examination of the logicand dynamics of the development of the “social formations”, that Habermassubdivides in primitive, traditional, modern and contemporary formations.Considering these as the cognitive basis, it is unavoidable to question whetherHabermas really achieves, in his itineraries through the “history of ideas”, thelogical coherence and the depth of research which are necessary to “systematize”the researches in social science into a unitary theorical framework.

Within the general reconstruction of Habermas’ work, the present paper focuseson the propositions of the explicative model of the theory of social evolution and onthe particular relationships between sociology and historiography. But primarily,we also have to point out more precisely the object of interest of his writings,considering that, according to Habermas, the debates within the social science dealwith the cognitive statute, but first of all with the “objectual sphere” and at leastthey concern the choice of methodologies and techniques of research in order toapproach data, describe them, advance hypotheses, develop analyses and controltheir results in relation to the scientific community. In his opinion, the “objectualsphere” is then at the highest level of abstraction: namely a theory of society whichreconstructs the “constitutive components” of the social formations and the“processes-mechanisms” of their “reproduction”, namely “statics” and dynamics ofthe social phenomena.

The reference to the constitutive aspects of society is confirmed in the Interviewwith Hans Peter Krüger (1989). Habermas replies to the request of outlining ageographical map of his theory and affirms: «Every theory of society must haveambition to explain how a society works, and through what it is reproduced»1. Inthis way, he goes back to the research about the classics in the sociological thoughtthat - starting from A. Comte, H. Spencer and K. Marx until P. Sorokin and T.Parsons, through F. Tönnies, E. Durkheim, M. Weber – has maintained the idea ofbuilding models in order to describe the structural elements of social formationsand the logics of development of human evolution, re-organizing the material ofhistorical researches from a synchronic (or structural) and a diachronic (or genetic)

1 J. Habermas, it. transl. Intervista con Hans Peter Krüger, in Id., NR, cit., p. 90.

point of view. The reference to the classics brings about the attention to the logicsof research and to the interdisciplinary horizon opened by their perspective onsocial phenomena, in opposition to the reductionistic attempts to bring back socialscience to specialist spheres, such as economic sciences for production, exchangeand use of wealth, political science for constitution and maintaining processes,crises of power and public opinion, sociology for social integration and anomiccrisis in groups and institutions, psychology for the “individuation” and“socialization” of generations, cultural science for the genesis and the transmissionof the canonical forms of knowledge and for heresies.

Habermas faces the definition of “conceptual framework” of the “theory ofsociety”, starting from the reflection on an “unclear relationship” between the“theory of action” and the “systemic action”. In other words, starting from thepreliminary question on how conceptual strategies are orientated, social sciencecan integrate in a “unitary model”, redefining the “theory of action” in terms of“theory of communicative action” and assuming, even if a reduced dimension, theneo-functionalist positions of the “systemic theory”2. This approach, redefined onthe model of “rational reconstructions” represents the thread of the reflectionsabout the “structures” of the lifeworld, cultural reproduction, social integration andsocialization, also considering the connections between the “structures subjected toall worlds of life” and their “symbolic reproduction” and “material reproduction”3.

1. THE THEORY OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION

The processes of social reproduction had been reconstructed in a specialist wayby E. Husserl’s phenomenology and Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics,referring to the actualization of cultural traditions, Mead’s symbolic interactionismand Weber’s comprehensive sociology with respect to the coordination of socialactions, and at least S. Freud’s psychoanalysis and J. Piaget’s, L. Kolberg’s, and R.Selman’s cognitive psychology, the social psychology in relation to the processes ofsocialization. Without omitting the original contributions given by A. Schütz’, T.Lückmann’s and P. Berger’s social phenomenology, A. Cicourel’s ethno-methodology and I. Goffman’s dramaturgy4. The “theory of communicative acting”aims at making a synthesis of all these different traditions. The “structures of thelifeworld” regenerate in the processes of cultural reproduction, social integrationand socialization, but social systems also have to produce material resources, rulethe internal functioning and control the environment and its boundaries; Marxdefined this process as “metabolism between society and nature”5. Through the

2 J. Habermas, it. transl. Seconda considerazione intermedia: sistema e mondo vitale, in Id., TKH, cit., p.697.

3 J. Habermas, it. transl. Seconda considerazione intermedia: sistema e mondo vitale, in Id., TKH, cit., p.739.

4 J. Habermas, it. transl. Scienze sociale ricostruttive e scienze sociali comprendenti, in Id., MB, cit., pp. 29-30.

5 J. Habermas, it. transl. Azioni, atti linguistici, interazioni mediate linguisticamente e mondo vitale, in Id.,Il pensiero post-metafisico (NMD), Bari-Roma, Laterza, 1991, p. 102.

concept of society on “two levels”, Habermas goes back to T. Parsons’6 and N.Luhmann’s7 works.

In the propositions of the social evolution, he specifies the integration of both“explicative models” in the analysis of the “systemic crises” of social formationsprovoked by “environmental challenges” and/or “internal contradictions” whichfall upon the reproduction of the structures of the lifeworld and whose resolutionrequires “innovative answers”8. As we shall mention, Habermas connects the«functionalist analysis of changes in structure and function, clarifying geneticquestions»9. The theory of social systems worked out by “neo-functionalism” is notable to explain, within the process of “functional differentiation” whichcharacterizes social evolution, the genesis of “organization principles” which solveout the systemic challenges, because it precludes the reconstruction of “learningprocess” arising from the lifeworld. This problem had already been raised by the“old master of functionalism”, S. N. Eisenstadt10.

The connection between the “theory of action” – Habermas’ approach to indicatethe reconstructions of “formal pragmatics” in the sphere of social theory – and the“theory of systems” represents “the most important problem for a theoreticalconstruction of social components in the theories of cultural reproduction, of socialinteraction and socialization11. A “conceptual and not banal connection” betweenboth paradigms is, above all, at the bottom of the study on social changing12.Indeed, even if the problem that dominates the researches is the reconstruction ofstructures and changing of the lifeworld, he considers that this study “receives itsright place online within a history of the system”, only accessible for afunctionalistic analysis»13.

In the perspective of the comparison with the systemic theory, he interpretsMarx.

During the Seventies, Habermas tried to make coincide the research programabout social evolution with a “reconstruction of historical materialism”14,

6 J. Habermas, Talcott Parsons – Konstruktionsprobleme der Theoriekonstruktion, in J. Matthes,Lebenswelt und soziale Probleme. Frankfurt a.M. – New York, Campus, pp. 28-48; Id., it. transl. TalcottParsons: problemi di costruzione della teoria della società, in Id., TKH, cit., pp. 811-950.

7 J. Habermas, it. transl. Teoria della società o tecnologia sociale?, in Id., Teoria della società o tecnologiasociale (TGS), Etas Kompass Libri, Milano 1973, pp. 95-195; Id., it. transl. Un concetto sociologico di crisi, inId., La crisi di razionalità nel capitalismo maturo (LPS), Bari, Laterza, 1975, pp. 5-9; Id., it. transl. Confrontodi teorie in sociologia, in Id., LSW2, cit., pp. 359-360; Id., J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id.,Per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico (ZRHM), Milano, Etas Libri, 1979, pp. 154-157, 175-179; Id., it.transl.Excursus sulla appropriazione dell’eredità della filosofia del soggetto da parte della teoria dei sistemidi Luhmann, in Id., Il discorso filosofico della modernità. Dodici lezioni (PDM), Bari-Roma, Laterza, 1987, pp.366-383; Id., it. transl.Sulla logica dei problemi di legittimazione, in Id., LPS, cit., pp. 105-123, 141-157; Id.,Diritto e morale. Lezione seconda. L’idea dello Stato di diritto, in Id., Morale, diritto, politica (MDP), Torino,Einaudi, 1986, pp. 45-78, Id., it. transl. Sociologie del diritto e filosofie della giustizia, in Id., Fatti e norme.Contributi a una teoria discorsiva del diritto e della democrazia (FG), Milano, Guerini e Associati, 1996, pp.61-67.

8 J. Habermas, it. transl. Un concetto sociologico di crisi, in Id., LPS, cit., p. 7.9 J. Habermas, it. transl. Per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 182.10 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 186.11 J. Habermas, it. transl. Talcott Parsons: problemi di costruzione della teoria della società, in TKH, cit, p.

813.12 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed evoluzione, in ZRHM, cit., p. 183.13 J. Habermas, it. transl. Il mutamento di paradigma in Mead e Durkheim, in TKH, cit, p. 696.14 J. Habermas, it. transl. Tesi per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., Dialettica della

Razionalizzazione (DR2), Milano, Unicopli, 19942, p. 151.

addressing more attention to the results of the sciences consigned to the “oblivionof middle-class knowledge”15. During the Fifties, he had already taken into accountthe heritage of “history of philosophy” of occidental Marxism of the SecondInternational and the Soviet canon, the Diamat, according to the news studiesopened with the discover of the “young Marx”16. On the other hand, in the essayscontained in For reconstruction of Historical Materialism (1976), Habermas“takes seriously” Marx’ and Engels’ “theoretic attempt”, defining the first “thesis” ofhis research program: «Thesis I: Historical materialism should not be consideredas a heuristics, neither as history, neither as an objective of history, neither as anobjectivistic theory of history, neither as a retrospective glance at an analysis ofcapitalism done more than a hundred years ago, but as an alternative solution totake into account in relation to the statement nowadays dominating about a theoryof social evolution»17. This “reconstruction” leads Habermas to re-define thepropositions of historical materialism relating to the “concept of social work”, the“theorem structure/superstructure”, the “dialectics between productive forces andreproduction relationships” and the “definition of social formation”.

In his Theory of communicative acting (1981), Habermas repeatsargumentations that he had already exposed in his collection of writings For thereconstruction of historical materialism (1976), without qualifying the “theory ofdevelopment” with the expression “formulated materialistically”. Now he taksabout a “partial overlapping” among “parallel theorical strategies”18. In each case,the attempt – considering the meaning of the word “reconstruction” in Habermas’proceedings, was then criticized in English-speaking and Latin countries, even ifhis studies founded their collocation in a continuity with the “critical theory”, inparticular with the “problem of modernity” in M. Weber’s interpretation of Hegel-Marxism.

It is meaningful that Weber’s consideration towards Habermas’ Theory, then atthe end of ten-year researches carried out at Max Planck Institut in Starnberg, doesnot find a confirmation in previous writings. Only at the end of the Seventies,Habermas presents, in classical sociology, Erfurt sociologist’s works as “the mostimportant attempt” to formulate a model of stages of development of the socio-cultural evolution intended as a “logically reconstructed process”. Thisdisplacement can be explain through the fact that exactly in those years the studiesof S. Kalberg, W. Schluchter, F. H. Tenbruck, R. N. Bellah e R. Döbert, K. Eder andothers were published. Here the dominating perspective of the philosophicaldebates in the Twenties about Weber’s Sociology of Religion goes back toinvestigate the “theory of rationalization”, after being shelved for long time by adeeper investigation in Economy and society19.

15 J. Habermas, it. transl. Dialettica della razionalizzazione, in DR2, cit., p. 224.16 J. Habermas, Marx in Perspektiven, in «Merkur», IX, 1955, pp. 1180-1183; Id., it. transl. Sulla discussione

filosofica intorno a Marx e al marxismo, in, DR2, cit., pp. 23-107; it. transl. Tra filosofia e scienza: ilmarxismo come critica, in Id., Prassi politica e teoria critica della società (TP), Bologna, Il Mulino, 1973, pp.301-366; Metacritica di Marx a Hegel: la sintesi mediante il lavoro sociale, in Id., Conoscenza e interesse(EI2), Roma-Bari, Laterza, 19832, pp. 27-45.

17 J. Habermas, it. transl.Tesi per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., DR2, cit., pp. 152.18 J. Habermas, it. transl.Sistema e mondo vitale, in TKH, cit, p. 769.19 J. Habermas, it. transl.La teoria della razionalizzazione di Max Weber, in Id., TKH, cit., pp. 229-230, 289-

291.

If Marx’ interpretation is influenced by Habermas’ critics to neo-funcionalismand the comparison with the “production paradigm” of “philosophy of praxis”20,the new interpretation of Weber’s analysis of “occidental rationalization” must bere-conducted to the model of reconstructive science employed by psychology toexplain the ontogenetic development. He presented the idea of an “homology”,relatively tight between filogenesis and ontogenesis21, which could find aconfirmation in Mead’s inter-actionism, in the Ego-psychoanalysis and psychologyand above all in genetic structuralism by Piaget, Kohlberg, Selman, Flavell andothers – a group of studies which represents the last of four “traditions of thought”,from which Habermas draws “enduring conceptual themes”, next to Parson’s andLuhmann’s systemic neo-functionalist theory, the “historical materialism” of “layversions” which avoid fideisms of scientism and philosophy of history andWeberian sociology in the “more carefully universalistic” interpretation suggestedin the Seventies. The concepts and hypotheses of the psychology of developmentrepresent, indeed, a “model” for the redefinition of social science from a“reconstructive perspective”.

In his anthropological reflections, Habermas maintains that social science mustprepare a theoretical frame which permits not only to reconstruct the “socio-cultural evolutional mechanisms”, but also to define properly what is meant withthe expression “principle” in the “history of genre”22 – a proposition that ourauthor finds confirmed in Parson’s Systems of societies (1966)23.

We must anticipate that, following Lévy-Strauss’ and many otheranthropologists’ studies, Habermas finds that the “gap between man and otheranimal species” must be found in the “familiarization of man” – “the evolutiveinnovation” which makes the “genesis of the social primitive formation” possible,around the “parental structures”. If on a “sub-human level”, the “biologicalreproduction” represents a “conditional center” of the genesis of the “nexus ofsolidarity” among the members of a species, as E. Durkheim24 and S. Freud25

supposed, “the unity of relationship” is the factor for the diffusion of “socialsolidarity”. Family skips the “hierarchical one-dimensional order”, according towhich every animal is assigned transitively only one status, allowing the “maleadult member” of the group to connect, assuming the “paternal role” (the“structural family unit”), the status within the “system of women and children” ofthe reproduction of social ties to the status in the “male system of economy basedon hunting and war”26.

Habermas presents this anthropological hypothesis as the “Second Thesis for thereconstruction of historical materialism”: «The specifically human living way canbe sufficiently characterized if hunting economy in the organization conditions ofthe family is taken into account. Production and socialization as equally importantfor human genre. The family structure of society which reigns as the appropriation

20 J. Habermas, it. transl. Excursus sull’obsolescenza del paradigma della produzione, in Id., PDM, cit., pp.77-85.

21 J. Habermas, it. transl. Introduzione: il materialismo storico e lo sviluppo di …, in Id., ZRHM, p. 12.22 J. Habermas, it. transl. Introduzione: approcci alla problematica della razionalità, in Id., TKH, cit., p.

224.23 J. Habermas, it. transl. Sviluppo della morale e identità dell’io, in Id., ZRHM, cit., pp. 142-143.24 J. Habermas, it. transl. Il mutamento di paradigma in Mead e Durkheim, in Id., TKH, p. 604.25 J. Habermas, it. transl. Psicoanalisi e teoria della società. Nietzsche e la … in Id., EI2, cit., pp. 271-272.26 J. Habermas, it. transl. Tesi per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., DR2, cit., pp. 153-154.

of external natural as the integration of internal nature is fundamental27. Habermasdoes not specify any possible “external” or “sociological conditions” which, in thesocio-cognitive process of co-generation of the “social world” and “subjectiveworld”, determined the passage from the “biological entity of family” to “parentalstructures”. He is interested in the necessary assumptions – the “logic ofdevelopment” – so that the “abstracted cognitive competences”, the “rules of socialacting” and “subjective identity” (necessary conditions for the reproduction of“every” social formation) arise from the interactions based on an “instinctualground” and “symbolically mediated” of groups of hominids. Habermas followsMead’s and Durckheim’s28 perspective about the transformation of the linguisticmedium in its relationships with the cognition and interaction structures. Indeed,the new cognitive and relational competences allow, through “communicative acts”,the production of a “knowledge culturally accumulated” (cultural transmission),the satisfaction of “generalized expectations of behaviour”, conveniently to thecontext (social integration) and the constitution of steady “personality structures”(socialization). The critical literature neglects the fact that the theory ofcommunicative acting is not a moral doctrine, but a reconstruction of theontogenesis and filogenesis of competences29.

Once reconstructed the necessary conditions to the constitution of humansocieties, Habermas works out a “rational model” which comprehends both“evolutional challenges” and the “logics of development of the possible innovativesolution”. As we have already explained before, integrating the “systemic theory”and the “action theory”, he presumes that the “social evolution” follows a “doubledifferentiation” which produces, on the one side, the “differentiation” betweenlifeworld and the social sub-systems”, and, on the other side, the formation of “twodifferent logics of development” – the “growth of complexity of social systems” andthe “rationalization of the lifeworld”: “I understand social evolution as a secondgrade differentiation process: system and lifeworld differ from one another, as thefirst’s complexity and the second’s rationality grow more and more, not onlyrespectively as system and as lifeworld – at the same time they get different fromone another»30.

Within the “theory of social evolution”, Habermas assumes some hypotheses of“theory of systems” – following Marx, Spencer, Durkheim, Parsors and at leastLuhmann. The beginning of the functionalistic analysis deals with the “adaptiveproblems” that a social system must solve within the sphere of “materialreproduction”, where some “evolutive challenges” arise which generate “impulses”to “differentiation”. The “evolutive logic” can be described, above all, as a “growthof social complexity”31. Habermas remembers that since Durkheim’s Division ofLabour (1893), functionalism has focused on the concept of differentiation, whoseexplicative importance is not to be re-conducted to mere socio-economical criteria.This differentiation is, above all, a segmented and/or functional differentiation ofsocial structures to which forms of “social integration” in relationship to the type of“social solidarity” (mechanical/organic) and different forms of “personal identities”

27 J. Habermas, it. transl. Tesi per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in DR2, cit., p. 154.28 J. Habermas, it. transl. Il mutamento di paradigma in Mead e Durkheim, in Id., TKH, cit, pp. 548-669.29 J. Habermas, it. transl. Coscienza morale e agire comunicativo, in Id., MB, cit., pp. 123-204.30 J. Habermas, it. transl. Sistema e mondo vitale, in Id., TKH, cit., p. 749.31 J. Habermas, it. transl. Sistema e mondo vitale, in Id., TKH, cit, p. 769.

(collective/individual) are correlated. What is here interesting is the centralitydedicated to “labour” – as development engine in the material reproduction ofgenre – which characterizes the evolutive theory since Marx’ praxis philosophyuntil Spencer’s organicism32 and contemporary functionalism33. In this traditionthe possibility in favour of the analysis of the “capacities of direction and control”of systems consists of re-elaborating the “internal complexity” towardsenvironmental challenges with the differentiation and re-unification of partialsystems functionally specified34.

In this reconstruction it results that from a first evolutive level – “primitivesocieties” – where only the “repetition of similar and homogeneous segments” ispresent – familiar structures – following the social development, “a system ofdifferent organs, each of them having got a specific task”, has generated, and theseorgans are “built up themselves by different parts”, which are “reciprocallycoordinated and subordinated around the same central organ” – the State – which“depends on them” and “exerts a moderating action on the rest of the organism”35.If, passing from primitive societies to “traditional societies”, a different relationshipamong the structures of material reproduction – “segmented” vs. “functional” –emerges, “modern societies” must face a differentiation between no more“centralized” but “decentralized” social structures, which find their balance point inthe “complementary relationship between the ‘State administration’, regulated andlegitimated by a rational-legal power and the capitalistic trade economy”36.

In this introduction it is not possible to sum up the “scheme” about themechanisms of systemic differentiation and the medium of regulation, nor toexplain in detail the long reflections about the single social formations:

SOCIAL FORMATIONSDIFFERENTIATION AND

INTEGRATION OFSYSTEMIC MECHANISMS

Equalitarian Similar unities. Not economic exchangePrimitivesocieties

Stratified Structural differentiation Not political power

Traditional societies Not similar unities. Political power

Modern societies Functional differentiationEconomic exchange andpolitical power

Tab. 1. Mechanisms of systemic differentiation

Habermas joins the theorical convention, common in the sociology of changing,of distinguishing between primitive equalitary and stratified societies, traditionaland modern societies based on mechanisms which raise the levels of possible

32 J. Habermas, it. transl. Sistema e mondo vitale, in Id., TKH, cit, pp. 698-699.33 J. Habermas, it. transl. Per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 147.34 J. Habermas, it. transl. Confronto di teorie in sociologia, in Id., LSW2, cit., pp. 347-350.35 J. Habermas, it. transl. Introduzione: approcci alla problematica della razionalità, in Id., TKH, cit., p.

192.36 J. Habermas, it. transl. Sistema e mondo vitale, in Id., TKH, cit, pp. 766-767.

increases of complexity37. On the other side, the “criteria of systemicdifferentiation” applied also by Habermas in the reconstruction of the theory ofsocial evolution does not suits, as from a funcionalistic point a view, it must bemade a distinction between “grades of complexity”, but not between “evolutivelevels”38. Functionalism is able to describe the process of functional differentiationwhich determines the formation of new social structures, but cannot explain thegenesis mechanism – has no value of explanatio39. Besides, the differentiationprocesses can be “clues” of an evolutive process, but also “causes” of a “movementin evolutive directions without escape”40. The complexity can be explained onlyexamining the mechanisms of learning which develop within the principle of socialorganization and those which, face the environmental challenges or internalinsoluble contraddiction allow innovative answers41.

Habermas faces “genetic questions” bringing up the limitations between “old”and “new” sociological functionalism, introducing a comparison between biologicaland social evolution, and indicating the conditions which make possible toinvestigate. Here it suffices to underline that the restoration of the evolutionism insocial science is due to contemporary biology, whose model of organic changingdoes not explain exhaustively the logic of development of human beings: «Asociologist who makes coincide the social development with the growth ofcomplexity, acts as a biologist who describes the natural evolution of species in theconcepts of morphological differentiation. An explanation of evolution must goesback to the inventories of behaviour of species and mutation mechanisms.Similarly, we should distinguish, on a level of social evolution, between the solutionto control problems and the mechanisms of learning»42. Besides, biologists explain“the learning of species” through the process of “genetic mutation” – a sort ofmistake in the transmission of genetic information which creates the “deviantphenotypes”, which are selected under the selective spur of the environment,making the stabilizing of a population in the new environmental conditionspossible43. As it is impossible to transpose such model to social changing, a“mechanism of equivalent variation” must be pointed out: the processes of culturallearning.

Three aspects space out the genetic mutation in the human sub-species fromlearning on a cultural level: a) the evolutive learning process completes not onlythrough the changing of genetic patrimony, but also through the changing of apotential of knowledge; b) on this level the distinction between phenotype andgenotype loses any meaning. The inter-subjectively shared and transmittedknowledge is a constitutive part of the social system and is not owned by isolatedpeople; c) who, indeed, constitute themselves as people just by means ofsocialization. Natural evolution brings among the member of the species a more or

37 J. Habermas, it. transl. Sistema e mondo vitale, in Id., TKH, cit., pp. 749-750.38 J. Habermas, it. transl. Per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., ZRHM, cit., pp. 146-147.39 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit., pp. 179-180.40 J. Habermas, it. transl. Confronto di teorie in sociologia, in Id., LSW2, cit., p. 350.41 J. Habermas, it. transl. Per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 147.42 J. Habermas, it. transl. Confronto di teorie in sociologia, in Id., LSW2, cit., p. 350.43 J. Habermas, it. transl.Per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., ZRHM, p. 143.

less homogeneous repertoire of behaviours, while social learning provokes anaccelerated diversification of behaviour»44.

Only reconstructing learning mechanisms and processes, we can explain whysome societies – even few of them – have been able to find solutions to problems ofdirection and control and why they have developed exactly those solutions, whichhave made possible a functional differentiation and a new balance in organizationalstructures. Then a distinction must be made between a “whole of (equivalent)solutions” of a “systemic locatable problem”, on the one hand, which must beinvestigated in functionalistic terms, and the “learning processes” on the otherhand, which can explain why some systems widen their capability of problemsolving and others fail face the same problems45.

When learning problems are investigated, it must be clear which forms ofknowledge are relevant for the evolution and what is the learning subject.

On the cultural level, the lifeworld represents a “handed down” and“linguistically organized reserve” of “interpretative”, “valutative” and “expressive”models, through which experiences are “pragmatically organized” in learningschemes and “semantically formulated” in “inter-subjectively common notions”and in “daily communications and specialist discourses”46. The concept of cultureoffered by Habermas, that we cannot examine in this work, has the merit ofilluminating “implicit knowledge”, behind “processes of comprehension andagreement”, showing how the “background of linguistic knowledge and commonsense” takes shape, and how a “cultural tradition of experts” lies over, retroactingand elaborating “visions of the world” (mythology, theology and metaphysics) and“forms of specialist knowledge” (science and techniques, moral and law, aestheticsand arts).

Facing “systemic challenges”, which get into crisis the adaptive and integrativefunctions of society, the available forms of knowledge are the “potentials ofsolution” which allow to “imagine and carry out” new principles of socialorganization. On one side, integrative functions of comprehension, legitimation,socialization in “symbolic reproduction – Habermas expresses this sphere with theconcept of lifeworld; on the other side, adaptive functions of innovation, directionand control of complexity in the “material reproduction” – Habermas summarizesthis sphere by the use of the concept “social system”. Every innovation rises from a“new level of learning”.

At this point, Habermas redefines Marx’ “dialectics between productive forcesand production relationships”, questioning that the process of social evolutionmust be intended in a “technical sense”, as if technical-scientific knowledge was abound between both “productive forces” and “forms of social integration”: «Thefundamental assumption of historical materialism, that the growth of productiveforces (and relative increase of productivity of social work) represents the learningmechanism, which helps us to explain the passing to new social formations, is notmaintainable empirically»47. The growth of cognitive potential and its conversioninto technologies which develop the material reproduction can explain the birth of

44 J. Habermas, it. transl. Per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., ZRHM, p. 144.45 J. Habermas, it. transl. Confronto di teorie in sociologia, in Id., LWS2, cit., p. 352.46 J. Habermas, it. transl. Sistema e Mondo vitale, in Id., TKH, cit., p. 712.47 J. Habermas, it. transl. Confronto di teorie in sociologia, in Id., LWS2, cit., p. 357.

certain systemic problems, but it cannot be explained how this arisen problems canbe solved. The introduction of new forms of social integration, i.e. the substitutionof the relational system with the state of passing from the primitive society totraditional societies, does not require a technologically valuable knowledge, whichcan be actuated according to the rules of instrumental knowledge (a widening ofcontrol on the external nature), but the widening of the practical-moral knowledge,that can embody new interaction structures48. Only in this sense, according toHabermas, it can be defended the principle that a social system doesn’t end andnew production relationships does not take over before the material conditions fortheir existence take shape within the old society.

The dialectics between systemic challenge and forms of knowledge isreformulated as the 4th Thesis for reconstruction of historical materialism: «Whensystemic problems arise and they cannot be solved through the method of thedominating production anymore, the existing form for social integration is indanger. An endogenous mechanism of learning foresees the accumulation of acognitive-technical potential, that can be used to solve problems which generatesuch crisis. But this knowledge can be given form in order to allow the deploymentof productive forces only if the evolutional step towards an institutional frameworkand a new form of social integration has been made. This step can only beexplained on the basis of different learning processes, the pratical-moral ones»49.

It is interesting that Habermas neglects here the “aesthetical- expressiveknowledge”, that knowledge which raises the problem of “authentic interpretationof needs” on the side of individuals in “existential discourses” and “aestheticalcritic”. On the other side, in the Theory of Communicative Action, he supports thatthe “selectivity” of modern societies towards the “complex of aesthetical-practicalrationality” is due to the “scarce effect” of art in the “formation of socialstructures”50.

As far as the imputed subject, Habermas affirms that learning neither can beascribed only to “individuals” nor to “society”. If it is true that individuals learn –the “learning mechanisms fall within the exclusive prerogatives of the humanorganism” – they acquire the competences within the symbolic relationships ofsocial groups and cultural traditions. Furthermore, he affirms that the learningprocesses which find their access to the interpretation system of cultural traditionreproduce themselves through the mediation of “social movements” or in“exemplary processes”51. Knowledge acquired “in a first time” by individuals ormarginal groups is then shared at a “collective level” and changes into a reserve ofknowledge, a cognitive potential of adaptation or integration, which is sociallyusable52.

Introducing the “nexus between ideas and interests”, he shows the “limits ofcomprehending sociology” and of the “culturalistic concept of the lifeworld” and herestores – “materialistically” – the study of the functions of culture within thesocial theory. Habermas is convinced that all societies based on classes with apolitical or economic ground are featured by the problem of “legitimation” or

48 J. Habermas, it. transl. Tesi per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., DR2, cit., pp. 156-157.49 J. Habermas, it. transl. Tesi per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., DR2, cit., pp. 157-158.50 J. Habermas, it. transl. La teoria della razionalizzazione di Max Weber, in Id., TKH, cit., p. 341.51 J. Habermas, it. transl. La teoria della razionalizzazione di Max Weber, in Id., TKH, cit., p. 259.52 J. Habermas, it. transl. Confronto di teorie in sociologia, in Id., LSW2, cit., p. 350.

“critics” exercised by culture, and, in particular, of the relationship between thereproduction of cultural knowledge and control strategies exercised by “power” and“money”. Cultural traditions are not only the expression of ideas, values and needsof social groups they are created by, elaborated and transmitted in the sequence ofgenerations. They also meet the need of cultural legitimation of the “materialinterests” of a group – rank or class – in relation to the interests of other groups,assuring the “non-problematical reproduction” of social formations whichinstitutionalize the differentiated participation to political power, the unequaldistribution of economical wealth, the selective acknowledgement of social prestigeand dignity of cultural identities. In such a context of analysis, Habermas’reflections about the strategy of “manipulation of consense” and about theformation of “ideological conceptions of the world” have to find their collocation.

In the definition of the “concept of social formation”, he reconfirms that the“deployment of productive forces” is important, but it is not the main dimension ofa theory of social evolution which intends to periodize the development. If we wantto find a definition, the Marxist tradition’s solution of identifying the socialformation starting from the “way of production” wouldn’t be adequate53.

Habermas prefers, indeed, to connote the social formation on the basis of “veryabstract regulamentations” that he defines “principles of organization”, whose“institutional nucleus” builds up the engine of “material” and “symbolicalreproduction”54. He summarizes the concept of “principle of organization”: «Withthis term I intend those innovations which are produced by steps of learning whichcan be reconstructed according to an evolutional logics and establish a level oflearning always new of society. […] they are structural models ordered according toan evolutional logic, which denote new structural conditions of possible learningprocesses. The principle of organization of a society circumscribes spheres ofvariation, and in particular it establishes within what structures possible changes ofthe system of institutions and interpretations are possible; to what extent thecapabilities existing in the productive forces can be socially used, and to whatextent such productive forces can be stimulated; and then how much the activity ofcontrol, and so the systemic complexity of a society can be powered55».

This revisionistic perspective – expressed in other works in an identical way56 –is the first part of the Vth Thesis for the reconstruction of historical materialism:«A social formation is not to be defined through a determined way of production(or even through the particular economic structure of a society), but thorugh aprinciple of organization. Every principle of organization establishes a a level oflearning, i.e. the structural conditions of the possibility of learning technical-cognitive and practical-moral processes»57.

The “process of rationalization” does not only concern the “progress ofproductive forces” in the solution of “technical tasks” and in the “choice ofstrategies”, but also the “moral conceptions” of cultural traditions and “moralconsciences” of the individuals which are institutionalized in structural nucleus ofsocial integration.

53 J. Habermas, it. transl. Per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., ZRHM, cit., pp. 122-126.54 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit., pp. 183-184.55 J. Habermas, it. transl. Tesi per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., DR2, cit., pp. 158-159.56 J. Habermas, it. transl. Confronto di teorie in sociologia, in Id., LWS2, cit., p. 353.57 J. Habermas, it. transl. Tesi per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., DR2, cit., pp. 157-158.

Habermas declares to follow Max Weber’s studies, where the “process ofrationalization” can be intended as a “historical-universal process” which proceedson two levels: the “cultural level” of the “differentiation of new forms of knowledge”(and of “levels of learning”) and the “social level” of the “translation of culturalknowledge” into a “process of modernization” which institutionalizes” “conducts ofpersonal life” and “forms of associated forms of life” (the vital dispositions andsocial subsystems): «This theory is based on the assumption that the processes ofonthogenetical learning anticipate the push of social evolution in some way, so thatsocial systems can, as soon as their structurally limited control capability gets over-stimulated by non-avoidable problems, they can, in some cases, resort tosuperabundant capabilities of individual learning, available also collectivelythrough images of the world, and then use them for the institutionalization of newlevels of learning»58.

Once the sociological model focuses on the abstract concept as the “principles oforganization”, the “theorem structure-superstructure” is no more intended in a“reductionistic” sense. Habermas affirms indeed that at each evolutional stage, therelationships of production “crystallize” around a different” institutional nucleus”,defining specific forms of social integration. The function of regulating the access toproduction means and then the distribution of social wealth is assumed by parentalsystems in primitive societies and by State institutions in the great ancientcivilizations59. Only with capitalistic-liberal societies, economy becomes a centralelement of the entire society as the “capital” acquires the function, through themedium of private law, of defining the class relationships, and not only thefunction of “internal regulation” within the market. Also in this case «the basicassimilation to economic structure is misleading, because not even in capitalisticsocieties the basic sphere coincides with the economic system»60.

Habermas marks out a reasonable series of social formations, each of them isfeatured by a different principle of organization made possible by theinstitutionalization of higher levels of technical and practical learning, whichpresent a own “logic of irreversible and necessary development” – higher andhigher structural stages of development – while their “development dynamics” –the historical way of achieving such stages – remain “contingent” and“conditioned” according to the different events of the social systems.

SOCIAL FORMATIONS PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION

1. Primitive societies EqualitarianStratified

Parental structure

Ancient reigns2. Traditional societies Great empires

Feudalism

State organization

Mercantilism3. Modern societies Liberal capitalism

Organized capitalism

Complementary relationshipState/Market

Table 2. Development of the organization principles of social formations

58 J. Habermas, it. transl.Confronto di teorie in sociologia, in Id., LWS2, cit., p. 352.59 J. Habermas, it. transl. Tesi per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., DR2, cit., p. 155.60 J. Habermas, it. transl. Sistema e mondo vitale, in Id., TKH, cit, p. 769.

Habermas summarizes the reflections about “waves of evolution” of “socialdevelopment” as the IIIrd Thesis for the reconstruction of historical materialism:“The different ways of production joined in a complex build up the economicalstructure of a society. This society crystallizes each time around an institutionalnucleus (family relationships, state, market, etc.) and fixes the form of socialintegration. The theorem structure-superstructure must explain the waves ofsocial evolution. This affirms that a) the systemic problems which, in determinedcircumstances require evolutional innovations, appear in the basic sphere of societyand can be analyzed as disturbs of social reproduction; and that b) an evolutionalinnovation to which it is given raise always consists of a modification of theeconomical structure and of the relative form of social integration61. In this “criticalphase” of trespassing to a new level the “theorem of the superstructure” is valid,according to which productive forces and production relationships acquire adirection role and constitute the basis which determine the whole society62.

The problem deals with the nexus between the increase of systemic complexityof societies in relation to the problems of material reproduction and the adequacyof rationalization processes in the socialization of the new generations, in thecoordination of social institutions and the formation of cultural traditions. Whensystemic problems arise in a society, and these problems “transcend” thecapabilities of integration of the organization principle in force (familiar, politicalor economical), the social system must develop new production relationships inorder to solve out the difficulties of reproduction in an evolutionally effective way,and these relationships imply the recourse to a practical-moral knowledge,endowed with a own logic of development, and previously accumulated (althoughsocially still unused). Its institutionalization makes possible and furthers thedevelopment of a new technical-organizative knowledge, and also a widening ofproductive forces and the complex system-environment. Only with learningprocesses we can explain why some social systems develop in an evolutional sense,finding solutions to the problems of regulation and control, while others fail facethese challenges63. These reflections can be found in the second part of the VthThesis for the reconstruction of historical materialism: “In the explanation of thetrespassing from a social formation to another (for example, the origin of the Stateor capitalism) we must: a) go back to systemic problems which transcend thecapability of control of the ancient social formation, and b) resort to an evolutionallearning process which generates the new principle of organization. A society canlearn, evolving, as it allows to solve out systemic problems face which the availablecapability of control fails, maximizing and using institutionally the capabilities ofindividual learning in excess. The first step here consists of establishing a new formof integration, which then permits to potentiate the productive forces and to widenthe complexity of the system»64.

61 J. Habermas, it. transl. Tesi per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., DR2, cit., p. 156.62 J. Habermas, it. transl. Per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 118.63 J. Habermas, it. transl. Confronto di teorie in sociologia, in Id., LSW2, cit., p. 350.64 J. Habermas, it. transl. Tesi per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., DR2, cit., pp. 157-158.

2. SOCIAL SCIENCE AND HISTORIOGRAPHY

The debated theme of the relationship between social science andhistoriographical studies has been object of Habermas’ reflection since the middleof the Sixties, as different passages taken from On the Logic of the Social Sciences(1967)65 and Knowledge and Human Interests (1969)66prove. But only since themiddle of the Seventies he has been completing the framework of relationshipsbetween “historiography” and “social science”, as the programmatical essayHistory and evolution” (1976)67 attests and the Second intermediateconsideration: System and lifeworld (1981)68 and then Actions, linguistic acts,interactions mediated linguistically and lifeworld (1988)69 precise.

Tracing the nodal points of the debate between “nomological sciences” and“ideographical sciences”, Habermas realized that the necessity of concepts andcomparative perspectives – essential aspects of today’s renewed historiography –was stronger than the rigid methodological dualism canonized by Neokantism70.The junction of both field of knowledge has been experimented with success, sothat some scientists have talked about “sociologization of history”71. The “mutualfunctionality” in human knowledge was also due to the impulse given to “comparedresearch” since the Fifties by American academical institutions – see Reports 54and 64 of the Social Science Research Council, by European institutions and byworks about “history of society” by M. Bloch, L. Febvre, F. Braudel in the Annales,by R. Bendix, P. Lepsius, C.W. Mills, H.U. Wehler, W. Cahnman and A. Boskoff, E.Schulin and F.G. Maier, O. Hintze, B. More and many other researchers that,following the trail of “Weberian studies” and “Marxist historiography”, worked outan “approach” whose results were assumed by Habermas as “partial theories” inmany passages of the “theory of social evolution”.

The German scientist underlines that this direction of research appears criticaltowards “traditional historiography”, gaining a wider space-time perspective and asensibility for phenomena that had been, until those days, completely or partiallyneglected: «history as social science moves away from the political history of Stateand capital actions, framed in a history of ideas, and leads to a social andeconomical history, where the history of cultures is also integrated»72. Habermasalso points out the “centrality of collective actors” and the “use of aggregatedquantitative indicators” in a progressive displacement of weights, without that thenarrative application of sociological instruments denies the idea of historiography.

While “sociology of history” enriches and does not damage historiography,Habermas affirms that other instruments of social science, the “rational ex-postreconstructions” of the theory of action and the “models system/environment” of

65 J. Habermas, it. transl. Il dualismo tra scienze della natura e scienze della cultura, in Id., LWS, cit., pp.31-86; Id., it. transl. La problematica della comprensione del senso …, in Id., LWS, cit., pp. 149-153, 220-253.

66 J. Habermas, it. transl. La teoria del comprendere dell’espressione di Dilthey, in Id., EI2, cit., pp. 142-162;Id., it. transl. L’autoriflessione delle scienze dello spirito, in Id., EI2, cit., pp. 163-186.

67 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit, pp. 154-183, 192-197.68 J. Habermas, it. transl. Sistema e mondo vitale, in TKH, cit., pp. 704-744.69 J. Habermas, it. transl. Azioni, atti linguistici, interazioni mediate linguisticamente …, in NMD, cit, pp.

82-97.70 J. Habermas, it. transl. Il dualismo tra scienze della natura e scienze della cultura, in Id., LWS, cit., p. 31.71 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit, pp. 154-155.72 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit, p. 165.

the systemic theory, cannot, contrarily, have full” historiograhical application”73.The reconstructions of the development logics of social formations and thenarrative representations of historical events are, indeed, two forms of knowledgewhich represent complementary but different ways of studying society and theirterms of cooperation lead the matter to explanations on historical research.

Retracing critically the epistemological discussions of the Fifties/Sixties on theTheses expressed by K. Popper, G. Hempel, E. Nagel, H. Oppenheim, Habermasfocuses first of all the problem if “historical explanations” can be “causalexplanations”. The reflections move round the extensibility of the so-calledCovering Law Model and to the critics – that he only partially shares – to“positivism” made by the “idealistic philosophy of history” (R. Collingwood and W.Dray) and by “analytical philosophy of language” (A. Danto). But generally hiswritings remain indefinite and require many efforts of interpretation74.

Habermas introduces the casual problem distinguishing the “descriptive” andthe “explicative” function in historiographical research. If descriptions are“assertions” which reproduce a particular “context of observation”, explanationsare “arguments” which deduce the genesis of past events and the prevision of thefuture ones through the nexus between the elements of the context and the lawwhich directs the production of the specific historical events75. The Covering LawModel, in its classical form, affirms that the “explanans” is composed by a series of“existential statements” about “initial” or “contextual conditions” of the beginningof phenomena and “theorical statements” about their “general laws”. The differenttypes of statements are the “premises” of the “casual explanation”: starting fromthe “general” or “universal laws” and from the “initial conditions” it is possible to“infer” a “single” statement which expresses the “conclusion” about the object of“prevision” (explanandum)76.

In the course of the epistemological reflexions, the studies about the “logics ofscience” have led the “Neopositivism” to more cautious cognitive proposals but, forHabermas, the whole debate about the theme of historical explanation versusscientific explanation would remain mortgaged by the limited conceptions of theInternational Encyclopedia of Unified Science77. For the cooperators of theEncyclopedia, as for the first Positivists-, the historical-social phenomenarepresented a research sphere in a “rear position” in relation to the natural ones,and while they cherished a hope about the development of social science, they hadgreat doubts about the same possibility in relation to a “theoretical knowledge”abut history. Habermas reminds that Popper tempered the “unity of science” withthe idea of “different functions of scientifical theories” about natural and social

73 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit., pp. 154-155.74 J. Habermas, it. transl. Il dualismo tra scienze della natura e scienze della cultura, in LWS, cit., pp. 45-52;

Id., it. transl. Comprensione del senso nelle scienze dell’azione, in Id., LWS, cit., pp. 161-221; Id., it. transl. Lalogica della ricerca di Charles S. Peirce, in Id., EI2, cit., pp. 91-112; Id., it. transl. L’autoriflessione delle scienzedella natura, in Id., EI2, cit., pp. 113-141; Id., it. transl., L’autofraintendimento scientistico dellametapsicologia, in Id., EI2, cit., pp. 255-256; Id., it. transl. lim. Discorso e verità, in Id., LWS2, cit., pp. 319-343; Id., it. transl. Charles S. Peirce sulla comunicazione, in Id., TuK, cit., p. 17-21; Id., it. transl. La teoriadella razionalizzazione di Max Weber, in Id., TKH, cit., pp. 285, 291, 295, 319.

75 J. Habermas, it. transl. Poscritto del 1973, in Id., EI2,cit., p. 317.76 J. Habermas, it. transl. Il dualismo tra scienze della natura e scienze della cultura, in Id., LWS, cit., pp.

40-41.77 J. Habermas, it. transl. Comprensione del senso nelle scienze dell’azione, in Id., LWS, cit., p. 242.

phenomena and in relation to historical studies. While “morphological sciences”are interested in researching hypotheses whose explicative content – alwaysgrowing – is fortified by results of “conditioned prognoses”, the “generalization”doesn’t fall, “in prima facie”, within the possibilities of history. With the expression“explanation sketch”, Hempel pointed out more punctually that historiansinterested in the “explanation of specific events” do not work out “complete”explanations, but “explanations in rough draft” which do not include “general laws”but imply them in an “implicit” and “pre-reflexive” way78. Nagel himself refused asharp separation between natural sciences and historical sciences, observing that ifhistorical investigation deals with what is “singular”, we must not suppose adifferent logical structure of scientific and historical explanation, for these lastsmake a wide use of “general laws”, even if “implicitely”79. Definitely, the supportersof the Covering Law Model are not interested in the fact that the “general law” areassumed as a background which is not thematized by the historical explanation,[22] not even that the “initial conditions” of events are hardly reconstructable, inconsequence of the time distance and the impossibility to re-propose them, ‘inlaboratory’. Also the history of the Logics of the scientific discovery follows theunique cognitive model: “in spite of the restrictions of their model, Popper, Hempeland Nagel firmly believe that the historian’s job, as far as it follows therequirements of investigation or not, such as the criteria of a literary exposition,ends with a casual explanation of events and circumstances, where thesussumption to general laws is valid as explanation scheme80.

From this point of view, Popper’s specification that the historical explanationonly describes “state of things” in determined space-time regions does not modifythe problem, because its control always deals with the use of initial conditions andgeneral laws. The statistical translation of E. Nagel’s model does not even changethe state of the debate. According to Nagel, apart from the logics of explanation, theincompleteness of the “necessary conditions” and the impossibility of indicating the“sufficient conditions” of events forbid a relationship of “logic deduction” betweenconditions and conclusions. What appears as “general law” of historicalexplanations cannot be a “category” statute, namely it cannot belong to theexplanations as “major conditions” in “deduction procedures”. On the other side, asHempel affirmed – if “adequate fundaments” for the explanation of theexplanandum are not available, the event can be “inferred” starting fromstatements which define the explanans, then replacing, as condition for the “law”, a“statistical-probabilistic assertion”: «E. Nagel, in agree with Hempel, focuses theattention on the fact that historical explanations do not imply the assumption oflaws at all; the condition through which we get to conclusions about the cause,usually has the form of a statistical generalization as it follows: in determinedcircumstances, we can expect a determined behavior with more or less probability.The historian must then be satisfied with probabilistic explanations»81.

Habermas affirms that re-considering the conditions of historical explanationsnot as “universal” but as “probabilistic” hides some objections raised by R.

78 J. Habermas, it. transl. Il dualismo tra scienze della natura e scienze della cultura, in Id., LWS, cit., p. 41.79 J. Habermas, it. transl. Il dualismo tra scienze della natura e scienze della cultura, in Id., LWS, cit., p. 42.80 J. Habermas, it. transl. Il dualismo tra scienze della natura e scienze della cultura, in Id., LWS, cit., p. 45.81 J. Habermas, it. transl. Il dualismo tra scienze della natura e scienze della cultura, in Id., LWS, cit., p. 42.

Collingwood and W. Dray about the possibility that historical explanations cansatisfy the condition of a sussumption to “general law”.

Unfortunately, Habermas’ reflections are fragmentary and this introduction onlyallows us to list the stages of the investigation that leads him to believe that the“empirical generalization” of historical explanations cannot be assumed as an“inference criteria” for the “formation of historical laws”.

According to some references of his writings, we can summarize the followingline of reasoning: a) the historical explanation does not permit the “completedescription” of events, because the historian can only indication the “sufficientconditions” which gives birth to a certain event in general; he can only go back to aseries of “necessary conditions” to the genesis of past events; b) the historian iswithin a margin of uncertainty, not only for the unavoidable “provincialism” inrelation to the future, but also for the “arbitrarity” of the narrative system ofreference where historical events are comprehended and explained. To this respect,Habermas confirms that every historical explanation does not represent thebeginning of a work in progress in an un-ended series, on principle, of “possibleexplanations”82; c) the narration fixes some relationships between the events of adetermined “general situation”, selecting the “possible series of necessaryconditions”, starting from a “knowledge background” without “ pretentions ofempirical validity”, but which is the object of investigation – “even if onlyglobally”83; d) the basic choices of the direction to take in the research of “necessaryconditions” and about the moment when it is reasonable to end it depend on the“historian’s judgment”, according to his expectations and the “logics of control”valid in the historiographical tradition. Habermas reminds that also Popper, tryingto keep together his solution to the “Kant’s problem” and the reflections of “post-positivism”, introduced the concept of “metaphysical programs of investigation”84.

Elsewhere, Habermas had fixed a parallel between the role of “paradigms” inscientific explanations and the role of “general interpretations” in historicalexplanations85. The “type gap” from the “particular to the universal” is notproblematic if it happens in the context of a system of reference recognized asadequate by all participants to the discussion: a community of investigatorsestablishes and works in empirical conditions and proceeds contemporarily in theresearch of consense on “meta-theoretical” problems linked to pre-scientificexperience [24] accumulated in the language of common sense. Since the Sixties,Habermas has been sharing Th. S. Kuhn’s idea that systems of reference – whichspecify the conditions of validity of argumentation of theoretic assertions can beaccepted – derive from primary experience of daily life86.

Habermas points out that the answer about the “meaning of a historical event” isstrictly predefined by the questions that the interpretation frameworks permits todevelop. The “sense of history” is not a “data it self” and the collocation of theevent A1 in the narration, namely the history which tells A1, depends on the choiceof the interpretative hypotheses. A same event will have a different meaning

82 J. Habermas, it. transl. Il dualismo tra scienze della natura e scienze della cultura, in Id., LWS, cit., p. 48.83 J. Habermas, it. transl. Il dualismo tra scienze della natura e scienze della cultura, in Id., LWS, cit., p. 49.84 J. Habermas, it. transl. Il dualismo tra scienze della natura e scienze della cultura, in Id., LWS, cit., pp.

44-45.85 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 199.86 J. Habermas, it. transl. L’autoriflessione delle scienze della natura, in Id., EI2, cit., p. 131n.

according to the decisions assumed by the historian, first of all, in relation to itsbelonging (or not) to the narrative plot and secondly according to the relationshipshe establishes between that event and groups of following events. As it is notpossible to put any pre-arranged limit to the number of different possibleperspectives, that means that every historical narration is in certain measureconventional, and its sense «depends in any case on the ermeneutical startingsituation of the narrator»87.

Habermas points out that the “continuity of history” is also a product ofnarration. Certainly, the continuity of the related events underlines on the“unifying force of existential nexus”, where events have already acquired theirmeaning for the contemporaries, before historiography arrives. On the other side, itmay not be ignored that selecting the interpretation framework, the historianchooses the beginning and the end of the story and what must be considered as a“period”, where the relevant events are conceived as elements of a “unique nexusgenerated narratively”88. The historian establishes also, as with Weber, some“relations to the value” which orient the attribution of meaning in the cognitiveresearch. There are some “normative aspects” that Habermas expresses with theconcept of “contemporarity of history” and therewith he tries to stimulate theconscience that «any application imply an unavoidable actualization of the past onthe base of expectations and concerns of the present»89.

But contrarily to H. M. Baumgartner’s critic about the historian’s “autonomousdonation of form”, Habermas believes that the historian finds a own objectualalready-built sphere, and more precisely, already narratively pre-build90. Inhistoriographical works, historians set themselves in the background of previousknowledges handed down in individual and collective memories whose “continuity”overcomes the distance between the interpreter and his/her objectual sphere91.

Habermas’ theory of social evolution represents an attempt of defining thefundamental problems of a general model of “rules for possible solutions toproblems” which indicates on the one side the “evolutive challenges”, and on theother side the “logics of development” of “innovative solutions” through whichsocial formations overcome crises or fail. So he investigates the necessaryconditions to the genesis of the “social principles of objectual organization” in“institutional complexes”, starting from cultural resources, namely the “logics ofdevelopment” of “pragmatic competences”, without which we could not evenimagine the individual conceptions, behaviours and attitudes which, spread incollective sphere, are the human capital of innovative processes. In such sense,reconstructive social science must indicate and test “universal hypotheses”92.

The atypical character of the assertions about social evolutions derives, forHabermas, firstly from the fact that, while “nomological sciences” allow to infersome “conditioned previsions” about events which happen in the future93, the

87 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 161.88 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit., pp. 159-160.89 J. Habermas, it. transl. Comprensione del senso nelle scienze dell’azione, in Id., LWS, cit., p. 238.90 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 198.94 J. Habermas, it. transl. Per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 196.91 J. Habermas, it. transl. Comprensione del senso nelle scienze dell’azione, in Id., LWS, cit., p. 232.92 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 194.93 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 160.

“rational ex-post reconstructions cannot exclude that “in the future” somestructures of conscience – different from the known ones – become accessible94. Associal theory develops a model ex-post, separating such structures by the changingprocesses of empirical substrata95, we must not suppose the “unicity of sense”, the“continuity”, the necessity or “irreversibility of the historical course”96. If the ideathat the development logics is not predefined and that “everything could have beendifferent” is valid for the past – nothing worries him more than seeing the theory ofsocial evolution confused with a philosophy of history -, in the “diagnosis of theproblems of the future”, Habermas pays attention to the “structural possibilities”which have not been yet institutionalized and, perhaps, will never be97.

Even if the “casual explanation” of history has not been explained, he writes thathistory has the task of individualizing the changes of the “outline conditions” whichare favourable or not to the genesis and consolidation of the forms of socialintegration, as well as the conditions which offer an evolutive challenge in thephases of development of social formations98. The principles of organizations onlycircumscribe the “logic evolutive space” but “if” and “when” it comes to newstructures depends on the contingent circumstances of the “single historicalevents”, for whose study only historic research is competent: «historic researchmust explain, in genetic terms, if, how and when a determined society has achieveda determined level of development in its base-structures»99. In another passage hewrites: «I find more appropriate to start, first of all, from the interdipendence oftwo casualities which flow in two opposite directions. If we distinguish the level ofthe structural possibilities (levels of learning) from the level of the factual courses,it is possible to comprehend both casualities with an exchange of the perspective ofthe explanation. We can explain the occurring of a new historical event referring tocontingent outline conditions and to the challenge set by structurally openpossibilities; instead, we explain the arising of a new structure of consciencereferring to the logic of development of the previous structures and to the boostgiven by the events which generate problems»100.

In this interdisciplinary framework, Habermas separates the problems of“evolutive logics” from those of “evolutive dynamic” of historical events, to theextent that he affirms that “historical material is related to determinations whichare specific for social evolution”101. The “theory of social evolution” and “historicresearch” are methodically distinguished and referred each other102. This does notmean that he neglects the problems of “social dynamics”. In the study about thechanging of social systems it is necessary to evaluate, at the same time, the “logicsof development” (the “structures of conscience”) and the “historical processes” (the“events”)103.

94 J. Habermas, it. transl. Per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 196.95 J. Habermas, it. transl. Tesi per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., DR2, cit., p. 161.96 J. Habermas, it. transl. Per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 115.97 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, p. 197.98 J. Habermas, it. transl. Confronto di teorie in sociologia, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 357.99 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 184.100 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 183.101 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 195.102 J. Habermas, it. transl. Un’altra via di uscita dalla filosofia del soggetto, in Id., PDM, cit., p. 303.103 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 182.

In the debate started in the ex-Federal Republic of Germany by J. Rüsen104,Habermas reflects then about the offer, “even modest”, of the theory of socialdevelopment to historiography, not excluding that «a theory of social evolutioncannot be used as a meta-theory to evaluate the concurrent histories of a samesphere of phenomena. Perhaps it is possible to get some points of view adequate tothe critics or the justification of problematic directives and narrative perspectives.In this mediated manner, a theory of social evolution can still inspirehistoriography»105. Even if, at the beginning of the same essay, he recognized thatthe “real offer of theory” elevated to history by the theory of social evolution, “onlyshows its first hints”106.

On the other side, the historical explanations are absolutely indispensable forthe definition of reconstructive sciences for the re-discovery and control ofhypotheses. On the one hand, through the intellectual engagement and thehistorian’s experience of life – the historical research carries out a “euristicfunction” for the “formations of theorems” of the evolution, as it suggeststypological comparisons among social structures and schemes of development. Onthe other hand, it carries out the irreplaceable “technical function” of obtaining the“necessary historical data” for the “indirect check” of the “almost-empiricaltheorems” of reconstructive sciences107. Habermas, indeed, aims at integrating the“general framework of reference” of the theory of social evolution with “partialtheories” into the different ambits of research in order to “verify indirectly” hishypotheses necessary to social reproduction”108. Furthermore, the sociologicaltheory can count, as well as historiography, on the results of historical researcheswhose contribution represents a correction in relation to the unavoidable space-time and thematic provincialism of the same theory109.

But what does the “indirect check” of the propositions of the reconstructivescience consist of? Some Habermas’ answers can be proposed which can bededuced by his fragments of reflection, but none of them brings to clarity. Thisaspect of his methodology has not been solved yet by the critical literature, even if itis fundamental in the antinomy between the “great theorization” and the “empiricalresearches”.

The answer to that questions remains then undetermined. Anyway, I hope that Ihave achieved the argumentative clarity and the linguistic simplicity I due to thereader/hearer, and rely on the “friendly-unfriendly cooperation of many scientists”.

104 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 203.105 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, pp. 196-197.106 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, p. 154.107 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 192.108 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 155.109 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 156.

BASIC BIBLIOGRAPHY

Here is a bibliography about Habermas’ publications, selectively limited to thedocuments where the assumptions of the theory of social evolution are precised.Some Italian translations are quoted and, in case they do not exist, their editions inGerman or in other foreign languages are indicated. Furthermore, Habermas’publications are often collection of writings which have been taken and re-orderedchronologically in this bibliography. In view of the complex structure of somebooks, such as The Theory of Communicative Action, The Philosophical Discourseof Modernity and Between Facts and Norms, we have preferred to indicate thetitles of each chapter using a subnumeration. This allows the reader to individuateeasily the themes, the “systemic theory”, the authors, the “history of ideas” theydeal with.

1967

J. Habermas, it. transl. Logica delle scienze sociali (LWS), Bologna, Il Mulino, 1970:01. Il dualismo tra scienze della natura e scienze della cultura, pp. 3-66.02. La metodologia delle teorie generali dell’azione sociale, pp. 67-136.03. La problematica della comprensione del senso nelle scienze dell’azione empirico-analitiche, pp. 137-258.04. La sociologia come teoria del presente, pp. 259-286.

1968

J. Habermas, it. transl. Conoscenza e interesse (EI2), Roma-Bari, Laterza, 19832:02. La metacritica di Marx a Hegel: la sintesi mediante il lavoro sociale, pp. 27-45.04. Comte e Mach: l’intenzione del vecchio positivismo, pp. 72-90.05. La logica della ricerca di Charles S. Peirce: l’aporia di un realismo degli universalirinnovato secondo una logica del linguaggio, in EI2, cit., pp. 91-112.06. L’autoriflessione delle scienze della natura: la critica pragmatica del senso, pp. 113-141.07. Teoria del comprendere dell’espressione di Dilthey: identità e comunicazionelinguistica, pp. 142-162.08. L’autoriflessione delle scienze dello spirito: la critica storicistica del senso, pp. 163-186.10. Autoriflessione come scienza: Freud e la critica psicoanalitica del senso, pp. 209-238.11. L’autofraitendimento scientistico della metapsicologia. Per la logica diun’interpretazione generale, pp. 239-264.12. Psicoanalisi e teoria della società. Nietzsche e la riduzione degli interessi dellaconoscenza, pp. 265-291.

J. Habermas, it. transl. Su alcune condizioni necessarie al rivoluzionamento delle societàtardo-capitaliste, in Id., KK, cit., pp. 61-76.

1970

J. Habermas, it. transl. La pretesa di universalità dell’ermeneutica, in AA.VV.,Ermeneutica e critica dell’ideologia (HI), Brescia, Queriniana, 1979, pp. 131-167.

J. Habermas, it. transl. Appunti per una teoria della competenza comunicativa, GiglioliP.P. (ed.), Linguaggio e società, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1973, pp. 109-125.

J. Habermas, Machtkampf und Humanität, in «Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung»,12.12.1970.

J. Habermas, Über das Subjekt der Geschichte, in Koselleck R. – Stempel W. D.,Geschichte – Ereignis und Erzählung, München, Fink 1973, pp. 470-476.

1971

J. Habermas, it. transl. Osservazioni propedeutiche per una teoria della competenzacomunicativa, in J. Habermas – N. Luhmann, it. transl. Teoria della società o tecnologiasociale (TGS), Etas Kompass Libri, Milano 1973, pp. 67-94.

J. Habermas, it. transl. Teoria della società o tecnologia sociale?, in J. Habermas – N.Luhmann, TGS, cit., pp. 95-195.

1972

J. Habermas, it. transl. parz. Discorso e verità, in Id., Agire comunicativo e logica dellescienze sociali (LSW2), Bologna, Il Mulino, 1980, pp. 319-343.

1973

J. Habermas, it. transl. La crisi di razionalità nel capitalismo maturo (LPS), Bari, Laterza,1975:

01. Un concetto sociologico di crisi, pp. 3-36;02. Tendenze di crisi nel capitalismo maturo, pp. 37-104;03. Sulla logica dei problemi di legittimazione, pp. 105-159.

1974

J. Habermas, it. transl. Sviluppo della morale e identità dell’io, in Id., Per la ricostruzionedel materialismo storico (ZRHM), Milano, Etas Libri, 1979, pp. 49-73.

J. Habermas, it. transl. Possono le società complesse formarsi un’identità razionale?, inId., ZRHM, cit., pp. 74-104.

J. Habermas, it. transl. Il ruolo della filosofia nel marxismo, in Id., Dialettica dellaRazionalizzazione (DR2), Milano, Unicopli, 1994, pp. 139-166.

J. Habermas, it. transl. Confronto di teorie in sociologia: l’esempio delle teoriedell’evoluzione, in Id. LSW2, cit., pp. 340-360.

J. Habermas, it. transl. Problemi di legittimazione nello Stato moderno, in Id., ZRHM, cit.,pp. 207-235.

1975

J. Habermas, it. transl. Introduzione: il materialismo storico e lo sviluppo di strutturenormative, in Id., ZRHM, cit., pp. 11-48.

J. Habermas, it. transl. Per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., ZRHM, cit.,pp. 105-153.

J. Habermas, it. transl. Tesi per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., DR2, cit.,pp. 151-165.

1976

J. Habermas, Überlegungen zum evolutionären Stellenwert des modernen Rechts, in Id.,Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismus (ZRHM), Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp,1976, pp. 260-270.

J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit., pp. 154-206.

1980

J. Habermas, it. transl. Scienze sociali ermeneutiche e scienze sociali ricostruttive, in Id.,Etica del discorso (MB), Bari-Roma, Laterza, 1985, pp. 25-47.

1981

J. Habermas, it. transl. Dialettica della razionalizzazione: J. Habermas a colloquio con A.Honneth, E. Knödler-Bunte e A. Widmann, in Id., DR, cit., pp. 221-264.

J. Habermas, it. transl. La funzione vicaria e interpretativa della filosofia, in Id., MB, cit.,pp. 5-24.

J. Habermas, it. transl. Teoria dell’agire comunicativo. Razionalità nell’azione erazionalizzazione sociale (TKH.I), Bologna, Il Mulino, 1986:

01. Introduzione: approcci alla problematica della razionalizzazione, pp. 53-228.02. La teoria della razionalizzazione di Max Weber, pp. 229-378.03. Prima considerazione intermedia: agire sociale, attività finalizzata ecomunicazione, pp. 379-456.04. Da Lukács ad Adorno: razionalizzazione come reificazione, pp. 457-529.

J. Habermas, it. transl. Teoria dell’agire comunicativo. Critica della ragionefunzionalistica (TKH.II), Bologna, Il Mulino, 1986:

05. Il mutamento di paradigma in Mead e Durkheim: dall’attività finalizzata a unoscopo all’agire comunicativo, pp. 547-696.06. Seconda considerazione intermedia: sistema e mondo vitale, pp. 697-810.07. Talcott Parsons: problemi di costruzione della teoria della società, pp. 811-950.08. Considerazione conclusiva: da Parsons attraverso Weber sino a Marx, pp. 951-1088.

1985

J. Habermas, it. transl. Il discorso filosofico della modernità (PDM), Bari-Roma, Laterza,1985:01. La coscienza temporale della modernità e la sua esigenza di rendersi conto di sestessa, pp. 1-11.Excursus sulle «Tesi di filosofia della storia» di Walter Benjamin, pp. 12-23.02. Il concetto hegeliano della modernità, pp. 24-45.Excursus sull’obsolescenza del paradigma della produzione, pp. 77-85.Excursus sulla appropriazione dell’eredità della filosofia del soggetto da parte dellateoria dei sistemi di Luhmann, pp. 366-383.

1986

J. Habermas, it. transl. Storiografia e coscienza storica, in G.E.Rusconi (ed.), Germania:un passato che non passa, cit., pp. 33-35.

J. Habermas, it. transl. L’uso pubblico della storia, in G.E.Rusconi (ed.), Germania: unpassato che non passa, cit., pp. 98-109.

1987

J. Habermas, it. transl. Sull’evoluzione delle scienze sociali e dello spirito nella RepubblicaFederale, in Id., TuK, cit. pp. 217-228.

J. Habermas, it. transl. Intervista con Angelo Bolaffi, in «L’Espresso», 25.01.1988.

J. Habermas, it. transl. Intervista con Robert Maggiori, in NR. KPS VII, cit., pp.32-40.

1989

J. Habermas, it. transl. La sociologia nella Repubblica di Weimer, in Id., TuK, cit., pp.195-215.

J. Habermas, it. transl. Intervista con Hans Peter Krüger, in Id., NR. KPS VII, cit., pp. 86-102.

J. Habermas, it. transl. Intervista con Barbara Freitag, in Id., NR. KPS VII, cit., pp.103-116.

J. Habermas, it. transl. Intervista con T. Hviid Nielsen, in Id., KPS VII NR, cit., pp. 117-146.