Luca_Buzzotta_821772_When Words Don't Find a Translation

7/28/2019 Luca_Buzzotta_821772_When Words Don't Find a Translation

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Luca Buzzotta, n 821772

WHEN WORDS DONT FIND A TRANSLATION

a comparative case study on the sentence pronounced by the statesman Li Denghui

Languages and Economic and Legal Institutions of Asia and North Africa, course ofHISTORY OF

CONTEMPORARY CHINA, Ca Foscari University, 10/05/2012


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INTRODUTION

- China, U.S.A. and Taiwan facing the beginning of the 21th century

- The original formulation in Chinese, 1989 (,,)

- The sentence, its context and its ideology

FIRST PROPOSED TRANSLATION ( July 1992)

- Sentence context, ideology background

- Analysis (lexis, references/implications)

- Reasons leading to a new reformulation

SECOND PROPOSED TRANSLATION (November 1992)

- Sentence context, ideology background

- Analysis ( lexis, references/implications)

- Reasons leading to a new reformulation

CONCLUSIONS

- Nowadays political directions: third proposed translation (1994, 1999),,

and friendly proposals ( 2007, 2008 )

- Analysis ( lexis, references/implications)

- Fourth proposed translation (2008, 2009)

SYNOPSIS


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In an hot summer afternoon of the 15th of July 1999, during an interview with the German radio

station Deutsuche Welle late, the statesman Li Denghui described with conviction Chinese and

Taiwanese cross-strait ties as a special state-to-state relationship; six days after, the Executive Yuan

hold an international press conference and officially adopted the terminology Two states in onenation to represent the new idea. In front of the journalist, Li Denghui restated such formula, and

when asked for a chinese translation of it, he could just answer: were still looking for the right words.

Can it really happen that words dont find a translation? Actually yes, it may happen, because every

single language in the world has its own Realia, i.e. those words that carry a very local overtone and

express culture-specific material things, thus posing thorny challenges to translators. But this is not our

case. The simple fact that, after more than ten years, because of political, ideological and economic

reasons few words cant find a translation (even made by Chinese people), its something that may be

embarrassing, irrational, inconceivable and disconcerting from many points of view. Men are political

animals, to communicate is their nature, their life. The present article seeks to examine some of themost proposed translations from English to Chinese for Li Denghuis words, and aims to explain

through comparative analysis the reasons that lead such translations to refusals,inadequacies,

quarrels and misunderstandings, while at the same time trying to take a direction for a possible

translation that satisfies not only common linguistic, social and communicative criteria, but also men

on both sides of the strait.

INTRODUCTION


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he Sino-U.S. relationship is one of the most important bilateral relationships in the world. The

two countries have common interests in many areas, as well as great differences. The post

Cold War Sino-U.S. relationship is never short of complexities and complications, and, at its

core, the Taiwan issue has always been the most important and sensitive one. Particularly since Li

Denghui described the cross-Strait relationship as a state-to-state relationship, the trilateral

relationship between and among the Chinese mainland, Taiwan and the United States has beenmeeting new challenges, and when Li Denghui spoke out those untranslatable words, the aim to

restate Taiwans De facto independence excluding any kind of reunification with China was clear.

Taiwan of the 89 was ready and more than encouraged; Each day of delay was a day of disrespect

to Jiang Jingguo, president Li Denghui was ascending to the chairmanship and Chen Shuibian, out of

jail, was elected as legislator side by side with sixteen parliamentary. The KMT and its Palace

Faction could just stand on the corner and watch.

China of the 89 was quite in a political and economic mess, and after Maos death, the Sino-

Vietnamese war and the drastic economically-cent-planned reform, a newly appeared Deng Xiaoping,

full of hopes and ideas for his country, was beginning to hold the reins of a horse just escaped from its

yoke. The gang of four was now a memory, but Dengs legacy left a number of issues, mainly in the

social-political arena and in the unprofitable state market, unresolved. Tian An Mens events were

already knocking at the door.

The international scene witnessed a dramatic shift due to the mutual concerns about the weak post

glasnost and perestroika reforms Soviet Union, the injured by economic bubble Japan and a not-yet-a-

peer Europe, concerns that brought Washington and Beijing into rapprochement. This shift step by

step led to diplomatic relations and a severance of official ties with the Republic of China, but there

were still strong elements of ambivalence on the part of the United States from the 1972 Shanghai

Communiqu to the events of 1979. In the former, the United States acknowledged the Chinese

position relating to Taiwan but did not necessarily accept it. The Taiwan Relation Act of 1979 that

accompanied formal U.S recognition of the PRC stipulated that the U.S would have continued to

furnish military supplies to Taiwan, to patrol the strait and to assist Taiwan pending a peaceful

settlement of the dispute.

But what are the real purposes under Washingtons mask of consummate international democracy

paladin? Where is the gain in provoking China and getting entrapped in such a spiny Chinese-

Taiwanese impasse? How and why a super-international power can guarantee democracy?

According to the remarks made by secretary of state George Shultz in Shanghai in February 1987,

Washington in order to foster a positive environment disposes of: a robust set of bilateral alliances

in East Asia, a deployment of naval and air force units, an aggressive pursuit of global economic

liberalization (which fosters interdependence among the countries of the Pacific), the support of

engagement of the people's Republic of China (to integrate Beijing and its rule-based regimes into theinternational system), and a strategic vision that affirms that the best way to achieve national interests

is to be actively involved in the affairs of East Asia on the side of peace. The main U.S. aim should be

the clear and consistent reaffirmation of the one China policy as defined by the three communiqus,

that not only remain the cornerstone of Taiwan-PRC-U.S. relations but also have fostered peace and

stability and facilitated the remarkable evolution that Taiwan has undergone, thus giving room to

Washington to continue both its arms sales to Taiwan and its economic relationships with China.

The stability of the Asian economy is vital to the American and world economy, and the U.S follows

closely the economic situation in Asia.

Of course, any arrangements between Beijing and Taipei should be made on a mutually acceptable

basis and not be imposed on one side by the other, but, as predictable, this is exactly what happens.

T


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The first formulations of Li Denghuis concept, made of course in Chinese, can be dated back to 1989,

and were all focusing on a certain degree of separation, at least from the political-governmental point

of view:

One nation, two states One nation, two governments One nation, two regionsTaiwan culture, even if results as a blend of Confucianism, Japanese, European, American and Taiwan

aborigines culture, has a lot in common with mainland China; in fact, if we analyze the first

formulations of the concept two states in one nation, we can easily find out that theyre expressed in

the classical chinese symmetrical structure made of four characters, typical first of the Shijing and then

of the idioms, able to underline the equilibrium between the whole concept and the single parts, while

at the same time expressing the separated valence of its elements and even the element s mutual

contrast.

The , source of Chinese writing system, is the , the stroke that opens the world (see

), from which derive the , i.e. the Yin and the Yang, the two elements that in their

continuous reciprocal and balanced opposition generate every single manifestation of the Dao, and

act as a single creative but divided force. In such Yijing-based analogy, the represents the unity of

one Chinas concept (one country,), whereas the stand for the clear separation of ROC

and PRC, thus alluding, as for Yin and Yang, to a perfect equilibrium of power and sovereignty between

the ROC and the PRC. At the same time, anyway, we know that Yin and Yang act as a single force, and

that means the two , in their cycle, actually do, because of the same nature of the, give

back life to it. In other words, since the are born from and give birth to the , both

concepts are the same :,. In other words, the ROC and the PRC (the) and the

One China (the) are all expressions of the same concept ().

Whether we like to talk of states , governments and administrations(formulation

denied by the PRC, since it would be the result of a Taiwan spelling error ) or territorial entities

, Li Denghuis two states in one nation theory leaves room not only for Taiwans independence,

but also for Taiwans sovereignty over China, given the hinted power equilibrium of ROC and PRC. Both

and , unaccepted by Taiwanese people, are just a .

To the international observers, after the interview with the German radio Mr. Li Denghui has rocked

the boat and become a troublemaker again. It has almost become a rule that Li Denghui comes out to

turn back the clock when the cross-Strait relationship has moved forward. It was true in 1995 when he

went to the U.S. to talk with Bill Clinton and Jiang Zemin, and it is true again this time.

The United States oppose to the two-state theory. First, Taiwan politicians often provoke the Chinese

mainland out of political motives on cross-Strait matters and then leave the United States to clean up

the mess. Second, Taipei produced the two-state theory without prior consultation with Washington,

and doing so trapped the U.S. in the cross-Strait crisis, but the United States does not want to take the

risk of military confrontation with the Chinese mainland by unconditionally supporting Taiwan. Third,

the two-state theory hampered the repair work of the Sino-U.S. relationship. The United States is

trying to mend the damage inflicted by the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and does not

want to be linked to another conspiracy. Fourth, the two state theory halted Wang Daohans much-

anticipated visit to Taiwan and circumvented the U.S. proposed interim agreements. Originally, theUnited States hoped very much to capitalize on these two opportunities to stabilize Cross-Strait

relations. Fifth, and most importantly, the two-state theory has interfered with the U.S.s strategic plan


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to stabilize the Asia-Pacific region as well as the cross-Strait relationship. Taipeis move has obviously

intensified the tensions in this region.

China doesnt agree too; The Chinese government, military forces, and people are giving continual

warning that Li Denghui should not play with fire. Not only did Beijing unleash an intense propaganda

barrage, but it also increased air activity over the Taiwan Strait, creating the risk of accident or

miscalculation that, in turn, might have led to some sort of an escalation. The two states theory and aneventual Taiwan De Jure independence is an evident political move against both the One China policy,

for which countries seeking diplomatic relations with the PRC must break official relations with

the ROC, and the One China Principle, for which Taiwan and mainland China are inalienable parts of a

single "China" that cannot be governed by a province nor suffer divisions (i.e. Taiwanese secession).

Neither what Bush will define in 2001 as a greater sense of security and confidence to enter into a

dialogue with Beijing (i.e. the arms sales to Taiwan) is seen in a good light, since this unjustified

commerce interferes with Chinas domestic affairs, violates Chinas sovereignty, disregards Beijings

appeals for a stop, expands Taiwan international living space, denies any premise for friendly

negotiations, ruins and disturbs China-Taiwan flourishing economy and loosens Chinese-Taiwanese

blood-cultural ties.As firmly stated by Jiang Zemin during 1995 official visit to the U.S., We shall try our best to achieve

the peaceful reunification of China since Chinese should not fight Chinese. We do not promise not to

use force. If used, force will not be directed against our compatriots in Taiwan, but against the foreign

forces who intervene in China's reunification and go in for the independence of Taiwan."

Thus, it is obvious that formulations as One nation, two statesOne nation, two governmentsOne

nation, two regions even if to some extent soften the tones, do satisfy only most of the 22 millions of

Taiwanese people, being undesired, if not harsh or misunderstood to mainland Chinese, oversea

Chinese and American people, hence failing to be accepted or to communicate their whole meaning.

FIRST PROPOSED TRANSLATION ( July 1992)

Is Taiwan just a misunderstood agent provocateur? Is Mr. Li, as some Taiwanese called him, an IBM

(international big mouth)? The major Chinese media have kept on denouncing the two-state theory

and enlisting the possible consequences. A national survey of 2000 shows that the Chinese people are

angered too. A total of 94.7 percent of people inquired said they were shocked and felt disgusted

when they learned of Lis remarks. 86.9 percent of people surveyed said they agree with the

governments stance on the Taiwan issue that when necessary, the government can resort to military

measures to resolve the Taiwan issue.Strong as its attitudes are, the Chinese Mainlands actual

counter-movements have been measured. Taiwan, as some anonyms said, even helps Beijing to realize

its primary objective: preserving social stability. Interdependent connections have even been

established between ROC and PRC enterprises in the areas of oil and coal, and, for example, just the

Tong Yi Company nowadays has already 70 factories on the mainland. More than 200,000 Taiwan

businesspeople now live and work in the PRC where they have established more than 50 associations

to promote their interests.Such firms employ approximately three million mainland workers, about 3

percent of the urban workforce. Taiwan, after all, is helping Beijing, and everything seemed to be going

in the right way during 1992 consensuss preparations, untilMa Yingjiu, under the wing of the KMT,


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made his appearance on the political stage . In 1993 Ma Yingjiu was elected as Taiwan justice minister,

began to develop his version of the two states in one nation and denied the existence of a consensus

between China and Taiwan, pointing out that 1992 consensus happened without any consensus, with

both states expressing its view of One China and nothing more. Hopes about any kind of reconciliation

became more and more dim, and the

formulation was easily transformed into .Meanwhile, the U.S. counter-movements and criticisms had been measured too. Keeping on

watching Taiwans democratic events, the U.S basic cross-Strait policy remained unchanged. The

United States had much at stake in Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait; It also took Taiwan as a successful

model to transplant its own political system and values to Asia, maximizing its national interests to the

extent that the separation of the Chinese mainland and Taiwan was prolonged. The proposal was just

declared by U.S as not approved.

At first glance, is quite an extremist formulation that puts aside any idea of One China,

suggesting a clear cut between ROC and PRC; after the Beijing talks held on the 22 March of 1992,

Taiwans Strait Exchange Foundation, (whose Chinese counterpart was ARATS,),

the non-governmental structure in charge of the problems related to the impasse with China,

explained that the policy of the Taiwan authorities was one of "no official contacts" with the mainland

and that"cross-straits developments had not yet reached (even)the stage of direct postal links. Ma

Yingjiu stated with regretful tone that the mainland was insisting not only on the One China principle,

but also on the document use and matters regarding registered mail as Chinese domestic issues, and

doing so, even a simple mail involved the question of whose domestic mail service were talking

about . To Taiwans eye, One China policy could just lead to , and became

its instinctive reply to mainland China; as pointed out by the CCP immediately after

formulation, in fact, Taiwan is a political entity equal (to the others, i.e. PRC and its provinces) inside

the whole China (not defined as one China anymore).

adheres again to the structure of four characters, but this time with an emphasis on the

simultaneous and separated existence of two Chinas, one for each side of the strait. The first

echoes the second , while is opposed to , without no more referring to the Chinese

ancestorss motherland reunified by QinShi Huang, but just to a state governed by the CCP and Jiang

Zemin, with Beijing as capital.

If we take a look to the plethora of chinese chengyu, we can easily find out that in the Chinese

language all the idiomatic expressions with the structure have two elements that

coexist in perfect balance and will lead to dramatic changes if altered. Thus, there should be two

Chinas with different names perfectly distinct with no relation with each other. Just because of such

formulation, at the beginning of the 21th century, Taiwan will begin to ensure its international

presence as China, by giving ( before the PRC could do anything about it ) to its state enterprises of

Oil, Aluminum, naval production and its air companies registered names including characters

in Chinese, and China in English, with the aim to obligate the PRC to find other names by itself and to

justify the ROC original existence in just one move.


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Is, such Chinese culturally speaking really straightforward expression, a better translation of

Li Denghuis words? More no than yes, since its meaning is quite to too far from the English original

words; but, we have to admit, without quibbles or sophisms, at least leaves few doubts on its real

meaning, as we can see from the following table about the detailed differences between the One

Zhong one Tai theory and the one nation two states theory.

ONE NATION TWO

STATES

ONEZHONG ONE TAI ,

TWO CHINAS THEORY

STATE NAMES

We are the Republic of China, the

other straits bank is The Peoples

Republic of China, both sides are

the whole China

the Republic of China, on

Formosas island, gradually

acknowledged as Taiwan; the other

strait s bank is The Peoples

Republic of China

TAIWAN DEFINITION The ROC is a state, but as a part of

the whole China

Taiwan (not the ROC) is a sovereign

country

CROSS STRAIT RELATIONSHIP

DEFINITION

state to state special relationship,

not only on politics, but also on

law. Also defined as two politically

equal entities

The strait relationship is state to

state, and at least a two-states

special relationship

STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND

GOVERNED TERRITORY

Both sides are within their

respective territories, enjoying a

completely autonomous

independent sovereignty and

governance, but the whole China

sovereignty its upon all the

Chinese people of both sides

ROC Sovereignty and governance

are not of PRC competence; Taiwan

governed national territory

includes Formosa, Pescadores,

Kinmen, and Mazu

OPINION ABOUT ONE CHINAS

PRINCIPLE

Favorable; proposes The whole

China Theory

Not Favorable; emphasizes that the

other straits bank is One China,

unrelated with Taiwan.

OPINION ON THE FUTURE OF


The two sides will be reunited, and

rule together side by side.

The two Chinas theory does not

presuppose any future situation,

just speaks of chronologically

ordered explanations, any ideas

about Taiwans future will be

decided by Taiwan people. No

unifications or democratic

unifications.POPULATION DEGREE OF

ACCEPTANCE

Someway acceptable for PRC, but it

absolutely cannot refer to 1989

Germanys model.

Quite high acceptance by

Taiwanese people. PRC and U.S. do

not approve

As many PRC scholars pointed out, the division between China and Taiwan is due to Chinese civil war,

and this is the reason why Li Denghui formulation cant be De Facto resolved through any international

law, as instead has happened for Germany during its division in East/West Germany.

The eine Nation, zwei Staaten formulation, meaning for BOTH German sides One Germany, a

nation for two Germans at that time was resolved thanks to international law, the Potsdam protocol

and the U.N. Charter, but in the case of China, no such international law can interfere, and therefore,the only way to solve the PRC/ROC impasse should reside in acting according to the wil l and the

consensus of all Chinese people, the whole China. Nevertheless, the whole China theory doesnt


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suite Li Denghuis words; does not admit any third entity, since Taiwan people desire to

according their own will, and does speak of a reunification in order to obtain once again pre-

1949 China, and not a whole China obtained on the base of Taiwanese and Chinese people will. Both

the two Chinas and the whole China theories do not take into consideration the other side

opinion, and, even if a translation of compromise, is tricky and foggy, living a big deal of

room for double-cross intentions: the first pair of characters conveys an idea of unification, and the

second pair an idea of division into two Chinas.

SECOND PROPOSED TRANSLATION (November 1992)

Do we really need to search for a translation of political compromise? After 92 consensus the cross

strait relationship was again instable, but both sides were reluctant to military confrontation. Thegame of words added a new strain of confusion to the already cloudy cross-strait relationship, but both

sides economies were enjoying a positive trend, and though Taiwan economy was of slower growth, it

was reaching for the first time a GNP of 10.000 US dollars per capita, while China was flourishing

thanks to Deng Xiaopings reforms. No need to say, the 1992 Consensus seemed to become a

nightmare to the Taiwan Democratic Progressive Party government, which tried desperately to deny

its existence. In fact, many who were directly involved in preparing and conducting the November

1992 negotiations in Hong Kong that led to the consensus-including Chairman Gu Chengfu of the SEF,

Jin Jin-yi, former vice chairman and secretary general of the SEF, Dr. Gao Konglian, vice chairman of

MAC and Qiu Taisan, who was the Mainland Affairs Councils senior vice chairman and spokesman - all

of them remember clearly that such a consensus on the one-China principle was reached and that eachside had agreed in correspondence that the meaning of one China, on which they disagreed, was to be

interpreted. What the DPP government came up with next on this thorny issue was even more

amazing. On July 31, 2000, when President Chen Shuibian called a press conference, he said that

although there was no consensus on one China in 1992, there was a "1992 spirit," namely, "dialogue,

exchange, and shelving disputes. Such a formulation, obviously intended to downplay the issue and

distract popular attention, had the effect of pouring fuel on the fire. Many people, including those in

the media, began to question the credibility of the DPP government. They argued that, although the

DPP government had every right not to agree to the one-China principle to which it has long been

opposed, it should not deny the existence of a historical fact. The Taiwan side view of the consensus

was (that is to say), while Chinas view was (that is to

say). In the first formulation, One China became the theme of the

sentence, on which both sides expressed different definitions, while in the second formulation, One

China became a single object expressed by a subject, that is to say, both sides of the strait. Chinese

language in fact, because of its lack of morphemes and desinences, most of times is able to express

clearly a concept according just to the words order, and this is the feature that allowed both 1992

formulations existence from a grammatical point of view. Another feature that allowed the co-

existence of this two formulations is the equal clarity of expression of the ideologies behind those four

characters, as we can see from the table about the detailed differences between the two formulations:


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STATE NAMES

Both sides acknowledge One

China, and each side express its

opinion about the meaning ofOne

China

Taiwan and mainland China are

inalienable parts of a single"China"; One China principle

TAIWAN DEFINITION The ROC is a sovereign country Taiwan is a part of China that cangovern its territory


DEFINITION

ROC and PRC are two politically

internationally equal entities

The strait relationship is a domestic

issue between political corpora of

the same nation


GOVERNED TERRITORY

The sovereignty belongs to the

whole China , while ROC

governance belongs to Formosa,

Pescadores, Kinmen and Mazu

ROC and PRC Sovereignty are of

One Chinas competence,

administered under all Chinas

parts will ;


PRINCIPLE

Each side will propose its own

formulation

Favorable; emphasizes that both

straits bank form One China,



Build up a democratic, free and

equally wealthy China

Each part of the strait will

cooperate side by side in the name

of a prosperous China directed by a

central sovereign government

representing every single citizen;

Each part of the strait has the right

of governance on its territory.

POPULATIONS DEGREE OF

ACCEPTANCE

PRC and ROC people can accept

this formulation, U.S. people accept

this formulation

The PRC accepts this formulation;

the U.S. can accept too, if all goes

in a democratic way; the ROC do

not accept, since the formulation

implies a loose of ROCs identity

Can a country with more than one milliard and three-hundred souls be hold at bay by a group few

islands with just twenty-two million souls just by means of a words game? Of course it cannot, but we

can unveil some of the new reasons behind Taiwans 1992 formulation that let Taiwan be neck to neck

with mainland China in the cross strait dialogue.

Firstly, during the 1990s the political role of the Taiwanese business people () in cross strait

relations has been increasingly noteworthy, chiefly thanks to PRCs policy of counting on the

Taiwanese people. But contrary to widely accepted allegations, mainland Chinas attempts to use

Taiwanese business people as a mean to gain political leverage on Taiwan did not pan out as asuccessful strategy. Huge economic sweeteners, given at the expense of mainland Chinas own

national and private industries did not make many of themore sympathetic to China or more

supportive of reunification. Many Taiwanese businessmen, strong of the US$90 billion trade profit

earned by Taiwan over the past 20 years, merely talked about reunification while visiting China in

order to gain more business opportunities. Secondly, as a result of normalization of Sino-Japanese

relations in 1972, Japan cut off its diplomatic ties with the ROC, and what followed was nearly two

decades of diplomatic tepidity between Tokyo and Taipei until 1990s, when Japan and Taiwan have

been rapidly approaching each other again. Rediscovered Japan as partner, Taiwans economy could

keep up again with mainland China. This commingling process, which has elevated their relations to

an un-official-in-name-only status, is the result of three mutually reinforcing factors: re-imaginationof colonial ties, sharing of a democratic identity and the permeating of popular culture. Thirdly, right


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during the 1990s Taiwan began its foreign policy after-called viable diplomacy() with

success: in 1991 Taiwan joined the APEC, in 1996 established the Taiwan ICDF (International

Cooperation Development Fund) and in 2002 will join the WTO as Chinese Taipei. Mainland Chinas

unrenstrainable economic growth under Deng Xiaoping was finally witnessing Taiwan noteworthy

growth, observing with more and more interest.From a linguistic and political point of view, the two post-consensus formulations are also translations

of compromise, since both, even if full of political meaning, do not exactly mirror Li Denghuis Two

states in one nation formula nor make good use of the experience of the precedent formulations. In Li

Denghuis Two states in one nation expression, we find two different subjects (both strait side, the

ROC and the PRC) that carry out together the action of being in a single entity, i.e. the one nation;

but if we take a look to, we find out that first there is a single theme, i.e. One China,

undergoing the action of being described in different ways by each subject, while in each

subject carries out on its own the action of describing a single object, i.e. One China principle. Whether

we see Li Denghuis words as two states in one nation or one nation, two states, it is hard to see

which formulation gets near to the English version from the linguistic point of view and which one

from the point of view of the meaning. Whatever our answer will be, we find out that both post 1992

consensus formulations arent good translations, from both the linguistic point of view and the point of

view of the meaning.

CONCLUSIONS

Over the longer run, it is possible that the two sides might eventually agree on a broader formula for

establishing a loose association between the two sides, a formula such as confederation or

commonwealth, but no PRC or ROC leader is now prepared to accept such an idea, even if appropriate.

Since May 2000 the ROC has repeatedly spoken of its desire to establish a stable and cooperative

relationship with China, has removed barriers to direct trade and investment with the mainland, has

talked of a shared history and has referred vaguely to the possibility of a future one China. On the

other side of the strait, the PRC affirms that the one China it has in mind wont just be the PRC, and

that China and Taiwan will negotiate as equals on this topic. That is the reason why, few years after the

so much discussed interview of the statesman Li Denghui with the German radio, several translations

have flourished, all more approachable by both side, cooperative and full of feelings of brotherhood,

such as, , where now appears one entity that is no more expression of political

governance or administration, but of community, ethnicity, blood relationship and culture, with

political corpora more equal rather than separated or distant. Nevertheless, many in Taiwan believe

that the PRC's ultimate intention is to delegitimize Taiwan's government and to subjugate Taiwan , and

the PRC authorities remain extremely distrustful too, since they view ROCs recent moves as merely

tactical adjustments. Thus, more than once eminent diplomatic and academic figures of Taiwan

pointed out that the problem was still the definition of, arguing that was merely an

elegant way to propose again Hong Kongs, and that under One Chinas roof, PRC would be

the living room, while the ROC just a bathroom. On top of that, after the one nation two states

formula public declaration at the radio, each verbal exchange by both sides happened in a quite

hasty but prolonged-in-time-way: Li wanted to lay a firmer foundation for his model of a future Taiwan

before his presidential term expired the next year, that is to say, as soon as possible. Each diplomatic

move, more and more close to the next one, easily became provoking. From the beginning of 1990s,


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among each political event and under international eyes, scorns and mockeries didn t lack, and this is

one of the reason of such a reciprocal distrust: Li made frequent public ridicule of Chinese leaders,

such as publicly calling them as a group of hooligans andbandits in 1994; mocked the PRC as the

son while calling the ROC as the father in 1995; called China being stupid though being big in 1997;

purposely provoked PRC with its theory on Chinas division in seven parts, and finally mentioned his

two-states theory in early July 1999. All this should not be dismissed as merely his personal style or aslip of the tongue. He did all this with the calculation to place Taiwan constantly in the international

limelight so that it would not be forgotten by the world. On the other hand, China, always with the

purpose to justify the cross strait impasse as a domestic issue, more than once found the right

opportunity to highlight Taiwans imperfections, as in the academic field as in the diplomatic political

field, mobilizing the nation through many articles, editorials, TV interviews, seminars, lectures,

conferences by scholars, and well-known figures from various circles to condemn Lis two-states

theory. The PRC was preparing its own people psychologically and politically for possible strong actions,

and the example of the punitive measures taken against Falun Gong from July 1999 showed that China

wasnt joking. Meanwhile, the PRC was also preparing the international ground. Under Chinas request,

many countries had reaffirmed their one China policy. Of course, the biggest concern was the UnitedStates, for which China adopted a two pronged strategy. It depicted Taiwan as the troublemaker for

normal China-US relations at the expense of the US strategic interests. China further asked the Clinton

administration to press Taiwan to retract its two-states theory and not to giving it cause for greater

concern by engaging in further arms sales and the Taiwan Missile Defense development. By mid-

September 1999, China appeared more or less satisfied with international response to Lis two-states

position. The United States, Japan, the EU, Russia, Canada, Australia, together with more than one

hundred other countries quickly reaffirmed their one China policy. President Clinton took the

initiative to call Chinese President Jiang Zemin, assuring him personally that the United States was

committed to a one China policy. US officials were trying to coax or pressure Li into modifying his

statement in order to avert a new round of tension, as they couldnt miss the chance to improve theirtattered relations with China. Taiwan couldnt dare to propose any new formulation, and limited itself

plainly mentioning a policy officially in 2007, and a declaration of special non-

state-to-state theory in 2008 (derived from the original Lianhebaos proposal

), both made under Ma Jiuying term of office.

Great and more democratic progresses have been made thanks to the last, but not less important

formulations of,made by the PRC, that can convey a much more gentle and

sensitive message, thanks to two special assets, i.e. the underlining of a future common and

unanimous expression on the One China issue, and the underlining of the certainty that each

side will have its right to preserve a certain autonomy (although the choice of instead of is aimed

to reduce any international nuance). Both formulations, for the first time, avoid any

structure, in the attempt to bring near the PRC and the ROC, and at the same time immediately give an

hint on possible concretizations of so that no doubt on double-cross purposes can arise (

purposes, as reported by the Taiwanese Want Daily), as we can see in the following table:


13/14

STATE NAMES

Both sides will work on the same

China s idea, each side listening

each other opinion

Taiwan and mainland China are

two constitutions that will

institute China;

TAIWAN DEFINITIONThe ROC is a rediscovered brother

that will build with us China

Taiwan is a constitutional corpus,

exactly as mainland


DEFINITIONROC and PRC are brothers (is a

verb, but also used in family

relationships as a name)

The strait relationship is

constitutional cooperation in the

name ofChina


GOVERNED TERRITORY

The sovereignty belongs to China

and each brother can accept the

brothers good suggestions

ROC and PRC Sovereignty are

Chinas competence, administered

according all three constitutions


PRINCIPLE

both side will propose together one

formulation

Favorable; the One China is the

pre-stage ofChina


CROSS STRAIT RELATIONSHIPBuild up a strong, free and equally

wealthy China

Constitutions will cooperate side by

side and form China government

representing every single citizen

POPULATIONS DEGREE OF

ACCEPTANCE

Both brothers will accept this

formulation, U.S. people accept this

formulation

The PRC accepts this formulation;

the U.S. can accept too, if all goes

in a democratic way; the ROC can

accept

There has been a long time in which mainland China talked about Taiwan as a son who shouldnt

depart from his mother, and in which Taiwan replied that the distance was not only a natural and right

evolution of the events course, but also of ideal measure, because there always will be time to delivera bowl of still hot soup (Japanese idiom). This time is gradually passing away, and both sides of the

strait, aware of the necessity to hear each other s opinions and to avoid any military conflict, are

beginning to propose formulations of Li Denghuis words that can give room to the other side. Its

really hard to propose a translation of Li Denghuis words that is politically pleasant to both sides ear,

and the best that the author can propose at the moment, even though childish at first glance, is

given the fact that nation and country are both translated into Chinese language as . In my

opinion, if handled well, the Taiwan issue (and therefore Li Denghuis words) will arouse in both sides

strong patriotism (instead of the possible split) that hina could use for its own internal cohesion. In

other words, China could turn the Taiwan issue from liability into an asset. It depends on Beijing and

Taipeis political wisdom and skill. Should this come true, Taiwan would then be a blessing in disguise

for Chinas rise.


14/14

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Alan D. Romberg, Cross-strait Relations: Avoiding War, Managing Peace, CAPS paper No.38, Chinese

Council of Advanced Policy Studies, November 2004

- Chung Kuo Shih Pao, The Chinese words guo jia can be translated into either countries or states

, China Times, 13 July 1999

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Studies, The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Summer/Fall 1999.

-Ke LanJian(pseudonim)"",, 3/12/2009

- LiRen Chen, "",53, 18/7/2008

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Republic of China, 6/5/2008

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- Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC,Jiang Zemins eight point Proposal,http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/en/Special/Jiang/201103/t20110316_1789198.htm, 1995-01-30

- Tania Branigan, Change is coming to China but will Beijing lead a social revolution? , The guardian,

18/03/2012

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http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbook/contents.html, 2011/01/01

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, 28/2/2005

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the Community View of History Should Be Established, www.Chinareviewnews.com, 1/16/2011

- ZhiLang Hong,,,, 28/12/2011
http://www.npf.org.tw/http://www.npf.org.tw/http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/en/Special/Jiang/201103/t20110316_1789198.htmhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/profile/taniabraniganhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/profile/taniabraniganhttp://www.gwytb.gov.cn/en/Special/Jiang/201103/t20110316_1789198.htmhttp://www.npf.org.tw/

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