Lutherian Influence on Kant Deprived Will

8/3/2019 Lutherian Influence on Kant Deprived Will

1/18

Int J Philos Relig

DOI 10.1007/s11153-011-9331-4

ARTICLE

The lutheran influence on Kants depraved will

Dennis Vanden Auweele

Received: 7 July 2011 / Accepted: 8 December 2011 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Abstract Contemporary Kant-scholarship has a tendency to allign Kants under-

standing of depravity closer to Erasmus than Luther in their famous debate on the

freedom of the will (15201527). While, at face value, some paragraphs do warrant

such a claim, I will argue that Kants understanding of the radical evil will draws

closer to Luther than Erasmus in a number of elements. These elements are (1) the

intervention of the Wille for progress towards the good, (2) a positive choice for evil,

(3) the inscrutability of moral progress, (4) the rejection of prudence as a means forsalvation and (5) the rejection of moral sentimentalism. I believe that Kant-scholarship

mistakenly pegs Kants rational Enlightenment optimism for an existential optimism

while Kants view of fallen nature draws closer to Lutheran than Erasmusian depravity.

A tacit Lutheran influence pervades Kants moral philosophy which could explain the

influence Kants has had on some more pessimistic 19th century philosophers such as

Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche.

Keywords Free will-debate Luther/Erasmus Depravity Radical evil Salvation

Immanuel Kant

How can an evil tree bear good fruit?

Immanuel Kant

German philosophy in the 1819th century seems dominated by philosophers who,

although usually renouncing direct influence from this, stem from a Protestant rather

than a Catholic line of inheritance: Leibniz, Kant, Wolff and Fichtealthough brought

up for charges of atheismwere are Lutherans, and even Nietzsche, the great enemy

of institutional religion, had nothing but Protestant ministers as direct male family

D. Vanden Auweele (B)

Hoger Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Lesagestraat 43,

1820 Steenokkerzeel, Belgium

e-mail: [email protected]

123


2/18

Int J Philos Relig

members. Their Lutheran pessimism with regard to the impossibility of autonomously

venturing towards salvation or the good often mixed with rationalist Enlightenment

optimism. Ever since the Gordon Michalsons seminal work on Kants1 concept of

radical evil as fallen freedom, Kant-interpretation has been having a tendency to more

or less univocally relate Kants notion of will closer to a Catholic than a Protestantunderstanding of the Fall by mistakenly pegging his rational optimism for an innate

seed of goodness in the natural human will2. While for Luther and Erasmus religious

soteriology and morality surely mix, for Kant, the distinction seems tantamount to

his system of autonomous ethics. I hope to show that there are a number of religious

influences in Kants moral system, and that some of these are typically Lutheran.

Therefore, I should like to raise a few notes of caution against univocally aligning

Kants understanding of the radical evil, depraved will closer to a Catholic than a

Protestant understanding of the Fall. Specifically, I will comment upon Michalsons

claim that Kants position is similar to that of Erasmus in his celebrated debate withLuther over the freedom of the will (1990, p. 75) by tracing some of the typically

Lutheran treads in Kants notion of the power of choice (Willkr)3. Textual fragments

seem to, at face value, align Kant closer to Erasmus than Luther. He writes that while

some supernatural cooperation is also needed for [the human being] becoming good

or better (6:44), still a germ of goodness is left in its entire purity, a germ that cannot

be extirpated (6:45). However, this restoration is not the acquisition of a lost incen-

tive for the good () [but] the recovery of the purity of the law (6:46). Two themes

will guide my exposition: first, how to understand depravity in a Lutheran, Catho-

lic and Kantian sense and, second, how Luthers concept of God and grace showstructural and performative similarities with Kants higher faculty of desire (Wille)

and feeling of respect (Achtung).

Erasmus diatribe

In 1524, Erasmus wrote his Diatribe or Sermon concerning Free Will as a re-

sponse to Luthers Assertio omnium articulorum D. Mart. Luth. Per bullam Leonis

X Damnatorum (1520) to which Luther responded with his On the Bondage of the

Will (1525)4, ultimately leading to Erasmus Hyperaspistes (15261527). Although

1 All references stem from the Cambridge Edition of Kants work. They will be followed by the number

of the volume and page number of the Akademie Ausgabe, as is customary.

2 See: Winter (1972, p. xi), Michalson (1990, p. 75) and Staten (2005, p. 17).

3 Kant was actually raised in Pietism, not Lutheranism or Calvinism. Pietism is a theological movement

within Lutheranism which is usually, in the constructivist understanding (cf. Wallmann (1990), taken to be

initiated by Philipp Jakob Spener (16351705) and continued by August Hermann Francke (16631727).

Several scholars (cf. Lindberg (2005) point towards the earlier influence of Johann Arndt (15551621),

Johannes Tauler (13001361) and Thomas Kempis (13801471) on the movement. Within Pietism, two

sub-movements emerged: Moravianism and Halle Pietism, of which the latter influenced Kant the most.

The most significant point of divergence between Pietism and Lutheranism is the formers emphasis on

the monastic ideal ofImitatio Christi. For the purposes of this paper, I feel I can gloss over the differences

between Pietism and Lutheranism.

4 The English translation of the free-will dispute is taken from Winter (Ed., 1972). I will abbreviate this

work in the text as EL as well as add the number of the page.

123


3/18

Int J Philos Relig

Erasmus was very critical of church authority, see especially his Praise of Folly

(1511), and initially sympathetic to the Reformation5, he was rather hesitant with

regard to Luthers analysis of the bondage of the will.

Erasmus defines freedom of the will as the power of the human will whereby man

can apply to or turn away from that which leads unto eternal salvation (EL 20). Manis free to turn away from salvation or towards God: in man, there is a desire both

for the depraved Flesh as well as for God. Erasmus equates fallenness with free-

dom: we have become free to turn away from God which, by itself, makes us evil or

depraved. Erasmus subscribes to the classical scholastic three-fold distinction of the

human being in body (flesh), spirit and soul. According to this distinction, only the

body is corrupted through the Fall. Erasmus understands the rejection of Godnot as

a positive commitment to evilas form of giving in to the depraved flesh. Because

of the Fall, human beings have a natural tendency to venture astray and are prone to

immersing in sensuality: The will capable of turning here and there is generally calleda free will, despite its more ready assent to evil than to good, because of our remaining

inclination to sin (EL 65). This attraction to sensuality has an upside, however, since

it forms the ground for the human agents potency for merit: the human agent is able

to freely opt for God and work towards her regeneration from evil. Whenever she

is evil, she is overtaken by her sensuous nature and needs to be re-awakened to her

moral destiny. Accordingly, Erasmus asserts that the human agent is principally able

to autonomously fulfill some of the basic requirements that will work towards her sal-

vation as her other capacities (i.e. spirit and soul) are untainted by the Fall: corruption

has not destroyed the human agents potency for the good, only weakened it; the nat-ural light has been dimmed, not extinguished. The Fall is, in Erasmus understanding,

never radical or absolute as a germ of goodness always remains.

A particularly emphatic illustration of this surrounds the Catholic interpretation of

Gods incarnation in the flesh: God enters the immanent world as a fleshed being,

therefore there is something about (fleshed) being that is fundamentally good. The

much-debated dual nature of Jesus does, in Erasmus understanding, not univocally

focus on either humanity or divinity as both are the constituent parts of Jesus being.

Therefore, we should not radically turn away from the devices offered to man, such as

prudence and charitable work, in order to be saved because they were blessed in Jesus.

Erasmus calls prayer and, more importantly, wisdom the weapons of a Christian as

he was thoroughly convinced that rational truth could not contradict revelatory truth

(the unity of truth). Being itself, if approached properly, is infused with an aura of

5 After Luther nailed his 95 theses to the door of the Castle Church in Wittenberg on October 31, 1517,

Erasmus wrote a number of letters to Thomas More and John Colet detailing his, to a large extent, approval

of Luthers discomforts with the Church. A popular saying goes that Erasmus work laid the egg that

Luther hatched. Erasmus refused, however, to univocally pick sides with the Reformation, or the Catholic

Church, and was therefore accused of cowardice from either side. Although Erasmus repeatedly claimed

that taking sides would be to the detriment of his position as a non-partisan scholar, one could easily takeErasmus refusal to adhere to all the tenets of the Reformation as a sign, reminiscent of his Humanism, of

his deep-rooted reservations concerning Luthers emphasis on the bondage of the will and the nullity of

charitable works and prayer to work towards the good. He did believe that the Catholic Church needed to be

reformed and returned to a more original and pure interpretation of Scripturealthough fiercely rejecting

any form of schismby criticizing the hairsplitting of theology. He feared that Protestantism would simply

replace the old theology with a new one. Cf. Gonzalez (1975, pp. 1922).

123


4/18

Int J Philos Relig

goodness that no amount of corruption can ever extinguish: If we are on the road to

piety, we should continue to improve eagerly and forget what lies behind us; if we

have become involved in sin, we should make every effort to extricate ourselves, to

accept the remedy of penance and solicit the mercy of the lord (EL 9). Accordingly,

there are some worldly things that can assist man in meriting the Kingdom of Heaven.The Church, for example, can work as a mediator between God and man in order

to put man on the right path to salvation. In Erasmus opinion, however, the Church

has strayed from her proper end and should be scrutinized and reformed: we need a

religion that returns ad fontes and not a new hairsplitting of theology.

To what extent can the human will and its worldly aids suffice to work towards

salvation without supernatural assistance? Erasmus remains relatively unclear on this

issue6, which could be attributed to the fact that he has not yet formed a definite

opinion on any of the numerous traditional views regarding the freedom of the will

(EL 7). He does seem to suggest, however, that, for the most part, salvation should beattributed to the grace of God. This does not entail, however, that human agency has

a negligible role to play in meriting this supernatural assistance. In fact, through the

workings of the will cultivating its talent for goodness through prayer and charitable

works, it will be more likely to be saved by God. This soteriological understanding of

moralitydrawing dangerously close to Pelegianismis mostly an inner attitude of

the mind for Erasmus, who strongly opposes hypocritical, and merely external, obedi-

ence to the law: vices masquerading as virtues are the greatest enemy to morality and

Christianity. Hence, augmented by Gods grace, human agency is able to overcome

its own depravity and venture towards personal salvation: Man is able to accomplishall things, if Gods grace aids him (EL 78). In good Christian humility, Erasmus

calls grace the principal cause and the will only the secondary cause of salvation

because the free will itself comes from divine grace (EL 86). The human agent

has some good within her that can assist to merit salvation, and she should therefore

work towards this end with all of her, even though limited, powers. Despite the con-

fidence Erasmus, who enjoyed the sobriquet Prince of the Humanists, has in human

capacities as well as his de-radicalization of original sin, his sense of Humanism in

general remains self-consciously Christian by emphasizing the requirement of a virtue

of faith7.

6 During the entirety of his life, Erasmus has stayed unclear on many issues. When he was asked by Fred-

erick the Great to testify to Luthers personality and piety, Erasmus answered with a glowing and brief

epigram. Luther commented to this that Erasmus is an eel. Only Christ can grab him. While many take

up Erasmus indecisiveness as a sign of cowardice or sloth, one could easily picture Erasmus as unwilling

to take sides as the options offered to him all seemed equally undesirable. He was convinced, however, that

there should be a Church in the future which should grow from the established one without violent schism.

He famously stated: I will put up with this Church until I find a better one.

7 Cf. Skinner (1978, p. 91). Although most scholars are, on a whole, sympathetic to mine and Skinners

analysis of Renaissance Humanism, some point out that this account fails to take in the larger social andintellectual context of Humanism in its interaction with scholasticism (Rummel 1995). Others tend to oppose

this homogenization of Humanism as it seemingly fails to note the strong Augustinian line of argumenta-

tion, e.g. Erasmus and Lorenzo Valla (Herdt 2008; Kraye 1988). Anthony Levi seems to formally oppose

Skinners assessment of Renaissance Humanism by claiming that it was mostly instigated by a rebellion

against a view of man as perfectible by norms of belief and behavior extrinsic and irrelevant to his rational

needs and moral aspirations (1974, p. 8).

123


5/18

Int J Philos Relig

Luthers response

Luther claims that Erasmus is not a proper Christian as the Christianity which he

describes is without Christ, without the Spirit, and chillier than ice (EL 105). Luther

interprets the Fall as a radical happening that cannot be reversed by any humanendeavor since the human agent is inexcusably fallen and the good is beyond her

reach. Luther believed that previous, especially Scholastic, theology has downplayed

the severity of the sinfulness of man (see especially his Attack on Latomus (1521)),

something which he found continued in Erasmus elicitation of the freedom of the

will. This total human depravity will later on be taken up as the first of the five

points of Calvinism. Prior to On the Bondage of the Will, Luther asserted, in the

Heidelberg Disputation (1518), that there is a Theology of Glory8 and a Theology

of the Cross9: the former attempts to comprehend God in His manifestation while

the latter only speaks of God in a more narrow sense of manifestation, namely in Hisimmediate revelation. In Luthers view, a Theology of the Glory was impossible

because of human depravity and weakness. God is not to be found in any works

which Luther understands in a twofold sense: the workings of, on the one hand, God

such as immanent creation (rationalism) and, on the other hand, man such as moral

agency (moralism). God is found neither in human kindness nor the beauty of creation.

Rational theology boasts of being wise, while it really is, according to Luther, folly10,

and even exalted reason is under the sway of the devil11. Luther does not refuse all nat-

ural knowledge of God, however, as he allows, in his Theologia Cruxis for the rational

and natural certainty that God exists, that He is good, that He is all-powerful and thatHe is all-knowing. This left hand-knowledge of God can become supplemented by

right hand-knowledge of God, which is Scripture. The error of both Paganism and

Peleganism consists in putting too much stock in the left-handed knowledge of God,

therefore downplaying the more essential right-handed knowledge.

The Fall has, according to Luther, not only tainted the human agents natural apti-

tude for goodness, it has removed all natural or rational possibility for knowing 12

and adhering to the good. In Luthers understanding, the problem created by the Fall

entails not that we are tempted by the Flesh, but that we are nothing but Flesh. Should

we lack all revelation and grace, we would be unable to fulfill any of the requirements

to become good. The only remaining grain of goodness that is left in the human agent

is her passive ability for faith which Luther, at times, calls the Holy Spirit in us.

8 Luther takes this term from Exodus 33:1820. Moses implores God to show his glory to which God

answers that he will only naturally disclose his existence, kindness, power and sight but not his face: You

cannot see my face, for no one may see me and live.

9 This term most likely stems from I Corinthians 1:25 in which Paul discusses the weakness of God.

10 Luther refers a lot to Pauls letters. This one is taken from Romans 1:22: Although they claimed to be

wise, they became fools.

11 This is Luthers 24th thesis. He does not take such a harsh stance on all forms of rationality, however, as

he sings the praise of rationality in the service of humanity. He praises scientific progress and especially the

printing press. He did believe that reason lacks all possibility to think or capture God as she is the whore

or prostitute of the devil.

12 See Sudduth (2009, 111127) and Moroney (2000) for a more elaborate treatment of these so-called

noetic effects of sin.

123


6/18

Int J Philos Relig

Charitable works and sacramental service are only good insofar as they are accompa-

nied by a spirit of grace and complete surrender to God. Jesus incarnation in the Flesh

did not serve, as Erasmus takes it, to infuse being with divine goodness, but rather rein-

forced the distance between God and man by emphasizing Jesus eminent grandeur

and transcendence. While, in a manner of speech, asking what would Jesus do is theultimate and only guide, according to Erasmus, to progress towards the good13, this

question only emphasizes, for Luther, the insurmountable difference between divine

omnipotence and human bondage. Luther recycles a lot of elements from classical

theology, but, in both his Sermons and comments to Pauls letters, we see an ever

returning emphasis on Jesus divinity over His humanity. Luther often quotes John

14:9 in which Jesus identifies himself univocally with God therefore mitigating His

supposed humanity.

Luther pushes his point by, most likely intentionally, misinterpreting Erasmus

avowal to the ultimate necessity of grace. Should we remove Gods grace from theequation, Luther claims about Erasmus, the will is not free at all, but is the permanent

bond-slave and servant of evil, since it cannot turn itself unto good (EL 112). While

Luther states that the human agent must be graced prior to her becoming good, Eras-

mus has emphasized that she can be set on the pathway to the good and can partially

become good through her charitable works and prayer for there is a gracing preceding

action and merit. For Erasmus, the human will is left a grain of goodness and can,

through this, venture beyond the Fall. For Luther, however, the human will is not red-

olent of divine goodness and even venturing upon the pathway to salvation is beyond

its strength. Ultimately, Luther will venture towards the most extreme of positions andstate that we must deny free will altogether and ascribe everything to God (EL 133).

The decisive difference between Erasmus and Luther can be captured in the latters

denial of the possibility to autonomously venture towards the good. Since, for Luther,

everything is up to God, we must reject the possibility of any kind of mediationsuch

as Church, prayer or charitybetween immanent world and transcendent beyond.

Moreover, the human agent can never know whether she is about to merit salvation

or not, as all immanent signs of a character pleasing to God are contested. While

Luther most definitely did not reject the possibility of salvation through grace, the

human agent can do nothing to merit it. Both Luther and Erasmus claimed that some

form of moral regeneration is needed and the original goodness of beingwhich pre-

ceded the Fallmust be restored; Erasmus believed, contrary to Luther, that some of

this was within the reach of human autonomy.

To sum up: Erasmus believed that the Fall only weakened and not extinguished the

human beings knowledge and aptitude for the good. Luther, however, claimed that

without revelation the human agent has no knowledge of his own sinfulness or the

good and man is fundamentally unable to progress towards the good without the prior

gracing of God. Moving beyond the Fall is a forteriori impossible without the gracing

of God that no human agent can ever merit. Luther denies both natural knowledge of

the good (cognitive Fall) and natural adherence to the good (conative Fall).

13 Jennifer Herdt eloquently states that the main goal of Erasmus moral discourse was to commit people to

the imitatio and aemulatio of Jesus Christ (2008, pp. 116 ff.). She gracefully captures Erasmus disagreement

with Luther on this point (173 ff.).

123


7/18

Int J Philos Relig

Kants fallen will

Kants morality is renowned for its emphasis on duty and the utter rejection to align

morality, in any way, with the human agents natural desires and ambitions. I will

investigate Kants suggestion that morality should be conceived as a duty and link thisto his discussion of the radical propensity to evil (Hang zum Bse) in his Religion

within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (hereafter, Religion). Understanding Kants

concepts of depravity and restoration will be tantamount to the notes of caution I

draw up in the next section against aligning Kant too univocally with Erasmus. I will

pinpoint how this gives food for thought for a concept of grace and the soteriological

powers of the rational will (Wille).

Kant sets out in Groundwork I and II to articulate the content of the supreme prin-

ciple of morality and carries this on into GroundworkIII by investigating whether this

principle is at all operative: The present groundwork is, however, nothing more thanthe search for and establishment of the supreme principle of morality (4:392). The

supreme principle will be autonomy understood as both the negativeor descrip-

tivefreedom from immediate determination by any interest and the positiveor

normativefreedom to determine oneself through reason alone (4:447). Autonomy,

positively speaking, elicits the moral duty to format our maxim in accordance with

rationality. This entails that we must act as if we are a universal legislator in a merely

possible Kingdom of Ends (4:431; 4:439). In this Kingdom we, on the one hand, treat

the humanity within ourselves and others never merely as a means, but always also

as an end and (4:428), on the other hand, make sure that the maxim upon we act islogically and volitionallyuniversally applicable (4:402). A significant amount of

scholarship has been pursued, over recent decades, on the subject of what exactly the

status is of Kants assertions in the Groundworkand the Critique of Practical Reason

(hereafter, second Critique) as opposed to his later works, such as the Religion, the

Metaphysics of Morals (hereafter,Metaphysics) and the Anthropology from a Prag-

matical Point of View (hereafter, Anthropology). Early commentators, among which

most noteworthy Hegel, Fichte and the early Schelling, focused almost exclusively on

Kants early works ultimately calling Kants system of morals an empty formalism.

More recently, Kant-scholars seem to unanimously agree that the earlier works need

to be supplemented with the insights of the later, thereby offering some much-needed

nuance14. In this spirit, one can only understand Kants emphasis on duty should one

take into account his discussion of the propensity to evil in the Religion and his bleak

outlook on humanity in the Anthropology.

In the Anthropology, Kant paints a picture of humanity that, despite its endowment

with reason, is hardly inclined to act accordingly. While human beings are irrevocably

confronted with morality as a fact of reason (Faktum der Vernunft), they are almost

not at all inclined to act in accordance with morality. Although some beings are more

likely to act rationallysuch as men over women and whites over othershumanity

as a whole is ill-disposed towards morality. The only thing that could lift mankind

beyond this state of depravity is its potency to be perturbed by his constant propensity

14 Cf. Wood (1999, pp. 113). Similar arguments were, before Wood, made by Aune (1979, xxi) and

Patton (1964, pp. xxi).

123


8/18

Int J Philos Relig

to be irrational (7:332333). In the Religion, Kant conceptualizes the human agents

ill disposition towards reason under the heading of the propensity to evil. Kant distin-

guishes a propensity (Hange) from a predisposition (Anlage): the latter is called a

predisposition to the good which is original and the constituent parts required

for [the nature of a being] as well as the forms of their combination that make for sucha being that should be perceived as belonging to this being with necessity (6:28).

In total, there are three predispositions to the good, namely to animality (mechan-

ical self-love), to humanity (comparative self-love) and to personality (respect for

the law). All three are originally good and yet prone to abuse. A propensity is, in

contrast, called the subjective ground of the possibility of an inclination insofar as

this possibility is contingent for humanity in general (6:29). Kant clarifies in foot-

note that a propensity differs from a predisposition in virtue of it being acquired over

time: human agents are not inborn with a disposition to drink alcohol, but, whenever

they experience enjoyment herein, a propensity might arise that arouses an inclinationtowards drinking alcohol. A propensity is contingent for mankind, while a predis-

position is a universal a priori necessary constituent of human nature. A propensity

must therefore have a historical and volitional basiswhich Kant calls a transcenden-

tal extra-temporal choicethat actualizes this propensity although it can be taken to

bein potencyslumbering in human nature prior to it. The propensity of evil is an

act in a twofold sense: temporal and extra-temporal (6:31). Kant now claims that man-

kind has an acquired disposition towards evil of which there are three levels: frailty

of the human heart, impurity of motives and depravity of human nature (6:2930).

Allow me to highlight three characteristics of this propensity to evil.First, this propensity is rooted in the moral faculty of choice (6:31): the moral

faculty of choice has acquired a propensity to rank the disposition to humanity over

the disposition to personality, and the disposition to animality over both former. Evil

is the subjective incentive to subordinate the incentives of the moral law to others

or to [reverse] the ethical order (6:30).

Second, this propensity to evil is an a priori part of human nature as all human

agents have acquired a universal taste for evil over the good. One should not univo-

cally attribute this taste for evil to either the senses or reason as the former contains

too little, since they do not allow a positive choice for evil (as there is no freedom),

and the latter contains too much as the will itself (Wille) does not legislate evil (6:35).

The latter is usually called Kants rejection of devilishness15.

Third, this propensity to evil is called radical (Radikal Bse) because of two char-

acteristics: on the one hand, it corrupts the ground of all maxims and, on the other

hand, it cannot be extirpated through human forces (6:37). The second follows from

the first: as evil taints all choices man, we will always be positively inclined to evil and

cannot hope to overcome it by ourselves. Still, Kant asserts that it must be rationally

possible to overcome this evil (6:37). One should note that the logical necessity

for a possible victory over evil does not entail that an actual victory is possible. Kant

explicitly denies the possibility of a final victory over evil when he rejects theological

chiliasm (6:34).

15 For a good discussion, see Anderson-Gold (1984).

123


9/18

Int J Philos Relig

To reiterate, the propensity to evil is an acquired universal characteristic 16 of man

that induces him to give priority to sensuous over rational interests. This propensity

to evil cannot be conquered, but must be battled at every turn. A human agent is good

only if her intentions (Motive) to be moral are pure even though the actual incentive

(Triebfeder) will never be pure. As such, it stands to reason that the highest good ahuman being can attain is a good will that intends to act in accordance with duty

because of duty and not a holy will that acts in accordance with duty because this is

its nature. This explains Kants emphasis on duty: we have the moral duty to combat

an evil we are principally unable to conquer.

How is a human agent actually motivated to act morally? This question returns

time and again in Kants published oeuvre and he seems to be unable to make up his

mind in this respect. In his Lectures on Ethics, he calls this the philosophers stone

(Infield, 1963, pp. 4445). He phrases the question in his published works as how

is a categorical imperative possible (4:453) or, how pure reason can be practical(4:459) or, how freedom is possible (4:459) or, whether pure reason of itself alone

suffices to determine the will (5:15). Ultimately, the question reads: if morality can

never be taken to align itself with that which a human agent naturally aspires to, and all

enjoyment motivating morality should be rejected, why would we want to be moral17?

16 This peculiar togetherness of a historical with an a priori basis for evil has caused philosophical

polemic with regard to which one is the most basic. In my analysis, I take the possibility for a propensity

to evil to be universal while its actualization is historical or contingent. Henry Allison has focused on the

imputability of evil in connection with his incorporation-thesis of Kantian freedom. He emphasizes the

a priori individual character of evil that makes each individual agent responsible for his evil nature and

the evil he might commit (Allison 1990; see also: Axinn 1994). Allen Wood (1999) emphasizes the social

dimension of radical evil by tracing it back to Kants discussion of unsociable sociability in Idea for

a Universal History from a Cosmpolitan Point of View. In this essay, Kant claims that there is a certain

antagonism in human history which he terms the unsociable sociability (ungesellige Geselligkeit) of man:

[the] propensity to enter into society which, however, is combined with a thoroughgoing resistance that

constantly threatens to break up this society (8:20). On the one hand, the human agent is propelled to

unite in a cosmopolitan society (vergesellschaften) by renouncing her claims as an individual (moving up

to personality), but on the other hand she experiences a powerful propensity to individualize (vereinzelnen)

and pursue her individual desires and ambitions. I believe that a finessed combination of both aspects would

be the best approach to capture Kants understanding of radical evil. On the one hand, Kant emphasizes that

each individual is responsible for her evil nature by a transcendental choice. Therefore, the propensity toevil cannot be reduced to a quality of the species as this might excuse the individual agent from the evil she

might commit. On the other hand, the propensity to evil is a genuine characteristic of the human species

whenever it engages in cultural activities: as soon as man is free from bestial necessitation, she finds herself

at a crossroads forced to choose between good and evil knowing all too well that she should opt for the

moral law but still remains tempted to evil. This propensity is universal to the human species and should

be understood as an achievement of man. How are we to combine the social and the individual dimension

of radical evil? Pablo Muchnik phrases this issue as follows: Their positions [Wood and Allison] can be

symptomatic of an unfortunate dilemma Kant poses to the interpreter: either to emphasize the widespread

social/empirical dimensions of evil at the expense of its noumenal origin (Wood), or to stress its noumenal

origin at the expense of its social/empirical dimension (Allison) (Muchnik 2009, p. 56). How can some-

thing common to a species also be imputable to an individual being if imputability entails freedom? Kant

seems to gloss over the problematic aspect of this issue as he never formally discusses it. Richard Bernstein

notes: Many of the tensions and problems in Kants conception of radical evil can be traced back to his

attempt to reconcile the claim that human beings are, by their very nature, evil with the claim that, despite

this propensity to evil, human beings () can become morally good (2002, p. 20).

17 The question of moral motivation is highly debate in Kant-studies these days. The field is split by,

what McCarthy (1993, p. 423) calls, intellectualists and affectivists. While the intellectualists hold that

123


10/18

Int J Philos Relig

What interest do we have in acting morally18? There seem to be three stages in Kants

argument with regard to the possibility for autonomy: the Groundwork, the second

Critique and the Religion.

In the Groundwork, Kant devotes the third part to the question whether freedom is

at all possible. While this must be assumed, we cannot know how since the noumenalrealm is barred from inquiry through the regulative use of transcendental idealism:

The subjective impossibility of explaining the freedom of the will is the same as the

impossibility of discovering and making comprehensible an interest which the human

being can take in moral laws, and yet he really does take an interest in them, the

foundation of which in us we call moral feeling (4:460). Kant does not deny that man

takes an interest in morality which he defines as that which by which reason becomes

practical, i.e., becomes a cause determining the will (4:460), he does, however, not

allow any inquiry in how this operates.

In the second Critique, Kant will lift the veil surrounding the noumenal realm some-what by stating that the confrontation with the moral law effectuates a twofold effect

on the human agent. It arouses, on the one hand, a negative and pathological feeling

of displeasure as it detriments self-love and strikes down self-conceit (5:73) and, on

the other hand, a positive noumenal feeling of eminence and grandeur moving man to

respect the moral law (5:74). The eminent grandeur of morality motivates the conative

adherence to morality.

In the Religion, Kant hints that the eminence of morality might not be enough, for

most people, to motivate themselves to act morally. They might need the subjective

supplementing of religion as delivering some good fictions, such as grace, in orderto cultivate the interest in morality19. How does the above give to think on grace?

Kant attempts to circumvent two classical approaches to explain moral motivation:

divine command-theory (Crusius) and moral sentimentalism (Hutcheson, Hume).

Footnote 17 continued

being confronted with the moral law elicits a motive for adhering to it, the affectivists claim that rational

insights are, in themselves, inert and need to be supplemented with something else. The affectivist position

is defended by, among others, Richard McCarthy (1993; 2009), Larry Herrera (2000) and Karl Ameriks

(2006); the intellectualist position is defended by, among others, Andrew Reath (1989), Henry Allison(1990) and Onora ONeill (1975). Christine Korsgaard (1996, chapter two) traces this dispute back to a

discussion between rationalist ethics (Wolff et al.) and moral sentimentalism (Hume, Hutcheson, et al.).

Personally, I find a nuanced version of affectivism most convincing.

18 Kant has, at times, been pegged as a psychological hedonist; such a person only allows the incorpo-

ration of an end into his maxim if this end is thought of as bringing pleasure. This position is virtually

undefendedfor a single exception (Kerstein 2001)over the last few decades. A more viable alternative

is motivational hedonism (Ameriks 2006, McCarthy 2009): an agent can only incorporate an end into his

maxim if and only if the human agent has an interest in this end. An interest can be given through the faculty

of desire comprising of two parts: the lower and the higher. The lower faculty of desire spawns interest

in material interests that come under the general principle of self-love or ones own happiness (5:22).

The higher faculty of desire, if there is such a thing, spawns interest in morality. While I find this approach

very valuable, it does fail to capture the qualitative difference between moral (normative) and non-moral

(non-normative) interest. It tends to reduce the choice for morality to a struggle between the force of an

interest while, for Kant, morality is superior to sensuality because of its nature and not its performative

strength.

19 As this issue does not belong to the core of this paper, I will not touch it. I have dealt with the connection

between religion and evil in Kants philosophy in my XXX (Peer review anonymous).

123


11/18

Int J Philos Relig

The former explains moral duties as deriving normative appeal from God in the sense

of motivating human agents to act in accordance with morality because God commands

so. The latter claims that human agents have a natural moral feeling that attracts them

to being virtuous: we are virtuous because this elicits a feeling ofhigher and more

stablepleasure. Although Kant flirted with both of them at some time20, he ulti-mately rejected them because the spurious principles on which they base morality

are all heteronomous (4:441). Morality should be based on autonomy: the legisla-

tion and execution of moral duties depends on the rational self-legislation of the will.

In contrast with Luther and Erasmus, Kant has no room in his theory of morals for

any robustly religious concept of grace. Kant discusses grace, in theReligion, as that

which serves to supplement the deficiency of all his moral capacity (6:174). Since

the human agents maxim-making is ultimately corrupted by evil, she will never be

good but can only aspire to the good. As this insight might paralyze moral agency,

we may think, from the viewpoint of the moral religion, on grace: as long as ourintentions are pure, God will grace and carry us the rest of the way. This way of think-

ing on grace was already prepared in the second Critique although Kant relegated this

insight to a footnote (5:124). Grace is but a good fiction and completely dependent

on our own merit21.

Only the human agents own devices seem, at this point, suited to work towards her

salvation, i.e. her victory over the propensity to evil. One must, however, qualify what

exactly lies within the powers of the human agent and what does not. Kant declares

that there is a negative and a positive sense in which the human agent has a free will.

The power of choice (Willkr) is descriptively free, i.e. it is free from immediate deter-mination by any interest. While animals are determined through the strength of their

interest in a certain end, a human agent can reflect on these interests. Kant defines neg-

ative freedom, in the Groundwork, as that property of such a causality[a power of

choice]that it can be efficient independently of alien causes determining it (4:446).

Accordingly, one must assume that rationality is, at first, an alien cause that does

not immediately determine the power of choice. Rationality as a motive for acting is

offered by the will, the higher faculty of desire (Wille), which is autonomous in a more

positive sense: it legislates in accordance with universal and a priori laws. In order to

20 In two of his pre-critical essays, namely Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime

(17631764) and Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality

(1764), Kant offers some praising to Hutcheson and seems to, to some level, align his own approach to

morality to moral sentimentalism. For the critical Kants disagreement with Hutcheson, cf. Henrich (2009).

In the second Critique, Kant seems to align himself with a divine command-theory as he proposes the

existence of God as a necessary postulate of practical reason. He claims that we ought to view all duties as

divine commands (5:129). While he does qualify this statement, it remains, to some extent, unclear what

his critical disagreement is with divine command-theory. In the Metaphysics, Kant will finally clarify that

we should act as if (instar) all duties come from God and not as if we have duties towards ( erga) God

(6:487).

21 Most scholars contend that Kant attempts to reduce religion to morality by rejecting anything that mightrepress morality. The apotheosis of this is found in Kants discussion with J. Michaelis in a footnote to the

Religion. Michaelis argues that we should not have a morality holier than the Bible (6:110) to which Kant

responded that we should always interpret the Bible in accordance with morality. Stephen Palmquist (1992;

2000), however, defends that Kant does not at all reduce religion to morality, but rather raises morality to

the level of religion for it to be able to fulfill its objectives. For a good discussion of both sides, cf. Firestone

and Jacobs (2008).

123


12/18

Int J Philos Relig

be morally good, the power of choice needs to incorporate the legislation of the higher

faculty of desire into its maxim as the supreme ground of determination. The power

of choice is, however, inclined to prioritize sensuous inclinations over rational laws

as it is radically evil. Therefore, a human agent can only be motivated to act morally

through the normative appeal of the higher faculty of desire. The power of choice isunable to incorporate the universal law into its maxim without the positive feeling of

respect elicited by the higher faculty of desire by the moral law.

In this section, I have argued that Kants system of morals is based on duty because

of the radical propensity to evil. We are only good if we incorporate the moral law

into our maxim with as sole motivation respect for the moral law. The rationale of

our interest in the moral law is given through the higher faculty of desire that spawns

interest in acting in accordance with universal and a priori laws through confrontation

with the eminence of morality. As such, the power of choice can only be saved from

its state of depravity through the higher faculty of desire. This should have given usthe tools to show that there are some similarities between Kant and Luther.

Closer to Luther than Erasmus

In this section, I will argue that Kants conception of the power of choice draws, in

some of its elements, closer to Luther than Erasmus, mostly because, for Kant, the

power of choice has no natural means to work towards its own salvation. Salvation is

offered through the powers of the higher faculty of desire legislating in accordance

with universal a priori lawsor reasonwhich could rightfully be termed Kants

form of revelation. In my argument, Kants higher faculty of desire (Wille) takes up

the function of Luthers God and respect (Achtung) replaces grace22. First, I will pres-

ent Michalsons argumentation for aligning Kants concept of the will with Erasmus.

Consequently, I will draw up some notes of caution on his univocal alignment of Kant

with Erasmus.

Kant is interested, especially in the Religion, in understanding moral regeneration.

After he argues that mankind is radically evil, he is puzzled about the possibility to

move beyond this state of depravity. How can an evil tree bear good fruit? (6:45 )23

How can we expect to construct something completely straight from such crookedwood? (6:100). Kant asserts that moral regeneration must be possible since reason

demands it and cannot demand anything irrational. Michalson acknowledges Kants

dilemma: We thus seem stuck between debility and demandbetween a corruption

brought upon us by ourselves, and an obligation nonetheless to heal ourselves through

a free but unspecifiable act (1990, p. 73). Since moral regeneration must be possible,

Michalson claims, there must be left a grain of goodness in our being. Michalson

22 Ever since Josef Bohatecs (1966) seminal work on the theological sources of Kants philosophy, schol-

arship has moved away from an original schismatic understanding (e.g. Ludwig Borowskis early work on

Kant) of Kants dialogue with Lutheranism/Pietism towards a more finessed dialogue. Recently, however,

Manfred Kuehn (2001, chapters one and two) has eloquently defended a significant break between Kants

Pietistic upbringing and his critical philosophy. I hope to show that the specific content of some of Kants

philosophical concepts shows significant kinship with some typically Lutheran assumptions.

23 Kant mimics Luke 6:43: No good tree bears bad fruit, nor does a bad tree bear good fruit.

123


13/18

Int J Philos Relig

connects this grain of goodness to Kants assertion that we are not devils: we do

not legislate evil for the sake of evil24 and, therefore, we must be capable of [moral

regeneration] (6:41). This is Michalsons basic mistake as he conflates devilish-

ness and depravity: Kant does not equate legislating evil for the sake of evil with

depravity. Depravity is, rather, the ineradicable tendency to give priority to sensuousover rational interests. In Michalsons view, Kant takes the human agent to be able

make some sort of initiative or constructive step in the salvation process and original

sin does not eliminate our capacity to turn towards God and open ourselves (1990,

p. 75). Michalson claims that radical evil has not corrupted the Wille and the human

agent can naturally opt for the good.

I believe that Michalson misses some aspects of Kants philosophy in depicting

Kant closer to Erasmus than Luther. Although I do not deny that, for Kant, freedom

in the positive sensemust rationally be possible, it must remain elusive. There are

some elements, I admit, that draw Kant close to Erasmus such as his elicitation thatthe fall has not extinguished the natural light of reason to know the good. Luther

espoused a more radical notion of the fallen human being that is unable even to know

the good. There are a number of angles, however, that align Kant closer to Luther

than Erasmus that seem to have slipped Michalsons notice. I will approach this issue

from five different angles: from the radicality of evil, from the choice for evil, from the

inscrutability of freedom, from Kants rejection of prudence, and from the un-Kantian

consequences of Michalsons argument. Basically, Michalson fails to fully conceptual-

ize the difference between the power of choice and the rational will and, therefore,

cannot fully conceive how the rational will fulfills a quasi-religious and soteriologi-cal function. Moreover, Michalson argues that, since Kant rejected devilishness, the

power of choice must be able to naturally progress towards the good. The rejection of

devilishness does not, however, entail the rejection of radical depravity to which Kant

fully describes. Only the Wille is untainted by depravity, much like, to Luther, only

the passive ability faith is the last grain of goodness in the human being.

The human agents depravity will forever mark him with a vital impossibility to

autonomously move towards the good. Kantbut also Luther and Erasmusclaims

that attaining the good must be rationally possible as the human agent can recuper-

ate from the Fall. Kant does not allow, however, for the human agent to naturally

move towards the good. This might be somewhat odd since Kants morality is based

on autonomy. The autonomy of the Wille is, however, not what we might naturally

understand as autonomy. We usually understand under autonomy something like the

possibility to choose between two options sometimes including that one option is

morally superior to the other: our power of choice can opt between two options with-

out being in any way predetermined to either of these choices (negative freedom). This

disinterested freedom seems to be to some extent lacking in Kants moral philosophy

as we are tainted with radical evil which gives an inclination to opt for evil over the

24 Michalson repeatedly refers to Sharon Anderson-Golds essay Kants Rejection of Devilishness: The

Limits of Human Volition (1984) to substantiate his own view that Kant rejects devilishness. He himself

does not offer any substantial argumentation to corroborate this claim except for some textual fragments.

In these fragments, however, Kant rejects legislating evil for the sake of evil and not the impossibility of

rising from the swamp of depravity. Michalson seems to conflate the terms devilishness and depravity.

123


14/18

Int J Philos Relig

good. By ourselves, we have no way to opt for the good over evil. We need the higher

faculty of desire fulfilling the function of Luthers God to move us towards the good.

Without the soteriological powers of the Wille, it would be impossible for the human

agent to venture towards the good. The Wille needs to grace us with respect for the

moral law in order for us to move towards salvation.Kant is often renowned for being one of the first to offer a concept of radical evil

that, although ultimately rationalized, exceeded the naivety of others, such as Leibniz,

who dealt with evil. Kant asserted that man does not lose his freedom when acting

in an evil fashion but rather makes poor use of this freedom. While Luther did not

discuss at great length the human agents choice for evil, as he denied the necessary

natural freedom of the will to opt for either good or evil, Erasmus did claim that any

evil a human agent commits must be perceived as a privatio boni. Kant would most

certainly not agree with Erasmus that we are tempted by the flesh whenever we act in

an evil fashion; he claims, on the contrary, that we are positively choosing to commitourselves to overturning the moral world order. For Kant, we positively choose to act

in an evil fashion although we are very much aware that we should act otherwise25;

for Erasmus, we act in an evil fashion because our spirit is weak and cannot refuse

the call of the flesh. Ultimately, our nature would, for Erasmus, opt by itself for the

good if not for the distractions of the flesh. For Kant, the propensity of evil is rooted

in the power of choice itself therefore including the need for a supernamely the

Willeto opt for the good. One could argue that the human being if devoid of sensu-

ous interest would not have a propensity to evil as sensuous interest forms the ratio

behind the reversal of the moral order. This point is, in my view, nonsensical as Kanttakes the three different predispositions (animality, humanity and personality) as nec-

essary constituents of human nature; a human being without sensuous interests would

therefore be a contradictio in terminis.

In Kants view, autonomy (or, the good) will always remain inscrutable. Kant repeat-

edly states that we are never allowed a glimpse into the depths of our own heart so we

do not know whether we are actually progressing towards the good26. Similarly, Luther

stated that salvation is ultimately unpredictable and no human practices can guarantee

progress towards the good as God is the ultimate unpredictable moral judge. Gods

grace is granted inscrutably, unconditionally, and not in accordance with any merit we

25 Kants notion of the radical positive choice for evil has been, and still is, prone to misunderstanding.

Frans de Wachter (2003) summarizes it well: First, radical evil is not equated, within Kantian philosophy,

with being overwhelmed by the sensuous drives. Second, radical evil can only be overcome by a different

positive drive. Third, radical evil is an action (commissio) that should also be seen as negligence (omis-

sio): we are doing something while we should have done something else. Martin Matustik (2008, p. 90)

has been careless in pegging Kants notion of evil as privative; such a reading has unintentionally been

enforced through a certain reading of Henry Allisons reciprocity-thesis of freedom ( 1990) which he later

on explicitly rejects (1996).

26

In the Metaphysics: The depths of the human heart are unfathomable. Who knows himself well enoughto say, when he feels the incentive to fulfill his duty, whether it proceeds entirely from the representation of

the law or whether there are not many other sensible impulses contributing to it that look to ones advantage

(or to avoiding what is detrimental) and that, in other circumstances, could just as well serve vice? (6:447).

In the Religion: Assurance of [making moral progress] cannot of course be attained by the human being

naturally, neither via immediate consciousness nor via the evidence of the life he has hitherto led, for the

depths of his own heart (the subjective first ground of his maxims) are to him inscrutable (6:51).

123


15/18

Int J Philos Relig

might have. While Kant claims that being good is ultimately the manner in which we

become worthy of happiness (4:393; 4:450; 5:124), being happy does not guarantee

us that we are in fact progressing towards the good. Erasmus claimed that a seed of

goodness remains in the human being allowing for autonomous progression towards

salvation; moreover, he acknowledges that there are some specific ways in which suchprogress can become apparent. Luther denied any and all mediation between God and

the human agent: she must fully rely on a super or transcendent entity to be saved.

In the same way must the human agent, for Kant, first rely on her super or higher

faculty of desire for her to progress towards the good.

Kant rejects prudence (4:394 and 5:2122) as a tool to work towards attaining the

good. Although Kant does not deny that prudential goods might be conducive to

attaining a good will, they lack value in themselves and can only become good if

combined with a good will: pleasure, standing, honor, esteem, etc. do not offer a stair-

way to Heaven. Luther has furiously lashed out against the business of indulgencesthat freed man from sins by performing some earthly works of atonement. To be fair,

Erasmus was also opposed to indulgences, although on different grounds. He believed

they were hypocritically given to a so-called repentant in order to free her from a sin

that she would happily re-commit. Luther, however, believed that no amount of earthly

labor or prudential practices could ever move the human agent towards regeneration;

only God decides who is worthy of it. Earthly labor only has moral value if combined

with the virtue of faith which can only be imbued in a human agent through revelation.

Similarly, Kant has asserted that only through respect (Achtung) for the moral law can

our actions have any moral resonance.Finally, Michalsons claim that a seed of goodness remains naturally in the human

agent leads to the absurd consequence that there is a natural and innate feeling for

morality in the human agent. This position is called moral sentimentalism with which

Kant flirted for a while but ultimately fully rejected from the Groundwork on. Kant

states, in the second Critique, that there is no antecendent feeling in the subject that

would be attuned to morality: that is impossible, since all feeling is sensible whereas

the incentive of the moral disposition must be free from any sensible condition (5:75).

Accordingly, the human agents natural being is in no way host to a feeling for moral-

ity that precedes being faced with the moral law through the higher faculty of desire.

Goodness must be, in Kantian philosophy, superimposed, and not built from the ground

up: the feeling of respect is forced upon the negatively free power of choice and is, in

no way, derived from it. As Kant puts it in theReligion: The restoration of the original

predisposition to good in us is not therefore the acquisition of a lost incentive for the

good () If a human being is corrupt in the very ground of his maxims, how can he

possibly bring about this revolution by his own forces and become a good human being

on his own? Yet duty commands that he be good, and duty commands nothing but what

he can do (6:467). The human agent is able to become good through a revolution

and not an expansion: a change of heart rather than a strengthening of natural moral

resolve (6:47). The legislation of the Wille offers the tools for this change of heart.

Although it is ultimately the human agents own workings that make him good, the

higher faculty of the desire delivers the tools for this ethical revolution.

123


16/18

Int J Philos Relig

Conclusion

I have argued that Kants understanding of the fallen or evil will is closer to, in

a significant number of elements, Luther than Erasmus. Allow me to reiterate before

examining the importance of my own claim. Kant claims that the human power ofchoice is corrupted by a propensity to evil which cannot be extirpated by the human

agent, and to progress morally is only possible through respect for the moral law

elicited through the higher faculty of desire. This draws Kant closer to Luther than

Erasmus in their respective understandings of the fallen will on five accounts. First,

the human agent can only progress towards holiness through being confronted with

a super, namely respect for the moral law. Second, radical evil is rooted in human

freedom as it is fundamentally corrupted (in Luthers term: completely flesh) and not

in the distractions of the flesh. Third, the progress towards the good remains inscru-

table to the human agent. Fourth, there is no mediation between the human agentswill and the good safe through rationality (or, to Luther, revelation). Finally, accepting

a prior feeling for morality reduces Kants morality to moral sentimentalism which he

explicitly rejects.

Kants rational optimism for the possibility of salvation through the powers of the

Wille has been wrongfully pegged as some form of natural potency to attain the good.

I have argued that Kant is in fact closer to Luthers pessimistic account of the human

agents own devices in attaining salvation. This has been offered in contrast with

Michalson who, in my view, surprisingly misses Kants underlying pessimism. In a

later work by his hand, Michalson (1999) has argued that underlying Kants philos-ophy there is a principle of immanence that paved the way for 19th century atheist

thinkers such as Schopenhauer, Feuerbach and Nietzsche. From the viewpoint of the

principle of immanence, Kant is aligned with (Romantic) atheism rather than liberal

theology (Schleiermach, Tillich) or positivism (Compte). I concur with Michalsons

(1999) argumentation: Kant can more properly be read as the intellectual father of

Schopenhauer and Nietzsche than Compte or Schleiermacher. I hope by clearing out

any lingering misunderstandings on Kants concept of the fallen will to strengthen

this point. Schopenhauer and Nietzsche both claimed that being is no good and that

it is better not to be. Both of them seem to reject any natural way out of this

mess and salvation could only be offered through silencing the will (Schopenhauer) or

re-creating the world and loving the fate we are dealt (Nietzsche): both were skeptical,

however, of the ultimate possibility of this highest good. As the super seems to

be missing for Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, they are left to their own devices which

are ultimately insufficient. Kant may be taken to pave the way for this through his

radicalization of the depravity of the will and the insufficiency of the natural powers

of man to break from this state of evil. I intend to argue for this point elsewhere.

Acknowledgments I would like to extent my gratitude to William Desmond, Simon Truwant, Martin

Moors, Andr Cloots and Paul Moyaert for their many helpful suggestions and comments on earlier ver-sions of this essay.

123


17/18

Int J Philos Relig

References

Ameriks, K. (2006). Kant and motivational externalism. In: H. Klemme, et al. (Ed.) Moralische

Motivation. Kant und die Alternativen (pp. 323). Hamburg: Felix Meiner.

Anderson-God, S. (1984). Kants rejection of devilishness: The limits of human volition. Idealisitic

Studies, 14, 3548.

Allison, H. (1990). Kants Theory of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Allison, H. (1996). On the banality of (radical) evil. A kantian analysis. In: H. Allison (Ed.) Idealism

and Freedom (pp. 16982). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Aune, B. (1979). Kants theory of morals. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Axinn, S. (1994). The logic of hope: Extensions of Kants view of religion. Amsterdam: Rodopi

publication.

Bernstein, R. (2002). Radical evil. A philosophical interrogation. New York: Routledge Press.

De Wachter, F. (2003). Hoe radicaal is het radicale kwaad?. Tijdschrift Voor de Filosofie, 65, 3357.

Firestone, C., & Jacobs, N. (2008). In defense of Kants religion. Bloomington: Indiana University

Press.

Gonzalez, J. (1975). A history of christian thought, vol. III: From the protestant reformation to thetwentieth century. Nashville: Abingdon Press.

Guyer, P. (2000). Kant on freedom, law, and happiness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Henrich, D. (2009). Hutcheson and Kant. In: K. Ameriks, O. Hffe (Eds.) Kants moral and legal

philosophy (pp. 2958). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Herdt, J. (2008). Putting on virtue. The legacy of splendid vices. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Herrera, L. (2000). Kant on the moral Triebfeder. Kant-Studien, 91, 395410.

Kant, I. (1963). Lectures on ethics. (L. Infield, Trans.). New York: Harper and Row.

Kant, I. (1996a). Practical philosophy. (M. J. Gregor, Ed. and Trans.) Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press.

Kant, I. (1996b). Religion and rational theology. (A. Wood & G. Di Giovanni, Ed. and Trans.).

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kerstein, S. (2001). Kants (not so radical?) hedonism. In: V. Gerhardt (Ed.) Kant und die Berliner Aufklrung, Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongress, vol. III (pp. 24755). Berlin: Walter de

Gruyter.

Korsgaard, C. (1996). Creating the kingdom of ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kraye, J. (1988). Moral philosophy. In: C. Schmitt, & Q. Skinner (Eds.) The cambridge history of

renaissance philosophy (pp. 30386). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kuehn, M. (2001). Kant: A biography. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Levi, A. (1974). Pagan virtue and the humanism of the northern renaissance . London: The Society for

Renaissance Studies .

Lindberg, C. (2005). Introduction. In: The Pietist theologians (pp. 121). Oxford: Blackwell Publication.

Matustik, M. (2008). Radical evil and the scarcity of hope. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

McCarty, R. (1993). Kantian moral motivation and the feeling of respect. Journal of the History ofPhilosophy, 31, 421435.

McCarthy, R. (2009). Kants theory of action. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Michalson, G. (1990). Fallen freedom. Kant on radical evil and moral regeneration. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.

Michalson, G. (1999). Kant and the problem of god. Oxford: Blackwell publication.

Moroney, S. (2000). The noetic effects of sin: A historical and contemporary exploration of how sin

affects our thinking. Lanham: Lexington Books.

Muchnik, P. (2009). Kants theory of evil. An essay on the dangers of self-love and the a prioricity of

history. Lanham: Lexington Books.

ONeill, O. (1975). Acting on principle. An essay on Kantian ethics. Columbia: Columbia University

Press.

Palmquist, S. (1992). Does Kant reduce religion to morality. Kant-Studien, 83, 129148.Palmquist, S. (2000). Kants critical religion. Volume Two of Kants system of perspectives. Aldershot:

Ashgate Publishing Ltd.

Patton, H.J. (1964). Foreword. In: The doctrine of virtue. Part II of the Metaphysics of morals.

(M. Gregor, Trans.). New York: Harper Torchbooks.

123


18/18

Int J Philos Relig

Reath, A. (1989). Kants theory of moral sensibility. Respect for the law and the influence of inclina-

tion. Kant-Studien, 80, 284302.

Rummel, E. (1995). The humanist-scholastic debate in the renaissance and reformation. Cambridge:

Harvard University Press.

Skinner, Q. (1978). The foundations of modern political thought. Vol 1: The renaissance . Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.Staten, H. (2005). Radical evil revived: Hitler, Kant, Luther, Neo-Lacanians. In: A. Schrift (Ed.)

Modernity and the problem of evil (pp. 1227). Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

Sudduth, M. (2009). The reformed objection to natural theology. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing.

Wallmann, J. (1990). Der Pietismus. Gttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Winter, E. (1972). Introduction. In: ErasmusLuther. Discourse on Free Will (pp. vxi). (E. Winter, Ed.

and Trans.). New York: Frederick Ungar.

Wood, A. (1999). Kants ethical thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

13

Documents

Lutherian Influence on Kant Deprived Will