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M. Atzori, F. Bonchi, F. Giannotti, D. Pedreschi KDD Laboratory University of Pisa and ISTI-CNR Speaker: Maurizio Atzori GeoPKDD, Venezia 18 October 2005 Pisa KDD Laboratory http://www-kdd.isti.cnr.it/ Anonymity Aware Data Mining

M. Atzori, F. Bonchi, F. Giannotti, D. Pedreschi KDD Laboratory University of Pisa and ISTI-CNR

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M. Atzori, F. Bonchi, F. Giannotti, D. Pedreschi KDD Laboratory University of Pisa and ISTI-CNR Speaker: Maurizio Atzori GeoPKDD, Venezia 18 October 2005. Pisa KDD Laboratory http://www-kdd.isti.cnr.it/. Anonymity Aware Data Mining. Our Taxonomy of Privacy Preserving Data Mining. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: M. Atzori, F. Bonchi, F. Giannotti, D. Pedreschi KDD Laboratory University of Pisa and ISTI-CNR

M. Atzori, F. Bonchi, F. Giannotti, D. PedreschiKDD Laboratory

University of Pisa and ISTI-CNR

Speaker: Maurizio Atzori

GeoPKDD, Venezia 18 October 2005

Pisa KDD Laboratoryhttp://www-kdd.isti.cnr.it/

Anonymity Aware Data Mining

Page 2: M. Atzori, F. Bonchi, F. Giannotti, D. Pedreschi KDD Laboratory University of Pisa and ISTI-CNR

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Our Taxonomy of Privacy Preserving Data Mining

Intesional Knowledge Hiding Bertino’s approach, based on DB Sanitization

Extensional Knowledge Hiding Agrawal’s approach, based on DB Randomization Sweeney’s approach, based on DB Anonymization

Distributed Extensional Knowledge Hiding Clifton’s approach based on Secure Multiparty

Computation

Secure Intesional Knowledge Sharing Clifton’s Public/Private/Unknown Attribute Framework Zaiane’s Association Rule Sanitization (but also IKH) Our approach

Page 3: M. Atzori, F. Bonchi, F. Giannotti, D. Pedreschi KDD Laboratory University of Pisa and ISTI-CNR

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A Motivating Example

Suppose that The Fair Hospital, by doing association analysis, discovered some interesting patterns in its patient data

Now, such an institution wants to: publish those research results NOT release any personal information of

its patients (i.e. Information that regard only few patients)

Page 4: M. Atzori, F. Bonchi, F. Giannotti, D. Pedreschi KDD Laboratory University of Pisa and ISTI-CNR

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Association Analysis can Break Anonymity

a1 a2 a3 a4 [sup = 80, conf = 98.7%]

Page 5: M. Atzori, F. Bonchi, F. Giannotti, D. Pedreschi KDD Laboratory University of Pisa and ISTI-CNR

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Association Analysis can Break Anonymity

a1 a2 a3 a4 [sup = 80, conf = 98.7%]

sup(a1,a2,a3) = = 81 sup(a1, a2, a3, a4)

conf

Page 6: M. Atzori, F. Bonchi, F. Giannotti, D. Pedreschi KDD Laboratory University of Pisa and ISTI-CNR

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Association Analysis can Break Anonymity

a1 a2 a3 a4 [sup = 80, conf = 98.7%]

sup(a1,a2,a3) = = 81

Therefore there is only one individual such that the pattern a1 a2 a3 ¬a4 holds This information can be used as a quasi-

identifier for that person, breaking her anonyimity

sup(a1, a2, a3, a4)conf

Page 7: M. Atzori, F. Bonchi, F. Giannotti, D. Pedreschi KDD Laboratory University of Pisa and ISTI-CNR

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Bad and Good Things

BAD THING: In general Data Mining results contain information related to few individuals This is true even if we use high values for

the support threshold (i.e. Forcing samples to be large)

GOOD THING: inference channels leading to anonymity breaches can be discovered and removed

Page 8: M. Atzori, F. Bonchi, F. Giannotti, D. Pedreschi KDD Laboratory University of Pisa and ISTI-CNR

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Our Approach: k-Anonymous Patterns

Based on Relational DB K-anonymity [Sweeney, 1998-2002] We can transform a Relation into another more

general s.t. Every row appears at least k times

From Data to Pattern k-anonymity A set of patterns is k-anonymous if it is impossible

to infer anything about a set of individuals of cardinality less than k

DB K-anonymity guarantees the extraction of only k-anonymous patterns, but: Optimal DB k-anonymity is NP-Complete (very high

computational cost) DB k-anonymity destroys also safe information

Page 9: M. Atzori, F. Bonchi, F. Giannotti, D. Pedreschi KDD Laboratory University of Pisa and ISTI-CNR

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Summary: Present and Future

What we did: Formalization of such anonymity threats in data

mining models, based on the concept of Sweeney’s k-Anonymity

We developed an Inference Channel Detector able to discover all anonymity breaches [Atzori et al., PKDD05]

We developed Sanitization Strategies to slightly modify the output of data mining algorithm in order to guarantee [Atzori et al., ICDM05]

What we (hopefully) will do: Apply k-anonymity framework to Spatio-Temporal

Databases and Data Mining