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MA 110: Finite Math Dr. Maria Byrne Instructional Laboratory 0345 Lecture 10/31/2008

MA 110: Finite Math Dr. Maria Byrne Instructional Laboratory 0345

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MA 110: Finite Math Dr. Maria Byrne Instructional Laboratory 0345. Lecture 10/31/2008. We’ll Study: Two Voting Systems. 1. Plurality Method 2. Pairwise Comparison Method. Plurality Method. Only considers voter’s top choice . The candidate with the most votes wins. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: MA 110: Finite Math Dr. Maria Byrne Instructional Laboratory 0345

MA 110: Finite MathDr. Maria Byrne

Instructional Laboratory 0345

Lecture 10/31/2008

Page 2: MA 110: Finite Math Dr. Maria Byrne Instructional Laboratory 0345

1. Plurality Method

2. Pairwise Comparison Method

We’ll Study:Two Voting Systems

Page 3: MA 110: Finite Math Dr. Maria Byrne Instructional Laboratory 0345

Plurality Method

• Only considers voter’s top choice.

• The candidate with the most votes wins.

• A tie can be handled in any way the voting system agrees upon.

• If there is an absolute majority vote for one candidate, that candidate wins.

Page 4: MA 110: Finite Math Dr. Maria Byrne Instructional Laboratory 0345

Plurality Method

• Only considers voter’s top choice.

• The candidate with the most votes wins.

• A tie can be handled in any way the voting system agrees upon.

• If there is an absolute majority vote for one candidate, that candidate wins.

Simple and easy voting method.

Page 5: MA 110: Finite Math Dr. Maria Byrne Instructional Laboratory 0345

Pairwise Comparison MethodAlso known as condorcet method.

• Considers all ranked choices of each voter.

• If one candidate beats every other candidate in a head-to-head match, that candidate is the winner.

• If one candidate beats one candidate but is beaten by another candidate, a point-system is used to find the winner that will satisfy people the most.

Page 6: MA 110: Finite Math Dr. Maria Byrne Instructional Laboratory 0345

Plurality and Pairwise Comparison Methods

• Both satisfy the majority wins rule.

• Only pairwise comparison satisfies the head-to-head winning rule.

• Both fail the irrelevant loser rule.

Page 7: MA 110: Finite Math Dr. Maria Byrne Instructional Laboratory 0345

Comparing Plurality and Pairwise Comparison

Fairness Rules Plurality Pairwise Comparison

Majority Wins Rule X X

Head-to-head Winning Rule X

Irrelevant Loser Rule

Page 8: MA 110: Finite Math Dr. Maria Byrne Instructional Laboratory 0345

Comparing Plurality and Pairwise Comparison Methods

Fairness Rules Plurality Pairwise Comparison

Majority Wins Rule X X

Head-to-head Winning Rule X

Irrelevant Loser Rule

Page 9: MA 110: Finite Math Dr. Maria Byrne Instructional Laboratory 0345

The Head-to-Head Criterion

If a candidate wins when compared head to head (individually) with each

of the other candidates, then that candidate should be declared the

winner.

Page 10: MA 110: Finite Math Dr. Maria Byrne Instructional Laboratory 0345

Plurality can fail

the head-to-head criterion:

Example 14 from book

Page 429

Page 11: MA 110: Finite Math Dr. Maria Byrne Instructional Laboratory 0345

Comparing Plurality and Pairwise Comparison

Fairness Rules Plurality Pairwise Comparison

Majority Wins Rule X X

Head-to-head Winning Rule X

Irrelevant Loser Rule

Page 12: MA 110: Finite Math Dr. Maria Byrne Instructional Laboratory 0345

Failing Irrelevant Losers Rulewith Plurality Voting

What kind of pie to have? 9 votes:

Apple Blueberry Cherry

3 4 2

Page 13: MA 110: Finite Math Dr. Maria Byrne Instructional Laboratory 0345

Failing Irrelevant Losers Rulewith Plurality Voting

What kind of pie to have?

Apple Blueberry Cherry

3 4 2

With cherry pie, Blueberry pie wins!

Page 14: MA 110: Finite Math Dr. Maria Byrne Instructional Laboratory 0345

Failing Irrelevant Losers Rulewith Plurality Voting

What kind of pie to have?

Apple Blueberry Cherry

3 4 2

With cherry pie, Blueberry pie wins!

If there’s no cherry pie, 2 people revote:

Page 15: MA 110: Finite Math Dr. Maria Byrne Instructional Laboratory 0345

Failing Irrelevant Losers Rulewith Plurality Voting

What kind of pie to have?

Apple Blueberry Cherry

3 4 2

With cherry pie, Blueberry pie wins!

Apple Blueberry Cherry

3+2=5 4 0

If there’s no cherry pie, 2 people revote:

Page 16: MA 110: Finite Math Dr. Maria Byrne Instructional Laboratory 0345

Failing Irrelevant Losers Rulewith Plurality Voting

What kind of pie to have?

Apple Blueberry Cherry

3 4 2

With cherry pie, Blueberry pie wins!

Apple Blueberry Cherry

3+2=5 4 0

Without cherry pie, apple pie wins!

If there’s no cherry pie, 2 people revote:

Page 17: MA 110: Finite Math Dr. Maria Byrne Instructional Laboratory 0345

On the independence of irrelevant alternatives:

After finishing dinner, Sidney Morgenbesser decides to order dessert. The waitress tells him he has two choices: apple pie and blueberry pie. Sidney orders the apple pie. After a few minutes the waitress returns and says that they also have cherry pie at which point Morgenbesser says "In that case I'll have the blueberry pie."

Page 18: MA 110: Finite Math Dr. Maria Byrne Instructional Laboratory 0345

Failing Irrelevant Losers Rulewith Plurality Voting

What kind of pie to have?

Apple Blueberry Cherry

3 4 2

With cherry pie, Blueberry pie wins!

Apple Blueberry Cherry

3+2=5 4 0

Without cherry pie, apple pie wins!

If there’s no cherry pie, 2 people revote:

Page 19: MA 110: Finite Math Dr. Maria Byrne Instructional Laboratory 0345

Voting Systems And Us

I. Who would have been president

if other voting systems were used?

Page 20: MA 110: Finite Math Dr. Maria Byrne Instructional Laboratory 0345

Often, details of the voting system don’t matter:

• 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996

• Different voting schemes (popular vote, the Electoral College, the pairwise comparison), all selected the same candidate.

Yoshie Furuhashi , 2004

Page 21: MA 110: Finite Math Dr. Maria Byrne Instructional Laboratory 0345

What happened in 2000?

Page 22: MA 110: Finite Math Dr. Maria Byrne Instructional Laboratory 0345

2000 Presidential Election

George W. Bush Al Gore

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Did Nader spoil the election?

Impossible to say but…

Page 24: MA 110: Finite Math Dr. Maria Byrne Instructional Laboratory 0345

Did Nader spoil the election?

Impossible to say but…

In the 2000 presidential election in Florida. Bush beat Gore by only 537 votes. Nader received 97,421 votes.

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A Voting Game

Page 26: MA 110: Finite Math Dr. Maria Byrne Instructional Laboratory 0345

A Voting Game

• Each student is an elf, a hobbit or a dwarf living in Middle Earth.

• Middle Earth is a democracy, but the inhabitants haven’t decided how to vote.

• Running for president:• Gandalf (elf)

• Gimli (dwarf)

• Bilbo Baggins (hobbit)

• Aragorn (man)

Page 27: MA 110: Finite Math Dr. Maria Byrne Instructional Laboratory 0345

Winning

• If Gandalf gets elected, elves and men win.

• If Gimli gets elected, dwarves and hobbits win.

• If Bilbo gets elected, elves and hobbits win.

• If Aragorn gets elected, man and dwarves win.

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Plurality Voting

• Vote #1

• Vote #2

• Vote #3

Page 29: MA 110: Finite Math Dr. Maria Byrne Instructional Laboratory 0345

Pairwise Comparison Voting

• Vote #1