Research Design Social sciences research paradigms

One issue that arises when dealing with social sciences philosophy is the lack of

agreement regarding the labels or terminology used in discussing epistemology,

research paradigms, ontology or theoretical perspectives. Crotty sets about some

definition for the main terminology, but also refers to other writers who disagree with

these or indeed use their own. If we take Crotty’s definition first, he describes,

ontology as dealing with the question of reality or existence, with which Creswell

agrees (Creswell, 2007, p 16-18), how we believe reality to exist; epistemology as

concerned with the theory of knowledge, or how we know what we know; theoretical

perspectives as philosophical stances informing and providing a context for the

methodology, which are embedded in the epistemology (Crotty, 1998, pp. 3-10).

However Guba and Lincoln (2005) call Crotty’s epistemologies paradigms, Williams

(in Jupp, 2006, p. 229) refer to positivism, for example, as a methodology, whereas

Crotty calls it an epistemology, in fact Jupp’s Sage Dictionary of Social Research

Methods frequently interchanges ontology and epistemology. Creswell includes two

categories between epistemology and methodological assumptions: axiology and

rhetorical (Creswell, 2007, p. 15), Bryman refers to a ‘positivist ontology’ in

Buachanan & Bryman (p. 433) but it is an epistemology in Bryman 2008 (p. 14).

Because of the issues of both ontology and epistemology tend to be related or ‘emerge

together’, ‘writers in research literature have trouble keeping ontology and

epistemology apart conceptually’ (Crotty, 1998, p. 10). Additionally many authors use

the words paradigm, perspective and approach interchangeably. With so many

differing approaches to the terminology, for clarity we will begin by setting some

agreed terms. Here research paradigms will refer to the entire approach of

philosophical thought relating to research, ontology will refer solely to the concept of

being, epistemology to the concept of knowledge and theoretical perspectives to

frameworks within epistemologies which will inform our methodologies and

methods.

Ontology, the concept of existence has five main categories; realism, empiricism,

rationalism, nomalism and conceptualism. Realism is a concept in which realities are

distinct and uninfluenced by the human mind, ‘the planet and everything else on it

could exist without us, and therefore our knowledge of us knowing it existed, as we

would not … and things in the world, existing independently of consciousness’

(Macquarrie, cited Crotty, 1998, p. 10-11). Empiricism places an emphasis on sensory

exploration, (Williams, in Jupp, 2008, p. 90-92), As a contrast against this, Mautner’s

Dictionary of Philosophy describes rationalism as (logically) as a theory based in

rational reasoning and logic (Mautner, 2005, p. 518). Nomalism, centres the concept

of existence around the individual, it has no relevance without this reference

(Mautner, 2005, p. 428) and finally conceptualism is the idea that existence applies

only to the mind (Mautner, 2005, p. 115). However these ontologies are not restricted

to any particular epistemologies, there are of course traditional relationships, such as

realism and positivism, conceptualism and post-modernism, seemingly opposed

ontological-epistemological couplings are in fact quite compatible (Crotty, 1998, p.

10-12).

Objectivist epistemologies and theoretical perspectives Crotty describes objectivism as the view that knowledge and facts exist independently

as meaningful objects outside our consciousness. From this view we have the

traditional framework for theoretical perspectives from the natural sciences,

dominated by validity, measurability and generisability (Crotty, 1998, p. 5). Science

has long been concerned with the ‘truth’, for example Galileo refused to accept

colour, taste and smell attributes to be ‘real’ as they could not be measured, counted

and quantified, the base of objectivist philosophy and its child positivism (Crotty,

1998, p. 28). Positivist philosophy as we know it today, has its origins in the work of

Auguste Comte, an nineteenth century French scientist whose predominate interests

included mathematics and religion. Influenced by, though later bitterly departing

from, a French intellectual named Henri de Saint-Simon, he became concerned with

the wellbeing of society, an organisational approach which, he believed could only

come about with one true universal approach to science (Crotty, 1998, p. 21). Though

he was a mathematician at heart, and the prevailing sciences of that era advocated a

typically quantitative approach Comte’s positive science ‘bids us look instead to

‘laws’ that can be scientifically established; that is, to facts that regularly

characterise particular types of beings and constant relationships that can be shown

to obtain among various phenomena. The direct methods whereby these laws can be

established scientifically are observation, experiment and comparison’ (Crotty, 1998,

p. 22) and ‘No social fact can have any scientific meaning till it is connected with

some other social fact; without such connection it remains a mere anecdote, involving

rational utility (in Simpson, 1982, p. 78). (Crotty, 1998, p. 22) However it could be

argue that this point can be made of any social science approach not merely

positivism, a single statement unrelated to another cannot deepen any process.

Naturally positivist thought has grown and evolved since this beginning, notably with

the Vienna Circle in the 1920’s, a group of philosophers including social philosopher

Otto Neurath, mathematician Hans Hahn, physicist Philip Frank and Ludwig

Wittenstein who developed the ‘verification principle’, which states that no statement

can be meaningful or have true validity unless it can be verified independently

(Crotty, 1998, pp. 24-25). Today positivism can be described as truth as a constant

existence, unsullied by human constructions or interpretation, or as Crotty describes

it: Whereas people ascribe subjective meanings to objects in their world, science

really ‘ascribes’ no meanings at all. Instead it discovered meaning, for it is able to

grasp objective meaning, that is, meaning already inherent in the objects it considers

(Crotty, 1998, p. 27). Postpositivism, as any post-name suggests, is the development

of positivism after the positivist movement. It differs somewhat from positivism from

in themes such as the development of validity and the concerns that regarding the

lifespan of knowledge, is it changeable and so on, the certainty of corroborations and

validity (Crotty, 1998, p. 29-41).

Interpretivist epistemologies and theoretical perspectives Crotty cites Thomas Schwandt’s definition of interpretivism as

‘conceived in reaction to the effort to develop a natural science of the social. Its foil was largely logical empiricist methodology and the bid to apply that framework to human enquiry. … The interpretivist approach, to the contrary, looks for culturally derived and historically situated interpretations of the social life-world’ (Schwandt, 1994, p. 125 and cited in Crotty, 1998, 67).

Crotty traces interpretivism back to Max Weber in the nineteenth-century, who was

interested by the idea that social sciences are drawn to the notion of understanding

(Verstehen) in contrast to explanation (Erklären) found in natural sciences. Later

thinkers in this are such as Dilthey regarded natural and social realities as different

kinds of realities and therefore should be treated and investigated as such, though

some, such as Windelband, have disagreed with the idea of different realities.

However they still agree that there should be some kind of distinction between these

nomothetic or generalising methods (seeking one explanation that can be used as a

general rule, found in natural sciences) and idiographic or individualising methods

(many particular and non-recurrent reasons accounting for one phenomena, usual in

social sciences (Crotty, 1998, p. 67). However it can also be seen as that both the

natural and social sciences have concerns that can be viewed in a nomothetic or a

idiographic way, though there are tendencies or traditions that align one with a

particular stance. In regards specifically to the social sciences, Weber emphasises the

interpretive aspect of understanding, and ‘as far as human affairs are concerned, any

understanding of causation comes through an interpretative understanding of social

action and involves an explanation of relevant antecedent phenomena as meaning-

complexes’ (Crotty, 1998, p. 69). With the appreciation that our understanding of

social phenomena can at best be described as ‘adequate’ (ibid), Weber emphasises the

‘ideal type’ of appropriate methodology, a heuristic device which allows rigours

examination ignoring the now accepted assessment that natural and social sciences

require different methods (Crotty, 1998, pp. 70-71).

Dividing interpretivism into three main strands; symbolic interactionism,

phenomenology and hermeneutics, Crotty examines each in turn, and so we shall

follow this model. The first, symbolic interactionism is as Crotty describes it (Crotty,

1998, p. 72), derived in part from pragmatism. Bulmer was a leading thinker in this

area and in his work cited by Crotty, he list three key characteristics to this

perspective:

• That human beings act towards things on the basis of the meaning that these

things have for them;

• That the meaning of such things is derived from, and arises out of, the social

interaction that one has with one’s fellows;

• That these meanings are handled in, and modified through, an interpretive

process used by the person in dealing with the things he encounters.

Another key semiotic figure emerges here; Charles Sanders Peirce, an American

pragmatist and a pioneer of semiotics, following from Saussure. Peirce was looking

for an evaluative theory but as Crotty explains, with the expansion of thought by other

figures, it became less critical, and so he abandoned it (Crotty, 1998, p. 73). Here the

departure from the original starting point can be seen, as the examination is based on

understanding and not criticism. As Crotty puts it (Crotty, 1998, p. 76), ‘Culture is not

to be called into question; it is not to be criticised, least of all by someone from

another culture’.

The second branch, phenomenology; is concerned by our interpretation of

experiences, or as Crotty (1996a; cited 1998, p. 78), puts it: ‘it suggests that if we lay

aside, as best we can, the prevailing understandings of those phenomena and revisit

our immediate experience of them, possibilities for new meaning emerge for us or we

witness at least an authentication and enhancement of former meaning’. He expands

on this by returning to constructionism, whereby the phenomenologist feels that the

experience of the phenomena is lost under our cultural experiences and we forget to

understand the object or phenomena itself.

Finally, and in a little more detail, we come to hermeneutics. Modern hermeneutics

has its origins in biblical interpretation, and is largely concerned with interpretations

and hidden meanings in texts. That is to say what meaning do we derive from a text,

how this is altered by our perceptions, be they preconceived or not, our cultural

backgrounds and so on. It has a great deal of influence in Marxist thought and

phenomenology too, however it could be criticised as creating meaning where there is

none (Crotty, 1998, p. 91). Hermeneutics works by combining understanding of the

whole and of parts, or as Crotty describes it in his explanation of the hermeneutic

circle (Crotty, 1998, p. 92): understanding turns out to be a development of what is

already understood, with the more developed understanding returning to illuminate

and enlarge one’s starting point’. Schleiermacher, a nineteenth-century hermeneutic,

differed from the view of Derrida’s rejection of speech as he likened reading text to

listening to someone speak, in this manner we know the vocabulary, the grammar and

the meanings, we can put ourselves in place of the writer (Crotty, 1998, p. 93).

Schleiermacher’s biographer Dilthey expanded on this stating that the ‘real’ is

inexhaustible by human understanding and we can never fully conquer it, that we are

firmly rooted in historical life, of historical culture (ibid). Crotty paraphrases him as

‘lived experiences is incarnate in language, literature, behaviour, art, religion, law –

in short, in their every cultural institution and structure’.

Through the many contributors hermeneutics has naturally evolved and diversified,

however just a few pertinent developments shall be referred to here. Heidegger saw

the natural combination of phenomenology and hermeneutics: ‘if hermeneutics retains

a nuance of its own, this is the connotation of language’ (Crotty, 1998, p. 97). Here

we can see the break from the application of hermeneutics for just texts, here it is

expanded to explore the notion of being or existentialism. Heidegger developed the

hermeneutic circle, declaring that we must, return to a primordial understanding of

being, to jump into the circle to fully immerse ourselves in the meaning making

process (Crotty, 1998, p. 98). Heidegger’s student Gadamer again refers to this

historical aspect showing us that we are intrinsically connected to tradition; ‘history

does not belong to us we belong to it’, (Gadamer, 1989, p. 276-7; cited Crotty, 1998,

103), and that this tradition is also connected to language, therefore to understand

ourselves and our world in the present we must look to our past and our language, that

‘the fusion of horizons that takes place in the understanding is actually the

achievement of language’ (Gadamer, 1989, pp. 378, 389; cited Crotty, 1998, p. 100).

Here he is claiming that without language we could never understand, we could not

communicate. The horizons he refers to are our history and our present, each exists,

perhaps not always meeting, but each is necessary. We cannot appreciate our past

without a present and we cannot interact fully with our present without a past. As the

present clearly has a profound importance it is then logical that he should understand

the interpretations to be unique as each ‘has to adapt itself to the hermeneutical

situation to which it belongs’ (Gadamer, 1989, p. 379; cited Crotty, 1998, p. 101).

This all is sharply contrasted with Umberto Eco and literary criticism which divides

meaning and significism in a way which we will not find useful in this study (Crotty,

1998, pp. 105-107). However Crotty does indicate some useful methods of

approaching texts, of which we might consider, namely; empathic, where we identify

with the author; interactive, where we converse with, agree or disagree with the

author; and also transactional, where we add to or expand on what the author has

communicated (Crotty, 1998, pp. 109-110). The will prove useful later on in this

study as we explore visual meaning making.

Constructionist epistemologies and theoretical perspectives Constructionism is centred on the idea that ‘truth, or meaning, comes into existence in

and out of our engagement with realities in our world. … Meaning is not discovered,

but constructed’ (Crotty, 1998, p. 8-9). Crotty (1998, pp. 42-43) states that, from the

constructionist view, meaning is not simply found, it is actively constructed by human

beings through their consciousness as they engage with the world. If there were no

human beings there would be no meaning. He recalls Merleau-Ponty’s view that

objects can be pregnant with many potential meanings but until consciousness

engages with them no real meaning can emerge; ‘How … can there be meaning

without a mind?’ He follows by remind us that an object can have many connotations

depending on who is engaging with it, for example a tree in a logging town, or an

artists’ settlement or a treeless slum.

You may object that you cannot imagine a time when nothing existed in any phenomenal form. Were there not volcanoes? … The answer is that if you had been there, that is indeed the way the phenomena would have appeared to you. But you were not there: no one was. And because no one was there, there was not – at this mindless stage of history – anything that counted as a volcano…. I am not suggesting that the world had no substance to it whatsoever. We might say, perhaps, that it consisted of ‘worldstuff’. But the properties of this worldstuff had yet to be represented by a mind. (Humphrey, 1993, p. 17)

However when discussing Brentano, Lyotard and other constructionists, Crotty notes

that we must have something to construct meaning from. We cannot create meaning

where from nothing. Using an example from Fish (Crotty, 1998, p. 45-47) he shows

how a list of random words, some of them found in the Bible, were constructed by a

group of students as a deeply religious poem. When the students were told it was a

poem. The students did not create literary interpretation from nothing, they created it

from something, which appeared to be a poem, they were told it was a poem, they

knew what a poem was, how it should look and so that is how they constructed the

meaning from it. The purpose of this example is to show how we construct meaning

and how multiple meanings can be constructed; or a Crotty puts it: ‘There is no true

or valid interpretation. There are useful interpretations to be sure…’ and that ‘the

object may be meaningless in itself but it has a vital part to play in generating

meaning’ (Crotty, 1998, pp. 47-48). The multiplicity of meaning gives rise to the term

bricoleur which Denzin and Lincoln (2000, p. 2) describe as a Jack of all trades,

though there is a discrepancy between the original meaning from Lévi-Strauss’ essay

and Denzin and Lincoln’s explanation (Crotty, 1998, p. 49). Crotty expands on

Denzin and Lincoln’s explanation and shows how, due to this multiplicity of meaning

the viewer-engager-researcher must pay particular attention to the object and be open

and prepared for new interpretations and meanings (Crotty, 1998, pp. 49-51). Our

interpretations however do not simply appear from our engagement with the object,

we also construct based on our social, historical and cultural awareness (Crotty, 1998,

pp. 52-53). ‘Without a culture we could not function. … We depend on culture to

direct our behaviour and organise our experience’ and paraphrasing Fish, ‘We come

to inhabit this pre-existing system and to be inhabited by it’. In short we are

influenced by our history and we then add to it our present and each of these affects

how we construct our meanings. To take the tree example again, a tree would mean

different things to a Neolithic hunter-gatherer, a Dark Ages peasant, an eighteenth-

century courtesan and a twenty-first-century eco-warrior. Each has been affected by

their historical, social and cultural ‘memories’. However there is debate in regards to

whether this constructionism refers to all realities, including natural or physical, or

simply social realities (Crotty, 1998, p. 54), again bringing us back to Humphrey.

Does it matter if the object exists or not? It is irrelevant if we were not there to

witness it. Here Schwant (cited Crotty, 1998, p. 57) finds it useful to separate

constructionism and constructivism. The former referring to ‘the collective generation

[and transmission] of meaning’, while the latter relates to ‘the meaning-making

activity of the individual mind’, one relating to the natural world and the other to the

social world, as we can see the two are not mandatory. As a final point, interestingly

here we see one of the semiotic writers present as a social constructionist, Charles

Sanders Peirce, an American who coined the term semiotics. As Crotty describes

them, the early social pragmatists, of which Pierce was one, were ‘constructionist and

critical’ (Crotty, 1998, p. 61).

Subjectivist epistemologies and theoretical perspectives Subjectivism as an epistemology is a base for theoretical perspective such as critical

inquiry and modernism/post-modernism. Crotty (1998, p. 9) feels that this is the

concept many people meaning when they refer to constructionism and its core

consists of meaning which is not actively constructed as in constructionism, but which

comes from our subconscious, dreams, spiritual beliefs or ‘that is to say meaning

comes from anything but an interaction between the subject and the object to which it

is ascribed’. The critical inquiry branch of subjectivism, quite straightforwardly

consists of theoretical perspectives including feminism; Marxism; critical race theory

- issues of ethnicity or race; queer theory – which deals with the experiences of gay,

lesbian, bisexual and transgender persons; and so on. It is engaged with discovering

the causes for oppression; whether of class, sex, race or other; and affecting change

for the improvement of people’s lives which could be seen as a spiralling (onwards

and upwards) process towards a more utopian society (Crotty, 1998, p. 112-138, 157).

Kinchelo and McLaren (1994, pp. 139-140; cited in Crotty, 1998, pp. 157-158) list

some basic assumptions:

• That all thought is fundamentally mediated by power relations that are social

in nature and historically constituted;

• That facts can never be isolated from the domain of values or removed from

ideological inscription;

• That the relationship between concept and object, and between signifier and

signified, is never stable and is often mediated by the social relationships of

capitalist production and consumption;

• That language is central to the formation of subjectivity, that is, both

conscious and unconscious awareness;

• That certain groups in any society are privileged over others, constituting an

oppression that is most forceful when subordinates accept their social status as

natural, necessary or inevitable;

• That oppression has many faces, and concern for only one form of oppression

at the expense of others can be counterproductive because of the connections

between them;

• That mainstream research practices are generally implicated, albeit often

unwittingly, in the reproduction of systems of class, race and gender

oppression.

In specifics, the Marxism perspective is typically concerned with class and

economics, and in a political sense has been developed by many including Lenin,

Mao, Guevara, Castro, amongst other, some of which have given their name to

offshoots of it. Feminists differ considerably in their approaches, some are radical:

seeking separation from the male sex; an exclusion of the notion of ‘male feminists’:

We reject the idea that men can be feminists because we argue that what is essential to ‘being feminist’ is the procession of ‘feminist consciousness’. And we see feminist consciousness as rooted in the concrete, practical and everyday experiences of being, and being treated as, a woman. (Stanley and Wise, 1983, p. 18; cited Crotty, 1998, p. 161)

Some are naturally more moderate, ontological origins can differ hugely too, though a

tendency with all groups is to reject the notion of categorisation as too ‘male’,

however Rosemarie Tong (1995) offers seven categories of feminism (Crotty, 1998,

p. 162-163).

Postmodernism and post-subjectivism however are considerably independent from

their distant cousins. Postmodernism, as an epistemology, centred around sociological

philosophy following modernism, generally given to mean the period of

industrialisation in the mid-nineteenth century (though there is debate, this refers to

the post modern, postmodernism thought is largely from the 1960’s p. 186)) which

utterly changed human society. Some philosopher see postmodernism as a definite

break from modernism, such as Milner (Milner, 1991, p. 108; cited Crotty, 1998, p.

183-185) others see it as a continuation of it. The terms often associated with art and

literature, with modernism coming to the fore in the turn of nineteenth-twentieth

centuries as a response to this new industrialised, modern society, breaking down

thought and image to remake it anew. Sarup describes it as emphasising

‘experimentation’, exploring ‘the paradoxical, ambiguous and uncertain, open-ended

nature of reality’, manifesting a ‘rejection of the notion of an integrated personality’.

However, artistically speaking a rejection of modernism, which neither embraced or

rejected the principles of the Enlightenment but which were central to it, and a

harking back to natural and nostalgic approach does not refer to postmodernism, this

instead was an anti-modernism, embodied in movements such as the Arts and Crafts

movement and Art Nouveau, or for example Picasso in his early modern years being

influenced by African art etc, Gustave Eiffel’s Eiffel Tower etc, though Picasso

moved to post-modernism in a sense with Cubism. It’s principle, essentially is to

break down the familiar, to recreate anew, to distance and distort – a deconstruction

of all which is familiar to use in order to rediscover truth (Crotty, 1998, p. 183-193)

It is this destruction which can made it difficult to understand the differences between

modernism, postmodernism and post-subjectivism. They share many similar

characteristics, difficult to distinguish them., as Richard Wolin and Jonathan Rée,

attempt to clarify:

There are no absolute truths and no objective values. There may be local truths and values around, but none of them has the endorsement of things as they really are… As for reality itself, it does not speak to us, does not tell us what is true or good or beautiful. The universe is not itself any of these things, it does not interpret. Only we do, variously. (Rue 1994, pp. 272-3; cited Crotty, 1998, p. 192)

There are so many similarities between postmodernism and poststructuralism that

Sarup finds it difficult to clearly differentiate between them (Sarup, 1993, p. 144;

cited Crotty, 1998, pp. 195-196). Others, e.g. Fink-Eitel however do see a clear

difference, even if they concede that poststructuralism falls under the umbrella of

postmodernism or as Blackburn (1994, p. 295; cited ibid.) admits have many aspects

in common. Blackburn however sees these as being poststructuralist= aspects which

postmodernism has claimed and developed. Crotty however sees poststructuralism

and postmodernism as informing each other with some overlap. Crotty rightly

identifies a decidedly French theme running through the poststructuralist debate and

identifies Émile Durkheim as one of the key structuralist figures though he mentions

that Milner (1991, p. 62; cited Crotty, 1998, p. 196-199) seeing him as a

‘protoscructuralist’. A central theme to Durheim’s work was of systems for

sentiments, ideas and images which obey their natural and intrinsic laws. Milner

(1991, pp. 65-66; cited Crotty, 1998, p. 199) points to five characteristics of

structuralism:

• Positivism (it can be described…pejoratively as scientific)

• Anti-historicism (structuralisms typically inhabit a never ending theoretical

present)

• A possible, though non-mandatory, commitment to the demystification of

experiential reality (a peculiarly enfeebled, and essentially academic, version

of intellectual radicalism, in which the world is not so much changed, as

contemplated differently)

• Theoreticism (a science of stasis, marked from birth by an inverterate abstract

theoretical, or formal, models)

• Anti-humanism (if neither change nor process nor even the empirical instance

are matters of real concern, then the intentions or actions of human subjects,

whether individual or collective, can easily be disposed of as irrelevant to the

structural properties of systems)

Crotty goes on to mention Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913), a linguist and

contemporary of Durkheim, who deviates slightly with a greater emphasis on

language. We will examine Saussure’s semiotic theory in depth in Chapter

XXXXXX, here it is sufficient to say that he separates word from sign from meaning,

recognising the exchangeability of the signifier (a symbol) with other signifieds,

leaving the signified (the concept) unchanged. Other investigation in semiotics

through anthropological studies were carried out by Claude Lévi-Strauss in the late

1950’s, examining the role of signs outside of language (Crotty, 1998, p. 196-199). It

is interesting to note the varied epistemological stances from which our key thinkers

in semiotics come from. However for the purpose of this study structuralism,

poststructuralism or postmodernism will not be employed as it is the understanding

and interpretation of our world, signs and visual language in particular, it is seeking

to explore. Additionally as can be seen above the exclusion of any history is contrary

to the idea of the viewer’s own history or culture forming meaning through

interpretation. Another post-structuralist who deals with words is Jacques Derrida

(cited Crotty, 1998, p. 205), however he differs considerably from Saussure’s stance

on linguistic semiotics.

For Saussure word and concept are like side of a lens that is at once concave and convex. For Derrida. However, word and concept never come together definitively in this fashion. ‘He sees the sign’, Sarup observes (1993, p. 33), ‘as a structure of difference: half of it is always ’not there’ and the other half is always ‘not that’. And signifiers and signifieds refuse to stand still. Signifiers constantly turn into signifieds, which keep turning into signifiers. As we search for meaning, we find ourselves led along a whole concatenation of signifiers/signifieds – an infinite regress of signification.

While Derrida focused on the written word, Saussure focused on the spoken word,

which is the problem Derrida had with it. To him the spoken word was too closely

related to thought when using Saussure’s combined sign concept. Lastly no study

involving human interpretation of language can avoid dealing with the human itself

and structuralism’s ant-humanism characteristic excludes this stance to us. Another

French philosopher Jacques Lacan ‘Saussureanised’ Freud’s psychoanalysis using a

structuralist/poststructuralist approach, taking the unconscious to be structured like

language and that language and sexuality arrive together. Influenced by him was Julia

Kristeva, a French feminist, however calling it the ‘semiotic’ rather than Lacan’s ‘the

imaginary’. Agreeing that the semiotic is repressed … she stated however that it is not

superseded. The semiotic-‘ the raw material of signification, the corporeal libidinal

matter that must be harnessed and appropriately channelled’ – is a movement of

“cutting through”, breaking down unities’ (Sarup, pp. 124, 126; cited Crotty, 1998, p.

208). However other structuralist philosophers such as Barthes did explore image and

language through structuralism and we shall examine these and other later.

Case for chosen methodology Having examined, albeit in brief, a selection of the possibilities available for such a

study some choices are immediately clear. This study deals with interpretations of

visual language. Hence we can immediately rule out objectivism and its related

epistemologies. This is not a critical theory approach; we are not dealing with any

marginalised groups. We could consider constructivism, especially as a key thinker in

semiotics Peirce worked in this area, however there is a good reason not to, which can

best be illustrated with the following example which I use as an introduction to a

semiotics lecture in my own work. During the early part of Operation Enduring

Freedom – America’s campaign in Afghanistan from 2001, the USPSYOPS dropped

a leaflet depicting a dove, two hands embracing and the text which read ‘A United

Afghanistan offers peace and prosperity’. Another variation showed the American

and Afghan flags together, a dove and a similar message. Even if we ignore the text,

to us the message seems clear, a dove clearly represents peace. So the fact that

literacy rates in Afghanistan are 28% (Unicef, 2009). logically doesn’t have any

bearing. However a US PSYOPS officer related that in fact, Afghans reported to US

military bases with what they believed to be a voucher for a chicken (Psywarrior,

2009). The Afghan’s, far from being backward or stupid, were bond by their history,

their culture in their interpretation of the visual language of the leaflet. As this is the

exact basis for the investigation in this study we must revisit our research paradigms

again to see where this theory has most parallels.

Revisiting the purpose of this study we find the word interpretation, and though our

examination of interpretative epistemology we can clearly find the parameters we

need, which deal with ‘culturally derived and historically situated interpretations of

the social life-world’ as Schwandt described it (Crotty, 1998, p. 67). In our overview

of the interpretivist epistemologies we found three main stances: phenomenology,

symbolic interactionism and hermeneutics. As phenomenology deals with the

interpretation of experiences, we can discount this approach. However both symbolic

interactionism and hermeneutics both have something to offer this study they require

a little more examination. Symbolic interactionism dealing with meanings and the

social, cultural and historical basis for these meanings certainly could be applicable.

Equally hermeneutics, dealing with the interpretation of language, and language can

be visual as well as textural, could also be applied. It also places an emphasis on the

historical and cultural context, which as we have seen, is also vital. In this case

hermeneutics will suit our purposes best, though as can clearly seen there is some

overlap in theory with symbolic interactionism.

Interpretative evaluative case study A case study is a term which we are familiar with from law, political science and

medicine, Keddie defines a case study as ‘an approach that uses in-depth

investigation of one or more examples of a current social phenomenon, utilising a

variety of sources of data. A ‘case’ can be an individual person, an event, or a social

activity group, organisation or institution’ (Keddie; in Jupp, 2008, p. 20). Creswell

expands on this as ‘the study of an issue explored through one or more cases within a

bounded system’ and also refers to the alternative view that some researches,

including himself and also those such as Denzin & Lincoln, Merriam and Yin, believe

it to be a methodology (Creswell, 2007, p.73). Here I would disagree as I believe the

case study’s characteristics lend it to be used with a variety of approaches but the

theory behind the approach is insufficient to be seen as a methodology in itself, with

the criteria for methodology established earlier in this chapter. Quoting Yin (1984,

cited Keddie; in Jupp, 2008, p. 20), Keddie says that case studies can be descriptive,

exploratory or explanatory, leaving a very flexible approach possible. Both authors

agree that the key characteristics of this approach include a variety of data-collection

methods, using qualitative or quantitative methods, or both. These can include, but are

not limited to observations, interviews, audiovisual material, documents, reports,

surveys, questionnaires etc. Cases can be collective – studying one issue over a

number of sites or persons, instrumental – one single case, or intrinsic – focusing on

the case or issue itself in an unusual situation (Creswell, 2007, p. 74). Occasionally

case study approaches have been criticised as being too specific to the case in

question, meaning that generalisations cannot be made from the data. However in any

case qualitative researchers, as a rule, are not fond of making generalisation, as there

are too many variable contexts.

Case for interpretative case study and mixed methods approach The case study approach is typically chosen when the study has identifiable cases

which appear clearly with boundaries or parameters, in this case, persons study a

visual subject who have poor, undeveloped or underdeveloped visual literacy skills

(Creswell, 2007, p.74). The identification of the study participants have been left at

random sampling, the students participate on a visual studies course. Anecdotally they

do not have wide experience of learning in this area but this cannot be confirmed and

exceptions will always occur. Manipulation of the sample is not in the interest of this

study, yes it could be possible following a participant background examination to

purposely choose persons who would have no visual literacy. However this would not

represent a more ‘natural’ or typical class in a real situation.

This study would not benefit from a collective case study approach, at least in this

stage. As the purpose is not to provide any sweeping statements or new rules for

design education, therefore generalisations will not benefit it. This, perhaps, is

something that could be examined in further studies, expanding this research and

applying it to multiple scenarios and comparing the results with these found here.

Creswell (Creswell, 2007, pp. 80, 93) recommends a structure which begins with the

problem, the context, the issues and findings, this has also been put forth by Lincoln

& Guba (1985) and will be the model for this study.

The approach of this case study will consist of:

• Building understanding through document and visual analysis which will

inform the study.

• Developing a visual language test and a visual language resource which will

assess visual language levels and inform the participants understanding.

• Gathering data about this understanding using limited interviews, direct

observations and assessment results through the visual language test and a

historical comparison of marks. (Note the purpose here is to see an

improvement, if any exists, percentages or proportions are not of any detailed

importance.)

• Combining data from all findings, analysing and drawing conclusions.

Case study and data collection approach

The nature of the case to be studied is favourable to the case study approach. The

Print Media Apprenticeship, the annual intake of which varies between 15-25 students

each year, rotate student groups on a four week basis, thereby theories can quickly be

put in place, evaluated and modified over a shorter period of time than with a group

running across the academic year.

As research methods must follow on from and adhere to the principles of the

interpretivist epistemology, this research will focus qualitative data (Wisker, 2001, p.

123). However some quantitative data is also useful in gaining an idea of numbers and

levels of the students in visual education. Therefore the first step of this research

would be to ask the students to complete a brief questionnaire so as to ascertain their

visual background to date. This would serve only to gauge the level of – if any -

previous visually related education undertaken; where, when, how long and the types

of subject etc. With a clearer outline of numbers then the methods would focus on

qualitative issues. The second step would be to ‘test’ the students’ existing knowledge

in visuality at this stage. This could be achieved by an analytical visual exam where

descriptions would have to be applied to examples as to how the image should be read

under a number of headings such as typography, colour, composition, graphic devises,

communication, semiotics etc, where expression, symbology and feeling would be

analysed. This would be developed and tested on a group from each course next year.

The ‘test’ must obviously be comprehensive enough to cover all primary aspects of

visual multimodality which would be covered in the design resource and yet

formulated in such a way that it is not completely inaccessible to a novice, perhaps

including a list of keywords and explanations.

The visual literacy resource would be in the form of an interactive multimedia piece

explaining each concept, showing it in practice and allowing the user to test the theory

while providing guidance on further independent research. This would be developed,

trialled upon a group and following feedback developed further or even dispensed

with should another approach be more suitable. At the moment there are a number of

good eLearning examples such as www.thingingwithtype.com (Lupton,

www.thingingwithtype.com, 2008) and www.wildlifeart.org (National Museum of

Wildlife Art, www.wildlifeart.org, 2008). Though I have utilised these in the

classroom in the past I find they are lacking in comprehensiveness. They explain

some concepts which could taken further and do not link these concepts overall. The

students use and understanding of this proposed resource will be and further

developed and modified upon reflection as part of the action research cycle.

Following this the students would be given a visual ‘test’ again, which would explore

the same concepts and the results compared with the previous one. An can also be

made between the marks the students achieved in previous years in comparison to the

groups grounded in multimodality – though it must be stressed this would only be for

comparative purposes and it is the student experience and understanding that this

research is primarily concerned with. In order to do so a small group of students –

three to four – would be chosen from the overall of the groups studied – for feedback

and interview. Here the term ‘limited’ interview is used as it will be difficult to build

up a rapport with the participants over such a short period of time and it is probable

that they may not be as open or comfortable with the process or the researcher as they

may if a longer relationship had been in place. It would be beneficial for them for

interview purposes to keep a reflective diary of their accounts though in practice this

is not be feasible. A reflective diary is the product of another skill; reflection, and is

often avoided as it is simply another piece of work to do or sometimes written up at

the end of the process, which defeats the purpose of keeping it.

It may be argued that there will be too many sources of research data, even for a case

study; consisting of a questionnaire/survey, two tests, observation and a few

interviews - to counteract this I would like to clarify that there will be only eight to

twelve students in each group, with two groups this will be a maximum of twenty

students – though this could be pared down. The questionnaire/survey will be concise,

as will both tests. As the observation is necessary in order to further the development

from the researchers’ perspective, that cannot be dispensed with and the interviews

will be reasonably concise. As the added value of student reflective diaries to the

process is negligible, in comparison to the workload burden they would produce,

especially to students who do not utilise them in the course, these will not be used.

Citations Chapter Two: Research Methodologies Social sciences research paradigms Bryman, A. (2001). Social Research Methods. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Buachanan, D. & Bryman, A. (2009) The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Research Methods London: Sage

Creswell, J.W. (2007). Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.

Crotty, M. (1998). The Foundations Of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the Research Process. London: Sage.

Denzin, N. & Lincoln, Y. (2000). The Handbook of Qualitative Research. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.

Jupp, V. (2008). The Sage Dictionary of Social and Cultural Research Methods. London: Sage.

Mautner, T. (Ed.) (2005). The Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy. London: Penguin Books.

Case for chosen methodology Unicef, Unicef website, statistics by country. 29 October 2009, www.unicef.org. Psywarrior. Psywarrior website, a catalogue of military psychological operations. 29 October 2009, www.psywarrior.com. Crotty, M. (1998). The Foundations Of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the Research Process. London: Sage. Interpretative evaluative case study Creswell, J.W. (2007). Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications. Case for interpretative case study and mixed methods approach Bryman, A. (2001). Social Research Methods. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Creswell, J. W. & Plano Clark, V. L. (2008). The Mixed Methods Reader. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.

Case study and data collection approach Wisker, G. (2001). The Postgraduate Research Handbook. New York: Palgrave. National Museum Of Wildlife Art (2007). Retrieved 2 October 2007 from www.wildlifeart.org. Ellen Lupton – Thinking with Type (2007). Retrieved 2 October 2009 from www.thingingwithtype.com.