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Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University

Center For Social Sciences

Lela Rekhviashvili

Graduate Thesis title:

Recognition of Kosovo and recognition of Abkhazia

Comparative study

Academic Supervisor:

Sergi Kapanadze, International Relations Department

Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, TSU

Tbilisi

2008

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Abstract

This paper identifies Kosovo recognition criteria and then compares Abkhazian recognition with it.

The paper argues that in Kosovo case there exists shared and well defined set of criteria that is

justifying the recognition of Kosovo by which the recognizing states went against international law

practices. Though, they have argumentation to justify their decision.

The paper shows that Abkhazian recognition and the Abkhazia’s situation on the ground doesn’t

repeat the conditions that made Kosovo exceptional, so Abkhazia cannot be regarded as a similar

case to Kosovo and the existing criteria of uniqueness cannot be applied to Abkhazia .

Though, the criteria’s are analyzed based on the constructivist theory, that incorporates in it belief

of change if the actors start changing their perceptions and understandings. The Kosovo recognition

is the case of this kind of a change: the actors started viewing the problem in a similar way and

tried to solve the problem by which they created new institution in form of exceptional recognition

of ethnic minority. This practice of making international decisions based on the shared

understanding and approaching the problem leaves a probability that Abkhazian case has potential

to be regarded as “irresolvable” case and get wide international recognition like Kosovo.

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Table of contents

I. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 4I.I Why Kosovo and Abkhazia? ................................................................................. 4

II. Literature review..................................................................................................................... 6 III. Research Question and Hypothesis..........................................................................................8

III.I The aim of the research..........................................................................................8III.II Research questions................................................................................................9III.III Hypotheses...........................................................................................................9

IV. Methodology...........................................................................................................................10V. Theoretical background...........................................................................................................10VI. Study........................................................................................................................................12

VI.I Kosovo recognition criteria ..................................................................................12VI.I.I Materials Used for the Identification of Criteria .................................13VI.I.II Identification of Kosovo recognition criteria (Contents)...................14VI.I.III Character of Kosovo recognition criteria...........................................24

VI.II Criteria of Abkhazia’s recognition.......................................................................26VI.II.I Materials that will be used ..................................................................26VI.II.II Recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russia ....................26VI.II.III Recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Nicaragua.............29VI.II.IV Criteria drawn from Russia’s and Nicaragua’s recognition (content)...........................................................................................................30 VI.II.V Character of Abkhazia’s recognition criteria......................................31

VI.III. Comparison of criteria of Kosovo recognition and Abkhazia’s recognition.....32VI.III.I Comparison of the contents of criteria ...............................................33VI.III.II Comparison the character of Kosovo’s recognition with Abkhazia’s Case......................................................................................42

VII. Summary and Conclusions ...........................................................................................44Annexes ...................................................................................................................................................47Bibliography ............................................................................................................................................50

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I. Introduction

I.I. Why Kosovo and Abkhazia?

The study object of the thesis is the recognition of Kosovo and Abkhazia, the comparison of the two

cases. The why should we take Kosovo recognition and compare Abkhazia’s recognition with it?

There are several reasons to argument this focus of interest.

Firstly, the two cases are similar in the face of international law. Kosovo was the first case in the

world history when considerable number of states went against the international law practices by

recognizing ethic minority. And Abkhazia (as well as south Ossetia) was the case following Kosovo

recognition, and was recognize by two UN states. Therefore it is interesting to study if these cases

have similar justification for the recognition.

I examined the recent study of international law by Vita Gudeleviciute “Does the Principle of Self-

Determination Prevail over the Principle of Territorial Integrity?” This is one of the latest studies

which examines, according to international law practices, which of the principles form territorial

integrity and self determination prevails in separate cases.

While in cases of colonies, peoples under foreign military occupation, suppression of peoples

because of racial and ethnical differences, the principle of self determination prevails over the

territorial integrity, and in the first two cases secession is supported, international law doesn’t

support secession of ethnic minorities and principle of Territorial Integrity is superior. ” The present

international law does not recognize minorities as separate peoples and hence precludes from

invoking the principle of self-determination. The principle of territorial integrity prevails”.1

Based on this research we can conclude that both Kosovars and Abkhazians, which are ethnic

minorities are denied write of external self-determination, this means according to international law

and its current practices the two entities cannot be recognized as sovereign states.

1 Vita Gudeleviciute, (2005) “Does the Principle of Self- Determination Prevail over the Principle of Territorial Integrity?” International Journal of Baltic Law (International Journal of Baltic Law), issue: 2, pages: 4874, on www.ceeol.com

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Thus not speaking of Abkhazia, Kosovo, as an ordinary unit populated mostly by the ethnic

minorities originally did not deserve recognition. But part of international society, the influential

Western European states and the United States recognized Kosovo arguing that Kosovo was the

“unique case”. Therefore, as Abkhazia was the next case to repeat going against this practice there

stands the need of identifying if Abkhazia can also stand in the category of unique case and be

judged by the similar criteria as Kosovo was.

Secondly, comparison of Kosovo and Abkhazia has been very actual since the war in Kosovo in

1998-1999. Besides, Since the Kosovo recognition it was frequently discussed that Abkhazia and

Ossetia would follow the example as they where the similar cases and they did. Though, no actual

scholarly study has been made to study the two cases. Therefore I regard it useful to study the two

cases together.

The comparison of the two conflicts has been the subject of lots of academic and nonacademic

articles. Georgian Russian and international press were very keen to highlight and discuss

thoroughly the differences and similarities of Kosovo and Abkhazian conflicts. Especially during the

last months it was actual to discuss the impact of Kosovo recognition on developments in Abkhazia,

and the press was full with headlines like: “Abkhazia is not Kosovo” , 2 “ The Kosovo precedent”, 3,

“Georgian Premier: Kosovo and Abkhazia cannot be comparable” 4, “Kosovo and Abkhazia cannot

be “identical” . 5 , and etc.

Making parallels between Kosovo and Abkhazia has also been made by the politicians. It was

Russian officials who most frequently referred to Kosovo case while discussing their policies

towards Georgian break-away regions. In fact, Russia while recognizing Abkhazia and South

Ossetia directly pointed that after Kosovo recognition, it was normal to recognize Abkhazia as the

similar case.

2 http://intellibriefs.blogspot.com/2008/02/abkhazia-is-not-kosovo.html 3 http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-ash21feb21,0,6880108.story4 http://www.turkishweekly.net/news.php?id=458955 http://www.geotimes.ge/index.php?m=home&newsid=9586

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The states that supported the recognition of Kosovo had argumentation behind their decision, that

tried to prove that Kosovo was the special case and had legal and moral right to declare

independence, unlike all the other similar cases.

On the other hand, there exists number of states that doesn’t support this solution and regard this to

be going against international law. They consider this to be a very dangerous precedent for the rest

of the separatist movements. Especially Russia along with Serbia opposed this decision. Several

months later Russia recognized Abkhazia and Ossetia. Though, Western states those, who

recognized Kosovo sovereignty do not recognize Georgian breakup units and are emphasizing

territorial integrity.

Thus it seems obvious that the issue of recognition is the political one and is the subject of

manipulation from all the sides. That is why it requires research to identify the bases for reasoning

the recognition of the units, and it is useful to study criteria of Kosovo recognition; criteria of

Abkhazia’s recognition and compare those two.

Here I also want to comment on the issue that South Ossetia’s case goes hand in hand to Abkhazia’s

case. But As far as my study is limited in length and scope I wish to concentrate on only one of

these two regions to have a possibility to discuss comparison with Kosovo in more details.

II. Literature review

Before discussing aim of my study I will examine what is existing literature that compares Kosovo

with Abkhazia and what are the shortcomings in current knowledge on the two cases.

Literature is of course wide about Kosovo and also about Abkhazia. But researches which would

compare the two cases are not easy to be found. It is mostly press articles that speak of the link

between the fates of two regions. Though there are important scholarly articles that examine the

issue. These scholarly articles about Kosovo and Abkhazia mainly discussed historical, legal, and

moral context of the war and post war periods. One of the most significant efforts to highlight the

important aspects concerning the issue was the debates that were held by Zeyno Baran andThomas

de Waal. Thomas de Waal, journalist and Caucasus expert, stresses that “Abkhazia and Kosovo felt

imprisoned inside a newly independent state against their will, after the break-up of a communist-era

multi-ethnic federation” and argues that they are basically identical and Abkhazia like Kosovo has

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the right to seek for independence6. He can identify no moral differences between the two cases.

Thomas de Waal recalls the fact that it was Georgians to start the war, and Georgian nationalism in

1990’s and also after Rose revolution provoked minorities. He argues that only real solution for

Abkhazia can be to offer her sovereignty and demand guarantees, that they will built a democratic

state and let Georgians return in Abkhazia peacefully. Thus he wants to support independence of

Kosovo and also Abkhazia and says that “Kosovo holds out a potential positive model”. (Thomas de

Waal)

Zeyno Baran, senior fellow in the Centre for Eurasian Policy, Hudson Institute, brings an

argumentation against the statement that Kosovo and Abkhazia are basically similar cases. Zeyno

Baran stresses several things: firstly he stresses demographic situation which was principally

different in two cases- In Kosovo 90% were Albanians, while in Abkhazia Georgians were tree

times larger than Abkhazians and were cleansed during the war; secondly Kosovars had very bad

conditions for decades before the war and were imprisoned and had limited political and economic

rights, while Abkhazians had all the rights defended; thirdly, he speaks of the role of Russia which

encouraged and supported Abkhazians by all means. Zeyno Baran argues that in this case the main

criteria should be regional stability and humanitarian needs and in Abkhazian case independence can

harm these objectives.

In February 2008 the famous scholar David L. Phillips wrote an article named: “Abkhazia is not

Kosovo” were he pays attention at legal and political differences between two territories. UN

council resolution 1244 gave space to discuss the status of Kosovo, also the 1974 constitution of

Yugoslavia affirmed Kosovo as the republic comparable to other republic of the federation like

Croatia, Slovenia and the rest. This gave legal bases for proposing Kosovo independence, while

there are no such preconditions for Abkhazia that would give it the legal right to push the

independence. The political situation is also different: In contrast with Kosovar political elites,

Abkhazians have never considered allowing Georgian refugees to get back and never showed

commitment to guarantee the minority rights. Also Russian involvement in Abkhazia in opposite of

West’s involvement in Kosovo has never proven to be helpful. That’s why David L. Phillips

6 Thomas de Waal, Zeyno Baran (2006) Abkhazia-Georgia, Kosovo- Serbia: Parallel worlds? http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-caucasus/abkhazia_serbia_3787.jsp

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concludes that “Abkhazia is not Kosovo”. 7In response to this article George Hewitt (Professor of

Caucasian Languages, SOAS, London Univ

ersity) wrote: “Some Thoughts on 'Abkhazia is not Kosovo' by David L. Phillips”. George Hewitt

doesn’t make much comparison but he just brings the history of Abkhazia and showes Georgians as

hostile people who have always been suppressing Abkhazians and that’s why claims of territorial

integrity shouldn’t be considered and Abkhazian sovereignty has to be recognized. He says that

today Russia is given chance to influence Abkhazia, but recognition would give Abkhazia chance to

develop independently and healthier relation would establish between Georgia- Abkhazia and

Georgia – Russia. 8

Other authors, like Mark Almond , Lecturer in History at Oriel College, Oxford,warned the world

that Kosovo recognition would be a bad precedent for the Caucasian states. He stressed the need to

develop overall criteria based on which the ethnic conflicts would be dealt and which would take

into consideration Western as well as Russian interests. Though, basically he, as well as some other

authors, who are arguing that Kosovo would cause blow- up in Abkhazia, did not discuss the

similarities and differences between two cases. 9

As far, as we see, there exist scholarly papers about Kosovo and Abkhazia but there is no academic

research made on the issue. Besides, the comparison is done about different aspects- political, legal,

historical, moral, and other dimensions. But the events have evolved and today we see the reality

that both Kosovo and Abkhazia are both recognized, and though there is a lot of discussion on the

issue, as already mentioned there is no study that would discuss the commonalities and differences

and the link of recognition of two cases.

It is important to define the aim, why one should regard either difference of similarities. In this case

making comparison is significant because we can discuss the policies of recognition based on

analyses of the cases; we have to observe the justification of recognition.

III. Research Question and Hypothesis 7 http://intellibriefs.blogspot.com/2008/02/abkhazia-is-not-kosovo.html

8 http://www.circassianworld.com/News/Abkhazia_Kosovo.html 9 http://www.timothypost.com/blog/2007/12/7/kosovo-and-abkhazia-solution.html

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III. I. The aim of the research

The aim of the presented research is to study international recognition of two Kosovo and

Abkhazia. To be more precise, the paper aims to study what makes Kosovo a unique case; and then

to examine if Abkhazian case can also have the same dynamics and characteristics that would also

make Abkhazia a unique case, give explanation for its recognition and make Abkhazia a similar case

to Kosovo deserving and receiving wide recognition.

By making this the work aims to give scientific ground for further discussions of the issue. It

identifies basic similarities and differences of the criteria of two cases and gives conclusions and

assumptions on the question that actors discussing Kosovo and Abkhazia fate pose so often: should

the two cases be treated in a same way.

III. II Research questions

Thus, there stands urgent need of examining firstly:

What are the criteria based on which Kosovo can be a Unique Case and can be recognised as

a state?

And secondly:

Does Abkhazia also satisfy and fit the criteria of being unique, exceptional case?

This Question has two sub questions:

o Is the similar criteria applied to Abkhazia by existing recognition?

o Can the similar criteria be applied to Abkhazia based on the examination of

Abkhazia’s situation?

III. III. Hypotheses

As far as I have two research questions I also want to pose two hypothetical conclusions.

There exists a particular well defined criteria based on which Kosovo is regarded as a special case;

the criteria that has been shared by a community of states, though not by whole international society.

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Abkhazia doesn’t have similarities with Kosovo in dimension of recognition criteria. Criteria of

Kosovo independence indentifies reasons of recognition that cannot be found in Abkhazian case.

Though there is possibility that Abkhazia will acquire own set of criteria based on which states

might continue (after Russia and Nicaragua) recognition of Abkhazia.

IV. Methodology

In order to answer the first question I use the desk research. As far as the criteria according which

the states are recognising Kosovo independence as well as Abkhazia’s independence officially

doesn’t exist, I examined the documents - where states recognise Kosovo and justify their decision. I

made content analyses of the texts that were the argumentation of the decision of Kosovo and

Abkhazia. I identified most repeated concepts in both text that spoke of recognition justification.

In the second part of my study took the criteria that I got by accomplishing the first part of my

research and then I used the method of comparative study, which can bring the new knowledge by

making the assessments of the relationships of the separate similar cases. I examined if Abkhazian

case is similar to Kosovo case and based on the criteria of Kosovo recognition it also requires the

same approach from the states which recognised Kosovo.

V. Theoretical background

To analyze the criteria of recognition of Kosovo which is regarded to be a “unique case” and also to

analyze criteria of Abkhazia’s recognition I take constructivist theory.

I chose constructivist theory to analyze the cases because constructivism is the theory which speaks

of the change that can be brought by the shared ideas and understandings of the actors. The Kosovo

recognition by more than 50 states and then also the recognition of Abkhazia (and South Ossetia) is

the big change in international practices. As constructivism speaks of the change that occurs based

on common understandings and ideas, I consider this theory to be a best tool for analyzing

recognition criteria of Kosovo and Abkhazia.

As we can also see from the name, the theory says that there is no objective social reality (like

critical theorists and postmodernists also argue) and world is inter-subjectively constructed. 10Thus

10 Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen, (2003) Introduction to International Relations, Theories and Approaches, Oxford University Press, p.253

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Social and political world is not something given and unchangeable, something static and existing

independently, but it is created, constructed according to the ideas, perceptions and believes of the

people, and it also exists in the form of inter-subjective awareness of the people. This definition of

political and social world gives the possibility of change. In opposite to neorealists, who argue that

world doesn’t change throughout the history, constructivists argue that the nature of international

relations can be changed if the thoughts, approaches and ideas change. I think that this attraction

with change is the most distinctive and significant in the constructivist theory.

As summarized in overview of constructivism in Jackson: “ Constructivists are united by much

more than divide them; especially, they all emphasize the importance of culture and identity, as

expressed in social norms, rules, and understandings. The social and political world is made up of

shared beliefs rather than by physical entities”.11

Thus, to expand discussion on constructivism we can once more admit the centrality of thoughts

and ideas. So, their first assumption is that human relations (also international relations) consist

of thoughts and ideas; social world is a world of human consciousness, people make the world.

Second assumption is that these ideas, believes and conceptions are shared among the people –

the knowledge and common understanding give them possibility to build social, economic,

political life, they create social institutions, they make joint arrangements. The concepts that are

widely shared matter.

The third assumption is that these shared believes create interests and identities of people as

well as states. These two variables seem to be crucial in the theory, as theory argues that these

are dependent variables that can be changed if practice and way of interaction changes.12 So,

national identities, as well as personal, are constituted by distinctive inter-subjective believes

and only extend a certain distance in space and time, no further.

Also, constructivists concentrate on discussing institutions that are created by the shared

perceptions; the well known example is Sovereignty, which can never exist materially, but can

exist in people’s collective believes.13 Constructivists argue that all the institutions that are

created in people’s minds can be changed- some haven’t existed in the past, some will not exist

11 http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199285433/jackson_chap06.pdf 12 Wendt Alexander (1992), Anarchy is What States Make of It: The social construction of Power Politics, International Organization, p.42413 Jackson and Sorensen, p.254-6

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in the future. “It’s a product of human intellect at a certain period of world history. It’s

specifically historical”.14

The constructivist theory and the works of constructivist authors are not primarily discussing

state recognition though I will use their major assumptions and definition of sovereignty in

analyses of the character of the recognition of Abkhazia. Mainly I take the work of famous

constructivist author Alexander Wendt:”Anarchy is what states make of it”. Although the main

subject of the paper is security systems, not the recognition problems, it still gives very good

tools for my analyses.

He defined sovereignty as: “an institution” that “exists only in virtue of certain inter-subjective

expectations”. He says that these understanding created a community the essence of which is “a

mutual recognition of one another’s right to exercise exclusive political authority within

territorial limits”.15

Wendt defines as a fundamental principle for social theory that “people act towards objects...on the

bases of the meanings that the objects have for them...it is collective meanings that constitute the

structures which organize our actions”. 16

And these collective meanings or collective knowledge are referred as institutions. He defines

institutions as actors’ ideas about “how the world works”. “As collective knowledge they

(institutions) are experienced as having existence over and above the individuals who happen to

embody them at the moment”. 17

Therefore recognition can also be discussed as institution. And recognition of exceptional case can

also be regarded as an institution that is created for a single case or can be for repeating cases.

So the constructivist theory opens door for discussing the criteria of Kosovo and Abkhazian

recognition.

14 Jackson and Sorensen, p.25615 Wendt...p.41216 Wendt...p.39717 Wendt...p.399

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VI. Study

VI.I. Kosovo recognition criteria

In this part I will answer to the first question that my study poses:

What are the criteria based on which Kosovo can be a Unique Case and can be recognised as

a state?

The first part of my research is identifying criteria or the main arguments based on which the states

recognising Kosovo Independence give reason for their decision. This contains no examination of

the correctness and accuracy of arguments. I will not justify the criteria and bring back up facts to

the arguments; I’ll just try to present what is expressed in the official statements of the major players

supporting the recognition.

The analyses will be divided into two parts:

I intend to draw conclusions about the content of the criteria. This is bringing together most

frequently used arguments for the recognition.

Secondly –I’ll discuss the character of the criteria using constructivist theory. I have to state once

more that this is not a justification of decisions, but this is generalization of nature of criteria.

VI.I.I Materials Used for the Identification of Criteria

In order to identify the criteria I’ve done the following work:

Firstly, I scrutinised recognition texts published by the states. Altogether 56 UN countries have

recognized Kosovo by the time. The big part of recognition texts are available, though some are

published only in original language of the recognising country, and some of the texts cannot be

found through internet. Therefore I examined recognition texts of 48 countries out of 57, that

includes the most Important and active players such as US, UK, France, Germany, etc. (see the

annex 1. List of the states whose recognitions texts were analysed ). The results of the analyses are

also shown in the Table (see the Annex 2. County and Criterion ) and it reflects the numbers of the

states that mention each criterion in recognition texts.

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Secondly, besides the recognition texts I used the Ahtisaari report of 2007 which proposes

“Supervised Independence” for Kosovo and outlines the major arguments for coming to this

decision. This is the document which is referred by the majority of the states recognizing Kosovo

independence. And examined the documents produced by the UN during the “Kosovo Status

Process”.

Finally, I attempted to gather all the available articles and publications that contain statements made

by the representatives of recognizing states, major stakeholders and opinion makers on the issue.

VI.I.II. Identification of of Kosovo recognition criteria (Contents)

While discussing Kosovo recognition criteria I will firstly discuss contents, factual arguments based

on which Kosovo is called “unique case”.

1. UN Resolution 1244 and International Presence

One of the most voiced arguments to justify Kosovo recognition is referring to UN 1244 resolution,

that placed Kosovo under UN influence in 1999, made Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to withdraw

completely form Kosovo, and gave the international society the right for "facilitating a political

process designed to determine Kosovo's future status". 18

This argument is directly formulated in UN special envoy, Martti Ahtisaari Proposal” Kosovo is a

unique case that demands a unique solution... In unanimously adopting resolution 1244(1999), the

Security Council responded to Milosevic’s actions in Kosovo by denying Serbia a role in its

governance, placing Kosovo under temporary United Nations administration and envisaging a

political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future. The combination of these factors makes

Kosovo’s circumstances extraordinary”. 19

The similar judgment is used by the European Union side. The document that was adopted by the

EU says that striving for the achievement of final status for Kosovo is consistent with 1244

resolution aims: "Acting to implement the final status outcome in such a situation is more

compatible with the intentions of 1244 than continuing to work to block any outcome in a situation

18 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7244538.stm 19 Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s future status, (2007) web site: http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2007.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/YZHG-6ZNTVS-full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf

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where everyone agrees that the status quo is unsustainable". 20The EU Council Conclusions on

Kosovo on the 18 February 2008, in Brussels affirms this position: “The Council welcomes the

continued presence of the international community based on UN Security Council resolution 1244”. 21

The importance of 1244 resolution and international presence is reflected in the recognition texts of

individual states as well. For example Ireland refers to the statements of EU foreign ministers who

“underlined that Kosovo represented a unique case because of the legacy of the conflict of the 1990s

and the fact that it has been under international administration since 1999 as provided for in UN

Security Council Resolution 1244... Member States will decide, in accordance with national practice

and international law, on their relations with Kosovo.”  22

The similar point is made by some other countries as well in their recognition texts, like Sweden,

Danmark, Canada, etc. (see annex 2.)

Significant document is kept on “Kosovareport” website named “Kosovo must be independent by

Former Foreign Ministers” which is signed by the personalities like: Madeleine Albright, Lloyd

Axworthy, Joschka Fischer, Niels Helveg Petersen and others. They represent not only EU but US,

Canada, Australia, etc. One of the milestone of their statement also refers to the resolution. The

content is identical to all the other examples brought before, stating that Kosovo is unique because

of resolution 1244 providing legal bases for defining developments about Kosovo: “Kosovo is a

unique situation that has required a creative solution. It should not create a precedent for other

unresolved conflicts. When the Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 in response to Milosevic's

actions in Kosovo, it laid the groundwork for a political process that would ultimately determine

Kosovo's future”. 23Therefore, the international presence guaranteed by the UN 1244 resolution

appears to be key criteria for justifying legal bases of Kosovo recognition.

2. No alternative to Recognition

20 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7244538.stm21 http://www.eu2008.si/en/News_and_Documents/Council_Conclusions/February/0218_GAERC5.pdf 22 http://foreignaffairs.gov.ie/home/index.aspx?id=42938

23 http://kosovareport.blogspot.com/2007/06/kosovo-must-be-independen-by-former.html

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The other argument put forward while arguing for the Independence as the best solution is that

Independence also is the only solution as there is no possibility of agreement between the two sides,

because of the unique historical context of the conflict.

This argument as well as the previous one is most vividly formulized in the report of UN special

envoy, Martti Ahtisaari’s Report of 26 March, 2007. In November 2005 Martti Ahtisaari was

appointed as the Special Envoy for the future status process for Kosovo by the Secretary-General.

He personally was the facilitator of 15 rounds of direct talks between the Belgrade and Pristina

negotiating teams, during 2006. Therefore it was him to take responsibility and declare that talks

wouldn’t bring a solution and to say that “potential to produce any mutually agreeable outcome on

Kosovo’s status is exhausted”. He concluded that ”after more than one year of direct talks, bilateral

negotiations and expert consultations, it has become clear to me that the parties are not able to reach

an agreement on Kosovo’s future status”.24 The Serbian side requested autonomy, Kosovo Albanian

side requested independence and there had been no changes in the positions. Ahtisaaari explains this

by referring to the recent history. He firstly underlines that the very fact that for eight years Kosovo

has not been a part of Serbian State, and secondly the history of brutal war creates condition when

“the return of Serbian rule over Kosovo would not be acceptable to the overwhelming majority of

the people of Kosovo”25. Therefore there is no room left for negotiating the position.

Though this was not the end of negotiations still, as in October 2007 NATO-Russia Council decided

that to continue the efforts with the help and assistance of EU-US-Russia Troika and “

Expressed the hope that the new period of engagement between Belgrade and Pristina would lead to

an agreement on Kosovo’s future status”. 26 Though this negotiations didn’t bring any change in the

situation. The situation was summarized by the US Troika negotiator Frank Wisner. “[…] The

Ahtisaari plan was never taken off the table during the Troika talks. The Serbian side rejected it, and

the Kosovo side accepted it – Ahtisaari’s plan is still there, alive and well...The conclusion will be

pretty self-evident: We did not find a solution”27. This was the assessment done in November 2007.

Therefore in the begging of 2008, after Kosovo declared independence, the states who recognized

this declaration pointed that the negotiation proved to be impossible. One of the key states playing

role in Kosovo, and Generally Balkan issues, the Germany states in the Recognition Text that: “The 24 Report of the Special Envoy...P.225 Report of the Special Envoy...P.326 Caruso p.5 http://www.ecmi.de/jemie/download/2-2008-Caruso.pdf 27 Caruso p.11-12

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German government is convinced that after so many years, further negotiations would not have

resulted in a breakthrough”. 28

The Hungarian Government even explains the reason why negotiations cannot have sense, and this

is the fact that the two sides remain to have extremely different positions that cannot get close to

each other: “It has become clear that the status quo in Kosovo was unsustainable ... It has also

become evident that there was no optimal solution acceptable to both sides, and the potential for

further negotiations had been exhausted”.

In the texts of recognition it is also underlined why the positions are so conflicting, and the

explanation is the Historical background. “The reality is that the legacy of the conflict of the late

1990s made the return of Serb dominion in Kosovo unthinkable, and also undermined the prospects

for a long-sought compromise”- says the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Danmark Per Stig Møller.29

"It is not a hasty recognition. We have carefully considered this decision. Unilateral independence is

not an ideal solution, but the only realistic and possible path. We must not forget the history of the

conflict. Nor can we close our eyes to reality. The status quo could no longer be maintained and was

a constant source of instability," asserted Austrian Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik. 30

Therefore we see the second criteria for the justification of recognition of Kosovo, which says that

there is no alternative to Kosovo independence as the unique historical background of the conflict

makes settlement of the two side’s position impossible. As US Under Secretary of State for Political

Affairs Nicholas Burns stated on June 2007:”There is no alternative to the recognized independence

of the southern province of Serbia”.31

3. Urgent Need for changing of Status Quo

28 http://www.bundesregierung.de/nn_6516/Content/EN/Artikel/2008/02/2008-02-20-deutschland-erkennt-kosovo-an__en.html29 http://www.foreignaffairs.gov.ie/home/index.aspx?id=42938

30 http://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/foreign-ministry/news/presseaussendungen/2008/plassnik-schreiben-ueber-anerkennung-des-kosovo-unterzeichnet.html

31 http://kosovareport.blogspot.com/2007/06/no-alternative-to-kosovo-independence.html

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As the next criteria the need of resolving Kosovo issue should be identified. This criteria contains

two sub arguments:

First one is concerning regional stability that is arguing that Kosovo was the last unresolved issue in

the region and the recognition is justified as it will strengthen regional stability.

Second sub argument is concerning political and economic development of Kosovo. This argument

is saying that Kosovo cannot develop in existing environment, and status has to be defined, and as

far as there is no other option, Kosovo independence is the only solution to the problem.

The first part of this criteria, that is speaking of regional stability was very actual and stressing. The

Europe had witnessed set of continues and harsh problems in Balkans, and not only Europe but US,

Russia, NATO, Council of Europe and other participants were highly involved since the beginning

of 1990’s in the Balkan wars. Kosovo was the last chord of harsh conflicts, and it also took a bog

effort from Internationals Society. But by 2005, the Balkan states in a way or another had settled and

some had successfully entered EU some were striving to reach this. Kosovo issue, linked with

Serbia was left as the only unresolved problem in the region. Because of difficult historical

experience about the Balkans all the players involved mentioned that stabilization of Balkans was

one priority for International Community in immediate neighborhood and throughout the world.

On 18 February 2008 Prime Minister of Great Britain announced that UK recognised Kosovo

independence and stressed the need of resolving Yugoslavian Problems:”I want to close the chapter

that has followed the break-up of Yugoslavia.  Kosovo has been and is the last unresolved status

issue”. 32

The study of the recognition texts showed that stressing the regional aspect of the problem is very

important for significant number of countries. 17 countries recognizing Kosovo refer to the issue,

and especially important is that most of the neighboring countries like Albania, Austria, Bulgaria,

Czech, Hungary, Turkey, Macedonia, and Montenegro pay attention to the fact that Balkans has to

settle down finally and start peaceful life and fully get involved in European integration and if there

is no other path to reach this aim then they express readiness for unilateral recognition of Kosovo.

32 http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page14594.asp

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Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik formulizes this argument in a clear way: “The Balkans have

already lost too much time. It was necessary to draw a clear bottom line. Now the path is free for the

region to free itself from stagnation and start dynamic development anew. The long-term

stabilization of the Balkans and its integration in the European Union remains our uppermost goal". 33In his statement made during his press conference in the General Affairs and External Relations

Council (Brussels, 18 February 2008) M. Bernard Kouchner asserts that recognition of Kosovo is a

big success for international society and especially for Balkans: ”it’s a victory for peace, it’s a

victory for common sense, and it’s certainly a victory for both peoples because they’re undoubtedly

going to move - separately perhaps initially, but together in the very near future - closer to the

European Union and towards a more peaceful Balkans”.34

The President of the Swiss Confederation, Pascal Couchepin also emphasizes that though

recognition is a difficult solution there is no other way to solve the problems of the region:

“In a situation such as this, where emotions run very high and there is a conflict of interests, an ideal

solution is not possible. Nevertheless the Federal Council considers that this new step in the political

reconstitution of the region to be preferable to any alternative”. 35

Immediate neighbors of Kosovo Macedonia and Montenegro, the countries that have undergone

similar difficulties on the way of state formation also stress for the need of regional stability:

“Macedonia and Montenegro are committed to permanent stability, peace, security and progress of

all countries of the region, with clear European and Euro-Atlantic perspective.”36

It is important to pay attention to the fact that not only interested regional players- European states

regard this as a vital issue, but other countries like Japan, South Korea, Senegal, Burkina Faso,

Canada and others. “Japan expects that Kosovo's independence will contribute to the long-lasting

33 http://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/foreign-ministry/news/presseaussendungen/2008/plassnik-schreiben-ueber-anerkennung-des-kosovo-unterzeichnet.html34 http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files_156/kosovo_6154/france-and-kosovo_6155/political-relations_6162/kosovo-declares-independence-18.02.08_10846.html#so_1

35 http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/recent/media/single.html?id=1749736 http://www.vlada.mk/?q=node/1252

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stability of the region”- statement by Foreign Minister Masahiko Koumura on the Recognition of the

Republic of Kosovo. 37

Therefore one part of the argument that status quo needs to be changed is that Balkan region needs

the resolution of Kosovo issue for development and stability. As already mentioned, the second part

of the argument concerns the Kosovo development itself.

“Kosovo status process” Since the 1999 Serbia had not been involved in the governance of Kosovo;

UN administration was present on the ground and Kosovo Albanians also had formed their

government, though had limited responsibilities. Therefore in fact the vacuum was created among

UN and Kosovar ruling, and this effected harmfully to the further formation of the affective

governance and political and economic development of region.

To draw the situation better it is very useful to look at the Letter of UN Secretary-General, Kofi A.

Annan, addressed to the President of the Security Council written in October of 2005 that attached

the report from UN special envoy, Mr. Kai Eide (Norway) who had undertaken a comprehensive

review of the situation in Kosovo. At the time there was so discussion about Kosovo independence

but the concern was about the status of Kosovo, and it was argued the situation on the ground

required that the status of Kosovo was resolved. Therefore, Kofi A. Annan concluded in the letter

that in accordance with 1244 Resolution Kosovo status process had to be started and he stated that

he agreed with the envoy with the assumption that it was necessary to be done at that period, 2005.

“I therefore intend to initiate preparations for the possible appointment, in the light of the outcome

of the forthcoming Council deliberations, of a special envoy to lead the future status process”- he

said. 38

The attached report summarized the successes and the shortcomings of the situation in Kosovo

reached by UN administration and Kosovar local government. Then it spoke of several important

points that indicated need for resolving Kosovo status issue. The report regarded UN presence being

37 http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2008/3/0318.html

38 Letter dated 7 October 2005 from the Secretary-General addressedto the President of the Security Council(2005) last checked on 13.06.09 on Relief Web, p.1

http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/KHII-6HG4UB?OpenDocument&rc=4&cc=scm

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no more usable on the soil: “The United Nations has done a credible and impressive job in fulfilling

its mandate in difficult circumstances. But its leverage in Kosovo is

diminishing” 39; It also considered resolution of the topic positive for the economy of Kosovo, and

said that Kosovo as well as Serbia have now to push for EU integration, as well as closer

cooperation with other international organizations for their political advancement; it stressed the

readiness of all sides for starting this process”. 40There is now a shared expectation in Kosovo and in

Belgrade, as well as in the region, that the future status process will start”; and it concluded that the

stagnation would follow if the process wouldn’t start: Kosovo will either move forward or slide

backwards — having moved from stagnation to expectation, stagnation cannot again be allowed to

take hold there”. After two years of leading “Kosovo Status Process” that contained raw of

negotiations that didn’t result successfully , Un envoy Martti Ahtisaari concluded the same that

existing situation was not sustainable and hampered Kosovo’s development :

“Almost eight years have passed since the Security Council adopted resolution 1244 (1999)

and Kosovo’s current state of limbo cannot continue. Uncertainty over its future

status has become a major obstacle to Kosovo’s democratic development,

accountability, economic recovery and inter-ethnic reconciliation. Such uncertainty

only leads to further stagnation, polarizing its communities and resulting in social

and political unrest.”41

The recognition texts also reflect the same argument. For example Albanian recognition text says:

“Independence of Kosovo puts an end to disintegration process of Yugoslavia, creates essential

conditions for constant development of the entire Kosovan society, including its concrete

perspective for quick integration in European and Euro-Atlantic integration”. 42

Therefore the third criteria is also well expressed in the opinion of major players, that situation in

Kosovo required changes and finding of the solution was vital for Kosovo development and

39 Letter... p.540 Letter... p.341 Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s future status(2005), last checked on 13.06.09 on Relief Web: http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2007.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/YZHG-6ZNTVS-full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf

42 http://www.keshilliministrave.al/index.php?fq=brenda&m=news&lid=7323&gj=gj2

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Regional stability and prosperity. And as far as, based on the second argument independence was

the only option to make change the actors went for unilateral recognitions.

4. Provisions for the defense of Democratic values

As the last criteria serves the emphases for support of democratic values. States that recognise

Kosovo independence stress that they act in the name of democracy and stressed that they recognise

Kosovo with the hope and guarantees that this independence will be “supervised” by international

institutions based on Ahtisaari plan that is welcomed by Kosovo, and therefore defence of the rights

of minorities will be guaranteed, the rule of law, multi- ethnicity and democracy will be encouraged.

This argument is the most widely shared among the recognising countries. As shown in the table

(annex2) democratic values are most frequently mentioned in recognition texts and this is the

argument that most countries share. 25 countries out of 48 examined stress this criterion.

In the recognition texts we can observe several approaches from the countries about Democracy.

Some of the countries simply declare that they recognize Kosovo in the name of democracy and

with the hope of witnessing democratic development in the newly independent state. Other countries

stress Ahtisaari plan that puts provisions that democratic values human rights and minority rights

will be defended and these countries welcome the attempts from Kosovar government to follow the

path offered by Ahtisaari project. And set of countries stress that they will themselves take part in

defence of these values in Kosovo, will watch closely and will get in the developments there.

As described some countries refer to democracy in general terms. For example Afghanistan declared

that recognises Kosovo “with belief in democratic values, human rights, the right of sovereignty, the

expansion of good relations between states, peaceful coexistence, and the independence of

countries”.43

Some of the countries make a suggestion like: “Ensuring the rights and safety of minorities, as well

as protection of cultural heritage sites, must be key priorities for Kosovo”. 44(Australia)

43 http://www.mfa.gov.af/detail.asp?Lang=e&Cat=2&ContID=562 44http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2008/fa-s034_08.html

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European countries feeling themselves closely involved in the process tried to ensure the democratic

provisions. Their discourse is sometimes imperative and demanding towards Kosovo, willing to

ensure defense of Democratic values in the country which they are about to recognize. Bulgaria

expresses exactly this point in the recognition text: “We demanded clear- cut commitments and

policy from Kosovo’s institutions to adopt relevant legislation, to fully implement the principles and

the arrangements envisaged by the Ahtisaari Plan and to prepare and pass a constitution of Kosovo

which is to reflect the commitments for the fulfillment of the European standards”.45

As far as Kosovo was very fast to adopt the constitution and to assume the responsibilities assigned

to it under the Ahtisaari Plan, countries expressed their welcome to the steps that Kosovo undertook

and promised to follow: “We welcome the commitment made by Kosovo to ensure the protection of

the rights of Serbian and other minorities, including their right to safety. Canada also welcomes

Kosovo’s commitment to ensure the protection of religious and cultural heritage sites. Canada

attaches great importance to the full implementation of these and other commitments, undertaken by

Kosovo’s leaders in line with the recommendations of UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari”. 46

This line of support for Ahtisaari recommendations is felt especially strongly in texts of most of EU

countries. Danish government, for example articulates: “It is a key issue for the Danish government

that Kosovo is committed to establishing a democratic, secular and multi-ethnic state that ensures

the protection of minorities. The new Kosovo is committed to implementing the Ahtisaari Plan and

has accepted that the international community will monitor the implementation of the Plan.”

The next angle formulated from the side of recognizing countries is that they will keep their eyes on

the fulfillment of promises made by Kosovo about defense of democratic values, rule of law and

minority rights. German government emphasizes that Kosovo will remain under the “watchful eye

of the international community”...” The German government will thus keep an attentive eye on the

Republic of Kosovo’s compliance with human rights, particularly as regards protecting minority

rights”. 47

45 http://kosova.org/independence/liste-der-staaten/bulgarien/Bulgaria.pdf

46http://w01.international.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.aspx? isRedirect=True&publication_id=385954&language=E&docnumber=5947 http://www.bundesregierung.de/nn_6516/Content/EN/Artikel/2008/02/2008-02-20-deutschland-erkennt-

kosovo-an__en.html

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European Union took a lead in the process of supporting and supervising development of newly

independent Kosovo and appeared as a major responsible organization in this direction: “The EU

stands prepared to support and supervise the development of Kosovo in the direction of a modern

society based on the rule of law”. 48

The EU decided to launch “a civilian crisis management operation in Kosovo” and sent The

European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX Kosovo, that began in June, with the

participation of about 2,000 international experts. 49

Therefore the last and most widely shared criterion is also described.

VI. I. III. Character of Kosovo recognition criteria

The content of the criteria is outlined in previous chapters, and now based on constructivist theory, I

will summarise it in terms of its character.

Firstly, it has to be admitted that the criteria for Kosovo recognition consists of shared believes and

ideas, or as Wendt calls it – collective meanings. All four criteria are shared among the recognising

states. They agree on the uniqueness of the case because of the UN role in the rule of Kosovo since

the conflict, they share concerns of Regional Stability and Development of Kosovo itself, they stress

that no alternative choice was to the decision of recognition, and they share belief in democratic

values.

This shared believes and understandings are the main subject of study of constructivist theory. “The

social world is a world of human consciousness: of thoughts and believes, of ideas and concepts, of

languages and discourses, of signs, signals, and understandings among human beings, especially

groups of human beings, such as states or nations”.50

And it is based on these shared understanding that states construct the world, make joint decisions

and joint arrangements.

48 http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/10358/a/10009649 http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?id=2 50 Jackson and Sorenson..p254

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Based on Wendt’s definition of institution that is actor’s common idea’s and “collective

knowledge’’ of “how the world works”(Wendt...p399), the Kosovo recognition can be regarded as

an institution.

Thus first point is that Kosovo recognition by its character consists of shared, collective

understandings and forms an institution.

The second assumption is that Kosovo recognition criteria is solution oriented. The actors involved

in Kosovo status process attempted to solve the problem through negotiations, though after

unsuccessful years of putting efforts in negotiations they couldn’t get a resolution of problem. The

basic concept in the criteria, in the arguments of the states is that the situation in Kosovo required a

solution as the status quo was unsustainable. Therefore they went to recognise the state unilaterally.

This goes in line with the Wendt’s judgment that: theory that “people act towards objects...on the

bases of the meanings that the objects have for them...it is collective meanings that constitute the

structures which organize our actions”. 51But in itself this solution is a change brought by this

common understanding of states, and the change is that for the first time bunch of states goes against

the practices of International law. As was defined in the theoretical part of the thesis, the current

international law practices do not support the recognition of ethnic minority.

But the explanation of change by the constructivist theory helps to explain this decision of

recognition or the new institution as we defined. As far as institutions are created in people’

minds, they are changeable, some have not existed in the past and some will stop existence in

the future. . “It’s a product of human intellect at a certain period of world history. It’s

specifically historical”. 52As defined by Wendt, shared believes crate interests and identities, but

these are dependent variables that can be changed if practice and way of interaction changes. 53Therefore, in Kosovo case as far as the new practice required solution that went against the

previous practices the actors went to create new institution in form unique practice.

51 Wendt...p.39752 Jackson and Sorensen, p.25653 Wendt...p.424

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Third Assumption about the character or nature of the criteria is that though it is widely shared

it is not shared by all the actors; it has opponents and is debatable.

VI.II Criteria of Abkhazia’s recognition

After identifying the criteria of Kosovo recognition I will go forward and identify what were the

criteria for Abkhazia’s recognition.

VI.II.I. Materials that will be used

It was in 2006 when the three breakaway regions, Abkhazia, Ossetia and Transnistria recognized

each other, but the first real recognition for Abkhazia was when the UN member country, Russia

recognized them in the August 2008 following the August war. The next and the last state to

recognize Abkhazian Sovereignty was Nicaragua. The Hamas authorities also expressed their

support for Abkhazia’s recognition.

Though here. as well as in the case of Kosovo I will discuss the recognition made by UN countries.

Therefore to examine what was the criteria of recognition I will examine recognition text of Russia,

and the statements made by the leaders of Russia and Nicaragua. Unlike Kosovo recognition, as far

as there are only several meaningful documents that are the bases for identifying criteria for

Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’ I will go through all of them and then deduce what can be regarded

as a criteria according to these texts.

VI.II.II. Recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russia

The Primary document to examine Russian arguments for the recognition are: the official statement

made by President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev, his statement published on the same day of

recognition in Financial Times: “Why I had to recognize Georgia’s breakaway regions” and the

interview given by the prime minister of Russia, Vladimir Putin in the near aftermath to BBC

correspondent.

In his official statement made on 26th of August, 2008 Dmitry Medvedev addressed the citizens of

Russia. The first point that he made was that Georgian side, broke international agreement, violated

rights of Ossetian people and caused death of thousands of civilians by starting the war in South

Ossetia and that the same scenario was planned against Abkhazian people.

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“Obviously, they in Tbilisi hoped for a blitz-krieg that would have confronted the world community

with an accomplished fact. The most inhuman way was chosen to achieve the objective – annexing

South Ossetia through the annihilation of a whole people.” he said and concluded that:” The same

fate lay in store for Abkhazia”.54

Therefore, Medvedev stated that after what Georgia has done, South Ossetian and Abkhazian

People have a right to “decide their destiny by themselves” that means to have independent states.

Medvedev said that a decision “needs to be taken based on the situation on the ground”.

He thereafter moved to recall the history of the conflict made the citation of the first president of

Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia who was pushing the idea of having “Georgia for Georgians”, and

said that Georgian side was not constructive during the negotiations and has always been ignoring

international agreements.

So, based on the “provisions of the UN Charter, the 1970 Declaration on the Principles of

International Law Governing Friendly Relations Between States, the CSCE Helsinki Final Act of

1975 and other fundamental international instruments” he recognized the independence of the two

regions.55

The speech of Medveved issued on the same day for the financial Times, repeats the same judgment

and adds the other point which is related to the recognition of Kosovo.

He once more says that the recent tragic events that took place in South Ossetia and the will of

South Ossetian and Abkhazian people to build sovereign states was the major bases for his decision:

“Taking into account the freely expressed views of the Ossetian and Abkhazian peoples and based

on the principles of the United Nations charter and other documents of international law, I signed a

decree on the Russian Federation’s recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and

Abkhazia”.56The history of the conflict is once more recalled. In the beginning of 1990’s when

Georgia became independent, she immediately started depriving autonomy from the autonomous

54 http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/08/26/1543_type82912_205752.shtml55 http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/08/26/1543_type82912_205752.shtml56 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9c7ad792-7395-11dd-8a66-0000779fd18c.html

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regions by eliminating the Abkhazian University, and by initiating war against the national

minorities of the country.

And, besides these already mentioned judgments, Medvedev states that international “precedent’ for

such a decision is already made, therefore Russia has right to repeat the similar action. After the

move of western countries which recognized the independence of Kosovo it seems impossible to

Russia to tell Abkhazians and Ossetians that they do not deserve to be recognized and this solution-

recognition cannot work for them, while it worked for the Balkans: “In international relations, you

cannot have one rule for some and another rule for others”.57

The interview with Vladimir Putin on the 29th of August 2008 is also a significant document

summarizing official Russian point of view about the issue.

Vladimir Putin once more talks about the history of relationships of the peoples of Caucasus region

in connection with Russian role. He goes farther than Medvedev and brings the facts from starting of

the 19th century, when South Oseetia willingly Joined Russia in the beginning of the 19th century and

Abkhazia also directly joined Russian empire later in the same century. A bit later it was Russian

Kingdom herself who put these regions under Georgian Administration formally. But during her

first independence Georgian state, in the beginning of the 20th century, acted brutally against with

both regions. By the word of Putin, Stalin because of being ethnically Georgian, gave these

territories to Georgia and “Therefore, those who insist that those territories must continue to belong

to Georgia are Stalinists: They defend the decision of Josef Vissarionovich Stalin”- he says. 58

Then Putin tells to the public the details of the recent war, and describes attacks from Georgian side,

and the negative effects of these actions on the population and region. He defines Russia’s role in

the process as constructive and defending moral principles, and also states that the ones who

disregard the importance of Russian responsibility on the issues are mistaken, because: “ We are a

peace-loving state and we want to cooperate with all of our neighbors and with all of our partners.

57 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9c7ad792-7395-11dd-8a66-0000779fd18c.html 58 http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/08/29/putin.transcript/

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But if anyone thinks that they can come and kill us, that our place is at the cemetery, they should

think what consequences such a policy will have for them”. 59

Vladimir Putin did not touch upon the issue of Kosovo in this interview, though as described above,

he gave extensive explanation of the position that the president of Russia expressed in his official

speeches.

VI.II.III. Recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Nicaragua

The recognition of Abkhazia by the second UN country, Nicaragua can be discussed based on the

recognition text of Nicaragua and the statement that was made by the president of Nicaragua Daniel

Ortega to mass media. The text of Recognition of Nicaragua is only available in Spanish therefore I

got the official translation in Georgian, that can be attached to the document and here I will

summarize it shortly.

The document says that the president of Nicaragua regards that based on the 15th paragraph of 5th

article of the constitution of Nicaragua, which confers to friendly relations, solidarity and respect of

international relations; Also based on the principles of independence and sovereignty in the UN

charter , Nicaragua recognizes Abkhazian republic.

The rest of the text just says that the Ministry of Foreign Relations of Nicaragua will be asked to

formalize the relations with Abkhazia; document will become a formal document after advertizing

it.

In the statement of the president made for mass media Daniel Ortega says that his decision was

made in order to support Russia’s plan to bring South Ossetia and Abkhazia closer to Russia. The

political views on the contemporary world politics makes him supportive to Russia’s positions:

"World peace is being threatened by hegemonist, rash policies, because the Soviet Union

disappeared and they went about promoting the break-up of nations that had a great unity that had

been established with great effort” – said Ortega, and therefore "The government of Nicaragua

recognizes the independence of the republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and we fully agree

59 http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/08/29/putin.transcript/

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with the Russian government's position that that conflict may end through dialogue with European

countries". 60

VI.II.IV. Criteria drawn from Russia’s and Nicaragua’s recognition (content)

The positions of Russia and Nicaragua and the criteria that come from their judgment can be

summarized as following:

1. Georgian Aggression

Because of the recent war that Georgia started against South Ossetia, and also intended to

start against Abkhazia, and the atrocities that this was brought, the two regions have

moral right to “decide their destiny by themselves” and be independent.

This criteria is expressed and in the speeches of Medvedev and Putin as well, who discuss the

process of starting the war and brutality from Georgian side that lead Russia to Recognition of

Abkhazia. In the position of Nicaragua this criterion is not reflected.

2. Historical Background

The second criterion is that the history gives Abkhazia right to form the Sovereign State.

In this second criterion as well both Putin and Medvedev refer to the history of the conflict

saying that in the beginning of 20th century, as well as in the 1990’s, when Georgia became

independent Georgian state tried to ruin Abkhazia’s autonomy and violated minority rights. This

aspect also is not mentioned by Nicaragua.

3. Precedent is existent

Because of the fact that Kosovo was recognized Abkhazia also has right to be recognized.

60 http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/show/229515,nicaragua-joins-russia-in-recognizing-south-ossetia-

abkhazia.html

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This point, as described above is mentioned just in an interview of Medvedev for New York

Times. Medvedev regards Kosovo recognition as a precedent and thinks it is not fair to deny to

Abkhazia, what was not denied to Kosovo.

4. Principles of International Law

International conventions justifying friendly relations between states and the right of sovereignty

gives ground to recognize Abkhazia.

This is the only criterion which is mentioned both in Russian and Nicaraguan statements. Russia

recalls UN charter, Principles of International Law, CSCE Final Act of 1995 and “other

fundamental international instruments”; while Nicaragua only mentions UN charter.

Though no specific articles are brought to attention, and this criterion is wide, without specifying

and explaining the concrete reference points.

VI.II.V Character of Abkhazia’s recognition criteria

Criteria’s of Abkhazia’s recognition do not constitute shared believes or ideas of actors. The

recognition itself was done by two countries, but even these two countries do not stress the same

arguments and understanding about the reasoning of the decision made. The only coincidence is

general mentioning of UN charter. otherwise, Nicaragua only expresses a support to Russian

position without justifying own decision of recognizing Abkhazia.

Therefore, these criteria in cannot create an institution.

Secondly the criteria are not solution oriented, but it’s situation-based. In the situation-based I mean

that it is justified based on the previous history, and consideration that something worse can happen.

as Medvedev stated: “A decision needs to be taken based on the situation on the ground”. 61Though

the criteria doesn’t show why is given decision better than other options or how will it resolve the

existing problem. On the other hand, it is situation-based also in a way that it refers to the fact that

Kosovo was recognized and repeats the similar action. It says that as Georgia made mistakes

61 http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/08/26/1543_type82912_205752.shtml

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Abkhazia should be recognised and as we have precedent like Kosovo it is now possible to take this

kind of step.

Thirdly criteria of Abkhazia’s recognition are debatable and not accepted by lots of countries.

VI.III. Comparison of the criteria’s of Kosovo recognition and Abkhazia’s Recognition

In the second and concluding part of my study I have to compare the two recognition criteria and

answer the second question of my study:

Does Abkhazia also satisfy and fit the criteria of being unique, exceptional case?

And as defined before I’ll answer this question in two dimensions:

Is the similar criteria applied to Abkhazia by existing recognition?

Can the similar criteria be applied to Abkhazia based on the examination of Abkhazia’s

situation?

This means that I will examine if existing recognition criteria proves the similarity of two cases and

also if the similarity can be found by analyses of Abkhazian case against Criteria of Kosovo

recognition. Or, to paraphrase once more- Is the similar criteria applied to Abkhazia now, and can

the similar criteria be applied generally?

As far as Kosovo is the first case of state recognition that goes against the practices of international

law as an exception, I take Kosovo recognition criteria and compare Abkhazia’s case to it.

To put in a better order we can formulate this comparison in this way:

The basic assumption about the reason why was Kosovo recognized is that it is a unique case. And

the reason or the possibility why Abkhazia is, or should be recognized is that it is a similar case. In

the previous part of the study I identified criteria that summarize the content part of the arguments

for Kosovo recognition and tree characteristics of the criteria. So I will compare contents and

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compare also the character of the criteria based on constructivist theory; I’ll examine each Criteria

and character of Kosovo recognition and justify if Abkhazian case repeats the exceptionality of the

case.

In order to organize the conclusions drawn out from comparison of each criterion I will categorize

the level of similarity in three categories: “no similarity” “week similarity” “strong similarity”.

The summery of the comparison is illustrated in the table shown by Annex3, which shows the

criteria and the level of similarity of two cases.

VI.III.I Comparison of the contents of criteria

1. UN Resolution 1244 and International Presence

So I firstly examine is there a criterion in Abkhazia’s recognition by Russia and Nicaragua that

responds to this criterion; and secondly what is the situation on the ground in Abkhazia that can

prove to be the similar to what was in Kosovo case?

Criterion defined as Principles of International Law is mentioned in Russia’s and Nicaragua’s

recognition justification. Nicaragua only recalls UN charter, while Russia says that “being guided by

the provisions of the UN Charter, the 1970 Declaration on the Principles of International Law

Governing Friendly Relations Between States, the CSCE Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and other

fundamental international instruments” she recognizes Abkhazia’s sovereignty. 62But they do not

explain what are these international instruments saying, and how these international instruments

justify the appropriateness of Abkhazia’s independence. While on the other hand, criterion about

Kosovo refers to very specific resolution of UN that placed Kosovo under UN supervision and gave

right to international community to be present in Kosovo and assist in rule and institution formation.

Now let’s have a look what kind of international presence was in Abkhazia since the conflict in the

beginning of 1990’s. The war during its immediate aftermath was mediated mostly by Russia and

UN.Russian peacekeepers were given UN mandate to conduct peacekeeping activities in Abkhazia.

And though OSCE and other organizations also mere involved in monitoring of developments The

United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) has to be named as the most important

involved body, in the post war and post war period. 62 http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/08/26/1543_type82912_205752.shtml

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AS described on the official website of UNOMIG, it was originally established on 24 August 1993

by Security Council resolution 858 (1993) to “verify compliance with the 27 July 1993 ceasefire

agreement between the Government of Georgia and the Abkhaz authorities in Georgia with special

attention to the situation in the city of Sukhumi; to investigate reports of ceasefire violations and to

attempt to resolve such incidents with the parties involved; and to report to the Secretary-General on

the implementation of its mandate, including, in particular, violations of the ceasefire agreement.

The authorized strength of the Mission was 88 military observers.” 63

In September 1993, the Mission was given an interim mandate, by Security Council resolution 881

of 4 November 1993, to maintain contacts with both sides to the conflict and with Russian military

contingent, and to monitor and report on the situation.

The last update in the mandate was made in 2003 by resolution 1494 of 30 July 2003, the Council

endorsed the recommendations by the Secretary-General that "a UN police component of 20 officers

be added to UNOMIG, to strengthen its capacity to carry out its mandate and in particular contribute

to the creation of conditions conducive to the safe and dignified return of internally displaced

persons and refugees".64

Therefore it is obvious that UN mandate in Abkhasia did not exceed the monitoring function, while

in the uniqueness of UN involvement in Kosovo was Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to withdraw

completely form Kosovo and gave international society right to rule the region. So the focal point

here is that UN took executive role in Kosovo governance. And it was only after 8 years of this kind

of international presence, and after the recognition of Kosovo Independence that “as Kosovo’s

Provisional Institutions of Self Government (PISG) were established and gained capacity to assume

more responsibilities, UNMIK has moved back from an executive role to one of monitoring and

support to local institutions”. 65

Therefore, as seen from the comparison of the criteria and the facts about international involvement

Abkhazia doesn’t have similarity with Kosovar case. Nor the official recognition criterion is similar

to Kosovo recognition Criterion about the UN resolution 1244 and International presence.

63 http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unomig/mandate.html64 http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unomig/mandate.html65 http://www.unmikonline.org/intro.htm

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To conclude, the first criterion is the case of no similarity.

2. No alternative to Recognition

The second criterion identified was that because of the historical background and the experience of

brutal war, the two conflicting parties couldn’t reach the agreement, and there was no alternative

seen except of supervised independence. I have to clarify here that historical background was not

stressed as the criteria itself, but the reason why negotiations couldn’t succeed and the basic part of

this argument was that all the ways had been tried, years of negotiations have passed and result

wasn’t reached. This left no alternative to recognition.

Two of the criteria on recognition of Abkhazia can be discussed against this criterion: Georgian

aggression; and Historical background. In these arguments Russia sais that Georgia always violated

rights of minorities, and the recent war proved that once more, so Abkhazia has the moral right to

“decide their destiny by themselves”.

As far as I defined it in the beginning of the thesis I’m not going to go in depth to discuss the

correctness of the arguments about the history and the existing situation brought up by either side.

So I will not compare the history of two cases and will not try to show differences and similarities,

but instead I will comment on the criteria once more. Both do stress that history was a major

obstacle for the resolution of conflicts. But, we see that the Criteria presented by Russia don’t show

how this historical background could exclude all the other options that could have been tried. It did

not show that the enough efforts were made to resolve the conflict. Therefore, Criteria pursued from

Russian side cannot be compatible to Kosovo recognition criteria about having no alternative to

recognition.

Now, we can have a look in reality if all the other solutions except independence were excluded in

case of Abkhazia and did Georgia and Abkhazia go through the efficient negotiation process.

Since the end of the war in 1994, Georgia and Abkhazia got involved in a lengthy process of

negotiations.

As it is defined on the official website of UNOMIG: “Over the years, the Secretary-General and his

successive Special Representatives, with support from representatives of the Russian Federation, as

facilitator, OSCE and the group of Friends of the Secretary-General - comprising France, Germany,

the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States - have continued efforts to

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promote the stabilization of the situation and the achievement of a comprehensive political

settlement, including a settlement on the future political status of Abkhazia within the State of

Georgia and the return of refugees and displaced persons. Despite those efforts, however, little

substantial results have been achieved on the key issues of the negotiations, and the Georgian-

Abkhaz peace process has remained stalled”. 66

In the middle of 1990’s peace talks were initiated By CSCE, also talks were held in Geneva under

UN auspices; The meetings between high level officials, even between the president of Georgia,

Shevardnadze and President of De-facto republic of Abkhazia Ardzinba were conducted. 67

Though, throughout the years the process got deadlocked at some points, continued at some periods

of time, without bringing significant results.

Since the end of 1990’s “Geneva Process” had lost importance and nothing substantial was reached.

However, soon Russian led ‘Sochi process” tried to supplement “Geneva Process”.

The EurasiaNet reported in 2002 that: “UN-brokered efforts to advance peace talks between

Georgia and its separatist region of Abkhazia remain at a virtual standstill ...Two top UN officials

briefed the UN Security Council December 9 on the Georgia-Abkhazia situation. Afterward,

diplomats told RFE/RL that no immediate consensus was reached on how to move the peace process

forward”. 68

Since 2004 the new government of Georgia had tried to show that they had new approach to the

conflict resolution. The center for strategic and international studies had summarized the points that

Irakli Alasania, representative of Georgian Government had presented at the CSIS on April 29,

2005,in Washington .

“Georgia’s new approach centers on a “completely new philosophy” of conflict resolution. In the

past, Georgia sought Abkhazia’s total isolation, political and economic. Georgia now recognizes,

66 http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unomig/background.html 67 A question of sovereignty The Georgia-Abkhazia peace process Issue, (1999) editor Jonathan Cohen, web site: http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/georgia-abkhazia/chronology.php 68 http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav121002.shtml

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however, that this isolation policy “has not gotten us any further in negotiations.” The Georgian

government is seeking possibilities for greater interaction with Abkhazia”. 69

But no real results have been reached by this new approach. The report of International Crisis Group

issued in 2007 highlights these developments very vividly. “Georgia now wants Russia’s facilitator

role within the UN-led process to be modified. It suggests the Coordinating Council reconvene as a

forum for direct dialogue between the Georgian and Abkhaz sides “under the patronage of the UN.

It wants the European Union (EU) and the OSCE as guarantors as well as observers”. 70

The same document is saying Georgia has also called for increased direct dialogue with the Abkhaz,

though the same Georgia, especially since 2006, has sometimes refused to attend the negotiations.

In 2003-2006 direct talks were largely suspended. Since then also was not much progress. And after

the conflict with south Ossetia, and deterioration of relations between Georgia and Abkhazia with

subsequent clashes in Upper Kodori, there have been no talks and Negotiations.

So now we have to be very careful to draw conclusion based on these facts.

On one hand it is obvious that Georgian- Abkhazian peace talks had been going on for more than ten

years and no progress was witnessed because of mistrust and entirely opposing positions of the two

conflicting sides. The difficult historical circumstances and bad experiences have played the role in

the failure. So, the Abkhazian case seems in a way similar to Kosovar case.

On the other hand we have to pay attention to several conditions

Firstly, it has been at least five years that direct talks have not been conducted between two parties.

Secondly, there has always been significant mistrust towards the facilitators of the negotiations.

From Georgian side I already described above that there was wish to change the format of

negotiations and to involve EU, OSCE and others to monitor the process but never reached this.

This pointed to mistrust towards Russia as the mediator. Sokhumi on the other side wanted “Russia

to remain the key facilitator” as it did not believe that” anyone else would offer it the necessary

69 http://www.csis.org/media/csis/events/ci.alasania.summary.04.29.05.pdf70http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/caucasus/179_abkhazia___ways_forward.pdf

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security guarantees”.71 This indicates that the parties were not satisfied with the environment and

conditions in which they had to negotiate.

Thirdly, the main facilitators did not put enough effort to create reliant, neutral and convenient

situation for negotiations. I will once more refer to Crisis group report considering it as a fair

document. Most important problem is that “The UN has only provided good offices and facilitation,

not tried to arbitrate or offer strong incentives or disincentives to influence the sides”. And the only

mediator war Russia who “committed as it is to protecting its own interests in its near abroad, has

never been fully neutral”.72 After looking at all these conditions it is impossible to say that the

negotiation process between Georgia and Abkhazia was fairly similar to “Kosovo Status Process” ,

which was genuine, well organized, systematic process of direct talks under UN and then under

“Troika”. Therefore it is not adequate to say that all the ways are ruled out concerning Abkhazia

issue by the time and negotiations have no product. There cannot be found any document which

would concludes this.

So as a conclusion to the second Criteria it becomes obvious that there exists certain similarity in

Kosovo and Abkhazian cases, though the similarity is not enough to say that Abkhazia fits the

second criteria of Kosovo recognition- that there is no alternative to the recognition.

The second criterion is the case of weak similarity.

3. Urgent Need for changing of Status Quo

The third criterion for Kosovo’s uniqueness was that Kosovo was the last unresolved problem in the

region that hindered regional security and regional development and that current political and

economic situation in Kosovo was not sustainable.

There can be little found in case of Abkhazia to compare it directly against these two sub arguments.

Russian and Nicaraguan recognition texts do not mention this kind of context.

Situation on the ground also doesn’t prove relevance. Regarding first sub argument concerning

regional stability, it is obvious that Abkhazia (even together with Ossetia) is not the “last unresolved

problem”, nor in south Caucasus, nor in Northern Caucasus. The region has number of

71 http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/caucasus/179_abkhazia___ways_forward.pdf72 http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/caucasus/179_abkhazia___ways_forward.pdf

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independence seeking units, some of which also are under Russian Federation and nobody argues

that independence of Abkhazia and Ossetia is the best solution for final resolution of Caucasian

conflicts.

Besides the fact that existing criteria of Abkhazia’s recognition doesn’t address the issue, there is

also no evidence that there was an urgent need for political and economical reasons for changing the

status quo in Abkhazia and that recognition would improve the conditions on the ground. Here we

should once more recall the situation in Kosovo. There was no chance left that any solution would

be found except independence and the situation was not sustainable because the UN administration

was ruling in parallel with Kosovo authorities that left vacuum and made the governance inefficient.

This has not been the case in Abkhazia.

Abkhazia has its de facto government and there has been no change in the political or social life

since recognition of Abkhazia by Russia and Nicaragua. As freedom house report said in 2007: “As

much as 85 percent of the Abkhaz population holds Russian passports and receive social benefits as

Russian citizens. .. Abkhazia’s economy is heavily reliant on Russia”. This status quo of course is

not good but recognition did not pose any changes to this existing condition.

Abkhazia in the recent years has not complained about economy because of tourism, and

agricultural products that are traded with Russia. In 2006 1.5 million tourists visited Abkhazia that

generated 16% of regions budget. 73

There exists no report or international acceptance about the urgent necessity to resolve the status of

Abkhazia immediately. In the case of Kosovo it was UN report that called for starting the status

process as it was not possible to continue UN mandate as an executive power, while the recent UN

reports on Abkhazia do call for negotiations but they do not conclude that there is an emergency to

sort out Abkhazia’s status issue, they only speak of the necessity to extend UNOMIG mandate there. 74This issue of course is a question of manipulation in sense that resolution of the conflict is a goal

for all the parties, and it is difficult to conclude that there is no need to resolve the problem, but the

vital need to push a solution in form of independence in the given time was not identified.

73 http://www.rosbalt.ru/2006/09/01/265769.html74 http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep07.htm

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I can conclude here that the two directions of arguments (regional stability and polit. econ.

development) given in Kosovo recognition criterion are not present in Abkhazia’s case. Though

there exists the topic raised by Russian side that refers generally to the need of change of status quo

and this topic is security problem.

As it was shown in the recognition criteria of Abkhazia, Russia argued that as Georgia started

vicious war against Ossetia” The same fate lay in store for Abkhazia”. And logic was that because

of this security concern and actions of Georgia, Abkhazia had to decide her fate for her own. 75

So after the independence Russia has ground to make military cooperation tight with Abkhazia. It

was just recently on the may 14th, news announced that:” Russia is going to sign agreement for the

lease of military basis in the breakaway Georgian republic, Abkhazia, within two weeks”.76

According to the president of Abkhazia Bagapsh, the building of bases has already started and the

agreement will simply formalize this process.

In this third argument, similarly to the second one, there is certain level of coincidence in the

conditions of the two cases, though it can be concluded that this similarity is very weak.

The third criterion is also the case of weak similarity.

4. Provisions for the Defense of Democratic Values

The strongest, most widely shared and most vividly emphasized criterion among Kosovo

recognition criteria was the will to support democratic values and appreciation and securing of the

guarantees that Kosovo government had promised to the rest of the world: that they would defend

Democratic values, rights of ethnic minorities and allow international society to control the

implementation of these promises.

75 http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/08/26/1543_type82912_205752.shtml76 http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=103629

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Abkhazia’s recognition doesn’t mention and regard this direction. The recognizing states as well as

Abkhazia itself have not expressed the commitment towards democratic development and have

provided no guarantees that minority rights would be defended in the newly established state.

Even before the recognition situation in Abkhazia concerning political rights and civil liberties was

far from satisfactory and no political will was expressed from the Abkhaz de facto authorities to

regulate the problem. The Freedomhouse report of 2007 describes the conditions existing there. It

stresses that Abkhazian Government is elected but more then 200 000 displaced Georgians have no

chance to participate the elections. 77

“The human rights and humanitarian situation in Abkhazia continued to be a very serious problem in

2006” , the report says. The biggest problem exists in Gali region which is mostly populated by

ethnic Georgians, where “ the security environment ...remained fragile over the course of 2006, with

a number of killings occurring during the year. While some Georgian schools operate in Gali, many

residents in the district do not have access to education in the Georgian language.” And the media is

also tightly controlled and restricted in “broadcasting news with political content”. 78

The war conditions have worsened this picture and after the recognition of Abkhazia by Russia the

most significant problem that arose was that ethnic Georgians were forced to take Russian passports.

Georgian news repeatedly reported of severe abuses against Georgian population in Gali. The

headlines like: “Ethnic Georgians evicted from Gali district”; “Separatists rob family in Gali

district”; “Aggressors dig up graves in Gali district” became more and more frequent. 79Though

Georgian side can’t be regarded as a neutral judge the similar facts are also reflected in the

statements of OSCE officials.

Just recently, on the 14 of April the statements of OSCE High Commissioner on National

Minorities Knut Vollebaek were released in media where he says ”In line with my conflict

prevention mandate, I urge the de facto authorities to put an end to the pressure being exercised on

the Georgian population in the Gali District through the limitation of their education rights,

compulsory "passportization", forced conscription into the Abkhaz military forces and restrictions 77 http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&country=7313&year=200778 http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&country=7313&year=200779 www.rustavi2.com

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on their freedom of movement... I also regret the decision of de facto leadership to close the

administrative border of Abkhazia, which makes it increasingly difficult for the population to

maintain family contacts, access necessary health care or sell their products on the other side of the

de facto border. I am concerned that such coercive practices, which violate international law, may

further destabilize the already fragile inter-ethnic situation in the region and force many Georgians

to leave".80 Here I do not argue that In the case of Kosovo situation about human rights and

democracy are completely resolved and at satisfactory level. Though, Kosovar government and the

states and international players have expressed strong commitment to take care of these issues.

While in contrast of this in Abkhazian case we saw that there is no will and no practical application

to the issue of democratic development and creation of secure environment for minorities in

Abkhazia.

Therefore the fourth criterion is the case of no similarity of the two cases that this study discusses.

VI.III.II. Comparison the character of Kosovo’s recognition with Abkhazia’s Case

Firstly I have to discuss the character against the question: Is the similar criteria applied to Abkhazia

by existing recognition?

First Character of Kosovo recognition was that it is widely shared. It is created out of “collective

knowledge’’ of “how the world works”(Wendt...p399) and based on constructivist theory creates

an institution. The recognition of Abkhazia is not based on shared believes and understandings. As

the theory argues, only concepts that are widely shared matter, we see that the character of

Recognition of Abkhazia doesn’t prove similar to Kosovar case- this is “no similarity” part of

character.

The second assumption is that Kosovo recognition criteria is solution oriented. It argues that given

situation needs change and solution to be resolved. While, Abkhazia’s recognition is situation-based,

deductive. It says that as Georgia made mistakes Abkhazia should be recognised and as we have

80 http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/72225/-osce-calls-for-an-end-to-pressure-put-on-the-georgian-

population-in-abkhazia.html

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precedent like Kosovo it is now possible to take this kind of step. So the second characteristic is also

the case of “no similarity”.

The third characteristic of both recognitions is that they are disputable. Nor of the recognitions and

their argumentation (or criteria) are undeniably correct. They are both challenged and both have

contrary argumentation and opponents. So, the third characteristic of Kosovo recognition proves to

have” strong similarity” with Abkhazia’s recognition criteria character.

Now I should answer the question can the criteria with similar character be applied to Abkhazia?

As we saw the characteristics of Kosovo recognition criteria was that they were shared, were

solution oriented, and were disputable. The constructivist theory showed that the shared

believes and understanding can constitute to a creation of institution. In this case as well, based

on the approach that the actors realized need for solving a problem they made change in existing

institutions and created unique institution in form of shared recognition for one case. The basic

idea of constructivism is that as far as institutions are created in peoples’ minds, they are

changeable, some have not existed in the past and some will stop existence in the future. 81

The Kosovo recognition criteria is exactly the example of this- It did not exist but was created

based on the change in peoples thinking about how the conflict could have been Solved. So can

this kind of criteria be applied to Abkhazia? –yes it can be. The character of criteria is adjusted

to change- it is not conventional, it doesn’t stick to any existing rule or law. This means can be

today Abkhazia’s recognition is not shared among the players, but if tomorrow they will regard

recognition as having no other alternative they are free to pursue this way. Big amount of states

have not regarded Abkhazia’s recognition necessary, but if tomorrow they will think that it’s

adequate there is nothing that will stop them from recognizing Abkhazia.

On this direction one fact is to be admitted. The very recent UN report that was released on 21st

of May indicates that UN has already changed approach to Abkhazia’s issue based on the new

circumstances: The new report doesn’t refer to Abkhazia as it used to refer before: “Abkhazia,

Georgia” , this title is neglected and also Abkhazian Authorities are no more called “de Facto”

81 Jackson and Sorensen, p.256

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authorities”. 82I do not assert that this is fact leading to recognition but this certainly is a change

in UN approach to the issue.

So, the logic of the Kosovo recognition criteria leaves chance that in case of necessity the states

have no obstacle to experience their power of making joint decisions and operation in new

reality, or in other words if the problem will require nothing will stop states from starting to

recognize Abkhazia’s sovereignty. On the other hand , by making this statement I do not try to

predict the future, I do not say that states will recognize Abkhazia, or they will not recognize

her, but I just conclude that criteria similar in character to what Kosovo recognition’s criteria

character is possible to be applied to Abkhazia as well at a certain time.

VII. Summery and Conclusions

In the last part of the Thesis I want to summarize the results that I got from the two levels of the

study. I will make the summarizing conclusions against the two research question that I posed in the

beginning of the study.

The first question of the thesis was: what are the criteria based on which Kosovo can be a Unique

Case and can be recognised as a state? My hypothesis to answer this question was: There exist

particular criteria based on which Kosovo is regarded as a special case; the criteria that has been

shared by a community of states, though not by whole international society.

This Hypothesis was approved by identification of specific four criteria that make Kosovo a unique

case. These criteria’s are: UN Resolution 1244 and International Presence; No alternative to

Recognition; Urgent Need for changing of Status Quo; Provisions for the defense of Democratic

values. The circumstances that are included in these criteria’s are bases for the states recognizing

Kosovo independence to justify their decision.

In nature, or in character these criteria are shared, solution oriented but still debatable, as they still

have the opponents. Based on constructivist assumption, as this recognition is shared it comprises an

institution in itself, as it is based on shared ideas and understandings.

82 http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=20960

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The second question was: Can Abkhazia also satisfy the criteria of being unique case; therefore,

can recognition of independence of Abkhazia be justified according to the similar criteria as

Kosovo?

The hypothetical answer to the question initially was: Abkhazia doesn’t have similarities with

Kosovo in dimension of recognition criteria. Criteria of Kosovo independence indentifies reasons of

recognition that cannot be found in Abkhazian case. Though there is possibility that Abkhazia will

acquire own set of criteria based on which states might continue (after Russia and Nicaragua)

recognition of Abkhazia.

The second part of my study compared Abkhazia’s recognition criteria and Abkhazia’s recent

situation to Kosovo recognition criteria. Each criterion was discussed separately. Abkhazia proved

to have no similarity with two out of four criteria of Kosovo recognition and the other two showed

weak similarity. As for character the existing criteria of Kosovo recognition and Abkhazia’s

recognition are different in two characteristics: Kosovo is widely shared case while Abkhazia’s

recognition is very narrowly shared; Kosovo is solution oriented case, while Abkhazia’s recognition

is fact-based; thought both recognitions are disputable.

As far as Abkhazia proves to have only weak similarity with about two criterions of Kosovo

recognition; and never showed signs of having strong similarity with Kosovo case it can be

concluded that Abkhazia cannot be compatible with Kosovo and the Kosovo criteria and the

conditions and situations that Kosovo witnessed are not repeated in Abkhazian case.

Though, the analysis of the criteria based on constructivist theory indicated that Kosovo recognition

criteria is solution oriented; this is a decision made by actors to solve the irresolvable conflict based

on their shared belief and understanding that recognition of independence could be the only

workable solution. This in itself was a change in the face of international law practices. So if we

ask- can the same approach be applied to Abkhazia? – the answer is- can be. This approach is open

to changes as situations requires from it. So, if at certain time number of states will view the

Abkhazian case as deserving recognition they will do so. This doesn’t mean that I predict that

Abkhazia will be recognized by wider number of actors, this only means that I conclude that Kosovo

criteria has the character which says that the recognition of a state as an only solution can be

repeated if required by the conditions.

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Annex 1. List of the states whose recognitions texts were analyzed

1. Afghanistan

2. Albania

3. Arab Emirates

4. Australia

5. Austria

6. Belgium

7. Bulgaria

8. Burkina Faso

17. Germany

18. Hungary

19. Iceland

20. Ireland

21. Italy

22. Japan

23. Latvia

24. Liberia

33. Norway

34. Palau

35. Panama

36. Peru

37. Poland

38. Portugal

39. San Marino

40. Senegal

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9. Canada

10. Costa Rika

11. Croatia

12. Czech

13. Denmark

14. Estonia

15. Finland

16. France

25. Lithuania

26. Luxembourg

27. Macedonia

28. Malaysia

29. Maldives

30. Malta

31. Montenegro

32. Nederland

41. Sierra Leone

42. Slovenia

43. South Korea

44. Sweden

45. Switzerland

46. Turkey

47. UK

48. US

Annex 2. County and Criterion

Criteria 1 2 3 4UN Resolution 1244 and

International Presence

No alternative to

Recognition (II)

(no possibility of

agreement between the two

sides, because of the

Urgent Need for

changing of Status Quo

Provisions for the

defense of Democratic

values

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unique historical context of

the conflict)

(regional stability and

political and economic

development of Kosovo)

(rights of minorities,

the rule of law, multi-

ethnicity and

democracy)

Countries

(Analyzed

48 out of

57)

Australia

Canada

Costa Rika

Ireland

Peru

Sweden

Switzerland

Portugal

Burkina Faso

Austria

Bulgaria

Costa Rika

Denmark

Germany

Hungary

Iceland

Ireland

Luxembourg

Sweden

Malta

Albania

Austria

Bulgaria

Canada

Czech

France

Hungary

Japan

South Korea

Senegal

Switzerland

Turkey

UK

Macedonia

Montenegro

San Marino

Burkina Faso

Afghanistan

Albania

Australia

Bulgaria

Canada

Costa Rika

Denmark

Estonia

Finland

Germany

Hungary

Iceland

Ireland

South Korea

Latvia

Nederland

Norway

Poland

Sweden

Turkey

US

Macedonia

Palau

San Marino

Sierra Leone

Totals 9 11 17 25

Annex 3. Level of Similarity

Criteria of Kosovo recognition Level Of Similarity

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UN Resolution 1244 and International Presence

No similarity

No alternative to Recognition Week similarity

Urgent Need for changing of Status

Quo

Week similarity

Provisions for the defense of

Democratic values

No similarity

Shared No similarity

Solution- oriented No similarity

Debated Strong Similarity

Bibliography

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