Ma'an: An Open-Ended Crisis, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan.

September 2003

The Center for Strategic Studies wishes to thank the government departments that provided the research team with all the information in this report. It especially wishes to thank the Headquarters of the Public Security Forces, the General Intelligence Department, Ma’an Governorate, Ma’an’s Municipality and all current and former officials who were interviewed during the writing of this report.

The Center also wishes to sincerely thank the people of Ma’an and its notables (both those living in the town and in other parts of the Kingdom) as well as the members of the Popular Committee for their constructive co-operation with the research team. The Center commends the efforts of the research team which consisted of: Faris Breizat, Nawaf Wasfi Tell, Ibrahim Seif, Musa Shteiwi, Fayez Al Suyyagh and Mohamad Tarawneh. It also wishes to thank Tony Al Sabbagh for his important work on the values and democracy surveys carried out especially for this report.

The Center also thanks Hikmat Yousef, Waleed Al Khateeb, Rania Arar, Khamis Raddad and Dina Haddad for their efforts, which helped to produce the report in its final form. Mustafa Hamarneh

Head of the Research Team

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary 2

Introduction 3

Chapter 1: A General Overview of Ma’an 4

Chapter 2: The Current Economic Situation in the Town of Ma’an 5

2.1 Age Groups

2.2 Education

2.3 Health

2.4 Income

2.5 The Labor Force

2.6 Poverty

2.7 Human Development

2.8 Government Projects for Developing the Ma’an Governorate

2.9 Economic Performance Indicators

Chapter 3: The Social Structure of the town of Ma’an 19

3.1 The Traditional Social Structure and its Role in Collective

Reactions

3.2 Differentials in the Social Structure and the Collective Self Social

Values

Chapter 4: A History of the Crises in Ma’an 24

4.1 Successive Events

4.2 Dealing with the Events in Ma’an from a Security Point of View

4.3 The Town of Ma’an and The State: Mutual Preconceptions

4.4 The Public Security Forces’ View of the Town of Ma’an

4.5 The People of Ma’an’s View of the State and its Institutions

4.6 Feelings of Injustice and Protestation

Chapter 5: Conclusion 34

Notes 35

1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Is Ma’an different from the rest of the Kingdom? Can the successive recurring events in the

town during the last few years be attributed to a “uniqueness of the same sort” which makes

Ma’an different from other towns in the Kingdom?

This report, “Ma’an – An open-ended Crisis”, attempts to answer these questions once and for

all using a multi-disciplinary methodological approach to cover all aspects of the issues in

question which include an intermingling of the security, economic and social factors on the one

hand and ethical and value-based behaviors on the other.

The report’s conclusion is that the phenomena of violent protests in Ma’an is as a result of

various intertwined factors and not a result of just one factor as was the general conclusion

reached by previous studies.

For example, if the vital economic factor is taken into account, the report shows that there are

some indicators that can differentiate the town of Ma’an from other towns. However, these

differentials can only explain one limited aspect of the events that occurred in the town.

If the social factor is considered, then the familial and tribal structure in Ma’an shows a

uniqueness that can partially explain some aspects of the collective response. The historic

social changes are reviewed and tied in with the prevailing value structure of the town and

compared to that of the rest of the Kingdom.

There is no doubt that there is a special situation in Ma’an. However, the successive events

reviewed by this report cannot be explained by the uniqueness of the familial and tribal structure

alone. Issues arising from the way the various governing bodies in the Kingdom coordinated their

activities in Ma’an play a part in explaining the events. Viewing Ma’an as only a security problem

without considering other factors has not fundamentally helped to ease the situation.

In order to avoid the recurrence of these events whether in Ma’an or elsewhere in the Kingdom,

dealing with the “problem of Ma’an” must involve a comprehensive solution to all aspects of the

problem as it is clear that mismanaging a crisis can often lead to a deepening of the crisis and the

problems causing it.

The report concluded that relations between the State and the people of the town cannot be

described as healthy as it was evident that there is a disagreement as to who represents Ma’an

on the State level. Is it represented by the Ma’ani notables who are members of the Popular

Committee or is it represented by the traditional leaders of the town who live in Amman and

who have historically been the link between the Government and Ma’an? Is it time for a change

now that the people of Ma’an have elected their representatives to Parliament? Can the

relationship become clearer and more transparent?

On a general level, it is difficult to consider Ma’an as a issue separate case from the national

trend. Economic and political development is a national requisite. Without achieving this

development, the situation remains subject to events that can take a variety of forms. This view

has given us our title: Ma’an – An Open-ended Crisis.

2

INTRODUCTION

Following the events of November 2002, the interest of research centers, academic institutions

and the international and local press in Ma’an increased. The International Crisis Group was

one organization that published a study covering the events and the situation in the town (see

note 1). This report is more descriptive than analytical. Its solution to the situation starts with

where it ends, with the events that happened, without the social and economic perspective of

these events. It also did not make a comparison between Ma’an and other parts of the Kingdom

to try to find where there were aspects purely related to Ma’an if any such aspects exist. Another

report was the one published by the Al Hussein University that reviewed the actual economic

and social situation of families in the Ma’an Governorate. The University carried out a survey

and issued important detailed data concerning the town. However, it left the analysis of this data

to researchers and interested parties. The University’s report is an attempt to complete previous

studies carried out to understand what happened in the town of Ma’an.

The report “Ma’an – An Open-ended Crisis”, however, presents an analysis and evaluation of the

various aspects connected to the recurring outbursts of violence which the town of Ma’an has

witnessed since 1989. It avoids adopting a single theoretical framework in an attempt to report

the facts more clearly and analyze the main political, economic and social components of the

crisis and connect them together to clarify what the report has elected to call “the Ma’an reality”.

The report concentrates on analyzing the crises in Ma’an in an effort to understand the real

causes behind them and then reach a conclusion that might help officials find a solution to this

phenomena on the one hand and, on the other, avoid any repetitions in the future whether in

Ma’an or in any other part of the Kingdom.

This report is divided into five chapters. The first chapter gives a general overview of the Ma’an

Governorate. Chapter two tries to describe the actual economic situation in the town of Ma’an

in an effort to identify the factors that led to the phenomena of violence and protests and to

refute or confirm previously held beliefs about Ma’an. In addition, chapter two aims to examine

whether Ma’an differs from other parts of the Kingdom and if it has certain characteristics or

particulars that other parts of the Kingdom do not have.

Chapter three of this report deals with the social structure of Ma’an. It reviews the tribal

affiliations and value trends in the town and helps the reader understand the role the social

structure and tribal affiliations play in forming the collective responses of the people of the town

on the one hand. On the other hand chapter three shows how the citizens carry out their daily lives

in normal circumstances and how they live their lives when a crisis erupts.

Chapter four of the report reviews the history of the crises in the town of Ma’an between 1989

and the latest crisis in November 2002. It explains the events that happened during each crisis

and analyzes them with the aim of identifying the main reasons behind them and how these

reasons evolved as well as the main obstacles to finding a solution to the problem.

The final chapter of this report is the conclusion reached by the research team. It also reviews

some solutions to avoid any similar crises in the future based on the analyses found in this

report.

The methodology used in this report involved face to face interviews with those connected to the

crises including meetings with current and former government officials. The report also relied

on a large amount of official data. In addition, the Center for Strategic Studies of the University

of Jordan carried out a survey to identify the values prevailing in Ma’an. Part of this report was

based on an anthropological methodology involving first hand experience as members of the

team lived in Ma’an among its people for a period of time.

A number of experts in social sciences contributed to this report including experts in sociology,

economics, law, political science, anthropology and history. They used a variety of methods

each according to his/her specific expertise. The report can, therefore, be described as a

multidisciplinary report as no single methodology or viewpoint was used to reach the

conclusions in it. This multidisciplinary methodology was necessary because of the subject the

report was tackling and the main question it aimed to answer: “Why do violent events recur in

Ma’an in particular?”

3

CHAPTER ONE: A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF MA’AN

The Governorate of Ma’an lies in the south of the Kingdom, 210 kilometers to the south of the

capital Amman. Administratively, it consists of four Districts: the Town of Ma’an, Shobak,

Wadi Musa and Husseiniyah. The Governorate’s boundaries extend north to the Capital

Governorate, west to the Governorates of Kerak, Tafileh and Aqaba and south and east to the

borders between Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

The Governorate covers 33,163 square kilometers representing 37% of the Kingdom’s area. It

is, therefore, the largest Governorate in size. Most of the Governorate (95% of it) is desert with a

desert climate. The average annual rainfall in the Governorate is 25-50 ml, which makes it

impossible for the people of Ma’an to depend on rain based agriculture or raising live stock.

Settlement habits in Ma’an have, historically, differed from those throughout the rest of the

Kingdom especially those in the Balqa Governorate in the late nineteenth century. Settlers in

Ma’an have basically been migrants who came from outside the Governorate and subsisted in it

during the Haj season by selling wares to the convoys of pilgrims from Damascus. Ma’an then

developed into a station post on the Hijaz Railway. This meant that, unlike the other areas

mentioned above, Ma’an had no shares in the tribal lands surrounding the town that could help

to support the economy of the town by providing agricultural income or income from grazing.

This led to it relying on the service sector and, especially, trade with areas around it, which, in

turn, limited the economic development of the Governorate and the availability of enough job

opportunities for new entrants to the job market.

The estimated population of Ma’an in 2001 was 101,000 people. This represents 2% of the

population of the Kingdom. The population of the District of the Town of Ma’an, at the end of

2002 according to the Department of General Statistics was around 30,000 people. Males form

54% of the population in the Governorate while females form 46%.

Urban dwellers in the Governorate represent around 43% of the population compared to 79%

throughout the Kingdom. The population density is 3 people per square kilometer compared to

58 people per square kilometer in the rest of the Kingdom (see note 2). Social demographic

indicators show that the average family in the Governorate consists of 6.1 members compared to

5.8 members in the rest of the Kingdom.

4

CHAPTER TWO: THE CURRENT ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE TOWN OF

MA’AN

The main question on which this part of the report centers and which covers the vital economic

aspect of the situation is whether or not the current economic situation in the town of Ma’an or

in the Governorate of Ma’an differs from that in the rest of the towns and governorates of Jordan

during the period under study.

This will be achieved through a review of some of the indicators connected to Ma’an and its

problems, which can help the reader understand the nature of the town and tie these indicators to

the events that happened there during the past few years.

From the theoretical point of view, development can occur nationally by following a

comprehensive set of policies which allow for a growth in the GDP and by maintaining levels of

stability that enable the implementation of economic projects. Another viewpoint concerns local

development. From this point of view development is represented by implementing projects on

the regional level based on the resources available or dependent on the skills available or by

using the geographical advantages of certain areas. A reason for targeting certain areas could be a

combination of these factors in addition to the social role that certain governments play in the

distribution of the benefits of development to achieve acceptable levels of social justice and to

limit the migration from rural areas into towns. Other more traditional reasons could be behind

implementing projects of a social benefit as well as a material one

2.1 AGE GROUPS

Table 1 below shows that the population of Ma’an is young as is that of the rest of the Kingdom.

The youth form a majority in the survey that the Center for Strategic Studies carried out for this

report. This impacts on the needs of the local community and its aspirations and on the private

and government development efforts in the town. In addition, this structure could affect how

events develop in the town especially if it is connected with a lack of job opportunities as many

sociologists believe.

Table 1: The Age Distribution of the Population of the Town of Ma’an

Age Group Number Percentage

18-25 117 44.7

26-35 68 26

36-45 31 11.7

46-55 25 9.5

55+ 21 8.1

Total 262 100

Source: Social Values Survey, Center for Strategic Studies, May 2003. The survey

questioned those who are 18+. The survey data was used because there was no other data

available on age groups for the town of Ma’an separately.

As the population aspect is connected with other social indicators like education, the economy

and the labor force, this report will cover these indicators to clarify the basic structure of the

society in Ma’an.

2.2 EDUCATION

Official data shows that the illiteracy rate among the male population of Ma’an is around 17%

compared to 10% in the rest of the Kingdom. According to the Year 2000 Report on Human

Development in Jordan, a family headed by an illiterate is ten times more likely to be poor or to

risk falling into poverty than a family headed by a person with secondary education. Among the

female population of Ma’an, the illiteracy rate is around 38%. This is more than double the

average rate in the Kingdom (see note 3). Attendance levels at primary, secondary and higher

education institutions are around 67% for males and 63% for females. This is similar to

attendance levels in the rest of the Kingdom, which are 68% for males and 67% for females.

5

A detailed study on the existing economic and social conditions in the Ma’an Governorate shows

that the illiteracy rate among those aged 12 and over is around 19% and that the illiteracy rate

among married men is around 23%. Among married women, the illiteracy rate reaches

45%. The percentage of people who have gone on to higher education is very low in the

Governorate. The number of families who have a male family member who has gone on to

higher education (a diploma or a 1st or higher university degree) is only around 15% of the

total. This rate is around 16% among female family members.

There are 19 nurseries in the Governorate of Ma’an run by the Ministry of Social Development.

These are attended by 1,082 children who are taught and supervised by 38 members of staff.

There are 144 schools that include 1,151 class grades. These are attended by 24,920 students.

Females form around 54% of the total number of students. There are 1,827 teachers (male and

female) teaching in these schools. Female teachers form around 69% of the total. The

student/teacher ratio is around 13.6. This is considered a good ratio from the practical point of

view as it indicates small class sizes (see note 4).

According to official data, truancy levels are low as the number of truants in the school year

2000/2001 was 68 students with females forming 45% of the total (see note 5).

The data related to education in the Governorate of Ma’an or in the town of Ma’an itself reflects

the actual situation in the rest of the Kingdom with the exception of the high illiteracy rates

especially among females. School attendance levels and the number of schools is close to the

average in the Kingdom.

A new university was established in Ma’an, the Al Hussein University. The local community’s

interaction with the university could be a framework for how to deal with new institutions and

for the role these institutions play in the local community.

FRAME ONE – The Al Hussein University: Indications of a Success Story

The Al Hussein University is considered an example of how a social education project can come close to

achieving a number of positive aims in the short span of its existence. At first, the university faced a lot of

resistance by certain groups in the town of Ma’an. These groups tried to suite the university into fulfilling

its own interests, priorities and beliefs. Their tactics included attacking the female students’ hall of

residence in the town center. The hall of residence building was shot at on 14/11/1999. It was attacked

again on 16/1/2000. This attack broke some windows. One student was lightly injured. The attack

caused panic amongst the students. Unknown groups published leaflets inciting the people against the

university and calling for the segregation of male and female students. The leaflets also incited people

against the female students and called on these students to dress according to the Sharia. At the time of

the attacks, several preachers in the mosques at Friday prayers called for the segregation of students. This

was used as a pretext by some to call for the closure of the university or for the segregation of students.

During this time (the year the university was first established), there were several assaults on the private

property of the university teaching faculty that included robbery and damaging cars.

However, three years on, it was clear to many opinion leaders and notables that the issues raised against

the university were concerns prior to its establishment and that they now no longer mattered.

The total number of Ma’anis from the various tribes in the town that have been accepted into the

university is 528 students (male and female) in 12 disciplines in the Colleges of Education, Arts and

Sciences. This represents almost 19% of the total number of students at the university. The number of

female students is 374 i.e. around 71% of the total students from Ma’an as opposed to 154 male students

who represent 29% of the total. This is proof of the increasing interest among females in Ma’an in

education in general and in higher education in particular. The existence of the university has brought

about a significant change in the status of women as the university draws around 20% of its students from

the females in the Ma’an Governorate.

The university also carried out a training and habilitation program that benefited around 600 town people

between the years 1999 and 2002.

The university also helped the local unemployment problem as the number of town people working in the

university is 170 out of a total of 338 workers from the Governorate.

In addition, the university purchases the majority of its needs from the local shops in the town. This has

increased the shops’ activity. Investment in construction has risen in order to provide halls of residence

for the students and housing for the teaching faculty and university staff. The transport sector has also

benefited.

Furthermore, the university has offered assistance in kind as well as technical and financial assistance to

around 40 local institutions on an almost regular basis. It established a prize “The Al Hussein University

6

Prize” for leading institutions in the Governorate as a contribution towards strengthening its

developmental role.

These facts helped to create a positive picture of the university and helped to quell the resistance against

it. In fact, a positive behavioral development began whereby certain sections of the society began to

defend and promote the university. For example, during the recent events in Ma’an, there were no attacks

on the university’s property or on the students’ halls of residence. The opinion leaders in the town

warned people not to approach the university campus. Preachers at mosques stopped their threatening

sermons and started calling on the people to support and preserve the university. This was confirmed

again and again by the Popular Committee, which confirmed in writing that the university should be

supported at the highest levels. Furthermore the calls for segregating the students have stopped.

All this indicates that the university now plays a positive role in developing the local community. It is

encouraging civil values that all parts of the community recognize as important values. The experience

also indicates that the people of Ma’an are able to interact with successful ventures.

2.3 HEALTH

Life Expectancy in the Southern Governorates of Kerak, Tafileh, Ma’an and Aqaba is 67.8 years

for males and 69.6 years for females. This compares to an overall average throughout the

Kingdom of 68.6 years for males and 71.1 years for females.

Child mortality rates among one year olds in the Southern Governorates are 37.9 per 1,000 for

boys and 33.7 per 1,000 for girls compared to a national average of 30.7 per 1,000 for boys and

29.3 per 1,000 for girls. There are 122 hospital beds in the Ma’an Governorate i.e. 12 beds for

every 10,000 citizens. This compares to a national average of 16 beds for every 10,000 citizens.

There are two hospitals in the Governorate. The first is the Ma’an Hospital in the

town of Ma’an and the second is the Queen Rania Al Abdullah Hospital in Wadi Musa, which is

under construction (see note 6). Although the hospital bed per citizen ratio is lower than the

national average, the same applies to other Governorates in the Kingdom. The number of hospital

beds in Zerqa is 11; the number of hospital beds in Irbid is 12.6; and the number of hospital beds

in Tafileh is 11 for every 10,000 citizens.

Ma’an Governorate also has the following Ministry of Health facilities and centers:

1. Three all-inclusive health centers, twelve primary health centers, twenty five subsidiary

health centers, fifteen maternal and child care centers and thirteen dentist clinics.

2. Dental laboratories in the all-inclusive health centers

3. Eighteen pharmacies in the health centers

4. A lung and chest clinic

The Health Directorate monitors and tests the drinking and purified water. It also monitors food

and medicine sold in the Governorate and provides school health care services (see note 7).

Official figures show that the most common illnesses in the Governorate are those related to high

blood pressure followed by those related to diabetes, heart problems and then skin problems. The

percentage of families with members suffering from heart problems and diabetes is around 35%

of all families. The percentage of families in the Governorate with no health insurance is around

28% of all families (see note 8). This percentage rises to 32% of all

families in the District of the Town of Ma’an. However, in the District of Shobak, this

percentage drops to around 14% as most of the health insurance in this District is military. Health

officials in Ma’an confirm that the major problem facing the health sector is in the health services

especially where staffing is concerned. Technical and nursing staff are not sufficiently trained.

There is also a continuous turnover in staff (i.e. they don’t stay in Ma’an) of male and female

nurses and doctors. In addition, there is no alternative health care facility in the main

government hospital in the town, no facilities for autopsies and no burns and dressing facility. It

was also made clear by these health officials that the percentage of medical staff who are Ma’anis

is, in general, low as Table 2 below shows:

Table 2: Medical Staff Numbers and those of them who are Ma’anis

Numbers of Medical Staff in

General

Number of Medical Staff who are

Ma’anis

40 Doctors 3

7

107 Nurses 9

15 X-Ray none

12 Technicians none

9 2

Source: This table was prepared by the research team who relied on the data available in the health departments in Ma’an.

Vital health statistics in the Ma’an Governorate indicate that life expectancy in the Governorate

is similar to that throughout the Kingdom. Health centers and services also do not indicate any

deterioration in the level of services.

2.4 INCOME

Studies indicate that the average per capita income in the Governorate of Ma’an is relatively

low. The income of more than 44% of all families in the Governorate is less than JD150 per

month (see note 9) compared to around 30% of families nationally (see note 10). More than

80% of families in the Governorate have an income of less than JD300 per month. If the size of

the family is taken into consideration, then this means that these families are almost on the

poverty line.

It seems that the source for more than half the income of families in the Governorate is

government jobs followed in importance by the private sector, which is the source of the income

of 20% of families and then pensions, which are the source of income for around 15% of

families. Remittances from abroad and income from agriculture and raising live stock are the

sources of income for less than 3% of families. Table 3 below shows income distribution and

expenditure for families in the Governorate.

Table 3: Income Distribution and Expenditure For Families in the Governorate of Ma’an

Income/

Expenditure According to Income According to Expenditure

No of Families Percentage No of Families Percentage

Less than JD

150 966 44.3 866 39.7

JD 150-300 811 37.2 851 39

JD 301-500 299 13.7 332 15.2

JD 501+ 107 4.9 134 6.1

Total 2183 100 2183 100

Source: Al Hussein University, The Social and Economic Condition of Families in the Ma’an

Governorate, Tables 46 and 48

More than 85% of families in the Governorate would like to increase their income. The most

important projects proposed to achieve this are agricultural ones followed by industrial projects

then handicraft projects. As a result of the low levels of income, more than 25% of families in

the Governorate turn to borrowing to cover the gap between income and expenditure despite the

fact that more than 90% of their income is spent on essentials like food, water, clothing,

transport, education and health. Expenditure on leisure and entertainment does not exceed 2%.

Borrowing is generally from a variety of sources most commonly commercial banks then the

Agricultural Credit Corporation then individuals (financiers) then the Development and Labor

Fund. Frame Two sheds light on the performance of the Agricultural Credit Corporation and its

activities in the Governorate of Ma’an.

The results of the survey carried out by the research team in the town of Ma’an supported the

results found throughout the Governorate as more than two thirds of the families in the sample

taken from the people of the town of Ma’an are low income families (67.2%); one quarter of the

families in the sample are middle income families and very few families can be considered more

than middle income families.

The information on income distribution in the Governorate and in the town support the view

that there is no clearly defined middle class and that there is a very small high class with the

8

majority of people being from the lower class. This view is further strengthened by the fact that

48% of respondents in the survey do not have an income and rely on the income of a family

member. This level of support, as we indicated previously, is a high one.

The data on the labor force, income and education show that the majority of citizens are of the

lower income class. This reality might partially explain the collective response in the town of

Ma’an to some policies and actions that can affect the majority of the population. Table 4

shows the sample distribution according to income.

Table 4: The relative distribution of monthly family income in the town of Ma’an

Income Level Number Percentage

30-100 25 20

101-200 59 47.2

201-400 34 27.2 401-700 5 4

Unknown 2 1.6

Total 125 100

Source: Social Values Survey, Center for Strategic Studies, May 2003

An analysis of the results drawn from the data on income shows that the majority of the people of

the town of Ma’an are in the low-income category. There is no detailed data on each town in

Jordan to compare this with. However, the low levels of income and the large dependence on

only salaries and rents as income might, in the absence of alternative sources of income or

short-term financial assistance to help people through a bad economic patch, make the people of

Ma’an more likely to be affected by general economic crises like repeated increases in prices.

However, it must be pointed out here that in the absence of data on other towns in Jordan, a

definite conclusion is hard to reach.

FRAME TWO – The Performance of the Agricultural Credit Corporation in Ma’an

The total loans extended by the Agricultural Credit Corporation at the end of 2001 were around JD103.98

million. The Governorate of Ma’an’s share of these loans was around JD2.933 million i.e. around 2.8%

of the total. Compared to other governorates in the South, this percentage is, on average, low as the

Governorate of Kerak’s share was around 9.9% of the total; the Governorate of Tafileh’s share was 3.7%

of the total and the District of Ghor Al Safi’s share was 4.7% of the total. Sources at the Agricultural

Credit Corporation indicate that around 80% of the loans extended to the Governorate of Ma’an between

1995 and 2002 were issued to the people of the town of Ma’an. This means that any discussion of the

Agricultural Credit Corporation data on the Governorate of Ma’an can mean a discussion of the data

related to the town of Ma’an.

As is the case in the rest of the Kingdom’s governorates, most of the loans extended in Ma’an are

medium-term loans. The total of medium-term loans extended at the end of 2001 in the Governorate of

Ma’an was JD2.27 million out of an overall total of JD16.4 million. This means that the percentage of

short-term borrowing in the Governorate is 77.6% of the total short-terms loans compared to a national

average of 79.4%.

According to the agricultural land ownership data in Ma’an, 90% of the loans extended to the

Governorate in 2001 involved farm sizes of 30 dunums or less. This is compared to 73% nationally and is

an indication of how small farms in the Governorate are and how few workers they can absorb.

On average, the majority of the loans extended to farmers by the Agricultural Credit Corporation are low

in value (not more than JD5,000). During 2000 and 2001, the percentage of loans extended with values

of less than JD5,000 compared to the total loans extended was 92% and 82% respectively. This is

compared to a national average of 67.5% and 57%. The low value of the loans is an indicator of the weak

credit and financial abilities of the borrowers. It is also an indicator of the small size of farms in the

Governorate when compared to other governorates. A review of the nature of the projects financed over

the past few years shows that the majority of loans were used to purchase agricultural production

necessities, which on average made up more than 65% of the loans compared to a national average of

50%. The number of loans extended for agricultural construction and planting and for developing,

improving and utilizing irrigation sources has dropped. This is an indicator that the projects that are

financed are not viable and cannot guarantee even a minimum amount of financial independence. Some

of the people of Ma’an, in interviews with the research team, agreed with this conclusion.

9

Table 5: Distribution of Loans According to the Area of Investment (as a percentage of the total)

2000 2001

Developing and

using

Ma'an Other Governorates

Ma'an

Other Governorates

agricultural

land

Developing,

improving and

using water

resources

Agricultural

mechanization

and

industrializatio

Developing and

improving the

raising of

animals and

chicken

Purchase of the

necessities for

agricultural

production

Total Loans (in

10.9 32.5 2.8 20.4

3.3 10.1 2.5 10.1

4.6 9.2 1.2 4.7 36 17.3 22 15.6 44 30.9 71 49

JDs) 867120 20891375 338760 13376951

Source: Calculated from the Agricultural Credit Corporation’s Annual Reports for the Years 2000

and 2001

2.5 THE LABOR FORCE

In view of the low-income levels in the Governorate of Ma’an, the desire to work among those

old enough to do so is relatively high. The unemployment rate, according to the numbers of

2001, is around 18.8% compared to 16.8% nationally (see note 11). It is highly probably that

the unemployment levels in the Governorate are on the rise (see note 12). More than a third of

the male workforce in the Governorate of Ma’an are civilian government employees. More than

20% of the male workforce are military (security and defense). More than a third of the male

workforce work in private institutions and companies. The rest are self-employed or work in co-

operative organizations or work abroad. Almost 90% of the female workforce are government

employees. A small percentage work in the private and co-operative sectors (see note 13).

Despite the high unemployment rate, the statistics of the Ministry of Labor show that there are

2,976 foreigners with work permits in the Governorate. As shown in Table 6 below, these

foreigners work as barbers, tailors and construction workers and in parts of the services sector.

The people of Ma’an show no inclination to train for these jobs because of the low salaries they

pay and also probably because of the “culture of shame” and the type of jobs the Ma’anis want

to do. This conclusion was confirmed in interviews with some Ma’anis who are active in the

social and economic sectors. In the town of Ma’an itself, 1,283 work permits were issued in

2003 distributed over three sectors as shown in Table 7 below. It is worth pointing out that

according to what many people said when they were interviewed in the town of Ma’an, the

actual number of foreign workers is higher than the official work permits issued show.

Table 6: Non-Jordanian workers holding current work permits in the Governorate of Ma’an

according to the type of work they do

Job NumberJob Number

10

Chemical Technician 27 Shepherd 35

Phosphate Laboratory Technician 28 Worker – Chicken Farm 57

Expert 22 Quarry Worker 31

Fuel Seller 12 Stonemason 16

Cook 10 Worker – Chicken Slaughterhouse28

Restaurant Worker 118 Pastry Worker 11

Servant 32 Baker 56

Cleaner 121 Tailor 21

Male Barber 40 Worker – Car Punctures 20

Rubbish Man 32 Brick Maker 38

Farmer - Raising Animals 20 Construction Worker 525

Agricultural Worker – Cereals 585 Worker – Loading and Unloading 90

Agricultural Worker – Fruit

Trees

695 Worker 99

Worker – Livestock 11 Other 196

Total 2976

Table 7: Foreign Workers in the District of the Town of Ma’an 2003

Sector Number

Agriculture 254

Construction 492

Services 523

Other 14

Total 1283

The Unemployment rate in Ma’an is not an exception if it is compared to unemployment rates

in the Kingdom. The attitudes of unemployed people are also similar to those of unemployed

people throughout the Kingdom for, despite the high level of unemployment, there are 1,200

jobs taken by foreigners. The skills needed for these jobs are not ones hard to find in the town

of Ma’an.

2.6 POVERTY

Poverty in Jordan has several obvious causes: the low levels of participation in economic

activity, low wages and high unemployment. Several factors involving supply and demand in

the Jordanian workforce play a part in each of these causes. The estimates of the number of

people living below the poverty line vary with each definition and in each study. The 2002

Strategy to Fight Poverty in Jordan (see note 14) states that “poverty” is considered a serious

problem in Jordan and, according to the definition currently in use, 15% to 30% (or more) of the

population live below the poverty line (see note 15). The World Bank estimates, based on the

1997 family income and expenditure survey, indicate that around one third of the population of

Jordan lives below the poverty line (see note 16). The Strategy to Fight Poverty in Jordan states

that since 1997, real GDP growth in Jordan is 3.2% annually while average population growth is

around 3.1%. Therefore, poverty, if viewed as a percentage of the population could not have

changed much. However, if poverty is measured by the number of poor people, then it is possible

that the number of people living in poverty might have increased and that the reason

for the increase is most probably the increase in population (see note 17). A 2002 report issued

by the General Statistics Department (see note 18) estimates that the number of people living

below the poverty line in the Kingdom is around 11% of the population compared to 21% of the

population of the Governorate of Ma’an (see note 19).

Whatever method is used for measuring poverty, it is possible to say that poverty levels in the

Governorate of Ma’an are higher than they are generally in the Kingdom. Income indicators in

the Governorate, which were reviewed earlier, confirm this.

The values survey carried out in Ma’an sheds some light on some aspects of the economic

situation of individuals and families with regard to their sources of income, the resources at

their disposal, if any, and the availability of these resources in the town of Ma’an, the

Governorate of Ma’an and outside them.

11

The field survey covered the issue of improving the economic and social conditions in the town

and the Governorate. Those surveyed were asked about what three steps should be taken to do

this. They were free to give any response they wanted. They all submitted a huge number of

specific suggestions. The main suggestions involved a demand for new projects as 42% asked

for factories and productive economic projects to be set up while 35% of those surveyed, in

almost equal numbers, suggested finding solutions for unemployment, poverty and inflation. The

results of the field values survey shed further light on the nature of the economic situation in

Ma’an covering the lack of resources on the one hand and the fact that most sources of income

for individuals and families were limited the town of Ma’an on the other. These results will be

reviewed later in the report.

2.7 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

In the Report on Human Development in Jordan in 2000, the differences between the

governorates were documented using data from 1997. The calculations of human development

indicators for each governorate (based on education, health and income) showed that the value of

national human development in Jordan for 1997 was 0.715 with the highest value of 0.738 in

Amman and the lowest value of 0.655 in Ma’an followed by Mafraq with a value of 0.663. It is

worth noting that there is little difference between the highest and lowest value on the scale and

that the values for the governorates of Mafraq and Tafileh are similar to that for Ma’an. The

difference in the human development value cannot explain the violent protests that occurred in

Ma’an in response to certain policies. Table 8 below shows the human development indicator

and its three components for each governorate according to the highest and lowest values.

Table 8: The Human Development Indicator for Jordan per Governorate in 1997 (see note 20)

Human Development

Governorate Life

Expectancy

Education

GDP

Indicator

Indicator Indicator Indicator Value

Order

Amman 0.758 0.833 0.624 0.738 1

Balqa 0.738 0.761 0.578 0.692 7

Zerqa 0.743 0.821 0.574 0.713 3

Madaba 0.776 0.783 0.578 0.712 4

Irbid 0.773 0.798 0.562 0.711 5

Mafraq 0.738 0.708 0.543 0.663 11

Jerash 0.725 0.789 0.547 0.687 8 Ajloun 0.770 0.781 0.544 0.699 6

Kerak 0.720 0.742 0.588 0.684 9

Tafileh 0.692 0.757 0.547 0.665 10

Ma’an 0.709 0.703 0.553 0.655 12

Aqaba 0.802 0.796 0.593 0.730 2

Jordan 0.751 0.802 0.591 0.715 - Source: Ministry of Planning, The year 2000 Report on Human Development in Jordan, Tables 2-6,

Page 22

2.8 GOVERNMENT PROJECTS FOR DEVELOPING MA’AN GOVERNORATE

Official efforts (see note 21) and expenditure aimed at developing Ma’an do not differ from

those in the other governorates or towns. The fact is that official efforts to develop Ma’an are

part of a national comprehensive development strategy, which successive governments adopted

through development plans or through the government’s annual budget. Projects were carried out

locally like the attempts to set up factories or provide training opportunities aimed at improving

people’s living conditions. Efforts, therefore, included direct investments like the setting up of

several government projects and providing direct support to some sectors. On a more detailed

level, government efforts can be summarized as follows:

2.8.1 Ma’an Municipalities’ Budgets

12

According to a new study published by the World Bank, municipalities’ budgets in the Ma’an

Governorate are considered high for the size of the population there. Despite the prevailing

general view that the Governorate does not receive sufficient funds, as shown in Table 9, budget

allocations for each person in Ma’an exceeds the average in the Kingdom. Budget allocations for

each person nationally in the year 2000 were around JD9.53 per person. This is compared to

JD15.39 per person in the Governorate of Ma’an (see note 22).

Table 9: Individual Central Government Budget Allocations Per Governorate

Governorate

Average Annual Personal Income

(1997) in

Individual Central Government

Allocations

1997 1998 1999 2000

JOD

Amman 934 6.01 8.78 7.85 16.06

Irbid 644 5.31 5.47 5.11 10.01

Kerak 752 8.85 10.84 9.75 15.00

Balqa 709 6.15 6.38 5.36 9.15

Ma’an 610 11.06 12.59 9.77 15.39

Zerqa 694 0.94 2.39 1.51 4.80

Mafraq 575 9.05 8.19 10.70 14.83

Tafileh 589 8.29 8.44 7.51 10.05

Madaba 708 5.40 9.20 6.75 8.60

Jerash 589 6.33 12.81 8.85 9.16

Ajloun 580 8.20 6.67 8.94 10.23

Aqaba 776 3.95 3.90 3.42 3.02

Average 767 5.39 6.28 5.61 9.53

Source: Jordan: Intergovernmental Fiscal and Municipal Finance Completion of Policy Note, The

World Bank, Dec. 2002

It is worth noting that the study does not cover actual expenditure and how expenditure is

distributed between employees’ salaries, infrastructure and improving the services offered by

the government. It also does not cover the fact that a high number of the town of Ma’an’s

Municipality’s employees are foreign workers especially the cleaners and certain other services

workers. Generally, the budget allocated for the municipalities in the Ma’an Governorate

reflects the government’s interest in the region. Despite the fact that the data covers Ma’an

Governorate, the high level of each individual’s share of the budget allocations even if this share is

distributed to other municipalities indicate that each individual’s share in the town of Ma’an

is not less than that in other municipalities in the Kingdom.

On the same subject, Ma’an Governorate was allocated its share of developmental projects, which

were carried out including those that were established in the South because of the availability of

raw materials there like phosphates and those that were established to develop the South

specifically within a comprehensive development plan like the glass factory. A review of the

people of Ma’an’s involvement in the Phosphates Mining Company as well as their involvement

in the glass factory follows. Views on why the glass factory failed and went bankrupt differ

greatly.

2.8.2 The Workers in the Phosphates Projects

It is sometimes argued that the phosphate mines did not really benefit the people of the South or

that the people working there mostly have unskilled jobs. There are five phosphate mines in

Jordan: Alhissa, Alabyadh, Aqaba (the industrial complex), Ruseifa and Shiddiyah. The

Shiddiyah mine is the nearest to Ma’an geographically as it is around 75 kilometers from the

town. This means that the people of the town can go there to work on a daily basis. At the end

of 2002, there were 450 workers from Ma’an Governorate working in the mine out of a total of

1,500 i.e. around a third of the workforce. The number of workers who were actually from the

town of Ma’an was 307.

13

Workers in the Shiddiyah mine from the town of Ma’an are distributed throughout the

company: 79 out of the 307 workers are drivers (i.e. 25%), 31 work in the administration (i.e.

10%) and the rest (197 workers) are technicians holding a variety of posts in the workshops, as

sample supervisors and other technical jobs. In this category, there were 7 engineers from the

Governorate, 3 of them from the District of the Town of Ma’an. There are also two doctors from

the town of Ma’an who work in the company, one is an assistant to the Services Department

Manager and the other is Head of the Dentistry Department.

There are fewer Ma’anis working in the Alhissa and Alabyadh mines: around 50 employees

from a total of 1,000 in the Alhissa mine while the number of Ma’anis working in Alabyadh

mine are no more than a handful.

2.8.3 The Glass Factory

The Government tried to take advantage of the raw materials found in the Governorate of Ma’an

by encouraging the setting up of a glass factory that would use the silicone available there in

large quantities. However, from the start, the project was mismanaged and badly planned and

ended up being a burden on the government budget rather than helping the people of the town of

Ma’an. It helped, to a certain extent, to strengthen the negative view the people generally held of

the government as Frame Three, which reviews the factory, shows.

FRAME THREE – The Glass Factory in the Town of Ma’an – Shortsightedness and Bad Planning

There is nothing to indicate that the people of Ma’an had anything whatsoever to do with the failure of the

glass factory. A review of the situation did not show anything specific to Ma’an that could have contributed to the failure of the project that faltered from the start.

The Jordanian Glass Factories Company is considered an example of failure in planning government

projects. The only glass factory project in Jordan faced problems from the start. It was part of the 1981- 1985 development plan for Ma’an. The plan included several industrial projects in the governorates of

Irbid, Jerash, Ma’an and Aqaba. The Pension Fund, which later became the Jordanian Investment

foundation, provided the funding for these projects.

The project started off as a project for the private sector aimed at using the silicone, which was found in

Ma’an. However, the amount of JD2 million in private capital allocated for the project was not sufficient

to set it up. The government intervened in 1977 to increase the capital to JD5 million and became a major shareholder in the project. This was in line with the 5-year development plan at the time.

It is clear that the economic viability studies for the project were not completely accurate. Despite the

fact that the private sector had contracted the French company BSN, a leader in glass production,

production at the factory was delayed until 1984 when the government, represented by the Jordanian

Investment Foundation, intervened again and raised the capital. The private investors were tied to their

contract with BSN. The contract was signed in 1976 and included the transfer of technology needed for the project. The technology at the time of the signing of the contract was the latest of its kind. However,

between 1976 and 1984, the technology involved in glass production worldwide developed in leaps and

bounds. This meant that by the time the factory started production it was behind in technology and,

therefore, unable to compete in the marketplace. This was a shame as the only competition for the factory

in the region was the Haifa factory in Israel. At present, Saudi Arabia has developed its glass production

sector using the latest technology. When it was decided to start constructing the factory in 1980, the old

technology was installed despite the fact that even then there was more recent technology available on the

market. There were two reasons for this: the contract with BSN and the fact that the newer technology

meant producing at least 150,000 tons each year. The target production was 20,000 tons each year in line

with the target regional market.

The factory’s production capacity was estimated at 27,000 tons. Jordan’s requirements were estimated at

around 16,000 tons. The factory never reached its full capacity in the few years it had. Experts say that

the capital funding was wrong from the start. The government encouraged the project then dithered about

committing to it only to change its mind again and provide the funding needed to start the project.

The bad planning of the project is evident in the huge discrepancy in the construction costs of the factory.

These were estimated at JD5 million but actually cost JD15 million. The factory’s management turned to

borrowing from local banks. The government guaranteed the loans. Production started with the factory

deep in debt and with no operating capital.

The people of Ma’an formed the majority of the factory’s workforce. At the beginning, the factory’s

management faced some administrative and organizational problems as it attempted to apply new

behavioral work patterns. Workers were injured as a result of ignoring the management’s work

14

instructions. After a couple of years of sporadic production, however, the people of Ma’an began to

consider the factory their own and took an interest in its success.

During this time, the factory’s debt burden increased. Work stopped more than once for technical reasons

as the foreign expert technicians who were running the factory withdrew because of the financial

problems facing the factory or because of their unwillingness to live in the town of Ma’an. With the

exception of 1988, the year in which the factory made an operational profit, the factory was facing

continuous losses that kept accumulating until they reached around JD22 million by the end of 2002.

In view of the factory’s inability to reach its full production capacity, the unit cost of production was

high. This meant that the factory was unable to compete regionally and internationally, as general

consumption was 35% of the general production costs. This meant simply that the price of locally

produced glass was higher than that produced on the world market.

The world market faced economic stagnation between 1989 and 1994. This led to lower glass prices

especially in Russia where the price of a ton dropped from JD380 per ton in 1988 to around JD200 per

ton in 1994. Production costs per ton of Jordanian glass were, at the lowest estimates, JD180.

The official Jordanian view of the glass factory was shortsighted. The original plans included regular

monetary contributions to guarantee production for 15 years. The estimates made at the start of

production ignored the fact that the factory would need maintenance after 5 years at a cost of JD8

million. The government did not want to provide this funding, which further increased the pressure on

the factory and on its workers.

In 1989, as a result of not carrying out the necessary maintenance, everything produced by the factory

was damaged. Every ton of production was a pure loss. The departure of the expert technicians between

1986 and 1988 contributed to the deterioration of the situation. There were no losses in 1987. The

factory stopped production for a year. Polish expert technicians were brought in to restart the factory.

However, it was not viable economically anymore in view of the developments that occurred in glass

production in neighboring countries like Israel and Saudi Arabia.

The reason for the factory’s failure and future scenarios

Several officials agree that the factory used to employ some of the people of Ma’an even though there

was really no need for them as the number of employees in the factory was often more than the factory

required. However, this cannot be considered a reason for the failure of a project, which, from the start,

lagged behind the technology available on the market and the construction costs for which were twice the

amount estimated in the feasibility studies. In addition, the factory was, on occasions, run by managers

with no relevant experience (a dentist and a security officer for example), a fact that could have doubled the technical problems the factory faced. Furthermore, there were no proper plans to utilize the available

technical expertise and train several Jordanian engineers to work in conjunction with the foreign technical

experts who spent long periods running the factory without there being any transfer of knowledge. The

transfer of knowledge and technology, supposedly, should have been one of the positive results of

importing the technology in the first place.

The latest development at the factory is that a Czech company has expressed an interest in leasing the

factory under certain conditions and operating it again. The case file is with the Attorney General who is

studying it. The case is not only a question of mismanagement and bad planning but also one of more

than a decade of financial corruption.

When the project first started, it would have been possible to consider involving foreign investors.

However, at the time, foreign investors preferred to locate the project in Amman. As it was a

development project with social aims, Ma’an was chosen because it was close to the source of raw

materials and in order to provide job opportunities for the people of the region.

The costs of getting the factory operational again are around JD10 million. It can be adapted to produce

containers. This is possible technically and can be easily done according to one of the experts (Munther

Saudi who was a former manager of the factory).

The following question is asked: What would have happened if the project had not gone ahead and if,

instead, the funding for the project and the accumulated losses had been used to develop the infrastructure

and to further education in Ma’an? Which option would have been better for the people of Ma’an?

2.8.4 NEW PROJECTS

Following the latest events in Ma’an, the Government has initiated a project to provide

temporary job opportunities. The project, known as “The Forestation Project”, has provided

around 900 job opportunities. Even though these jobs are temporary, they have, to a certain

extent, helped to lower the unemployment rate and, therefore, the poverty rate in the town.

However, this is not a long-lasting viable project as it relies on Government support. It is also not

possible to absorb 955 government employees in Ma’an for a long period of time as it goes

15

against the current economic policy in Jordan, which is aimed at reducing the size of the civil

service. Table 10 shows the number of employees working on the national work project in the

various departments of Ma’an Governorate:

Table 10: The number of employees working on the national work project (Forestation) in the

department of Ma’an Governorate

Number

Number Name of Department Number of Workers

1 Tourism 164 241 males and females including 38 in Ma’an Municipality, 33 appointed

2 Municipal, Rural and Environmental

through the Governorate and 5 through the Municipality’s Engineering Affairs Department

3 Public Works 150 4 Agriculture 151 Males/65 Females

48 female workers from the

Development Department/56

5 Development

females from other departments attached to the Development Department

6 Antiquities None

7 Vocational Training 5

Total 880

On the same issue, the security forces have increased their campaign to recruit as many people as

possible from Ma’an into the various security forces in an effort to reduce unemployment. This is

in addition to the recent recruitment of around 600 young men from Ma’an into the armed forces.

It is expected that 304 projects will be funded through the Government’s annual budget for 2003

and through the Economic and Social Adjustment Program for 2003 at a cost of around JD40

million. This funding covers various infrastructure and services projects.

2.9 ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

This section aims to answer the following question: Is the deteriorating economic situation the

main reason for the events? The question will be answered by summarizing the main indicators

of the various recessions, which occurred during the crises in Ma’an and involved several

sectors. Several factors relating to the transport sector and to administrative policies combined to

negatively affect the living standards of the people of the town of Ma’an. The most important

are:

1. The recession in the transport sector: until the mid eighties this employed around 1,000

drivers from the town of Ma’an and provided a source of income, which, for a while

improved the living conditions. The housing sector in the town benefited the services

sector as well including, among others, maintenance services and led to a boom in trade

in the town. This sector, which basically revolved around the transport of phosphates to

Aqaba and, later, on transport between Aqaba and Iraq began to face a recession in the

second half of the 1980s. There were two reasons for this: the first was the increase in

port fees by JD1 for every ton and the subsequent hidden costs on Jordanian truck

companies and the second reason may be the use of Jordanian trucks for transport

purposes inside Iraq by the Iraqi Government without paying for unloading fees. This

sector actually stopped work after Iraq invaded Kuwait and then collapsed completely.

This had a severe negative impact on the Governorate. However, the collapse happened

after the events of April 1989 and not before them.

2. The cancellation of the concession to enter Saudi Arabia: the people of Ma’an used to

travel to work in the city of Tabouk in Saudi Arabia with a permit issued by the

16

Governor. The numbers of workers who did this was relatively high as the number of

cars transporting people from Ma’an to Tabouk and back sometimes reached 20 cars a

day. The workers were employed in trade, crafts and teaching. Some even lived in

Tabouk. There were even intermarriages between the two towns. However, these

relations were suddenly cut after the 2 August 1990 because of the political stance

Jordan took in the First Gulf War. The stance led to negative economic repercussions.

3. Most recently, the designation of the Aqaba Special Economic Zone has had a negative

impact on Ma’an as, due to the short distances, people from the town of Ma’an visit

Aqaba to shop. This has had a negative impact on the retail trade sector.

The people of Ma’an talk about other factors, in addition to the above, which have had a

negative impact. These are:

ƒ Separating Wadi Musa and Petra administratively and commercially.

ƒ The Desert Highway bypassing the town of Ma’an in the 1980s.

ƒ The construction of the Aljafr-Husseiniyah Road in 2000, which affected trade

ƒ activities between Ma’an and Aljafr

ƒ The continuing strong presence of the security forces, which has affected trade in

the town as it makes it difficult for shoppers from outside the town to enter it.

These are the issues raised by a large number of Ma’anis and believed by them to be reasons for

the economic recession in the town. They were brought up in discussions with the research team

during the fieldwork carried out by the team. It is worth noting that, in the absence of detailed

estimates, it is difficult to judge the total negative impact of these factors, which are actually just

the views of the town people.

Another indicator of economic activity are the construction permits issued in the town of

Ma’an. The data related to these permits (see Diagram 1) indicates that the total number of

licensed buildings decreased by 53% between 1987 and 1991. This is the period during which

Jordan faced a real economic crisis. The number of licensed buildings, which probably reflect

the amount of savings the people of Ma’an have and their trust in the town’s economic

performance, did not show any change between 1993 and 2002 that could be linked to the crises

in the town. In fact, the number of licensed buildings in 1996 - a year of crisis - was the

highest in two decades. Chart 1 shows the increase in the number of licensed buildings in the

town of Ma’an from 1980 to the end of 2002.

It is clear from the economic recession indicators discussed above that what applies to Ma’an also

applies to other parts of the Kingdom as the period between 1988 and 1991 was a difficult one for

everybody. Things picked up and stability returned in 1992 and economic activity returned to

what it was in the past. However, building permits are more of an indicator of the economic

activity of individuals and families in the town. The emphasis on house licenses and investment

in Ma’an is similar to the spread of capital throughout Jordan where the construction sector

witnesses the most growth during times of economic prosperity.

CHART 1: Surface Areas of Licensed Buildings Between 1980 and 2002

17

Insert Diagram 1

Cons tr uction in Square m e te r s in M a`an be tw e e n 1981-2002

35000

30000

32250

25000

20000

22800

20350

1930020150

23340

20255

15000

10000

13841

11519

8555

125571146411

337

8812

12140

15400

18760

16800

7132 6703 8061

7600

5000 5897

0

Source: This Diagram was prepared using data the research team obtained from Ma’an

Municipality

Generally, the successive events in Ma’an were not always connected to budgetary constraints

and stopping subsidies on certain items as many occasions during the past few years required

budget controls and did not lead to any violent protests. Between 28/3/1989 and 7/5/2003, the

government raised fuel prices 21 times. These price increases did not lead to violent protests and

riots like those seen in 1989. Between 31/3/1993 and 14/5/2003, government subsidies on bread

were lifted 7 times in accordance with cabinet instructions. This did not lead to demonstrations

and protests except in 1996.

18

CHAPTER THREE: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE TOWN OF MA’AN

Social structure forms an important part of a community’s infrastructure for, on the one hand, it

defines how members of the society interact and, on the other, it gives individuals and groups a

set framework for their behavioral patterns. The forms of social structure of the town of Ma’an

will, therefore, be reviewed in detail in comparison to the information available to determine if

the social structure affects the political behavior of the people of the town.

3.1 THE TRADITIONAL SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND ITS ROLE IN THE

COLLECTIVE REACTIONS OF THE PEOPLE

In order to study the traditional social structure of the town of Ma’an and in order to collect data,

several methods were used. The most important was observing by participation. This allows the

researcher the opportunity to live with the people. The team also held over 100 face- to-face

interviews with officials and non-officials and joint meetings with the people of the town. These

methods were implemented during the fieldwork, which lasted from the beginning of March

2003 and ended at the beginning of May 2003. The team practically lived in the town of Ma’an

spending five days of each week there.

The town of Ma’an consists of a group of large and small social units. A unit is defined as a

group that has its own diwan. If a large social unit consists of several smaller sub-units, which

are recognized socially, then each of these smaller sub-units would have their own diwan while

the larger unit would not have a diwan. On the other hand, if the larger unit does not

acknowledge the existence of smaller sub-units, then it would have its own diwan. For

example, the Al Kreishans is a large social unit consisting of three smaller sub-units: Al Mar’ee,

Al Hwarain and Al Halalat. The Al Kreishans, therefore, have three recognized diwans none of

which are in the name of the Al Kreishans due to the belief that the sub-units are not the same.

The opposite also exists whereby the Al Mahameed is a large social unit with a diwan in its

name. There are no diwans for the smaller sub-units, which form the Al Mahameeds. The sub-

units of the Al Mahameeds are: Al Bahry (or Al Ibrahim), Aal Abu Karaki and Al Abboud.

This means that the internal structure of the Al Mahameeds does not acknowledge sub-units

within the unit in the belief that all the units have joint origins. This applies also to the social

unit known as Al Khawara as they have their own diwan even though they have three sub-units:

Zanouneh, Al Jamal and Aqeed. There are no diwans in these names. The signs on which the

name of the diwans are written do not mention the word asheera (tribe) as happens in other parts

of the Kingdom. However, the people, when referring to the names of the diwans, use the word

asheera. Thus the name of the social unit is written on the diwan’s sign e.g. the diwan of Al

Mar’ee and the diwan of Al Halalat and the diwan of Abu Rkhieh and so on. Diwans are very

important in the life of the individual and the group in the town of Ma’an. They run the daily life

of the members of the unit in a crisis especially during the violent crises seen since

1989. There are at least 40 diwans in the town of Ma’an.

Social units in Ma’an have a very complex social positioning. Some are considered “main units”

i.e. with an influence that cannot be overlooked in any kind of negotiation whether political,

security related or social. Some units follow the main unit even if they are not one of the units

forming the main unit. All these have their own diwans. On the other hand, there are the

wafidoun (literally the people who came from outside) and have no role to play in any kind of

negotiations. They do not have a diwan. These include the Saudeyeen, Harara, Shweikh and Al

Khudari. The wafidoun is a social issue and has nothing to do with migration from a certain

place or at a certain time. The origins of the main and sub-units who have diwans are the same

as those who do not. However, they are not “Ma’ani” because they do not have a diwan. The

diwan is the main component that defines a unit’s social position and identity. A unit’s social

position and identity has nothing to do with its financial position, its origins or its politics.

This could explain the collective response to a call for action. These responses are always

familial and territorial. They are not linked to class or self-interest. This in turn limits the

possibilities of developing any modern framework for the collective action that is the main

component of institutions in an urban society. Reactions in Ma’an are not those of a

19

sophisticated urban society. Herein lies the vital importance attached to the formation of the

Popular Committee, which is considered an advanced form of popular political representation.

To limit the violent reactions to the State, the government closed the diwans after the latest

events in Ma’an. However, the people later insisted on re-opening them. Most of the private

meetings related to these events took place in these diwans. To emphasize the positive role

played by the Popular Committee, most of the Committee’s meetings began to take place in the

residence of the Committee’s Chairman and not in an asheera’s diwan. The Chairman is from

the Shamiyehs of the Mahameeds and the aim of holding the meetings in his house and not in the

diwan of the Mahameeds was to avoid classing the Committee as a tribal or territorial entity as it

represents all of Ma’an and not the Mahameeds.

3.1.1 The Social Units in the Town of Ma’an and the People’s Solidarity

The people of Ma’an belong to around 14 main social units. These units are composed of around

48 sub-units. Some main social units have sub-units and some do not. Table 11 below shows

the families in Ma’an, their Diwans and their historic affiliations. The 14 main units and the 48

sub-units do not include any wafidoun.

Table 11: Families and Historic Affiliations in Ma’an

Main Unit Sub-units Neighborhood Diwan Affiliation

Kreishan Aal Mar’ee, Al

Hwarain, Al Halalat Toor & Wusta Several Hijazi-Masri

Al Aqayleh None Tahata & Wusta Yes Hijazi-Masri Al Talhouni None Tahata & Wusta Yes Hijazi-Masri Al Ruwad None Tahata & Wusta Yes Hijazi-Masri Al Muhtaseb None Tahata & Wusta Yes Hijazi-Masri Aal AbuDarwish None Wusta & Toor Yes Hijazi-Masri Al Salahat None Tahata & Wusta Yes Hijazi-Masri

Al Khawaldeh, Al

Qabba’ah, Al

Aal Khatab

Al Bazay’ah

Al Fanatsah

Shalabi, Al Sa’aydeh,Al Sharari, Abu Odeh, Abkal Abu Mir’ee, Abu Rkhieh, Ellayan, Dweirij

Al Ma’ani, Al

Khatee, Abu Saleh,

Tahata & Southern Several Hijazi-Masri

Tahata & Southern Several Hijazi-Masri

Aal Daoud (see note Tahata & Southern Several Hijazi-Masri

23)

Aal Bahry,

Al Mahameed

(Ibrahim), Abu Karaki, Aal Aboud

Shamiyeh Several Shamiyeh

Al Khura Zanouneh, Al Jamal,

Aqeed Shamiyeh Yes Shamiyeh

12 units, Most important are Al Asaf, Abu Hayatieh,

Aal Hisan

Al Shawaheen, (Abu Shamiyeh Several Shamiyeh Matar), Karaghli, Masri

Jaghameen, Al Tis’a

Al Aagha, Ojan, Al

Rashaydeh, Abu Al

Al Qaramseh

Zait, Al Kateb, Al Tahan, Abu Al Qabalat

Shamiyeh Several Shamiyeh

20

It is clear that a large number of or all members of certain social units have migrated to Amman.

These include: Al Jaghameen, Al Karaghli, and Aal Matar. Half the Al Ojan and the Mahameed

for example have migrated to Amman and Zerqa.

3.1.2 Affiliations and the Social Structure

Ma’anis are split into two main groups: the Hijazi-Masri on the one side and the Shamiyeh on

the other. The Hijazi-Masri affiliation is led by the Kreishans with its three sub-units followed

by the other sub-units that do not have sub units of their own i.e. do not have a diwan like

Aqayleh, Talhouni, Ruwad, Al Muhtaseb, Abu Darwish and Salahat. Added to this are the large

social units that do have sub units like Aal Khatab, Al Fanatsah and Al Bazay’ah. All the

members of these units live in specific areas in the center of the town and in its southern part

whether in the Toor neighborhood or the Tahata neighborhood or the Hai Al Bawab

neighborhood (which is often referred to as the Southern Ma’an neighborhood).

On the other hand, the units affiliated with the Shamiyeh like the Mahameed, Al Hisan, Al

Khawara and Al Qaramseh live in one neighborhood known as the Shamiyeh neighborhood i.e.

it is named after the main unit. Historically, this is the largest neighborhood in the town.

Each of these two affiliations have a number of affiliations outside the town. They are alliances

in the true sense as there are reasons for their existence as well as geographic social ties. For

example, the Hijazi-Masri affiliation has ties with the Bedouins of the Hweitat and with the

farming community of the Wadi Musa tribes. The Shamiyeh affiliation has ties with the

Bedouins of Bani Attiyeh and with the farming community of the Shobak tribes. These ties have

a geographic, social and economic basis.

The basis for the establishment of these two affiliations was the trade routes. The trade convoys

that came from Damascus had their local agents within a confined market now known as the

Shamiyeh neighborhood. The neighborhood and the affiliation took their name from the Arabic

slang for Damascus Alsham. To secure the convoys arriving from the North, it was necessary to

make an alliance with whoever controlled the area to the North of Ma’an. Hence, the Shamiyeh

affiliation with Bani Attiyeh and with the tribes of Shobak.

The Hijazi-Masri affiliation was as a result of the trade routes with Egypt (Misr) and Hijaz and

the agents in Ma’an who dealt with these routes. They originate in one market to the South of

the Shamiyeh neighborhood, which was originally in the northern part of the town of Ma’an. It

was necessary for these agents to make an alliance with the Hweitat who controlled that area.

Social history is not set in stone as there are always many exceptions. One of the exceptions

concerning the affiliations is that the Ma’anis (Hijazi-Masri and Shamiyeh) can all unite

together against any danger from outside the town as used to happen with one of the strong

tribes affiliated to the Hweitat themselves. For example, one of the Hweitat tribes does not at

present have a good relationship with all the social units in Ma’an regardless of any affiliation.

In the past, these relations have actually been bloody. Another example is the alliance made by

all Ma’anis with the entire Hweitat Qatibah clan in the 1920s against Bani Sakher whose

territory lies to the North of the town of Ma’an.

It was noted that the social units, which dealt with the trade routes with Egypt mostly originate in

Egypt and Gaza whereas those that dealt with the trade routes with the Hijaz mostly originate in

Hijaz and Najd. Those that dealt with the trade routes to Damascus mostly originate in Bilad

Alsham and Turkey.

3.2 DIFFERENTIALS IN THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND THE COLLECTIVE

SELF

An analysis of the social structure of the main social units from the point of view of the old

alliances historically based on trade leads to the conclusion that the social structure of the people

in the town of Ma’an differs from the asheera structure whether a Bedouin asheera or a farming

community asheera. In itself, the asheera structure is not an urban structure. The social

components of the main units are not a result of the physiological-filial model known as the

divisive model related to the structure of the asheera or tribe. The social structure, as was

previously explained, arose out of other considerations. In addition, Ma’anis do not rely on

raising sheep or farming as a main source of income. However, what are understood to be

21

social alliances in Ma’an are not based on the nature of social relations town people develop on

the basis of class or political influence. An urbanite is someone who is closely linked to

institutions that are not based on primary or territorial relations. As we have shown, the lives of

the people of Ma’an and their behavior center mainly around the diwans. It is, therefore, possible

to state that Ma’anis are not urbanites even if they do live in a town.

The town’s isolation because of its geographic position and the distance between it and other

urban centers in the Kingdom might be a reason why Ma’anis do not culturally acknowledge

centers other than their town. The site of the town inhibits interaction with happenings

elsewhere. It is natural, therefore, for the people to develop a sense of the collective self and, as a

result, a sense of self. The conclusion reached in this report is that this sense of self is

strengthened in a crisis regardless of whether the reasons behind it are political or economic and

its effects direct or indirect. This is why the response was a popular collective response and not

an individual response especially after the violent events that happened at the end of 2002. Many

educated people in Ma’an who were interviewed believe that the bringing back to life of the

asheera method of giving speeches and the interest in tribal ties between small and large tribes

was a reaction to the recurring events in Ma’an especially after 1989 and the re- instatement of

parliamentary life that followed. It is an attempt to protect themselves from the hard facts of life

and also an attempt to find a place for the “collective identity” in defiance of the central authority

in Amman. This in itself led to the growth of the “collective self” among the majority of the

30,000 people in the town.

This collective behavioral pattern does not exclude some personal values held on to by

individuals. These values are closer to urban behavioral norms. For example, on the subject of

religious tolerance, the people of Ma’an seem to be more tolerant than people in the rest of the

Kingdom. The percentage of people who do not want followers of other religions as neighbors is

24% in Ma’an compared to 33% in the rest of the Kingdom. A relatively small percentage of

men (13%) do not want members of the security forces as neighbors. This percentage rises to

44% among the male youth of Ma’an and to 22% among the female youth. The percentage of

those who say they do not mind is quite high in all categories (85%) with the exception of the

youth where it is 56%. This tendency might be as a result of a certain amount of reservation felt

by the youth against the members of the security forces both on a personal and social level.

The people (males) of the town of Ma’an also seem to have a stronger sense of responsibility

than people in the rest of the Governorate. Housewives and young females also seem to be more

independent, more forgiving and more respectful of others. Heads of families seem to want to

save more. In general most Ma’anis are more religious. On reviewing the responses to similar

questions in the values survey carried out nationally in September 2001, it was found that what

makes the people of Ma’an (or some of them) different from the national sample is, in order:

the importance they attach to religion, their sense of responsibility, their independence, their

tolerance, their respect for others and their wish to save and cut expenses.

3.3 SOCIAL VALUES

There is a general belief that people in the town of Ma’an are conservative. This is measured by

their view of women and includes their views on certain traditional values like having more than

one wife and a woman’s role in society.

A noticeable trend that was confirmed by the values survey is that the male youth of Ma’an are,

in their views and private and public behavioral patterns are becoming more inclined to cling to

traditional values when compared to the previous generation despite the fact that the younger

generation has seen more social change, is more educated and has more opportunities and

options. On the other hand, the female youth of the town when compared to the male youth show

more openness in their views on various issues especially gender issues. This applies to Jordan

generally and is not specific to Ma’an.

Regarding the issue of having more than one wife, the percentage of those who agree is 19%

nationally compared to 26% in the town of Ma’an. Those opposing represent 71% of people

nationally compared to 72% in Ma’an. These numbers indicate that Ma’an is no different

fundamentally from the rest of the Kingdom.

22

If having more than one wife is considered a purely male patriarchal issue, then it is possible to

say that the males in Ma’an are more inclined to want to leave this option open than their

counterparts in Jordan. Care should be taken in making this conclusion because the measure

nationally is based on a sample of both sexes of all ages. The data in the study of the Al Hussein

University might give a more realistic picture of the situation concerning multiple marriages as

11% of men in the families involved in the survey have two wives and 2% have three or more

i.e. a total of 13%. This percentage increases slightly across the Governorate to reach 14%.

There is no available data to be able to make a comparison with the rest of the Kingdom.

When the participants in the values survey were asked about the most important traits in a

woman, the majority (90%) said that they believed that the most important trait was that a

woman should be a good mother and a good wife. She should be religious and educated. This

does not differ from the rest of the Kingdom as per the values survey carried out in 2001.

As expected, almost two thirds of the participants believe that university education of Ma’ani

women nshould be in the town of Ma’an followed by any other Jordanian town with the

exception of Amman (25%). Amman comes last with only 5% of people in the Governorate

approving of it as a suitable venue of higher education for Ma’ani women.

It is worth noting here that the women of Ma’an would, to a certain extent, be happy to leave

Ma’an to study in another town but not Amman. There are a variety of reasons for their

reluctance to consider Amman. These include: financial costs, geographic distances and social

shyness as well as a fear of moving to a place more sophisticated and complex than the

traditional environment they live in.

To conclude, the town of Ma’an seems conservative. However, it does not differ in this from the

rest of the Kingdom. The general conservative and religious trend in the town will probably not

develop into an organized political force according to a detailed analysis of the data obtained in

the values survey.

23

CHAPTER FOUR: A HISTORY OF THE CRISES IN MA’AN

4.1 SUCCESSIVE EVENTS

Between 1989 and 2000 and for various reasons, there were four serious political crises in

Ma’an all involving acts of violence and rioting. This section of the report deals with the

reasons behind each of these crises and what happened during them.

4.1.1 The Events of April 1989

In April 1989, a decree was issued raising fuel prices in Jordan without adjusting transport

prices accordingly. This provoked lorry drivers in two areas in Jordan: Irbid and Ma’an. The

Minister of Interior at the time immediately ordered the Governors of Irbid and Ma’an to raise

transport prices before the decision to raise fuel prices was published in the press in order to

avoid any problems. The issue was, indeed, resolved in Irbid. However, the crisis deepened in

Ma’an and gradually spread to other Jordanian towns.

Analysts have differed greatly in their views of what appears to be close to a mass civil

disobedience movement in Ma’an. They not only disagree about the reasons behind the whole

matter but the official line on the crisis also often differs from other accounts of the reasons that

actually led to it.

The Event and the Explanations Behind It

In 1989, various members of the government were split in their analysis of the reasons why the

people of Ma’an resorted to organized violence. Some adopted the theory of foreign intervention

whereby they believed a foreign hand had a vested interest in spreading chaos in Jordan to force

it to back away from some of its policies. They believed that what happened was the start of

foreign intervention in Jordan – basically relying on the fact that the United States did not

approve of Jordan severing ties with the West Bank and, in addition, on the fact that some Arab

and regional parties (Saudi Arabia amongst them) did not approve of Jordan’s participation in the

Arab Co-operative Council which, at that time, included Jordan, Iraq,

Yemen and Egypt. The adherents to this theory used the fact that Saudi flags were raised in

Ma’an and that slogans supporting King Fahed were written on the walls of the town to back up

their theory. They also believed that some of Jordan’s political elite connived to inflame the

security situation in the country implying that the Head of General Intelligence at the time was

the main instigator of this in an effort to prove that the events were not really spontaneous but

were actually pre-planned. Some also believed that the training which the public security and

armed forces underwent in order to deal with a crisis of this kind was not put to use even though

the public security forces repeatedly called for the intervention of the armed forces.

What actually happened is that the crisis deepened and events evolved in a daily patern. The

crisis spread northwards to Tafileh, Karak and Madaba. At the same time, there were also a

series of meetings between the youth of the Bedouin tribes in central Jordan to show support for

the people of Ma’an. The movement then spread to Salt and Amman and became a national

movement. Another government view, which was held by the Head of General Intelligence

amongst others and which reflected the view of the Jordanian street was that the movement had a

spontaneous start but that the crisis then deepened and spread throughout the country because of

political frustration that reached boiling point as a result of the allegations of government

corruption and favoritism and because of the economic crisis following the devaluation of the

national currency in 1988 which mainly affected the transport sector. Ma’an suffered the most in

the Kingdom as a result of this according to the adherents to this view. However, the situation

was actually more complicated than this.

If foreign intervention is taken out of the equation, then what appeared to be a spontaneous

outburst in Ma’an and ended with the visit of Prince Hassan, the Regent at the time, recurred in

the days that followed as events developed dramatically. The movement spread north and

reached Amman. This could be proof that the country was going through a political and

economic crisis that provided the incentive for various political parties and political leaders to

demand the return of parliamentary life. However, the reasons for what appeared to be the

24

complete inability of the government to deal with the situation could be attributed to the

following:

- The hidden rivalry and personality cults amongst the various government leaders and

their attempts to take advantage of the events for their own personal gain to promote

their own agendas and to settle personal vendettas

- The lack of co-ordination amongst the heads of government departments tasked with

resolving the issue

Blaming the economic adjustment program for the events in Ma’an in 1989 is not completely

accurate. The devaluation of the Jordanian Dinar affected all the country and not just Ma’an.

Furthermore, the fleet of transport vehicles in Ma’an did not stop working in April 1989. It

stopped after August 1990 i.e. after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. These facts do not support the

view that the crisis was the result of raising fuel prices which provoked the transport sector in

Ma’an. The Gulf War that followed the crisis had yet another negative impact: workers from

Ma’an stopped going to work in Tabouk in Saudi Arabia. From this, one can gather that the

transport sector was not hit by the rise in fuel prices (the price of transport was immediately

adjusted accordingly) and that this sector was not the instigator of the crisis as has previously

been believed. This disputes the view that believes that the economic factor is the only reason

for the crisis.

The return of King Hussein from abroad played an important part in calming the situation as did

the change of government that followed. The holding of parliamentary elections also helped to

relieve the political frustration in the country that had caused the events of April 1989. Section

H of the Election Law was frozen. This had prevented political parties from taking part in

elections. The freezing of Section H allowed for elections in which all political tendencies and

political parties in the country participated. The election campaigns of the candidates throughout

the country were free. This emphasized the belief that the elections were free and clean and that

it might be possible to have a credible and popular parliament.

4.1.2 The Events of 1996

Things stayed calm in Ma’an until 1996 when demonstrations took place in Jordan against the

rise in the price of bread. However, the demonstrations did not start in Ma’an this time. They

started in Karak and spread from there to Ma’an. The government again blamed foreign

intervention pointing the finger at the Ba’ath Party ruling Iraq at the time. Jordan’s foreign

policy had started to move away from Iraq and Jordan had given refuge to Saddam Hussein’s

two sons-in-law. The adherents of this view believe that the Iraqi regime organized the events

through its allies in Jordan to punish the then Prime Minister Abdul Kareem Al Kabariti who

was behind the new foreign policy. As for the people of Ma’an, as recounted by their popular

leaders, they demonstrated in support of Karak because Karak supported Ma’an in 1989.

Furthermore, the violence and rioting in Ma’an this time was less than that in 1989.

4.1.3 The Events of 1998

Riots occurred again in 1998 following a lecture given by the well-known politician Eng. Layth

Shbeilat. The movement in Ma’an this time was because of regional issues: the American

attack on Iraq known as “Desert Fox” and the sanctions on Iraq. A demonstration started at

night after Eng. Shbeilat’s lecture. Another one started at a mosque the next day after Friday

prayers. It was led by a small group which was described by the public security forces as a group

of “Salifis”. According to the official line, a citizen, Mohammed Al Kateb, died as a result of a

shot fired by an unknown person among the demonstrators. The demonstrators burnt the

municipality building and the telecommunications center and destroyed the ATM machine of the

Housing Bank.

4.1.4 The Events of 2000

In 2000, demonstrations took place in Ma’an in support of the Palestinian Intifada. The

demonstrators’ demands were not all related only to Ma’an. For example, they demanded the

closure of the Israeli Embassy in Amman and the Jordanian Embassy in Israel. They also called

for a “Jihad” to liberate Al Aqsa Mosque and for Sharia laws to be applied in Jordan. They

25

demanded the immediate release of the town’s prisoners and that these prisoners be allowed to

return to their jobs. Following these events, the government started to back away from its role

as a provider of security and stability in the town. This slowly led to a state of lawlessness. The

crime rate rose especially robberies. Arms and drugs dealing thrived. The role of some “Salifi”

groups in the town was strengthened.

Due to this lack of security and stability, some religious groups were able to build a religious or

vested interest base for themselves. These groups became influential although in a limited way

and were able to incite the people of Ma’an and tie their aims and interests generally with those

of the people in the town. The fact that the economic, social and security situation in the town

did not improve but rather deteriorated helped strengthen this tie and enabled these groups to

incite the people of Ma’an against the government and its symbols in the town taking advantage

of the situation and their unmet demands to promote their own agenda.

4.1.5 The Events of 2002

In January, according to the official line, the public security forces arrested the citizen

“Suleiman Adnan Ahmad Al Fanatsah” for robbery. According to the people of Ma’an, he was

arrested because he was befriending a group of “Salifis”. A picture of Usama Bin Laden was

found in his wallet. According to the official line, Al Fanatsah died during his period of arrest

because of kidney failure. However, according to the people of Ma’an, the kidney failure which

caused his death was as a result of the circumstances of his arrest and his subsequent torture. The

people of Ma’an add that, after he had been taken to hospital and before he died, Al Fanatsah told

his mother the names of the people who had tortured him. Riots erupted when the family of the

deceased reached a settlement with the public security forces. A march took off heading towards

the public security center in the town. The center was damaged and the telecommunications

building was burnt as was the whole of the municipality building. There was a lot of material

damage. These events were marked by extreme violence and resulted in both material damage

and loss of lives unlike previous incidents in Ma’an.

On 29 October, a highway police patrol car from Alqatarneh stopped a civilian car carrying a

disabled person’s sign. It had no number plates and was driven by “Mohammed Al Shalabi”

who is known as Abu Sayaf. He was heading to Amman to take his disabled wife for treatment.

The patrol car asked him to follow it to the public security center. He, however, headed to

Ma’an instead of Alqatarneh. The police chased him. On the way, he used his mobile phone to

call his associates. This is the consensus reached by the members of the local committee and the

officials who were consulted about the events. Abu Sayaf passed several checkpoints at one of

which he was shot in the shoulder by the police. He had reached the entrance of Ma’an after a

chase which lasted over 130 kilometers. He left the car leaving his wife alone in it. In the

meantime, a group of armed men shot at the car of the Head of Police in Ma’an at the town’s

entrance which resulted in the injury of one of the officers accompanying him. The same group

headed to the Governorate Building and shot at it. Another armed group attacked the town’s

public security center and damaged a government car which was passing.

Abu Sayaf escaped to a house in Ma’an owned by a man wanted for arms smuggling. According

to some, he was guarded by between 15-30 armed men. He was then admitted to hospital.

Several armed men had gone to the hospital prior to this and had taken over several key areas in it

in order to protect him. Abu Sayaf was treated in hospital and discharged. He went to his father’s

house. This was agreed on during negotiations between the Head of Intelligence in Ma’an and

Mr Adel Mahameed who later on headed the town’s local committee. After this, the government

represented by the Minister of Interior, the Head of Public Security Forces and the Governor of

Ma’an started negotiations with Ma’an’s notables and asked them to give Abu Sayaf up within

48 hours at the latest. Ma’an’s notables, after discussing the matter with Abu Sayaf and his

group, agreed to the following:

1. Not to give Abu Sayaf and his group up but to try to persuade them to give themselves

up.

2. Ma’an’s notables promised Abu Sayaf and his group that, if they gave themselves up,

they would help them and would appoint lawyers to defend them. They would also

26

pay the expenses of their families and would negotiate with the government to

guarantee their safety.

The notables had obtained a promise from the Head of Public Security that Abu Sayaf would be

allowed to finish his treatment and would not be harmed. However, they failed to convince Abu

Sayaf and his group to give themselves up because, according to what they said, the members of

the group had been tortured when they had been arrested on previous occasions. There was,

therefore, no trust between the group and the security forces especially the public security forces.

The notables declined to continue their mediation efforts. On a practical basis, the local

committee did not offer Abu Sayaf and his group any support despite the fact that, according to

prominent Ma’anis, the majority of Ma’an’s population supported them.

When the 48 hours determined by the Minister of Interior were up, the security and badia forces

entered the town followed by the armed forces in order to arrest the group and other wanted drug

smugglers, arms dealers and armed members of the “Salifis”. Thus, what appeared to be a

normal traffic violation outside Ma’an turned to violence and was met with even more violence

by the state to put an end to what had become known as “the problem of Ma’an”.

The general consensus of many popular leaders in Ma’an is that the violent reaction of the

government was not justified. They insist that Abu Sayaf and his group were not the main

targets of this excessive violence but that the government made a pre-emptive strike so that the

people of Jordan would not go out onto the streets in support of Iraq. The government,

according to them, wanted a message to reach not only the people of Ma’an but also all other

Jordanians to prevent them from any such show of support. They base this on what an official

Jordanian source told CNN on 11/11/2002 and their belief is strengthened by the view that, in

the past, Abu Sayaf co-operated with the security forces and that the state was not incapable of

arresting him if it wanted to.

Nevertheless, Abu Sayaf is still free. Security forces have no intelligence on his whereabouts.

There is some information occasionally on where he might be but as soon as the security forces

arrive there, he seems to have just left to destinations unknown.

To sum it up, the Abu Sayaf incident is the latest of a series of clashes between a group or

groups of Ma’anis and the state. The apparent reasons for all the incidents the town has

witnessed and the forms the incidents take differ from one incident to the other. On the whole,

however, they have contributed to an image of Ma’an which has collectively hurt the people of

the town (see note 24). The incidents have also greatly contributed to the bad relations which

exist between the people of Ma’an and the various state apparatuses.

Field surveys show that the majority of respondents (24%) believe that the reason for the

clashes lies with the government’s official policies. This includes the government’s neglect, the

lack of security and the provocation of the citizens by the police. This percentage rises amongst

the youth to 43%. The number of people who believe the official line that the security forces

entered Ma’an to arrest wanted men and that there are arms smugglers in the town does not

exceed 9% of Ma’anis.

4.1.6 Political Developments Following The Events of 2002

One of the popular collective responses of the Ma’anis to the events of 2002 was to elect a

Popular Committee consisting of a group of the town’s people whether those actually resident in

Ma’an or resident outside it so that the committee could represent them and strive to fulfill their

demands. This committee enjoys greater credibility than any other party elected or through

which the government deals regarding Ma’an. The committee submitted a memorandum

containing 12 main demands made by the citizens of Ma’an.

The demands revolve around several issues some of them dealing with the security situation and

with compensation for the damages that occurred and others involving support of existing

development projects or new ones. On the security issue, the memorandum asked that the

extraordinary security apparatus in the town be dismantled, that those arrested be released, that

those accused be referred to the judiciary, that people’s licensed weapons be returned to their

owners, that those responsible be held to account for their mistakes and illegal actions and that

raids and arrests stop. It also asked that a neutral investigative judiciary committee be set up to

investigate the real reasons for the public security campaign against the town and that the

27

government commit to securing justice and equality among the people of the town and the

country as a whole.

On the issue of compensation for both material and emotional harm, the memorandum referred

to the damages caused by the widespread arrests, the curfew and the number of injured and

wounded.

The memorandum also asked that the citizens of Ma’an be given a number of seats in the military

university at Mu’tah, that the project of the Hashemite Hall be carried out, that the schools in

Ma’an be included amongst those less fortunate and that the land issues in Ma’an be resolved.

On the development side, the memorandum called for supporting the Al Hussein University, the

setting up of a military hospital and the setting out of solutions for what was stated in the

International Crisis Committee’s report. This is in addition to asking the government to set up

development projects aimed at alleviating poverty and unemployment such as restarting the glass

factory, setting up an industrial zone, proceeding at full speed with the landrover cars project and

not tampering with the Shiddiyah Housing Estate for the employees of the Phosphate factory.

The memorandum ended its list of demands with a request for building bridges of co-operation

and trust between the citizens and the government in Ma’an.

The demands in the memorandum are general ones specific to Ma’an. It is interesting to note that

the members of the committee support to a large extent the view of the public security forces’

field officers: that the release of the rioters after each crisis without taking them to court helped

to create a state of continuous chaos which started in 2000 and did not end until the latest

intervention by the state.

4.2 DEALING WITH THE EVENTS IN MA’AN FROM A SECURITY POINT OF

VIEW

Another form of collective action appeared in the town of Ma’an after the events of 1998. This

form of action can be called a kind of “negative resistance” or “negative violence”. It appeared

in the actions and behavior that individuals and groups sometimes resorted to in order to defy the

authority of the State and the respect it is owed.

Indeed, the relationship between the State and some of the people in Ma’an differs from that

between the State and the people throughout the rest of the Kingdom. Behavior associated with

this kind of resistance has developed into a total disregard of law and order; resisting and

attacking members of the security forces; and not paying bills (like water and electricity), traffic

fines and other financial obligations (in other words civil disobedience through non-

cooperation). Public servants from Ma’an have also taken to disregarding official working hours

and to using their positions and their government cars for private gain.

The Government’s weak response helped the situation to deteriorate even further. The

Jordanian Government believes in avoiding trouble or distancing itself from it. It also believes

in calming situations and sometimes even turning a blind eye to them. This position was clear

in Ma’an as the State tried to avoid a confrontation with its people and this position was

probably the main reason for the appearance of this “negative resistance”. It appears that the

public security apparatus loyalty was towards Ma’an’s tribes and not to represent of the

authority whose task is to impose law and order on everyone. This point of view was even more

strongly adhered to according to some public security officers in order to lessen the losses of both

the public security forces and civilians. Accordingly, the field directorate of the public security

forces during each crisis used to call on the town’s notables to bring the outlaws to justice.

The main contradiction in this was that the same notables would then intervene in most cases to

secure the release of these outlaws. The whole scenario would then be repeated with the public

security apparatus not having the will to impose law and order on everybody resorting to

intermediaries to solve security issues and the same intermediaries then contributing to the

continuing state of lawlessness. In the end, the continuing release of prisoners led to a belief

among the prisoners that they were above the law. This could explain why this group of people

immediately resorts to violence at the slightest provocation.

28

However, following the events of 2000, which were marked by a serious breakdown of security,

and for a variety of reasons all inter-related, the notables of Ma’an occasionally stopped co-

operating with the security forces. The “state notables” (the people who the State apparatus

whether in Amman or locally - including the governor, the police and the intelligence department

- patronizes and regards as town notables regardless of how the people of the town actually view

them) slowly began to lose credibility with the people of Ma’an. It was also claimed that people

who were arrested by the security forces were treated badly as some said that they had been

beaten, sometimes severely. This caused a problem for the notables themselves as their closeness

to the State began to affect their standing with the people.

The social structure in Ma’an helped to strengthen the feeling of solidarity amongst its people. It

led a local committee, the Popular Committee established outside the framework of the town

notables, the diwans and the tribes, to refuse to give up Abu Sayaf and his group for fear that the

town people might harm the members of the committee if Abu Sayaf and his group were treated

harshly by the security forces. This collective feeling of support and solidarity helped to

strengthen the view held not just by the state but also by the general public that Ma’an was a

“problem town”.

The public security forces took unprecedented and radical actions. It replaced the members of the

police force in Ma’an with new people. It also appointed a new Head of Police with the rank of

Colonel, a man considered one of the forces’ best officers. He was assisted by two officers with

the rank of Lt. Colonel. Unfortunately for him and, perhaps, unfortunately for the town, he was

shot at on his first day of duty. He escaped injury but the officer with him was hurt. The Head of

Public Security met with representatives from the town and offered to recruit hundreds of their

youth into the public security forces. However, all of this did not help to improve the

relationship between the majority of the town’s notables and the state. The representatives of the

State’s other apparatuses had varying relationships with the town’s people. For example, the

Head of General Intelligence was widely respected by the people of the town. In our view, the

General Intelligence Department’s field reports on Ma’an were the closest to reality. There is a

general agreement between the General Intelligence Department’s Field Officers and a majority

of Ma’an’s notables (who do not get on well with the Governor and with the central authority) not

only on their analysis of the cause of the crises but also on the solutions presented to solve the

town’s problems.

4.3 THE TOWN OF MA’AN AND THE STATE: MUTUAL PRECONCEPTIONS

The mutual misunderstanding between the State apparatuses and the people of the town of

Ma’an is one of the main obstacles to solving the Ma’an Crisis. Each side’s preconceptions

have further increased the communication gap between them. The Public Security Forces is the

State apparatus with the most direct, frequent and active contact with the town’s people.

Therefore, the Public Security Forces’ performance affects how the town’s people view the State.

It represents the respect owed to the State and, in actual fact, imposes the State’s authority. It

deals with citizens on a daily basis. This part of the report will deal with what the Public

Security Forces believe to be the reasons for the crises in Ma’an and how the crises reflect on the

way the forces deal with the town. It will also deal with how the people of Ma’an view the

Public Security Forces and other government institutions and how this view has contributed

towards the creation of a stance that forms the basis for violent protests by the people of Ma’an

and an equally violent reaction by the various government apparatuses.

4.4 THE PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES’ VIEW OF THE TOWN OF MA’AN

Since the establishment of the Emirate of Trans-Jordan, the higher echelons of central

government have always regarded Ma’an as different. A public servant who was sent to work in

Ma’an was often sent there as a form of punishment or at least that was the way he regarded it.

The basis, therefore, for the historical relationship between the center of government and Ma’an

was not a favorable one. Events between 1989 and 2000 and afterwards have contributed

towards this mutually negative viewpoint.

One of the reports of the Public Security Forces referred to the fact that the main reason for the

problem was the very nature of the people of Ma’an and their characters which the prevailing

29

desert weather conditions played a part in forming as these characteristics lead to simple matters

developing into big problems.

It was deduced from this report that the Public Security Forces believe that the lack of security in

Ma’an is caused simply by the desert-influenced nature of its people thus disregarding other

economic, social, political, behavioral and ethical factors. What is worth noting is that this view

is the prime mover behind the policies taken in Amman, the center, with regard to Ma’an. It can

be said that this view does not help to solve either the security problem in Ma’an or other

problems there because it does not acknowledge that there may be other factors that together

form an appropriate background for the violent protests. Putting all the blame on the people of

Ma’an and absolving the State and its various apparatuses from any responsibility as well as

regarding the matter purely as a security issue is not really conducive to finding a proper

solution to a problem like that of Ma’an. Following the logic of the Public Security Forces’

report which lays the blame for the lack of security only on the desert-influenced nature of the

Ma’anis means that finding a solution to this problem would be impossible and that the problem

will continue indefinitely because the reason behind it is the desert weather, which cannot be

changed never mind beaten.

The Public Security Forces’ view of the nature of the problem in Ma’an not only affected the

forces’ performance in the town and the way it carried out its duties but also affected the civil

servants’ performance and their ability to form cordial relations with the people of the town. If

a civil servant went to Ma’an believing that he could not achieve much because the problem was

primarily related to the desert climate, then he could not be expected to change the situation on

the ground. However, the ability of the Al Hussein University to achieve a change in the local

community is the biggest proof that change is possible and that the problem is not weather related

but is directly and probably to a large extent connected to sustained development

projects like the University.

It is obvious, in the opinion of the research team, that there is a basic problem between the

people of Ma’an and the State for, in addition to what has been mentioned previously, this

problem lies in the misunderstanding between them. The central government believes that the

crises that arise in Ma’an every now and then are caused by the climate whereas the people of

Ma’an, after long experience, realize that the government rushes to meet their demands after

every act of violence and that it tries to appease them either by employing their youth in the

various state apparatuses or by promising them to invest in development projects in the town.

The cycle of violence and appeasement recurs whenever the government seems to back down

from fulfilling its promises.

One of the things that the government has done, which has exacerbated the problem is the fact

that it depends on some of the people of Ma’an and some Ma’anis who live in Amman who it

regards as the town’s notables. These individuals are not trusted by the people of Ma’an but the

government regards them as the people who can solve its problems ignoring those who have

stayed in the town and have strong relations with its people.

After the continued violence especially after the events of November 2002, there was a change

in the way the State dealt with Ma’an. The official line stuck to the story of there being

smugglers and armed men and weapon factories and ammunition in the town and that the

government, this time, intended to solve the problem once and for all so that the crisis could be

resolved and its authority restored. It, therefore, resorted to an excessive use of violence and

punished the whole town. It imposed a curfew and carried out widespread arrests.

Now, security has been restored to the town after it suffered through several years of a state of

lawlessness marked mainly by the concerned apparatus’ failure to impose law and order. The

Jordanian government, which had seemed weak, slowly started to re-impose its authority as the

people of the town went back to paying taxes, electricity, and water bills and traffic fines.

Public Security Forces’ reports show that the security situation in the town is the best it has been

for many years. Public Security officials conclude, therefore, that the use of force against the

people of the town has indeed helped to improve the situation. This means that the latest

intervention by the various government apparatuses during the last crisis is still based on the

theory that Ma’an does not suffer from any economic, social, behavioral or ethical problems and

that it is mainly an issue of lack of security.

30

Despite the strong intervention by the government and its various apparatuses including the

armed forces, Abu Sayaf is still free, the town is still full of arms despite the fact that the

government declared that it wasn’t, the living conditions are poor and the government is still

holding on to the same security issue as the cause of the problem. The factors causing the crisis

are, therefore, still there and the relationship between the people and the government is still not a

healthy one (see note 25).

4.5 THE PEOPLE OF MA’AN’S VIEW OF THE STATE AND ITS INSTITUTIONS

It was clear to the research team during the interviews they held and the field surveys they

carried out in the town of Ma’an that the performance of the Public Security Forces has

contributed to the negative view of the State that the people of Ma’an had in general. The

people of Ma’an said that they either do not trust the Public Security Forces at all or that they

trust them very little (18% and 19% respectively). It is worth noting that these percentages rise

to a total of 56% amongst the youth of Ma’an. It is also worth noting that the youth are the ones

that participate the most in the demonstrations the town has witnessed. They were, therefore,

more likely to be arrested and beaten by the Security Forces according to the reports from Ma’an.

Furthermore, the people of Ma’an’s trust in the successive Jordanian governments is not high.

Against 43% of people who said that they trusted them or trusted them a lot, 51% said that they

don’t trust them at all or trusted them very little. This is in addition to the fact that 54%

expressed the belief that the government is not serious in its fight against corruption. This

means that the Public Security Forces enjoy more credibility than the successive governments

despite the crises that affected the forces relations with the town. The town’s notables who are

members of the Popular Committee expressed their complete lack of trust in the government

and in the seriousness of the meeting held between the Prime Minister and the committee. They

did not hide their dissatisfaction with the government’s position and with its policies towards

the town. What draws attention is the high percentage of the people of Ma’an who trust or have

a lot of trust in the Armed Forces (74%). This proves that the people of Ma’an do not view all

the State’s apparatuses negatively. It seems that the apparatuses with the most direct and daily

contact with the people (the public security forces and the other government institutions) are the

ones that enjoy the least amount of trust.

As for the Jordanian Media, its was clear during interviews with members of the Popular

Committee that the method in which the Jordanian Press and Jordanian TV and Radio dealt with

the events caused grave reservations amongst the people of Ma’an especially towards those

journalists who commented on the events of 2002 on some Arab satellite channels. The

Jordanian Media to a certain extent helped to strengthen the impression that Ma’an was “a

problem town”, that its people were “outlaws” and that it was controlled by a group of Salifis and

drugs and arms dealers. These generalizations and “bad coverage” affected the superficial view

of the Jordanian Media held by the people of Ma’an as 54% expressed little or no trust in the

Jordanian Press while 58% expressed little or no trust in Jordanian TV and Radio.

4.6 FEELINGS OF INJUSTICE AND PROTESATION

The lack of ways to express feelings of injustice whether individually, nationally or institutionally

leads to protests. The lack of peaceful ways to protest leads in turn to violent protests like those

seen in Ma’an. The feeling that there is equality, justice and equal opportunities is considered a

safety net that helps to alleviate the feelings of political, social and economic injustice that are a

cause for protest and are a fertile ground for social incitement and mobilization. Field studies

show that the people of Ma’an differ from those in the rest of the Kingdom in their evaluation of

many political and economic indicators as the state of crisis and the feelings of injustice are ever

present.

As shown in Chart 2 below, the results of the field study indicate that the feelings of injustice in

Ma’an rose over the last four years. It also shows that the difference between Ma’an and the rest

of the Kingdom is a basic, substantial and often very major difference as, in general, the number

of those who believe that Jordan is a land of equally opportunity is much lower in

Ma’an and as the number of those who believe that there is no equality in Jordan is much higher

31

in Ma’an. The major difference appears in the percentage changes in these beliefs as the

number of those in Ma’an who believe that there is no equality in Jordan rose from 5% in 1999

to 34% in 2003.

Chart 2: a comparison between those nationally and in Ma’an who believe that there is equality in

Jordan and a comparison between those nationally and in Ma’an who believe that there is no equality in Jordan

Comparision between National and Ma`an samples regarding the

extent to w hich equality exists in Jordan

40

35 34

30

27.1 26

to a

great

extent -

National

sampe

Doesn’t

exist

National

25

20 20 20.7

15 13.2

18.5 14 12.3

24

17.1 15.16 7

16.5

12.6

sample

to a

great

extent 12.7 12 10

5 5.1

0

7.7

10.7

Ma`an

Doesn’t

exist -

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Sur ve y ye ar

Ma`an

The same numbers apply almost exactly to the issue of justice in Jordan as the percentage of

those in Ma’an who believe that there is justice in Jordan dropped by 13% between the years

1999 and 2003 as shown in Chart 3. The chart also clearly shows that the number of those who

believe that there is no justice in Jordan rose significantly in Ma’an when compared to the rest

of the Kingdom as it rose from 6% in 1999 to around 27% in 2003. This shows the gradual rise

in the pent up feelings in the town whether regarding the issue of equality or the issue of justice.

Chart 3: a comparison between those nationally and in Ma’an who believe that there is justice in

Jordan and a comparison between those nationally and in Ma’an who believe that there is no

justice in Jordan

Comparision betw een national and Ma`an samples regarding the

extent to w hich Justice exists in Jordan

40

to a

great

extent -

National

sampe

35 35.6

30 30

28

25 26

20

15

2019.2

15 3 13.9 14.714.8

11.5

28.2

16.9 15.1

11.7

Doesn’t

exist

National

sample

to a

great

extent

10 8.4

9.6 6.8 8

5.7 5

0

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Surve y ye ar

Ma`an

Doesn’t

exist -

Ma`an

32

The feelings of injustice amongst the people of Ma’an are strengthened by the fact that they

believe that the principle of equal opportunities is not applied in Jordan as Table 12 below

shows. The difference between how the people of Ma’an regard this issue and how people

throughout the Kingdom regard it is insignificant.

Table 12: Equal Opportunities in Jordan

National

Sample

Sample from

Ma’an

There are Equal Opportunities 12.6 7.8

There are Equal Opportunities to a certain

extent 27.4 27.2

There are no Equal Opportunities 51.1 56.3

Don’t Know 8.9 8.7

A feeling of injustice does not necessarily lead to peaceful or violent protests if there is a legal

and political mechanism and framework that allows these feelings to be addressed and if there is

trust in this mechanism and framework (the Parliament, the judiciary and political parties). It is

clear that the level of trust in such mechanisms and frameworks amongst the people of Ma’an is

low as 50% of the people of the town do not trust Parliament or trust it very little. The same

applies to political parties as 59% of the people of Ma’an do not trust them or trust them very

little. As for the judiciary, the percentage of the people of Ma’an who do not trust it or trust it

very little is 56%. This percentage is low as trust in the judiciary should be higher. In the rest

of the Kingdom, the percentage of people who trust the judiciary is 81%.

The lack of trust in these mechanisms and frameworks lessens the chances of people turning to

them as institutions that maintain and apply the law and ensure justice and equality among the

people. The lack of trust contributes to people protesting outside institutionalized mechanisms

and frameworks. There is a large percentage of Ma’anis who believe that some of the civil and

political rights guaranteed by the constitution are not adhered to including the right to

demonstrate and the right to hold sit-ins or at least that these rights are only partially guaranteed

(67% and 66% respectively). In addition, 93% of Ma’anis said that they cannot openly criticize

the government without them or their families facing some sort of physical or financial

punishment. This percentage compares to 83% of people in the rest of the Kingdom as is shown

in Table 13 below.

Table 13: The Ability to Criticize the Government and Participate in Opposition Activities

The ability to criticize the government openly and oppose

Participation in peaceful

it opposition Activities

The Kingdom Ma'an The Kingdom Ma'an

Yes 9.5 4.9 15.3 7.8 No 83.2 93.2 77.5 89.3

Not Relevant 1.5 - 2.4 1.0

Don’t Know 5.3 1.9 4.5 1.9

Refused to

Respond 0.6 - 0.3 -

33

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

It is clear from the preceding descriptive and analytic reporting that there is not one single factor

that led to the “Ma’an Phenomena” – the repetitive outbursts of violence. Several factors

unique to Ma’an made it more inclined to resort to collective violence as a form of protest. These

factors caused the eruption of the crises between the State and the people of Ma’an.

Unemployment and poverty in Ma’an are higher than they are generally throughout the Kingdom.

However, they are equally high in other parts of the Kingdom like Ajloun and Mafraq. The same

applies to family income. It is lower than the average in the Kingdom. However, it is also lower

than the average in other parts of the Kingdom. The same also applies to other human

development indicators.

This means that Ma’an is not unique in the Kingdom. There are certain similarities between it

and other parts of the Kingdom. Ma’an’s uniqueness may be as a result of the negative

relationship between its people and the State. This relationship evolved over time as a result of

certain official policies that arose out of the central government’s belief that Ma’an is a

“problem town” and led it to concentrate on security as the sole reason for this thus

disregarding other factors.

This uniqueness is clear in the strong show of force that is applied to the town during each crisis

– a show not seen in other parts of the Kingdom. For example, after the parliamentary elections

in June 2003, there were riots in Na’ur similar to those seen in Ma’an marred by the same degree

of violence (if not more). However, it did not result in the same show of force by the State as

that seen in Ma’an during its crises.

The State’s method of dealing with Ma’an has led to a strengthening of the feelings of solidarity

amongst its people in facing up to the State’s apparatuses, a solidarity so unique and which could

be as a result of the nature of the social structure reviewed in this report. Field officers of the

Public Security Forces and the General Intelligence Forces working in Ma’an confirm this. They

confirm that it is difficult to get help from the people of Ma’an in finding those who are wanted

for questioning or in arresting them. Some of the popular notables in Ma’an also confirmed this.

This solidarity became stronger because of the lack of trust in the State’s actions and its

mismanagement of the crises according to the majority of notables living in Ma’an.

The lack of trust in these institutions as a result of the methods previously discussed helped to

increase the phenomena of recurring violent protests.

According to the conclusions reached by the team who prepared this report, the following points

could form the basis for dealing with the issue of Ma’an:

- Establishing the Popular Committee for the town of Ma’an is considered a positive response to

the crisis and to the reality on the ground in Ma’an. The fact that the State does not take the

Committee seriously is an unnecessary hindrance especially as the demands made by the

Committee are reasonable and practical

- Ties should be strengthened with the notables of Ma’an who actually live in the town as they

are aware of the people’s concerns and have good relations with them. The government

apparatuses should remain neutral and not favor one group of people over another.

- The performance of local government institutions that represent the central government must

be improved in order to overcome the lack of trust that exists at present even if this means

making some changes as the Public Security Forces had done.

- Applying law and order throughout the town and stopping the release of prisoners especially

those convicted of crimes in order to appease certain notables will help to overcome the lack of

trust and improve the image of the Public Security Forces in the town.

- The crisis in Ma’an cannot be viewed in isolation. It is part of what is happening nationally in

Jordan. Political and economic development in the Kingdom will positively affect the reality of

the situation in Ma’an.

- On the economic front, the situation in Ma’an does not differ from that in other parts and

governorates in the Kingdom. The development of the infrastructure is necessary to improve

the economic situation generally and throughout the Kingdom. Talking about projects specific

to Ma’an contradicts the government’s economic policy of applying the same incentives

throughout the Kingdom through the Investment Encouragement Law. Emphasis should be

34

placed on pointing out certain aspects of a town or governorate that can be the targets of new

investments. These investments should then be made and operated according to modern

methods in order to avoid repeating the mistakes of the unsuccessful glass factory.

- It is obvious that the youth of Ma’an who form the majority of the population need a way to

expend their energies through clubs and societies or local associations or through the amenities

of the Al Hussein University.

These ideas, if they are all applied, form a good basis for joint action between representatives of

the various State apparatuses and Ma’ani notables in order to put an end to what is known as the

Ma’ani Crisis.

We hope that this report will be the start of a national dialogue that differs from the norm

concerning Ma’an. We also hope that it will contribute to achieving results, which will help to

solve this problem, which has reached a dead end and has resulted in Ma’an being an open-

ended crisis.

NOTES:

Note 1: Red Alert in Jordan: Recurrent Unrest in Ma’an: ICG report presented to HM

King Abdullah of Jordan Amman/Brussels, 19 February 2003 www.intl-crisis-group.org.

Note 2: The Existing Economic and Social Conditions in Ma’an, March 2002, Directorate

of Economic Surveys, Department of General Statistics, Pages 1, 13, 16.

Note 3: Ministry of Planning, Jordan: The Year 2000 Report on Human Development,

Pages 54, 55 and 56

Note 4: The Existing Economic and Social Conditions in the Ma’an Governorate, March

2002, Directorate of Economic Surveys, Department of General Statistics, Page 27

Note 5: The Existing Economic and Social Conditions in the Ma’an Governorate, March

2002, Directorate of Economic Surveys, Department of General Statistics, Page 28

Note 6: Directorate of Economic Surveys, Department of General Statistics, Pages 1, 2, 13

and 25

Note 7: The Existing Economic and Social Conditions in the Ma’an Governorate, March

2002, Directorate of Economic Surveys, Department of General Statistics, Page 25

Note 8: Al Hussein University, The Social and Economic Condition of Families in the

Ma’an Governorate, Page 72.

Note 9: Al Hussein University, The Social and Economic Condition of Families in the

Ma’an Governorate, Page 57.

Note 10: Center for Strategic Studies at the Jordan University, The Labor Force in

Jordan, 2001- 2002

Note 11: Center for Strategic Studies at the Jordan University, The Labor Force in

Jordan, 2001- 2002

Note 12: Department of General Statistics, Labor and Unemployment Survey (February

2003).

Note 13: Al Hussein University, The Existing Social and Economic Conditions of Families

in the Ma’an Governorate, Tables 57 and 58.

Note 14: Ministry of Social Development, Strategy to Fight Poverty, 2002, Page 13

Note 15: Ministry of Social Development, Strategy to Fight Poverty, 2002, Page 13

Note 16: Ministry of Social Development, Strategy to Fight Poverty, 2002, Page 17

Note 17: Ministry of Social Development, Strategy to Fight Poverty, 2002, Page 17

Note 18: The Existing Economic and Social Conditions in the Ma’an Governorate, March

2002, Directorate of Economic Surveys, Department of General Statistics, Page 16.

Note 19: Poverty levels differ according to each definition used. Is it absolute poverty or

abject poverty? The above-mentioned study by the World Bank stated that poverty levels

were lower despite a drop in private individual consumption. However, this drop was not

accompanied by a drop in personal income for each citizen. This is the most commonly

used measure of poverty levels. In general, the estimated poverty line used to measure the

above rates is JD313 per person per year. Department of General Statistics/Directorate of

Economic Surveys, Page 16.

35

Note 20: Indicators were calculated according to the methodology used in UNDP Reports

on Human Development between 1991 and 2002. Data from the Department of General

Statistics in Jordan was used to calculate the indicators.

Note 21: It is worth noting that the Ministry of Planning is preparing detailed work plans

on several economic issues. The work of the Ministry of Planning team involves the

preparation of a list of the most important economic and social problems and suggested

solutions.

Note 22: Data covers the governorates in the Kingdom. There is no date specific to towns.

This data shows that Ma’an is, generally, not worse off than other governorates. Note 23:

Other units like Al Zarkali, Al Turk, Al Barajkli and Aal Ma’touk can be added to Al

Fanatsah. None of them have a diwan.

Note 24: The total human and material cost since 1989 up to the recent events is as

follows: Deaths: 12 citizens, 5 public security men. Injuries: 10 citizens, 41 public security

men. Arrests: 394 (most have been released with around 58 remaining in custody).

Damages: repeated attacks on the security center; repeated attacks on the police station;

repeated attacks on the municipality; an attack on Ma’an’s courthouse; repeated attacks on

the post and telecommunications center; an attack on the general health center; an attack

on the government shop; damages to the Islamic Bank, the National Bank, the Arab Bank,

the Bank of Jordan and the Housing Bank; the looting of and damages to the Al Daraghma

Trading Corporation; the burning of a privately owned car; the burning of several

corporations and trading organizations owned by people outside of Ma’an; an attack and

assault on Ma’an College; shooting at a Hall of Residence for female students; the

confiscation of 69 pistols and 57 rifles, machine-guns, RPGs and hand-grenades; attacks on

the cars of the Minister of Interior and the Head of Police/Head of Public Security; the

burning of a car belonging to the fire department, a car belonging to a forensics lab and two

other cars belonging to the police; damages to 46 public security vehicles.

Note 25: It is worth noting that some of the projects which the government adopted

following the last crisis like the temporary employment of large numbers of workers has

helped to alleviate the severity of the problem for a while.

36