Macleod 1997 - French Policy Toward Yugoslav Collapse

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French Policy toward the War in the Former Yugoslavia: A Bid for International Leadership Author(s): Alex Macleod Source: International Journal, Vol. 52, No. 2, Leaders and Leadership 3 (Spring, 1997), pp. 243-

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ALEX MACLEOD

French policy toward the

war in the former

Yugoslavia: a bid for

international leadership

As Yugoslavia entered into its final crisis in the spring of 1991, France was still recovering from the shock of the fall of the Berlin wall, which had shaken the very basis of French foreign policy. France could no longer exploit the bipolarity which had created so much room for an independent policy between the United States and the ussr. The unification of Germany, which France had accepted with great reluctance, upset the balance of power within the European Community (ec), which had always favoured unification. Finally, the end of the Cold War called into question a defence policy based on an independent nuclear deterrent. It is, therefore, by no means surprising that France, like the other members of the ec, was at sea when faced with the first major crisis of the new European order. However, if one looks beyond the fluctuations in French policy toward the various conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, it becomes clear that this crisis acted as a cata-

lyst in the process of adapting French foreign policy to the

post-Cold War age. In particular, it underscored the limits of the

capabilities of the budding European Union (eu) as a political institution and raised serious questions about the aim of estab-

lishing a treaty system for European security. Above all the crisis

gave France an opportunity to reclaim its position as a leader, not

just within the eu, but also worldwide.

Professeur, Departement de science politique, Universite du Quebec a Montreal.

This article is the author's translation of 'La politique franchise et raffirmation du leadership international,' which originally appeared in Alex Macleod et Stephane Roussel, dir. Interet national et responsabilites internationales: Six Etatsface au conflit en ex-Yougoslavie (1991 1995) (Montreal: Guerin universitaire 1996).

International Journal lii spring 1997



244 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

French policy toward the former Yugoslavia can be divided into three distinct periods: (1) from the beginning of the crisis in the summer of 1991 to the victory of the French right in the March 1993 parliamentary elections; (2) the so-called cohabitation period (April 1993 -April 1995) between Socialist President Frangois Mitterrand and the conservative government of Prime Minister Edouard Balladur; and (3) from Jacques Chirac's presidency in May 1995 to the signature of the Dayton peace accord in November 1995. During the first period, foreign policy making was dominated by Mitterrand, supported by his trusted foreign minister, Roland Dumas. It was a time of deep division, not only between the government and the opposition but also within the

governing Socialist party. The main architect of French policy toward the former Yugoslavia during the second period was the Gaullist foreign minister, Alain Juppe. Despite the change of government in April 1993, everything indicates that the three main French foreign policy makers (the president, the prime minister, and the minister for foreign affairs) came to an agreement, even

though the new government did not hesitate to criticize the policy of its predecessor.1 In the third phase, Chirac sought to estab- lish his mark with a vigorous foreign policy - beginning with the former Yugoslavia.

THE IMPOSSIBLE EUROPEAN SOLUTION

The Yugoslav crisis should have given the European Community its first chance to prove that it could settle a problem in its own

backyard. In fact, it showed just the opposite. After six months of fruitless attempts to find a solution, the EC was forced to hand the

question over to the United Nations early in 1992. However, by sharing the lead in the peace negotiations with a United Nations

1 In an interview broadcast on radio station Europe 1 , 5 September 1994, Juppe welcomed the fact that during the cohabitation era Trance has always spoken with one voice,' but added that when he had taken office 'French policy was generally considered as extremely indulgent toward Belgrade and the Serbs.' La politique etrangere de la France. Textes et Documents (September-October 1994), 34-



FRANCE AND THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 245

special envoy, France managed to remain on the front line, at least until the Contact Group was formed in July 1994.2 Unfortunately the crisis happened at the very time that the ec was

reflecting on its own future. On the one hand, there was talk of

expansion to include other West European countries and possibly some from Eastern Europe. And on the other, the existing member states were seeking ways of strengthening integration among themselves. Events in Yugoslavia were to show that the conditions for formulating a Common Foreign and Security Policy (cfsp), as provided for by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, were still far from

being met. On the contrary, they revealed the deep divisions between the member states and their incapacity to agree on how to handle the break-up of the Yugoslav federation. They also high- lighted the fragile nature of the Franco-German axis on which the

dynamics of European integration depended. In these circumstances, France, which had always seen the eu as a counterweight to the international influence of the United States, preferred initiatives which would ensure that Europe played an important role in the search for a solution to the crisis.

From the beginning of the crisis, the ec countries agreed on the need to maintain a united Yugoslavia, but quickly disagreed on how to react to the claims of the two dissident republics, Slovenia and Croatia. The Germans wanted to recognize the inde-

pendence of both immediately, while France and Britain continued to support Serbia as the successor to the Yugoslav state and

hoped to put off recognition of the other two contenders for as

long as possible. Historical references offer an inadequate explanation for the

positions adopted by the countries involved. To be sure, Germany had supported a Croat puppet state during the Second World War and France had links of friendship with Serbia and then with the

newly-created Yugoslav state which went back to the First World War. It is also true that these memories remained strong in

2 The Contact Group brought together France, Britain, Germany, Russia, and the United States. It was set up by the French and reflected French perceptions of the most influential countries in this crisis.




France, at least for the generation which had taken part in the Second World War.3 But to explain their attitudes one should look to the way in which each interpreted international law and

perceived the international situation and the implications for its national interest. For France, Yugoslavia was still a recognized legal entity, and it could not conceive of recognizing the dissident

republics as long as the question of the rights of the different minorities throughout the territory of Yugoslavia had not been settled. Behind these legal considerations lay concerns about the

political consequences of any hasty recognition of Croatia, and, to a lesser extent, of Slovenia. First, such a move would have an

impact on the other Yugoslav republics, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, which were also getting ready to proclaim their inde-

pendence, and on the complicated problem of Kosovo. The French feared above all the domino effect on other sensitive areas, especially the Soviet Union, which was also on the verge of

breaking up in late 1991 . Finally, France did not welcome the possibility of Germany extending its influence in the Balkans at a time when it already seemed to have taken the first steps toward

creating a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. French public opinion, opposition parties, and even the

Socialist party were becoming more and more outraged by the news of concentration camps, stories of ethnic cleansing, and the

implacable siege of Sarajevo, all of which were blamed on the Serbs. Mitterrand felt compelled to act. At the Lisbon European Community summit in June 1992 he announced a sudden

change in his indulgent view of the Bosnian Serbs and followed this declaration with a surprise visit to Sarajevo. His purpose was to retake the French initiative in the war in Bosnia at a time when

European helplessness was becoming more and more obvious. He was also attempting to rally French public opinion in favour of a referendum on Maastricht, in which both sides were citing the case of the former Yugoslavia to boost their cause. According to

3 For example, in an interview published in the Frankfurter AUgemeine Zeitung on 29 November 1991, Mitterrand recalled that 'Croatia and not Serbia belonged to the Nazi bloc'




those on the 'yes' side, European unity had prevented the conflict from spilling over into other countries, whereas their opponents countered that the cfsp was forcing France to adopt policies which were against its interests and which would condemn

European diplomacy to impotence.4 These purely domestic considerations could not overshadow

the fact that France's policy toward the former Yugoslavia influ- enced its relations with the other members of the ec, particularly Germany. Before the fall of the Berlin wall, Mitterrand had done

everything possible to strengthen relations between France and

Germany. Within the Community, the two countries had agreed on implicit power-sharing, with France taking on the political and

military leadership which was denied Germany, and Germany assuming leadership in economic and monetary matters. The end of the Cold War had upset this balance, and the French now feared the Germans would withdraw into themselves and follow a much more independent policy, centred on Eastern Europe. At the time, these fears seemed justified when the German chancel- lor, Helmut Kohl, imposed his own plan for unification without

consulting his allies, delayed recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as the eastern border of the new Germany, and pursued a policy of opening toward the East, based on Germany's economic and commercial power. For their part, the Germans were disappointed that their western neighbours continued to distrust them. At the outbreak of the Yugoslav crisis, these misunderstand-

ings appeared to have dissipated. The French and the Germans were once again exercising their leadership within Europe by tak-

ing the initiative on the negotiations which were to lead to the

signing of the Maastricht Treaty. Despite their disagreement over

recognizing the separatist republics, they supported together certain concrete measures for the former Yugoslavia. However, it cannot be said that Franco-German co-operation made any very tan-

gible contribution to solving the on-going conflict.

4 See Patrick Jarreau, 'La guerre en Bosnie alimente le debat entre partisans et adversaires de Maastricht,' Le Monde (Paris), 2 1 August 1992; and 'Politique etrangere et defense,' ibid, 18 September 1992.




Still smarting from accusations of over-aggressiveness in its unilateral recognition of the dissident republics, Germany adopted a low profile. The French, for their part, had absolutely no desire to exclude the Germans from an event so crucial to the future of Europe. They tried to include them through consultation and by inviting them to put forward joint initiatives. These consultations took the form of telephone conversations, such as one Mitterrand had with Kohl after (but not before!) his trip to

Sarajevo, or more formally through official discussions followed

by communiques and press conferences during the biannual sum- mits between the two countries. The French went out of their way to point out how much Franco-German co-operation, and especially joint initiatives, had contributed towards resolving the

Yugoslav situation. Without doubt the most significant Franco- German initiative was the 'global concept,' which became the

'European Union's peace plan' in November 1993 and then the basis of the Contact Group's proposal for a settlement eight months later.

These grand declarations on the importance of Franco- German co-operation could not hide some noteworthy differences between the two countries. For example, at the Copenhagen European Community Summit in June 1993 Kohl's announce- ment that Germany favoured lifting the embargo on arms to the former Yugoslavia was greeted with strong opposition from the French and the British. However, the French remained convinced that European unity was vital for facing Europe's most serious

post-Cold War challenge, and that unity depended on Franco- German co-operation, which, in the words of the minister for

European affairs, 'played a decisive role in unifying the European position on the Yugoslav conflict.'5

An indication of the real nature of Franco-German co-operation in this conflict came during the first phase of the peace process set in motion by the Geneva agreement of 8 September

5 Interview with Alain Lamassoure in the Croat daily Vejsniky reprinted in Lapoli- tique etrangere de la France. Textes et Documents (September-October 1994), 270.




1995. The French and the Germans began by announcing a joint task force to study ways of reaching a peace agreement in Bosnia; it was never mentioned again. The French suggested that the Franco-German Eurocorps should be made a part of a multilateral intervention force to enforce an eventual peace accord. This idea was rejected by the German defence minister, Volker Ruhe, as evidence of 'crass ignorance.'6 Finally, in October 1995 at their first summit after the peace process had begun, Chirac and Kohl made no reference whatsoever to the question of peace in Bosnia.

By allowing such little space to the Germans in the peace process, France managed to achieve several of its foreign policy objectives. It succeeded in containing German foreign policy ambitions within the eu and in checking German influence in

part of Eastern Europe. And because Britain, the only other member of the European Union which was as committed as France in the former Yugoslavia, would not or could not increase its economic and political weight within the Community, France found itself well placed to claim the role of European leader in this drama.

RETHINKING EUROPEAN SECURITY

The conflict in the former Yugoslavia transformed perceptions of European security. Not only did it become necessary to revise the very definition of this security, but also, and above all, it was quickly realized that Europe's existing security institutions could no longer function as before. The Conference on (now Organi- zation for) Security and Co-operation in Europe (csce), for example, had been sidelined from the beginning, while the Western European Union (weu) was relegated to overseeing sanctions against Serbia, and the eu was reduced to administer- ing Mostar and appointing a mediator the belligerents often ignored. It would be an understatement to say that the conditions for a true common foreign and security policy still did not exist.

6 Daniel Vernet, *L'Allemagne devrait envoyer 4 500 soldats dans le cadre des accords de paix,' Le Monde, 25 October 1995.



25O INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

Two international institutions, the United Nations and the North American Treaty Organization (nato), in which the Europeans controlled only part of the decision-making process, took over

responsibility for operations in Croatia and Bosnia and ensured that conflict there did not spill over into the rest of the Balkans.

Throughout these wars, the mandates of both organizations, their

jurisdiction, and the nature of their relationship evolved, forcing each participant in their operations to reflect on the future of

European security and how to defend it. For France, what happened in the Balkans epitomized all the

new security problems of the post-Cold War era. In the first place, this region belonged to what the recently published white paper on defence called France's 'strategic interests/ which it distin-

guished from its 'vital interests' to which were 'attached the sur- vival of the nation.' Although the paper steered clear of defining these strategic interests, they included keeping the peace on the

European continent and 'watching over these interests ... to fore- warn us of threats against our vital interests.'7 Secondly, French leaders defined the situation in the former Yugoslavia in terms which left no doubt about the importance of the area for

European security. It was referred to as a war of religions or as a conflict between ethnic groups which must absolutely be con- tained - failure, in the words of Mitterrand, would be tantamount to 'a licence for all the ethnic groups in Europe which want to become sovereign and thus [lead to] the break-up of most exist-

ing countries.'8 French leaders were particularly concerned about the impact

of the Bosnian conflict on the rise of Islam, for, according to Pierre Lellouche, a former defence advisor to Jacques Chirac, several of them feared the emergence of a 'sort of Gaza Strip in the middle of the Balkans.'9 Without going quite that far, Juppe claimed that 'Europe cannot know stability and peace in a context

7 Livre blanc sur la defense 1994 (Paris: Union generate d'Editions 1994), 49, 50. 8 Jean-Marie Colombani, Thomas Fernczi, and Jean-Pierre Langellier, *Un entre-

tien avec M. Francois Mitterrand,' Le Monde, 9 February 1993. 9 Quoted in Roger Cohen, 'West's fears in Bosnia: 1) chaos 2) Islam,' New York

Times, 1 3 March 1 994.



FRANCE AND THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 25 1

of confrontation with Islam* and that the 'possibility of an open and tolerant Islam' was at stake in Sarajevo.10

After diplomatic interventions by the ec and the csce failed in 1991 and war broke out in Bosnia in May 1992, French policy rapidly evolved into a sort of interventionist peacekeeping operation. At first, in April 1992, France agreed to send peacekeeping troops to act as a traditional buffer between the belligerents. Three months later, following Mitterrand's visit to Sarajevo, a policy of humanitarian aid was adopted which included military support for food deliveries to the civilian population. The constant attacks against these civilians and against its own troops forced France to support the more vigorous actions approved by the United Nations Security Council - first declaring an air exclusion zone, then announcing the establishment of security areas, and

finally ordering air strikes. Clearly, the whole notion of peacekeeping had changed, creating ambiguities about the exact nature of the United Nations missions and who had political control over them.

The Yugoslav crisis considerably changed the French view of

Europe's security institutions, especially nato. After the fall of the Berlin wall, Mitterrand had insisted on an American presence in Europe, while seeking to lay the foundations for a home-grown European defence policy. The Western European Union was meant to form the cornerstone of this policy, and the Franco- German Eurocorps, created in 1992, was to be the embryo of a

European military force. The cfsp was the first step toward insti-

tutionalizing a truly European defence policy. However, from the

beginning the British had fought hard against any notion of an autonomous European defence policy. As for the Germans, they were in no hurry to exchange their alliance with the Americans for a purely European institution and insisted on attaching the

Eurocorps to nato. The situation in the former Yugoslavia exposed the limits of French ambitions. From the beginning, but

especially after the fiasco of recognizing Croatia and Slovenia, it

10 Alain Juppe, 'Ex-Yougoslavie: une volonte pour la paix,' Le Figaro, 17 October




was clear there could be no German participation in peacekeeping operations on the ground, even supposing the constitutional obstacles to such a force could be removed. Thus, using the

Eurocorps was out of the question. Moreover, the weu had been

kept out of most military operations in the former Yugoslavia in favour of nato. By the end of 1992, France had begun to signal its wish to strengthen its ties with the Atlantic alliance.

Using a very different tone from that of the preceding Socialist government, Jacques Chirac's former defence advisor declared that it was France rather than Britain that would have the 'enviable but difficult challenge' of formulating, with the United States, Europe's future security system.11 The defence white paper confirmed the new French policy toward nato. France intended 'to remain faithful to its allies and to its commit- ments within the framework of the principles which pertained at the creation of the Alliance,' but called for 'a place where the

European defence and security identity can also be asserted.'18 For its part, the weu became 'complementary to the role of nato.' However, this rapprochement did not mean going back on the 1966 decision to leave nato's integrated military struc- ture. Ironically, it was left to an old opponent of General Charles de Gaulle, Frangois Mitterrand, to complain of a 'certain ten-

dency' in the Balladur government 'to return to the nato fold.'13 To a large extent the stalemate in the Bosnian conflict

accounts for this change of heart toward the Atlantic alliance. As

Juppe explained, the Yugoslav case had shown not only the need for a common European policy, but also the need for a 'critical mass' at the military level.14 In other words, French leaders had come to realize that Europe was politically and materially inca-

1 1 Pierre Lellouche, Trance in search of security,' Foreign Affairs 72 (spring 1993), 128.

1 2 Livre blanc sur la defense iQQ4> 65, 66.

13 Franz-Olivier Giesbert, 'Politique etrangere: la mise au point de Mitterrand,' Le Figaro, 9 September 1994.

14 Alain Juppe, 'Quel horizon pour la politique etrangere de la France?' Politique etrangere 60 (spring 1995), 248; 'La France et la securite europeenne,' Defense nationale (April 1995), 14.




pable of resolving by itself a question which was so fundamental to its own security. In addition, the American decision to see such distant conflicts as no longer vital to United States national secu-

rity meant that the Europeans, and above all the French, could no

longer adopt positions which risked alienating the United States, even less so at a time when instability had become the main threat in Europe. Finally, France could not afford to exclude itself from the decision-making process within an institution whose actions could have an enormous impact on the safety of its own troops.

The events in the former Yugoslavia revealed not only the weaknesses of those institutions which should have made the

management of such crises much easier, but also the total absence of any efficient means for ensuring preventive security, since the csce had clearly failed on that score. To make up for the latter's

shortcomings, the French proposed a stability pact, which was

signed by all the European countries in March 1995 and which

lay down mechanisms for settling the problems of ethnic minorities and borders seen to be at the origin of the conflicts in the Balkans. This pact, sponsored by the European Union, became

part of the cfsp with the long-term objective of helping certain countries to join the eu and of ensuring partnership relations with others. It went in the direction of the ideas of other members of the European Union, such as Britain, about the kind of security system needed to respond to the instability which threatened

Europe in the post-Cold War era.

WINNING INTERNATIONAL LEADERSHIP

If any medium-sized power which claims to have global responsibilities is to provide leadership to and influence other countries, especially the largest ones, in favour of a particular policy, it must use its moral and materialistic capabilities. In general, this involves imposing a certain number of priorities on the international agenda, making sure these priorities are debated in the terms laid down by the initiating state, and getting the major actors to accept the basic elements of the proposed solutions. At a more modest level, a medium-sized power will propose a series of




initiatives aimed at settling an important international issue or a

specific serious crisis which will then serve as the basis for the search for a long-term solution.

Throughout the Yugoslav crisis, France attempted to play the role of leader by adopting a strategy which would ensure that it was present in all the formal and informal decision-making bodies at the international level, striving to take the lead where possible, or exercising pressure to defeat those measures which it deemed hostile to its own interests. Taking advantage of United States indecisiveness over whether the war in Bosnia did or did not con- stitute a vital national interest, of Russian hesitation in the face of domestic problems, of British reluctance to engage in a conflict so far away, and of German reticence to repeat the painful experi- ence of recognizing the two dissident republics, France assumed a

position no other country appeared willing to take. As the prime provider of troops on the ground and the country which had suffered the most casualties amongst the peacekeepers, France also considered that it had the right to direct participation in those decisions which could affect the safety of its soldiers.

Behind this desire to assume a leadership role lay the key French foreign policy objective - maintaining France's rank at the international level. This rank did not mean that France could act

unilaterally on an issue as important as the conflict in the former

Yugoslavia. Rather, France sought to be treated on an equal foot-

ing with the major powers, at least on questions which impinged on its strategic interests. It claimed this rank as a member of the

Security Council, as a nuclear power, and as a country with extra-

European interests. In the words of the defence white paper, France continued to assert its global responsibilities and to declare that 'it must contribute actively, undoubtedly more than

others, to keeping peace in the world and to ensuring respect for international law.'15 Thus it could not agree to a secondary role in

resolving a crisis in its own backyard.

1 5 Livre blanc sur la defense 1 994, 50- 1 .




This concern over rank was reflected in the French strategy for settling the Yugoslav conflict. In general, France sought to make the responsibility for a solution to the conflict as wide as

possible. On the one hand, it submitted the question to the rele- vant international institutions, notably the eu and the Security Council, and supported all proposals for peace or settlement. On the other, it made an effort to involve the United States and Russia closely because it presumed (and undoubtedly overesti-

mated) the influence the two countries had over the two most

important actors in the war in Bosnia, the Muslims and the Serbs. The Contact Group adopted a plan in July 1994 which was to con- stitute for a long time the basis for settlement put forward by the international community, although the group's efficiency was undermined by divisions among its members.16 Multiplying initiatives aimed at keeping the peace process alive constituted the second element of this strategy.

At first France proposed mainly initiatives which would have an immediate effect, usually on the heels of a particular event. Thus, in the summer of 1 99 1 , in an effort to find a way out of the deadlock within the ec brought about by declarations of inde-

pendence by Slovenia and Croatia, France suggested an arbitra- tion committee, made up of five constitutional court chief justices from ec countries and headed by the president of the French Constitutional Council, Robert Badinter. Its mission was to set down the conditions for recognizing the separatist republics. Unfortunately, the commission's report came out only after

Germany's unilateral recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. Pleas for security zones can be put in the same category.

France proposed areas in which peacekeepers would be committed to protecting civilian populations around six predominantly

16 For the internal problems of the Contact Group, see Steven Greenhouse, 'Year's effort by 5-nation group accomplishes little in Bosnia,' New York Times, 22 March 1995; and Daniel Vernet, 4Le Groupe de contacte: le retour des grandes puissances en Europe?' Relations internationales et strategiques 17 (autumn i995)» !32-8.




Muslim towns in Bosnian Serb-held territory. This decision, which was sanctioned by the Washington agreements of 22 May 1993, pushed the United Nations Protection Force (unprofor) and nato a step further toward militarizing peacekeeping operations, though without any talk at that time of imposing a solution on the belligerents.

In a second series of initiatives, France put forward measures aimed either at long-term solutions or at producing a qualitative change in the commitment of the various countries involved in

settling the conflict. The European peace plan proposed by France and Germany in November 1993 deserves to be cited at the head of the list of the long-term solutions, even though it was

rejected by the United States because it granted too much land to the Bosnian Serbs and too many concessions to Serbia. Its main ideas were taken up by the Contact Group and incorporated into its proposal. In the wake of the obstacles put in the way of this

plan by the belligerents, especially the Bosnian Serbs, France continued to call for new initiatives from the Contact Group. It gave priority to two such initiatives: exploring the possibility of an insti- tutional link between the Bosnian Serbs and Serbia and seeking 'to globalize the political settlement* in the region.17 These became the main points of the United States peace plan put forward by the administration of President Bill Clinton in the autumn of 1995.18

An example of a French initiative which changed the nature of unprofor and nato operations in the former Yugoslavia was the Sarajevo ultimatum. In reaction to the Serb bombing of a

Sarajevo marketplace on 5 February 1994, in which 68 civilians were killed, the French called on nato to declare a deadline for

17 For the essential points of this plan, see Juppe, 'Ex-Yougoslavie: une volonte pour la paix.'

1 8 Although he congratulated the Americans for finally committing themselves in the Yugoslav conflict, Chirac could not help reminding them that when Juppe had presented the same plan they 'had not yet understood that only military action in the service of forceful diplomacy would lead to results.' Jacques Chirac prend la tete de la "guerre" contre le terrorisme,' Le Monde, 1 2 September 1995.




lifting the siege of that city and to threaten to bomb Serb positions if the deadline were not met. At first neither the Europeans nor the Americans were prepared to go so far, but finally the French got what they wanted from their allies. The Serb military were to pull back their heavy artillery more than 20 kilometres from the city centre within 10 days or face military strikes from nato forces. In fact the French obtained much more. They succeeded in involving the United States directly in the peace process for the first time.

France also tried to steer its allies in the direction of its own solutions. It constantly advocated a policy aimed at reinforcing and clarifying the peacekeepers' mission in the conflict and succeeded in beefing up sanctions against Serbia, the country it held most responsible for the hostilities in Bosnia. Having seized the

leadership of this operation in Europe, and well aware of its lim- ited influence over Russia, France concentrated its efforts on the United States to such an extent that the war in the former

Yugoslavia seemed increasingly to be waged against a background of Franco-American rivalry. On several occasions the French man-

aged to force the Americans to make decisions they did not want to make or offered them a way out when their Yugoslav policy was at a dead-end. According to the French, the Americans suffered from a lack of political will in this conflict, accused the Europeans too easily of weakness at the same time as they refused to position their own troops on the ground, and encouraged the war's inten-

sity by supporting first the Muslims and then the Croats, without

measuring the consequences. In many cases the French challenged the Americans directly.

For example, during the January 1994 nato summit, they man-

aged to put the Bosnian question on the agenda, despite objections from the Americans who wanted to spend this meeting redefining nato 's role and on eventual plans for eastward expansion. But the issue which acted most often as a backdrop to the

rivalry between the Americans and the French was the July 1991 embargo on arms to the former Yugoslavia which the United States wanted lifted. Every quarrel on this topic turned to the




advantage of the French. With British support, the French always claimed that lifting the embargo would only prolong the war, increase the number of victims, and settle nothing. To put pressure on the Americans, they threatened to pull their troops out if ever a unilateral decision was taken on this issue. In early December 1994 matters came to a head. Irritated by what they saw as American encouragement of renewed hostilities by Bosnia,

disappointed by the United States decision to ignore the arms

embargo, and outraged by Bosnian Serb hostage-takings, the French once again declared their intention to pull their troops out. Within hours they withdrew this threat because they knew full well that it had little credibility; however, they had received assurances that the Clinton administration was not in favour of

lifting the embargo - and they had succeeded in putting the Bosnian question back on the international agenda.19

JACQUES CHIRAC: REASSERTING FRENCH LEADERSHIP

When Jacques Chirac came to power in May 1995, French policy entered an even more assertive period. Chirac had decided to make foreign policy a priority of his presidency. The Bosnian

question gave him an opportunity to put his stamp on French for-

eign policy at his very first cabinet meeting.80 This desire to control foreign policy, in the pure presidential tradition of the Fifth

Republic, also heralded a return to certain Gaullist principles, in

particular a more autonomous policy vis-a-vis the United States, a reaffirmation of allegiance to the Atlantic alliance, a proclama- tion of France's sovereignty in the defence of its most vital security interests, a role as broker between the West and the rest of the world, and an assertion of the right to take its place among the

major powers. All these principles, except the question of sover-

19 Michael R. Gordon, 'Paris ends threat to drop its role in Bosnian force,' New York Times, 8 December 1994; and Alan Riding, 'French successfully bluff their allies on Bosnia,' ibid.

20 Thierry Brehier, 'M. Chirac se veut le "patron" de la politique etrangere francaise,' Le Mondey 2 June 1995.




eignty,81 were expressed in the Chirac government's policy toward the former Yugoslavia. But, as will be shown, there was some dis-

crepancy between calls for firmer policy and the realities of French diplomacy.

At the very moment when France decided to put the Bosnian conflict at the heart of its foreign policy, the United States finally responded to two years of French pressure by looking for ways to end the conflict. This situation, which announced a new phase in the war, also posed a challenge to French policy because the United States seemed bent on taking over all the available space in a relaunched peace process. French decision-makers were to find themselves with much less room to manoeuvre.

During the first months of this new stage of the conflict, which stretched from the bombing of Bosnian Serb positions by nato

warplanes in May 1995 to the massive nato air strikes in August and September, the French experienced few difficulties in taking initiatives which allowed them to remain at the head of the countries involved in the conflict. When Bosnian Serbs first attacked the peacekeepers and began to take unprofor personnel hostage, Chirac ordered French troops to react and had no hesitation in blaming the hostage crisis on the inadequate military means authorized by the United Nations. French policy would be

distinguished from the policies of its allies by its insistence on the need to respond to force with equivalent force. As Chirac

acknowledged three months later, the French were abandoning 'the error ... of wanting to carry out a humanitarian mission' to go on 'to the military phase.'22 During the summer of 1995, France

put forward a series of proposals aimed at strengthening the mili-

tary aspects of United Nations and nato actions in Bosnia which were to have direct influence on United States policy in the former Yugoslavia.

2 1 The French government illustrated its conception of sovereignty over defence matters when it decided to renew nuclear testing in the summer of 1995, with no prior consultation with any of its allies, including Germany.

22 Jacques Chirac prend la tete.'



26O INTERN ATIONAL JOURNAL

On the military level, France, with Britain's support, achieved

agreement on a rapid reaction force (rrf) of some 10,000 French and British troops - later joined by Dutch forces - whose mission was to support unprofor in Bosnia and Croatia. The rrf served to weaken the direct control of the United Nations over military operations on the ground and caused some friction between the Americans, who suspected that behind the strengthening of European troops lay a plan to withdraw European peacekeepers from Bosnia before the winter of 1995-6, and the

Europeans, who did not appreciate the American refusal to share the costs of the rrf. With the collapse of the so-called protected zone of Srebrenica, followed shortly by the fall of Zepa, the French demanded a dramatic gesture. They called on the Western countries to join forces to take Zepa but had to give up the idea when the British displayed little enthusiasm for it and the Americans refused to supply the helicopters needed to transport the troops. The French then suggested that Western forces should beef up the security on the ground in the remaining four protected zones, especially Gorazde, the last big Muslim town in Serb

territory. This plan was also turned down by the British and the Americans.83 French pressure, which gave Chirac great press cov-

erage, much to Clinton's chagrin,84 forced the United States to

put forward its own plan. Initially, it was restricted to the idea of massive air attacks in the case of any Serb threat against Gorazde, but, under pressure from its allies, who did not really believe air strikes would work, the plan was extended to all protected zones. After a Bosnian Serb attack against the market in Sarajevo on 28

August 1995, which triggered the massive air raids promised by the American plan and vigorous action from the rrf on the

ground, France succeeded in extending this operation to end

Sarajevo's status as an enclave.

23 However, according to American sources, Clinton would have approved the plan if it had been presented by the French and the British together. See Craig Whitney, 'Disunity imperils French proposal for Bosnia force,' New York Times, i8July 1995.

24 See Todd S. Purdum, 'Clinton now tries to define role for the us in Bosnia,' ibid, 23 July 1995.



FRANCE AND THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 26 1

On the diplomatic level, Chirac's greatest success came at the 07 meeting in Halifax in June 1995 when he forced the other participants to put the Bosnian question on the agenda, despite the reluctance of the meeting's host, Prime Minister Jean Chretien of Canada.25 Once the war in Croatia and the success of Croatian and Muslim forces against Bosnian Serbs had begun to turn the tide of the war, French and European initiatives had to give way almost completely to American diplomacy.

While Chirac was calling for tougher measures from the international community against the Bosnian Serbs, French diplomats were negotiating solutions which did not square well with this public demonstration of bravado. Thus, during the hostage crisis of June 1995, it was above all the French who obtained freedom for the hostages by reassuring the Bosnian Serbs during a series of secret talks, at the very moment when the United Nations and the West were calling for their unconditional release, that the Serbs would not be bombed by nato planes.26 Similar discrepancies between words and deeds occurred during the events surround- ing the fall of Srebrenica and while talks were being held on the fate of Gorazde. Apparently General Bernard Janvier, the French commander ofuNPROFOR, refused to follow up a request from the Dutch peacekeepers defending Srebrenica for air strikes against the Serb forces, declaring, with the approval of Paris, that it was time to put an end to the Muslim enclaves in Bosnian Serb territory.27 One may also wonder whether the French really believed in their plan to win back Srebrenica by military means, since they could be sure the Americans would turn it down. In the same way it would seem that the French put forward their plan to save Gorazde, knowing full well that it depended on logistical support from the United States, essentially 'to annoy the Ameri-

25 Edward Greenspon, 'Chirac a tour de force in world debut,' Globe and Mail (Toronto), 17 June 1995.

26 Roger Cohen, 'France held secret talks with Serbs,' New York Times, 23 June 1995-

27 Francois Schlosser, 'Le massacre qu'on a laisse faire,' LeNouvel Obsevateur, 16-22 November 1995, 16.




cans/88 Though these incidents put the public impact of Chirac's arrival on the international scene in perspective, no one should be surprised by what went on behind the diplomatic curtain or think the French enjoyed a monopoly over such behaviour. It was after all the new French president's public actions and words, and not these behind-the-scene dealings, which impressed world public opinion and forced the leaders of the other Contact Group member counties, especially the United States, to react to the French challenge.

However, from the moment the United States decided to take over the peace process, France found itself reduced to calling for measures which gave it all the honours of a front-line actor, without any real control over future events. For example, it managed to hold the last stage of the negotiations for a peace agreement among Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia, including signing the final document, in Paris,29 and it wanted a French general to be second in command in the future multilateral intervention force led by the United States. The French showed their displeasure with this new situation by announcing that they had no intention of

increasing the number of troops they had stationed in the former

Yugoslavia, that is, their contribution to the new intervention force, only two weeks after they had promised to do so.3°

In these circumstances, France tried to maintain its participation in a process from which it felt more and more excluded by falling back on its traditional policy of mediator between the West and the rest of the world. On the one hand, it showed great concern for the impact of the conflict on relations with the Muslim world. With his visit to Morocco in June 1995, Chirac set up a

meeting for 7 September 1995 between the foreign ministers of the Contact Group countries and those of the Islamic Conference

Organization. According to Le Monde, the French foreign minis-

28 Ibid.

29 But the Americans made it clear that once serious negotiations had started in Dayton they wanted most of the process to take place in the United States.

30 See * 1 2 500 soldats francais pour la Bosnie,' Le Monde, 6 October 1995; and 'La France n'augmentera pas ses effectifs militaires,' ibid, 8 September 1995.




ter wanted to use this gesture 'to show France's interest in associ-

ating the Muslim world with the search for a settlement in the former Yugoslavia.'31 On the other, France rallied around the cause of the other power left out of the peace process, Russia. In wel-

coming Boris Yeltsin to Paris at the end of October 1995 on Yeltsin's way to the 50th anniversary celebrations of the United Nations in New York, Chirac declared that he wanted to be sure that Russia would not be excluded from the peace process in the former Yugoslavia in particular and would not feel isolated inter-

nationally in general. He expressed his support for a Russian zone in Bosnia and for the idea of a meeting between the Croat, Serb, and Bosnian presidents in Moscow before negotiations began in the United States. (The proposed meeting had to be cancelled when Yeltsin fell ill.) He also repeated his opposition to extending nato eastward without an agreement with the Russians.

By assuming the role of go-between, France was pursuing not

only its objective of maintaining its international rank by attempting to become indispensable on all issues concerning European interests, but also two other no less important aims. First, it was

reasserting its independence from the United States, with which it has always conducted a relationship which has hovered between that of ally and rival. Second, it was defending its own security interests, both by avoiding pretexts for terrorist attacks from Muslim fundamentalists on its own territory and by refusing any gesture on the part of the West which could be used against Yeltsin and his policy of co-operation with the West by his domestic opponents.

CONCLUSION

Like all great crises, the one in the former Yugoslavia brought out the distribution of power in post-Cold War Europe. And France came out on top. It succeeded in taking on political and diplomatic leadership from the beginning of the conflict, almost by

31 Alain Frachon, 'Paris veut tenir compte de la diplomatic musulmane,' ibid, 8 September 1995.




default, since Germany had excluded itself from that position. Afterwards France managed to neutralize Germany by associating it with the most important decisions but never let it act on its own. Thus by including Germany in the Contact Group, France assured it of a place amongst the major powers, whilst forcing it to show solidarity with French decisions. As for its other European rival, Britain preferred to follow the French lead; it put forward no noteworthy initiatives of its own. Before the United States, which was aware of the limits of its power and less and less prepared to act as a global policeman, France presented itself not

only as an equal partner on an issue of primary importance, but also as a driving force behind Western policy toward the crisis. It was often France which asked for and got a firmer military commitment from the Americans. It also provided the basis for the

peace plan which the Americans put forward as their own at

Dayton. In addition, by making sure the Russians took part in the search for a solution and by acting as a counterweight to American demands, the French succeeded in keeping alive at least the illusion of the international community's unity toward the conflict.

Nevertheless the French had to admit that realizing the dream of a strictly European defence and security policy based on the weu still lay far in the future. German reluctance, British

objections, and American opposition certainly helped to put this

objective on the back burner. But the reality on the ground in Bosnia was enough to convince France that the Europeans still did not possess the means to implement such a policy. Thus an American presence in Europe remained necessary. However, the United States decision that it was not vital for it to settle every European crisis leaves the French with some room for manoeuvre within nato, and it will not be long before they exploit it.

