ManagingMenandMachines:U.S.MilitaryOfficersandtheIntellectualOriginsof

ScientificManagementintheEarlyTwentiethCentury

By

Copyright2016DavidW.Holden

SubmittedtothegraduatedegreeprograminHistoryandtheGraduateFacultyofthe

UniversityofKansasinpartialfulfillmentoftherequirementsforthedegreeofDoctorofPhilosophy

________________________________ChairpersonJefferyMoran

________________________________

Co-ChairTedWilson

________________________________BethBailey

________________________________

JohnKuehn

________________________________PaulAtchley

DateDefended:February8,2016

ii

TheDissertationCommitteeforDavidHoldencertifiesthatthisisthe

approvedversionofthefollowingdissertation:

ManagingMenandMachines:U.S.MilitaryOfficersandtheIntellectualOriginsofScientificManagementintheEarly

TwentiethCentury

____________________________________________

ChairpersonJefferyMoran

Dateapproved:February8,2016

iii

Abstract

ManagingMenandMachines:U.S.MilitaryOfficersandtheIntellectualOriginsofScientificManagementintheEarlyTwentiethCentury.ByDavidHolden

ProfessorTheodoreA.Wilson,Advisor

TheU.S.Armyofficercorpsexperiencedanintellectualrevolutionfollowingtheexperience

ofWWIthatfundamentalalteredtherelationshipbetweenmanandmachinesinwar.Asa

result,officersfailedtodevelopthetechnologygeneandbegantothinkofwarasbeing

inherentlyquantitativelyandtechnologicalbased.Thisdissertationexaminesthe

relationshipbetweentechnologyandtheU.S.ArmyandNavyofficersspecificallybetween

1900-1925.Furthermore,thetreatiseaddressestheroleofFrederickTaylorandtherise

ofscientificmanagementwithintheU.S.ArmyandNavy.

iv

Acknowledgements

Inwritingthisdissertation,Ireceivedinvaluableassistanceandsupportfroma

numberofpeopleandorganizations.Withouttheirhelpandsupport,Iwouldhavenever

succeededinfinishingthistreatise,northecourseofinstructionattheUniversityof

Kansas.Forthesereasons,andmanymore,Ioffermysincereandutmostappreciationto

thefollowing:

First,IwillforeverbegratefultomylovelywifeSherri.Icouldnothavesucceeded

withouthersupport,caringforourfouryoungchildrenKayla(6),Noah(5),Jeremiah(3),

andIsaiah(2)throughoutmyarduousdaysofworkandresearch.Shegraciouslyendured

myisolatedhoursofreadingandtheendlessstreamofbooksthatarrivedonthedoorstep

fromAmazon.Thebookscontinuetoappearmysteriously.

IalsooweagreatdebttoDr.RogerSpiller,adivergentthinkerwhofiredthe

intellectualcuriositythatledmetomakethisjourney.Hechallengedmetobecomemore

thanIthoughtIwasencouragingmenottofearfailure.

Dr.JohnKuehnworkedtirelesslytoformmydisparatethoughtsintoacoherent

narrative.WithoutDr.Kuehn’senergythisdissertationwouldneverhaveseenthelightof

day.Hemanagedtoworkthroughhundredspagesofmyworkwhileworkingfulltimeasa

professoratCGSC.I’mnotentirelyconvincedthatheishuman.Heworksmoreefficiently

thananyothermanIknow.Dr.JonathanHouse’shonestandinsightfulsuggestionsonthe

manyversionshesurveyedalsocontributedsignificantlytothiswork.

v

AttheUniversityofKansas,Dr.TheodoreWilsonguidedmystudies.Heprovided

valuableeditingandcommentaryregardingthecontentofthispaperandnosmallamount

ofwordsmithing.Beyondthisdissertation,Dr.Wilsonwasinstrumentalinworkingwith

theU.S.ArmytoallowasmallcadreofwoundedsoldiersintotheprogramattheUniversity

ofKansas.ThankyouDr.Wilson,inthemostClausewitziansense,fortakingachanceon

us.

vi

TableofContents

PAGEAPPROVALPAGE…………………………………………………….………….……ii

ABSTRACT………………………………………………………………..………….…iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS………………………………………….…………….…iv

CHAPTER

1.TheTechnologyGene…………………………..………………….………….…1

2.PracticalLeadershipforEmpire.…………………………….…………....40

3.OriginsandContextfortheArmy’sCulturalDNA……………….….57

4.JournalsandProfessionalization.…..……………………………….…….77

5.InroadsofEfficiency….…………………………………..…………….………97

6.FrederickTaylor,ScientificManagement,andtheU.S.Army

Armories………………………………..………………………………………118

7.TheArmybyNurture&theNavybyNature………………………..140

8.Conclusion:Historymatterednot,becauseitchangedso

much………………………………………………………………….……..…..180

vii

Appendix………………………………………………………………………………193

BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………..…………………………………………..219

1

ChapterI

TheTechnologyGene

TheU.S.Armytodayisthemostpowerfularmytheworldhaseverseen.Forthelast

fourteenyearsthisArmyhasconductedmilitaryoperationsagainstinsurgentsarmedwith

assaultweaponsandprimitiveexplosives.Severaltrilliondollarshavebeenexpendedto

fightthiswar.TheArmylost--theylosttoanidea.Thereasonisthattechnology,in

aggregate,producesaparticularmindset,azeitgeistthathinderstheArmyofficercorps

fromdevelopinganunderstandingofwar.Thisstudyexamineshowthefundamental

propertiesoftheEnlightenmentandRomanticismcontributedtotheformingoftheArmy

officermindsetandhowideasofhistory,time,andheroesevolved,andthenshifted,under

thelightoftechnology.Thematerialexaminedisdiffuse,andyetcompelling.Fewworks

existthatexaminetherelationshipbetweenmanandmachine.Thus,thethesisstartswith

abroadexaminationofideas,values,andbeliefsinordertodemarcatethelinesofinquiry

thatfollow.

ThethinkingoftheArmy’sofficercorpsaboutman’sroleinwarfareandthe

relationshipinwarbetweenmanandtechnologypassedthroughaturningpointduringthe

firstquarterofthetwentiethcentury.Thisturningpointsawthemachinesupplantman.

Thepurposeofthisstudyistoshowthenatureofthisturningpointandexplainhowthe

newideasaboutwar,man,andtechnologygainedtractionahundredyearsagoand

continuetoshapeU.S.militaryofficersthinkingtoday.Thisstudydoesthisbyfocusingon

themethodsofFrederickTaylorandhowheinfluencedtheU.S.military.Frederick

Taylor’sinfluenceinboththeArmyandtheNavywereexaminedindetail.Lettersfromthe

2

FrederickTaylorarchiveofferthebalanceofevidence.TheInfantryJournal

providesadditionalmaterialthroughthecriticalperiodofWWItoevaluatethechanging

viewsofArmyofficerstowardstechnology.Taylor’scorrespondencewithNavalofficers

demonstratesthatthisphenomenonwaspartofawiderculturalshiftwithinthemilitary,if

notwithinthenation.ItbecomesclearthattheexperienceontheWesternFrontinWWI

combinedwithmassiveindustrialgrowthacrosstheUnitedStateshadapronouncedeffect

onthezeitgeistoftheArmyofficercorps.

DuringtheeighteenthandnineteenthcenturyinEurope,theperiodknownasthe

Enlightenmentanditssuccessor,sometimescalledRomanticism,broughtabouttwoofthe

greatestintellectualshiftsinWesternhistory.Anothertitanicintellectualmovement,the

abandonmentofhistoricismforwhathasbeentermed“technicism,”beganwiththeFirst

WorldWar.Humankindoncereveredthepastforthelightitcastonthefuture;now,the

paceoftechnologicalchangeforeveralteredthatperception.Thisintellectualshiftswept

withgrowingmomentumandfervencythroughbureaucraticinstitutions.Thischanging

perspectiveespeciallyinfluencedtheU.S.Armyfromtheyearsjustpriorto1914untilit

reachedmaturityintheSecondWorldWar.Thegrowthoftechnicism,socialsciences,and

thegeneralquantificationandmeasurementofallthings,bothmaterialandotherwise,

encouragedthedisplacingofmanbymachine.Complexhumanproblemsappearedasa

matterofproperorganizationalandtechnologicalapplicationratherthanasconceptual

questions.

Warisfirstandforemostahumanendeavor.Motivationsinwarrunfromirrational

torational,butintheendthatseemstomatterlittle.Ideasarethecatalystsforwarandthe

passionsofthepeopleprovidethefuel.Thinkingaboutthenatureofwar,SunTsu(Sunzi)

3

mused,“…thoseunabletounderstandthedangersinherentinemployingtroopsare

equallyunabletounderstandtheadvantageouswaysofdoingso.”1Similarly,thoseunable

tounderstandthenatureofwarareequallyunabletounderstandtheadvantagesand

disadvantagesofemployingtechnology.ThestrategicapproachSunTzuadvocatedbegan

bylookingatasituationasaneaglepeeringdownfromtheheavens;technicalanalysis

oftenadvancesfromtheoppositedirectionbyslicinglifeintodiscreetsubsections,

categories,andclassifications,aprocessofmicrotomacro.

TheGreektermfortechnology(techne)includedbothartandtrade.2

Conceptualizationsofthetermprogressedslowlyuntiltheearlynineteenthcenturywhen

itenteredthelexiconinitsmorefamiliarmodernconnotations.However,notuntilthe

AmericanCivilWardidtheterm“technologist”comeintocommonparlance.3Onecan

followthesteadyprogressofthisconceptfromitshumblebeginningsasmenwho

practicedatradeandskilltomenwhospecializedintheinventionandoperationof

machines.4Theevolvingterminologycloselyparalleledadvancesinsociety.Technology

continuestoevolveanddefiesasingledefinition;themultiplicityofusesandthenatureof

technologyitselfnecessitateaflexibledefinition.Defineittoonarrowlyanditdoesnot

adequatelyincludeelementswithinitsprerogative,conversely,toobroadadefinition

wouldsubsumenearlyeverything.

LewisMumford,arguablythemostinsightfulobserverofthecomplexrelationship

betweenmanandtechnology,resistedaconcisedefinitionoftechne.Althoughhe

1SunTzu,TheArtofWar,trans.SamuelGriffith(OxfordUniversityPress,1963),73.2MiguelFlachAznar,TechnologyChallenged:UnderstandingOurCreations&ChoosingOurFuture(KnowledgeContext,2005),20.3FrederickC.Mish,ed.,Webster’sNinthNewCollegiateDictionary(Springfield,MA:Merriam-WebsterInc,1984),1211.4Ibid.

4

acknowledgedtheGreekdefinition,hestressedthattheGreeksmadenodivisionbetween

theideaofartandindustrialproduction.Mumfordobservedin“TechnicsandtheNatureof

Man”(1966)thatmodernmanemphasizedtheutilitarianaspectoftechnewhileeschewing

themoresignificantandprevalentfactorofartintheoriginalconceptionandpracticeof

techneinantiquityandpre-history.5

ThomasP.Hughes,authorofAmericanGenesis(2004),definedtechnologyas“the

efforttoorganizetheworldforproblemsolvingsothatgoodsandservicescanbeinvented,

developed,producedandused.”6BrianArthurinTheNatureofTechnology(2009)provided

threedefinitions,“…technologyisameanstofulfillahumanpurpose;…anassemblageof

practicesandcomponents;…[and]theentirecollectionofdevicesandengineering

practicesavailabletoaculture.”7Thefirstdefinition,forexample,couldconstituteacar

thatisatechnologyforthehumanpurposeoftransportation.Thesecond,an“assemblage

ofpractices,”alsoreferstotheinformationnecessarytouseanddevelopsuchtechnology.

Thethirdisthetraditional“mechanical”and“material”definitionoftechnology.

However,MiguelAznarapproachedtheissueinTechnologyChallenged(2005),

muchlikeClausewitz,seekingtodefinetheessenceofthesubjectandthusaddaninclusive

definition.Hewrotethat“technologyextendstheabilitiesofman,”aruggeddefinitionthat

bearsthemanyfacetsoftechnologyfromfiretoinformation.8Similarly,inSocietyand

TechnologicalChange(2006)RudiVoltidefinedtechnologyas“…asystemthatuses

5LewisMumford,“TechnicsandtheNatureofMan,”TechnologyandCulture7,no.3(July1966):309.6ThomasP.Hughes,AmericanGenesis:ACenturyofInventionandTechnologicalEnthusiasm,1870-1970(UniversityofChicagoPress,2004),6.7W.BrianArthur,TheNatureofTechnology:WhatItIsandHowItEvolves(NewYork:SimonandSchuster,2009),28.8Aznar,TechnologyChallenged,17.

5

knowledgeandorganizationtoproduceobjectsandtechniquesforattainmentofspecific

goals.”9

FollowingtheCivilWar,thetechnologicalprofessionsdevelopedalongmore

rigorouslinesasthefieldadvanced.Bytheturnofthetwentiethcenturythetechnological

community,atleaststructurally,haddevelopedintoa“Mirror-ImageTwin”ofscience.

However,wherescienceawardedthehighestdegreeofprestige“tothemostabstractand

general…inthetechnologicalcommunityitwenttothedesignerorbuilder…scientistseek

toknow,technologisttodo.”10Thus,ascientistsoughttounderstandwhileatechnologist

aimedforpracticalapplication.

Duringthe19thCentury,mostU.S.Armyofficersfailedtodevelopthe“technology

gene”,definedasanunderstandingofthelimitsoftechnology.Theliteraturethatbears

directlyonthissubjectissparseandoftentangentialinnature.However,theproximate

informationprovidesawealthofinformationthatilluminatesthebroadoutlines,allowing

onetoexaminetheprocessthatledtothisdeficiency.Thisliteratureisdividesintothree

separatethemesconstitutingatriumvirateargumentalongphilosophical,intellectual,and

historicallines.FirstwasthedevelopmentofideaswithinWesternsocietyandtheUS

Army,regardingspecificallyhowtheperceptionofhistoryevolved;secondcamethenature

oftechnologyanditsreciprocalrelationshipwithAmericanculture;lastwasthe

intellectualdevelopmentoftheUSArmyofficercorps.

Failurealmostalwayshassystemicexplanationsandinnaturerarelyistherea

singularcause.ThefailureoftheUSArmy,andspecifically,theofficercorpstodevelopthe

9RudiVolti,SocietyandTechnologicalChange(Macmillan,2005),6.10EdwinLayton,“Mirror-ImageTwins:TheCommunitiesofScienceandTechnologyin19th-CenturyAmerica,”TechnologyandCulture12,no.4(1971):576.

6

technologygenewasnottheconsequenceofanysingleactionorinaction.Itwouldappear

tobeone-thirdnatureandtwo-thirdsnurture:inheritanceimpartedaparticularmindset,

theenvironment,includinggeographycolludedtoprovidestructure,andideasaboutthe

natureofwaranimatedthegene-deficientcolossus.Historically,AmericanArmyofficers

havegenerallydemonstratedonlypassinginterestinmilitaryhistory,andhaveputagreat

dealmorefaithinthematerialtoolsofwar.11

ThisdissertationdrawsonvariousapproachesthatinfusedthecharacteroftheUS

ArmyofficercorpsandthevariouselementsthatamalgamatedintoanAmericanWayof

War.Iftheofficercorpsconstitutedapatient,itwouldbedifficulttoremoveanyofthe

vitalorganswithoutflat-liningthatpatient,norcouldonehopetodemonstrate,by

examiningtheorgansinisolation,whytheembryonictechnologygenedevelopedas

incompletelyasitdid.Likeaphysicianonemustunderstandhoweachaffectstheother-

contextuallyandhistorically.ThetypicalAmerican,likehisEuropeancounterpart,shares

certainphilosophicalmindsetsthatunderpinWesterncivilization.Time,progress,and

historyareideasthatareinterwovenandinterdependent,buttheyrequiretwopoints,

suchasthoseonamapthatallowonetotracethejourney.Inthestorybeingtoldherethe

traveleronthisjourneyistheofficercorps.

NiccolòMachiavelli(1469-1527)marksthestartpointforthisjourney.Secularand

ChristianvaluesdivergedinMachiavelli’smind.HewroteThePrincein1513,and

observedthepoliticalandmoralsphereswhiledemonstratingakeenperceptionofhuman

motivations.Machiavellibrokewithlongstandingtheologicalconceptsofhistory.12Time

11ColinS.Gray,IrregularEnemiesandtheEssenceofStrategy:CantheAmericanWayofWarAdapt?(Lulu.com,2006),32.12NiccolòMachiavelli,ThePrince(UniversityofChicagoPress,1998).

7

nolongerrepresentedacountdowntothereturnofChrist,butinsteadaprogression

towardapositiveifundefinedfuture.Thus,Machiavelliandlike-mindedthinkers

rationalizedpoliticsandgovernance.MoralitywasnolongerboundtotheChristianor

Socratictraditionbutinsteadassumedthemantleofwhatonedaywouldbecalled

Realpolitik.

Machiavellihadnoqualmswiththemotivationsofman,andtookthemforwhat

theywereratherthanforwhattheycouldbecome,orshouldbeintheAristotelianor

theologicalviewofself-actualization.Asformorality,Machiavelliobservedthatvaluesare

constitutedandjustifiedintheends.HismisgivingswerenotwithChristianvalues

themselves,butwiththeonesthathevalued,whichinthisearthlyparadisewerenotthose

ofheaven.Rationalizedgovernance,thegrowthofscience,andpropagationofknowledge,

abettedbytheprintingpress,aggravatedandenlargedthebreachbetweensecularrulers

andthechurch.However,withthisincreasedfreedomofthoughtcametheknowledgethat

therewerebetterways,entirelyun-divine,andyeteffective,ofearthlymodesofgoverning.

MachiavellisetmanonapaththatdivergedfromGodtowardsthatwhichmancould

control;thus,theintellectualpathclearedandallowedfortheprogressiveideasoflater

mentopropagate.OnehundredyearslaterDescartesfollowedinthepathblazedby

Machiavelli.

In1637,RenéDescartes(1596-1650)wroteADiscourseonMethod,buildingupon

therationalstructureerectedontheashesoftheologybyFrancisBacon’s(1561-1626)

scienceandMachiavelli’sutilitarianism.TheknowledgeoftheGreeks,oftheancients,could

onlysupporttheascensionofmansofar,andasachildmust“putawayhischildishways”

8

ashebecomesaman,sonowmankind,asaspecies,mustabandonhissimpleways.13

Descartesdiscoveredinmathematicsanorderandsymmetrythathefoundinvigorating:

Thelongchainsofsimpleandeasyreasoningbymeansofwhichgeometersareaccustomedtoreachtheconclusionsoftheirmostdifficultdemonstrations,hadledmetoimaginethatallthings,totheknowledgeofwhichmaniscompetent,aremutuallyconnectedinthesameway,andthatthereisnothingsofarremovedfromusastobebeyondourreach,orsohiddenthatwecannotdiscoverit,providedonlyweabstainfromacceptingthefalseforthetrue,andalwayspreserveinourthoughtstheordernecessaryforthedeductionofonetruthfromanother.14

Descartesbelievedthatmathematicscoulduncoverandtesttruth,thatthroughthe

useofmathematicsonecoulddiscoverthehiddenlinksthatconnectedeverythinginthe

universe.Thisconstitutedthekeythatrevealedwhereeachpieceofthepuzzlefit.Thus,

celestialelementsweretransposedintomathematicalones.Itwasnolongerthroughfaith

butthroughscienceandmathematics,thelightofDescartes,thatonewasabletodeduce

theinterconnectednessandtruthofthisworld.

Descartesapproachedproblemsfromthespecifictothegeneral(inductive),a

simpleandprofoundreversalofthenorm,whichallowedhimtobreakproblemsintotheir

divisibleparts.IfonebelievedinthegreatchainofbeingwithGodatthetop,thenone

reasonedtheconnectednessoflifefromthatlight,fromthetopdown.Thiswasnotthecase

forDescartes,andhisapproachfurnishedanintellectualperspectivethatrendereda

mechanisticviewoftheworldandopenedupthewayforadeeperunderstandingof

technologicaldevelopment.AntonioDamasioinDescartes’Error:Emotion,Reason,andthe

HumanBrain(2005)arguedthatsuchaperspectiveledDescartestobelievethatemotion

inhibitedreason,althoughcurrentneuroscience,accordingtoDamasio,indicatesthat

13ThomasNelson,HolyBible,NewKingJamesVersion(NKJV)(Nashville,TN:ThomasNelsonInc,2009),chap.1Corinthians13:11.14ReneDescartes,ADiscourseonMethod,ed.ErnestRhys,trans.JohnVeitch(NewYork:J.M.Dent&Sons,1916),16.

9

emotion,despiteflaws,iscrucialtoreasoning.15Nevertheless,Descartesassumedthe

worldfunctionedasagreatmachinethatcouldbeunderstoodifbrokendownintoits

divisibleparts,andifonecouldunderstandtheparts,thenonecouldreassembleand

understandthewhole.16TheseedsfortheEnlightenmentdevelopedinthefertileground

ofaCartesian-influencedintellectualtraditioninEuropeandwithinacenturytheideas

thereinreshapedthe[mindoftheWest].

Theemergenceofmodernscienceinthesixteenthcenturyformedfissuresinthe

intellectualfoundationofEurope,andaccordingtoHansEichnerinTheRiseofModern

ScienceandtheGenesisofRomanticism(1982),therapidandradicaldeparturesfrom

traditionalGreekandtheologicalconceptsusheredinanewunderstandingofthecosmos

andmans’placewithinit.NicholasCopernicusandJohannesKeplerrevolutionized

astronomy,IssacNewtonandGalileotransformedideasonplanetarymotion.The

propagationoftechnologicalmachines,includingtheclockandtelescope,beganto

produce,initiallyslowly,andthenwithincreasingspeedandauthority,thebeliefthat

worldfunctionedbymechanicalandmathematicallydeduciblelaws.Eichnernotedthatin

thisbeliefthatsomethingexceptionalandunprecedentedoccurredin“Westernthought”

between1500and1800.17

TheintellectualhistorianArthurO.LovejoyobservedthattheobjectiveofWestern

manwasa“…longefforttomaketheworldhelivesinappeartohisintellectarational

one.”18U.S.Armyofficersfindsuchanapproachparticularlyattractivesincetheworldthey

15AnthonyDamasio,Descartes’Error:Emotion,Reason,andtheHumanBrain(Penguin,2005),xii.16Descartes,ADiscourseonMethod,16.17HansEichner,“TheRiseofModernScienceandtheGenesisofRomanticism,”PublicationsoftheModernLanguageAssociationofAmerica,1982,8.18ArthurO.Lovejoy,TheGreatChainofBeing:AStudyoftheHistoryofanIdea(HarvardUniversityPress,2009),47.

10

inhabitisoneofchaos.Technologyprovidedofficersthetoolstolimitandminimizethe

unpredictabilityoftheirworld.Nevertheless,somemilitaryofficersintheearlynineteenth

centurythoughtthesolutionsresidedinamoreintrospectiveprocess.

Bildung,awordofGermanorigin,isbesttranslatedas“self-education.”Accordingto

ReinhartKoselleck,ithasatheologicalrootingimplyinga“transformationandrebirth,”a

salvationfromtheoldignorantselftotheenlightenedthroughself-reflection.19This

conceptisfoundationaltotheideaofmilitaryeducation,thecultivationanddevelopment

ofthemind.CharlesWhiteinTheEnlightenedSoldier(1989)foundthatwithinEuropetwo

broadconceptsofwaremerged.GerhardvonScharnhorst(1755-1813),aPrussianofficer,

facilitatedtheinculcationofBildungintomilitaryofficereducationtolaythefoundations

foroneofthemosteffectivemilitaryorganizations(somewouldsaycultures)theworld

haseverseen,thegeneralstaff.20Thisfertilegroundgavebirthtooneofthegreatest

militaryintellects,thatofCarlvonClausewitz.WhitearguedthatScharnhorstdiverged

fromthatwhichwascommoninofficereducationinEuropein1801byfocusinglessonthe

technicalandtechnologicalaspectsofwarfare.“Inthisregard,onlyPrussiaappearedtobe

awareofthebroaderscopeofwarfare.”21NapoleoncastashadowoverFrenchmilitary

thoughtandovertheAmericanofficercorps,andthus,bothdevelopedalongadifferent

pathfromthatofPrussia,placingafargreateremphasisonthecommanderand

engineeringexpertise.

19ReinhartKoselleck,ThePracticeofConceptualHistory:TimingHistory,SpacingConcepts(StanfordUniversityPress,2002),176–177.20CharlesEdwardWhite,TheEnlightenedSoldier:ScharnhorstandtheMilitärischeGesellschaftinBerlin,1801-1805,Kindle(Westport,CT:GreenwoodPublishingGroup,1989).21Ibid.,187.

11

Clausewitz’theoryofwarinOnWarcomprised“threetendencies…deeprootedin

theirsubjectandyetvariableintheirrelationshiptooneanother.”22Passion,reason,and

chancecomprisetheClausewitzian”trinity”ofwar.Thefirsttwoelementsareproductsof

thehumanmindandthelatterstandsindependentofman.Clausewitzbelievedthat

judgment,thedevelopingofintuition,andinsightformedthecornerstones,forwhichthere

isnosubstitute.23

Unlikeotherofficersofhistime,Clausewitzremainedreticent,evenhostile,tothose

thatchampionedtheviewthatwarcouldbebothcontrolledandmathematicallyreduced.

Clausewitzwasnotunawareofscientificdevelopments,andusedscientifictermssuchas

friction,magnetic,centerofgravity,andpolarityandtohelphimconceptuallyexplainhis

ideas.However,hisunderstandingofmanandwarwerebynomeansboundtoscience

theymerelyservedasconvenientwaystoconveytheconcepts.Theconceptofwar,similar

totechnology,requiredanuanceddefinition.Clausewitzsettledonthreeexplanationsto

conveytheconcept.Thefirstwas“warisnothingbutaduelonalargerscale”;second

asserted“waristhusanactofforcetocompelourenemytodoourwill”;thirdwas“war,

however,isnotheactionofalivingforceuponalifelessmass(totalnonresistancewould

benowaratall)butalwaysthecollisionoftwolivingforces.”24Takentogether,these

descriptionsprovideacontextualfoundationforunderstandingthenatureofwar.

Clausewitzlivedataturningpointinhistory.Warandthestudyoforganized

conflictcontributedtoanemergingprofessionalizationofthemilitaryinstitutionsofthe

era.SpreadbyFrencharms,nationalismignitedthroughoutEuropeandpowerfulideasof

22CarlvonClausewitz,OnWar(PrincetonUniversityPress,1989),89.23Ibid.,141,578.24Ibid.,75,77.

12

humanagencymotivatedindividualsandgroupstoachievenewheights.Humanist

philosopherIsaiahBerlinarguedthatsomethingprofoundtookholdoftheGermanicmind

between1760and1830anddiffusedfromthere.25Clausewitz,Prussianbybirth,lived,

fought,andwrotebetween1780and1831.Lovejoynoted,“itisoneoftheinstructive

ironiesofthehistoryofideasthataprincipleintroducedbyonegenerationintheserviceof

atendencyorphilosophicmoodcongenialtoitoftenprovestocontain,unsuspected,the

germofacontrarytendency-tobe,byvirtueofitshiddenimplications,thedestroyerof

thatZeitgeisttowhichitwasmeantominister.”26

TherearefewmorepowerfulexamplesofthisthantheRomanticMovement.This

movementrevoltedagainstthesubjugationoftheEnlightenment–thetyrannyofreason--

andproducedawhollynewconcept,onenolongerbasedentirelyontheobjective,the

ends,theresult,butonethatinsteadconsideredandvaluedintentandmotive.27Awarof

ideasproducedanentirelynewunderstandingoflifeandreality,awayofthinkingthat

untilthatmomentlaydormantwithinthemindofman.Certainlythesemovements

representtwoofthemostprofoundintellectualshiftsinhistory.Notably,however,there

wouldoccurathirdtransformationalparadigm.

Ideasareartifactsofthetimeandplacefromwhichtheyoriginate.Infusedwithlife

(becausetheyarehumancreations,)someevolvewhileothers,liketheculturesthey

represent,recedeintotheabyssoftime.Regardless,ideasarenotstatic;theyabut,

subsume,fuse,contradict,compliment,andproduceotherideas.Notallideasthatmen

choosetolivebyareequal,noraretheyallrelative.Theyrepresenthumanvalues;oneis

25IsaiahBerlin,TheRootsofRomanticism(PrincetonUniversityPress,2001),12.26Lovejoy,TheGreatChainofBeing,289.27Berlin,TheRootsofRomanticism,10–12.

13

definedbythevaluesthatanimateonetoact,thatareratifiednotonlyinthemind,butalso

intheheart;productsofone’stime,visibleandreflectedintheconsummatebeliefsofthe

individual,orcollectivelyinorganizationsandnations,theyarenonethelesslimitedbythe

lightoftheirage.

Onemaymeasuremenandwomenbytheirideas,culturesbytheircreationsand

statesbytheiractions.Collectively,somevaluepeace,otherstrade,andstillothers,

violence.Somerisetoempires,butothers,likeAthens,areconsumedintheprocess.Yet,

twomillenniahavenoteffacedThucydides’observationthathumanbeingsaremotivated

bygreed,honor,andfear.28Theseideas,thoughdistinct,oftenamalgamatetogovernand

defineactions.

Onecanunderstand,asGiambattistaVicoclaims,thatitispossibletolive,through

imagination,intheshadowsofanothercivilization;toknow,albeitimperfectly,whatitwas

tobeSpartan,tovaluewhattheyvalued,toperceivethroughPeloponnesianeyes,tohate

theAthenians.29Therearelimits,ofcourse,andthoughonecouldunderstand,onecould

notlivebytheircreed,forone’smindhasbeenshapedbythisworld.Yet,ifhistoryisnota

progression,ashiftfromimperfectiontoperfection,fromdisordertoorder,itis

nonethelessaccumulative.

Theideasofgrandfathershapedfather,andfatherson,andtheseideasaccumulate,

oneuponanother,toeventuallyproduce,toborrowfromThomasKuhn,aparadigmshift.30

Formillenniaonecouldpluckatravelerfromoneageandanachronisticallyplacehim

28RobertB.Strassler,TheLandmarkThucydides(SimonandSchuster,2008),43.Greedissometimestranslatedat“interest”or“profit.”29GiambattistaVico,NewScience(UnitedKingdom:PenguinBooks,1999),xii,xxii.30ThomasS.Kuhn,TheStructureofScientificRevolutions:50thAnniversaryEdition(UniversityofChicagoPress,2012).

14

hundredsofyearsintothefuturewiththeexpectationthatthetravelercouldfunction.Past

andpresent,thoughseparatedchronologicallybythousandsofyears,resembledeachother

morethannot.However,[theWesternmind]haschangedoverthelast300years,though

notattheneurologicallevel(whichwouldrequireatimescalevastlylongerthanisat

questionhere).Thischangeistheproductofnewideas,waysofthinking,andexisting.

TheEnlightenmentsweptthroughEuropeintheeighteenthcenturytransforming

howpeopleperceivedtheworldastraditionalandtheologicaldogmagavewaytoscientific

explanations.Empiricalevidenceandreasonbecamethecommoncurrency.Man,nolonger

dependentonGodforrevelation,coulddiscovertruthforhimself,throughhisown

observations.Gradually,butwithincreasingspeedandfrequency,onlycorporealthings

counted.Thereissomethingwithinman,inhisdeepestbeing,wherewordscannot

accuratelyorjustlythroughanylexiconpossiblyquantifytheessencethereof.Inthatplace

asparkignited,byandagainsttheEnlightenment,andfuryensuedoverEuropeaswhen

twoweatherfrontsoppositelychargedcollide.Thereafter,thesetwointellectual

movementsdefinedWesternthoughtforthenextthreehundredyears.31

FormillenniathelogicofPlato,Socrates,andChrist(asarticulatedbySt.Augustine)

guidedmen’smindstowardtruth.Thatsomewhere,someplace,somehow-through

enoughperseverance,discipline,andsacrificeonecoulddiscoverthecombinationtolife

thatwouldlaybarethesecretshiddenbythegods.Berlinclarifiedhispointthroughan

analogy.Asoldier,priortotheperiodinquestion,foughtfortruthasitappliedtoloyaltyto

hismonarch,prince,orfeudallord—theonlyrealtrueandauthenticGodwhosewillthe

lordpresumablyexecuted(i.e.thedivinerightofkings).Regardlessofwhoone’senemy

31IsaiahBerlinandHenryHardy,TheSenseofReality:StudiesinIdeasandTheirHistory(Macmillan,1998).

15

mayhavebeen,andwhateveronebelievedin,anenemysoldierdiedapointlessdeath

becausehefoughtforfalsetruthsanddeadgods(orfalseones,thusidentifyingenemiesas

heretics)32.Courage,accordingtoBerlin,remainedauniversallyrespectedattribute,but

howevercourageoustheenemysoldier,onedidnotreasonthathediedforanequallyvalid

truth,orevenforhisprinciples.Rather,oneadmiredhiscourageandpitiedthewasteof

suchtalentinsupportoffalseideas.However,“bythe1820syoufindanoutlookinwhich

thestateofmind,themotive,ismoreimportantthantheconsequence,theintentionis

moreimportantthantheeffect.”33Thus,fightingforone’sbeliefs,one’sprinciples,being

truetooneself,regardlessofwhatthosebeliefsconstituted,becamethemeasurementby

whichonewasdefined.Thisradicalintellectualdeparturerepresentedademarcation,

wherebyanindividualahundredyearspriortobeingtransportedto1820wouldhave

experiencedtremendouscognitivedissonance.

Overthevastexpanseofrecordedhumanhistorystretchingoverthelastfour

thousandyears,changefromonegenerationtothenextremainednearlyundetectable.

Father,son,andlaterprogenyallusedthesamewaterholes,hunted,fishedandlater

farmedinfamiliarlands.Toolsofthetrade,likewise,evolvedlittleovergenerations.Skills

andknowledgewerepassedfromonegenerationtothenextthroughoraltraditionsthis

constitutedthebedrockofhumanknowledge.Theveryideaofprogresswasalmostwholly

unknown.Measurablechange,thatis,changewithinthelifetimeofoneindividual,

appearedonlygraduallyinthefifteenthcentury.OnlywiththeIndustrialRevolutionwas

theperceptionoftime,forthefirsttime,emancipatedfromchainsofhumanendurance.

Labor,travel,andcommunicationwerenolongermeasuredinthecapabilityofsinewand32Berlin,TheRootsofRomanticism,9,10.33Ibid.,10.

16

blood,butofwheels,belts,andengines—andmeasuredwithtimepiecemachinesof

incredibleaccuracyandconsistency.ThesetimepieceseventuallyallowedtheEuropeans

toconquertheoceansaswellastime.34

Psychiatrist-NeurologistIainMcGilchristinMasterandhisEmissary:TheDivided

BrainandtheMakingoftheWesternWorld(2012)contendsthatthe“bihemispheric

structureofthebrain…‘renders’…twofundamentallyopposedrealities,twodifferent

modesofexperience….”35Thisaffectsnotjusthowonethinksabouttheworld,butindeed

howoneexperiencestheworld.McGilchristpointsoutthatthenothingisentirely

producedinonehemisphereortheother,butthatthetwoperceivetheworldinstarkly

differentterms.36Furthermore,McGilchrist’sprimarycontention,whichisimportantforits

relationshiptotechnology,isthattheWesternworldoverthelastfewhundredyearshas

favoredthedisposition(andprocessing)ofthelefthemisphere.37

Thelefthemisphereattendstothepartsratherthanthewholeandisresponsible

forfocusedattentionandanalysisonexaminingdetail.Itpreferstheinanimatetothe

animateandappearstotreatthingsastools,asmeanstoanend.Thegaininganduseof

power,theutilityofallobjects,actingonwhatitknows,andapreferenceforthe

mechanicalarealltraitsassociatedwiththelefthemisphere.38Muchoftheknowledge

gainedinrespecttothehemispherecomesfromresearchofpatientsthathaveexperienced

variouslevelsofleftorrightbraindamage,aswellasfromsophisticatedbrainimaging

technology.34DavaSobel,Longitude:TheTrueStoryofaLoneGeniusWhoSolvedtheGreatestScientificProblemofHisTime(BloomsburyPublishingUSA,2010).35IainMcGilchrist,TheMasterandHisEmissary:TheDividedBrainandtheMakingoftheWesternWorld(YaleUniversityPress,2012),3.36Ibid.,34.37Ibid.,6.38Ibid.,10,39,40,55,208,209.

17

Bycontrast,ifMcGilchristiscorrect,therighthemisphereprefersandistheprimary

mediatorofnewexperiences.Emotion,theabilitytoexperienceempathy,theabilityto

respondwithflexibleattention,difficultorcomplexpredictions,patternrecognitionanda

preferenceforthelivingareallcommonattributesoftherighthemisphere.Furthermore,

theoryofmind(theabilitytounderstandwhatothersmightbethinking)andasenseofthe

pastarebothcenteredintherighthemisphere.“Inhumans,justasinanimalsandbirds,it

turnsoutthateachhemisphereattendstotheworldinadifferentway…theright

hemisphereunderwritesbreadthandflexibilityofattention,wherethelefthemisphere

bringstobearfocusedattention.”39

Technologyisnotjustahumancreationthatextendsourabilitiesofhowwethink

aboutinformation,asAznardefinedit,butfollowingMcGilchrist’slogic,thenitisalsoa

facet,apreference,ofhowsomepeopleintheWestperceivetheworld.Thisperceptionis

aprismthatfavorstheleftovertherighthemisphere.Technologicalubiquityexacerbates

theproblemsofthemilitarymind.AlreadyconditionedbytheWesternmindsetto

deconstructproblemsintodiscreetparts,examiningandresolvingeachindividually,the

soldiertendsnottolookattheoverallsituation.

ColonelCharlesArdantduPicqservedintheFrenchArmyandwaskilledin1870by

aPrussianshell.Asasoldierandatheorist,duPicqexaminedancientandmodernwarfare

todeducewhatcouldbelearnedfromtheformerandappliedtothelatter.Inhiswork

BattleStudies(1880),publishedafterhisdeath,duPicqobservedthataconstantinwardid

exist--humannature.Ancientmanandmodernmanwerebothmotivatedbyfearandpride

accordingtoduPicq.However,themodernbattlefieldrequiredmorepreparation,because

39Ibid.,27.Brainscanningindicatesapreferenceforlivingobjectsintherighthemisphere.

18

ittaxedthesensestolevelsunknowninantiquity.40DuPicqnotedthatotherfactors,such

asorganizationandstructure,areimportantelementsintheformulatocreatecohesion

andmotivationwithintheunit,andthereisasciencetothis,butthosethatplacethe

greateremphasisonnumbersandsciencemisstep.41Inthisrespect,duPicqdidnot

conformtotraditionalFrenchmodesofthoughtonwar,buthiscombatexperience

informedhistheories,andasaresulthearrivedatacloserapproximationtowar’s

realities.

Theincreasedtempoofmodernlifehaschangedone’sperceptionofhistoryand

time,accordingtoKoselleckinThePracticeofConceptualHistory(2002).Heclaimsthat

historyhaseffectivelyceasedtomatterinaworldofrapidandcontinuouschange.

Koselleckexpressestheconceptwithclaritynoting,“traditionsarenolongerpasseddown

butareretrospectivelyestablished;anyfutureisnewlyopenedupwithouttheknowledge

ofhistoricalBildungoftheindividualaswellasofthesociety-beinglostasacontinuous

process.”42Thus,overtime[theWesternmind]hasfoundhistoryoflessandlessvalue,and

placinggreatervalueonthatwhichhasdisplacedhistory--technicism.Thesocialtremors

createdbytechnologyarefrequentlyreferredtoasrevolutionary,butinpractice,omitting

theoccasionaloutliers,thelargestsocialchangesareintellectualandorganizational.The

frequentassumptionamongofficersisthateverynewwidgethasthepotentialto

revolutionizewar.Instead,themostsignificantrevolutionmightbetheaggregative

assumptionoftheseerrors.Inotherwords,ifabeliefisenduring,prevalent,andpowerful

40CharlesJeanJacquesJosephArdantduPicq,BattleStudies:AncientandModernBattle,trans.JohnN.GreelyandRobertC.Cotton(NewYork,NY:Macmillan,1921),94–100.41Ibid.,148.42Koselleck,ThePracticeofConceptualHistory,197.

19

enoughthennoamountoftraining,reeducation,andrehabilitationisgoingtogetoneany

closuretoreality.

TheinherentriskforU.S.Armyofficersisthattheaboveprocessleadstoevaluation

basedonartificialandsunderedsituations.Falseassumptions,fabricatedrealities,and

faultyreasoningcoloredtheprismthroughwhichofficersperceivedtheworld.Thus,they

arrivedinoneshortintellectualleapfromaprocessthatledfromcontroloftheinanimate

totheanimate.Ifonecancontrolandmanagemachinesforefficiencythencertainlysimilar

methodscanbeemployedwithpeople.Socialengineeringemergedasthe“science”to

makepossiblecontrolofhumanrawmaterial.ThisperceptionformedtheArmyprismand

ensuredthateachsituationpresentedasimilarhue,eachpremisehadacorresponding

proclivity,andeachsolutionalikeanswer.

ForanumberofreasonstheU.S.Armyofficercorps[circa1800]wasespecially

susceptibletothislineofreasoning.First,theU.S.Armyofficercorpslackedthelong-

standingtraditionsofestablishedmilitariesinothernations.Nodoubttherearebenefitsto

youthfulness,butthelackofculturalmaturity,remainsaproblemtothepresent.Second,

thegeographicallocationoftheUnitedStatesimputedapracticalitytotheAmerican

characterthatplacedapremiumonaction.Third,theNorthAmericancontinentprovided

theU.S.Army,inmanyways,anartificialenvironment.UnlikeEuropeannations,oreven

thoseinEastAsia,theAtlanticandPacificoceansprovidedwalls,ageographicalbarrier

thatminimizedthreatsandtheneedtothinkdeeplyaboutwar.Incomparison,Germany’s

centralpositionwithinEuropenecessitatedacompletelydifferentmilitaryculture.Here

militarycompetencedefinedsurvival.Ifnothingelse,onecouldnotspurnthemilitaryarts,

onemight‘getit’wrong,butonedidnotsimplyignoreit.Clausewitznotes,“…theoryand

20

experiencemustneverdisdainorexcludeeachother;onthecontrarytheymustsupport

eachother.”43[However,intheinstanceoftheArmy,thedistortion,theexclusion,though

notwillfulneverthelesstranspired.]TheFrenchexperiencedsomethingsimilar,aself-

inflictedwound,buttheirmyopiawasintellectual.TheU.S.apathyregardingmilitary

mattersresultedfromgeographic,intellectualandtechnologicalfactors,andperhapsa

generalpovertyofimagination.

AmorecomplexphenomenonaffectedtheintellectualstructureoftheU.S.Army

officercorpsfollowingWorldWarI.Thetotalityofthisintellectualshiftwasnottheresult

ofanysingleagentbutrathertheconvergenceofamultitudeofproximatecausesand

influences.Beginninginthemid-nineteenthcenturyandculminatingintheseconddecade

ofthetwentiethcenturytechnologyandhistory,communicationandexperienceappeared

tohavefundamentallychangedfromallprevioushumanexperience.Time,similarto

geography,hasaubiquitousqualitythatpowerfullyinfluencesone’sperceptions,butthe

natureofthatquality,likeyeast,implicitlyleavenstheworldwheretheeffectislargely

unseenandyetpronounced.

Time,andman’sunderstandingofit,changedoverthelastseveralthousandyears.

InantiquitytheGreeksimaginedtimeasagodthat“draggedallthingsintoaceaseless

flux.”Later,theideaoftimeinvolvedintotherealmofperfectionorideas,andtherealmof

decay;thatwhichbelongedtothegodsandthatinwhichmanexisted.Theideaoftime

continuedtoprogressandby1690JohnLockesuccinctlydefineditas,“durationisbutasit

werethelengthofonestraightlineextendedininfinitum,notcapableofmultiplicity,

variationorfigure,butisonecommonmeasureofallexistencewhatsoever,whereinall

43Clausewitz,OnWar,61.

21

things,whisttheyexitequallypartake.”44Thus,timeisanywhereandeverywherethe

sameforallindividualsinallcircumstances.Theidearemainedrelativelystableuntila

youngscientisttwohundredyearslateradvancedanewtheory.

In1905,AlbertEinsteinpublished“OntheElectrodynamicsofMovingBodies”

followedbyGeneralRelativityin1915wherebyhepostulatedthattimewasrelative,thus

disprovingtheclassicalNewtoniantheoryoftimeassomethingwithaconstantvelocity

andvector.Andforphysicists,timeisobjectivelyrelative.45However,fortheofficer,

politicianandcitizen,perceptionrendersadifferentreality.Theclassicaltheoryoftime,for

theseagents,remainedasvalidasthedayNewtonfirstdescribedit.

One’sperceptionoftimeandspacealteredwithtechnologicaladvances.Perhaps,

nothingexercisedsopowerfulaninfluenceonthemindasthelocomotiveinthenineteenth

century.Thesteelbeastslookedtobeofanotherworld,andnexttothemechanicalclock,

withitsgrowingpopularity,encompassedthespiritofanage.Itisnoaccidentthat

Einstein’sthoughtexperimentthatresultedinthetheoryofrelativityusedthemost

powerfulandubiquitousexampleofmoderntechnologyinhistime--thetrain.

Time,fundamentally,isthemeasurementofmotion,andthushasnotobjectively

changed,thoughman’sinterpretationandunderstandingoftimehas.46Timeoriginally

measured,atleastintheWest,fromonehumaneventtothenext,oritcounteddowntothe

endoftimewiththereturnofChrist.Notuntilthesecularizationofthestateand

44G.J.Whitrow,“TimeandMeasurement,”inDictionaryoftheHistoryofIdeas,ed.PhilipP.Wiener,vol.IV(CharlesScribner’sSons,1973),389,391,404.45AlbertEinstein,Relativity:TheSpecialandtheGeneralTheory(AndrasNagy,2010).46GyorgyBuzsaki,RhythmsoftheBrain(OxfordUniversityPress,2006),8.

22

divergencefromthechurchdidonebegintomeasuretimeandthinkofitasprogress

towardsomethingimprovedratherthanacountdowntotheend.47

HistorianLewisMumfordalludedtoachangethattookplaceintheWesternmind

withtheadvent,spread,andeventuallyubiquityoftheclock.Theclock,forMumford,

representsaseparationandabstractionoflife,andthoughalltimeisbasedonsome

measurementofmotionorplanetaryrotations,itsmeasurementisthefirststeptoward

humanservitude,oftheliving,theanimate,beingsubordinatetothemechanicaland

inanimate.Previously,theseasons,dayandnightorderedmuchofhumanity.48Timecan

nowbeaccuratelyobserved,timecanbesaved,lifecanbeorganized,ordered,bytheclock,

inshort,onebeginsthinkingintime.49

Theubiquityoftechnologyservedasafurtherabstractionfromreality,boththen

andnow,becauseitdisassociatesanddivideslife.Itfavorstheparticular,thespecific,over

thewhole,thegestalt.Technology,initsvariousforms,generallyenhancescontrol;in

manywaysitprovidesathinveneerofauthorityoverreality.However,realitycomprises

chaosmorethanorder;chanceisboundupinthesystemitself.Thus,perceptionand

realitydivergewidelybetweenthatwhichcanandcannotbecontrolled.

Technology,definedasa“toolthatextendsone’sabilities”,50assumedashifting

placeinthehumanexperience.Dataarenotjustzerosandones,orspearsandhammers,

butalso,mostimportantly,andmorecommonly,information.51Assuch,technologydoes

notdefinewhatitistobehuman,butitdoesreflect,ifonlyinpart,whatitistobehuman.

47Koselleck,ThePracticeofConceptualHistory,106,120.48Ibid.,102.49LewisMumford,TechnicsandCivilization(UniversityofChicagoPress,2010),14.50Aznar,TechnologyChallenged,11.51Ibid.,24.

23

Nevertheless,acomplexrelationshipexistsbetweenmanandtechnology,makingit

difficulttoseparatethetwo.Technologyisanexpressionofhumanthought.One’sintellect,

ideasandcreativityaremadeconcretethroughit.Thereisconfusioninhowonethinks

abouttheroleandpurposeoftechnology,becausetechnologynaturallyextendsour

abilities;therefore,itcanandoftendoesassumeasenseofprogress,potential,and

capability.

Theanimateandtheinanimate,manandtechnology,makeupasymbiotic

relationshipwitheachaffectingtheother,buttheyarenotequalnoraretheyalways

amiablepartners.52Peoplethinkabouttechnologydifferently,andsometimesthesame

people,atdifferenttimes,thinkaboutitdifferently.Certainly,theyoungFrenchinfantry

officerof1914viewedtechnologyradicallydifferentlyifheremainedalivein1919.The

Americanmilitarytraditionperceivedtechnologyasbothmeansandend,asatoolto

minimizechance,andtocontrolit—notastheself-inflictedwoundthatouryoungFrench

officerin1919mighthaveperceived.

Armyofficersthuscametobesubsumedinatechnologicalenvironment,aprocess

thatgainedconsiderablemomentuminthefirsthalfofthetwentiethcentury.Itis,

however,worthnotingthattechnologyonlyextendstheabilitiesalreadyinherentinthe

individualandorganization--perhapsabanalobservation,butafundamentally,and

frequentlyoverlookedfact.Consequently,nearlyeveryproblemappearedtohavea

technologicalsolution.Successandfailurewerepredicatedoncorrecttoolselectionto

achievethedesiredoutcome.Themostobviouscurrentdayexampleofthisisthemilitary

targetingprocesscontainedinU.SArmydoctrineisknownas“d-cubedalpha”—decide,

52McGilchrist,TheMasterandHisEmissary,6.

24

detect,deliver,assess.53Waraddsmorelayerstoanalreadychaoticsystem.Oneisleftwith

aprofoundlyunstablesituation,onewhichisoverlaidwithsystemsofsystemsthatattempt

tobalancecountlessvariablesthroughtechnologicalsolutionstocomplexhuman

challenges.Theimpetusforperceivingtheworldinthislightmaybeasmuchafunctionof

experienceasofphysiology.

TheU.S.ArmyfollowsconceptssuchastheMilitaryDecisionMakingModel(MDMP)

andDesign,bothofwhicharemodelsforcontrollingandmanagingvariables.54Chaos,

frictionandfogofwarareallfactorsthat,giventherightmodel,canbemitigatedor

minimized.McGilchristfoundthat“thelefthemispherebuildssystems,wheretheright

doesnot.”55Thisisnottoarbitrarilyarguethatsystems,models,andprocessesarenot

withoutgreatvalue,butwithgrowingconfidenceandgreaterconvictiontheU.S.Army

officershavelaidtoomuchatthefeetofthisidol.Somemilitarymindsresistedthis

temptation.

Clausewitzhardlysparedawordfortechnology,notbecausehewasunawareofits

existence,orevenimportance.Healsodispensedwithantiquity,notforlackofcuriosity,

butbecausehegraspedthegrowingdistancebetweenantiquityandthepresentatthe

lowerlevelsofwar,animplicitacknowledgementofachangeintheconductofwarover

time.Expandingperspectiveupandouttothestrategiclevel,Clausewitzsidelined

technology,becauseheunderstooditstemporalnatureforthisreasonhisworkisnotfixed

intime,butaimedatthehumanvaluesoutlinedbyThucydidesandMachiavelli.For53DepartmentoftheArmy,FieldManual3-60(FM6-20-10):TheTargetingProcess,2010,http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/dr_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_60.pdf.54DepartmentoftheArmy,FieldManual101-5:StaffOrganizationAdnOperations,1997,http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/doctrine/genesis_and_evolution/source_materials/FM-101-5_staff_organization_and_operations.pdf;DepartmentoftheArmy,ArmyDoctrineReferencePublication5-0,2012,http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/dr_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adrp5_0.pdf.55McGilchrist,TheMasterandHisEmissary,228.

25

Clausewitz,asforhispredecessors,warwaspreeminentlyahumanphenomenonandall

otherfacets,characteristics,andelementsofwarplayedsupportingroles.

Fortheofficer,thestudyofhistoryandthehumanities,anunderstandingof

Romanticismforexample,allowthemindtopenetrateandgraspthenuancesand

contextualfactorsthateludestaticandexplicitanalysis.Militaryhistoryisnotmerelythe

collectionoffactsandfigures,armsandarmor,tacticalandoperationalengagements,the

actionsofgreatmenandlesser,orvictoriousempiresandconqueredones.Instead

militaryhistoryisa“pasture”forreflectionandimagination,notastorefulloftools.

Rather,andoffargreaterimportance,itconveysandinforms,notjustatananalyticalbuta

vastlymorepowerfulintuitivesense;anunderstandingofmanandthepropensityof

events.56Suchanunderstandingisindispensableforthemilitaryofficer.Iftheintentof

waris“tocompelourenemytodoourwill”tosuperimposethevictor’sintentonthatof

thevanquished,thenthemindshapedbyanunderstandingofhistoryisessential.

Overrelianceontechnologicalsolutionsdemonstratesashallowunderstandingofmanand

war.

Clausewitzprovidedfurtherclarityinrespecttothemilitarymind:“theinsights

gainedandgarneredbythemindinitswanderingsamongbasicconceptsthattheorycan

provide...itcangivethemindinsightintothegreatmassofphenomenaandoftheir

relationships,thenleaveitfreetoriseintothehigherrealmsofaction.”57Themind,as

Clausewitzdescribedit,isnotboundtoorbytheory,doctrine,orexplicitboundaries.

Ratherheconveysafreedom,a“wandering”andthatbythisapproach,andbynoother

method,doesoneachievethezenithofmilitarythought.56Tzu,TheArtofWar,92–93.57Clausewitz,OnWar,578.

26

Berlinbelievedthat“…wearechildrenofbothworlds..,”bothoftheEnlightenment

andRomanticism,“…butatthesametime–andtotheextenttheromanticethosistrue–

arethepersonswhomoststronglyemphasizedtheunpredictabilityofallhumanactivity.”58

Theofficer’smindsetisonthemechanical,thetechnological,thetools.Hisfocusisalltoo

easilydrawntopossibilitiesforcontrolandthusrisksthelossofanunderstandingof,the

unpredictabilitythatunderlieshumanactivity.

Clausewitznotedthattheoryandrealityshouldneverdisdaineachother,which

leavesonetobelievethathemusthaveexperiencedsuchdivergenceonmultiplelevelsand

onnumerousoccasions.59ThemostcommondefinitionofwarofthemanythatClausewitz

providedis“waristhusanactofforcetocompelourenemytodoourwill.”60‘Ourwill’isa

concept,anidea,astatethatisabsentinthepresent,thoughdesiredinthefuture.Hitler’s

andStalin’sbeliefswerenotcompatiblewiththisconcept,fortheendsofeachrequiredthe

submissionorannihilationoftheother.Warisforemostaconflictofideas.However,the

conflictofideasthatnecessitatewarisnotwar.One’sreasonsforwagingwaroughttobe

separatefromthemeansbywhichonewagesit.

“Thereare,inmyview,twofactorsthat,aboveallothers,haveshapedhuman

historyinthiscentury[20th],”Berlinobserved.“Oneisthedevelopmentofthenatural

sciencesandtechnology…theother,withoutdoubtconsistsinthegreatideologicalstorms

thathavealteredthelivesofvirtuallyallmankind.”61Whatisprogress,ifitexists,andhow

doesonegoaboutmeasuringit?Isitmeasuredinchronology,intechnological

58Berlin,TheRootsofRomanticism,141,147.59Clausewitz,OnWar,61.60Ibid.,75.61IsaiahBerlinandHenryHardy,TheCrookedTimberofHumanity:ChaptersintheHistoryofIdeas(VintageBooks,1992),1.

27

development,inscientificachievement,intheemancipationofmantowardindividual

freedom,intheabatementofhumansuffering,inpeace?Orisitamarchtowardorderthat

beganinearnestwiththeEnlightenment?Afterall,accordingtoBerlin,theonethingthat

theEnlightenmentdenied,initstotality,wastheChristianfaith.Menareborngood,orat

leastmorallyneutral.Withpropermoldingandnurturing,theycanandwillrisetonew

levels,theywillprogress.62ScienceandrationalityconspiredtoslaytheHobbesianbeast.

Greatmindsbelievedthatwiththedeathofmonarchiesandtheriseofrepublicsofvirtue,

warwouldwithtime,effort,andperseverancebeevictedfromhumanmemory.63Suchwas

nottobethecase.

IftheWesternworldistheheirtotwointellectualtraditions,therearefacetsor

spectrawithineach.Ifmaniscapableofactsofbothdepravityandsacrifice,itseemsthat

theEnlightenmentandRomanticism,beinghumancreations,areequallysoimbued.

Technology,however,didnotentertheconsciousnessofmanasadriverofhuman

progressuntiltheIndustrialRevolution.Theawarenessoftechnology,liketheintellectual

shiftinauguratedbyRomanticism,beganasanopaque,intuitivefeeling.Thisfeelingwasat

theedgesofhumankind’sconsciousness,whereonewasmindfulthatsomethingisthere,

thatsomehowthingsarechanging,butunabletoarticulatethespecificnatureofwhatwas

changing.IftheEnlightenmentandRomanticmovementsconsumedmanwithorwithout

hisconsent,sothendidtechnology.Technologyisnotanintellectualmovementinthe

samewaythattheothertwoemphasizewaysofthinkingandbeing,fortheyareboth

purelyintellectualframeworksuponwhichonmayact,yettheimpulseiswhollycognitive.

Theyarespiritual,moralmovementswithallthepowerandresolutionofareligion.62IsaiahBerlin,AgainstTheCurrent:EssaysintheHistoryofIdeas(RandomHouse,2012),20.63AzarGat,WarinHumanCivilization(OxfordUniversityPress,2008),510.

28

Technology,atitsmostfundamentallevel,“extendsone’sabilities.”Thus,itisboth

anetherealproductofthemind,andsomethinglateractualizedinthephysicalrealm.

Thoughithasnoinherentmoralorspiritualqualitiesitisnonethelessanimatedbysuch

impulses.Inmanyways,andperhapsthisisMumford’sactualizedfear,manfoundhimself

subtlysubduedbythepromiseofprogress.Insomemanneroranother,technologywould

reducetheburdenslifeplaceduponhumankind.Throughtime-reducing,muscle-saving,

thought-minimizingtechnology,civilizationwouldprogress;andman,withhisburdens

reduced,couldfocushiseffortsonthebettermentofhisfellowkinregardlessofrace,

religionorcreed.Thisphilosophicalbelieforinclinationhaspenetratedthepsycheofthe

Armyofficer—itisthemedium,theculture,inwhichthearmyexistsandacts.

Punctuatedequilibrium,oftenusedinconjunctionwithexplainingthetheoryof

evolution,mayaptlybeappliedtothetechnologicalworld.Thegradualandsteady

evolutionoftechnologythroughouthistorysuddenlyexplodedintheseventeenthcentury.

Thiswaslikelytheresultoftheprintingpress,whichacceleratedthedisseminationand

accumulationofinformation.Thedangerisnotthatinformationisincreasingtooquickly

ortowardsomekindofsingularity,butthatitappearstobethedomainwithinwhichthe

vastmajorityoforganizations,institutions,bureaucracies,governments,andofprimary

importance,U.S.Armyofficersassumethesolutionsreside.Itcantakemanyforms,often

usingmoretechnologytosolvetheproblemcreatedbymoretechnology,moreprocessto

controlotherprocesses,morerulestoaugmentcurrentrules,andmorelawstorectifyold

laws.Forexample,theintroductionofcomputerstothebattlefieldprovidedmore

informationandincreasedlethality,butitalsoengendered,amongotherfactors,a

targetingsolutionmindset.Aby-productoftechnologyimmersionistheillusionofcontrol

29

andspeciouscontextualunderstanding,onebelievestheyperceiveandknowtoafar

greaterdegreethantheyactuallydo.

Theincreasedtempoofdailyactivity,particularlythemilitarythinker’sdesireto

operatewithintheenemy’sdecision-makingcycle,elevatedtimetoapremium.Officersare

trainedtoexecutemethods,processes,andsystemsthatiffollowedtheoreticallyproduce

anacceptablemilitarysolution.ErichvonManstein,theGermanofficerwhoplannedthe

invasionofFrancein1940andsentthepanzersthroughtheArdennesforest,believedthat

logicalmilitarysolutionswereobvioustobothfriendlyandenemycommandersalike.

Therefore,intellectualsurpriseisonlyachievedwhenonestrikeswhereleastexpected,

andintheGermancasein1940,thatthrusttraversedthe“impenetrableArdennes.”Oneof

thegreatestmilitaryvictoriesinhistorywasproducedbyamindthatexploredthe

impracticable.64

Bellicosity,inwhateverformsittakes,frequentlytrendstowardthemostnatural

humaninstinct--imitation.65Thus,conflictnotonlyescalatestowardsextremes,as

Clausewitznotes,butalsotowardasortofchaoticequilibrium;technologicalasymmetrical

advantagesvanish,allthemoresogiventheinstantaneoustransmissionofinformationin

thedigitalage,allthatremains,theonlyasymmetricadvantageonemayhavethatcannot

becaptured,mimicked,orduplicatedisthecultivatedmindwithitsintellectualagility,

toleranceforrisk,andcontextualunderstanding.Thedevelopmentofthecultivatedmind

isaslow,arduous,aqualitativeprocess.Technicism,technocracy,technologicaldriven

thought--whateverformittakes-,bycontrast,oftenproducesasystematic,linear,and

64Karl-HeinzFrieserandJohnT.Greenwood,TheBlitzkriegLegend:The1940CampaignintheWest(USNavalInstitutePress,2005),69.65McGilchrist,TheMasterandHisEmissary,248.

30

superficialprocessthatfailstopenetratethecomplexitiesthatexistoutsideofthe

controllablevariables.

ThefocusontechnologybyofficersandArmyeducationalinstitutionshasproduced

ashallowandcircumscribedmentality.ThisisespeciallyreflectedbytheU.S.Army’s

institutionalpreferencefortraining.Traininghasmanybenefits,whichhavebeen

exploredandexploitedwithindustriousefficiency;however,itsdangersarelessclearly

understood.Trainingappealstothemodernmilitarybureaucracybecausetechnology-

focusedsystemsorprocessarelogicalandthereforeonecanquicklytrainotherstouse

technologyandthenexploittechnologyitselftodothetraining.Tempoisthussustained

throughtherelationshipoftrainingandtechnologyallofwhichcanbequantifiableand

thereforemeasurableandintheend,monetarilyjustifiable.

Thepervasivenessoftechnologyhasafurtherbyproduct:reducingthedepthand

breadthofanofficer’sthoughtprocess.Onecannowdomorethingsinlesstime(not

necessarilybetterbutfaster),andasthefamiliartruismofStalinholds,quantityhasa

qualityallitsown.Superficialsolutionstocomplexproblems,augmentedbytechnology,

createsasinistercyclethatbedevilshumankind’severyattempttosolveproblemsby

creatingmore.LewisMumforddescribeditbest:“…Scientistscreatedahabitofmind

favorabletodiscretepracticalinventions:atthesametimeitwashighlyunfavorabletoall

thoseformsofartforwhichthesecondaryqualitiesandtheindividualreceptorsand

motivatorsoftheartistwereoffundamentalimportance.”66Mumfordaimedhiswordsat

thephysicalscientistsandtheirhabitsofthoughtthatexcludetheunquantifiable,andhis

66Mumford,TechnicsandCivilization,51.

31

warninghasbeenfullyrealizedinthemoderntechnologicalworld.War,afterall,ismore

artthansciencebecausetherearetoomanyvariablesforonepersonorsidetocontrol.

Theintellectualshiftprecipitatedbytechnologydidnottouchsocietyequallyfor

somesectorsexperiencedradicalshiftswhileotherswerelessaffected.Whatdidoccur,

throughgreatercentralizationofthestateapparatusmadepossiblebytechnological

advancements,wasamassivegrowthofindustrytosupportthestatebymeansofthe

militarystrengththroughacyclicalrelationship,eachsupportingandreinforcingtheother.

AccordingtoMumford,thearmyofLouisXIVmade,“thefirstlarge-scaledemandfor

absolutestandardization[of]goods.”67Thearmyandintellectualcadre,theofficercorps,

notonlydemandedthestandardizationofgoods,butfrequentlyalsothestandardizationof

thought.FewWesternofficercorpsacrosstimehavepaidmorethanlipservicetotheidea

ofvaluingdissentofthought.Thisis,inpart,becausemilitarycommandinbattlerequiresa

quicktop-downsystem,incontrast,militaryinnovationrequiresjusttheopposite.

ReturningtoBerlin’sanalogyofhowsoldiershavewrestledwithideasfromthe

Enlightenmentthroughthe19thcentury,soldiersfoundthatstrengthinthefaceofalmost

certainlossconstitutedarequisiteelementforsuccessonthebattlefield.Moralecannotbe

quantified.Itdefiesmeasurement,iteludescapture,andexistsandmotivatestheliving.It

isvisibletothehumaneye,but,asArdantduPicqobserved,notalleyesperceiveit,though

itpenetrateseventhehardesthearts.68

TheWesternofficersofthesixteenththroughtheearlytwentiethcenturywere

definednot,asonemaysuspect,bytheirdifferences,butratherbytheirremarkable

similarity.Officercorpsduringthisperioddevelopedorganicallyfrompeculiarformsof67Ibid.,92.68ArdantduPicq,BattleStudies,118–129.

32

autocracies,republics,aristocracies,andoligarchies.Diversehistorical,social,political,

religiousandeconomicfactorscoloredtheoutlooks,liketheuniforms,oftheseofficers,

and,perhapsnotsurprisingly,theydemonstratedafairlyhomogenousunderstandingof

war.Essentialfeaturessuchasdiscipline,morale,andleadershipideasrevivedfromthe

RomanEmpirebreathednewlifeintomilitaryaffairsintheEuropeansphere.

Romanticismbirthedtheideaofplurality;however,anunderstandingofmotiveand

intent,ofotherwaysofbeing.Piercedmilitaryideasofstandardizationandmechanization

ofmanandonceagainawakenedthepowerofthewill.Napoleonbroughtlifeandvigorto

theconceptof“popularwill”thatheretoforehadbeenunknown.Forthenexttwohundred

yearstheNapoleonicmodeldominated,andinmanywaysitsinfluenceliveson.The

intellectualpenetrationofRomanticismintothemilitaryprofession,however,tookhold

onlyinpart--acceptingtheviolent,unrefined,andpassionate,whilerejectingoutofhand,

pluralityofthought.Fascismcouldfurnishnofinerexampleofthisdistortion.One-wayof

being,thinking,andbelievingpermeatedtheThirdReich.Celebratingtheheroic

individual,thesingularityofthecause,thepowerofthewillensured-–despiteallodds—

ultimatevictory.“Thelightsofpervertedscience”asChurchillwarned,amalgamatedwith

thespiritofRomanticismfromwhenceitwasbornintheheartofGermany,togivebirthto

oneofthemostterriblyviolent,destructiveandpowerfulforcestoeveranimatemenand

womentoaction.

Timeforthosecaughtupinmassmovementsassumesanimmortalquality,andthe

presentceasestomattertotheindividualsoraptured.Thepastprovidesthejustification

tofuelthepassions,andrecklessabandon,cavalierinclinations,andindifferencetodeath

arecommonlysharedattributes.Enormousnumbersofhumanbeingsrevoltedagainstthe

33

technicismandlimitations.Theirresponsewasperhapsdrivenbyadesiretohave

purpose,toachievesomesortofimmortality.Themechanicalandtechnologicalimpulses

ofWesternculturecontinuetoconstrainthehumanwill.Thesefrustrationsfindreleaseon

thebattlefieldswherethespiritandmachineduelforsupremacy.Nowhereisthismore

evidentthanwiththehorrorsofWorldWarI.

TheFirstWorldWarappearedtohavedealtamortalblowtothewillasthepivotal

elementofwarfare.Ëlandiedthirteenmillionsdeaths,takingintotheitsembracemen

thatwouldneverwalkagainandothersnevernormally.ThekillingfieldsofWestern

Europedemonstratedthatthedeterminationtoadvanceagainsttheoddscouldnot

succeedinthefaceofmodernfirepower.TheNapoleonicmodel,whichstumbledat

Waterloo,succumbedtoitswoundsattheSomme.TheheroiclegacyofSpartanfortitude

whilesurroundedandtrappedonanislandattheBattleofSphacteriaagainstthe

Atheniansandthesacrificeofthe300attheBattleofThermopylaewitheredinthemud

YpresandVerdun.Thisunbrokenlineageofcourageandbravery–theapotheosisof

soldiering-endeditstwomillennialreignbycedingitspowertothemachine.

Historymatteredmuchbecauseitchangedsolittle.Humansarebytheirnature

historicalcreatures.Pastexperiencesareusedtoextrapolateapotentialfuture--thereby

allowingonetotakeactiontoensurefuturesurvival.History,whetherpersonalor

collective,canprovidethedatatounderstandtrends.Onewhounderstandscurrent

propensitiesisnotguaranteedsurvivalorsuccess,butdoingsodefinitelyincreasesthe

oddsinone’sfavor.

Therelevanceofmilitaryhistoryseemedtobeinquestionbythelatenineteenth

century.ThepastandpresentdivergedonbattlefieldspriortoandafterWorldWarI,at

34

leastsuperficially,andtheevidenceofmillionsofdeadconvincedmanyofficersthat

somethinghadnowcertainlychanged.Forthefirsttimeinmilitaryhistorytechnologyhad

apparentlyeclipsedthehumanelementasthedecisivefactorinwar.Thus,thepotent

intellectualshiftthatBerlindiscussedproducedasiblingthatinmanywaysyielded

comparableconviction.Forthemilitaryofficer,technologydecisivelydisplacedman.Just

astheEnlightenmentsweptawaytraditionalconceptionsofChristianity,tradition,andthe

qualitative;technologysweptawayhumanmoralprimacywithsterile,dispassionate

materialfactors.

In1949,JosephCampbellinTheHerowithaThousandFacesfoundthatacrossall

culturesandcivilizationsthemostthought-provokingfacetoftheheroicformula,of

mythology,wasnotthedifferences,butthesimilarities.69GeorgeLucascitedCampbell’s

workasoneofthemostimportantinfluencesindevelopingStarWars.Thehero’sjourney

thatCampbellabstractedistheexacttropethatLucasusedtostructuretheStarWarsfilms.

Likewise,StevenSpielberghascitedCampbellasasourceofinspirationforhisworks.

Thesedirectorswentontodevelopstoriesthataresomeofthemosticonicand

commerciallysuccessfulinhistory,buttheydrewfromanancientblueprint.

Campbell’sfindingsechoedthoseofLovejoyandBerlinthatvaluesarefinite,that

theredonotexistaninfinitenumberofvalues,thattheseheroes,heroesoftheEastand

thoseoftheWest,soughtanexperience,apassage,whichreflectedvaluesifnotinthe

detailsmostcertainlyintheiressence.Thus,Thucydidesisnotinerror,butmostcertainly

struckthecruxofthematter.History,inthebroadstrokes,sharesfamiliarhuesbecause

theheroes–whatmenaspireto-thevalues,perhapsnotthesamevalues,butvalues

69JosephCampbell,TheHerowithaThousandFaces(NewWorldLibrary,2008),2,211.

35

nonetheless,asBerlinobserved,thatarediscernible,understandable,andthestagesofthe

journeythatleadtheherotoself-discoveryareremarkablysimilar.

Officers,however,nowperceivedwarthroughanewlens.Goneweretheliving

heroes:petroleum,coldsteel,andcomplexgearsreplacedblood,bone,andspirit.

Industrialproduction,strategicmaterial,scientificandtechnologicalprogressdefinedhow

futurewarswouldbefought--warbymath.Somemilitarytheoristshadreachedthispoint

muchearlier.InfluencedbytheEnlightenment,Antoine-HenriJominihadabstractedand

simplifiedwardowntoagameofnumbers,but,notably,hisfirsttradewasbanking.70Ivan

Bloch,alsoabanker,predictedwithsomeaccuracythecomingcarnageofmodernwar,

althoughhefurtherpostulatedthatnationscouldnot,becauseoffinancialandeconomic

costs,gotowarforanylengthoftime;andshouldtheydosoanywayexhaustionwould

followinshortorder.71Nowwarcouldbemeasured,counted,andpredictedbasedon

rationalcalculations.Thevisionofbankers,industrialists,scientists,andmilitaryofficers

bondedoutofmutualself-interest.

Theidealsoldierwasalwaysmoremachinethanmanandfromhisearliest

momentsundertheflagheexperiencedextraordinaryandarduoustraining.Incessant

drills,marching,andcalisthenicsfilledtheyoungsoldier’slife.Choreographedmovements

matchedtheancientandritualisticmotionsofdance,butnowcuriouslyassumed

mechanicalfunctions;thefirstennobleddeepprimordialhumaninstincts,andthesecond

fusedthemovementofboththeanimateandinanimate.Sothetemplateforthemachineor

mechanisticparadigmwasalwaysthere.Bythenineteenthcenturydiscipline,augmented

bynationalism,infusedthecommonsoldierwithhoped-forironfortitude.Discipline,70AntoineHenribarondeJomini,TheArtofWar(Philadelphia:Lippincott,1862).71JeanBloch,TheFutureofWar(Boston:GinnandCompany,1899).

36

instilledthroughphysicalexertions,aimedtoexpungethought.Thatoneobeyedorders

withoutthinking,thattheresponsewasimmediateandexact,inmanywayscausedthe

soldiertopredateandportendthemachine.72

TheillusionofcontrolpermeatesAmericansociety,andnonemoresothaninthe

U.S.officercorps.Thearrivaltothispointintheevolutionofthisinstitutionrepresentsa

slow,speciousimitationofsuccess--ajourneywithoutdirectionandwithoutphilosophy

resultinginahollowcolossus.TheU.S.Armyofficercorpsdidnot,andhasnot,cometo

gripswiththenatureofwar,ratheritsubstitutestechnologyastheproperrealityto

understandandtomaster.

WilliamSkeltonarguedthatrootsofprofessionalismintheUSArmytookholdin

theSouthpriortotheCivilWar.73SamuelHuntingtonbelievedthattheprocessgainedits

impetusbetweentheCivilWarandtheFirstWorldWar.74Whetherbeforeorafter1865,

theU.S.Armyofficercorpsprofessionalized,buttowhatextentandtowhatdegreeisless

certain.Thephilosophicalrootsoftheofficercorpslackedtheenvironmentnecessaryto

produceaphilosophyofwar.Thisintellectualimmaturitymadetheyoungofficercorps

susceptibletoborrowedorspuriousideas—sometimesboth.Thus,natureandnurture

naturallyamalgamatedinthemindsofthesementoproduceanentirelygenuine,yet

flawed,understandingofthenatureofwarandhowonesolvedtheproblemsitposed.The

growthoftechnology,anditssubtlebutprofoundinteractionwithman’sconceptionof

timecompoundedtheseotherconceptualerrorsandmisunderstandings.

72Mumford,TechnicsandCivilization,89–95.73WilliamB.Skelton,AnAmericanProfessionofArms:TheArmyOfficerCorps,1784-1861(Lawrence:UniversityPressofKansas,1992),xiii.74SamuelP.Huntington,TheSoldierandtheState:TheTheoryandPoliticsofCivil-MilitaryRelations(Cambridge,MS:HarvardUniversityPress,1957),237.

37

Intellectualaccelerationisoneofthemostsignificantchangesbetweenthisworld

andthenineteenthcentury.Historynolongermattered,becauseitchangedsorapidly—

propelled,ofcourse,bytechnologicaldevelopments.Technologyfundamentallyalteredthe

relationshipbetweenmanandtime.ReinhartKoselleckinThePracticeofConceptual

Historydefinedhistoricalaccelerationas,“theshorteningofthetimespansnecessaryfor

gainingnewexperiencesthatthetechnical-industrialworldforcesuponus.”75Technology

hasalteredtherelationshipbetweentheelementsofClausewitz’trinity,because“the

shortenedtemporalrhythms”havecausedthetrinitytocollapse.Thetrinityisnownearly

singularwiththevariouselementsinteractingonanalmostinstantaneouslevel.Inessence

technologyhasincreasinglyeliminatedspace.Thetimeittakesideas,weapons,andpeople

totravelhasdecreasedtoapointunseeninhumanhistory.

Conflictgeneratesamagneticorcentripetalpulluponforcesinvolved,notjust

escalation,butalsoatendencytopullintoconflictbodiesinorbittowardthecenter.The

collapseofthetrinityresultedin[theheavenlybodiesbeingpulledinamalgamatingintoa

whole.]Thecombinationoftimepressures,avoidanceofthinking,andeverincreasing

relianceontechnologyhaveresultedinanattempttoturntacticalandoperationalvirtue

intoacoherentstrategicpolicy.TheU.S.Armyoftodayevenhasatermforit—“strategic

compression.”76Officersbelievethatevenmoretechnologyistheanswertoa

technologicallysaturatedworld.AsThucydidesnotes,”…twothingsmostopposedtogood

75ReinhartKoselleck,FuturesPast:OntheSemanticsofHistoricalTime,Kindle(ColumbiaUniversityPress,2013),113.76DaveDilegge,“Thoughtson‘StrategicCompression,’”SmallWarsJournal,February3,2007,http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/thoughts-on-strategic-compression.

38

counselarehasteandpassion…”bothofwhicharemorelikelyundertheauspicesof

technology.77

In406B.C.anAthenianfleetdefeatedaSpartannavalforceattheBattleof

Arginusae.Followingthevictory,eightAthenianstrategoifacedtwodecisionsthatpulled

forcesinoppositedirections.First,theAthenianfleetcouldcapitalizeonthevictoryand

rushtoMytileneandrelieveanAthenianforceblockadedthere,or,second,itcouldrescue

sailorslostinbattleclingingtoflotsam.Thestrategoidecidedthatallwouldsailfor

Mytileneminusafewshipsdivertedtosalvagethesoulsfloatinginthesea.Chance

intervened,however,andneitherthesailorsnortheSpartanfleetencounteredthe

Athenianfleet.Rather,asuddenstormpreventedbothactions,whiletheSpartansescaped

andtheAtheniansailorsdrowned.

ThegeneralsupontheirreturntoAthensfacedahostilepopulace.Thevictory

forgotten,thepeopledemandedthatthegeneralsassumeresponsibilityfortheirfailureto

savethesailors.Politicalintrigueandpassionsoverwhelmedallreasonandbysomeodd

twistoffate,evenSocrates,whopresidedovertheassemblythatday,anddideverythingin

hispowertopreventit,couldnotrepeltheirrationalandcunningintentofthosepresent.

Theywereexecuted,andnosoonerhadtheblooddriedthantheAtheniansreversedtheir

position,regrettingtheirdecision,andthosemostresponsibleforurgingexecutionnow

faceddeaththemselves.78

Antiquityfurnishedofficerswithfrictionofadifferentkind.Information,in

whateverformittook,remainedlimitedandboundtolocomotionofthatage.Today,the

speedofinformationtransmissionseemsanobviousobservation,buthowitinfluencedthe77Strassler,TheLandmarkThucydides,179.78DonaldKagan,ThePeloponnesianWar(Paradise,PA:PawPrints,2008).

39

education,action,andthoughtofArmyofficersisaprofoundquestionwithfarreaching

implications.

40

ChapterII

PracticalLeadershipforEmpire

Establishedin1775,theU.S.Armydevelopedanintensefocusonpracticalityearly

initsevolution,nourishedbythegeographicalandenvironmentalfeaturesoffrontier

America.OncefreeofBritishcontrol,Armyunitswerelargelydeployedalongthewestern

boundariesoftheU.S.toprovidesecuritytosettlers,oralongtheAtlanticcoastlineto

defendportcities.Armyofficersconcernedthemselveswiththeregimenofday-to-daylife

andpatrolsthroughtheouterterritories.Forthemostpart,theoldworldremaineda

distantthreattoarmyofficersandthestudyofwarreceivedlittleattentionduringthis

period.Thehardshipsoflifeinthesesmallfortsandpostsaffordedlittletimeoran

environmentconducivetointellectualstudy.

TheWarof1812generatedasurgeofnationalisminthesonsofmanywhohad

foughtin1776;aneardisaster,itresultedinarealisticreevaluationofsomeofthe

foundinggeneration’smoreromanticprecepts.79Themilitiaperformedunevenlyatbest

andfailedmiserablyattheworst.Theneedforapermanentandprofessionalarmywas

painfullyobvious,atleasttotheofficercorps,inthewakeof1812.80Furthermore,bythe

early1820’s,theseedsofprofessionalizationbegantosproutinthefieldsofscience,law

andeconomicsintheNorth.IntheSouth,slaveryrapidlytransformedunderthepressures

79WilliamB.Skelton,AnAmericanProfessionofArms:TheArmyOfficerCorps,1784-1861(UniversityPressofKansas,1992),116.80Ibid.,122.

41

oftechnologicalchangeyieldingafarheavierandintheendunbearableyoke-the

industrialinstitutionalizationofslavery.81

ThetrendsofprofessionalizationnaturallyfiltereddownintotheU.S.Armyofficer

corps.ThearistocraticandromanticsensibilitiesoftheSouthernelitefitcomfortablyin

theArmywithitsfocusonhonorandsacrifice.Furthermore,thepresumedever-present

threatofslaverevoltthroughouttheSouthandthemilitantnatureofsouthwesternslavery

servedonlytoreinforcethetendency,perhapsnotunlikeSparta’senslavementofthe

helotsnecessitatingamilitantsociety,atleastintheupperclasses.82

WestPointproducedthevastmajorityofofficersduringthisperiod,andwasthe

intellectualcenterintheUnitedStatesofthearmy.83Although,theWarof1812leftafew

self-taughtgeneralssuchasAndrewJacksonandWinfieldScott.TheprimaryfocusofWest

Pointaimednotattheeducationofofficerswhograspedthenuancesofwar,butratherat

producingengineerstohelpbuildtheroadsandbridgesneededbythefledglingnation.

Therearenotaninfinitenumberoffactorsthataffecttheintellectualdevelopment

ofanindividual.Theproximateinfluences,whethertheybethirty,thirteen,orwhatever

thenumbermaybe,arefinite.Andthoughtheymaydiffer,theynonethelessprovidefor

commonunderstandingforthoseinwithinthatfield.84FortheU.S.Armyofficercorpsthe

dominantfactorcenteredonengineering.

Clausewitzdescribedfrictioninwarasthe,“countlessminorincidents-thekindyou

canneverreallyforesee-combinedtolowerthegenerallevelofperformance,sothatone

81VernonLouisParrington,MainCurrentsinAmericanThought,1800-1860(UniversityofOklahomaPress,1987),63.82Huntington,TheSoldierandtheState,211.83MatthewMoten,TheDelafieldCommissionandtheAmericanMilitaryProfession(TexasA&MUniversityPress,2000),56.84BerlinandHardy,TheCrookedTimberofHumanity.

42

alwaysfallsfarshortoftheintendedgoal.”85TheU.S.Armyexperiencedasimilarfrictional

phenomenonthroughoutitsearlydevelopment.Whilenoneofthesefactorsaresignificant

takenindividually,theyformedearlyandprovidedthesubstratefromwhichtheorganism

evolvedandtakencollectivelycompounded.

Inhisclassicstudy,TheSoldierandtheState.SamuelHuntingtonarguedthat

technicism,popularism,andprofessionalismaretherootsofAmericanmilitarytraditions.86

RussellF.Weigley,seekingtosynthesizetheintellectualoutlookoftheU.S.Army’s

leadershipoveritsentirehistory,positedthattheAmericanwayofwarwasannihilation

basedonmass-producedtechnology.87Morerecently,BrianLinnnotedthatimprovisation

andpracticalityappearagainandagainashallmarksofAmericanmilitaryactionthattake

onthecharacterofautilitariandoctrine.88Facedwiththisdiscontinuity”,Linncontinued,

“betweenidealandreality,thenation'smilitaryleadershavebeenquitereadytoabandon

theidealandembracethepossible.”89LinnarguedthatthehallmarkofAmericanofficers

wastheylearnedtoimprovise,butcertainlytheremustbemoretoitthanthis.The

principleofthe“HidingHand”byAlbertHirschman,aspinoffofAdamSmith’sinvisible

handofthemarket,applieshere:

Wemaybedealingherewithageneralprincipleofaction.Creativityalwayscomes asasurprisetous;thereforewecannevercountonitandwedarenotbelieveinit untilithashappened.Inotherwords,wewouldnotconsciouslyengageupontasks whosesuccessclearlyrequiresthatcreativitybeforthcoming.Hence,theonlyway inwhichwecanbringourcreativeresourcesfullyintoplayisbymisjudgingthe

85Clausewitz,OnWar,119.86Huntington,TheSoldierandtheState,193.87RussellFrankWeigley,TheAmericanWayofWar:AHistoryofUnitedStatesMilitaryStrategyandPolicy(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1977),xxii.88BrianLinnandRussellWeigley,“TheAmericanWayofWarRevisited,”TheJournalofMilitaryHistory66,no.2(April2002):430.89Ibid.

43

natureofthetask,bypresentingittoourselvesasmoreroutine,simple, undemandingofgenuinecreativitythanitwillturnouttobe.90

Creativityinthiscontextistheresultofencounteringtheunknownand,whenfaced

withseeminglyinsurmountableobstacles(includingpeople,e.g.armyofficers),searching

forsolutionsbeyondthetraditionallimitsofacceptableresponses.Second,ifthecosts

couldbecountedaccuratelybeforehand,manyendeavorswouldremainmerelygraphite

sketches.AtypicalcareerintheU.S.Armyconfrontstheofficerwithmultiplechallenges

thatrequirepracticalinnovationstosurmount.Overtime,thismakesasuccessfulofficer

veryconfidentofhisorherabilitytomeetanychallenge.Thus,onecouldarguethatthe

unknowncontributesasmuchtofailureasitunwittinglyadvancessuccess.

TheAmericanwayofwar,inthiscase,isthecollectiveculturaldispositiontounder-

estimatethetime,cost,andbloodrequiredtoachievethedesiredendstate;andthus,faced

withaconflictbeyondtheexpectedscope,encouragestheofficertoimprovisetoachieve

victory.ItisdoubtfulthatsuchcoursesofactionareparticulartotheU.S.AGerman,

Russian,orChineseofficermightapproachproblemsdifferently,atleastinitially,butthe

matterofresolutionwouldmostlikelybesimilar.Howoneframesaproblemandembarks

onasolutionprobablyvarieswidely,however,thegeneralstepsofaresolutionaresimilar

–theconscioushumanmindgenerallythinksinalinearfashion-thoughtherangeand

solutionsthemselveswouldvaryasmuchastheoriginalframework.Linn’sconclusionof

improvisation,practicalityandutilityarenotenough-itistoogeneralandcommonofa

solution-apatternthatisarguablyhuman.Onemustinquire,then,regardingwhat

90AlbertO.HirschmanandBrookingsInstitution,ThePrincipleoftheHidingHand(Washington,D.C:BrookingsInstitution,1967),13.

44

intellectualtrendsareparticulartotheexperienceofmilitaryserviceandhowthey

originated—lookingspecificallyasthehistoricalexperienceofU.S.Armyofficers.

WhentheBritishsurrenderedatYorktown,itappearedthataragtagvolunteerforce

ofcivilianshadvictoriouslydefeatedthegreatestempireonearth.TheroleoftheFrench

expeditionaryforce,andespeciallyofitssiegeengineers,wasignored.Thisconstituteda

mytheagerlypropagatedbyAmericanpamphleteersandonethatfoundingfatherswereall

toowillingtoharnessastheyforgedanewnation.ThevastsumsofFrenchmilitaryand

financialaidwerequicklyforgottenandfootnotedtohistory.91

ThememorythatremainedthatconformedtotheAmericanidealgeneratedimages

offathers,mothers,sons,anddaughters—sturdyyeomen--takinguparmsmuchlikethe

GreeksofAthensandtheRomansoftheearlyRepublic,storiesnotunfamiliarinthat

period.TheAmericanRevolutionremindedmanyofthebiblicalDavidandGoliathwhena

youngfarmboytookuparmsagainstagiantschooledintheartofwar.Jeffersonbelieved

thatthecitizen-soldierhadproveditsworthandthatprofessionalarmieswerenotonly

costly,butalsodangerous,andsuperfluousintimesofpeace.92Myths,perhapscommonin

thebirthofmostrevolutions,providedapowerfulandnecessarycatalystthat,left

unchallenged,shapedthedominantnarrative.93

TheAmericanmilitaryprofessionduringtheearlydaysofthenewnationfound

littlesupportfromthegovernmentwillinglyonlytoauthorizeatinystandingforce.In

91MichaelDavidPearlman,WarmakingandAmericanDemocracy:TheStruggleOverMilitaryStrategy,1700tothePresent(UniversityPressofKansas,1999),66;MacGregorKnoxandWilliamsonMurray,TheDynamicsofMilitaryRevolution,1300-2050(CambridgeUniversityPress,2001),63.92ThomasJefferson,TheWorksofThomasJefferson:1799-1803(Cosimo,Inc.,2009),139,381;ThomasJefferson,TheWorksofThomasJefferson:Correspondence1771-1779,theSummaryView,andtheDeclarationofIndependence(Cosimo,Inc.,2010),181.93RichardHofstadter,TheAgeofReform(NewYork:RandomHouse,1955),43–53;JosephCampbellandBillMoyers,ThePowerofMyth,Kindle(RandomHouseLLC,2011),31–32.

45

manywaysthefederalgovernmentactedantitheticallytotheinterestsofthemilitary

professionandthenation.Poorlyled,trained,andfunded,thenascentarmyserved

primarilyasananti-Indianforcespreadacrossscoresofsmallfortsthatstretchedthe

lengthofthecountrybothalongtheseaboardandthewesternperipheryofthenation.

Napoleon’ssuccessonthebattlefieldwitharmiesmannedbycitizen-soldiersover

theprofessionalarmiesofEuropefurtherconfirmedthebeliefofmanyAmerican

politiciansthatthecitizensatarmsmodelwaseverybitthesuperiortotheprofessional

armymodeldominantinEuropefortheprevioustwocenturies.Jefferson,aFrancophilein

manyrespects,usedtheFrenchasanexamplefromwhichtodrawsupportforhisown

conceptionofthepropercivil-militaryframework.Theprominenceofthemilitiasolution

andcolonialexperiencescombinedwithJefferson’sinfluenceresultedinadefactoFrench

approachtomilitarymattersinearlyAmerica.94

WiththeestablishmentofWestPointin1802,theU.S.haditsfirstmilitarycollege.

Thecurriculuminitiallylackedrigor,andinstructionprimarilyconsistedoflecturesanda

readingsfromasinglefifty-pagemanualtranslatedfromFrench.Manyofitsearliest

professorswereeitherFrench-trainedorFrenchthemselves.ProfessorClaudiusCorzet,

borninFranceandeducatedatthePolytechnicSchool,taughtsomeoftheearliestcourses.

Hisfocuswasengineering.95SylvanusThayerin1817expandedthecurriculumwithmore

worksfromFrance’sPolytechnicSchool.96Theinfluenceofcontinentalmilitarythoughtat

WestPointandthroughouttheU.S.Armymerelyfollowedtheformandfunctionofthe

94ThomasJefferson,TheWorksofThomasJefferson:CorrespondenceandPapers1808-1816(Cosimo,Inc.,2010),68–89;Skelton,AnAmericanProfessionofArms,1992,11.95UnitedStatesMilitaryAcademy,TheCentennialoftheUnitedStatesMilitaryAcademyatWestPoint,NewYork.1802-1902...(U.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice,1904),275.96Ibid.,275–277.

46

Frenchsystem.Muchlikeayoungpredatorthatmimicsthehuntingpatternsofitsparent,

YoungWestPointerslackedthematuritytounderstandwhyapatternofactionwas

taken;,buttheyfullycomprehendedtheobservableresults.Clearly,thelessonwasto

followintheimmediatefootstepsofsuccess,ignoringsuchissuesasunderstandingwhy

thefootingwassoundorknowingwherethepathleads.

TheU.S.Army,the“lastbastionofFederalism”duringitsfirstdecadesofexistence,

accordingtoWilliamSkelton,developedapeculiarunderstandingofmilitary

professionalism.97Militaryofficersbelievedtheimpetusforsuchasystemdevolvedfrom

thearistocraticmethods,andinoneoftheoddintellectualtwistsofmilitary

professionalismintheU.S.,theArmyplagiarizedformandfunction,withoutthehigher

educationalstandardsthatwereoftenfoundinEuropeansystems.Thus,therawmaterial

remainedqualitativelydifferent.Theendresultwasasystemthatatoncerejected

AmericanstrengthsandadoptedEuropeanmethodsinpart.Guidedbyinternallights,as

Tocquevillesuggested,theArmyblunderedundertheworstofbothsystems.“Thedistrust

oftheexpert,rationalizedintoademocraticaxiomduringtheJacksonianera,wasdeeply

ingrainedinAmericancharacterandpersistedlongafteritsoriginaljustificationhad

passed,”HenrySteeleCommagerconcluded.98Theideathattheprofessionalofficer

constitutedthefinalwordonmilitarymattersneverachievedbroadacceptanceinthe

UnitedStates,especiallyincomparisontoEuropeanandlaterEastAsiancolleagues.

EqualityisnotmerelyaqualitydesiredinthesocialmediumoftheUnitedStates;itisa

97Skelton,AnAmericanProfessionofArms,1992,73.98HenrySteeleCommager,TheAmericanMind:AndInterpretationofAmericanThoughtCharacterSincethe1880’s(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1950),12.

47

valuedesiredandpursuedasaquintessentialcharacteristicoftheAmericanpsyche.99As

such,intheU.S.Armyprofessionalismassumedaconditionfarmorecomfortablewith

actionandactsofheroismthanwithintellectualachievements.

PerceivedFrenchsuccessunderNapoleonexertedapowerfulmagneticeffectupon

themindsofmilitarymenthatcrossedbothtemporalandgeographicalbarriers,centuries

andoceans.Napoleon’svauntedsuccesscompelledmentoseekandwagebattleinalike

manner.However,patterningorganizationsonfaultypropositionscanandoftendoesend

indestruction,aswhenBaronAntoinedeJominiledmanydownapathofmimicry

centeredonasupposeduniversalprincipleofwar.DallasD.IrvinefoundthataFrench-

influencedtemplatecenteredonslavishlystudyingNapoleon’smethods,orthoseofhis

interpreterslikeJomini,propagatedanofficersystemwherebystaffs,andstaffofficers,

werelargelyinconsequential.Menofmerit,whocouldshootfromthehipandoperated

largelywithoutadvisorystaffs,foundsufficientemploymentintheNapoleonicarmies.100

“Thisstateofaffairsonceestablished”,observedIrvine,“…tendedtoremainfixed,forit

accordedwiththeengrossingtendenciesofstrongandablecharacters….”TheAmerican

ArmyenthusiasticallyacceptedthisFrenchsystem.

DennisHartMahan,fatherofthefamousnavaltheoristAlfredThayerMahan,

graduatedfromWestPointin1824andfornearlythenextfiftyyearsservedasaprofessor

there.However,beforeMahansettledinatWestPointhedepartedforthebattlefields,

fortifications,andwarcollegesofEurope.Mahanoverthenextfouryearsfamiliarized

99AlexisdeTocqueville,AlexisdeTocqueville:DemocracyinAmerica:ANewTranslationbyArthurGoldhammer(NewYork:LibraryofAmerica,2012),3;MorrisRaphaelCohen,AmericanThought:ACriticalSketch(Piscataway,NJ:TransactionPublishers,1954),37–39;Commager,TheAmericanMind,7–8.100DallasIrvine,“FrenchandPrussianStaffSystemBefore1870,”TheJournaloftheAmericanMilitaryHistory2,no.4(1938):198.

48

himselfwiththeintimatedetailsofFrance’sfortificationandengineeringminds,Vauban.101

Mahan’stimeonlyreinforcedhispredispositiontowardFrenchsolutionsandengineering.

OvertimeMahan’sinfluenceanddominancegrewwithinWestPointuntilhiscourse

becamethe“capstoneoftheentirecurriculum.”Ofmaterialthatcomprisedthecapstone

courseonlyeightpercentwasnotengineeringrelated.102Inonesense,therefore,theU.S.

Armydidhaveaphilosophy--engineering.D.H.Mahanarguedthatfortificationswerenot

onlynecessaryforthesuccessofmilitiaagainstprofessionalsoldiers,butthatitwasthe

nation’sdutytoprovideeverymeanstoimprovetheirsurvivalandsuccess.Hisargument

carriedtheweightofdoctrinesincehecontrolledmilitaryofficereducationforthebetter

partoffiftyyears.103

CadetsatWestPointweregivenaneducationthatinitstotalitywasFrench.They

wererequiredtolearnFrench,mostthebooksinthelibrarywereFrench,theengineering

bookswerenearlyverbatimcopiesofFrenchworks,andmanyprofessorsweretrainedin

France.TheoccasionaltacticsclassusedFrenchmethodsandhypotheticalEuropean

enemies.WestPoint,priortotheCivilWar,embodiedtheU.S.Armyintellectual

professionalframework,andthatframeworkinmostrespects,withfewexceptions,

replicatedeverythingFrenchandfocusedonmilitaryandcivilengineering.

Institutions,whetherbrickorflesh,arereliantuponandshapedbythefoundation

onwhichtheyarebuilt.Theedificeisnoteasilyalteredoncelaid,andchangerequires

sufficientmotivationandpurpose,bothofwhichareusuallylackingshortofasignificant

101Moten,TheDelafieldCommissionandtheAmericanMilitaryProfession,57.102Ibid.,58.103DennisHartMahan,ATreatiseonFieldFortification,1852,viii.

49

threat.TheU.S.ArmyformedfromtheFrenchmoldcontinuedtodevelopalongthoselines

wellintothefuture.104

PriortotheinfluenceofThayerandMahanatWestPoint,theU.S.Armyhadturned

toready-madeFrenchdoctrinefortheWarof1812.105TherelianceonFrenchmilitary

thoughtcontinued,almostunabated,untiltheCivilWar.Thecordsofdoctrinaldependence

onFrancewereseveredonlyafterthePrussianscrushedFranceduringtheFranco-

PrussianWar.106ThoughtheFrenchdefeatnecessitatedare-evaluationofdoctrine,anda

shifttoPrussianmethods,theintellectualrootsoftheU.S.Armyprofessionnonetheless

remainedFrenchinthoughtandaction.

TheFrenchobserverofAmericancultureandpolitics,AlexisdeTocqueville,noted

inthe1830s:“Thereisnot,Ithink,asinglecountryinthecivilizedworldwhereless

attentionispaidtophilosophythanintheUnitedStates.”107Reason,accordingto

Tocqueville,wastheprincipaltraitthatdominatedtheAmericanmind.However,the

attachmenttoreasonisnotofothersbutderivedfromone’sownexperience.Thisreliance

uponpersonalrevelationwastheconsequenceofequality,anditisherethatTocqueville

illuminatedanAmericancondition--onethatfuseswithIrvine’sthesis,andinfusedthe

Armyasanemergingmodernprofession.Americansperceivedothers’capacityfor

reasoningtobemuchliketheirown.Thus.onearrivedataplaceafewstepsremovedfrom

thebeliefthatifpowersofobservationarerelativelyequivalentwhatgainistherein

104Academy,TheCentennialoftheUnitedStatesMilitaryAcademyatWestPoint,NewYork.1802-1902...,276;Skelton,AnAmericanProfessionofArms,1992,11;HenryWagerHalleck,ElementsofMilitaryArtandScience:Or,CourseofInstructioninStrategy,Fortification,TacticsofBattles,&c.,EmbracingtheDutiesofStaff,Infantry,Cavalry,Artillery,andEngineers(D.Appleton,1862),134.105RichardV.Barbuto,Niagara,1814:AmericaInvadesCanada(UniversityPressofKansas,2000),125.106WalterE.Kretchik,U.S.ArmyDoctrine:FromtheAmericanRevolutiontotheWaronTerror(Lawrence:UniversityPressofKansas,2011),69.107Tocqueville,AlexisdeTocqueville,483.

50

readingandstudyingtheworksproducedbyotherindividuals,anactwhollynecessaryin

thedevelopmentofamorebroadmindedapproachtoprofessionalism108Thejunior

officersthatfilledtheranksoftheearlyAmericanarmywerenotclassicallyeducated

aristocrats.Instead,theycamefromthepracticalfieldsofmercantilismandfarming.They

desiredthefruitsoftheirlaborthatcouldbeenjoyedandobserved,thetangible,practical

andimmediate,lessthantheintellectualpuritythatoftenmotivatedtheirtheoretically-

mindedaristocraticcounterpartsinEurope.109TheU.S.Armypreferredofficersofanother

kind-menofaction.

PromotionswithintheU.S.ArmychangedduringtheWarof1812,withseniority

playingsecondfiddletodemonstratedability.Thedeclineofthesenioritysystemduring

themassiveexpansionofstateandfederalforcesduringtheWarof1812,lentitselfto

soldiersofmerit,aswellasthoseendowedwithagenerousdoseofambitionandpolitical

connections,notunliketheFrenchexperience.110Furthermore,thelowesteemofsociety

formilitaryofficersintheU.S.,withoccasionalexceptionsduringtimeofwar,didnot

generallyattractthebestandbrightestintoitsservice.111

Tocquevilledemonstratedanuncannyinsightintothepossibilitiesofequality.He

noted,“Iseetwoverycleartendenciesinequality:oneimpelseachindividualtowardnew

waysofthinking,whiletheotherwouldinducehimtogiveupthinkingvoluntarily.”112One

couldarguethatmoreofthelaterthantheformerhadoccurredwiththeranksoftheU.S.

Armyofficercorpsduringitsformativeevolutioninthe19thcentury.Equalityofthought

108Ibid.,483–485.109Ibid.,484–485.110Skelton,AnAmericanProfessionofArms,1992,49–50.111Tocqueville,AlexisdeTocqueville,764.112Ibid.,492.

51

hasthepotentialtobreedthoughtlessness,andthewillingnesstoassumetheintellectual

cloakwithouttherigorsthatenlightenthemindbeneath.

Bycontrast,Clausewitzlaboredtopenetratethepenumbralofwartounderstanda

phenomenonthatpervadedhislife.ClausewitzfoundtutelageatthehandsofHans

GerhardJohannDavidvonScharnhorst;asoldier,teacher,andmentorwhofullygrasped

thepossibilitiesofmilitaryeducation.Inmanyways,therelationshipechoedthatof

SocratesandPlatoandtheeffectsoftheformeronhistorywerenolessthanthoseofthe

latter.Clausewitzprovidedarichandfertileintellectualframeworktostudythenatureof

war;though,therewereothertheorists,notablyJomini,whomofficersmightstudyinthe

developmentoftheirmilitaryprofession.113

ThePrussian,British,French,andAmericanmilitaryprofessionsdeveloped

accordingtothepeculiarsocial,political,andeconomicfactorsoftheirrespective

countries.TheBritishalwaysshowedmoreconcernaboutnavalmattersthanthoseoftheir

army—afterall,theBritisharmyhadchoppedofftheKing’sheadduringtheEnglishCivil

War.TheduelsbetweenFranceandGermanyprimarilyfueledtheprocessongoinginthe

UnitedStatesandelsewhere(suchasImperialRussia).Somecountries,suchastheUnited

States,duringthenineteenthcenturyalteredtheirprofessionaldevelopment,atleast

superficially,inaccordancewiththeverdictfromofthebattlefieldsofEurope.Battlefields

ofthewestandsouthwestasaresultprovedtobelessinfluentialthanthosehalfway

aroundtheworld.

113ChristopherBassfors,ClausewitzinEnglish:TheReceptionofClausewitzinBritainandAmerica1815-1945(OxfordUniversityPress,1994);PeterParet,ClausewitzandtheState:TheMan,HisTheories,andHisTimes(PrincetonUniversityPress,2007);AlanBeyerchen,“Clausewitz,NonlinearityandtheUnpredictabilityofWar,”InternationalSecurity17,no.3(1992):59–90.

52

TheMexican-AmericanWar(1846-1848)resultedinfew,ifany,significant

innovationstotheArmyofficercorps.114Officersinterpretedtheoften-lopsidedvictories

andlackofskillintheirMexicancounterpartsasconfirmationofthesuperiorityof

Americanarmsandmanifestdestiny.115Thus,theresultsofthewarservedasevidenceof

martialacumen.Therealthreat,andthereforelessonstobeobserved,emanatedfrom

acrosstheAtlanticneithertheIndianorMexicanthreatbreachedthatthreshold.

In1855,SecretaryofWarJeffersonDavis,dispatchedthreeofficers(collectively

knownastheDelafieldCommission)toEuropewithexplicitinstructionstostudyand

examineforeignarmies.Thecommissionrepresentedoneofthefirstsignificantsteps

towardthedevelopmentoftheAmericanmilitaryprofession.However,theofficers

dispatched--MajorRichardDelafield,MajorAlfredMordecai,andCaptainGeorge

McClellan--“hadallgraduatedfromWestPointwithacommissionintheCorpsof

Engineers.”116Thethreewerehighlyintelligentandrepresentedthebestofthearmy,but

theywereunabletobreakfreeofthemechanisticthoughtpatternsingrainedintothem

whileattheMilitaryAcademy.117

Thethreeofficerssetdowningreatdetailthetactical,technical,andmechanical

elementstheyobservedofEuropeanarmies,but,ashistorianMatthewMotenhasnoted,

theyutterlyfailedtoanalyzeorevencasuallyexamine“thefunctionsofhigh-levelstaffs.”118

Theyconstructed,astheyweretaughtandonewouldexpect,themodelWestPointproduct

114RussellFrankWeigley,HistoryoftheUnitedStatesArmy(NewYork:Macmillan,1977),189.115Pearlman,WarmakingandAmericanDemocracy,101,104.116Moten,TheDelafieldCommissionandtheAmericanMilitaryProfession,75.117Ibid.,211.118Ibid.,208.

53

craftedwiththemindandthehandofanengineer.Thereportswere“widelydistributed”

ontheeveoftheCivilWar,butitisdifficulttoevaluatetheirimpactontheofficercorps.119

Thenatureofthereports,thoughthoroughandprofessionallywritten,didnot,and

couldnot,tendtomotivatethinkingthatponderedthehigherlevelsofwar.Accordingto

Moten,theU.S.Armyhadthreeintellectualdeficienciesinthemid-19thCentury:“an

overrelianceonFrenchexpertise,exclusiveconcentrationonengineeringastheonly

militaryscienceworthyofstudy,andtherewardingofachievementinendeavorsmore

civilianthanmilitary,morestaffthanline.”120Thereportshadnomeasurableeffecton

thosefailingsbythestartoftheCivilWar,andforthevastmajorityofficers,boththeblue

andgray,Frenchtacticsandprocedurescontinuedtogovern.

FrenchGeneralVictordeChanalshadowedUnionofficersduringtheCivilWar,

observingdrills,operationsplanning,andbattles.Hisobservationsledhimtoconcludethat

“ourmethodshavebeencopiedveryexactly.”121DeChanal’sthoroughaccountexamined

themajorbranchesofthearmyindetailandcontrastedUnionforceswiththoseofthe

FrenchArmy.Moreoften,thedistinctionswerenotofmethod,butofdetail.Hisanalysis

notedUnionartillery,cavalry,infantry,andengineersreplicatedFrenchdrillinalmost

everyaspect.122Furthermore,deChanalextendedhisinspectiontoincludeWestPont

wherehenoted,“theworkoftheengineeringcorps,provetheexcellenceofthescientific

instructionoftheacademy.”123HisfinalthoughtsontheMilitaryAcademyaremost

revealing:“Theacademyis,however,menacedwithareorganization,oneofthecausesof

119Ibid.,203.120Ibid.,205.121VictorDeChanal,TheAmericanArmyinTheWarofSecession(Leavenworth,KS:GeorgeA.Spooner,1894),26.122Ibid.,25,45,48.123Ibid.,132.

54

whichisanunfortunatedesiretoimitateEuropeansystems.”124Theeasewithwhichthe

U.S.militaryprofessionalternatedbetweentheFrenchandGermanmodelduringthe

nineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturywassymptomaticoflargeranddeeperissuesand

servedtoconfirmtheintellectualimmaturityoftheU.S.Army.

Theamalgamationofthesediversefactorsdenotedabizarrealchemythat,whilenot

altogetherdeadlytothepatient,sufficedtodistort,inhibitandpermanentlystuntthe

developmentofanyAmericanmilitaryphilosophy.“Menwholiveinagesofequalityare

thereforenotinclinedtolocatetheintellectualauthoritytowhichtheysubmitoutsideand

abovemankind,”accordingtoAlexisdeTocqueville,“[for]usuallytheyseekthesourcesof

truthinthemselvesorintheirfellowmen.”125Theobservedpracticalityandindividuality

thatstirredTocqueville’spenresultedfromthestrongundercurrentsofRomanticismthat

fusedwithChristianitytoanimatetheAmericanspirit.Aforcenolesspowerful,though

perhapsmorediffuse,thanthefanaticismthatfueledaEuropeanarmyacenturylater,both

ofwhichwouldresulttheinsubjugationandconquestofthebetterpartofcontinent.“To

beamanisnottounderstandorreasonbuttoact,”wrotehumanistphilosopherIsaiah

Berlin,“…hishourofinspiration,ofpersonaltruth,whenheknowswhathemustdoto

realizeshisinnervision…toact,toliveinacreativefashion…thatistheheartof

romanticism.”126Toact,tomove,todosomethingembodiedtheAmericancharacter.In

manywaysitwastheirphilosophy;boldness,inthewordsofClausewitz,hasageniusallits

own.127

124Ibid.,133.125Tocqueville,AlexisdeTocqueville,490.126BerlinandHardy,TheSenseofReality,183.127Clausewitz,OnWar,190–192.

55

Theobviousconclusionisthatduringitsfirstcenturyofexistence,energeticaction

substitutedfordeepthoughtintheU.S.Army,andthatapproacharosefromadeeper

charactertraitintheAmericanpsyche-obsessionwithpracticality.H.S.Commagernoted,

“Nophilosophythatgotmuchbeyondcommonsensecommanded[theAmerican’s]

interest,andheruthlesslytransformedeventhemostabstractmetaphysicsintopractical

ethics.”128

Soldiersfarfromthefamiliarprecinctsofcivilizedlifesurvivedonthefrontierof

AmericaninsmalloutpostsdeepinthewildsofunconqueredAmerica.Here,morethan

anywhereelseinAmerica,soldierslivedday-to-dayandpracticalitytookonawholenew

meaning;bookswerefew,andthetimetoreadandcollaboratewithothersevenlessso.129

Thoseluckyenoughtobepostedalongtheeasternseaboardhadotherdutiesand

distractions.TheU.S.Army,unliketheGermansorFrench,didnothavetocontendwith

theever-presentthreatofinvasion,fortheAtlanticprovidedaninsurmountablebarrier.

Withouttheconstantthreatofinvasion,andwiththefocusonexpansioninthewest,any

impetusforofficersintheUnitedStatesArmytodeveloptheirintellectualcapabilities

rankedconsiderablylowerthansuchobsessionsaspolo,gambling,andattendanceat

musicals.

Insum,thepoorperformanceofAmericanmilitiaintheWarof1812cameasa

surprisetomanyobserverswho,aftertheAmericanRevolution,predictedonselected

evidencethatcitizen-soldiersproperlyledremainedamatchforanyregularsoldiers.The

128Commager,TheAmericanMind,8.129WilliamAddlemanGanoe,TheHistoryoftheUnitedStatesArmy(NewYork:D.AppletonandCompany,1924),157;OliverLymanSpaulding,TheUnitedStatesArmyinWarandPeace(G.P.Putnam’sSons,1937),91;RussellF.Weigley,“TheLongDeathoftheIndian-FightingArmy,”GarryD.RyanandTimothyK.Nenninger,eds.,SoldiersandCivilians:TheU.S.ArmyandtheAmericanPeople(NationalArchives&RecordsAdministration,1987),27–29.

56

soberingresultsoftheWarof1812didnotendthemilitia–thoughithasteneditsend-but

itdiddemonstratethenecessityofmaintainingaprofessional,ifsmall,army.Overthe

ensuingdecadesWestPointofficersbegantofilltheranksoftheArmy,thoughtheupper

echelonsoccupiedbycolonelsandgeneralswereoftenpoliticalappointments.

Nevertheless,theArmyofficercorpsmaturedinthemiddlingranks,ledbyintelligentand

capableWestPointgraduates.However,Frenchdoctrinegenerallydominatedinstruction

atWestPointresultinginacorpsthatfunctionedandthought-inbroadoutlines-ina

mannerconsistentwiththeirengineeringinstruction.Americanculturealreadyinfused

withastrongpracticalandutilitarianstreakfoundfurthersupportintheeducational

curriculumofyoungofficers.

57

ChapterIII

OriginsandContextfortheArmy’sCulturalDNA

Thedevelopmentofanarmyisacomplexprocess.Itscreatorsarenotbio

geneticists,whosimplydecidewhatparticularcharacteristicsaredesirableinanarmyand

thenconcoctaserumwiththeappropriateingredients,placethemixtureinacentrifuge,

andtheninjectthesolution.Theanalogyisnotwithoutitsappeal,buttheDNAofanarmy,

ofanofficercorps,mutatesoveranextendedperiodoftimewitheachgenerationbuilding

uponthepreviousone.Social,political,economicandenvironmentalfactorsamongothers

contribute,thoughunequally,tothegeneticmakeupofanarmy.Theprocessisnotonly

oneofchoice,butoffortuneandnotalwaysofthefortuitouskind.Manyfactorsbeyondthe

oneslistedaboveprovidegeneticmaterials.130Nonetheless,therearedominant

intellectual,environmental,culturalandprofessionalinfluences,thatdeserveparticular

attentionfortheroletheyplayinthedevelopmentofofficers.131

Itwouldbetheheightoffollyforanyauthortoclaimacompleteunderstandingof

theintellectualtraditionsofanypeopleortoclaimthatenvironmentalfactorsaffectedall

individualsinthesamemanner.Themultiplicityofinfluences,manyofthemobscured

fromhistorians,makesanysuchendeavorunwise.However,analyticalinsightsaremuch

likeariver,fedfromtherunoffofmountains,springs,andvarioustributariesthatallow

onetoexaminethewateranddeducegeneralconclusions.AnanalysisoftheAmerican

militarytraditionrequiresthestudyofitsintellectualroots,andthus,itisessentialtohave

anunderstandingoftheexperiencesofearlyAmericansbecausethosemanifestationsof130Commager,TheAmericanMind,409.131Ibid.

58

“character”haveexertedpotentandubiquitousinfluenceonthemilitaryprofessiontothe

presentday.132

EarlyimmigrantspredominatelycametoNorthAmericaforabetterlifeandto

escapetherestrictions,inwhateverformtheyexisted,ofoldEurope.Suchdangersand

adventuresattractedaparticularsoul,perhapsthedesperateorthebrave;arguably,

venturingintotheunknownrecruitedmenandwomenofadifferentmettle.133Thesemen

andwomenweregenerallyyoung,lookingforabetterlife,andincolonialAmericatheyhad

reasonableexpectationsofowningsomeland.

InTheAmericanMindHenrySteeleCommagerstates“thatsoheterogeneousan

inheritanceshouldresultinsohomogeneousacharactersuggeststhattheenvironment

wasdecisive.”134Thosewhocametothecolonieswerewillingtostandapartfrom

everythingtheyhadeverknown.Traditionalbondsunraveledwiththesailsthatbore

themacross4,000kilometersoftheAtlantic.TheintellectualrootsinEuropegenerally

failedtopenetratethesoiloftheNewWorldtoanymeaningfuldepth,andthechallengesof

subjugatinganunyieldinglandshapedtheideasandoutlooksofthosewhoenteredthis

environment.TheNewWorldwasdeficientinlabor,hadlandinplentywithvastarable

areas,oncecleared,andafertilefishingshorethatstretchedtheentiretyoftheAtlantic

seaboardandprovidednearlyunlimitedfoodforthehardworkingperson.

ThephysicalcharacteroftheAmericatheimmigrantsencounteredgaveprioritytothe

pioneer,Conestogawagon,andaxe.ThousandsofmilesfromEurope,whatbecameknown

astheindustriousAmericanspiritwasborn,notoutofdesignorintent,butofnecessity.

132DenisWilliamBrogan,TheAmericanCharacter,ByD.W.Brogan,1944.133GeorgeSantayana,CharacterandOpinionintheUnitedStates(Norton&Company,1934),169.134Commager,TheAmericanMind,4.

59

Theharshandunconqueredlandsrequiredthebuildingofroads,canals,bridges,

andharbors.Pioneersclearedlands,plowedandplantedfields,constructedfences,dug

canals,andbuiltcabins.Eachmanusedhisownwittomeetthemassivelogisticaland

physicalrequirementsofthisendeavor.Self-relianceandindividualismthrivedwhen

deprivedoftherestrainingandcontaininghandofgovernance.Menmadetheirpeace

throughforce—nootherrecoursetoahigherauthority,saveGodandguns,existed.Atthe

individuallevel,thesephenomenawereexecutedcountlesstimesgivingrisetocorporate

activityandthereforeamindsetaboveallelsethatprizedpracticality.Thephilosophical

andintellectualimpetuswitheredindirectproportiontothephysicaldemandsofanew

world.135

Theenvironment,initstotality,lackedstandingtraditioninalmostanyformthat

mighthavefunctionedtorestrictandretardtherangeofthought,andthus,themindwas

givenfreerein.Imaginationanddiscoverythrivedinoneofthoserareperiodswhere

ignoranceoftheimpossiblemadeeveryendeavorseempossible,muchlikeneweyes(or

eyeglasses)cansolveaseemingly-intractableproblem.Unmitigatedpossibilitygavebirth

tovibrantandfertileideasofunboundedopportunitythatfoundresonanceinthe

corporealexpanseoftheWest.Themindofmenempoweredbyoptimismanimatedthe

agencyoftheindividualandcollectivelyinspiredasenseofthepossiblethatendured,

almostunimpeded,fortwocenturiesinAmerica.Theconceivablebecamepossiblethrough

theintenseingenuityandpracticalityofthecommonAmerican-aresultof,andmade

necessaryby,theunfetteringofthehumanmindfromthelimitationsofanachronistic

135Cohen,AmericanThought,29,30,39.

60

tradition.“Americanoptimismwas,”accordingtoCommager,“infact,impenetrableand

unconquerable.”136

Thus,whatisgenerallydeemedtheAmericancharacterisflexible,yetstrongand

robustinnature,butalmostwhollyunsuitedforuseintheconstructionofphilosophical

edifice.Americans,regardlessoflocality,whetherlivinginBostonorCharleston,shareda

deepandabidingbeliefintheunrealizedpotentialofthefuture.JustasnoteveryPrussian

wasatJena,noteveryAmericantraveledwest;neverthelesstheyexperiencedvicariously

theexperienceofcrushingdefeatandunboundedoptimism.WilliamSkeltoninAmerican

ProfessionofArmsfounda“spiritofadolescentrebellionthatpervadedtheearlynational

period.”137ThebondsofearlyAmericawerestrong,thesinewofayouthfulnationflexible,

andasaresultimmediateexperienceratherthanthedictatesoftraditiondeterminedwhat

itmeanttobeanAmerican.138WhathappenedinNewYorkwasnotwhathappenedinthe

OhioValleyandthatwhichhappenedintheSouthwestwasnotwhathappenedin

Richmond,butthespiritofanageisnotboundbygeography,thoughitmostcertainlycan

beshapedbyit.139

Colonialsfoundsolaceinsturdyfences,areliablemusket,anddependablefriends.

Herepioneershadlittletimeforprofoundthoughtsandreflection.Butifonefoundlittle

timeforphilosophythatdidnotholdtrueforwhatwetermpsychology;someideasare

formedfromthought,othersfromunconscioushabit.Thenewpsychologyofdemocratic

136Commager,TheAmericanMind,162.137Skelton,AnAmericanProfessionofArms,1992,55.138Commager,TheAmericanMind,5;Cohen,AmericanThought,28–29.139RobertM.Citino,TheGermanWayofWar:FromtheThirtyYears’WartotheThirdReich(Lawrence:UniversityPressofKansas,2008),XIVCitinoexplainedthatGermanmethodsofwardevelopedinpartfromgeography;JaredDiamond,Guns,Germs,andSteel(NewYork:Norton,1997).

61

individualismemergedfromday-to-dayactivatesthatsustainedlifeincolonialAmerica.140

ThemindsetofAmericansintheearlynineteenthcentury,bynomeanshomogenous,did

sharequalitiesthatlateramalgamatedunderthethreatofrevivedBritishtyrannyandthe

stampofRedcoatboots.141

ThevastmajorityofearlyAmericansfarmed,fishedortraded,withfarminga

distantfirstfromtheothers.Southernstaplesincludedrice,indigo,andtobacco;whilein

theNorthgrain,cattleandfishingdominated.Thecultivationofriceandtobaccodiffered

fromothersintheirintenselaborrequirements.Theincreaseintobaccofarmingwent

handinhandwithademandformorelabor.Whiteindenturedservants,oftenwithother

opportunities,shirkedtheharshdemandsoftobaccofarming.Thus,arapidincreaseinthe

demandforAfricanslavessoonfollowed.AlthoughAmericanslargelyembracedpractical

tradestheydidharborreservationstowardothers.

ThebeliefthatAmericansocietyis,orhasbeen,staunchlyantimilitarysinceits

inceptionisnotentirelyaccurate.142Anarmy,byitsnature,isacollectiveofindividuals

engagedinacooperativeactivity(albeitviolent,orpotentiallyviolent)intheserviceofthe

state.However,thenatureofaprofessionalarmyisdifferentfromonecomprisedof

warriorsormilitia,foraprofessionalarmyincorporatesfull-timesoldiersandofficers

educatedduringpeacetimeinthewaysofwar.Itwasthatmodelthatwasanathemato

Americanidealsthatvaluedindividualityandfreedomofchoiceandaction.Bycontrast,

JapaneseandChineseculturesvaluedcollectiveandcorporateactivityovertheneedsand

140VernonLouisParrington,MainCurrentsinAmericanThought:TheColonialMind,1620-1800(HarcourtBraceJovanovich,Inc,1927),131.141Ibid.,181.142JackC.Lane.“IdeologyandtheAmericanMilitaryExperience:AReexaminationofEarlyAmericanAttitudesTowardtheMilitary.”InSoldiersandCivilians:TheU.S.ArmyandtheAmericanPeople,ed.GarryD.RyanandTimothyK.Nenninger(NationalArchives&RecordsAdministration,1987),15.

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interestsoftheindividual.Thus,unlikeAmericanculture,servicetothewholeabovethe

individualcamemorenaturallyforsomeAsianculturesandEasternresistanceto

militarizationmeasuredwellbelowthetrendsuniquetoAmerica.

RevolutionaryeraAmericansheldaheroicviewofwarfare,notanuncommon

perspectiveintheWest,datingtoantiquity.143Heroicvirtueswerethoseanindividual

exhibitedonthebattlefieldintheserviceofGodandcountry,anditisnoteworthythatthey

neverthelessmagnifiedtheachievementsoftheindividual.Theysatisfiedadeep-seatedif

notentirelyhumandesiretobehonoredandesteemed.144Thus,withintheAmerican

conceptionofwar,theheroic,theidealized,andtheindividualizedwereclearlydistinct

fromthatofthecomponentsthatcomprisedtheprofessionalarmy.Thestandingarmyin

theeyesofearlyAmericansrepresentedeverythingtheyhatedabouttheBritish,acostly

andcoerciveorganizationthatnecessitatedtaxes.Suchanarmyhadasymbiotic

relationshipwithgovernmentsuchthatalargerandstrongerauthoritariangovernment

generatedalargerandstrongerarmyandcouldthenuse,atwill,forceofarmstoexercise

arbitrarypoweringreaterandgreatermeasureattheexpenseofindividualrights.145

AntipathytowardaprofessionalarmycontinuedfromtheAmericanRevolution

throughthepostWorldWarIeratovaryingdegrees,buttheideathatthestandingarmy

representedaseriousthreattolibertyabatedsignificantlybythepresidencyofAndrew

Jacksonin1829.146Circumstancesandcost,andattimesboth,militatedagainstalarge

standingarmyandforthosereasonsalonetheUnitedStatesArmyremainedatsubsistence

levels.

143JohnKeegan,TheMaskOfCommand:AStudyofGeneralship(RandomHouse,2011).144A.H.Maslow,“ATheoryofHumanMotivation,”PsychologicalReview50,no.4(1943):381.145RyanandNenninger,SoldiersandCivilians,18–21.146Ibid.,22.

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TheMexican-AmericanWarwaslargelyunpopular,butitsshortdurationcombined

withitssuccessfuloutcome,thedefeatofMexicanforces,demonstratedtotheArmythere

waslittleneedforreorganization.147Twentyyearslater,theAmericanCivilWar,despite

differencesinscaleandmagnitude,resultedinaquickreturnfortheArmytoprewarlevels

albeitthemeannumberofsoldiersrosefromaprewarlevelofaround16,000to29,000by

1871downfromahighof1,000,000in1865.148Armyofficerswereslowtodraw

connectionsbetweenthehighcasualtyratessufferedonthebattlefieldandadvancesin

modernweaponry.Thus,tacticscontinuedtrailtechnologicaladvancesinwar.149

UntiltheturnoftheTwentiethCentury,warintheeyesofordinary

Americansdidnotappeartorequireanyspecialtrainingorweaponry.Manandmusket

(laterrifle)sufficedinmostsituations.Numerousnineteenthcenturypoliticians,from

JacksontoGarfield,hadbeensuccessfulwartimecommanderswithoutsignificantmilitary

training.Castinthemythicimageofantiquity,ofrepublicanRomeanddemocraticAthens,

theUnitedStatesinheritedinstitutionsofasimilarqualityandcharacter,andlikeRome

andAthensfoundirresistibletherichestobegainedinhonor,land,andmaterialby

heedingthesirencallofwar.Itisnosmallironyofhistorythatsomeofthemost

“bellicose”nationsinhistoryareoftenthosethatbowmosteasilytothevoiceofthe

people.150Theimmenseresourcesofthewestcompelledmenofeverystaturetoexplore

andstriketheirclaims.The“peacetime”U.S.Armyprovidedsecurityforthatwestward

expansionandwasshapedbytheactionstherein.151

147Weigley,HistoryoftheUnitedStatesArmy,189.148Ibid.,567.149Ibid.,232.150AzarGat,WarinHumanCivilization(OxfordUniversityPress,2008),510.151MarcusCunliffe,SoldiersandCivilians:TheMartialSpiritinAmerica,1775-1865(Aldershot,UK:GreggRevivals,1993),46.

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Geographyiseasilyoverlooked.Becauseofitsubiquity,itcanbeaccepted,much

liketime,asamerefactofexistence.However,geographyhasprofoundlyaffectedthe

historyofhumankind.JaredDiamond’sthesisinGuns,GermsandSteelcentereduponthe

roleofgeographyinthedevelopmentofhumanbeingsandcivilization.152TheGermanWay

ofWarbyRobertCitinoand“TheMartialSpirit-NavyStyle”byJohnKuehnbothfollow

similarlinesofanalysistoDiamond’sthesis.Geographyisnottheonlyelementshapingthe

natureofwarfare,butCitinobelievedthatitwasasignificantifnotadominantcontributor

totheGermanwayofwar.153Likewise,KuehndemonstratedtheinfluenceofA.T.Mahan,

whoarguedtheuniquegeographicallocationoftheU.S.madethenationanaturalsea

power,thusshapingtheevolutionoftheU.S.NavyandtheapproachAmericanstookto

powerprojection.154

A“wayofwar”,whateveritmaybeandregardlessofnationalorcultural

inclinations,ismorethanachoice.Rather,itisanamalgamationofqualitiesthatgivea

particularcharactertotheactionsofapeople.Thosefactorsaredictatedasmuch,ifnot

moreso,byenvironmentthanbychoice.GreatBritaindecidedtobecomeagreatseapower

lessasaclearly-definedchoicethanbythefacttheBritishnationaroseonanisland.Japan

couldneverbecomeagreatlandpowernomatteritsambitionsbecauseofitslimited

populationduetogeographicalconstraints.

FrederickJacksonTurnerproposedoneofthemostwell-knowntheoriesonthe

shapingoftheAmericancharacteranditsinstitutionspredicatedontheunique

152Diamond,Guns,Germs,andSteel.153Citino,TheGermanWayofWar,xiv.154JohnT.Kuehn,“TheMartialSpirit—NavalStyle:TheNavalReformMovementandtheEstablishmentoftheGeneralBoardoftheNavy,1873-1900,”TheNorthernMarinerXXII,no.2(April2012):8–12.

65

geographicalpropertiesofNorthAmerica.155TheAmericanfrontierofferedunbounded

opportunity,andunliketheOldWorld,thevast,sparselypopulatedexpanseshada

catharticeffectonthenationasawholethatlimitedviolenceandsocialtensions.156For

thefirstcenturyandahalfof,first,colonialand,then,U.S.control,westwardexpansionwas

thedominantelementofAmericanpoliticsandpolicy.

Turner’sthesiscanbeextendedforthelightitthrowsontheevolutionofthe

AmericanArmyand,byextension,itsofficercorps.Toprotect,advance,andmakeAmerica

acontinentalpowerrequiredanarmybutthesizeandcharacterofthatarmyhadyettobe

determined.Themilitia,despiteJefferson’shopestothecontrary,neverachievedtheends

imaginedforit,andinrealityfailedmiserablyinthewarof1812.157Washingtondespised

themilitia(havingservedwithaVirginiamilitiaunitduringtheSevenYearsWaragainst

theFrench),andperhapshisproximitytothemilitiafurtheredhismisgivingsabout

relianceuponyeomensoldierstoachievemilitarygoals.158Militiaperformancethroughout

theRevolutionremaineduneven,andafterthewarfrontierdemandsaskedtoomuchofthe

militia.ThefledgingArmyoftheRepublicfounditselfstretchedthinlyalongthefrontiers

ofthenation.ThemanningoffortsalongtheAtlanticcoastlineandprotectingpioneerson

theinteriorofthenationkeptsoldiersfullyengagedandthepart-timenatureofmilitia

combinedwiththechallengesofarduousresponsibilitiescalledforapermanentforce.

155FrederickTurner,“WesternState-MakingintheRevolutionaryEra,”TheAmericanHistoricalReview1,no.1(1895),http://www.jstor.org/stable/1834017.;FrederickTurner,“WesternState-MakingintheRevolutionaryEraII,”TheAmericanHistoricalReview1,no.2(1896),http://www.jstor.org/stable/1833651.156Turner,“WesternState-MakingintheRevolutionaryEra,”3.157Jefferson,TheWorksofThomasJefferson,2010,426.158GeorgeWashington,TheWritingsofGeorgeWashingtonVol.IX.1780-1782(G.P.Putnam’sSons,1891),143,154,174,175,454.

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TheArmy,followingtheCivilWar,maintainedastrengthofaround25,000until

1897.Likewise,officerstrengthfoundequilibriumaround2,100activeofficers.159William

GanoeinhisHistoryoftheUnitedStatesArmywastoobserve:“Throughoutthenineteenth

century,withtheexceptionoftheCivilWar,theUnitedStateshadalowerratioofmilitary

personneltopopulationthanJapanoranyEuropeanpower.”160Themapsbelow

graphicallyillustratethewidelyspreaddistributionofactivearmysoldiers;primarilyalong

theentirewesternfrontierfromnorthtosouth.FrancisPaulPruchapublishedAGuideto

theMilitaryPostsoftheUnitedStates1789-1895in1964.Themapscontainedwithinthat

studydemonstratevisuallythedifficultyofficersencounteredintheirmarchtoward

professionalization.161

Thegeographicaldispersionofthearmyprovedformativebothinformand

character,andby1843,whenseveraldozenfortsringedtheperimeteroftheUnitedStates,

mosthadfewerthanfourhundredsoldiersandahandfulofofficers.Communication

betweentheforts,andfromthefortstotheWarDepartment,remainedrudimentaryand

slow.ThedistancefromFortLeavenworth,Kansas,toWashington,D.C.isslightlyovera

thousandmilesandtravelbyhorsebackatthirtymilesaday,anoptimisticpace,tooka

rideralittleoveramonthtomakeaone-waytrip.Asthenationexpandedwestward,the

constructionoffortsfollowedandonoccasionledtheway.

159Weigley,HistoryoftheUnitedStatesArmy,568.160Ganoe,TheHistoryoftheUnitedStatesArmy,220.161FrancisPaulPrucha,AGuidetotheMilitaryPostsoftheUnitedStates:1789-1895(Madison:StateHistoricalSoc.ofWisconsin,1964),11–34.

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TexasjoinedtheUnionin1845andCaliforniafollowedin1850.Asaresultthe

armyestablishednewfortsinthesestates.Afterthebriefexplosioninthearmy’ssizefrom

1846-1848inresponsetotheMexican-AmericanWar,theofficercorpsexpandedby

twelvepercentinthedecadefollowingthewar.162Theincreaseinsizerepresentedan

astonishinglymodestresponsebothtothewarandnewterritoryacquired.Garrisons

remainedquitesmall,frequentlylessthantwohundredsoldierswithafewofficers.163

162Weigley,HistoryoftheUnitedStatesArmy,566.163Prucha,AGuidetotheMilitaryPostsoftheUnitedStates:1789-1895,11–34.

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OvertheensuingdecadethearmyexpandedintoOregon,Arizona,Utah,andNevada

toprovidesecurityforsettlersandcontrolIndiantribes.TheArmy’sprimary,ifnotsole,

dutyduringthisperiodwaspushingIndiansintoreservationsandopeningvastnew

territoriesforwhitesettlement.Understandably,mostIndiansstoutlyresistedthefloodof

settlersintotheirtraditionalgrazingandhuntinglands.Thedustyisolatedpostsdidnot

affordofficersthetimetoreadandstudy,muchlessthinkabouttheirprofession.Their

daysgenerallyconsistedofbackbreakingwork,chasingbanditsandsurvival.Evensuch

simpletasksasfindingfirewoodprovedtimeconsumingasmostnearbywoodswere

quicklyusedupintheconstructionoffortsandforwarmthinthewinter;thetaskbecame

morearduouswitheverypassingyearwithtreksofmorethantenmilesnotuncommon.

Ifoneexaminedthe“typical”experiencesofofficersintheWestduringthisperiod

andusedMaslow’sHierarchyofNeedsasthetemplate,theobviousobservationisthat

officersspentthemajorityoftheirtimeinthelowerrungsofsecurityandsurvival.The

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upperechelonsofthehierarchyoccupiedbyesteemandself-actualizationproveddifficult

toachieveintheday-to-daydemandsofwesternserviceforallbutthemostseniorU.S.

Armyofficers.164

TheCivilWarrepresentedamajorchangeinthisnarrative.Thepeacetimearmy

massivelyexpandedfromsixteenthousandsoldiersin1860toacombinedtotalofmore

thanonemillionNorthernandSouthernsoldiersby1865.Thearmyneverreturnedtoits

prewarsizedespitedischarging950,000soldiersbacktothecivilianworldfollowedby

gradualdeclinefrom1866-1870ofanother20,000.TheArmy’sreturntonormalcynever

achievedthatconditionwhichcamebefore;thenewformnolongerfitintotheold.The

armynumbered27,000soldiers,plusorminusafew,overthethirtyyearsfromtheCivil

War’sendtotheonsetoftheSpanish-AmericanWar.165NearlyeverymajorAmerican

164Maslow,“ATheoryofHumanMotivation,”4.165Weigley,HistoryoftheUnitedStatesArmy,567.

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conflictappearstoendwithaslighttomoderatelevelincreaseinthearmyovertheante-

bellumlevel.Later,whatEisenhowerlabeledthemilitaryindustrialcomplextraceda

similarpathwithshrinkageafterwarbutneverquitetoprewarlevels.166

Thegradualaccumulationofresidualartifacts,thingsrelatedtowar,whether

industrial,technological,ordoctrinalinnowayimpartedanunderstandingofwartoU.S.

Armyofficers.Astheresidueamalgamatestheseexperiencescanhindertheprofession,

impartingknowledgeofthingsaboutwarthatofficersmayspuriouslyinterpretasan

understandingofwar.Theyaretoolsofwar,buttheyarenotwar.Thismisstepwasfatal

becauseitappearedlogical.

WiththeconclusionoftheCivilWar,officersconcernedthemselveswiththe

reconstructionoftheSouth.Makinguseofexistingforts(andsomefewnewonesthat

dottedtheSouth,detachmentsofsoldiershelpedrebuildroads,railways,andtowns.Army

officerswhoremainedintheservicenownearlyuniversallyhadbattlefieldexperience.

Thatwasasignificantpoint,fortherearemanyadvantagestoactualbattlefieldexperience

foranofficer,anddependingontheprofessionalculturedominantatanytime,itcouldbe

thesinglemostimportantfactorthatshapesperceptionsofwar.However,itcanalso

impartadegreeofarroganceinanyofficer,butespeciallytothosethatlackabroadliberal

education.Itisatruismthatthepossessionofaliberaleducationconveysan

understandingofotherwaysofthinkingandbeing.Lackingbreadthofinsightsimparted

byintellectualstudies,officersmaybelievethattheyunderstandwarmorecompletelyand

166DwightD.Eisenhower,“Eisenhower’sFarewellAddresstotheNation,”January17,1961.

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comprehensivelythanothersbasedsimplyontheirexperience,anattitudethatinhibitsthe

developmentoftheindividual,andcollectively,theprofession.167

By1878thevastmajorityoffortsintheSouthhadclosedshopandtheirpersonnel

hadbeenre-deployedtothewest.ChasingrebelliousIndiantribesandprovidingsouthern

bordersecurityonceagainbecamethefocusoftheArmy.FortsinMontanaandWyoming

expandedtobettercontrolthelargereservationsandoccasionalIndianoutlaws.The

movementoffortswestwardlefttheMidwestnearlydevoidofsoldiers.Despitethis,the

army’swesternpopulationsinthesefortsremainedsmall,generallynumberingfewerthan

threehundredsoldierswithonlythreefortsnumberingmorethanathousand.In1878the

armyincludedamere23,870soldiersand2,153officers.168

167JasonW.Warren,“TheCenturionMindsetandtheArmy’sStrategicLeaderParadigm,”Parameters45,no.3(2015):13.168Weigley,HistoryoftheUnitedStatesArmy,567.

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Lifeonthefrontierdidnotaffordmanyopportunitiesforprofessionalizationand

theredidnotseemtobeanyparticularlypressingneedtodoso.ColonelStephenC.Mills,

writingabouthisearlierexperiencesinthewest,summedupanaverageday:

Youwerewet,andcold,andhungry;ordry,andhot,andthirsty,accordingtoyourgeographicallocation.YouchasedelusiveIndiansoverroutesofalkali,rockandsage,theyusuallygotawayfromyouandallyougotinreturnwerethejeersofthefellowswhodidn’thappentobeoutthattrip…Youwerealwaysbehindonyourpaperwork,andwhenyougotthechancetomakepapers,itwasusuallydonewiththepaucityofdetailonlyequaledbyMarkTwain’sboyhooddiary.Amonth’shardscoutingwasdismissedbytheentry‘distancemarchedduringmonth,360miles…’Thesewerethegoodolddayswhenonedrilladay,fivedaysaweek,comprisedmilitarytraining.Targetpracticewaspracticallyunknown.Ithinktheallowanceofammunitionwas20roundsayear,andbycustomoftheserviceitwentinhunting.169

Theenvironment,thephysicalgeography,anddailydemandsonofficersof

nineteenthcenturyAmericalargelymilitatedagainsttheformsofprofessionalizationseen

inEuropeannations,althoughtherewere“professionalizes”intheforce.Onerecent169GeorgeCroghanandFrancisPaulPrucha,ArmyLifeontheWesternFrontier:SelectionsfromtheOfficialReportsMadeBetween1826and1845(UniversityofOklahomaPress,2014).

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historicalstudyhasarguedthe“emergenceofastableprofessionoccurredbetweenthe

warof1812andtheCivilWar.”170However,boththequalityandquantityofthat

professionalizationmustbeinquestion.Certainly,whencomparedtothe

professionalizationoftheofficercorpsinFranceorPrussia,orevenwithinother

professions,theprofessionalizationoftheUnitedStatesArmyfellshortoftheideal.What

isnotinquestionisthatanarmyofdiminutivenumbers,bothinsizeandratiobyany

militaryEuropeanstandard,founditselfscatteredoverageographicalregionvastlylarger

thananysingleEuropeancountry.171TheU.S.Armywaswidelyscatteredonthewestern

frontierinsmallforts,andlikewiseitsideasremainedequallyseparatedbythedistances

andhardshipsimposedbyfrontierservice.

Theexchangeofideas,certainlyanecessaryprerequisitetoanyprofession,were

severelylimitedbythepaucityortotallackofanyroadnetworkconnectingtheseposts.

HistorianWilliamSkeltonhasnotedattheturnofthenineteenthcenturythat“economic

activitiescombinedwithprolongedtenureatsmallpoststoencouragelocalorientationin

theearlyofficercorps-atendencytoidentifywithaparticularcommunityorregionmore

stronglythanwiththearmyasanationalinstitution.”172FrederickJacksonTurnernoteda

similartrendinhiswork,GeographicSectionalisminAmericanHistory,statingthat,“the

UnitedStatesbeingpracticallyaslargeasallofEurope,itmustbethoughtofincontinental,

andnotmerelyinnationalterms.”173Thus,therewereminimalstandards,aboveand

beyondemergence,thatonemustattainbeforesuchidentityconstructionconstitutesthe

170Skelton,AnAmericanProfessionofArms,1992,XV.171Prucha,AGuidetotheMilitaryPostsoftheUnitedStates:1789-1895,7–33.172Skelton,AnAmericanProfessionofArms,1992,46.173FrederickT.Turner,“GeographicSectionalisminAmericanHistory,”AnnalsoftheAssociationofAmericanGeographers16,no.2(1926):1.

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actualizationofaprofession.Ifamilitiaweretoacquirethetitleofanactivearmyunitand

thenfounditselfinbattle,itwouldstillperformtostandardsasconferredbyitstrainingas

militia,tosaynothingofthenotabletimeinvestmentrequiredtodevelopintellectual

facultiescomparedtothoseofbattledrills.Americanpolicythroughoutthenineteenth

centuryfocusedchieflyonwestwardexpansionandtheArmy’sprimary,ifonlyexplicit,job

wastosupportthatend.TheArmyandCongresscouldconceiveofnothreatthatjustified

anarmybeyondthatofIndiandepredationsorcoastalattack,andboththefundingforthe

militaryandnumberofsoldiersinuniformsupportedthatoutlook.

Furthermore,asubtleandlargelyunnoticedphenomenonofexpansionand

contractionwasthecreationofanorganizationalandintellectual“residue”intheofficer

corps.TheWarof1812,Mexican-AmericanWar,CivilWar,andSpanish-AmericanWarall

requiredalargeinfusionofpersonnelwithinabriefwindowoftime.Likewise,

demobilizationproducedthesameactionbutinreverse.Consequently,thesystem

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adoptedandconformedtothesedemands.Materialandmanpowerdemandscouldbemet

through[prodigiousfeatsofaction].Intellectually,however,theofficercorpssuffered,

unabletoattractthebestandbrightestgiventhelimitedopportunitiesforadvancement.

Especiallyduringtheperiodsofeconomicexpansion,financialandotherrewardsfor

militaryservicecontrastedsharplywiththeopportunitiesavailableincivilianlife.174The

processofrapidmobilizationmadesenseinacountrythatprizedequality,andifallare

intellectuallyequalthenoneisdefinedandrecognizedbytheirdeeds.175Theseindividual

facetsamalgamatedtoproduceaculturethatprizedmanagerialskillsandpractical

accomplishment.

AsthecenturycametoacloseandwiththeIndianslargelysubdued,thesmallforts

disappeared.Fortsdecreasedinnumber,butincreasedinsizewithamoreequitable

distributionacrosstheUnion,thelargestconcentrationremainedinthenorth-central

statesnearthereservations.SamuelHuntingtonarguedthatisolationfrompoliticsiskey

tothedevelopmentofaprofessionalbody.176Inthe19thCenturyAmericancontext

isolationismextendedbeyondjustseparationfrompolitics,toincludeseparationofofficer

fromofficer,andgreatlyhamperedtheprocess.Thedistancesinvolvedsufficedtosuffocate

theexchangeofideasnecessarytofirearmyprofessionalization.Notuntilthe20thcentury

dawneddidtheflamesofprofessionalizationburnwithanydegreeofintensity,anditisno

coincidencethatthearmywasinamoregeographicallyfavorablypositiontocapitalizeon

174Skelton,AnAmericanProfessionofArms,1992,118;Huntington,TheSoldierandtheState,198–199.175Huntington,TheSoldierandtheState,203.176Ibid.,34.

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theprocessbythattime.177TheseexperiencesprovidedthecontextualbasisfortheArmy

thattransitionedintothetwentiethcentury.

177ToddR.Brereton,EducatingtheU.S.Army:ArthurL.WagnerandReform,1875-1905(UofNebraskaPress,2000),21–29;Spaulding,TheUnitedStatesArmyinWarandPeace,394–397;PaulA.C.Koistinen,MobilizingforModernWar:ThePoliticalEconomyofAmericanWarfare,1865-1919(UniversityPressofKansas,1997),88–96.

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ChapterIV

JournalsandProfessionalization

Professionalizationgrewapaceduringthenineteenthcenturyinmostfields,butin

theU.S.Army,aspreviouslyemphasized,ittendedtoreflectthepersonaldevelopmental

inclinationsofindividualofficers.Onemeasurementofthatprogresswasthepublication

ofjournals.Dr.SamuelLathamMitchellpublishedTheMedicalRepository(1797),thefirst

medicaljournalintheUnitedStates.178BenjaminSillimanestablishedTheAmericanJournal

ofSciencein1818.179TheNewEnglandJournalofMedicine(1812)istheoldestcontinually

publishedmedicaljournalintheworld.180TheJournaloftheAmericanChemicalSociety,

establishedin1879,isoneofthefirstpublicationsfocusedonchemistryandtheJournalof

theRoyalUnitedServiceInstitution(RUSI),aBritishpublication,firstranin1857and

servedtoinformmilitaryofficers.181

However,Americanmilitaryjournals,especiallythosewhichfocusedontheUnited

StatesArmy,neverenjoyedthesamekindoffinancialsuccess,andthustendedtohave

shorterlivesthatthoseintheengineeringandmedicalfieldsexperienced.182Although

militaryjournalsbrieflyflourishedinthesecondquarterofthenineteenthcentury,many

diedwithinyearsoffirstpublication.183Thesecondhalfofthecenturydidseethe

178RichardJ.KahnandPatriciaG.Kahn,“TheMedicalRepository—TheFirstU.S.MedicalJournal(1797–1824),”NewEnglandJournalofMedicine337,no.26(1997):1926–30.179“AmericanJournalofScience,”AmericanJournalofScience,2014,http://www.ajsonline.org/site/misc/about.xhtml.180“TheNewEnglandJournalofMedicine,”NewEnglandJournalofMedicine,2014,http://www.nejm.org/page/about-nejm/history-and-mission.181“TheRoyalUnitedServicesInstituteThroughHistory,”RUSI,accessedApril21,2014,https://www.rusi.org/history/ref:L4607E6D83729C/.182Skelton,AnAmericanProfessionofArms,1992,258.183Moten,TheDelafieldCommissionandtheAmericanMilitaryProfession,56.

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foundingoftheArmy-NavyJournalduringtheCivilWarbytwobrothersandthe

establishmentofthenavaljournal,Proceedings,in1874,andtheJournaloftheMilitary

ServiceInstitutionoftheUnitedStatesin1879.184Nevertheless,thesejournalswerenot

specifictothearmy,generallylackedtherigorfoundinotherprofessionalpublications,

andfrequentlyfailedtogeneratescholarlydebate—theprimarypurposefortheir

publication;itisworthemphasizingthatconcernsforrank,tradition,andlackofan

existentialthreatcombinedwithvastdistancesservedastheprimaryimpediments

scholarlydebate.185Proceedings,anavalfocusedpublication,representedthebestexample

ofanoutlierinthisrespect.186

Professionaljournalsdemonstrateanintentbothtoexpandspecializedknowledge

andtoorganizethefield.TheArmydevelopedintellectuallyatamuchslowerratethan

someofitscompetitorsacrosstheoceans.First,thegeographicallocationoftheUnited

Statesprovidedanaturalbarriertoongoingintellectualexchangeamongnations.

CompetingstatesbothinEuropeandintheFarEastgenerallyshareborderswithother

maturingstates.Theproximityofthesestatestoeachotherhistoricallyhavecreated

tensions,andthus,professionalizationofofficersandarmiesgrewtodefendstateinterest.

TheU.S.founditselfinanenviablegeographicalpositionasBismarckispurportedtohave

observed:“theAmericanshavecontrivedtobesurroundedontwosidesbyweak

neighborsandontwosidesbyfish.”Thus,formostofitsexistencetheUnitedStatesdid

notfaceexistentialthreatsatanypointonthecompass.U.S.securitythreats,priortothe

184“Proceedings,”U.S.NavalInstitute,2014,http://www.usni.org/about/history;“ArmyOfficersUniting:AMilitaryServiceInstitution.,”NewYorkTimes,September29,1878;FrankLutherMott,AHistoryofAmericanMagazines,1850-1865(HarvardUniversityPress,1938),547.185Moten,TheDelafieldCommissionandtheAmericanMilitaryProfession,56.186Huntington,TheSoldierandtheState,243.

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atomicbombemanatedeitherfrominternalunrestorIndians.Asaresult,theUnited

States’strategicatmospherelackedoneofthekeyelementsnecessarytocatalyzeofficer

professionalization,namelyaproximateenemy.

Incontrast,thePrussians,reelingunderthe1806defeatatJena-Auerstedt

professionalizedtheirofficercorpsundertheguidanceofGerhardvonScharnhorst,andby

1816establishedthemilitaryjournal,Military-Weekly.Thismilitaryjournalremainedin

publicationforonehundredandtwenty-fiveyears.187Prussian,andlater,Germanofficers

usedittoexchangeviewpointsanddevelopideasonwar,anditservedinthatcapacity

until1942whenimpendingdefeat,followingStalingrad,sweptawayanydesireto

continue.Conversely,theUnitedStatesArmy--establishedin1775--predatedthe

formationoftheGermanstatebynearlyonehundredyears.However,theU.S.Army’sfirst

professionalpublication,theInfantryJournal,didnotbeginpublicationuntil1904,one

hundredandtwenty-nineyearsaftertheinstitutionformed.Thus,usingprofessional

journalsasamechanismformeasurement,theGerman-speakingmilitaryprofessionalized

warnearlyacenturybeforetheUnitedStatesArmy.TheexplanationisthattheGerman

strategicenvironmentoccupiedapositionpolaroppositetotheAmerican,apositionthat

compelledtheGermanstomakeaclosestudyofwar.

TheInfantryJournalwasthefirsttruejournalreflectingconcernsoftheU.S.Army.

ItqualifiedasrepresentativeofAmericanmilitaryculturesincetheinfantrybranchwasthe

largestandmostimportantbranchofthearmyduringthisperiod.Thejournal,published

quarterly,focusedonthetacticallevelofwar,thoughalsoincludingoccasionalpiecesthat

examinedpolicydrivenconcerns.Oneenlighteningsectiondevotedtoforeignarticles

187White,TheEnlightenedSoldier,158.

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providedinsightintohowotherarmiesfunctionedandcoveredabroadrangeoftopics.

Forexample,in1912MajorImmanuel,aGermanofficer,authored“TheInfantryAttack:A

ComparisonofthePrinciplesoftheAttackoftheGerman,FrenchandRussianInfantry”,an

articlethatexaminedvarioushistoricalexperiencesthatledtodifferencesinbattle.188

However,takenasawholethejournal(notablydifferingfromthePrussianMilitary-

Weeklyinthisregard)servedmoreasanorganofthearmythanasavenuetoexchange

competingideas.MuchlikeFrenchArmypolicyofintheperiodbetweentheworldwars,if

positionsandconceptsthatappearedinpopularjournalsorperiodicalsoftheperioddid

notconformtotheacceptedpolicyofthedaytheauthoroftenfacedrepercussions.For

example,DwightD.EisenhowerreceivedaverbalreprimandfromMajorGeneralCharlesS.

Farnsworthforpublishingideasthatconflictedwithdoctrine.Eisenhowermodifiedhis

positionasaresultoftheimplicitthreatcouchedinFarnsworth’swarning.189

Ananalysisof1100articlesfromtheInfantryJournalbetween1904and1921

revealsseveralnotabletrends(seegraph).Thematically,thejournaldividedintothirteen

differentsections:lowtechnology(example:saddles,ironsights,backpacks),high

technology(example:machineguns,airplanes,telephones),foreignarticlesontechnology,

foreignarticlesconcerningregulations,training,doctrine(example:tactical,operational,

theoretical),general(Example:companycooksandkitchens),management(socialscience

ofman),humanelement(spiritofman),education,policy(example:militia,strategic,

diplomatic),andafteractionreviews(example:historicalanalysis,battleanalysis,

reflections)providedthestructureforexamination.Majorarticles,ratherthanopinionor

188Immanuel,“TheInfantryAttack:AComparisonofthePrinciplesoftheAttackoftheGerman,FrenchandRussianInfantry,”trans.H.J.Damm,InfantryJournal9(1912)Firstnamenotprovided.189DwightD.Eisenhower,AtEase:StoriesITelltoFriends(GardenCity,NewYork:Doubleday,1967),173.

81

editorialpieces,remainedthefocusoftheanalysis.Thecategoriesofafteractionreviews

and“general”havebeenremovedfromthegraphtofacilitategreaterclarityandfocuson

thosetopicsmostgermanetothedissertation.Theauthorcreatedthegraphdepicted

belowtovisualhighlighttopicalchangeswithintheInfantryJournal.

82

190190DavidHolden,“InfantryJournalArticleAnalysisfrom1904-1921,”October5,2015.

83

Trainingcomprisedtacticalactivitiessuchasmarksmanship,battledrills,andtroop

movementamongotheractivities.However,suchtrainingwasintendedtoachieve

minimalcompetenceatagivenactivityinarelativelyshortperiodoftime.Itdidnotbegin

toapproachthedevelopmentofexpertisebutaimedtoprovidebasicknowledgetonew

recruitsandpracticetoofficerscontrollinglargebodiesofsoldiers.Inthepagesofthe

InfantryJournal,trainingconsistentlyrankedatornearthetopwithaconsiderablespikein

emphasisduring1916-17astheUnitedStatespreparedtoentertheFirstWorldWar.A

significantdropoccurredoncesoldiershitthebattlefield.Onemightassumethe

importanceoftrainingwouldonlyincrease,butoncesoldiersenteredcombat,experience

becametheprimaryinstructor,andthusarticlescorrespondinglyshiftedinemphasis.

TheArmythroughoutitshistorytendedtofocusonthetacticalminutiaeofwar

abovethestrategicdimensionsoforganizedconflict.Thistacticalfocusisunderstandable

giventhisiswherethefightinganddyingtakesplace;furthermore,victoryatthetactical

levelintuitivelyimpliesvictoryinwar,althoughinpracticethatisnotalwaysthecase.

Logicallyonemustproceedfromtheother,butwarisnotrationalandthuslogicdoesnot

penetratefarintothisopaquephenomenon.Nevertheless,theinterestofarmyofficersin

thetacticallevelofwarisreflectedinthequantityofarticlespublishedonthistopicinthe

InfantryJournal.However,atacticalmindsetdoesnotrequiremuchofaneducational

effortsinceitcanlargelybederivedfrompersonalexperiencewithoutadeeper

understandingofthenatureofwaranditsrelationshiptosocial,political,andeconomic

factors.

Atacticalmindset,oneneedstostress,isnotaparticularfocusoftheAmerican

officercorps,anditappearedtoafflicttheotherarmiestovariousdegrees.JonathanM.

84

HouseinTowardCombinedArmsWarfarenotedtwotechnologicalwavesthatmoved

throughWesternarmiesfrom1820-1890.191Thesechangesdirectlyinfluencedbattlefield

tactics,and,thus,generallycontributedtoamyopicviewofwar.

Technologicaldevelopmentsdistractedandconcernedofficersofthelatter

halfofthetwentiethcentury.However,theimportanceoftechnologicalchangeonshaping

thebattlefieldremainedanuncertainrealityintheyearsbeforetheFirstWorldWar.

Technologycouldanddidinfluencebattlesduringtheseventeenththroughnineteenth

century,buttheevidencewasinconclusiveastowhatdegreeitproveddeterminative.The

subjectwasoftenatopicofdebate.Withintheofficercorpshightechnologyranksthirdin

volumeofwritings,butsecondwhenforeignarticlesaboutadvancesintechnologyare

combinedwithdomesticanalysesonthesubject,edgingoutdoctrine.TheRusso-Japanese

Warattunedsomeobserverstothechangingconductofwarandprovidedreaderswith

potentialinsightintotechnologicaltrends.However,thebattlefieldcarnageoftheRusso-

Japaneseconflictoftenfellintoexistinginterpretations,andthus,thebellwethertolledbut

fewperceivedthechangeinpartbecausehistoricallytechnologygenerallyhadanegligible

effectabovethetacticallevel.192Followingthatconflict,foreigntechnologyarticles

generallydeclinedinproportiontodomesticarticles,andbythestartoftheFirstWorld

Warthevastmajorityoftechnologyarticleswereofdomesticorigin.Machineguns

191JonathanM.House,TowardCombinedArmsWarfare:ASurveyof20th-CenturyTactics,Doctrine,andOrganization(FortLeavenworth:CombatStudiesInstitute,1984),7–9.192WilliamH.Johnston,“ALessonFromManchuria:WhatWouldKuropatkinSayofUs?,”InfantryJournalVI,no.6(May1910);MichaelHoward,“MenagainstFire:TheDoctrineoftheOffensivein1914,”PeterParet,GordonA.Craig,andFelixGilbert,eds.,MakersofModernStrategyfromMachiavellitotheNuclearAge(PrincetonUniversityPress,1986),518.

85

populatedmanyoftheearlyarticlesfollowedlaterbynewartillerydevelopments.

Airplanesandtheradio,referredtothenasthe“buzzer”,appearedwithWorldWarI.193

Policyseizedthethirdspot,thoughthismaylargelybetheresultofquantifying

militiaasanartifactofpolicy,butitseemedthemostappropriatefit.Regardless,the

significantquantitiesofarticlesthatdiscusstheroleandcapacityofmilitiaisfurther

evidenceoftheslowintellectualprogressionofthearmyofficercorps.Mostnationshad

longsinceabandonedtheideathatmilitiacouldserveonthemodernbattlefieldwhilein

theUStraining,equipping,anduseofmilitiaoccupiedanodd,ifnotanachronistic

prominenceintheAmericanmind.Arelicofanotheragewithitssourcesinthewellspring

ofJeffersonandotherfounders,themilitia’sconductintheWarof1812shouldhavelong

dispelledsuchillusions.194However,theConstitutionallimitationsonthemilitiaimpeded

developmentofamodern,German-stylereserveforce.195DemobilizationinAmericaand

postwarpolicytowardGermanyconsumedthelatterpagesofpolicypiecesandincreased

notablyin1918and1919.QuestionsonhowandifGermanyshouldbebrokenup

frequentlyappeared.Piecesdiscussedwithhowlargequantitiesofprisonersofwarshould

behandledandthenreleasedafterthewar.196

Doctrineassumedfourthplacebehindpolicyandsomedistancebehindtraining,

althoughgiventhecloserelationshipbetweendoctrineandtrainingonecouldpotentially

amalgamatethetwowithoutdoingtoomuchviolencetotheanalysis.However,by

maintainingthedivisionthearmy’semphasisontraininganddoctrineareamply

193Holden,“InfantryJournalArticleAnalysisfrom1904-1921.”194Ibid.195JonathanM.House,“JohnMcCauleyPalmerandtheReserveComponents,”Parameters12,no.3(1982):11–18.196Holden,“InfantryJournalArticleAnalysisfrom1904-1921.”

86

demonstratedastheyassumedbothfirstandfourthplace.Doctrinalanalysisexploded

followingtheRusso-JapaneseWarasofficersattemptedtofindbattlefieldsolutionstothe

problemsposedbythemachinegunandmodernartillery.Doctrinalanalysissurged

significantlyastheArmypreparedtoenterthewardrawingheavilyfromtheFrenchand

British.However,priortoAmericanentryintothewar,officersfrequentlyexamined

Germandoctrinalmethods.ThiscontinuedtoalesserdegreeoncetheUSenteredthewar

in1917,whenthefocusshiftedtoAmericanexperiences.Officersnolongersoughtto

imitatetheGermans,butrathernowthatitdependedonthem,thefocusofarticlesshifted

tohowandwhattacticalactionsonemighttaketodefeattheGermans.

Surprisingly,doctrinaldiscussiondroppedoffsharplyasthearmyassumedits

allottedplaceinthetrenchesontheWesternFront.InitiallyAmericanofficersdeviated

littlefromthedoctrinewithwhichtheyhadenteredthewarandresisted,ifnotoutright

dismissed,BritishandFrenchexperiences.197Thebattlefieldarbitratesdoctrinaltheory

fromrealityanddelineatesthedistancebetweenthem.Unnecessarysacrificeisoften

proportionaltothedistancebetweenthetwo,sothatpracticalofficersclosethedistance

quickly;intelligentoneshaveashorterjourneyandthecostisconsiderablyless.Some

officercorpsareknowntolargelyjettisondoctrineonceincombatinpreferenceforwhat

works;still,thisgenerallyresultsinonlyminorshiftsratherthanwholesaleabandonment

ofpeacetimedoctrineunlessprobablydefeatsuppliestherequisiteimpetusforchange.

However,becauseofthecloserelationshipbetweentraininganddoctrineitshould

beacknowledgedthatsomearticlescrossedthetopicalthresholdfromdoctrinetotraining;

amoreequitabledistributionprobablywouldhaveresultedifthatcouldbedetermined.

197Kretchik,U.S.ArmyDoctrine,128.

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GiventhetacticalemphasisofthepublicationandtheentranceoftheUSArmyenmasse

intothewar,itlogicallyfollowsthatofficersfocusedonarticlesfortrainingsoldiersforthe

battlefieldsofEuropepriortothewar.Onceonthebattlefield,officershadlesstimeto

writeandprobablyimprovisedutilizingwhattheyexperienced.

Foreignpiecesrankedfifthonthelist,butprovidedsomeofthemoreintellectually

interestingandthoughtfularticlesinthejournal.Translatedarticleswerefrequently

brokenintosegmentsandreleasedconsecutivelyovermultipleissues.Foreignarticles

acquaintedofficerswithrecentchangesonbattlefieldsaroundtheworldthatthey

otherwisewouldhavelacked.198RussianandJapanesetranslationsremainedrelatively

rarewiththevastmajoritycomingfromFrenchandGermansourceswithorganizational

andtechnologicalfactorscomprisingmostofthematerial.Workspublishedbythe

GermanGeneralStaffrankednearthetop,ifnotthemostcommonsourcefor

translations.199

Thecategoriesofregulations,general,andlowtechnologygrabbedthemiddling

positionsandarenotableonlyfortheirmediocrity.Theydemonstrateneitheragreat

interest,noralackthereof,andthereforearenotexaminedindetail.Thelightburns

brightestatthepoles,wherethatwhichanorganizationvalues,anddoesnot,isrevealed.

Managementmaybedefinedasthecontrolofboththeinanimateandtheanimate

foragivenpurpose.Inthiscontextmanagementisconcernedwiththecontrolofpeople

thatencompassesthesocialsciences,whichattheturnoftheTwentiethCenturywere

rapidlyexpandingfieldsdrivenbyprogressiveideasandanoptimisticviewofhuman

nature.Ifthehumanelementisdistinctwithitsfocusonthespiritofmanthen198Holden,“InfantryJournalArticleAnalysisfrom1904-1921.”199Ibid.

88

managementembodiesamechanisticviewofman.Managementplacedlast,butthat

makesitnotablenotforaperceivedlackofinterest,but,tothecontrary,thattherewould

besomuchemphasisonthisconceptintheemergingcircumstanceofwhathasbeen

termedthe“managerialrevolution”intheUnitedStates.200Thatmanagementbeincluded

atallisofinterest.Oneofthefirst“management”orientedarticlesappearedinthe

September,1910editionoftheInfantryJournal.CaptainF.J.Morrow’sarticleentitled

“CharacterExcellent”,examinedhowtocollect“data”usingformstorecord“efficiency”and

thenusethatdatafora“pay…bonus.”201FrederickTaylor’sinfluencewasunmistakable

hereandtheimportanceof“timeandmotionstudies”wastoincreaseexponentiallyinthe

U.S.Armyovercomingdecades.202

ManagementwasatopicofconsiderableinterestasthearmyenteredtheWorld

WarI.Armyofficerssearchedformethodstomotivateandcontrolmenundertheintense

firesofmachinegunsandrapid-fireartillery.Thehumanelement,especiallyinthecontext

ofbayonetwarfare,wasacommontopic,butgenerallypsychologicalanalysisonthefaceof

battleissparseatthispoint.ClausewitzandlaterColonelArdantduPicqtheorizedabout

emotioninwar,butmostofficersdiscussedtheimportanceofwhatcametobeknownas

“morale,”assessingthespiritofsoldiers,onlyinpassing.Thefieldofpsychologywasinits

infancywithanecdotalevidenceastheprimaryinformingsource.203

GeneralCharlesP.Summerall,ChiefofStaffoftheArmy,spoketotheArmyWarCollegein

February,1927on“TheHumanElementinWar.”Heemphasizedtheimportanceofthis

200MerrittRoeSmith,“Introduction,”MerrittRoeSmith,ed.,MilitaryEnterpriseandTechnologicalChange:PerspectivesontheAmericanExperience(MITPress,1985),10–29.201F.J.Morrow,“CharacterExcellent,”InfantryJournalVI,no.2(September1910).202FrederickWinslowTaylor,ShopManagement(HarperandBrothers,1919).203ArdantduPicq,BattleStudies,84–93.

89

element,especiallytheimportanceofleadershipaboveallotherfactorsinmotivatingmen.

Summerall’sspeechwasintendedtohighlighttheroleofmaninwar,butitselfassumed

thatamechanisticformulacouldbeemployed.Soldiersaresomethingtobemanaged

throughvariousmethodsemployedbytheleader.Thus,hecelebratedthehumanelement

butthentreatedthesubjectasanobjectivegovernedbymechanicalprescriptions.

Summerallobserved,“whiletheconsiderationofthehumanelementispredominantin

war,thereisagreatnecessityofcomprehendingitasanessentialinthemanagementof

meninpeace.”204Summerall’ssuppositionmightbeindicativeoftheperiodasofficers

struggledontheprecipiceoftechnologicalchangetocomprehendthewrenchinglessonsof

WorldWarI.

Sincethedawnofrecordedhistory,massesofindividualhumanbeingsbearing

personalweaponshadreignedsupremeonthebattlefield.However,thelessonsofWorld

WarIindicated,ifonelooksatthesheerscaleofbattlefieldcasualties,thatthisparadigm

nolongerremainedvalid.Summerallequivocatedabouttheissue,stating,“Itistritetosay

thatthehumanelementremains,asithaseverbeen,thedeterminingfactorinbattle.

Machinesandarmsmaybemultipliedandchanged,butthemanwhousesthemwill

determinethefinalissuesofvictoryordefeat.”205Theroleofmachinesandarmshaving

beenacknowledged,heheldtotheview,asemphasizedinthelatterhalfoftheabove

quotation,thatmannotmachinedecidestheoutcomeofwar.However,thekeywordin

theabovepassagebySummerallis“uses”.Victoryisnowachievedbythesoldierwhobest

wieldsmoderntechnology.Mannolongercarriesthebattlealonebutinconjunctionwith

thetool,andeventuallyonlythetoolwouldbecomepivotal.204C.P.Summerall,“TheHumanElementinWar,”TheCoastArtilleryJournal66,no.4(April1927):293.205Ibid.

90

Theso-called“AmericanWayofWarorBattle,”whatevernomenclatureoneprefers,

beginstorevealitselfhere.206QuiteapartfromtheGermanmodelthatAmericanofficers

desiredtoemulate,inmanyfacetsitremainedinderivationclosertotheFrenchsystem.

Nonetheless,auniquelyAmericansynthesisofbattledeveloped,buttheevolutionwasless

organicandmoremechanicalinnature.HistorianJörgMuthinCommandCulturehitthe

markwhenhestated:

IfthemostimportantverbandthemostimportantnounshouldbefoundfortheU.S.ArmyandWehrmacht,accordingtothevastnumberofmanuals,regulations,letters,anddiaries,andautobiographiesIhaveread,theywouldbe“manage”and“doctrine”fortheU.S.Armyandführon(lead)andAngriff(attack)fortheWehrmacht.Suchacomparisonalonepointsoutafundamentallydifferentapproachtowarfareandleadership.207

TheAmericansystemofwardevelopedmechanicallyfromthearmories,industries,

andbureaucraciesofcapitalisminthegeographicalisolationofaNorthAmericancontinent

devoidofotherseriousstatepredators.Conversely,thePrussianwayofwardeveloped

organicallyfromwarwherethemostcommonverbandnoun,asnotedbyMuth,were

“lead”and“attack.”Thesetermsarenaturaloutgrowthsofhumanconflictandcapturethe

essenceofwar.Onedoesnotmanagemeninwar,oneleadsandinspires.AsClausewitz

noted“themostpowerfulspringsofactioninmenlieinhisemotions”andonedoesnot

managetheirwaytopassion.208

AzarGatinWarandCivilizationargued,“humansthusbecamequintessentialfirst-

strikecreatures.”209Unlikeanimals,humanshaveweaksensesanddefenses,buthavean

incredibleintellect.Inthehumanrealm,raidsandambushesareinherentlysuperiorform

206AuntulioEchevarria,“TowardanAmericanWayofWarEchevarria”(StrategicStudiesInstitute,2003),3.207JörgMuth,CommandCulture:OfficerEducationintheU.S.ArmyandtheGermanArmedForces,1901-1940,andtheConsequencesforWorldWarII(Austin:UniversityofNorthTexasPress,2011),195.208Clausewitz,OnWar,112.209Gat,WarinHumanCivilization,2008,129.

91

ofwarfarefromapsychologicalstandpoint.InthewordsofErwinRommelinhisclassic

study,InfantryAttacks,“itisbettertobethehammerthantheanvil.”210“Lead”and“attack”

formedthedominantmindsetoftheWehrmacht--notehowcloselythosevaluescorrelate

withthoseGatobservedinearlywarfare.TheGermansintuitivelynurturedandlater

consciouslydevelopedvaluesthatorganicallydevelopedfromcontinuouswarfareover

centuries.Conversely,theU.S.ArmycameofageduringtheSecondIndustrialRevolution,

withahistoryinfusedwithtechnologicalsolutions,andinthisageonemanagedmachines.

Menwereconsideredmachines(orcogsinagiganticmachine)andsoonemanaged

men.211

TheNavy,achildofthesameage,exhibitedsimilarsymptoms.AdmiralBradleyA.

Fiskein1916describedtherequirementsofamodernnavalforceinTheNavyasaFighting

Machine.212FisketracedthemechanizationofnavalwarfarebacktotheCivilWarclash

betweentheMerrimacandtheMonitorwitheachsubsequentyearseeingmore

“machinery.”213Furthermore,heobserved,“theattitudeofofficers…issomuchmore

favorabletonewappliances…butaveryfewyearsagomanydeviceswerelosttous

becausetheywereconsidered‘notadaptedtonavaluse.’Nowweendeavortoadapt

them.”214AlthoughFiskeappreciatedthefogofwar,theroleofchance,andtheimportance

ofeducationhefrequentlyreturnedtoamechanisticthemehighlightingtheimportanceof

themachineabovethatoftheindividual.215

210DavidFraser,Knight’sCross:ALifeofFieldMarshalErwinRommel(NewYork:HarperCollins,1994),58.211Mumford,TechnicsandCivilization,46–51.212BradleyAllenFiske,TheNavyasaFightingMachine(NewYork:C.Scribner’ssons,1916).213Ibid.,197.214Ibid.,198.215Ibid.

92

FiskeconceivedoftheNavyasahybrid,ablend,asynthesisofmanandmachine;

however,asFiskenoted,“…ourmaterialasmaterialmustbebetterthanourpersonalas

personal”,inthisrelationshipthepartnerswerenotcoequals.216Inthisrespect,theNavy’s

inclinationtowardthemachineisperhapsamorenaturaltendencyandappearedearlier

thanthatoftheArmy.Nevertheless,theinclinationofbothservicestraversedaparallel

paththoughperhapsnotatanevenpace.

ProfessionaleducationintheAmericanofficercorps,beyondwhatwenowcallthe

undergraduatelevel,hadneverbeenvigorouslysupportedandusuallymetwithahealthy

doseofdisdain,especiallyamonglong-servingArmyofficers.Thus,itisnoaccidentthat

whenprofessionalmilitaryeducationfirstcametotheUnitedStatesitcameviathepathof

theNavy,nottheArmy.217Officersaffectedtheworldaroundthemthroughaction,not

intellectualpursuits,andthiswasreinforcedonadailybasisonthefrontier.Thegrowthof

technologyincreasedthewidgetsofwar,andthusnecessitatedgreatertechnicismwithin

theofficercorps.Technicalknowledgeisknowledgeoftheinanimate,thetoolsofthetrade

thatareasubsetofwarproper.

ThenumberofarticlesinInfantryJournalthatdiscussedtheofficereducation

systemrankednearthebottom,andthatconclusionissupportedthroughoutallvolumes

examinedfrom1904to1921.218Thisisnotanunsurprisingrevelation,asArmy

institutionshaverarelybeencitedasintellectualincubators.Anaggregateassimilationin

totalityofmaterialonthearmyofficercorpsacrossitsexistenceindicatesthatifone

imaginedacontinuumwithanabsolutelyprofessionalstudentofwarononeendopposed

216Ibid.217Kuehn,“TheMartialSpirit—NavalStyle:TheNavalReformMovementandtheEstablishmentoftheGeneralBoardoftheNavy,1873-1900.”218Holden,“InfantryJournalArticleAnalysisfrom1904-1921.”

93

byanabsolutewarriorattheother,thereisanundeniabletendencyofmilitaryhistorians

toinclinetheneedletowardthewarrior.219Historiansandofficersalikehaveageneral

lackofinterestinprofessionaleducationforofficers,andareviewoftheInfantryJournal

confirmsthisconclusion.

SamuelHuntington,inTheSoldierandtheState,oneofthedefinitiveworkson

officerprofessionalism,arguedthattheuniquesynthesisbetweendemocraticand

aristocraticidealsbothinPrussiaandlaterFranceprovidedthefertilegroundfromwhich

officerprofessionalismdeveloped.Aristocraticbeliefsinhonor,courage,andfidelityco-

mingledwiththedemocraticnotionsofmeritandthefreeexchangeofideas.220This

uniqueamalgamationcreatedtheperfectenvironmentforarmyprofessionalismto

germinate.

Asmentioned,historianWilliamSkeltonarguedtherootsofprofessionalismtook

holdintheSouthpriortotheCivilWar.221Huntingtonbelievedthattheprocessgainedits

impetusbetweentheCivilWarandtheFirstWorldWar.222WhethertheU.S.Armyofficer

corpsprofessionalizedbeforeorafter1865,therootsoftheofficercorpslackedthe

environmentnecessarytoproduceaphilosophyofwar.TheU.S.Armydevelopedinan

environmentdistinctlydifferentfromthatofPrussia.AmericansocietyandCongress

neithervaluednorperceivedtheneedforaprofessionalarmyofficercorps,preferring

insteadadispersedconstabularywhoseofficerswereengineersandnationbuildersrather

thansoldier-intellectuals.However,whilethegeopoliticalpositionoftheUnitedStates

219Muth,CommandCulture,1–13;BrianLinn,“TheAmericanWayofWarRevisited,”TheJournalofMilitaryHistory66,no.2(April2002):501–33;Huntington,TheSoldierandtheState,194–204;Skelton,AnAmericanProfessionofArms,1992,238.220Huntington,TheSoldierandtheState,35.221Skelton,AnAmericanProfessionofArms,1992,xiii.222Huntington,TheSoldierandtheState,237.

94

generallysubvertedtheintellectualdevelopmentofthearmyitprovidedanobviousneed

andsoundanchorforofficereducationintheNavy,spurredonbythefirstnavaltheoristin

history.AlthoughthearmylookedtoandmodeleditselfoffitsEuropeankin,itlackedthe

fundamentalandnecessarysupportofthestatestructure.223Americansocietydidnot

demonstrateanti-militarismsomuchasanti-professionalisminfusedwithaheftydoseof

governmentanimosity.Therefore,theeducationalburdenimposedontheofficercorpswas

relativelylightthroughoutthearmy’shistory.

In1855,SecretaryofWarJeffersonDavisdispatchedthreeofficers,includingthen-

CaptainGeorgeB.McClellan,tostudyEuropeanMilitaryInstitutions.224In1875General

WilliamT.ShermansentGeneralEmoryUptontoEuropetoobserveEuropeanandAsian

armies.UptonchosetofocusonEuropeanarmiesanduponhisreturnpublishedThe

ArmiesofEuropeandAsiain1878.225SpenserWilkinson,aBritishmilitaryjournalistand

historianpublishedTheBrainofanArmyin1895asanaccountoftheGermanGeneral

Staff.226OtherreformerstovisitEuropeincludedArthurWagner,JohnSchofield,Tasker

Bliss,WilliamCrozier,andA.T.Mahan.OfficersdrewupontheirEuropeanobservations

andasaresultarmydoctrinemarchedcloselyinstepwiththatofEuropeexceptforminor

culturalinfluences,whicharealwayspresentinarmies,suchastolerationofdissent,

educationalemphasis,andreligiousimplicationsamongothersconcerns.Bytheturnof

thetwentiethcentury,severalU.S.Armyfiascos,especiallyexperiencesintheSpanish

AmericanWar,providedsufficientevidencetosuggestthatchangewasnecessary.

223MichaelA.Bonura,“AFrench-InspiredWayofWar,”ArmyHistory,no.90(Winter2014);Skelton,AnAmericanProfessionofArms,1992,249–250,255.224Moten,TheDelafieldCommissionandtheAmericanMilitaryProfession,XI.225EmoryUpton,TheArmiesofEurope&Asia(Chicago:Griffin&Co.,1878).226SpenserWilkinson,TheBrainofanArmy(Westminster,England:Constable,1895).

95

Duringthefirstdecadesofthetwentiethcentury,theworldoutsidetheArmy

acceleratedatapacerarelyseenbeforeinhumanhistory.Electricity,thetelephone,

automobileandinthenearfuturetheairplaneallcontributedtosocialupheavalattheturn

ofthecentury.TheProgressivemovementcapturedmuchofthefrustration,excitement

andideasgeneratedinpartbythesenewtechnologies.Foritsportion,thegenerally

conservativeofficercorpsstruggledtocopewithpressuresbroughttobearbysocietyat

large.Thearmyremainedcaughtbetweenmilitaryvirtues,traditions,anditspast

constabularyfunctions,allofwhichwerejuxtaposedtoanuncertainfutureinfusedwith

socialandtechnologicalchangeandgrowingAmericanpowerandengagementinthe

worldofgeopolitics.

Nonetheless,thepagesoftheArmy’sInfantryJournalfrom1904to1921more

directlyreflectedthecomingchangesofthenewcenturyratherthanalookbacktothe

peaceful,pastorallifeofthe[infrequently]armedyeoman.Themundaneandtrivial

articlesthatfilledthepagesoftheInfantryJournalin1904maturedquickly.Technological

progressoverthelastfewdecadesstartedtoconvergeattheturnofthecentury.The

movementofpeopleandideascross-crossedacrosstheWesternworldwithatempoand

senseofconnectednessrarelyexperiencedinhistory.ThearticlesintheInfantryJournal

reflectedthischange.Discussionsonmachinegunsbecamemorecommonasdidthosethat

dealtwithforeignaffairs.By1906,articlesontheRusso-JapaneseWarstartedtopopulate

thepagesofthejournal,asofficersacquiredagreaterinterestineventsoutsidethe

continentalUnitedStates.Asaresult,discussionsabouttheAmericanCivilWarandmilitia

diminishedtoatrickle.Thepagesofthejournaleruptedwithenergy,ifnoturgency,with

thestartoftheWWIin1914.

96

Ideasontraining,doctrine,andpolicyfilledthepagesoftheInfantryJournalduring

thewar.Likewise,interestintechnologyincreased,butlessthanonemightsuppose.That

lessoncameonlyaftertheexperience.Theinfluenceandroleofadvancedtechnology

becameoneofthemostenduringandpowerfulconclusionsofthewar.Victorywas

measuredbycelebratingtanks,artillery,andquantityofmaterial,and,muchlessso,the

humanspirit.Likewise,ideasaboutfuturewarwerenowderivedfromexperiencesonthe

battlefieldsofEurope,liketheSommeandtheMeuse-Argonne.Officersnolonger

reminiscedabouttheirgrandfather’spartatBullRunorGettysburg.Nowtheyspokeof

theirownexperienceofcombat.

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ChapterV

InroadsofEfficiency

TheUnitedStatesexperiencedrapidandwrenchingchangeduringtheclosing

decadesofthenineteenthcenturyandthefirstdecadeofthenextcentury.Scientific

advancement,technologicaldevelopment,andsocialchangeamalgamatedintoavolatile

tonicthatacceleratedthepaceoflife.Thegovernmentalinstitutionscraftedinanagrarian

ageunderaslowertempowerestrained(andinsomeinstancesbroken)underthe

pressuresofrapid,unrelentingchangeinthisnewmachineage.Thefoundingfathershad

envisionedanagrarianstate,geopoliticallydisinterested,anddefendedbycitizen-soldiers;

theseassumptionsandmorefalteredinaworldmadesmallerbytechnology.Thesonsand

daughtersofCivilWarveteranswitnessedtheintroductionofelectricity,thetelephone,

airplane,and,ultimately,theatomicbomb.Somebureaucraticinstitutionsexpandedand

otherswerecreatedtosupportthegrowingfederalizationofgovernment.Bothpublicand

privateinstitutionsinAmericahadtoevolveinresponsetoachangingworldiftheywere

toremainrelevant.227

Thepressuretoinduceactionandrevampantiquatedsystemsaccumulated

graduallyinthesystem.Eventually,in1883CongressactedandpassedthePendletonAct,

whichrepresentedtheFederalGovernment’sfirstdeliberateattempttoimproveefficiency

offederalemployeesthroughlegislation.ThePendletonActintroducedthemeritsystemof

promotionandprotectedemployeesfromunlawfulterminationbasedonpersonalpolitical

227Hughes,AmericanGenesis,chap.3,4,5,6;BrianMcAllisterLinn,TheEchoofBattle:TheArmy’sWayofWar(HarvardUniversityPress,2009),chap.4;Koistinen,MobilizingforModernWar,chap.4;PaulKennedy,TheRiseandFalloftheGreatPowers(NewYork:KnopfDoubledayPublishingGroup,2010),242–249.

98

affiliation.228Thus,itreducedtheawardofgovernmentjobsthroughpatronage,nepotism

andpoliticalrelationships.ThePendletonActmovedthefederalgovernmenttowarda

moreequitableandefficientcivilianpersonnelsystem.Inmanywaysthisputfederal

institutionsonasimilarfootingfoundwithinthebroaderbusinessworld.Incontrast,

however,reformofmechanismsforselectionandretentionoftheArmyofficercorps

developedatananemicpaceincomparison.Onlydecadeslaterwassufficientforce

broughttobearbythosecommittedtoequityandefficiency.

Aspreviouslynoted,theU.S.Armyofficercorpsincurredsignificantintellectual

debtstotheirEuropeancounterpartsthatcanbetracedbacktothecolonialperiod.The

youngGeorgeWashingtonservedasamilitiaofficerinBritishserviceduringtheFrench

andIndianWars;later,WashingtoncommandedtheContinentalArmy,trainedbythe

PrussianGeneralSteuben,intheRevolutionaryWaragainsthisformerBritishmentors.

IntellectualstreamsofBritish,Prussian,andFrenchmilitarythoughtmingledand

influenced,tovaryingdegrees,generationsofU.S.Armyofficers.229

MajorSylvanusThayerexercisedsignificantinfluenceontheearlydevelopmentof

WestPointtothedegreethathistorianshavegivenhimthebyname“FatherofWest

Point.”230ThayeremphasizedengineeringintheWestPontcurriculumandvisitedFrance

in1815formoreinstructionalmaterial.WestPointwastheonlyinstitutionthattaught

engineeringinAmericauntil1824.231Interestingly,thefocusonengineeringdiverged

fromthehistoricaldominanceoftheinfantryandcavalryofficersamongEuropeannobility

228“ThePendletonAct”(29Cong.Rec.416,1897).229RussellF.Weigley,TowardsanAmericanArmy:MilitaryThoughtfromWashingtontoMarshall(ColumbiaUniversityPress,1962),7.230StephenAmbrose,Duty,Honor,Country:AHistoryofWestPoint(TheJohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1999),63.231Ibid.,97.

99

andfurtherhighlightedtheimportance,ifnotelevation,ofatechnologicalfieldoverthe

traditionalbranches.WestPoint’slibrarywaspopulatedbyFrenchengineeringworks

mostofwhichwerenottranslated.232Engineersfrequentlyhadshortstintsinthemilitary

andmovedontomorethelucrativeworkinprivateemployment.Nevertheless,by1860

WestPointgraduatesaccountedfor76percentofofficersinthearmy.233

Formuchofthenineteenthcentury,traditionalpatternsofappointmentand

educationheldtrueforthosewhoservedasofficersintheU.S.Army.Littlewasdoneto

remedytheorganization’sleisurelyifnotapatheticapproachtochange.AftertheCivil

War,veteransdominatedseniorpositionsandenvisionedlittlechangeintheconductof

war;senioritycombinedwithbattlefieldexperiencemorethansufficedtosuppressthe

ideasandconcernsoflessexperiencedofficersandthosewhoserankdidnotallowthema

voicecommensuratetotheirarguments.Unconventionalwarfarereceivedlittleattention

inthedoctrinaldevelopmentinthepost-CivilWarperiod,despitethefrequencyarmy

engagementswithIndiansandbanditsinthewestandsouthwest.234

JohnM.Schofield,whoservedthroughouttheCivilWarandlaterascommanding

GeneraloftheArmyfrom1888-1895,observedin1879that,“everyprogressmadeinthe

methodsofwarbringsthemmorewithinthedomainofscience.Theartofwarhasalready

approachedthemarginoftheexactsciences,andtheelementsoftheproblemswhichwar

presentsforsolutionarevastlymorecomplexanddifficultofexactmeasurementthan

thosewithwhichanyotherbranchofsciencehastodeal.”235Schofieldacknowledgednot

232Moten,TheDelafieldCommissionandtheAmericanMilitaryProfession,31.233Ibid.,43.234Kretchik,U.S.ArmyDoctrine,81–83.235JohnM.Schofield,“InauguralAddress,”JournaloftheMilitaryServiceInstitutionoftheUnitedStates1,no.1(1879):3.

100

onlyanawarenessofwar’sevolution,butalsoitsgrowingcomplexity.Heusedtheterm

“science,”andthatisfrequentlyusedasaninclusivetermfortechnologyduringthisperiod.

Scienceandtechnology,althoughrelated,arealsodistinct,adivisionnotreadilymadeat

thispoint.

WestPointservedlessasaplacetotrainmilitaryofficersandmoreaninstitution

toproduceengineers,whichrealizedPresidentJefferson’soriginalintent.236However,like

somanythingsinhistorythesecondaryandtertiaryeffectsareoftenfarbeyondone’s

abilitytoforesee.Machiavelliappraisedthematterandarguedthatnotonlyaresuch

effectsdifficulttoforesee,butoften,oratleastinpart,impossibletocontrolinhisopinion,

“…thatfortuneisarbiterofhalfouractions.”237JeffersonbelievedthattheUnitedStates

neededengineersifitweretodevelopandcompetitivelycompeteintransatlantic

commerce,andinthatpropositionhewascorrect.However,thebyproductoflocatingthe

engineeringcomplexin,andas,theintellectualcenterofthearmycastwarintheshadow

ofanarchitect.OtherintellectualbarometersbeyondWestPointcurriculumincluded

frontierexperience,journals,andmilitarymanuals.

Thedrillanddoctrinalmanualsprovideinsightintothemethodsandintellectual

rootsthatprovidedafoundationfortheAmericanapproachtotheconductofwarfare.As

lateas1891,InfantryDrillRegulationsstillemphasizedmethodsoftheCivilWar.238The

officialmanualfocusedheavilyonvarioustacticalformationsfromplatoontodivision,and

othermodificationsweremostlyminoradjustments.239Theregulationsprovided

236ThomasJefferson,TheWritingsofThomasJefferson,Volumes3-4,1907,471.237Machiavelli,ThePrince,98.238PerryD.Jamieson,CrossingtheDeadlyGround:UnitedStatesArmyTactics,1865-1899(Tuscaloosa,AL:UniversityofAlabamaPress,1994).239U.S.Army,InfantryDrillRegulations1891(D.AppletonandCompany,1891).

101

extensiveexamplesofmaneuversforlowertiersofcontrolandbasicguidanceisgivenfor

camps,marches,andbattlefieldactions.Bayonetexercisesoccupyarespectableeight

pagescomparedtosevenforfiringpositions.240However,thoughthetopicofmodern

weaponswasnotunknowntoofficers,itwasstillsomewhatforeignandhadyettomakeits

wayintotheapprovedliterature.TheFranco-PrussianWarhadofferedaglimpseintothe

future,andthoughitinfluencedtheU.S.ArmytosomedegreeEuropeanexperienceand

intimateknowledgeofchangesinwarfareweregenerallyconsideredtobeirrelevantto

America’ssituation.

AmericanofficersreliedonwhathadhappenedintheUnitedStatesoverthe

previouscenturyinthequartercenturyafterGettysburg.Thestrongest,mostpotent,and

influentialformofknowledgeisthatwhichisempirical.Knowledgederivedfromsecond

ordersources--evensuchvisualevidenceasphotographsandfilms--lackthepurevisceral

energyoffirsthandexperience.Itcanbeclaimedthatthistendencyextendstonations,

whichfrequentlyvieweventsthroughanethnocentricorculturallens.Thus,European

observersintheRusso-JapaneseWarcouldchalkupstatisticaloutlierstocultural

shortcomingsoflesserpeoples.IntheFirstWorldWarAmericanofficerslargelyfailedto

incorporatetacticallessonsoftheFrenchandBritishexperiencesbelievingthatAmerican

soldierscouldbesuccessfulwhereothersfailed.Furthermore,intheSecondWorldWar,

lessonsfromtheBattleofBritainwereagainlargelyignoredbyofficersofthearmyair

corpsinregardstounescortedbombers.Thus,thearmyobtainedinformationfrom

militaryattachesandotherobserversofwarfareacrossbothAtlanticandPacificoceans,

buttheknowledgeprovidedremaineddistinctlysecondaryinnature.Whileonecan

240Ibid.,55.

102

legitimatelynotethepowerofexceptionalismforAmericans,thetendencytoemphasize

personalexperienceorthatoftheirownnationovertheexperiencesofothersisnot

entirelyanAmericanaberration.Bynature,mangenerallyvaluespersonalexperienceto

thosemanifestationsofcultureandoutlookthataredeemedtobeforeign.Nationalism,

especiallyhyper-nationalismsuchaspracticedbyNaziGermany,demonstratesthis

particularfacetinspades.241

The1891InfantryDrillRegulationsmanualwasrenamedtheFieldService

Regulations(FSR)in1905,and,whilemaintainingtheprimacyoftheinfantry,thename

changealonesignaledashiftinthecurrentsofthoughtamongarmyofficers.Morethan

merelyacosmeticnamechange,the1905FieldServiceRegulationswasnolongera

compositeoftopicslooselyconnected.Ratheritnowofferedalogicalandordered

approachtothemilitarycraftandreflectedagrowingprofessionalizationoftheofficer

corps.Battlepropernowconsumedafargreaterpercentageofthemanualthanithadin

thepast.Orders,organization,list,andtablespervadedthe1905additionprovidingaclear

structure.Furthermore,andthiswasasignificantchange,themanualnolongersimply

statedwhatonedoesbutitdetailedhowonedidit,andtowhatdegree,andwhatthe

finishedproductshouldapproximate.242

The1891versionbeganwithdefinitionsandmoveddirectlytobasiccommandsto

controlsoldiers.However,the1905FieldServiceRegulations(FSR)progressedfroma

descriptionoftheU.S.Army’sorganizationtogeneralprinciples--anaturaldescentfrom

macrotomicro.Forexampleunderthetitle“Orders”points1-3read:

241AdolfHitler,MeinKampf(BottomoftheHill,2010),chap.11NationandRace.242U.S.Army,InfantryDrillRegulations1891;WarDepartment,FieldServiceRegulationsUnitedStatesArmy1905(GovernmentPrintingOffice,1905).

103

27.Amilitaryorderistheexpressionofthewillofachiefconveyedtosubordinates.28.Theartofgivingproperdirectionsandorderstotroopsisoneofthemostimportantfeaturesintheexerciseofcommand.29.Thehigherthepositionofthecommander,themoregeneralincharacterwillhisordersbe.Atthebeginningofoperations,andfromtimetotimethereafter,theplansandintentionsofthesupremeauthoritywillprobablybecommunicatedintheformoflettersofinstructions.Theseregulatemovementsoveralargeareaandforconsiderableperiodsoftime.243

Armydoctrineexemplifiedasubtleandcautiousshiftinthinkingandremainedthe

purviewoftheinfantryfortheforeseeablefuture.WalterKretchikinU.S.ArmyDoctrine

observed,“the1891and1895manuals,thedirectdescentsinalinetraceabletothe1779

Regulations,hadbeenwrittentoguideaninfantrydominatedforce.Whenchangecame

oncemore,itwasagaintechnologythatdroveit.”244Technologycertainlyservedasa

catalyst.

However,itmustbenotedthattechnologicalperformanceinAmericanexperience

onthebattlefield,bothduringtheCivilWarandagainsttheindigenousnativeAmericans,

hadbeenuneven,andthus,concreteconclusionscouldnotbeeasilydrawn.Thelegacyof

CivilWarindustrialproductionprovedmorestableanditseffectoverthecourseofawar

providedaquantitativeedgebothasdriveronthebattlefieldandoftheeconomyat

home.245

Thegrowinglethalityofthebattlefield,asdemonstratedbothbytheCivilWarand

morerecentconflictsaroundtheglobe,produceddoctrinalconsternationamongarmy

officersattheturnofthecentury.Infantryformationsthathadbeenusedforthelast

severalhundredyears,harkingbacktotheRomanlegionandtheSpanishtercio,offered

243WarDepartment,FieldServiceRegulationsUnitedStatesArmy1905,27.244Kretchik,U.S.ArmyDoctrine,104.245Koistinen,MobilizingforModernWar,88,96;KnoxMacGregorandMurrayWilliamson,TheDynamicsofMilitaryRevolution,1300-2050,1sted.(CambridgeUniversityPress,2001),4.

104

greatercontrolandconcentrationoffire,butinthefaceofaccurateartilleryfireandrapid

firegunsweretantamounttosuicide,accordingtosomejuniorU.S.armyofficers.246The

GermanssolvedpartoftheproblemthroughthephilosophyofAuftragstaktikaformof

decentralizedcontroltoallowsubordinatestoexerciseinitiativetoachievethe

objective.247Rankswereopenedupandjuniorofficers(andevennon-commissioned

officersinsomecases)exercisedgreatercontrolofthetacticalengagement.However,

duringandafterWorldWarIU.S.Armyofficersmaintainedsomedistancefromthis

innovation.

The1895InfantryDrillRegulationsstateonpageonethat“allpersonsinthe

militaryservicearerequiredtoobeystrictlyandtoexecutepromptlythelawfulordersof

theirsuperiors.”248Expectationsareclearlystatedwithabsolutelynoroomleftfor

initiativeorinterpretation.However,by1905,inpartialrecognitionoftechnological

developments,the1905FieldServiceRegulations(FSR)stated,“Anordershouldnot

trespassontheprovidenceofasubordinate.Itshouldcontaineverythingwhichisbeyond

theindependentauthorityofthesubordinate,butnothingmore.”249Furthermore,witha

nodtoGermandoctrine,theFSRcontinued,“…whenanordermayhavetobecarriedout

undercircumstanceswhichtheoriginatoroftheordercannotcompletelyforecast…it

shouldlaystressupontheobjecttobeattainedandleaveopenthemeanstobe

employed.”250Thislatterstatementappearsasifithadbeenliftedverbatim,whichwas

notuncommonduringthisperiod,fromaGermanmanual.

246AntulioJosephEchevarria,AfterClausewitz:GermanMilitaryThinkersbeforetheGreatWar(UniversityPressofKansas,2000),23.247Muth,CommandCulture,173;Echevarria,AfterClausewitz,38.248“InfantryDrillRegulations1895”(GovernmentPrintingOffice,1895),1.249WarDepartment,FieldServiceRegulationsUnitedStatesArmy1905,30.250Ibid.,31.

105

TheU.S.Army’sconductintheSpanish-AmericanWarin1898couldbesuccinctly

describedasfumblingforwardasoneunmitigateddisasterfollowedanother.Many

observers,includingA.T.Mahan,attributeditssuccessfulconclusiontofortuitouschance,

bravesoldiers,andanineptenemy.251InmanyrespectstheSpanishAmericanWarserved

todemonstratethatmodestreformsintheinterimcouldhaveprecludedthesummoningof

vastmaterialandhumanresourcesinacolossalefforttoovercomeshortsightedpolicy.

Perhapssuchknowledgeisonlygrantedthroughthelensofhistory;nonetheless,the

propensityforsuchactivitieshintsatamoresystemicfault.The1905FSRwasoneresult

ofthelessonslearnedfromtheSpanish-AmericanWarandaimedtoremedysomeofthese

faults.

Armyperformanceattheturnofthecenturyleftmuchtobedesired,andthrough

thesteadyaccumulationofnearrundisastersintheSpanish-AmericanWar,pressuresfor

changereachedatippingpoint.Despitethis,andtheactivismofjuniorofficers,change

requiredastrongpersonalityandaptnegotiatorfromoutsidetheorganizationtobring

change.Armyregulationsuntiltheturnofthecenturyfocusedlessonbattleandmoreon

properdrill,bothindividualandunit.Properformations,firecontrol,andbasictroop

leadingproceduresfilledthepagesofearlyarmymanuals.TheAmericanCivilWaris

arguablyoneofthefirstwarstofullycapitalizeonadvanceswroughtbytheIndustrial

Revolution.Yet,theAmericanofficercorpsreturnedtoprojectbuildingandanti-Indian

activitiesfollowingthewar.Bythelate1890s,theAmericanmilitaryfounditselflagging

decadesbehindtheEuropeanmilitaryprofession.

251Ganoe,TheHistoryoftheUnitedStatesArmy,371–376;“TheWorkoftheNavalWarBoardof1898:AReporttotheGeneralBoardoftheNavy,”29October1906.AlfredT.Mahan,LettersandPapersofAlfredThayerMahan,ed.RobertSeagerIIandDorisMaguire,vol.III(Annapolis,Maryland:NavalInstitutePress,1975),627–643.

106

ElihuRootservedasSecretaryofWarinthelatterhalfofPresidentWilliam

McKinley’stermbeginningin1899andlaterforPresidentTheodoreRooseveltuntil1904.

Rootasuccessfulcooperatelawyerbroughtconsiderablepoliticalacumenandcooperate

connectionstothepositionthoughhelackedmilitaryexperiencethatappearedtomatter

littleintheend.Root,bothintelligentandresourceful,graspedtheneedforinstitutional

changeandknewhowtoobtaintherequisiteinformationtomakeinformeddecisions.His

successfultenureinthepositionofSecretaryofWarwasfollowed,afterthedeathofJohn

Hay,asSecretaryofStateunderPresidentRooseveltin1905.Rootembodiedmanyofthe

idealsoftheProgressiveEra.Anablediplomatandreformer;hetookspecificinterestin

reformingtheUSArmy.252RootreorganizedtheupperechelonsoftheArmyby

introducingtheofficeofChiefofStaffand“abolishingtheofficeofCommandingGeneralof

theArmy.”253Furthermore,theMilitiaActof1903providedfundstotheNationalGuardfor

trainingandequipment.TheNationalGuardtookstepstomodernizeitsstructureand

mirrortheactivedutyArmy.

Meanwhile,thefederalgovernmentexpressedanawareness,albeitslowly,of

institutionalossificationbythelate1890’sandsoughttoremedyshortcomings.However,

nometa-theoryonefficiencyyetexistedonwhichtodraw,thusitturnedtoAmerican

businesses.Theprofessionsoftechnologyandbusinessadministrationwereintheir

infancybymodernstandards,andassuch,mostsolutionsrepresentedatinkeringaround

theedgesoveranylarge-scalestructuralchangesinactionorthought.Conceptualthought

onscienceandtechnologyduringthenineteenthremainedunifiedandcontinuedalong

similarlinesuntilaftertheSecondWorldWar.Inotherwords,traditionalviewsperceived252PhilipJessup,ElihuRoot,vol.I(Dodd,MeadandCompany,Inc,1938),215–230.253JamesDonaldHittle,ed.,TheMilitaryStaff,ItsHistoryandDevelopment(GreenwoodPress,1975),203.

107

technologyandscienceasoneinthesame.Thatmorescience“beget”moretechnology,

whichisonlytrueinthemostdistanceterms.254Thoughrelated,theexactrelationship

betweenscienceandtechnologyremainedobscuredbythefactthat“bothdealtwith

matterandenergy.”255Theconceptofefficiencydatedtoantiquity,buttheideaofbest

practicesremainedunexplored.Codifyingthoseprinciplesandthentrainingpeople

specificallytoimplementthemonlyclearlybrokethehorizonastheworldenteredthe

twentiethcentury.

Congresscontinueditseffortstoincreaseefficiencywithinthefederalgovernment

inlightofthegrowingbodyofprofessionalknowledgeonbestpractices.TheReviewofthe

WorkDonebytheJointCommission-ReorganizationoftheAccountingSystemandBusiness

MethodsintheExecutiveDepartmentspublishedin1895examinedvariousgovernmental

bureaucraciesinaneffort“tosecuregreaterefficiencyandeconomy.”256TheU.S.

governmentbeganaconcentratedattempttostreamlineitsstructureanditquickly

becameevidentthatAmericanbusinessespossessedarepositoryofknowledgeand

capability.Additionally,theU.S.ArmyArmorieshadundertakenearlyexperiencesin

efficiencyuponwhichtheFederalGovernmentwasabletodraw.257

Bytheturnofthecentury,asborneoutbytheSpanish-AmericanWar,theobsolete

militarysystemhadreachedapointthatitsantiquatedstructureandprocessesfailedto254ChalmersSherwinandRaymondIsenson,“ProjectHindsight,”AmericanAssociationfortheAdvancementofScience156,no.3782(June23,1967)Eightyearstudythatexamineddefensespendinginrelationtotechnologyandsciencetoachievebreakthroughs.Morescienceproducedmorescienceandmoretechnologyproducedmoretechnology.Inshort,defensespendingonsciencedidnottranslateintoincreasedtechnologicalbreakthroughs.Thisnewscamesomewhatasabombshellatthetime.255Layton,“Mirror-ImageTwins,”565.256AlexanderDockeryetal.,“ReviewoftheWorkDonebytheJointCommission-ReorganizationoftheAccountingSystemandBusinessMethodsintheExecutiveDepartments”(53Cong.ReportNo.2000,March3,1893),1.257MerrittRoeSmith,“ArmyOrdnanceandtheAmericanSystemofManufacturing,1815-1861,”MerrittRoeSmithetal.,MilitaryEnterpriseandTechnologicalChange:PerspectivesontheAmericanExperience(MITPress,1985),39.

108

functionadequately.Observers,bothcivilianandmilitary,couldnolongerignoretheneed

formilitaryreform.TheSpanish-AmericanWarprovidedthecatalyst,generallyabsentbut

necessary,toadvancereform.258Root,withthesupportofRoosevelt,startedhisfirst

reformeffortswiththearmy’scommandstructure.Thearmyexperiencedreformfrom

multipledirectionsoftenindependentandunrelatedtoabroaderplanresultingin

redundantworkandalossofefficiency,butoverallthereoccurredprogressinreforming

themechanismsbywhichthenation’sdefenseweretobeachieved.

PresidentTheodoreRoosevelthaddiverseinterests(afascinationwiththenatureof

technology,forexample)andaprogressivebenttowardsreform.Rooseveltappointeda

committee,inlinewithhisdirectivetoRoottoreformtheArmy,butforbroader

applicationtothefederalgovernment,anddirectedGeneralWilliamCrozier,Charles

Walcott,AdmiralFrancisTiffanyBowles,GiffordPinchot,andJamesR.Garfieldin1903,

“…toreportdirectlytomeupontheorganization,presentcondition,andneedsofthe

ExecutiveGovernmentworkwhollyorpartiallyscientificincharacter."259Thebeliefthat

sciencecouldbeappliedtootherfields,toincludethoseofman,andthatarationaland

logicalmethodologyexistedthatoncediscoveredordevelopedcouldthenbeapplied

broadly,pervadedthisera.ItconstitutedoneofthedefiningtenetsoftheProgressiveEra.

Furthermore,theProgressiveErawitnessedtherapidexpansionofprofessionalsocieties

attheturnofthetwentiethcenturydevotedtoincreasingtheknowledgeandapplicationof

theirparticularfields.260

258Ganoe,TheHistoryoftheUnitedStatesArmy,397.259TheodoreRoosevelt,“LetterfromTheodoreRoosevelttoCharlesDoolittleWalcott,”March11,1903,http://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Research/Digital-Library/Record.aspx?libID=o184453.260RobertH.Wiebe,TheSearchforOrder,1877-1920(Macmillan,1967).

109

ElihuRootbelievedthatthecurrentsystemwasnotonlyinefficientbutcourting

disaster.261Onecouldargue,andindeeditwouldbeaccuratetostate,thattheProgressive

movementwithintheUSandthegrowingintricaciesofwarbothcontributedtothe

creationofaGeneralStaffsystemintheU.S.Army.TheFrenchduringtheNapoleonic

period,theRussiansinthe1830’sunderthetutelageofJomini,andindeedtheGermans

createdsuchasystemin1813-14wellinadvanceoftheU.S.Army.Root,aidedbythe

worksofSpenserWilkinsonauthor,ofTheBrainoftheArmy,andEmoryUpton,influential

advocateofaprofessionalstandingarmyontheEuropeanmodel,examinedvarious

EuropeanstaffsystemsandfoundthePrussianmodelmostimpressive.262Withthe

supportofthepresident,Rootattemptedtopushforwardlegislationtoimplementatype

ofGeneralStaffCorps,althoughoneparticulartoAmericancircumstances.263Not

surprisingly,however,thereformersencounteredsignificantresistancetotheidea

especiallyfromCivilWarveteransandaswellassomeArmyofficers.264

Rootin1899stated,“theAmericansoldiertodayisapartofagreatmachinewhich

wecallmilitaryorganization;amachinewhich,asbyelectricalconverters,thepolicyof

governmentistransformedintothestrategyofthegeneral,intothetacticsofthefieldand

totheactionofthemanbehindthegun.”265AdmiralBradleyFiskein1916employed

similarlanguagetostate:“anavybeingamachinecomposedofhumanandmaterial

261ElihuRoot,“EstablishmentofaGeneralStaffCorpsintheArmy”(GovernmentPrintingOffice,1902),9–11;Wilkinson,TheBrainofanArmy.262Root,“EstablishmentofaGeneralStaffCorpsintheArmy,”3–4;Koistinen,MobilizingforModernWar,88–90;Spaulding,TheUnitedStatesArmyinWarandPeace,395–397;Hittle,TheMilitaryStaff,ItsHistoryandDevelopment,195–209.263Root,“EstablishmentofaGeneralStaffCorpsintheArmy,”4.264PhilipSemsch,“ElihuRootandtheGeneralStaff,”MilitaryAffairs27,no.1(1963):16–27.265ElihuRoot,TheMilitaryandColonialPolicyoftheUnitedStates:AddressesandReportsbyElihuRoot(HarvardUniversityPress,1916),3.

110

parts…”266Thetransitionfrommantomachineoccurredwithlessangst,andperhapseven

someenthusiasmonthepartofAmericansociety.Americancultureingeneral--its

business,institutionsandeventheyouthfulnessofthenation--contributedtothefavorable

perceptionoftechnology.Armyofficers,especiallyinthemoretechnicalfields,displayed

eagernesstoembraceandcapitalizeonthepotentialofnewtechnologiessuchasthe

telephone.

Thearmyservedastheprogenitorofprogressiveorganizationstocome,insofar

thatitdisciplined,organized,inculcatedindividualsefficiently,providingablueprintfor

organizationalcontrolandcollectivism.WalterLippmann,anotedpoliticalcommentator

andjournalist,observedin1916that,“thewar[WorldWarI]hasgivenlargenumbersof

Americansanewinstinctfororder,purpose,discipline.TheseAmericansaredistressedat

thelocalselfishnessandblindindividualismoftheUnitedStates.Theyfeelthatmodernlife

requiresapeoplescreweduptoahigherpitchofdevotionandforethought…itisfromthis

sentiment…thatMr.Roosevelthasbeendrawingstrength.267”Armedconflicthasbeenthe

greatorganizerthroughouthistoryasgroupsandnationsassembledbothforsecurityand

profit.However,intheAmericancontextthewarservedtomoveahighlyindividualistic

societytowardssomedegreeofcollectivism.

Themostdominantculturalfactorsinasocietydecidedlyshapearmies,and

likewiseofficersgenerallyassumeattributesfromtheenvironmentinwhichtheyexist.268

Cultureisanamalgamationofone’shistory,institutions,technology,geography,and

religion.PowerfulideasandmovementssuchastheEnlightenment,Romanticism,Social

266Fiske,TheNavyasaFightingMachine,193.267DorothyW.Straight,ed.,TheNewRepublicBook :SelectionsfromtheFirstHundredIssues.(RepublicPublishingCompany,1916),126.268Clausewitz,OnWar,100–101,580.

111

Darwinism,andnationalismcanserveaspotentcatalyststotransformattributesalready

inherentinapeople.269Atthetailendofimperialism,pejorativeperceptionsexisted

regardingmostnon-whitenationsandevenintheWestvariousnationsjostledforsuperior

positionwithinapresumedDarwiniancontext.Abeliefpersistedthattacticalsuccess

mightdependuponnationalvirtuesthatonenationhadbutanotherlacked.Attacksfailed

notbecausetheyfacedmachine-gunsorartillerybutbecausetheylackedsufficientElán.

Thequestionofthesuperiorityofmanormachinehadyettobeanswered.Technologyhad

clearlyalteredtheformulaofbattle,buttowhatdegreeremainedunanswered.Andeven

whenansweredbythehundredsofthousandsofBritishandFrenchdeadof1914-17,the

Americanshadtotrythemselves.Itwasnotenoughtomerelyobservefailurefromafar;

onehadtoexperienceitintimately,personally.Thus,onemightshareasimilardoctrine

withanothernation,butfailure,shoulditoccur,reflectednotdoctrinalshortcomingsbut

ratheranationalflaworweakness.270

OneshouldnotethattherewereafewAmericanreformerswhosoughttodevelop

andadvancetheartofwar,whiletakingintoaccounttheculturalparticularitiesof

Americansociety,inthelastquarterofthenineteenthcentury.EmoryUpton,acareer

soldierservedintheCivilWarandlatertouredEuropein1876visitingtheleadingmilitary

institutions.UponhisreturnhecompliedhisnotesthatspokehighlyoftheGermansystem,

thoughthemanuscriptwasonlypublishedafterhisdeath,whichservedtoinformedRoot’s

reforms.271ArthurWagner,adiscipleofEmory,waspostedtoFortLeavenworthInfantry

269Strassler,TheLandmarkThucydides;BarryPosen,TheSourcesofMilitaryDoctrine:France,Britain,andGermanyBetweentheWorldWars(CornellUniversityPress,1984);MacGregorandWilliamson,TheDynamicsofMilitaryRevolution,1300-2050.270MichaelHoward,“MenAgainstFire:TheDoctrineoftheOffensivein1914,”Paret,Craig,andGilbert,MakersofModernStrategyfromMachiavellitotheNuclearAge,510.271Weigley,TowardsanAmericanArmy,104.

112

andCalvarySchoolinthelate1890s.Oncethere,Wagnerreformedthecurriculumand

increasedthestandards.Oneauthorreferredtohimasthe,“…SylvanusThayerofthe

GeneralServiceschools.”272Upton,Wagner,andRooteachwrestledwithhowto

amalgamateEuropeanmethodsofwarfaretotheAmericancharacter.

Americaninstitutions,laws,andsocietyingeneraldidnotshare,atleastnottothe

samedegree,themilitarismofPrussiaortheimperialismofBritain.273NordidAsian

civilizationshavetheanswer,inpartbecauseoftheWest’stechnologicaldominance,which

castothercivilizationsinanunfavorablelight.Asianarmiesdidnotoffermuchofvalueto

U.S.Armyobserversandthereforeappearedweakanddisorganized.Furthermore,the

collectivismofAsiancultures,whichcontrastedsharplywiththeindividualismfoundinthe

UnitedStates,hasalwaysbeensomewhatofananathematoAmericansociety.Aswell,

EuropeanpowersexercisedgreaterpowerovertheirpopulacesincomparisontotheU.S.,

whichstressedtheindividualaboveallelse.

Americanofficerswerenottheonlyoneswhowrestledwithtechnological

advancementsandtheirimpactonthebattlefield.SinceAmericanofficersreliedheavilyon

theEuropeanmodel,intellectualcrisesintheoldworldcausedripplesinthenew.The

BritishArmy,forexample,enjoyedadistinctmilitarycultureandalonglegacystretching

backhundredsofyearsthatinfusedaheavydoseoftraditionofthepastintothepresent.

Officersknewtheimportanceofinstillingasenseofprideintheirsoldiersandthatpride

foundcontinuityandsubstancefromthepast.Aunit’spast,itsreflectedglory,honorand

evencollectivesacrificewerecastforwardlikeasettingsunupontheoceanilluminating

thepresentinahueofsplendor.Thissplendormustbeprotected,defended,andif272Ganoe,TheHistoryoftheUnitedStatesArmy,363;Weigley,TowardsanAmericanArmy,145.273Root,TheMilitaryandColonialPolicyoftheUnitedStates,3.

113

necessarysacrificedforthatitmightendure.Thehumanofelementofwarfare,its

centralityindefeatorvictory,representednotonlytwomillenniaofrecordedexperience,

butitalsoembodiedamorerecentbutnolesspotentmemoryofthosethathadfallenin

servicetothatunitandnation.

Someobserversoutsidethemilitarythatattemptedtograpplewiththedangersof

moderntechnologyonthebattlefieldsuchasJean(Ivan)deBloch,aPolishbankerand

industrialist,whopublishedTheWarsoftheFuturein1899.274Blochpositedthatwar

shouldbeavoidedinthefuturebecausetechnologicaladvanceshadincreasedthelethality

ofweaponstoadegreethatwouldberuinous.War,ifitcame,wouldnecessarilyresultin

economicexhaustioninamatterofweeks.BlochwasnotwidelyreadpriortotheFirst

WorldWar,andthoughcorrectinsomeobservations,hisanalysisprovedlargelyirrelevant

toitsparticipants.Thefocuscontinuedtobeontechnologyandthetoolsofwar.More

subtlebutnolesspowerfulweretheintellectualfissuresthatweregainingforce.

Technology,thoughmorespecifically,theawarenessofit,itseffects,itsinfluenceon

everydaylifebegantotakeholdintheU.S.Armyofficercorpsasthetwentiethcentury

rapidlyapproached.

AsurveyofU.S.Congressionaldocumentsrevealsthatbetween1880and1900the

wordtechnologyappearsamere29times;bycontrast,between1901and1921,asecond

consecutivetwenty-yearperiod,“technology”enterscongressionalparlance410times.

Certainly,publishingincreasedoverthoseperiods,andthereareunpublisheddocuments

totakeintoaccount;nonethelessasageneraldatapointitdoessupporttheassertionthata

lineofdemarcationhasbeencrossed.Asimilarsearchoftheterm“scientificmanagement”

274Bloch,TheFutureofWar.

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yieldsameretwomentionsbetween1800and1900.However,aqueryfor1901-1921

returns67matches.Interestingly,theuseofthistermreacheditsapexduringtheFirst

WorldWarandifthesearchisextendedasapointofreferencethefrequencyoftheterm

dropsoffsharplyinuseaftertheSecondWorldWar.

FrederickTaylor,thefatherofscientificmanagement,remainedrelativelyunknown

outsideengineeringfieldsuntiltheFirstWorldWar.Hissecondwork,ThePrinciplesof

ScientificManagement,publishedin1911,articulatedmethodsandprocesseswhereby

managementinafactorycouldincreaseefficiency.275Taylornotonlyexaminedfactory

floorplanstodevelopthemostlogicalandefficientlayout,butalsousingsimilarmethods

howtoachieveoptimalperformancefromworkers.Thelatteraspectgeneratedagreat

dealofdebate,becauseTaylorperceivedworkersinmuchthesamewayheconceivedof

machines.Awarenessofmoralandpsychologicalelementshardlyfactored,ifatall,intohis

formulas.276

Intheearlyyearsofthetwentiethcenturydiscovery,excitementandpossibility

infusedtheperceptionoftechnologyinAmerica.Thosesentimentswerenotentirelyalien

tothearmyofficersandinfactagreatdealofexcitementsurroundedtheradio,airplane

andrapid-fireweapons.Thesetechnologiesenhancedarmies’andnavies’capabilitiesin

war,butdidnotappeartoradicallyupsettheequilibriumbetweenoffensiveanddefensive

warfare.SecretaryofWarRootleftnodoubtastowhathethoughtwerethedominant

lessonsoftheCivilWarandSpanish-AmericanWarwhenheobserved,“…themachinewas

themachinebywhichwasfought,throughwhichwereclothedandarmed,equipped,

275FrederickWinslowTaylor,ThePrinciplesofScientificManagement(Harper,1913).276JosephSchumpeter,“DigitalTaylor:AModernVersionofScientificManagementThreatenstoDehumanisetheWorkplace,”TheEconomist,September12,2015.

115

transportedandordered,thearmieswhichfought,thegreatestcivilwarofmoderntimes.

Itwasthemachinerythatwereceivedthroughthatgreatgeneration…ithasrequiredthe

experienceofanotherwartoteachtheAmericanpeoplewhereitneedsimprovementand

change.277Roothailedfromabusinessbackgroundhisknowledgeandexpertiseinclined

himtoperceivesolutionsnotasasoldierbutasabusinessman.Forhim,presentarmy

shortcomingsweretheresultofmanagement,organization,andindustrialfailuresthathad

accumulatedinthesystemsincetheCivilWar.

ThecreationofaGeneralStaffrepresentedafurtherdevelopmentinthe

professionalizationoforganizedviolence.Inmanywaysitmirroredthechangingsocialand

politicallandscapefromtribetothenation-state,fromwarriortoprofessionalsoldier.The

embryonicAmericansystemhadinheritedformandalsomemoryfromitsparentGreat

Britain’sstoriedhistory.TheFoundingFathers,wellversedinPolybiusandTacitus,

structuredtheAmericansystemtoresistandactivelyhinderthepossibleriseoftyranny.

Usurpersoftenemergedfromtheexecutivebranchesofgovernmentandtheirtoolof

controlandoppressionwasoftenanarmy.Thus,thearmy,liketheexecutivebranch,

founditselfrestrainedbydesign.Bydelayingandretardingprofessionalization,politicians,

deliberatelyorunconsciously,minimizedthethreatofamilitarycouptotheAmerican

people.278

ThesafeguardsagainstmilitarismbuiltintotheAmericansystemrenderedboth

protectionbutalsoinefficienciesthatextendedtotheArmy’sofficercorps.Significant

conflictsbetweenthePresidentandtheCommandingGeneral,aswasthecasebetween

LincolnandGeneralGeorgeMcClellan,becameobviousintimesofwar.Moreover,bythe277Root,TheMilitaryandColonialPolicyoftheUnitedStates,4.278Semsch,“ElihuRootandtheGeneralStaff.”

116

adventofthetwentiethcenturytheseConstitutionalsafetyswitcheshadobstructed

necessaryintellectualdevelopmenttoadangerousdegree.Severalmilitaryoperations

nearlyflounderedonpoorservicecommunicationandoverallineffectualcommand.The

SpanishAmericanWar,andspecificallytheinvasionofCubasucceededonlybecauseof

equalorgreaterineptitudebytheSpanish.TheeconomicinequalitythatexistedinCuba

furthertiltedthescalesinfavoroftheAmericans.However,theentiremilitaryenterprise

wasplaguedwithpoorsupply,transportation,andmobilizationbythearmy.Comparably

poorcooperationbetweentheArmyandNavydidlittletoenhancethechancesofvictory.

Nevertheless,enterprisingyoungofficersandtheaggregatemassthrownagainstthe

objectiveoverwhelmedtheSpanish,whodemonstratedlittleenthusiasmforthewar.279

NoneoftheotherEuropeanGeneralStaffsdevelopedthelevelofprofessionalismor

wereasintentionalasthePrussians,nonetheless,thegreatEuropeanpowersofthe

nineteenthcenturyallfounditbeneficialandnecessarytothinkandactalongthoselines—

educatingandpracticingmethodicalplanningledbyageneralstaff.280However,theUS

Armylaggedbehind,despitestrategicpolicysquabblesatthehighestlevelandseveral

operationalnear-debacles.NotuntiltheRootreformsdidtheU.S.ArmycreateaGeneral

StaffCorps,andeventhenCongressandmostcitizensmakeknownnogreatinternaldesire

ormotivationforsuchaninstitution.281

Thearmyappearedcognizantoftheincreasingtechnologicalaspectsofwarbutit

didnot,asofyet,perceivethosechangesasradicallychangingbattlefieldconduct.Rootdid

279Spaulding,TheUnitedStatesArmyinWarandPeace,378–381;Pearlman,WarmakingandAmericanDemocracy,172–175;JosephC.BernardoandEugeneH.Bacon,AmericanMilitaryPolicy(Penn.,MilitaryservicepublishingCompany,1955),274–285.280Hittle,TheMilitaryStaff,ItsHistoryandDevelopment.281Root,“EstablishmentofaGeneralStaffCorpsintheArmy,”3.

117

notwearauniformandhehadalmostnomilitaryexperience.Inspiteofthese

shortcomings,Rootexperiencedfarmoresuccessthanmostinitiallythoughtpossible.He

institutedreformstomodernizethearmyofficerstructureandelevatetheprofessionalism

ofthecorps.On14February1903thePresidentRooseveltsignedthebillandtheAmerican

ArmyGeneralStaffCorpscameintobeing.282Rootrationalizedthecommandstructure,but

theArmy’stechnologicalgenehadalreadydevelopedandthroughaprocessthat

representedlessachoicethanhappenstance.

282Semsch,“ElihuRootandtheGeneralStaff,”27.

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ChapterVI

FrederickTaylor,ScientificManagement,andtheU.S.ArmyArmories

Onenotableanomalyingeneralpatternoffederalsubsidiesforprivateeconomic

activitieswastheestablishmentofarmoriestoproducevarioustypesofweaponsforthe

UnitedStatesArmyandNavy.Thefivegovernmentarsenalsatthetimewere:RockIsland,

Frankford,Springfield,Watervliet,andWatertown.283TheArmy’sroleinthedevelopment

oftheAmericansystemofmanufacturingprovidedfertilegroundfortheideasofFrederick

Taylor.Anengineerbytrade,TaylorpublishedThePrinciplesofScientificManagementin

1911,agroundbreakingworkthatdetailedgeneralapplicationofhisideastomaximize

industrialefficiency.Scientificmanagementwasatfirstreferredtoas“Taylorism”orthe

Taylorsystem,butlater,todistancetheconceptfromthecontroversialfigure,

professionalsmodifiedthenameto“scientificmanagement.”Scientificmanagement

utilizedscienceandengineeringtodeducethemostefficientmethodsofagivenactivity.

TaylorfoundthearmoriesoverseenbytheWarDepartmentaveritableEdentoexperiment

withhismethodsofefficiencyinacontrolledenvironment.

TheHarper’sFerryArmory,establishedin1799andlocatedinWestVirginia,was

thenation’ssecondgovernment-operatedarsenal.284Militarymanagementoverthe

followingdecadesimplementedincrementalefficiencychangesatthearmory,andasearly

as1841,supervisorsinstalledaclocktoregulateworkinghours.285TheUSArmyOrdnance

Bureaumaintainedresponsibilityforthearmories,andtheearlymanufacturingpractices

283WilliamCroziertoFrederickTaylor,December14,1906,Box114,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.284MerrittRoeSmith,HarpersFerryArmoryandtheNewTechnology:TheChallengeofChange(CornellUniversityPress,1980),41.285Ibid.,271.

119

putinplaceinthefirsthalfofthenineteenthcenturyproliferatedfirsttosimilararms

industriesandtheneventuallytootherfieldsentirely.286

Thegovernment’sinitialmovetowardefficiencypredatedFrederickTaylor’sideas

andtookconcreteformwiththecreationoftheForestServicein1905.287Asearchthrough

amassiveelectronicdatabasecatalogingCongressionaldebatesrevealedthattheterm

“scientificmanagement”wasrarelymentionedbefore1894.288Tayloropenedan

independentengineeringfirmin1893;thereafter,otherbureaucraticchangesfollowed

withintheFederalGovernmentbothinfrequencyandmagnitudeandwereinfluencedin

partbytheadoptionofFrederickTaylor’sideasoverthenextseveraldecades.However,

Taylor’sgreatestsuccessresultedinhissystembeingadopted,inwholeorinpart,at

variousfederalarmories.

CaptainWilliamCrozier,initiallyacoastartilleryofficer,playedanimportantrole

indisseminatingTaylor’sideasintheWarDepartmentandtheArmy.Crozierhad

demonstratedhisengineeringaptitude,honedatWestPoint,whenhedevelopedagun

carriagein1893.KnownastheBuffington–Croziercarriage,itwasdesignedforusein

fortsalongthecoast.289Thecarriageallowedthecannontobeloweredtoaffordcoverand

concealmentwithinthefortfromenemywarships.Crozier’sinterestintechnological

manufacture,withwhichtheOrdnancebranchwasintenselyinvolvedduringthisperiod,

286MerrittRoeSmith,“ArmyOrdnanceandthe”AmericanSystem“ofManufacturing,1815-1861,”Smithetal.,MilitaryEnterpriseandTechnologicalChange,77.287FrancisFukuyama,“AmericainDecay,”ForeignAffairs93,no.5(October2014):5–26.288UnitedStatesCongress,“CongressionalRecord:Vols.1-156Pt.12(1873-2010)(43rdCongress,SpecialSessionto111thCongress,2ndSession),”August2014,Heinonline,http://www.heinonline.org.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/HOL/Index?collection=congrec&set_as_cursor=clear.289“BigArmyContracttoBeLet;TenDisappearingGunCarriagesWanted,”NewYorkTimes,November24,1894,http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F10C13FF355515738DDDAD0A94D9415B8485F0D3.

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continuedthroughouthiscareer.TheOrdnancebranchwasresponsibleforengineering,

manufactureandproductionofArmyweaponryandthereforeappearedperfectlysuitedto

capitalizeonchangeswithinthesefields.

Crozierhadadistinguishedcareerthatatvarioustimesputhiminthepresenceof

notableAmericanpioneers.CrozieraccompaniedCaptainAlfredThayerMahantothefirst

HagueConventionin1899asrepresentativesoftheUnitedStates.290Anamicableand

mutualrespectdevelopedbetweenthetwomenandbothplayedprominentrolesinthe

developmentoftheAmericanmilitary.291MahanhadpublishedTheInfluenceofSeaPower

UponHistory,1660–1783in1890,whichinthefollowingyearsprofoundlyinfluenced

majorpowersaroundtheworld.292InJapan,Britain,Germany,andoddlytoalesserextent

theUnitedStates,itinauguratedmassivefleetexpansionsthatcontributedtoanavalarms

race.293FollowingtheHagueConventionandtheirreturnstateside,CaptainCrozier

deployedtoChinaaroundthetimeoftheoutbreakoftheso-calledBoxerRebellion.There

isnosmallironyforMahan’spartatthepeaceconvention,followedbyhisinadvertent,

thoughsignificant,roleinprecipitatingthenavalarmsracethatprecededtheFirstWorld

War.

CroziermadeanameforhimselfonthestaffofMajorGeneralAdnaR.Chaffeeinthe

reliefexpeditiontoPekinginAugustof1900.Crozierprovidedasummaryofhis

290AndrewWhite,TheFirstHagueConference(NewYork:TheCenturyCompany,1905),3;AlfredT.Mahan,LettersandPapersofAlfredThayerMahan,ed.RobertSeagerIIandDorisMaguire,vol.II(Annapolis,Maryland:NavalInstitutePress,1975),641.291Mahan,LettersandPapersofAlfredThayerMahan,1975,III:38,106.292AlfredThayerMahan,TheInfluenceofSeaPowerUponHistory,1660-1783(Boston:Little,Brown,andCompany,1890).293SeeLisleRose,PoweratSea:TheAgeofNavalism,VolumeI(Columbia,MO:UniversityofMissouriPress,2007),PrologueandChapters1and2,passim.

121

experiencepublishedin1901throughTheNorthAmericanReview.294Chaffee,also

submittedapersonalaccountandrecommendedCrozierforpromotiontomajor.295It

seemedafairrecommendation,whichSecretaryofWarElihuRoottooktoheart,although

strictsenioritypreventedthesecretaryfrompromotingsomeonetoanygradebelow

generalofficer.Atthetime,Armyofficerstrengthnumberedbetween2146officersonthe

low-endin1894and2486onthehigh-endin1900;withsuchlownumbers,namesand

reputationswerewellknown.296RootpromotedandadvancedCaptainCrozierfourranks

toBrigadierGeneralandtransferredhimfromtheCoastArtilleryBranchtobecomeChief

ofOrdnanceoftheUnitedStatesArmyin1901.Crozier’sinterestinengineeringsoonled

himtosearchfornewmethodsandprocessestoincreaseoutput.

In1903,Crozierserved,byrequest,onacommitteeforPresidentTheodore

Roosevelt.Rooseveltdemonstratedanunderstandingofexpandingindustrializationand

changingcharacterofAmericansocietyandpaceofthenewcentury,andhedesiredmore

informationonhowtoincreaseefficiency.Accordingly,Rooseveltwrote,“inviewofthe

authoritysoconferredonme,Iappointthefollowingcommitteetoreportdirectlytome

upontheorganization,presentcondition,andneedsoftheExecutiveGovernmentwork

whollyorpartlyscientificincharacter,anduponthestepswhichshouldbetaken,ifany,to

294WilliamCrozier,“SomeObservationsonthePekinReliefExpedition,”TheNorthAmericanReview172,no.531(February1901):225–40.295UnitedStatesWarDept,AnnualReportsoftheWarDepartmentfortheFiscalYearEndedJune30,1903(Washington,D.C.:U.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice,1903).296FrancisHeitman,“HistoricalRegisterandDictionaryoftheUnitedStatesArmy”(Washington:GovernmentPrintingOffice,March1903).

122

preventtheduplicationofsuchwork,toco-ordinateitsvariousbranches,toincrease

efficiencyandeconomy,andtopromoteitsusefulnesstothenationatlarge.”297

InDecember1906,now-GeneralCrozierprovidedatouroftheSandyHookProving

GroundstomembersoftheSocietyforMechanicalEngineering.298CrozierinvitedThe

AmericanSocietyofMechanicalEngineers(ASME)toSandyHookProvingGroundto

demonstratenewapproachestotheproductionofmilitaryordnance.Hedescribedthe

tourasfollows:

ThemembersoftheSocietyweretheguestsoftheWarDepartment…SecretaryofWar,WilliamH.Taft,designatedashispersonalrepresentativestoreceivetheSocietyatSandyHook,BrigadierGeneralWilliamCrozier,ChiefofOrdnance…About800membersoftheSocietyandtheirguestsmadethetrip…ItwasundoubtedlyoneofthemostenjoyableaswellasinstructiveexcursionsevermadebytheSociety,andeveryonewhotookpartunderstandsinwhatlargemeasureweareunderobligationtotheWarDepartmentforthisspecialcourtesyshowntheSociety.299

Oneofthesociety’smembersinattendancewasFrederickWinslowTaylor,then

servingastheorganization’spresident.Taylor’spresencewascoincidental,atleastforhis

part,butevidencesuggeststhatCrozierknewofTaylorandhismethods.Taylorism,asa

term,hadnotyetbecomewidelyknown.OutsidethemanufacturingfieldTaylor’sname

probablymeantlittle,buthismethodsandideashadbeguntodiffusewithinAmerican

industry.

Crozier’sexperienceandassignmentslikelyprovidedhimwithsomeknowledgeof

theprincipalleadersandnamesofindustry.Theleadingengineeringjournaloftheperiod,

297TheodoreRoosevelt,“LetterfromTheodoreRoosevelttoWilliamCrozier,”March11,1903,http://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Research/Digital-Library/Record.aspx?libID=o184439,TheodoreRooseveltPapers.298WilliamCroziertoTaylor,December14,1906.299ASMETransactions,vol.28(NewYork:AmericanSocietyofMechanicalEngineers,1907),7.

123

theAmericanSocietyofMechanicalEngineers(1904),publishedarticlesontheworkofboth

TaylorandCrozier.300Furthermore,therewereonlytwomajorsteelmanufacturing

companiesintheUnitedStatesatthetimeandTaylorhadworkedatboth.Frederick

TaylorworkedforMidvaleSteelCompanyfrom1878until1890wherehelearnedthe

detailsandmethodsofmanagingamachineshop.Later,in1898,hewasemployedbythe

BethlehemSteelCompany.301WhileatBethlehemherefinedandappliedhissystemto

improveefficiency.Taylorexaminedthe,“Tasksforeachemployee…makingaverycareful

analysis...usingthestopwatchtodiscoverthe‘unittimes’requiredforthevariouswork

elements.”302Taylor’sexperiencesandprocesscapturedinthearticle,“ArtofCutting

Metals”(1906)receivedsignificantexposureandmadehissynonymouswithefficiency.303

Subsequently,abeneficialrelationshipdevelopedbetweenthesetwoacquaintances

thatpromisedtobringsignificantsavingsandefficiencytoArmyarsenals.304Following

Taylor’svisittotheprovinggroundshesentalettertoCrozierthankinghimforthe

“honor”ofvisitingandthe“expense”oforganizingtheevent.305Fromtheearliestmoment

bothmenhadrealizedthebenefitsofaunion.Taylorobserved,“Ithasbeenaliberal

educationtous,andItrustmayalsobeofvaluetothedepartment.Ineednottellyouhow

greatlyinterestedIhavebeenintheOrdnanceDepartmentformanyyears…..”306Taylor

continuedbynotingthathedispatched“severalpamphletsonshopmanagement”and

300R.Birnie,“OrdnanceforTheLandService,”AmericanSocietyofMechanicalEngineers25(1904):355,374;FrankRichards,“IsAnythingtheMatterwithPieceWork,”AmericanSocietyofMechanicalEngineers25(1904):68,75.301AmericanSocietyofMechanicalEngineers,“FrederickWinslowTaylor,”TransactionsoftheAmericanSocietyofMechanicalEngineers28(1907):28.302HoraceDrury,ScientificManagement:AHistoryandCriticism(P.S.King&Son,LTD,1915),210.303AmericanSocietyofMechanicalEngineers,“FrederickWinslowTaylor,”31–350.304FrederickTaylortoWilliamCrozier,December10,1906,Box114,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.305Ibid.306Ibid.

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invitedCroziertodinnerathishometobefollowedthenextdaybyvisitingTaylor’sshop

sothatCroziercouldobservethesysteminactionTaylor’sinvitationwasreadilyaccepted

byCrozier.307

CorrespondencebetweentheCrozierandTaylorincreasedthroughthecoming

years;attimesletterswereexchangedseveraltimesaweek.InJanuary,1909,Crozier

alongwithseveralotherArmyofficersvisitedTaylor.Thetripwasnotonlyinformative,

butalsosymbolicsinceCrozierservedastheChiefofOrdnanceheimplicitlyspokeforthe

branch.Taylorelaboratedingreatdetailthemethodsandeffectivenessofhissystem.

FollowingthevisitCrozierreturnedtoWashingtongenuinelyenthusiasticabouthis

experienceandexpressedconsiderableinterestinTaylor’smethods.308Crozierremained

infrequentcontactwithTaylorandonmultipleoccasionsoverthenextfiveyears,oftenin

responsetonewspaperarticlesonworkerresistance,CroziersentletterstoTaylor

promptinghimtorespondtothecontroversies,aswellasprovidesolutionsiftheissues

relatedspecificallytotheOrdnancedepartment.309

Notsurprisingly,workersbristledatthenewlevelofsupervisionandmechanistic

methodsimposedbytheTaylorsystem,asystemthatminimized,ifnotremoved,theart

andcraftofthearmorer.Arsenalquotasemphasizedquantityanddrovedownwages.

TheTaylorismapproach,whichcharacterizedmenintheimageofmachinestobeutilized

asinterchangeableparts,dismissedasirrelevantexperience,expertise,andmasteryof

307Ibid.;CroziertoTaylor,December14,1906.308WilliamCroziertoFrederickTaylor,January25,1909,Box114,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.309WilliamCroziertoFrederickTaylor,February13,1909,Box114,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection;WilliamCroziertoFrederickTaylor,March30,1909,Box114,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection;WilliamCroziertoFrederickTaylor,April3,1909,Box114,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection;WilliamCroziertoFrederickTaylor,March16,1910,Box114,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection;WilliamCroziertoFrederickTaylor,March17,1913,Box114,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.

125

one’scraft.Taylorviewedtheartisan,asdidCrozierthoughtoalesserdegree,with

skepticismnotunlikehowonemightperceivechildrengivenataskwhichtheywere

predisposedbynaturetoshirk.Thus,thechildren(workers)requiredcarefulsupervision

andongoinginspectionoftheiractionstoensureefficiency.ScientificManagement

providedthatmeans.

Inearly1909CrozierimploredTaylorinseveralletterstovisittheWatertown,

Massachusetts,arsenaltoexaminewhatshouldbedonetheretoimplementscientific

management.310Taylor,uninformedaboutfederalpersonnelpoliciesandequally

uninterested,largelyfailedtoappreciatetheobstaclesandcomplexityCrozierencountered

institutionalizingscientificmanagement.311Federalworkershadaccesstogreatresources

andwerebetterprotectedthantheirprivatecounterparts,andtheyoftencontacted

congressmenwhenevertheirjobswerethreatenedbyproposedreductionsandchangesto

improveefficiency.312Thus,CrozierandtheOrdnancearsenalmanagersworriedoverthis

kindofbureaucraticresistanceastheysoughttoimplementelementsofTaylor’ssystem,

realizingthattheyfacedpotentialCongressionalscrutinyandevenhostility.

Taylorrarelysharedordemonstratedanygreatconcernfortheworker,atleastnot

inthemanneronemightexpect.Taylor’sempathy,hiscontributiontotheircharacter

development,wasinmakingthemworktotheirfullestpotential.AccordingtoAitken,“the

introductionoftheTaylorsystemofmanagementatWatertownArsenalwasnotmerelya

technicalinnovation.Itwasahighlycomplexsocialchange,upsettingestablishedrolesand

310WilliamCroziertoFrederickTaylor,February6,1909,Box114,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection;WilliamCroziertoFrederickTaylor,February8,1909,Box114,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.311WilliamCroziertoFrederickTaylor,May10,1909,Box114,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.312CroziertoTaylor,February13,1909;CroziertoTaylor,April3,1909.

126

familiarpatternsofbehavior,establishingnewsystemsofauthorityandcontrol…”313The

threatofsocialchangeandthedestructionoflongestablishedmethods,especiallythe

valuesofthemastercraftsman,theartisan,greatlyincreaseddiscontentaboutthe

situation.ThearsenalsandlatertheArmyofficercorpsinevitablyexperiencedsocial

upheavalwiththeintroductionofscientificmanagementthatservedasaprecursoror

prototypefortheadvanceofsocialsciences.Thischangemirroredabroader

professionalizationthattranspiredwithinAmericaduringthisperiod.Furthermore,the

proximityandnatureofthesechangescontributedtotheintellectualframeworkofthe

Armyofficercorps.

Taylorwasnolessaprogressivethanothersofhisday,buthisprogressivismwas

ofadifferentorder,aviewof“progress”thatvaluedthetool,themachine,thesystemover

theindividual.Thebettermentofeachindividualcouldbestbeachievedthroughself-

actualization.EvenifhesympathizedwithTaylor’sviews,andthereisevidencehedid,

Croziercouldnotemploythoseideasarbitrarilywithoutcausingworkerstrikesand

politicalturmoil.314ThroughhisrelationshipwithTaylorCrozierscatteredtheseedsof

scientificmanagementwithintheArmy.Thequalitiessoughtinofficers,andthe

propensityofsolutionstoassumeamechanisticcharacterinformedbymindstrainedin

thesocialsciencesandcomplementedbyatechnologicalconstructisrooted,atleastin

part,intheideasandmethodsofCrozierandTaylor.Scientificmanagementismost

amenabletomanufacturingplantsthatfocusonrepetitivetasks,butTaylor’sandCrozier’s

acolytesexploitedthepotentialtoapplyscientificmanagementtothefieldsparticularto

313HughGeorgeJeffreyAitken,TaylorismatWatertownArsenal:ScientificManagementinAction,1908-1915(LiteraryLicensing,LLC,2011),12.314CroziertoTaylor,April3,1909.

127

man.Psychology,government,managementandevenwarappearedtobefieldsthatmight

benefitfromscientificmanagement.315

TaylorvisitedtheWatertownarsenalandthoughtitshouldbeclassifiedasan

“engineeringestablishment,ratherthanamanufacturingestablishment”becauseofthe

diverseandcomplexnatureoftasks.316TheWatertownarsenalproducedexperimental

weaponsandequipment.Theythenconductedteststoevaluatethereliabilityand

feasibilityofitemsproduced.317Taylor’sclarityonthispointleftsomethingtobedesired

becausethefactsdidnotsupporttheassertionthatWatertownwasthebestlocation

insofarastheprinciplesofscientificmanagementwereconcerned,however,bothmen

desiredtogetthesystemimplementedasquicklyaspossible.Regardless,theWatertown

arsenaldidofferauniqueopportunity,andatthesametimetheproposalofferedinsight

intotheguidingassumptionsheldbymilitaryofficers.Watertownremainedtheleast

amenabletoscientificmanagementingeneralandprobablythemostdifficultofanyofthe

arsenalsbecauseofthecomplexnatureoftheworkthere.TheTaylorsystem

demonstrateditsgreatestefficiencygainsinplantsinwhichworkermovementsremained

repetitiousandsimpleinnature.318Inspiteofthisincongruity,theWatertownarsenalwas

wheretheOrdnanceBureauimplementedTaylor’ssystem.319Crozier’slogicimpliedthatif

scientificmanagementwassuccessfullyinstalledherethenitwascapableofbeinginstalled

anywhere.CrozierendedhislettertoTaylorobserving,“Iamgladthatyourjudgment

315DanielNelson,“AMentalRevolution:ScientificManagementsinceTaylor,”1992,chap.1.316WilliamCroziertoFrederickTaylor,April8,1909,Box114,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.317Aitken,TaylorismatWatertownArsenal,53.318FrederickTaylortoWilliamCrozier,April20,1910,Box114,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.319CroziertoTaylor,April8,1909.

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agreeswithminethatthisarsenalisthebestplaceatwhichtomakeacommencement.”320

Thisassertionwasbasedlessonthemeritsofthesystemthanontheresistanceofworkers.

InadditiontoanyadvantagegainedintheimplementationofTaylorisminthe

complexoperationsoftheWatertownarsenal,withitsevidentdifficulties,wereoffsetwith

lowerlevelsofopposition.Inregardsto,“…questionsattheRockIslandArsenal,“Crozier

explainedtoTaylor,“wherethesuspiciousfeelingthattheGovernmentisnotalwaysdoing

itsbestfortheworkersseemstoberatherstrongerthanatanyotherofour

establishments.”321Crozierfollowedthisobservationwiththeimplicitexpectationthatthe

“examinationoftheWatertownArsenal”mightbemorefruitfulinthisrespect.322

AfewhistorianshavedelvedintothegrittydetailsofWatertownanditslittle

knownrelationshiptoscientificmanagement;however,almostnolighthasbeenprojected

ontotherelationshipbetweenTaylorandCrozierspecifically.Thelooseassociationthat

beganin1906betweenthetwomenwasbyallaccountsamicableandprofessional.The

lettersbetweenthemconveyagenuineregardandaboveallothermotivationsadrivefor

efficiencyandproductivity.Taylorneededtoturnaprofitasheadofaprivatefirm,butfor

himprofitwasabyproductandnottheprimeproduct.ForTaylor,scientificmanagement

hadanalmostspiritualcomponent.HoraceDrurynotedinScientificManagement(1915)

that,by“…1901,Mr.Taylor’spossessionofafortuneenabledhimtoretirefromworkfor

pay;butitwasonlytogivehimselfmorecompletelytothecauseofscientific

management.”323Hefirmlybelievedthathismethodsweresuperiortothoseinusebymost

320WilliamCroziertoFrederickTaylor,April16,1909,Box114,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.321CroziertoTaylor,March30,1909.322Ibid.323Drury,ScientificManagement:AHistoryandCriticism,89.

129

industrialfacilitiesatthetime.ItisclearthatTaylor’senthusiasmforreformofAmerican

industrystimulatedCrozierandmenlikehimtotakeaction.

Crozier’sassociationwithTaylorrapidlyevolvedintooneoffriendship.Theletters

gainedacordialtoneandthetwobeganexchangingideasnotonlyaboutscientific

management,butpeopleandpolitics.TayloroccasionallydinedwithCrozierathishome

whileinWashington,D.C.,andamutualrespectformedbetweenthem.Crozierperceiveda

degreeofgeniusinTaylor’smethodsandmanagementtechniquesthatcouldtransformthe

arsenals,ifoutsidefactorscouldbekeptatbay.AfterTaylor’sdeathin1915,Crozier’s

friendshipwiththebrilliant,stiffneckedengineer,causedhimtorefusetousetheless

controversialtermscientificmanagementinplaceofTaylorism,becausehebelievedthat

thesystem’sauthoroughttoreceivecreditforhislabor.324ForTaylor’spart,Crozier

playedacriticalrolewithinthefederalgovernmenttoensurethathismethodsgainedwide

recognitionandimplementationbyfederalinstitutions.Thatthefederalgovernmenttoa

degreeembracedscientificmanagementservedasatacitformofapprovaltothe

manufacturingindustriesatlarge.

InadditiontointroducingscientificmanagementattheWatertownArsenal,anact

ofconsiderablepersonalsatisfactiononhispart,CrozieractivelyassistedTaylorin

diffusinghismethodsthroughoutthefederalgovernment.In1912,heinformedTaylor

thathehadtakenleaveasChiefofOrdnancetospendayearattheArmyWarCollege.“…I

havegivenupthechargeoftheOrdnanceDepartment”,lamentedCroziertoTaylor,

“…separatedwithmyownconsent,although…thechangewassomethingofawrench…for

324WilliamCrozier,“ScientificManagementinGovernmentEstablishments,”BulletinofTheSocietytoPromotetheScienceofManagement1,no.5(October1915):5.

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elevenyears…Ihadworkedinagoodmanyimprovements…andfinally,theintroductionof

theTaylorsystemofscientificmanagement….”325Crozierwastocontinuehiseffortsuntil

hisretirementin1918.

Taylorearnestlybelievedhismethodsweremoreefficientandbetterforthenation,

thecompany,andeventheindividual.InformedbytheideasofSocialDarwinismand

infusedwithprogressivism,Taylorarguedthat“soldiering”ordoingtheminimalwork

possible,hadacorrosiveeffectonthecharacteroftheworker,andthenationcouldnot

affordtohavemenandcompaniesfunctioningfarbelowtheirpotential.326Likewise,

Crozierviewedtheworldthroughasimilar,thoughmilitary,lens.Forofficerssuchas

Crozier,ImperialGermany,whoseprowessinwarandengineeringwaswellestablished,

lurkedasanever-presentthreat.ThedangersthreateningAmericansecuritydictatedasa

matterofurgency,therefore,effortstoimproveAmerica’sproductioncapabilities.InThe

StoryofOrdnanceintheWorldWar(1920)SevellonBrowndetailedthedifferencebetween

theAmericanandFrenchsystem:

InAmericanthemechanicbecomesaspecialistintheproductionofasinglepartworkingtotolerancesdependingupontheaccuracyofgaugestoproduceinterchangeablepartsrequiringlittleornohand-fittingandmachiningwhentheentiremechanismisassembled.ButtheFrenchmachinistisdevelopedasahighlyskilledartist workingalwayswiththepictureofthecompletelyassembledmechanisminmindandinthehabitofdoingagreatdealofcarefulhand-fittingasthepartsareassembled.TheFrenchthusgainperfectionintheirworkattheexpenseofspeed.Generallyspeaking,highlyefficientindustrialorganizationontheimmensescalecommoninAmericaisimpossibleundertheFrenchSystem.327

325WilliamCroziertoFrederickTaylor,October10,1912,Box114,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.326FrederickTaylortoWilliamCrozier,April15,1909,Box114,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.327SevellonBrown,TheStoryofOrdnanceintheWorldWar(Washington,D.C.:JamesWilliamBryanPress,1920),37.

131

TheUnitedStatesArmycouldillaffordinefficientofficersandarsenals.Crozierperceived

inTaylor’smethodsasolutiontothisproblem,auniquelyAmericansolutioninthemaking

thatutilizedmanagementandtechnologytoachieveefficientmassproduction.

TheirpurposesfurtherconvergedunderpoliticalpressureonthepartofCongress

andlaborunions.Unionsandworkersfearedanincreasedworkloadwithoutadequate

compensation;furthermore,workersnaturallychaffedundertheimplicitlackoftrustthat

underlinedscientificmanagement.Crozierhadinvestedhimself,hisofficers,andthe

OrdnanceDepartmentintheimplementationofTaylorisminthegovernmentarsenalsto

varyingdegrees.Crozier’slegacyincludedthemeritsystem,improvementsinaccounting,

andtheoreticalandpracticalcoursesforofficers,butthoseallpaled--inhisopinion—in

comparisontotheimplementationofscientificmanagement.328Crozierconcluded,ina

careerspanningthirty-sixyearsatthetimeofthecomment,thathismostimportantand

enduringaccomplishmentwastheimplementationofscientificmanagement.Hetherefore

tookgreatcareinpromotingofficerswhocouldprotectandpropagatescientific

management--hiscareer’sgreatesttriumph.CrozierandTaylor’sjointlegacies,inthis

respect,wereunitedlesttheirworkbeundone.Crozier’sfirmsupportforthesystemand

itsmeritswascapturedinAnnualReportoftheSecretaryofWar(1911)andportendsthe

importanceofscientificmanagementtothefutureefficiencyofgovernmentoperations.

WhilenotdirectlyattributabletoCrozier,thetoneandnarrativewereunmistakablyhis.

PressuremountedtoblockreformsasCongressionalcommittees,motivatedby

laborunionswhosememberswereconstituentsandcontributorstomembersofCongress

instatesinwhichfederalarsenalswerelocated,movedtoexaminethatwhichwasalready

328CroziertoTaylor,October10,1912.

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known.Oneobviouscriticismwas,whiletheTaylorsystemdidleadtoincreasesin

productiontheimplementationofTaylor’spaysystemmeantthatworkerswerenot

compensatedequitably.Toweathercongressionalinspections,TaylorandCroziercolluded

lesttheirworkbeundone.329TaylorconveyedtoCrozierthemosteffectivetermsand

methodstoargueinfavorofscientificmanagementandofferedtorunarticlesin

sympatheticnewspaperstogarnerpublicopinion.330Croziersuppliednamesofimportant

committeememberssothatTaylorcouldprovidesupportivematerialandamass

appropriatepressureonthem.331Theydiscussedwhoandhowtoappearbefore

congressionalcommitteestoachievethemostadvantageousresults.Thiscollaboration

servedasaprecursortotheconventionalassociationsbetweenservingandretiredsenior

militaryfiguresandproducersofthegoodstheypurchasedinthemodernmilitary

industrialcomplexwhoseoriginsresidedinspirit,ifnotalsoinpart,intherelationship

betweenthesetwomen.

From1909untilTaylor’sdeathin1915,thetwomenworkedtogethertoeducate,

implement,andexpandtheinfluenceofscientificmanagement.DanielNelsoninAMental

Revolution(1992)foundthat,“Between1901and1915Taylor’sassociatesintroduced

scientificmanagementinnearly200Americanbusinesses,181oreightypercentofwhich

werefactories.”332FollowingTaylor’sdeathhisacolytesbegantoexpandscientific

managementintootherfieldsoutsideofmanufacturingandthemilitary.Theemployment

329WilliamCroziertoFrederickTaylor,May10,1912,Box114,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection;WilliamCroziertoFrederickTaylor,June26,1912,Box114,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection;FrederickTaylortoWilliamCrozier,June20,1912,Box114,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.330FrederickTaylortoWilliamCrozier,October8,1913,Box114,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.331WilliamCroziertoFrederickTaylor,September14,1911,Box114,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.332DanielNelson,AMentalRevolution:ScientificManagementsinceTaylor(OhioStateUniversityPress,1992),11.

133

ofscientificmanagementdidsuffersetbacksandwasevenremovedinpartfrom

Watertownandotherarsenalsin1915.CrozierinstoiclanguageinformedTaylor,“…sorry

tohavetosaytoyouthattheanti-scientificmanagementlegislationplacedontheArmyBill

bytheHousewillremainthere…”333However,afterWorldWarI(andinpartasaresultof

themilitary’sexperimentationwith“scientific”teststoassesstheaptitudesofrecruitsand

potentialofficers),thewallsofresistancegavewaytoadelugeofscientificmanagement

initiativesthatrapidlypropagatedthroughoutthefieldsofscience,manufacturing,andthe

newfieldof“management”nowseparatingfromthedisciplineofengineering.

PeterDrucker,describedasthefatherofmodernmanagementtheories,334

suggestedinThePracticeofManagement:“ScientificManagementisallbutasystematic

philosophyofworkerandwork.Altogetheritmaywellbethemostpowerfulaswellasthe

mostlastingcontributionAmericahasmadetoWesternthoughtsincetheFederalist

Papers.”335

AlthoughTaylor’sworkfellintodisreputeamongworkersatthearmories,which

resultedinthehaltingoftime-motionstudies,theirrespitefromthecrazeforefficiency

provedshort-lived.ThenecessitiesofWorldWarIprovidedtheperfectenvironmentfor

Taylorism,whichranroughshodoveroppositionfromunionsandCongresswithaspeed

andmagnitudethatonlywarcouldachieve.WorldWarIcatapultedindustrialproduction,

andtherequisiteidealofefficiencytotheforefrontofAmericanpolicygoals.

333WilliamCroziertoFrederickTaylor,March4,1915,Box114,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.334SteveDenning,“TheBestofPeterDrucker,”Forbes,July29,2014,http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2014/07/29/the-best-of-peter-drucker/.335PeterDrucker,ThePracticeofManagement(London:Routledge,1955),242.

134

Evenso,thatpracticalmanufacturingknowledgeresidedinfewplacesandwas

embracedbyevenfewermen.336MajorGeneralClarenceC.Williams,ChiefofOrdnance

from1918to1930,observedin1920,“AsIhavesaiditisimpossibletoimprovisean

Ordnanceexpert.Engineerswhohadwonfameandsuccessinprivateenterpriseand

weremastersintheirfieldcameintotheOrdnanceDepartment…”337Thoseengineers“of

fame”werelargelyTaylor’sdisciplesfromtheAmericanSocietyofMechanicalEngineers.

Warprovedthemostimportantvector,buttherewereothers.

HindySchachter,inTheroleplayedbyFrederickTaylorintheRiseoftheAcademic

ManagementFields,noted,“Taylor’sworkcoincidedintimewithamajorexpansionof

collegeeducation…Americancollegeenrollmentwasbasicallystaticfrom1820-1880,[but]

itgrewby20percentatprivateEasterncollegesand32percentatstateinstitutions

between1885-1895.”338

By1908,TaylorwaslecturingattheHarvardUniversitySchoolofBusinessandhis

workformedthefoundationforthecurriculumwithenthusiasticsupportfromHarvard’s

academicdean.339Managerstrainedinscientificmanagementthenmovedtopositionsin

governmentandothersegmentsofsociety.340ThemethodsofTaylorismwereextracted

andthenelaboratedtoproduce“bestpractices”whichthoroughlypermeatedmanagerial

America.

336ClarenceC.Williams,Brown,TheStoryofOrdnanceintheWorldWar,17.337Ibid.338HindyL.Schachter,“TheRolePlayedbyFrederickTaylorintheRiseoftheAcademicManagementFields,”JournalofManagementHistory16,no.4(2010):440.339Ibid.,442.340Nelson,AMentalRevolution,1992,23.

135

Taylor’sgreatestachievementmaynothavebeenWatertownoranyoftheother

arsenals;rather,nothingsoaptlydemonstratedthemaster’sfingerprintthanwhat

transpiredintheOrdnancebranchduringtheFirstWorldWar.CrozierservedastheChief

ofOrdnancebranchfor16yearsbetween1901and1917andduringhistenurehe

developededucationalandtrainingmethodsforOrdnancebranchofficers.Furthermore,

Crozier’spowerfulpositionatthetopofthehierarchyallowedhimtopositionmenoflike

mindsteepedinTaylorismthroughoutthebranch.TherapidexpansionoftheArmyduring

WorldWarIpushedthosemenintotheupperechelonsoftheArmyandcommittees

throughoutthefederalapparatusandfromtheretheyimplementedvariousprinciplesof

scientificmanagement.TheOrdnancebranchaloneexpandedfromamere97officersto

over5000officersandhadsupervisionover500privateindustrialplantsbywar’sendin

November,1918.341

AtthebeginningofAmerica’sentryintothewar,theTaylorSocietywasoneofonly

afeworganizationsthatclaimedtohavetherequisiteexpertisetoimplementsystemsthat

wouldmassivelyincreaseindustrialoutput.AccordingtotheBulletinoftheTaylorSociety,

publishedinFebruaryof1919,“…theinfluenceofwarconditionsontheaffairsofthe

Society,especiallytheabsorptionofalloftheofficersandthegreaterpartofthe

membershipintowarorganization,madeitexpedienttosuspendpublicationin1917for

thebetterpartofayear.InDecember,1918,publicationwasresumed….”342The

magnitudeofthisstatementshowhowwidespreadandinfluentialTaylorismbecamewith

thewar;bothindepthandbreadth.Bywar’send,variousprinciplesderivedfrom

ScientificManagementpermeatedtheFederalGovernment.341Brown,TheStoryofOrdnanceintheWorldWar,15.342“Note,”BulletinoftheTaylorSociety4,no.1(February1919):8.

136

Thewarbroughtwithithopeforchange,anendtothestatusquoandthe

emergenceofamoreefficientmanagementsystem.Engineers,armedwithscientific

managementprecepts,believedthatthecommonworkercouldachievegreaterefficiency.

ProgressivesbelievedthatthewarofferedanopportunitytotransformAmericansociety

andinpositionsofleadershipcouldmanage,aswellas,tomoderatethemechanistic

impulsesofengineerstowardworkers,andsocialintellectualsconceivedofaneworder

thatemphasizedandcenteredoncollectiveobjectivesratherthanthoseofthe

individual.343Dr.IraN.Hollis,presidentoftheAmericanSocietyofMechanicalEngineers,

observed,“Wemustagainkeepinourmindsthefactthattherearetwoefficiencies:onethe

efficiencyoftheindividual;theother,theefficiencyofthecollectivemass.Ourefficiencyas

awholewillmaintaintherepublicbuttheefficiencyoftheindividualactingalonewill

createsuchdivisionastodestroyit.”344Thewarappearedtoprovidetheperfect

mechanismtointroducecollectiveactionintoadistinctlyindividualisticAmericansociety.

Followingthewar,Armyofficersintimatelyinvolvedwithindustryand

manufacturing,andevensomewhoservedwiththeAEFinFrance,tendedtoviewvictory

throughthelensofAmerica’sproductionoftheweaponsofwar.Whenjudgingthesuccess

ofWorldWarI,theyproclaimed,oneneedchieflytolookto“Americanindustryand

engineering,toAmericanscience,thatthecreditforthisachievementmustbegiven.Itwas

Americanindustryandsciencethatwereontrial.”345TheGermanssharedthisviewand

coinedthetermMaterialschlacht,translatedwarofmaterial,tocapturetheessenceof

WorldWarI.Theheartandthesoulofwarnolongerturnedonthestruggleofmanagainst

343DavidM.Kennedy,OverHere:TheFirstWorldWarAndAmericanSociety(OxfordUniversityPress,2004).344DonaldStabile,ProphetsofOrder(SouthEndPress,1984),85.345Brown,TheStoryofOrdnanceintheWorldWar,14.

137

man,“acollisionoftwolivingforces.”Itinsteadhadbecomeaquestionof“warby

algebra”--production.346MajorGeneralWilliamsconcludedin1920:“Norcouldthepower

ofourcountryhavebeenmadeeffectiveexceptatthiscompositemindharnessedscience

andindustryintheserviceofthewarmachine.”347

TheessenceofScientificManagementistime;themeasureofmotionnecessaryto

achievethedesiredresultinthesmallesttemporalwindow.Thesetwocompoundsoftime

andmotionamalgamatetoformthemodernideaofefficiency.Taylor’smethodsspread

fromtheshopfloor,toarmories,universitiesandultimatelytothesupremelevelsofpower

intheUnitedStates.However,ideasarenotstaticandwhatwasonce“shopmanagement”

evolvedintoScientificManagement.Abstracted,ScientificManagementnolongersimply

governedthebasicmotionsoffactoryworkersbutmutatedtoanintellectualconcept.If,as

RogerSpillerobservedonideas,“…they'reconceivedandadoptedbycollectionsofpeople

withacommoninterestandthatinterestisthefuelthatkeepsthemgoing.Butthatfuel

canspenditselfovertimeandtheidea'soriginalpotencyslowlydimsorelseis

transformedtoaccommodateitselfwiththerestoftheuniverseofideas.Thatis,ideasmay

notconvergesomuchasgrowcomfortableinthespacetheworldawardsthem.”348That

observationhasspecialrelevancetotheexperienceofU.S.Armyofficersoverthecourseof

theearlydecadesofthetwentiethcentury.

Thencompelledbywar,theinterestofArmyofficers,politicians,andevenworkers

converged,ifonlyforatime,towardacommongoal.Warprovidednosmallmeasureof

propellant(infact,nothingcouldhaveexceededitspotency)topropagateideasof346Clausewitz,OnWar,76–77.347Brown,TheStoryofOrdnanceintheWorldWar,16.348RogerSpillertoDavidHolden,Email,(February27,2015).

138

ScientificManagementthroughouttheArmyandAmericansociety.Interestingly,the

Americanphilosophyofpracticalitycombinedalmostwithanydifficultywiththeideasand

assumptionsofScientificManagement.Practicality,theonlytrueAmericanphilosophy,

providedtheperfectsoilforTaylor’sideastoproliferateandwaraffordedtheopportunity

andcatalystfortheirdissemination.

NoArmyofficerexplicitlyarticulatedtheconceptualchangethattranspired

between1914and1930.Certainly,theramifications,byproducts,orupshotswere

discussedintherenumerousechoesorphysicalreverberationswhethertanks,planes,

radiosorMaterialschlacht;theproximatecauses,thesecondandthirdordereffects,were

visible.349Itisclear,however,thatthesourceandrootofchangeremainedcloakedbehind

theeffects.Similarly,thoughtoagreaterdegree,ScientificManagementfixedclosuretothe

sourceamplydemonstratedtheintellectualchangetowardtime.LewisMumfordperceived

theevolution,thetrendinsocietalchange,observingin1934,“Intime-keeping,intrading,

infightingmencountednumbers;andfinally,asthehabitgrew,onlynumberscounted.”350

ItisatruismandnolesstruethatArmyofficers,beginningwithWorldWarIandinevery

majorconflictthenceforwardusedthekill/deathratio-numbers-astheprimarymetric

wherebyvictoryanddefeatweremeasured.

349PoormobilizationofmaterialandindustrialcapacityinWWIresultedinthecreationoftheArmyindustrialCollege.ScientificManagement,withitsfocusonefficiency,certainlyfoundanaturaloutgrowthintheAIC.FrancisW.A’Hearn,“TheIndustrialCollegeoftheArmedForces:ContextualAnalysisofanEvolvingMission,1924-1994”(DoctorofEducation,VirginiaPolytechnicInstituteandStateUniversity,1997).350Mumford,TechnicsandCivilization,22.

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ChapterVII

TheArmybyNurture&theNavybyNature

TheU.S.Armyarrivedatthephilosophyofscientificmanagementorganicallyand

largelyunintentionally.Thatjourneywasdrivenlargelybyenvironmentalfactors.TheU.S.

Navyembracedtheconceptsknownasscientificmanagementdeliberatelyandforcefully.

Thestrikingdifferencebetweenthetwoculturesliesattheheartofthisanalysis.TheArmy

andNavybothconfronteddauntingchangeatthedawnofthetwentiethcentury.Both

wereinextricablylinkedtopreparingforwarandtheofficersthatfilledtheirranksvalued

similartraitsofleadership,courage,andforbearance.Nevertheless,theyconducted

operationsinseparateanddistinctenvironments.Toolsoftheirtradeswerenoless

diverse.TheNavytradedinvaststeelseagoingtitans.TheArmydealtinboneandsinew.

Similaritiesanddifferencesaside,theybothfundamentallypursuedoneendaboveall

others--efficiency.

FrederickTaylorbridgedtheArmyandNavyastheforemostnameinefficiencyin

thefirstdecadesofthetwentiethcentury.Heembodiedthebowwaveofmanagerial

changesweepingthroughAmericanfactories,industrialestablishments,andsoon

universities.Formostwhowereawareofhistheories,Taylorwasnosnakeoilsalesman

pedalingspuriousconcoctionsfromthebackofagaudily-paintedwagon.Taylorhada

vision.Andlikeallvisionarieshisdreamsandideasofchangegeneratedsignificant

resistance.Throughyearsofstudyandpracticalexperiencehehadrefinedhismethodsfor

improvingworkplaceefficiency.Asaresult,asearlierdiscussed,privateandpublic

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businessandorganizationsfrequentlysoughtTaylor’sexpertiseabouthowtodomore

withless.

Taylor’sinvolvementwiththeNavypredatedhisinvolvementwiththeArmy.This

contactwasgreaternotonlyinchronologicalorder,butalsoinfrequencyandquantityof

correspondence.ItappearsthatTaylorpersonallyinvestedhisinterestsandenergies

moredeeplyinrelationswiththeNavy.Ofcourse,theNavycertainlyrepresentedthe

largerquarryofthetwoservicesbyalargemeasure.Nevertheless,hisengagementwith

theU.S.Navybureaucracyandnavalofficersweredemonstrablystrongerthatthosewith

U.S.Armycounterparts.Last,theNavyandTaylorismsharedacommonnature--thatof

machines.Itisnecessarytoemphasize,however,thatscientificmanagementforTaylor

andtheU.S.Navyofficerswithwhomhedealtwasnotmerelyasetofproceduresfor

tinkeringwiththeproductionandrepairofmachines;itembodiedamindset,awayof

thinking.Intheend-it’sallabouttime.

FortuneappearedtofavorTaylor,butonlyinstints.CaptainCasperF.Goodrich,a

long-timefamilyfriend,provedtobeanimportantandpowerfulally.Goodrichwasa

strongadvocateforNavyreformandservedontheNavyBoardthatrecommendedthe

establishmentoftheNavalWarCollege.351Theirfriendship,bytoneandsubstanceclearly

predatedthe1891letterbetweenthetwowhich,representsoneoftheearliest

communiquésbetweenTaylorandanofficeroftheNavy.Theletterwascomposedtwelve

yearsbeforeTaylorpublishedhisfamouswork“ShopManagement”in1903.352

351Kuehn,“TheMartialSpirit—NavalStyle:TheNavalReformMovementandtheEstablishmentoftheGeneralBoardoftheNavy,1873-1900”;RonaldH.Spector,ProfessorsofWar:TheNavalWarCollegeandtheDevelopmentoftheNavalProfession(Newport,RI:NavalWarCollegePress,1977),23–24.352Taylor,ShopManagement.

142

TheearlylettersbetweenGoodrichandTaylorfrequentlytouchedonmattersof

workandfamilyinnearlyequalmeasure.Theterm“ScientificManagement,”asyet

uncoined,neverenteredthediscussions,althoughstatementsleavenedwithTaylor’sideas

aboutefficiencyturnedupoccasionally.Generally,thewarmandaffablemissivesbetween

TaylorandGoodrichclosedwithsomevariationof“lovetoallthefamily.”353Therewere

signsthatmoresubstantiveexchangesoccurred.InDecember1891,Goodrichencouraged

Taylor’searlysuccessbyobserving,“Ihopethingsarerunningnowwithouthitchandthat

thequantityproducedisasampleasthequalityissatisfactory.Iamalwayswithyouin

spiritandamalwayswishingyouthebestofluckinallthings.”354

However,neartheendofthecenturyTaylorstartedtograsptheessentialsofhis

systemwhileworkingasaconsultantatBethlehemSteel.InMarch1899,Taylordetailed

informationabouthisworkinalettertoGoodrichthathintedatthisprogress.“Itwould

givemetheverygreatestpleasure,”Taylorwrote,“tohaveyougothroughworkshereand

lookoverthevariouslinesinwhichwearetryingtomakeimprovements.”355Goodrich

wasunabletovisitanditappearedhispressingnavaldutiestookatollonhistimetowrite

aswell.Taylorpressedahead,makingsignificantadvancesintooldevelopmentand

proclaiminghis“newschemeofmanagement.”356HeinformedGoodrichinaletterinthe

summerof1900astohisprogress.357GoodrichcomplimentedTayloronhissuccessesbut

didnotasofyetinquireintothespecificdetailsofTaylor’ssystem.Goodrichappeared

content,asfriendsareusuallyaccustomedtodo,toacceptknowledgeofafriend’sworksin

353FrederickTaylortoC.F.Goodrich,January1892,Box21,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.354C.F.GoodrichtoFrederickTaylor,December29,1891,Box21,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.355FrederickTaylortoC.F.Goodrich,March14,1899,Box21,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.356FrederickTaylortoC.F.Goodrich,June16,1900,Box21,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.357Ibid.

143

themostgeneralterms.However,followingextendedserviceatseaduringtheSpanish-

AmericanWar,onSeptember1901Goodrichreceivedorderstotakecommandofthe

LeagueIslandNavyYardoutsidePhiladelphia.Discoveringthathisnewcommand,atthe

navalyard,wasparalyzedbytraditionalproceduresandlackedefficiency,Goodrichknew

exactlywheretoturn.358

FrankCopleystatedinFrederickTaylor,FatherofScientificManagement(1923):

ItwillberememberedthatoneofthereformseffectedbyGoodrichandNewberryupontherecommendationofTaylorwastheconcentrationatLeagueIsland,inPhiladelphiaofallthetoolmakingfortheAtlanticyards.Theorganizationofthistool-makingshopwasdirectedbyHathaway.ItwasalwaysGoodrich’sambitiontohaveBarthemployedattheBrooklynNavyyard,theretoestablishmachine-shopstandardsfortheentireservice.359

ChancehadsmiledonTaylor.Alongtimefamilyfriendgivenakeypositionwithin

theU.S.Navy’sshipyardsprovidedTaylorwiththeperfectopportunitytorefineand

expandhismanagementmethodsonascalenotpreviouslypossible.Theoldadagethat

“it’snotwhatyouknow,butwhoyouknow”fitsaptlyhere.Nevertheless,Goodrich,like

mostlineofficers,expressedsomediscontentatgivingupseacommand,exchangingship

forshoreduty.Goodrichdid,however,confidetoTaylorthat“oneoftheredeeming

featuresofmynewduty-whichIfranklydonotlike-willbethebetterchanceofseeingyou

occasionally.”360

TheadministrationofTheodoreRooseveltprovedaformidableproponentfor

governmentreform.GoodrichandTaylorbenefitedfromthestronganti-unionstanceof

Rooseveltandbothmensharedasimilarviewof“loafers”ingovernmentservicethat

358C.F.GoodrichtoFrederickTaylor,September9,1901,Box21,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.359FrankB.Copley,FrederickW.Taylor,FatherofScientificManagement,vol.II(NewYork:HarperandBrothers,1923),304–305.360GoodrichtoTaylor,December29,1891.

144

neededtoberemoved.361Stillunionsandleisurelylaborpracticespersistedwithin

America’snavalyards.

GoodrichwasTaylor’soldestally,butnothismostardentsupporter.Thattitle

belongedtoanotherofficer.Goodrich,tenyearsTaylor’ssenior,employedarefined

politicalacumen.Thus,Goodrichapproachedrestructuringofthenavalyardsobliquely,if

conservatively.HesupportedTaylorinhisplansfortheinstallationofscientific

managementideasreformbuthisnavalcareersuperseded,shoulditcometoahead,any

commitmenttohisdesireforsubstantialreform.

GoodrichmighthavebeenTaylor’soldestally,buthewasnothismostardent

supporter.Thattitlebelongedtoanotherofficer.NavalConstructorHoldenA.Evans

discoveredTaylorthroughacombinationofwordofmouthandprofessional

development.362Taylor’sreputation,forillorwell,gainedconsiderablereachwithhis

publicationofShopManagement,andhisnotorietyincreasedasaresultofwell-publicized

conflictswithlaborleaders.WhereasGoodrich’sappreciationandapplicationofTaylor’s

managementsystemhadlogicalandreasonablelimits,Evanshadnosuchcompunctions.

Hedeliberately,ifwithadegreeofrelish,sacrificedhimselfontheshrineofTaylorismand

inthenameofefficiency.363

Ideashavethepotentialtoigniteafireintheheartsofthosewhoembracedthem.

Suchindividualsaredrivenbysingle-mindedcommitmentandabeliefinthepurityoftheir

cause.Theywillimmolateothers,andeventhemselves,toseethosebeliefsrealized.

InspiredbyTaylorism,Evanssacrificedhismarriageandlaterhiscareerinacrusadeto

361FrederickTaylortoC.F.Goodrich,May7,1891,Box21,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.362H.A.EvanstoFrederickTaylor,June28,1906,Box116,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.363HoldenA.Evans,OneMan’sFightforaBetterNavy(NewYork:Dodd,Mead,1940),182.

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implementscientificmanagementinAmerica’snavalyards.364Thetitleofhis

autobiography,OneMan’sFightforaBetterNavy(1940)conveysthesolitarytenorofhis

journey.365

HoldenA.EvansgraduatedfromtheNavalAcademyin1892.Poorhealthnearly

abortedhiscareerbeforeitwaslaunched.However,fatesmiledonyoungEvans.Hisfather

wasa“life-long”friendofthenSecretaryoftheNavyBenjaminF.Tracy.Acordialmeeting

putthemattertorestinminutes.366However,anunfortunateconversationbetweenEvans

andSecretaryTracyplacedEvansasalineofficerratherthanasupervisorofnaval

construction.ThisoccurrencedemonstratesacleardemarcationbetweenGoodrichand

Evans.WhileEvansdesirednothingmorethanacareerinthefieldofshipyard

managementandeschewedalifeontheline,Goodrichlovedthelifeofalineofficerand

wantednothingtodowithnavalyards.AfterashorttourasalineofficerEvanswassentto

GlasgowUniversityforaneducationinnavalarchitectureandshipbuilding.367In1897,he

reportedtoNewportNavyYardtobeginhiscareerasanavalconstructor.368

OnJune28,1906,Evans,writingfromtheNavyYardatMareIslandCalifornia,

dispatchedthefirstofmanyletterstoTaylor.369Inthismissiveherequestedahalf-dozen

articlesandTaylor’smonograph,ShopManagement,becausehewas,“…anxioustogo

furtherintothissubject…”370Evanswasambitiousandcurious,apowerfulcombination

forchange.Aprolificpublicist,Taylorrarelywastedtimerespondingtorequestsfor

informationabouthismethods.Truetoform,TaylorrepliedtoEvans’srequestonJuly4,364Ibid.,88.365Evans,OneMan’sFightforaBetterNavy.366Ibid.,59,60.367Ibid.,90.368Ibid.,111.369EvanstoTaylor,June28,1906.370Ibid.

146

1897andincludedarecentlypublishedarticletitledthe“PieceRateSystem.”Hethen

notedthathehad“forwardedthebalanceofyour[Evans’]listsofpamphletstothe

AmericansocietyofMechanicalEngineers,withtherequesttothemtoforwardthese

paperstoyou.”371TaylorhadbeenelectedpresidentoftheASMEthatsameyearandmade

useoftheorganization’sstafftodealwithsuchmatters.

Overthenextseveralyears,Taylorfoundhimselffavorablypositionedbetween

CrozierwiththeArmyandGoodrichandEvanswiththeNavy.CrozierandGoodrichboth

exercisedadegreeofcautionintheirimplementationofshopmanagement,whileEvans

utterlyabandonedhimselftothecause.DrivenbyhisbeliefinTaylorismandinfusedwith

youthfulidealism,hissingle-mindedpursuitofefficiencynearlymatchedthatofTaylor

himself.Hewasnotsofortunateindealingwithresistancewithinthesystemtohis

advocacyofscientificmanagement.Taylor,unlikeEvans,waspositionedtoweatherthe

politicalfalloutthatwasinevitable.CrozierandGoodrichunderstoodthatturmoilwith

shipyardworkersmightwellsinkanyprospects,andtheircareers,ofimplementing

change.

Nevertheless,TaylorandEvanscontinuedanactivecorrespondenceoverthenext

severalyears,especiallyduring1906-1909.Taylor,ashefrequentlydidwithbright

prospects,invitedEvanstocometoPhiladelphiatoseeshopmanagementinaction,Taylor

suggestedastayofa“weektotendays”thathemight“graspthewholesystem.”372

Taylor’sinvitationsextendedtoothers,butoneotherimportantgroup-menofinfluence-

foundsimilarfavor.

371FrederickTaylortoH.A.Evans,July4,1906,Box116,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.372FrederickTaylortoH.A.Evans,April29,1907,Box116,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection;H.A.EvanstoFrederickTaylor,July30,1906,Box116,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.

147

Taylordiscoveredbychance,orperhapsitwasbydesign,thatshopmanagement

foundgreatersuccesswithatwo-prongedattack.Inessence,itappearsthatheattempted

toinfluenceengineers,builders,andpractitionerssuchasEvans,menattheroots.Ifnaval

constructorsandtheircounterpartsinotherindustrialestablishmentsadoptedshop

managementforitsbenefits,thenitpropagatednaturallythroughouttheorganization.

Taylorpossessedasortofscientificmystique,anauraofconfidencethatcaused

peopletoadmirehimformasteryofacomplexsubject.Theintellectualprowessofsuch

individualsproducesanallure,amagneticattractionthatconflatesrealitywithmagic

withintheapprentice.Themasterdemonstratesanabilitytoelucidatedatawithelegance

andprecisionthatinfectsthenovicewithcuriosityandenthusiasm.Thatsortofperson

connectsopaquerelationshipsbetweendisparateaspectsofthetopicthatappearobvious

andself-evidentbutonlyinretrospect.Taylorhadthisinspades.

Aspreviouslydiscussed,themostcommontermsforTaylor’sideaswereshop

management,Taylorism,andscientificmanagement.Theideaevolvedwithtimelikethe

termitself.Initially,shopmanagementaimedprimarilyatimprovingthemechanistic

elementsofafactory.Later,theideaevolvedandappliedtotheindividual,notjust

motions,buttothought.Evolutionoftheconceptproducedthemorepowerfulelementof

scientificmanagement.

Evans,theparagonnavalconstructor,foundhimselfgrippedbyTaylorandhis

system.However,methodsandprocessesalonedonotgeneratetheemotionalappeal,the

ferventdedicationexhibitedbyEvans.Rather,suchadherentsbegantograspquiteearly

thepotentialofTaylor’ssystem.373ForEvansitwasasubtle,butnatural,stepfromefficient

373H.A.EvanstoFrederickTaylor,December29,1906,Box116,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.

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actiontoefficientthought.Hebelieveditwasamatteroftimeuntilshopmanagement

becamethelawoftheland.

Taylor’ssecondmechanismforthepromulgationofhisideasaimedtoinfluence

thoseatthetop.Forexample,hemetwithPresidentTheodoreRoosevelt,theSecretaryof

theNavyandtheAssistantSecretaryoftheNavytodiscusshissystem.Hemetwith

senatorsandinvitedthemtovisithisshops,ashedidwithEvans.Furthermore,Taylor

appearedatcongressionalhearingsbothtofurtherandattimesdefendhissystem.He

frequentlyenteredintothemostpowerfulcirclesofAmericanpolitics.

TheNavyprovedmoreimportantthandidtheArmytoensurethesuccessof

Taylorism.Complicatedmachinessuchastankshadyettobeinvented,andwheeled

vehiclesplayedonlyaminorroleintheArmyproductionandprocurementsystematthe

turnofthecentury.Ontheotherhand,theNavyproducedshipsrangingfromfrigatesto

dreadnoughts,thelargestmachinestheworldhadseen.Aswell,navalyardswerehighly

visible,beinglocatedinornearlargemetropolitanareas,andtheyemployedsignificant

numbersofworkers.Thepublicandpoliticiansremainedkeenlyattunedtoanychangesat

theyards.Thus,navyyardspromisedtobeamarveloussitefortheimplementationofthe

principlesofscientificmanagement.

However,Taylorandhisdisciplesfacedsomegiantobstacles.IfFrederickTaylorwasDavid

ofOldTestamentfame,theworkersandtheirembryonicunionsprovedtobehisGoliath--

albeitanadversarythatneverquitestayeddead.Taylorfoughtthemateveryturn.He

foughttheminprivateindustry.Hefoughttheminthearmories.Hefoughttheminthe

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navalyards.Hefoughtthemingovernment.374Buthedidnotfightthemalone.Hiswaron

inefficiencyenlistedcapablemenineverytheaterofactionlistedabove.

Taylor’sdisciplesintheNavy,primarilynavalofficersresponsibleforship

construction,demonstratedanunusualdegreeofloyaltytoTaylorandhistheories.Line

officerswerefoundintheirranksaswell,buttheirnumberswerelimited.Taylor

engenderedthisfidelitybynurturingpersonalrelationshipsandadvisinghisloyal

supporterswhenevertheyencounteredanobstacle.HeregularlyadvisedCrozierand

Evans,amongothers,astohowtodealwithworkersandunions.375

On30August1907,EvansdispatchedalettertoChiefConstructorW.L.Capps,

CommandantoftheNavyYardatMareIsland,California.Theformalrequestentitled,

“Piecework-Recommendedforscalingoutsideplatingofships”inwhichheenumerated

point-by-pointthereasonsandbenefitsofthissystem.Evansendedthemissivewithhis

mostcompellingpoint,statingthat“…pieceworkwasbrieflydiscussedwiththeHonorable

SecretaryoftheNavyduringhisvisittothisyardandIwasinformedbytheSecretarythat

hewouldapprovepiecework…”376Asitturnedout,thelettertoCappsprovedamere

formality.LessthanamonthlaterEvanshadhisanswer.Pieceworkwasago.377Theletter

toCappsprovedamereformality.

PresidentTheodoreRoosevelt--apragmatistinthetruestAmericansense--valued

utilityandefficiency.Hemadeclearthosevaluestomembersofhiscabinet.Thus,

SecretaryoftheNavyVictorH.MetcalfhadnorealobjectionstoEvans’proposalfor

374H.A.EvanstoFrederickTaylor,April19,1907,Box116,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.375TaylortoEvans,April29,1907.376H.A.EvanstoW.L.Capps,August30,1907,Box116,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.377W.L.CappstoH.A.Evans,September20,1907,Box116,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.

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pieceworkatthenavyyards,althoughitwasinitiallylimitedtowoodcaulking.378Capps,of

course,followedsuit.InhisresponsehedirectedEvans“…tokeepacarefulrecordofthe

quantitiesandcostsofpieceworkscalingdone…”forcomparisonpurposes.379Fromhis

conversationwithSecretaryMetcalf,Evansinferred,“…thathewouldlookwithfavoron

recommendationsfortheextensionofthepieceworksystem.”380Overthefollowing

months,EvanswastedlittletimeinimplementingandextendingpieceworkattheMare

Islandshipyard.

EvansandTaylorcontinuedtoexchangeideasonpieceworkandshopmanagement.

Infact,Evansstatedinonecommunicationon27July1908,“your[Taylor’s]opinionisso

valuablethatIhavetakenthelibertyofforwardingyourletter…totheNavy

Department.”381ThisdemonstratedEvans’faiththatTaylor’sopinionnotonlythatthosein

theNavywouldknowofFrederickTaylorbutthathisviewscarriedsignificantweight.

Taylorfoundhimselfinauniqueposition.BecauseofhisfriendshipwithGoodrichand

Evanshehadthepotentialtoexertsignificantinfluence,andhedidsoasanintermediary

shufflingsituationalortacticallevelinformationfromlowertoupperechelons,anot

uncommontacticthatleadersfrequentlyemploytogetunfilteredinformation.Evansonce

cautionedTayloraboutblatantmeddling.382TheNavymightnotlookkindlyonthiskindof

collusionifrevealed.

TheoutlookimprovedforTaylorandEvanswiththeappointmentofTrumanH.

NewberrytothepositionofSecretaryoftheNavyinDecember,1908.Newberry,whohada

378EvanstoCapps,August30,1907.379CappstoEvans,September20,1907.380EvanstoCapps,August30,1907.381H.A.EvanstoFrederickTaylor,July27,1908,Box116,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.382Ibid.

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backgroundinindustry,appeareduniquelyopentoshopmanagement.However,

Newberry’sinterestextendedonlytotheendswithlittleregardtothemeans.Ifscientific

managementincreasedefficiency,andintheendsavedmoney,hefullysupportedit.383

Moreimportantly,HerbertL.Satterlee,thenewAssistantSecretaryoftheNavy,appeared

determined,asEvansreportedtoTaylor,“…tothoroughlyreorganizethemethodsinthe

navyyards.”384Thefuturelookedbrightforscientificmanagement.

In1908,Evansenumeratedinanarticle,“AnAnalysisofMachine-ShopMethods,”

theprocessesbeingimplementedtoincreaseefficiency.Evansrepeatedlyaddressedthe

“…beliefthatallGovernmentshopsareinefficientlymanaged…”abeliefwithwhichhe

explicitlydisagreed.385Yet,hisargumentsbeliedhisownsituation.Evansused

considerableinktocatalogtheproblemsthatgovernmentofficialsfacedthatcivilian

counterpartsdidnot.Inhisview,unions,bureaucraticentanglements,andlazy

governmentworkerscombinedtoreducetheefficiencyofnavalyards.Tocombatthese

maladies,Evansnoted,“I,however,believethatstop-watchtimestudies,asadvocatedby

Mr.Taylor,canbeusedtogreatadvantageinfixingstandardtimeforpremiumsystem.”386

Taylor’sinfluenceoverEvansisunmistakable.Evans’titledhis1908article“An

AnalysisofMachine-ShopMethods”atributetoTaylor’sShopManagement.Evans

confessed,“IhavebeenmuchimpressedwiththeteachingsofF.W.Taylor…”387.Healso

notedintellectualinspirationfromF.A.Halsey,aprominentmechanicalengineerandlong

timeeditoroftheAmericanMachinist.WhileEvansacknowledgedhisintellectualdebtto

383H.A.EvanstoFrederickTaylor,November12,1908,Box116,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.384Ibid.385HoldenA.Evans,“AnAnalysisofMachine-ShopMethods,”AmericanMachinist31,no.1(1908):568.386Ibid.,569.387Ibid.,569.

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Halsey,Evans’publishedworksandhiscorrespondencedemonstratedhowimportantwas

Taylor’sinfluence.

On19November1908,TaylorwroteEvanstostresstheimportanceofgettingthe

SecretaryoftheNavytoapprovethemethodsofscientificmanagement.388Taylorand

Evanswereworkingagainsttheclock,fortimeandpoliticswerenotontheirside.They

neededtoimplementthesystemandnetsignificantresultsbeforetheunionsgained

adequatesupporttohalttheprocessofimplementingthereforms.Withoutthedata

yieldedbytheinitialchanges,theystoodlittlechanceofdefendingtheirmethodsifthe

politicalwindsshiftedagainstthem.Scientificmanagementnecessitatedasignificant

amountofdatacollection,sometimescalled“redtape”byitsadvocates.389Objectionsto

whatwasperceivedasunjustifiedexperimentationservedasonefocalpointforresistance

toscientificmanagement.

In1909stormcloudsformedonthehorizon.TheincomingWilliamH.Taft

administrationappearedmoresensitivetounionconcernsthanhadthatofTheodore

Roosevelt.Evans’windowofopportunitytoimplementscientificmanagementatMare

IslandNavyyardwasfastclosing.TaftwastedlittletimeinreplacingNewberrywith

GeorgevonMeyerasSecretaryoftheNavyinMarch1909.Meyer’sspecificfeelingstoward

scientificmanagementremainedanopenquestion,muchdebated,inthefirstfewweeks

afterhetookoffice.However,withintheNavybureaucracyresistancewasgrowing

noticeablyandquickly.TaylorlamentedtoEvans,somethreeweeksafterMeyer’s

388FrederickTaylortoH.A.Evans,November19,1908,Box116,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.389Ibid.

153

confirmation,“itseemsmostunfortunatethatNewberrywasnotallowedtocontinuethe

fineworkhehadthenervetostart.”390

Taylor’sfearwasconfirmedwhenhereceivedaletterfromEvanson15October,

1909.Scientificmanagementhadnotprogressedfastenoughinthenavyyards.Unionand

bureaucraticoppositioncombinedtoforceEvansandTayloronthedefensive.Meyer

abandonedNewberry’splans,asTaylorpredictedbecause,“resultshadnotbeenobtained

fromMr.Newberry’sscheme.”391TheinitiativeauthorizedbySecretaryNewberryran

fromFebruarytoJuly,hardlyenoughtimetofairlyadjudicateamethodsocomplexand

encompassing.ThesunhadsetontheacceptanceofscientificmanagementbytheUnited

StatesNavy—atleastforatime.

Evansflounderedduringthefollowingmonths.Scientificmanagementwasmore

thanasystem,process,ormethodtohim.Despairshadowedeverything,ashisdeepand

abidingbelief,purposeinlife,allhisworkturned,itseemed,toashes.Thislosswasmade

allthemoreacutebecausewhathadhappenedflewinthefaceoflogic.Meyer’spolicy

shiftedwiththepoliticalwindsoflaborpolicy,notonabasisofefficiencyorwhatwasbest

fortheNavy.Shrewdpoliticalmaneuveringandprimalemotionsdrovethesechanges,and

toalogicalmansuchasEvans,emotionsandpoliticsseemedasarbitraryandrandomasa

hurricaneorflood.On16October,EvansconfidedinTaylor,“…Iwillneverquit,butthereis

nouseofexpendingone’slifeinworkwheretheconditionsaresuchastomakeit

impossibletoproduceresults.”392OneoftheofficialexplanationsprofferedbytheMeyer

administrationasserted…thattheproblemofhandlingshopsofNavyYardisamilitary

390FrederickTaylortoH.A.Evans,March29,1909,Box116,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.391H.A.EvanstoFrederickTaylor,October15,1909,Box116,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.392H.A.EvanstoFrederickTaylor,October16,1909,Box116,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.

154

ratherthananindustrialproblem.”393ToEvansandotherproponentsofscientific

management,heclaimwasasthinasthepaperitwaswrittenon.

However,thedarknesswasnotallencompassing.AssistantSecretaryoftheNavy

BeekmanWinthropdemonstratedsomeinterestinscientificmanagement.394Hissupport

wasqualifiedsince,asEvanswroteTaylor,“…hewantstofindoutforhimselfthebest

methods.”EvansprimedTaylortoexpectapotentialtelephonecallfromWinthrop.395

Meanwhile,heattemptedtoamelioratesomeofhisanxietythroughprodigious

correspondence,firingoffthreeletterstoTaylorinfourdays.On15October1909,Evans

againapproachedTaylorforhelp.ForEvans,Taylorrepresentedthefinalhopeto

overcometheresistance,thelastreserve,theOldGuard.HewageredTaylorleveraged

againstWinthropcouldplacescientificmanagement,perhapsunderadifferentguise,back

intothenavyyards.396

Intheinterim,Evanspublishedanarticle,“ReductioninCostofNavyYardWork”

thatcapturedhisbroaderthoughtsonscientificmanagementwithinthenaval

establishment.397Evanshadimplementedscientificmanagement,atleastinpart,several

yearsbeforeCrozier.Predictably,hisattemptsgeneratednosmallmeasureofdiscontent

fromworkersandpresagedsimilarunhappinessthatoccurredlateratWatertown.

However,Evansobserved,“…anotherdifficultywhichprobablyeverymanagerencounters

whenheattempttointroducesomeradicalimprovement,thatis,theoppositionofhis

workmen…probablyduetotwocauses…naturalconservatismofworkmen…anditgavethe

393EvanstoTaylor,October15,1909.394H.A.EvanstoFrederickTaylor,October12,1909,Box116,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.395Ibid.396EvanstoTaylor,October15,1909.397HoldenA.Evans,“ReductioninCostofNavyYardWork,”AmericanMachinist33,no.1(1910):3.

155

menlesstimetostandaround.”398Inhismind,workersdislikedprogressandwere

inherentlylazy.Nowhediscoveredthepoliticiansplayedthepart-andbetter.

Evansacknowledgedinthisarticlethat,“…ournavyyardshaveapoorreputation

amongbusinessmenandmanagers”inregardstoefficiency.399Hestressedthat,the

complexnatureofworkatthenavyyardsmilitatedagainstanyeasyfixes.Onlythe

applicationofFrederickTaylor’stheorieswouldcorrecttheproblems.

ItisclearthatTaylor’sinfluencecontinuedtospreadthroughouttheconstructorcorps.400

NamerecognitionofTaylorandTaylorismfueledboththespreadandoppositiontohis

methods.HisworkShopManagement,publishednearlysevenyearsbefore,gained

considerabletractionby1910.Thetermscientificmanagement,notcoineduntil1910and

notbyTaylor,implicitlyconveyedtheideaoffactual,eternalanduniversallyapplicable

lawstoincreaseefficiency.MensincetheageofAristotlehadlookedforthemagickeyto

unlockthemysteryofcreationandTaylor,asitpertainedtoefficiency,appearedtohave

foundtheanswer.

Evansremainedsteadfastinhisfaith.Unwillingtobendorrescindhismethods,his

daysatMareIslandwerenumbered.TheNavy,bythemiddleof1910,reassignedEvans

fromtheMareIslandNavyYard.401Therewasnoneedtospeculateastothecauseofhis

removal.Nevertheless,theseedsofapowerfulideahadtakenroot.Evans’s“detachment”

didnotnecessarilyreducehisinfluence.Thosewhohadnot,bymereproximity,stumbled

ontoTaylor’smethodswereledtherebymenlikeEvans.398Evans,“AnAnalysisofMachine-ShopMethods,”156.399Evans,“ReductioninCostofNavyYardWork,”1200.400H.A.EvanstoFrederickTaylor,July26,1910,Box115,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection;G.S.RadfordtoFrederickTaylor,December3,1910,Box117,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection;G.A.BissettoFrederickTaylor,“G.A.Bisset,LettertoFrederickTaylor,”November29,1910,116,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.401F.G.CoburntoFrederickTaylor,September20,1910,116,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.

156

Forexample,in1910EvansintroducedNavyconstructorA.G.CoburntoTaylor.402

Followingtheirinitialmeeting,Coburnrequestedpamphlets,muchasEvanshadbackin

1906.403Taylor’scharmwasevidenthereaswell.Coburnnoted,“…Ifeeltheneedofafirst

handinspirationtokeepmegoingforawhileundertheconditionswhichasyouknoware

extremelyuncomfortable.”404Taylorpromptlyrespondedon22Septemberwriting:“…It

wouldgivemeverygreatpleasuretohaveyoucometomyhouse,”Taylorwrote,“atany

timewhenyouareintheneighborhood…”405

Furthermore,TaylorsuggestedthatCoburngototheArmy’sWatertownArsenal

andobservethesysteminaction.OnTaylor’srecommendation,CarlBarthhadworked

therewithCroziertoimplementscientificmanagement.406Taylorthusactedasaconduitto

routeanavalofficertoanArmyarmory.Presumably,theinformednavalofficer,having

observedscientificmanagementinpracticeatanarmorysanctionedbythegovernment,

andthenreturnedtoanavalyardtoenactit,aformofintellectualcross-pollination.In

earlyOctoberCoburnbrieflystayedwithTaylorathishome.407

WithtimeonhishandsafterhisdeparturefromMareIsland,Evansrequested

extendedleaveforadvancedstudyunderTaylorinscientificmanagement.Therequest,

despiteapositivereferralfromAdmiralRichardM.Watt,wasdenied.408Theatmosphere

hadshifteddecisivelyagainstscientificmanagement,atleastthekindadvocatedbyEvans.

TaylorwrotetoWattregardingwhathetermedtheincoherenceoftheTaftadministration.

“Itis,however,extraordinary”,Taylorobserved,“whenonerealizedthatthesame402EvanstoTaylor,July26,1910.403CoburntoTaylor,September20,1910.404Ibid.405FrederickW.TaylortoF.G.Coburn,September22,1910,115,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.406Ibid.407F.G.CoburntoFrederickTaylor,October7,1910,116,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.408R.M.WatttoFrederickTaylor,December12,1910,115,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.

157

methodswhicharesoseverelycondemnedandwhicharebeing,“…tornoutofthenavy

yards,arebeingintroducedbyGeneralCrozieratWatertownwithgreatrapidityandinthe

mostthoroughmanner.”409TaylorfoundthattheArmyarmoriesprovedastrongbulwark

againsthostilityofpoliticians.

TaylorinformedWattthatCrozierplannedameetinginearly1912ofthe

commandersofallarsenalsforthepurposeof“introducingthesamemethods.”410If

SecretaryMeyerwanteda“thoroughlyimpartial”witnessastotheviabilityofscientific

management,Taylorargued,Crozierfitthebill.411Failingthat,Taylorsoughtameeting

withPresidentTaft.412Unfortunately,asTaylorrecalled,themeetinglastedlessthana

minute.413Inthatspanthepresidentdemonstratedlittleinterestinscientificmanagement

ortheEvans“matter.”Thepresidentbluntlystated,“…heofcoursecouldnothavemuch

interestinasystemwhichwasinoppositiontotheviewoftheSecretaryoftheNavy.”414

Thus,theroadblocktoacceptanceofscientificmanagementappearedtobe,atleast

officially,SecretaryoftheNavyMeyer.

ThetreatmentofEvanscausedahighdegreeofresentmentamongfellownaval

constructors.Coburncalledtheadministration“shortsighted”and“bigoted”inits

treatmentofEvans’“case.”415However,likeEvans,Coburnexpectedlittlesympathyfor

Taylor’smethodsathisnewdutystation.Indeed,Taylorwarnedhisprotégéewithatouch

ofsarcasm:“Youwillnot…findthecommandingofficer…atLeagueIslandingreat

409FrederickTaylortoR.M.Watt,December15,1910,116,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.410Ibid.411Ibid.412FrederickTaylortoR.M.Watt,January12,1911,115,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.413Ibid.414Ibid.415F.G.CoburntoFrederickTaylor,February7,1911,116,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.

158

sympathywithanythingwhichinvolvedprogress.”416Taylorknewthisbecauseheresided

notfarfromtheLeagueIslandfacility.Perhapstheonlybenefitofthenewassignmentwas

TaylorandCoburnwouldnowseeagreatdealmoreofeachother.

MostofTaylor’snavalcontactsresidedintheconstructorcorpsamongstengineers

andthoseinthenavyyards,Goodrichbeinganobviousexception.However,oneother

sourceofsupportemerged—fromalineofficer.Taylorreceivedanintriguingletterfrom

LieutenantW.B.Tardyon6February1911.Tardy,astudentofscientificmanagement,

inquiredofTaylorwhetheranengineeringsectiononboardashipmightbenefit

significantlyfromsuchanorganization.417Tardynoted,thatifcorrect,delineatingthetime

ittooktodoeachjoballowedformultipleimprovementsandincreasedefficiencyaboard

thebattleship.Withthisaction,scientificmanagementexpandedfromshoretoship.The

tasksweresimilar,butthecontexthadchanged.

ApeculiarsituationexistedintheperiodbeforeWorldWarI.Meyerpersistently

toutedthefailuresofscientificmanagement,andnavalofficers,especiallyconstructors,

continuedtoimplementit.418ItisdifficulttogaugetheprevalenceorpopularityofTaylor’s

methodsintheNavyatthistime.SufficeittosaythatMeyer’svocaloppositionprovideda

valuablebenchmark.Meyerwasnottotallyopposedtothemethodsofscientific

management,buthewasopposedtoanythingthathadTaylor’snamestampedonit.

WhereTaylor’snamepoppedup,stormsfollowed.Taylorhimselfrecognizedthathewas

toxic.Inaletterof11February1911,hewarnedTardy,“…Ifeelyouwillbemorelikelyto

succeedbycallingyoursystem‘scientificmanagement’ratherthanbrandingitasthe

416FrederickTaylortoF.G.Coburn,February13,1911,116,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.417W.B.TardytoFrederickTaylor,February6,1911,115,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.418FrederickTaylortoW.B.Tardy,January31,1911,115,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.

159

Taylorsystem.”419GeneralCrozierwasawareofthissentimentaswell,butthoughtTaylor

deservedthenameandthefruitsofhislabor.420

WhateverMeyer’smotivationsandthepoliticalintrigueinvolved,inMarch1911,he

instructedCaptainAndrewstoinviteTaylor,astheSecretary’sguest,tocomeaboardthe

U.S.S.Dolphin.FromtherethetwowouldmovetoviewnavalgunneryinactionontheU.S.S

Vermont.421TardyalsobrieflyspokewithMeyerwho,“sincerelyhopeshe[Taylor]will

accept”theinvitationandforTardytoensurethathedid.422Thisprovidedthetwomen

ampletimetodiscussthemeritsofscientificmanagement.Fromthemomenthewassworn

inMeyerhadcrushedeverysignofTaylorismintheNavy,includingreassignmentof

officers,likeEvans,whogotinhisway.Now,itappeared,theinvitationtoTaylor,the

embodimentofthemovement,todineaboardshipsuggestedthatMeyer’stunehad

changed.Buteverysongcomestoanend.

InabrazenbreachofdecorumTardyimploredTaylortoaccepttheSecretary’s

invitation.423IfTaylor’srecordwasanyindication,heneededlittlepromptingtoaccept

Meyer’soffer.DismissedbyMeyeranddeflectedbyTaftin1909,Taylornowsenseda

breachinthepoliticalbarricade.Withthecharacteristicconvictionofatruebeliever,he

chargedin.Tardyplayedadangerousgamebydancingontheboundarylineofcollusion.

However,TaylorandTardywerefamilyfriendsandtheirrelationship,akintothatwith

Goodrich,providedTaylorwithaninsideseat.

419Ibid.420Crozier,“ScientificManagementinGovernmentEstablishments.”421W.B.TardytoFrederickTaylor,March27,1911,115,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.422Ibid.423Ibid.

160

Meyer’smovetowardscientificmanagementcausedacorrespondingshiftinthe

Navy.Officersandagentsofscientificmanagementnowbegantomoveoutoftheshadows.

AjubilantTardyobservedtoTaylor,“itlookstome,fromwhatisapparentandwhatIget

behindthescenesthatthetimeisripeforyoutoaddtheNavyscalptoyourbelt.”424If

Evans’scareerhadsufferedbecauseofhisbeliefinscientificmanagement,Tardysoughtto

profitbytheassociationwithTaylor.Furthermore,Tardy’sproximitytotheSecretary

providedhimwithconfidentialinformationaboutMeyer’snavalplansthathesharedwith

Taylor.425

Inahandwrittenletterof27March1911,afterafriendlypreamble,Tardyspelled

outhisplan.“Myreasonsforsendingyouamanuscriptletter”,Tardyexplained,“instead

ofatypewrittenoneisbecauseIamgoingtosaythingsthatIdon’twantayeomanorclerk

tosee.”426Henolongerwasdancingalongthelineofcollusion;heclearlyhadchosento

eraseit.TardydescribedhisplansindetailtoTaylor:

…whyIamsoanxioustohaveyouaccept.Nowforalittlemoreprospectivehistory,whichwillunfoldotherpersonalreasonswhyitisnecessarytomycareeralmostthatyoucome.IamgiventounderstandthatIamtobecomeamemberoftheboardofofficerswhoaretovisitscientific[management]shops.ThatifImakegoodinthatcapacityIamtobecometheSecretary’saidforNavyyardorganizationandmanagement.IbelieveIhaveaprettyclearconceptofalltheunderlyingprinciplesoftheTaylorsystemofmanagementandIknowthatIaminfullsympathywithyou…nowisthecriticalopportunemomentforyoutoadvanceyourreligionofmanagementbyaddingtheNavytothenumbersoforganizationsthatareoperatingunderTaylorsystemofmanagement.Youcanhelpmeinmyambitiontobe ofvaluetotheserviceandtorenderyouloyalassistanceinreorganizingNavyYards.YouseeifIamtheofficerdesignatedtoworkwithyourrepresentativeandtoseethateachyardadvancesasrapidlyandasuniformlyaspossiblyyounotonlydonothaveareactionaryinme,butyou haveanenthusiasticdisciplewhowillavail

424Ibid.425FrederickTaylortoR.M.Watt,March29,1911,115,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.426TardytoTaylor,March27,1911.

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himselfofallthecounselyoumay caretogive…pleaseregardtheaboveasconfidentialforthepresent.427

TaylorhappilyacceptedtheSecretary’sinvitationon30March,1911.428Nolonger

thepariah,fortuneagainsmiledonhisendeavors.Thenavalexercisewasasuccessforall

interestedparties.Taylorfeltliberated,ifnotvindicated.Tardyreceivedthesupporthe

neededandtheaffirmationoftheSecretary.AndMeyerwasnowinformedonthematterof

scientificmanagement.Taylor,confidedinAdmiralWatt,“IdevotedallofmytimewithMr.

Meyertothisend…”429

TardywroteTayloron11Apriltoinformhimthat,aspredicted,hehadbeen

appointedtoaboardassignedtoinvestigatescientificmanagementatvariousshops.430

TardysuggestedtoSecretaryMeyerthatEvansbeappointedtotheboardbecauseofhis

expertiseinscientificmanagement.Taylor,likewise,defendedEvansatlengthwhile

aboardtheDolphinandVermontinthehopeofmendingtherupturebetweenthetwo

men.431TheSecretarytooktherequestunderadvisement.TardyinformedTaylorthat

“theSecretaryauthorizedmetotellyou[Taylor]inconfidencethathehadtakeupwith

WattthequestionofappointingEvanstothisBoard,andthatWattthoughtEvanslacked

judicialbalance…”432

Butmatterswerenotastheyseemed.Taylorpromptlyrespondedinamissive,on

April13,toTardy.AccordingtoTaylor,Wattrememberedtheconversationquite

differently.“WatttoldmehestronglyrecommendedEvansasamemberofthisBoard,”

427Ibid.428FrederickTaylortoW.B.Tardy,March30,1911,115,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.429FrederickTaylortoR.M.Watt,April10,1911,115,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.430W.B.TardytoFrederickTaylor,April11,1911,115,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.431TaylortoWatt,April10,1911.432TardytoTaylor,April11,1911.

162

Taylorrecounted,“andstatedthathewasbetterqualifiedthananyoneelseinthe

ConstructionCorps…TheSecretaryrefusedtohaveEvansbecauseheclaimedEvanshad

attackedhiminthepress.”433GiventherecommendationbyWattthatEvansbeallowedto

takeayearofleavetostudyunderTaylor,theSecretary’sassertionappearedquestionable.

Theruptureremained,andexperiencedU.S.Navyconstructor,G.H.Rock,andCharles

ConradPaymasteroftheNavy,werenamedtheothermembersoftheBoard.

Taylor’scomplexmanagementmethodsrequiredsignificanttrainingandeducation.

Withoutpropertraining,scientificmanagementappearedburdensometotheuninformed.

Copiousrecordsanddetailedprocessesseemedunnecessary,andfortheworkerthe

requirementforrigorousrepetitioncausedfrustrationandanger.Taylorfearedthat,

lackingextensiveeducationaboutmethods,theboardmemberswouldviewscientific

management“…asembodyingavastamountofredtape,therealmeaningofwhichthey

wouldinnowayappreciate.”434Toforestallanysuchjudgment,Taylorhostedtheboard,at

hishomeinlateApril,1911.435Itsmembersmadecleartheircommitmenttoimpartiality

andobjectivity,andassuredTaylorthathehadnothingtofearfromtheboard.Thethreat

emergedfromanotherquarter.

ByAugust1911Taylorhaddefeatedoroutmaneuveredthosewhoopposed

implementationofscientificmanagementingovernmentworkshops.Tardywaspoisedto

introducescientificmanagementonalargerscale.And,surprisingly,Meyerrelentedand

allowedEvanstojointheboard.436EvansalsobecameamemberofAdmiralCharlesE.

433FrederickTaylortoW.B.Tardy,April13,1911,115,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.434Ibid.435W.B.TardytoFrederickTaylor,June3,1911,115,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.436W.B.TardytoFrederickTaylor,July23,1911,115,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection;FrederickTaylortoW.B.Tardy,August1,1911,115,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.

163

Vreeland’scommission,whichwasalsoworkingonmodernmanagementforNavy

Yards.437Inprinciple,theNavyacceptedscientificmanagementasofferingsuperior

methodsthatifemployedimprovedefficiency.Officersagreedonthatmuch.Nowthe

questionrevolvedaroundthedetailsofwhatwouldbedone.Taylorassumed,aslateas27

August,thatMeyer’sintroductionofscientificmanagementwasonlyamatteroftime.438

On12OctoberTaylorreceivedashockingletterfromG.S.Radford,inclosinga

newspaperclippingfromtheWashingtonPost.Thearticle,“WillTryNewNavyPlan:Sec

MeyertoImportEnglishSystem,”indicatedthepossibilityofMeyermovinginadifferent

directionthanhehadintimatedtoTaylor.439

Washington,Oct8—CastingasideallscientificsystemsofNavyYard

managementadvocatedinthiscountry,becausehebelievestheyinvolvetoomuch

detailandrequireseriouschangestotheCivilServicerulesof employment,Secofthe

NavyMeyerwillimportfromEnglandthesystemof managementinusebyVickers,

Limited…EveryoneintheNavy,itissaid,exceptpossiblysomeradicalbureauorcorps

partisans,willwelcomea systemwherebythecommandantwillagainbethechiefofall

mattersata NavyYard.440

Meyerhadonceagainchangedhismind.Heappearedtobesteeringbysailrather

thanrudder.Likemostbureaucratsofthetime,heappearedtobeguidedbythepolitical

winds.TheAmericanMachinistcapturedtheconfusionina11April,1912article,“The

VickersSystemofManagement.”Thepiecestated:“Engineersandmachinerybuildersin

437W.B.TardytoFrederickTaylor,August28,1911,115,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.438FrederickTaylortoM.H.Karker,August27,1911,115,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.439TheWashingtonPost,“WillTryNewNavyPlan:SecMeyertoImportEnglishSystem,”TheWashingtonPost,October9,1911.440Ibid.

164

AmericawereconsiderablysurprisedafewmonthsagotolearnthatSecretaryoftheNavy

Meyerhaddecidedagainstallofthesystemsofshopmanagementinuseinthiscountry

anddeterminedtoinstalltheVickerssystemofmanagementfromthegreatBritish.”441

Thedramaticshiftinpolicycaughtcivilianandpublicengineersbysurprise.

ItisnoteworthythatMeyerdidnotentirelytorpedotheideaofscientific

management.Instead,heseparatedtheconceptfromitscreator.Anythingattachedto

Taylor’sname,inanyform,becameflotsamandwasjettisonedoverboard.Needinga

substituteforTaylorism,SecretaryMeyerdispatchedtwocaptainsobserveEnglish

productionmethodsatVickers,thegiantmanufacturingcompanyproducingeverything

fromsteelcastingstomachineguns.Neitheroftheofficershadanyexperienceinscientific

management.442TaylorcynicallyremarkedtoRadfordthattheirtripwill“nodoubt…bea

greatsuccess.”443Notably,theirtriptoinspecttheVickersfactorylastedameretwo

weeks.

SecretaryMeyerinthe1911AnnualReportoftheNavyDepartmentstated:

IfoundinEngland,attheworksofMessrs.Vickers(Ltd.),atBarrow- in-Furness,amostefficientsimplesystemofmanagement.Briefly,itmaybesaidthatthisestablishmenthasanengineeringdepartmentandashipyarddepartment,withanelectricaldivisionundertheenginedepartment.Theyarrange,inthelargerjobs,fortheorderlypassageoftheseparatepartsfromoneshoptoanother,instructtheworkmenhowtoworkmostefficiently,andfollowtheseparateoperations,bymeansofacorpsofskilledprogressmen,untiltheassemblyiscompleted.Inageneralwaytheworkisthoroughlysystematizedoncommon-senseprinciples,butnoattemptismadetogointotheforecastingofminutedetails.Inconsequencetheextracostofelaborateplanningisavoided.Thegreatestpercentageofincreasedefficiencyseemstohavebeenattainedbybroadeffectsinsystematizationandinsecuringthecheerfulcooperationoftheworkmentowardbestresultsthroughproperrecognitionoftheirinitiativeandmoreefficienteffort.ThemanagementatVickersisthoroughlyconvincedthatexcessiveprevisionofdetaildoesnotpay.The

441“TheVickersSystemofManagement,”AmericanMachinist36(April11,1912):573.442FrederickTaylortoG.S.Radford,October24,1911,Box117,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.443Ibid.

165

companyisconfirmeditsexperienceatoneofitsownplants,atErith,England,whereforbetweenthreeandfouryearstherehadbeeninstalledoneofthemostelaborateofthescientificmanagementsystemswithunsatisfactoryresults.444

Meyer’smotivationswerequestionableastheyrelatedtoscientificmanagement.

PerhapsTaylor’ssystemdidrequiretoomuchpaperwork.Taylorhimselfnotedthat

withoutadequatetrainingnovicesfailedtograsptheimportanceofdetailed

quantification.445However,Meyeralsowantedasystemthatdidnotrequireyearsof

trainingandeducationtobeemployed.Taylorisminthatrespectfailedtomeetakey

threshold.

Meyer,alongwiththeheadsofothergovernmentalentities,createdmultipleboards

tostudyTaylorism.ThecompletedreportsgenerallyconcurredthattheNavyYards

requiredorganizationalandmanagementchanges.Taylor’svastnetworkofdisciples

alwaysseemedtofindtheirwayontothesecommittees.NameslikeHenryL.Gantt,

HarringtonEmerson,HollisGodfreyandCharlesDaypopulatetheliteratureonscientific

management.Afterall,theyweretheefficiencyexperts.Theirconclusionswerewhatone

mightexpectfromagroupofmenassociatedwithTaylor.446

Nevertheless,Meyer’soppositionfocusedonTaylorhimself.Asystembyanother

namesuchasprovidedbytheVickersinvestigationprovidedMeyerwiththepretensehe

needed.H.F.Wright,anavalconstructor,notedtoTayloron9November1911,“Iammore

thaneverconvincedthattheintentionofthoseinauthorityistoinstitutescientific

managementasunderstoodbyyouandtocallitbyanothername.”447Taylorrepliedonthe

444GeorgevonL.Meyer,“AnnualReportoftheSecretaryoftheNavy”(Washington,D.C.,1911),22.445TaylortoTardy,April13,1911.446DouglasD.Wilson,ed.,“ReportofthePresidentofDistrictNo.44,”Machinists’MonthlyJournal25(1913):1132;“NavyYardSystemIsDeclaredFaulty,”NewYorkTimes,March9,1912;“ScientificManagementintheNavy,”NavalInstituteProceedings37(1911).447H.F.WrighttoFrederickTaylor,November9,1911,Box117,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.

166

13November,“hewouldliketogetanybenefitsthatwouldcomefromtheprinciplesof

scientificmanagement,butwouldpreferbrandingthemastheMeyerSystemrather

anythingelse.”448Taylorknewhisnameevokedresistance.However,theanimosity

betweenTaylorandMeyerhadbecomepersonal.TaylorfeltbetrayedbyMeyerafterhis

overtlyfriendlygesturesixmonthsearlier.

Onedaylater,TaylordisclosedtoCoburnthattheArmy’sleadershipprovidedsolid

supportforscientificmanagement.Hedrewstrengthfromthissuccessandreflectedonit

duringtimesoftrouble.TheSecretaryofWarandGeneralCrozierwereoutspoken

supportersofTaylorism.449Croziertestifiedmultipletimesbeforecongressional

committeesalwaystothebenefitofTaylor.TaylorassistedCrozierwithmaterialsupport

forthehearingsbeforecongress.Furthermore,Taylorclaimedtoknowhowtomanage

disgruntledworkers,sincehismethodstendedtocreatethem.Hepassedonsuggestionsto

bothCrozierandCoburnaboutthatsubject.450

TheArmy&NavyJournalranasmallpieceon16December1911highlightingthe

increasedcostofrepair,over10%,between1910and1911.451Itwasanobliqueshotat

Meyer.TaylorconfidedinCoburn,“…thismightbeunpalatablereadingtoSecretary

Meyer…Ratherunexpected[as]Ihadtheimpressionthatthey[Army&NavyJournal]were

verystrictpartisansoftheline.”452Thejournalwasquitepopularwithofficersduringthis

period.TheMeyer’sadministrationwasnowcomingunderfiremultipledirections.The

ConstructorCorps,underMeyer’sjurisdiction,continuedtoexecutetimeandmotion

448FrederickTaylortoH.F.Wright,November13,1911,Box117,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.449FrederickTaylortoF.G.Coburn,November14,1911,116,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.450Ibid.451F.G.CoburntoFrederickTaylor,December12,1911,116,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.452FrederickTaylortoF.G.Coburn,December22,1911,116,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.

167

studiesalong,albeitcovertly,withvariousotherelementsofscientificmanagement.453

Internalfrustrationandloathingbegantoboilover.

ItappearedMeyer’srapidlyevolvingmanagementplansmightcosttheNavyoneof

itsbrightestofficers.OnNovember19,TardyinformedTaylorthathehad“…heardvague

rumorsthatEvansisgoingtoresignsoon.”454Infact,itwasnotarumor.Evanshadno

intentionofwastinghislifeinpursuitofaworthyidealthattheNavyrefusedtoembrace.

Meyerhadchangedhispositionforathirdtimeregardingscientificmanagement.Evans,

emotionallyexhausted,wasdonewithitall.455

Tardy’sintentionallybelatedletterprovidedTaylorwithsomeinsightintotheNavy

workings.Thedelayedresponseallowedeventstomature,whichaffordedTardytwo

revealingobservations.First,theNavyleadershiptook“flight”atthe“first”signsoftrouble

fromorganizedlabor.Inprinciple,theNavyacceptedtheneedforputtingintoeffect

scientificmanagement.Inpractice,politiciansandorganizedlaboropposedtheplan.

Second,Tardycontended,“Idonotbelieveforamomentthatanyeffortistobemadeto

adoptVickersmanagementfortheyards.”SecretaryMeyerwasplayingashellgameand

oneeveryoneappearedtorecognize.“AsIunderstand,whateverefficiencytheremaybein

thatsystem”,Tardyexplained,“isduetopieceworkandthepremiumsystem.”456Inshort,

thecreditbelongedtoTaylorbuthewasnotgoingtogetit.

DespiteinterferencebyMeyer’sadministration,navalofficerscontinuedto

implementscientificmanagementinitsvariousincarnations.457Lineofficers,especially

453FrederickTaylortoG.S.Radford,November18,1911,Box117,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.454W.B.TardytoFrederickTaylor,November19,1911,115,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.455FrederickTaylortoW.B.Tardy,November21,1911,115,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.456TardytoTaylor,November19,1911.457TaylortoRadford,November18,1911.

168

thoseaboardlargerships,usedittorefineandhonesailor’sactions.Thoseatshoreusedit

toreducecostandtimeinvolvedinrepairsandproduction.458

Withunabashedadvocacy,Crozierenumeratedthebenefitsandvalueofscientific

managementatArmyarmories.HetoldtheSecretaryofWarandCongressonmultiple

occasionsthatTaylor’smethodsdeliveredasuperiorproductbelowtraditionalcostandat

afasterrate.459NavyConstructorCorpsofficersdrewstrengthfromtheArmy’ssuccess.

Rationallyitseemedthatifthegovernmentapprovedtheprocessinoneareathatitought

tobeapplicableinanother.TheconclusionwasthatiftheyweatheredMeyer’sattemptsto

disassembleregardingscientificmanagementthenextadministrationmightbeamenable

tothesystem.460

TheapproachingendofMeyer’stermcouldnotcomefastenoughforTaylorandhis

followers.Ifthenightisdarkestandthecoldmostpenetratingjustbeforedawn,Meyer’s

administrationplayeditspartwell,exploitingTaylorismatitsmostvulnerablepoint.

NothingdroveTaylorintoadefensivefurylikeapotentialstrike.Itthreatenedeverything

heworkedforoverthelasttwentyyears.Turmoilmenacedsocialstability.Politiciansand

employerscouldnotabideorganizedworkeropposition,atleastforlong.

On1January1912,whilemostmenrecoveredfromthenightbefore,Taylor

feverishlyfiredofffourletters.Taylor’scorrespondencewithoveradozennavalofficers

spannedoverfifteenyearsandthecorrespondencequantitativelymeasuredhundredsof

pages.OnnootherdaydidTaylorfireofffourletterstonavalofficers,employingnearly

verbatimlanguage.Thematically,theywereidentical.Taylorexpressedhisviewstothe

458TardytoTaylor,February6,1911.459FrederickTaylortoGeoH.Rock,December20,1911,115,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.460TardytoTaylor,March27,1911;CoburntoTaylor,February7,1911;R.M.WatttoFrederickTaylor,April1,1911,115,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.

169

recipients,Rock,Wright,Coburn,andJamesReed,regardingtheproteststakingplaceatthe

BostonNavyyardandpotentiallyotherfacilities.461

Thespecialcongressionalcommitteeassignedtoevaluatescientificmanagement,

whichexaminedArmyarsenalsandNavyyards,wasnearingtheendofitsinvestigation,

scheduledtoconcludeon11February,1912.462Withonemonthremaining,Taylorneeded

todemonstrateconcreteexamplesof“loafing”atnavyyards.Heusedtheterm“loafing”

(andonotheroccasions,“soldiering”)todescribeemployeesworkingatminimumcapacity.

Taylorinquiredwhetheranyoftheofficersmighthavesuchexamples,preferringonein

anyaboutwhichaforemanmightbewillingtotestifybeforethecommittee.

TaylortoldCoburnthatifhewerewillingtotestifybeforethecommittee,hewould

payforallexpensesincurred.463CoburnagreedtoTaylor’srequest.However,Taylor

subsequentlylearnedthat“thecommitteeisnotissuingsubpoenasforpeopletoappear

beforeit,butIhavenodoubtthatIcangetthemtowriteyou,requestingthatyouappear

beforethem.”464InaletterofJanuary12,TaylorinformedCoburn:“Ishallsendyourname

toMr.Wilson,theChairmanoftheHouseCommitteetoInvestigatetheTaylorandother

SystemsofManagement,andaskhimtohaveyousubpoenaed…”OvertheyearsTaylorhad

developedanextensiveandinfluentialnetworkthatenabledhim,ataminimum,togainan

audiencewithjustaboutanypolitician.

461FrederickTaylortoJamesReed,January1,1912,117,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection;FrederickTaylortoF.G.Coburn,January1,1912,116,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection;FrederickTaylortoH.F.Wright,January1,1912,Box117,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection;FrederickTaylortoGeoH.Rock,January1,1912,117,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.462ClarenceBertrandThompson,ScientificManagement:ACollectionoftheMoreSignificantArticlesDescribingtheTaylorSystemofManagement(HarvardUniversityPress,1914),789.463TaylortoCoburn,January1,1912.464Ibid.

170

OnJanuary19,1912,TaylorwrotetoTardy,observing:“Agoodmanywitnesses

haveappearedbeforetheCommitteefromtheBostonyardandsomefromtheNewYork

yard,andtheimpressionleftupontheCommitteebythesemenisthattheyarepretty

badlytreatedinthenavyyards…and…thatiftheTaylorSystemweretobeintroducedthey

wouldbedriventodeath.”465Taylorhadaflairforcaricatureandhismostfrequenttarget,

rivaledonlybyMeyer,wasthecommondayworker.Hisexperienceasayoungmanand

thenasacontractorhadfueledhimwithaparticulardisdaintowardwageearners.Implicit

inthepiece-rateandpremiumsystemwasthebeliefthatdayworkerswerenotworkingto

theirfullpotential.Thus,Taylor’ssysteminvolvedidentificationoftheshirkersand

achievedefficiencybyrewardingthosethatexceededthestandardwhilethosethatdidnot

receivedlesspay.Unionsandemployeesperceivedthesystemaspunitive.Theenemyof

everyunionsystemisthe“ratebreaker”whosetsaseemingly-unfairstandardfor

comparisontootherworkersperformingsimilartasks.

Taylor’slettertoTardycontinuedwiththewarningthat“…ifthey[thecommittee]

weretorecommendagainsttimestudyitwouldbecomepracticallyimpossibleinmany

casestogetafairday’sworkoutoftheworkmen.”466Histruefeelingsonthesematters

occasionallypopulatedletterstohisclosestfriends.Herepeatedlyclaimedthatscientific

managementassistedworkersinreachingtheirfullpotentialwhilehispersonalletters

betrayedadifferentperspective.Towardstheendofthemissive,TaylorentreatedTardy

toappearbeforethecommitteeaswell.Taylorplayedeverycardhepossessed.InTardy,

Taylorfoundamanoflikemind.OnJanuary26thTardyreplied,“Ifirmlybelievethatwe

mustcometoscientifictimestudiesandbonusorpremiumsystemofwagesifweareto465FrederickTaylorandW.B.Tardy,January19,1912,115,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.466Ibid.

171

hopeforevenfairresults.”467Taylorhopedwithacriticalmassofnavalofficersbeforethe

committeehemighttrumpthevoicesofworkers.

AfterTaylortestifiedbeforetheCommittee,hedispatchedalettertoTardy,on

February2,whichrevealedhispersonalthoughtsabouttheSecretaryofNavy.

InTaylor’sopinion:

…theSecretaryoftheNavyhadannouncedinthemostemphaticmannerthathedidnotintendandneverhadintendedintroducinganyelementofscientificmanagementintotheNavy,thathewasabouttointroducetheVickerssystem…thatscientificmanagementhadbeenusedinoneoftheVickersshopsinEnglandforyears,andhadresultedinlossofmoneytotheVickersCompany,andthatthewhentherealVickerssystemwassubstitutedinitsplacethisDepartment,whichformerlyoperatedataloss,atonceoperatedataverylargeprofit.468

Meyerusedhispositiontobroadcasthisdamagingviewsonscientificmanagement

tothepublicandtheNavy.Headoptedapopuliststance,ashadPresidentTaft,thatthere

waslittleneedforspecialistsinArmyandNavyfacilities.Thecommonmanwasjustas

capableastheeducatedprofessional.Navalofficersdemurred.469However,whileMeyer

stilloccupiedthepulpit,Taylorismwastherisingreligion.

DavidWatsonTaylorhadservedasanavalconstructorfrom1892to1894atMare

IslandNavyYard.470Tayloreventuallyattainedtherankofadmiraland,“forabouteight

yearsfrom1914to1922…servedastheChiefConstructorandChiefofBureauof

ConstructionandRepair.”471OnFebruary2,1912,twoyearsbeforeheattainedtherankof

Admiral,constructorTaylordispatchedalettertoFrederickTaylordetailinghistestimony

beforethecommittee.Thetestimony(forwhichheseemedparticularlyproud)strongly467W.B.TardytoFrederickTaylor,January26,1912,115,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.468FrederickTaylor,“FrederickTaylor,LettertoW.B.Tardy,”February2,1912,115,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.469Ibid.470WilliamHovgaard,“BiographicalMemoirofDavidWatsonTaylor1864-1940,”SocietyofNavalArchitectsandMarineEngineers22(1943):136.471Ibid.

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supportedscientificmanagement.ConstructorTaylordescribeditas,“…thegreatmental

revolutionwhichtakesplaceunderscientificmanagement,andwhichisitsessentialfeature

[myemphasis].”472

Furthermore,constructorTaylorinformedhismentorthathehadencountereda

particularlybeneficialindividualinWashington,D.C.,whohelpedprepare“allwitnesses

whoappearforourside”,Mr.HollisGodfrey.Asidentifiedbyauthorsofastudyofshop

managementmethods,Godfreywasa,“consultingengineer,associatedwithMr.Frederick

WinslowTaylor.”473FouryearslaterWoodrowWilsonwastoappointGodfreytothe

AdvisoryCommissionofCouncilofNationalDefensein,anoversightorganizationcreated

toefficientlyfocusandmanagethenation’sresourcesinpreparednesseffortsforWWI.474

OnlytwolettersbetweenD.W.TaylorandF.W.Taylorhavebeenfound.However,

thetenorandconversantlanguagedisplayedinthesemissivesarguesforafamiliarityonly

acquiredthroughfrequentcommunication.Thisrelationshipnodoubtpaiddividendslater.

D.W.Taylor’sinfluenceasChiefConstructorallowedhimtoputintoeffectscientific

managementintheNavyYardsthroughoutthewar.D.W.TaylorworkedcloselywithF.W.

Taylortopreparenavalconstructorsfortestimonybeforethecongressionalcommittee.

Thepreparationwouldallowconstructorstohighlightthepositiveelementsofscientific

managementandavoid“embarrassing”moments.475

TheCommittee’sreportfoundnodamningevidenceagainstTaylororanyother

systemofmanagement.DespiteOrwellian-likepredictions,theCommitteeuncoveredlittle

472FrederickW.Taylor,“FrederickTaylor,LettertoD.W.Taylor,”February2,1912,117,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.473WilliamB.Wilson,WilliamC.Redfield,andJohnQ.Tilson,TheTaylorandOtherSystemsofShopManagement,3vols.(Washington,D.C.:GovernmentPrintingOffice,1912).474FirstAnnualReportoftheCouncilofNationalDefense(U.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice,1917).475Taylor,“FrederickTaylor,LettertoD.W.Taylor.”

173

tosupportthenotionthatscientificmanagementcreateddraconian-likeenvironments.476

Taylorhaddeftlydodgedthecoupdegraceintendedbytheshipyardunions.

Nevertheless,Taylorreceivedashotacrossthebowfromanunexpecteddirection.

On20June1912,TaylorreceivedaletterfromT.G.Roberts,anavalconstructor.Roberts

detailedtwointriguingideas.First,“someofmycolleagueswhohavebeenassociatedwith

Evans,andareintouch,toldmethatthesysteminstalledattheVickersworkswas

introducedtherebysomeonewhogotitfromsomeonebackinAmerica…”Theallegations

provedtobetrue.InamissivetoRoberts,TayloracknowledgedthatVickersdidinfact

sendoverseveralmenin1900forthreeweekstotheBethlehemworks.Accordingto

Taylor,whiletherethemen“…learnedasmuchastheycouldaboutoursysteminthattime,

butthatwasmightylittle…”477FrederickW.Taylorhadaninventor’sdisdainforimitations

andthoseassociatedwithit.However,Robertsalsoprovideddetailedinformationona

newlypublishedattackonTaylorism.

AdmiralJohnR.Edwardspennedascathingcritiqueofscientificmanagementinthe

journaloftheAmericanSocietyofNavalEngineersinMay,1912.478Edwardsassertedthat

“…managementisanartnotascience,thattheTaylorSystemantagonizestheworkmen

andneglectsthepersonalequation…”479AgraduateoftheU.S.NavalAcademyandan

engineer,Edwards,accordingtohisofficialbiography,“…transferredtotheLineofthe

476Thompson,ScientificManagement,15.477FrederickTaylortoT.G.Roberts,August8,1912,Box117,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection;T.G.RobertstoFrederickTaylor,August10,1912,Box117,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.478JohnR.Edwards,“TheFetishismofScientificManagement,”AmericanSocietyofNavalEngineersXXIV,no.2(May1912).479Thompson,ScientificManagement,22.

174

Navyin1899.”480Edwardswasamanofbothworlds,and,thus,hisperspectivecarried

weightamonghisfellowofficers.

Sinceitwasexplicitlydraftedinresponse.Taylorwroteanundateddocumentthat

correlated,intime,totheSpecialCommittee’sreportonTaylorandOtherSystemsof

ManagementConsequently,onecanconfidentlyplacetheprovenanceofthedocument

betweenMayandAugust1912.Inthethree-pagedocumentTayloracknowledged

Edward’sarticle,“TheFetishismofScientificManagement,”byname.Taylordidnot

wrestlewithEdward’smajorpoints,butmerelyobserved,“AdmiralEdwardshasnever

beeninsideasingleestablishmentinwhichscientificmanagementhasbeenintroduced.”481

TaylorassumedthatwasenoughtodiscreditEdwards.Onehighrankingofficersargument

representedathreattoTaylor’sideas,butanysuchattackspaledinmagnitudetothoseof

Meyer.

SecretaryMeyer’stenurewasanythingbutpalatabletoofficersintheNaval

Constructercorps.Taylorsharedthesentiment.Tothisend,onDecember12,1912,

RadforddispatchedarevealinglettertoTaylor.Theletteritselfwaslargelyunremarkable.

RadfordmerelywantedTaylor’sinputastothepotentialofanewtoolthatRadfordtook

thecaretosketch.However,attheendofthetypedletter,Redford,inmanuscript,penned

thecrypticmessage,“P.S.the4thofMarchapproaches”-nothingelseisintimated,nothing

elseissaid.482Fourdayslater,Taylorresponded.AttheconclusionofhisletterTaylor

acknowledgedRadford’shandwrittenmessage,“Inotetheveryimportantfactstatedby480“PapersofRearAdmiralJohnR.Edwards,”NavalHistoryandHeritage,n.d.,http://www.history.navy.mil/research/archives/research-guides-and-finding-aids/personal-papers/d-e/papers-of-john-r-edwards.html.481FrederickW.Taylor,“AnswerstoCriticismsofScientificManagementwithReferencetotheProceedingsbeforetheHouseCommitteetoInvestigatetheTaylorandOtherSystemsofManagement,andOtherDocuments,”1912.482G.S.RadfordtoFrederickTaylor,December12,1912,Box117,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.

175

youinMS.attheendofyourletter.Letushopeforthebest.”483Themysteriousnote

referencedtheendofSecretaryMeyer’sterm,onMarch4,1913.

WiththeexitofMeyer,oneofthegreatestobstaclestotheacceptanceofTaylor’s

ideasbythemilitaryestablishmentoftheUnitedStatesthreatswasremoved.Unions

remainedaproblem,butamanageableonewithoutafriendlyearintowhichtopourtheir

entreaties.DespiteMeyer’shostility,navalofficers,especiallythosewithintheConstructor

Corps,sustainedandexpandedtheuseofscientificmanagementwithintheNavy.484Inthe

end,MeyersimplyimpededthedepthandbreadthofTaylor’sinfluence,foratime.

TheelectionofPresidentWoodrowWilsonprofferedthepossibilityofan

administrationamenabletoscientificmanagement.Althoughatthisjuncture,Taylorand

thenavalconstructorswouldhappilytakeadisinterestedparty.485Nevertheless,Taylor

haddoubtsabouttheNavy’snewleadership,basedonspeechesbythenewSecretaryand

AssistantSecretaryoftheNavy,JosephusDanielsandFranklinRoosevelt,respectively.486

Whetherfromfatigue,frustration,orteachingcommitmentsFrederickTaylor’s

correspondencewithnavalofficersdwindledinthelasttwoyearsbeforehisdeathin

Marchof1915.Taylor’ssupporterswithintheNavyhadlargelywonacceptanceof

scientificmanagementintheNavy,ifnotinname,thencertainlyinpractice.However,

debateaboutTaylor’smethodsmovedfromwithintheArmyarsenalsandtheNavyyards

tothehallsofCongress.Inthatvenueunionsandsympatheticlegislatorsmaintainedthe

pressure.

483FrederickTaylortoG.S.Radford,December16,1912,Box117,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.484FrederickTaylortoF.G.Coburn,November5,1913,116,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.485FrederickTaylortoT.G.Roberts,March12,1913,Box117,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection;JamesReed,“JamesReed,LettertoFrederickTaylor,”April15,1913,117,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.486FrederickTaylortoA.M.Cook,May26,1913,115,FrederickWinslowTaylorCollection.

176

OnJanuary22,1915,FrederickDietrickscoredamajorwinfortheunions.He

introducedanamendmenttotheArmyspendingbillthatstated:

Provided,Thatnopartoftheappropriationsmadeinthisbillshallbe availableforthesalaryorpayofanyofficer,manager,superintendent,foreman,orotherpersonhavingchargeoftheworkofanyemployeeoftheUnitedStatesGovernmentwhilemakingorcausingtobemadewithastopwatchorothertime-measuringdevice,atimestudyofanyjobofanysuchemployeebetweenthestartingandthecompletionthereof,orofthemovementsofanysuchemployeewhileengageduponsuchwork;norshallanypartoftheappropriationsmadeInthisbillbeavailabletopayanypremiumorbonusorcashrewardtoanyemployee-inadditiontohisregularwages,exceptfor-suggestionsresultingInimprovementsoreconomyintheoperationofanyGovernmentplant;andnoclaimforservicesperformedbyanypersonwhileviolatingthisprovisoshallbeallowed.487

TwoweekslaterasimilarbillkilledsupportfortimeandmotionstudiesintheNavy.488It

appearedthatscientificmanagementintheArmyandNavyhadfinallybeendealta

deathblow.YetagainTaylorsviewsweretoarise,likeLazarus,fromthetomb.

Evans,Tardy,Watt,andD.W.Taylor,amongothersNavyConstructors,graspedwhat

manyduringtheperiodunderstoodonlyimplicitly.Yes,mostunderstoodthatscientific

managementrationallyorderedworkwithintheshop,arsenal,andnavalyard--whatever

theform—toincreaseefficiency.However,thelatentpotencyofthisprocessdidnot

resideinthephysicalrealm,butintheintellectual.Taylorhimselfdidnotappeartofully

sense,atleastinitiallyandmaybeneverfully,whathismethodactuallywrought.Allideas

evolveandmaturewithtimeastheymovefromthemindtopracticeinthephysicalrealm.

Theprocessdoesnotonlyflowinonedirection.Frequently,thesparkcreatedwiththe

collisionoftheimmaterialandmaterialworldilluminatesotherpossibilitiesthatremained

dormant,unknown,andunexploredbythehumanmind.

487(52Cong.Rec.2082,1915)488Aitken,TaylorismatWatertownArsenal,232.

177

WithintheArmy,scientificmanagementmovedforwardlylargelyatthebehestof

GeneralCrozier.OrdnanceofficerssuchasColonelWheelerplayedanimportantrole,but

directionandforceemanatedfromCrozier.Heneededmethodstoreducecostsatthe

arsenals.Todomorewithlessrequiredradicalchangeinselectionofemployees,tools,and

methods.CrozierlookedforsolutionsandfoundthemintheideasofFrederickW.Taylor.

AswasthecaseintheArmy,theNavysoughtoutTaylor.Bynomeansahousehold

name,hewasneverthelesswellknowninthefieldsofengineeringandindustry.Taylor’s

friendshipwithGoodrichprecededhisadvancesinmanagement,and,thus,Goodrich’s

proximitytoTaylor,inabsoluteterms,wasmuchcloserthanthatofCrozier.Goodrich

exertednotimesearchingforsomeonewhoknewsomethingaboutefficiency.Fortunehad

seentothat.However,theprogressionintheNavyofscientificmanagementdiffered

significantlyatseveralkeyjunctures.BoththeArmyandNavylaunchedfromsimilarpoints

intheirpursuitofefficiency,buttheyrapidlydivergedinexecution.

IftheFrenchRevolutionradicallychangedsocietyfromthebottomupandthe

Prussiansaimedto,“…dofromabovewhattheFrenchhavedonefrombelow”489theUnited

StatesArmyandNavy’sintellectualrevolutionfollowedalongasimilarpath.Scientific

ManagementpropagatedthroughtheArmyfromabovewithCrozier,and,incontrast,the

Navy’sacceptanceofthemethodologywasspearheadedbyEvansandtheconstructors

frombelow.Evans,drivenbyadevoutbeliefintheefficacyofscientificmanagement,

forfeitedhiscommissionandhismarriagetothecause.Hiscapableanddeterminedbattle

489ShearerDavisBowmanAssistantProfessorofHistoryUniversityofTexasatAustin,MastersandLords :Mid-19th-CenturyU.S.PlantersandPrussianJunkers(OxfordUniversityPress,USA,1993),123;TheQuarterlyReview,vol.231(London:LeonardScottPublicationCompany,1919),37.

178

forscientificmanagementelevatedhisnametotheattentionofeminentindividualssuchas

PresidentTaft.

TaylorandGoodrichhadsomesuccesslayingthegroundworkintheNavyfor

scientificmanagementundertheRooseveltadministration.Meanwhile,Crozierimposed

Taylorismonthearsenalslargelyunassistedandunopposed,albeitwiththesupportofthe

SecretaryofWar.However,innovatorsintheNavyfacedGoliathsofanothersize,andmore

thanjustone;SecretaryoftheNavyMeyerandtheunionscameinfirstandsecond

respectively,andlineofficersplacedadistantbutstillsignificantthird.ConstructionCorps

officersunderwrotethesuccessesandlikewisesharedinthedefeats.Theyoungofficers

advancedinthefaceofresistancethroughstubbornandnotinfrequentlyinsubordinate

actions.

FrederickW.Taylorthroughoutthispivotalperiodprovidedemotionalandmaterial

support.EvansandTardy,andmanyotherconstructors,heldTaylorinalmostspiritual

regard--notasademigod,butratherasaprophet,someoneenlightenedwhobringsa

messageofprofoundtruth.Navalconstructorsweretrainedandeducatedengineers.

Thesewerenotmen,byandlarge;whoweresuperstitious;rathertheyvaluedmathematics

andlogic.Taylor’srationalsystemextollingefficiencydoubtlessappealedtothem,and

giventhedegreeofsupport,providedanimprovementoverthestructure,orlackof

structureforthenation’snavyyards,thatpreviouslyexisted.

TotheNavy,andspecificallytotheofficersoftheConstructionCorps,mustgothe

honorofbeingthefirstofthetwoorganizationstograsptheintellectualpotentialof

scientificmanagementasasystemofthinking.TheArmy’sheroicideaofleadershipalways

causedtensionintherelationshipbetweenmenandmachines.TheNavy,inessence,wasa

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machine.It,ofcourse,madeuseofhumanbeings,butthetools,theship,alwaysloomed

largerthanmen.FromtheinceptionoftheUnitedStatesNavy,navalofficersembracedthe

machine,andtheclosertheyconnectedwithitthebetteritran.Scientificmanagement

harmonizedmenwithmachinesbecauseitreducederrors,waste,andproduceda

methodical,calculable,andmeasurablesetofoutcomes.Properlyapplied,itreduced

chance,theeverpresentspecterforthosewhopreparedforandengagedinorganized

conflict.

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ChapterVIII

Historymatterednot,becauseitchangedsomuch

Inthefinalanalysis,thereisbutoneobjectofinquiry--thewill.Armyofficersare

principallyconcernedwithexecutingorders,ordersthatinsomemannerconnect,or

shouldconnect,backtoapoliticalobjective.Officersdirectforcetowardaimsthat,atleast

intheory,reduceanadversary’sresolutiontoresist.Todothis,anddoitwell,onemust

intuitivelygraspwhatanimatesmentoaction.

Technologyhasincreasinglyobscuredthenatureofwar.Likelayersoffog,it

shroudsthesharpoutlinesfromobservation.Thelightofrealityfadesbehindthe

accumulatinglayersoftechnologywithknowledgeandunderstandingofthephenomenon

sufferingproportionally.Moretothepoint,theissueislessabouttechnologythantheway

wethinkaboutitandhowitconformsone’sperceptions.Thisisespeciallytrueof

Americansoverthecourseofthepastcenturyormore,whotendtolookfortechnological

solutionstomostproblems.Givenenoughtime,flawedassumptions,andmistakenbeliefs,

Americanmilitaryofficerstypicallyperceivethenatureofwarthroughthetechnological

meansofitsexecution.Ifthenatureoftechnologyistoorderandcontrol,thenperhaps,

war–chaos--lendsitselfsusceptibletosuchmeans.

Technologydivorceswarfromitsproperfocus,whichisman.Writingin1934,

LewisMumfordobserved,“…theprincipalaimofourmechanicalroutineinindustryisto

reducethedomainofchance…”490Ifthatpremiseiscorrect,thentheindustrial

managementrevolutionaryFrederickTaylorbroughtaboutoneofthegreatestmental

490Mumford,TechnicsandCivilization,304.

181

revolutionssincetheEnlightenmentandRomanticmovements.WhiletheEnlightenment

andRomanticismdescribed,“…ideasaboutwhatrelationsbetweenmenhavebeen,are,

mightbe,andshouldbe…”scientificmanagementaimedtoprescribe,atleastimplicitly,the

relationshipbetweenmenandtheirmachines.491

Taylor’sapproachhadfarreachingeffects.Armyofficerswerebornintoanation

largelydevoidofmilitarytraditions.Therewerefewmorestoconfineormoldearly

militarythought.ThosethatdidexistwereimportedfromFrance,Britain,andGermany.

MilitaryideasandstructuresintroducedfromthedistantshoresoftheOldWorldmingled

andamalgamatedintoauniquelyAmericanDNA.EncodedwithintheDNAwasthesource

materialthatformedthesubstrateoftheAmericanmilitarymind.

TheruggedlandscapeofNorthAmericaproducedanequallytoughandpractical

mindsetinArmyofficers.Therewasnotimeforabstractthought,theoryandphilosophyas

theyattendedtothedemandingdutiesofwestwardexpansion.Preoccupiedwith

constabularyfunctions,Armyofficersexpendedpreciouslittleresourcesontheintellectual

developmentoftheirprofession.

Officerscamefromapeoplethatprizedliberty,individuality,andindustriousaction.

Thesevalues,inamannerthatnoonecouldquitehavepredicted,producedanoptimism

thatpermeatedAmericanculture,ahopeinthefuture,inthepotentialofthiscityonahill.

ItwastheZeitgeistoftheage.Drivenbywhattheyperceivedtobedivinestatute,

Americansexpandedgeographicallywithaconvictionanddeterminationrarelywitnessed

inhistory.TheArmydrewitsofficersfromsuchstock.

491BerlinandHardy,TheCrookedTimberofHumanity,1.

182

Bythe1860’s,boysthathadoncesharedanaweofthosewhofoughtinthe

AmericanRevolutionassumedthefieldingrayandbluewhilebothsidesinvokedthespirit

of‘76.War,forthem,wasnolongerachild’sgameandofficersmaturedquicklyinthe

battlestheywagedduringfouryearsofbrutalconflict.Lessonswerelearnedataterrible

cost.ButifAlexander,Caesar,andNapoleonachievedvictorythroughheroicleadership,

theAmericanCivilWarwhisperedofchangeintheunderstandingofwarfare.

Historyexercisesapowerful,ifcentrifugal,effectonthemind.Itprovidestherawmaterial

outofwhichthemindextrapolatespotentialandlikelyfutures.Likeapuzzle,themind

assortsthepiecestoformimpressions.Yet,thepiecesaremalleable,pliable,and

impressionable.Beginningwithsimilarsuchpieces,eachmindconstructsaunique,though

related,picture.Ifaparticularidealorconceptbeginstopermeatetheorganism,in

whateverformthatideamaybe,itgainsmomentum,apropensityandaMentalitätis

formed.492

AsbothlargersocietiesandmilitaryorganizationsintheWesternWorld

professionalizedatanacceleratedrateattheturnofthetwentiethcentury,thereemerged

asenseofincreasedtempo,ofinterconnectedness,andtheimportanceoftime

management.AmongofficersintheUnitedStatesArmy,therewasagrowingawarenessof

America’sincreasedroleontheworldstage.Andthoughrarelyexplicitlystated,officers

confessedthattheywereprofoundlyunpreparedforthisfuture.Rapidindustrialization

andproliferationofthemachinehailedthedawnofanewage.Ideasaboutleadership

evolved.Inthefactory,arsenals,andnavalyardsthemantrabecameefficiency.Leaders

werenotbornasmuchasmanufactured,anditseemedthatonenolongerledmen--one492DennisE.Showalter,“ThePrusso-GermanRMA1840-1871,”KnoxandMurray,TheDynamicsofMilitaryRevolution,1300-2050,112.

183

managedthem.WhathasbeenclaimedastheuniquelyAmericanphilosophyofpracticality

fusednaturally,almostorganically,withtheideaofmanagement.

Navalofficers,especiallyfromitsConstructorCorps,pursuedscientificmanagementwith

thezealoftruebelievers.TheNavy,afterall,wasafleetofmachines.Theunionof

TaylorismandtheNavymadeforahappyone,atleastifHoldenEvanshadhisway.

Nevertheless,theconstructorsdivinedthetrendmoreclearlythanmost.Managementis

aboutcontrol.Itisathoughtprocessthatdictateshowonearrangesthepiecesofthe

puzzle,aperceptionpredicatedontime.

PriortoWorldWarI,Armyofficershadmoredifficultyharmonizingmanand

machine,andthetrendsofmanagementwereconfinedtoarsenalsandsimilarfacilities.

Armiesstillmovedatthepaceofbeastsofburden.Prideofplacestillfelltothecavalryas

ithadformuchofthepasttwothousandyears.Perhapsnothingcapturedtheheroicideal

betterthanthemountedofficerleadinghismenfromthefront.Regardless,theU.S.Army

OrdnanceBranchandarsenalsprovidedsufficientsoilfortheideasofscientific

managementtotakeroot.

WorldWarIwasawatershedeventfortheU.S.Army.Theperceivedexistential

threatthrustinnovationtotheforefrontandneutralizedthemicro-managementthata

peacetimeCongresshadimposedonmilitaryprocurement.Governmentalfundingpushed

breakthroughsintomassproductionataratescarcelyimaginablebeforethewar.Fleetsof

airplanesandtanksappearedoverandonthebattlefieldsofEurope.Officersbeganto

measuresuccessbythenumberofartilleryshellsfired,leadingtoafour-yeartotalofan

estimatedonebillionshells.Heroismappearedtocountforlittleinindustrializedwarfare.

184

Clausewitzobserved,“…thesuperiorityofnumbersisthemostcommonelementin

victory.”493Hewasright,buthehadinmindnumbersofmen.Aftertheexperienceof

WorldWarI,officersthoughtintermsofmaterialschlacht,abattleofmaterial.Primacyin

battlemovedfrommantomachine.Mumfordperhapscaptureditbest:“Intime-keeping,

intrading,infightingmencountednumbers;andfinally,asthehabitgrewonlynumbers

counted.”494TheU.S.Navyepitomizedthisapproachinthemilitaryrealm,measuringthe

overallefficiencyofthefleetinthenumberofbattleshipsitclaimed—48in1914tobe

exact.495

Taylor’sformulationofscientificmanagementwaspredicatedontheideaofefficacy

throughreductionismbyeliminatingwastedmovementsandunnecessarysteps.Yet,

scientificmanagementportendedamoresignificantchange,oneofthought,especiallyin

managementandleadership.Ithighlightedashiftingviewoftime.Theartisanand

craftsmangavewayunderthepressuresofacceleratingtemporalrhythms.Modern

conceptionsoftime,withincreasingdivergencefromnaturaltime,becamesomethingthat

onecalculated,controlled,andsaved.

Themechanicalrealmiscontrollable,orderly,andcertainandwhenoverlaidon

man,intheory,producespredictableresults.Thus,theorderingoftheday,numberingand

delineatingoftasks,andthebreakingdownofone’sdailylifebytimeeliminatesoratleast

reduceschance.Therefore,manappearstogaingreatercontrolovertimeandofthe

future.Historically,whereonceprogresswasalmostimperceptiblyslow,nowprogress

493Clausewitz,OnWar,194.494Mumford,TechnicsandCivilization,22.495“StudiesoftheGeneralBoardoftheNavy,”November17,1914,420–422,RecordGroup80,NationalArchivesandRecordAdministration(NARA).

185

becamesomethingthatonenotonlyperceives,butcanalsoexertconsiderablecontrol

over.

Inindustrialwarfare,chancefrequentlywasportrayedinanegativelightas

somethingtobereducedandeliminated.However,chanceisnotnecessarilyanegativeor

evenanundesirableevent.Certainly,onedesiresreliabilityandcontrolinnuclearreactors

andthelike,butcreativityandspontaneityinevitablyintroduceanessentialelementof

chanceintowar.Itisfundamentaltothehumanexperience,andthus,intrinsicallypartof

warfare.Officerspaylipservicetoitsrolewhileatthesametimehoningtheskillsof

technicismdesignedtoreducechance.

Theimplicationsoftechnicismformilitaryaffairsweresubtleandyetincredibly

powerful.Abyproductoftechnologicalimmersionistheillusionofcontrolandspecious

contextualunderstanding,ofeliminatingorreducingthesourcesofClausewitzianfogand

friction.Onebelievesthathecanperceiveandhaveknowledgeofphenomenatoafar

greaterdegreethanisactuallythecase.Thisillusion--causedbytechnological

determinism--distortsrealityandforceswarfareintoarealmofabstractioninwhichitcan

besubdued,harnessed,andmaderational.Intellectually,andthus,theoreticallyand

doctrinally,theunquestioningembraceoftechnicismdoesviolencetotheauthenticityof

war.

Temporalaccelerationalteredandgreatlycontributed,atanintellectuallevel,

tohowmenperceivedmodernwarfare.Overthefirstthreedecadesofthetwentieth

centuryinAmerica,thespiritofTaylorandscientificmanagementpermeatedacademia,

management,andpoliticalandmilitaryspheres.Officersandpoliticalleadersbecame

morerationalandscientificallymindedinembracingintellectualprocesses.Thuswar

186

becamemorerationalized.Themantraof“thewartoendallwars”flowedfreelyand

frequentlyonbothsidesoftheAtlantic,awhollyunderstandableconclusiongiventhe

carnageofWorldWarI.EchoesfromtheWesternFrontfurtherconfirmedthenecessity

forembracinganorderly,methodicalnatureofbattle-reducedtotimedmovementsand

phaselines.Theperfectsynchronizationofinfantryandartillerytocrossno-man’sland,

themeasuredshellspermeteroftrenchlinetoinsuresuccessallcontributedtothebelief

inarational,reducible,calculablemethodofwarfare.TheFrench,intheinter-warperiod,

definedtheirarmydoctrineas“methodical”battle.496Whatismethodicalbutanentirely

systematic,controlled,andrationaltime-boundprocesstoachieveadesiredendstate,

regardlessofitsphysicalandmentaleffectsonindividualparticipants?

Ifmilitaryminds,priorto1914,perceivedonlyminortemporaltremorsinthe

conductofwaritremainedessentiallyacontestbetweenmen,acontestofwills.The

temporalpressuresofmodernity,oftheirage,remainedtrappedinthehistoricalmindof

man.Historymatteredbecauseitresembledthepresentandthuscastlightonthe

questionsofthefuture.Thelinearflowoflogic,ofreason,requiresextrapolationofpast

trends.Buteverytrendcomestoanend.Therefore,officersenteredtheFirstWorldWar

withamindnurturedontheexploitsofageslongpast.PaulFussellinTheGreatWarand

ModernMemoryobserved:

…theGreatWarwasperhapsthelasttobeconceivedastakingplacewithinaseamless,purposeful‘history’involvingacoherentstreamoftimerunningfrompastthroughpresenttofuture.Theshrewdrecruitingposterdepictingaworriedfatherofthefuturebeingaskedbyhischildren,‘Daddy,whatdidyoudointheGreatWar?’assumesafuturewhosemoralandsocialpressuresareidenticalwiththoseofthepast…buttheGreatWartookplaceinwhatwas,comparedwithours,astaticworld,

496House,TowardCombinedArmsWarfare,58–60.

187

wherethevaluesappearedstableandwherethemeaningsofabstractionsseemedpermanentandreliable.EveryoneknewwhatGlorywas,andwhatHonormeant.497

FromtheIliad(circa800B.C.)tothepresentthereisadiscernablecontinuityto

valuesandidealscelebratingthejourneyofheroes.Notthattheirendsarethesame,for

theyarenot,butthevalues–notwhattheyserve-arenearlyuniversal.Courage,honor,

self-discipline,sacrifice,andtruthwerevaluesthatmensought,yet,themindand

imaginationanticipateand,arguably,demandstheirexemplificationinthefaceofmortal

danger.Inbothproseandpoetryoverthecenturies,heroismshinesbrightestinthe

shadowofdeath.Nevertheless,theimageoftheidealheroandtherealityofthemodern

battlefieldseemalmostincompatible.PaulFussellpurportedlysaidinaninterviewwith

PBSfor“TheGreatWar”series,“heroismdoesn’tmatterwhenyou’renotfightinghand-to-

hand.”498ThereisanundeniablelogictoFussell’sstatement.Neitheranartilleryshellnora

guidedmissilehasanyregardforthesoldier’sskillorbravery;thesequalitiesneverenter

intotheequation.

Therefore,therealityofscientificmanagement,ofthemodernbattlefieldclashed

withthedeeperimpulsesofmen.Officerswereattractedcerebrallytoscienceand

technology,tonumbersandratios,tomethodsandformulas;quantitativelymeasurable

andrational,thesesolutionsprovidedanabsolutemeanstocontrastwiththemeans

availablevis-a-visothernations.Indeed,itwastheofficers’dutytoimposeJominianorder

ontheClausewitzianchaosofbattleinordertoachieveassignedmissions.Technologyat

onceincreasedandextendedtheabilityofofficerstocontrol--whileseeminglyrendering

497PaulFussell,TheGreatWarandModernMemory(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2000),21.498PaulFussell,“TheHeroicConnotationofWar,”PBS,TheGreatWar,(n.d.),http://www.pbs.org/greatwar/historian/hist_fussell_02_heroic.html.

188

thehumanelementirrelevantoratleastlargelyinconsequential.Couragestillmattered,

foranarmyofcowardswinsnobattles,butitssignificancediminishedattheindividual

level.ThiswasperhapsthethrustofFussell’sstatement.

Thus,iftheconductofwarhaschangedovertime,whichseemsareasonable

proposition,itappearsthatman,inrespecttothetechnology-drivenadvancesinwarfare,

remainedpsychologicallystatic.Thisdiscrepancyhascreatedagreatdealoftension

clearlyobservableinhowneurosisandshell-shockwerefirstdiagnosed.Lineandmedical

officersalikestruggledtoexplainhowbravemen“suddenly”becamecowards.Technology

transformedthebattlefieldandmenpsychologicallygrappledtofunctionin,letalone

understandit.WorldWarI,forthefirsttimeinhumanhistory,strippedmanofthat

psychologicalarmoronascalepreviouslyunimaginable.Menbythetensofthousands

brokeunderthestrainofindustrializedwarfare.BritishsoldiersontheSommecould

endurenomorethanRomanlegionnairestwothousandyearsearlier.

Thedawnofmechanizedwarfaresweptthosebeforeitintoafrenzyoftechnicaland

scientificprognostication.Scientificmanagementofbothmenandmaterialnolonger

belongedsolelytothefieldofbusiness,butnowwastheconcernofstates.Interestingly,

thepracticalnatureofAmericansandtheagrarianmythabettedthisprocess.TheUnited

Statescameofagelateinthisprocessofnation-statedevelopment.Itshistoryand

heritage,andthatofitsofficercorps,werenecessarilyyoung.Theintellectualtraditions

thatexistedbelongedtotheoldworld.AndasTocqueville,Commager,andHofstadter

weretoobserve,alackoftraditionproducedaspiritualreverenceforthepractical,the

utilitarian.

189

TheintellectualtrendsoftheprewareraandlessonsofWorldWarIcreateda

peculiarAmericanMentalität,adispositiontothinkalongparticularlines.Taylorismbuilt

onthestrongundercurrentsofAmericanpracticalityandArmyengineering.Soon,theU.S.

triedtomass-producecombat-readysoldiersandleadersinthesamemannerithad

crankedoutautomobiles.Theconvergenceofthesefactorscreatedauniqueperspectiveof

modernwar.Theindustrialandmanufacturinglessonswereobvious,butthoseof

leadershipwerelessso.IfvictoryontheEuropeanbattlefieldsseemedaquestionof

productionthentheageofheroicleadershipwasataclose.Theapplicationofscientific

managementtomen“produced”anewtypeofleader,anupshotoftheAmericansynthesis

-themanager.

Managersarenotleadersinthetraditionalsensefortheirprimaryconcernisfor

efficiencynotmen.Theirconcernforsubordinatesextendsonlysofarasitaffects

production.Successandfailurearereducedtonumericalresults.Indeed,thegeneralsof

theFirstWorldWarsteeledthemselvestoregardcasualtiesasaninevitable,ifinefficient,

costofdoingbusiness.Questionswereofquantity,foronlythatwhichisreducibleto

measurementmattered.Conversely,heroesandleadersinspire,theyconsistentlynurture

values(orvirtuesastheancientscallthem),qualitiesthatareetherealanddistinctly

intangibleandoftenspiritual.Whilemanagersbetprimarilyonquantities,leadersdepend

mostlyonqualities.Inmanyrespects,bothareproductsoftheirtime.Managerscameinto

existenceonlywiththeindustrywhileleadersarenaturaloutgrowthsofthehuman

experience.Thismayexplaintheaversionthatpeoplegenerallydemonstratetoward

managerswhoseprimaryobjectiveisnumbersratherthanpeople;suchprioritiesappear

190

unnatural,evenmechanical,especiallytothesoldierswhohavetopayforthemanager’s

success.

TheMentalitätoftheU.S.officercorpsandthedevelopmentofthemanager,asa

typeinthatbody,gohandinhand.Thereisapropensity,alogictotherelationship.Ifwar

wasbecomingmoretechnologicallyfocusedasaquestionofmaterial,production,and

numbers,thenlogicdictatedthatmanagers,asofficers,playalargerrolebothoneconomic

andbattlefronts.499Theincreasing“temporalrhythms”ofmodernlifeprovidedfurther

evidenceofthischange.History,atleastsuperficially,appearedlessandlessilluminating

thefurtheroneprogressedintothetwentiethandtwenty-firstcenturies.Thelogicof

circumstancesdroveofficerstopursuethenextwidgetofwarthatwidenedthegulf

betweenhumanvaluesandtechnicism,betweenheroicandmaterialwarfare.Mumford

observed(1934),“[this]phenomenon…[canbe]describedasthe‘culturallag.’Thefailure

of‘adjustment’maybelookeduponasafailureofartandmoralsandreligiontochange

withthesamedegreeofrapidityasthemachineandtochangeinthesamedirection.This

seemstomeanessentiallysuperficialinterpretation.”500

Itisasuperficialinterpretationbecause“…changeinadirectionoppositetothe

machinemaybeasimportant…”501Thus,propensitydoesnotequatetorightnessor

correctness’itismerelythemostobviousforce.AmericanArmyofficersafterWorldWarI

perceivedthegeneralmaterialtrendandintheinterveningyears,withgrowingspeedand

momentum,movedtowardacultureoftechnicism.

499BrianMcAllisterLinn,TheEchoofBattle:TheArmy’sWayofWar(HarvardUniversityPress,2009),7.500Mumford,TechnicsandCivilization,316.501Ibid.

191

TheacceleratedtempoofWorldWarIandthewarsthatfolloweditimpartedan

ideaoftechnologicalandscientificdependency.Thetrendapparenttoofficerscreateda

divergencebetweenthemanandmachine.TheresultsofWorldWarIindicatedthat

victoryresidedwithmaterialdominance,andthus,tacticalsuccessonthebattlefield

throughquantityoftechnologybecamesynonymouswithstrategicvictory.Theabilityto

deliveroverwhelminglevelsoffirebecametheU.S.mantra.Bythepost-KoreanWarera,

attritionalwarfare,warbykill/deathratios,becameastrategyevenfornuclear

annihilation.Thedivergenceofmanfromwarfocusedsoheavilyonthelatterthat

strategistslargelyfailedtoaccountforthepowerofthewillandotherintangiblefactors.

JosephCampbellinthePowerofMythargued:“Peoplesaythatwhatwe’reall

seekingisameaningforlife.Idon’tthinkthat’swhatwe’rereallyseeking.Ithinkthatwhat

we’reseekingisanexperienceofbeingalive,sothatourlifeexperiencesonthepurely

physicalplanewillhaveresonanceswithinourowninnermostbeingandreality,sothatwe

actuallyfeeltheraptureofbeingalive.”502

Inasimilar,ifnotmorecompelling,statement,GeorgeOrwellsuggestedinhis1940review

ofMeinKampfbyAdolfHilter:

Alsohe[Hitler]hasgraspedthefalsityofthehedonisticattitudetolife.Nearlyallwesternthoughtsincethelastwar,certainlyall“progressive”thought,hasassumedtacitlythathumanbeingsdesirenothingbeyondease,securityandavoidanceofpain.Insuchaviewoflifethereisnoroom,forinstance,forpatriotismandthemilitaryvirtues…Hitler,becauseinhisown joylessmindhefeelsitwithexceptional strength,knowsthathumanbeingsdon’tonlywantcomfort,safety,shortworking-hours,hygiene,birth- controland,ingeneral,commonsense;theyalso,atleastintermittently,wantstruggleandself-sacrifice…whereasSocialism,andevencapitalisminamoregrudgingway,havesaidtopeople“Iofferyouagoodtime,’’Hitlerhassaid tothem“Iofferyoustruggle,dangerand

502CampbellandMoyers,ThePowerofMyth,1.

192

death,”andasaresultawholenationflingsitselfathisfeet.503 Thethoughtprocessofscientificmanagementtakesnoaccountoftheforces

describedbyCampbellandOrwell.“Warbyalgebra”onlyprovidespartoftheformula,as

Clausewitzobserved,andarguablythelesspotentpart.504Inlargemeasurethiswasnota

failureofofficerstoadjusttothetempoofmodernity,butaspuriousinterpretationof

temporalcompressionthatresultedintheconclusionsofwhatscientificmanagementand

technologycouldachieveinrelationtoman.Intheend,manismovedbyideas,values,and

faith.Anysuccessfulgeo-politicalstrategymustacknowledgeandaccount,tosomedegree,

forthesefactors.Thetechno-centricofficercorpsoverestimatedthemachineand

underestimatedtheimportanceofthetimelessvaluesorganictoman—perhapshistory

mattersafterall.

503GeorgeOrwell,TheCollectedEssays,JournalismandLettersofGeorgeOrwell,ed.SoniaOrwellandIanAngus,vol.2(HarcourtBraceJovanovich,1968).504Clausewitz,OnWar,76.

193

AppendixI

LiteratureReview

Theliteraturereviewisdividedintotwosectionstofacilitateclarity.First,

Americansociety,withitsdiverseinclinationsandattitudes,isexaminedtoextractthe

commonthemesandsharedbeliefsthatdiffusedthroughoutthecorporatebody.The

reviewbeginswithabriefanalysisofthenatureoftechnologyandthenmovestoexamine

theAmericanmindsettowardtechnology.Second,theattitudeofthearmyandits

associatedinstitutionsisexaminedtodemonstratethecommonbondsbetweenthecivilian

andmilitaryworld.Thesurveybeginswiththecolonialperiodanddevelops

chronologicallyfromtherelayingthefoundationforchapterthree.

Americans’RelationshipwithTechnology

Technology,scienceandindustryaredistinctthoughrelatedconcepts,often

interdependentbutdevelopingalonguniqueanddivergentpaths.Theconceptsof

technologyandsciencefromthecolonialperiodthroughthepostatomicworldscienceand

technologywerefrequentlyconflated.Thus,historicalterminology,giventheproximate

relationship,issomewhatloose,oftenusingthetermsinterchangeably.Nevertheless,early

Americanswerenotoverlyconcernedwithconcretedefinitionsandbytheearly

nineteenthcenturythebeliefthatthesemechanicalmarvelsimprovedeverydaylifewas

quiteprevalent.

Nearlyeverymajorworkonthehistoryandevolutionoftechnologyoverthelast

eightyyearsbeginswithanodetoLewisMumford.Thebreadth,analysisandsynthesishe

appliedtounderstandingthenatureoftechnologyremainsunmatched.InTechnicsand

194

Civilization(1934)Mumforddividesthelastthousandyearsintothreephases.The

eotechnicphase,orMiddleAges,iswhereMumfordbeginshisanalysis,believingthat

moderntechnologyhaditsoriginsatthispointratherthanthemorecommonly-citeddate

ofthemid-EighteenthCentury.Thus,theeotechnicphaseextendsfrom1000A.D.untilthe

mid-SeventeenthCenturyandisprimarilypoweredbythe“water-and-woodcomplex.”

Theeotechnicphaseisfollowedbythepaleotechnicphase,fueledbya“coal-and-iron

complex;”last,theneotechnicphaseisdrivenbyan“electricity-and-alloycomplex.”505

Mumfordneverprovidedaconcisedefinitionoftechnology.Rather,andquite

intentionally,heusedtheGreekwordTekhnethatconveysaconceptofbothartandcraft.

Likewise,Mumfordarguedman’snature-beforeanythingelse-wasthatofthe“mind-

maker”before“took-maker”.506Mumforddescribedthisphenomenon,andisperhaps,one

ofthefirsthistorianstounderlinetheshiftthatMcGilchristlateridentifiedfroma

hemisphericperspective.Mumfordascribedthisprocesstothepropagationoftechnology.

Technologyhasmanymoderndefinitions.Nearlyallofthem,regardlessofwherethe

emphasisfalls,demonstrateadesireandintenttocontrolthat,accordingtoMcGilchrist,is

oneofthedefiningfacetsofthebrain’slefthemisphere-adesiretocontrolandseethings,

includingpeople,astools.

Mumfordsuccinctlysummarizedtheprocesswherebythelivingarereducedin

orderofprecedence.Sciencedeformed“experienceasawhole…theinstrumentsofscience

werehelplessintherealmofqualities.Thequalitativewasreducedtothesubjective,the

subjectivewasdismissedasunreal,andtheunseenandunmeasurableappearednon-

existent.Intuitionandfeelingdidnotaffectmechanicalprocessormechanical505Mumford,TechnicsandCivilization,110.506Mumford,“TechnicsandtheNatureofMan,”925.

195

explanations.”507Mumfordbelievedthat,inthisrespect,sciencedidnotbringoneclosureto

an“objectiveexperience”,butratherrepresenteda“departurefromit.”508Therefore,unlike

Descartes,whobelievedthatmathematicsenabledonetodiscerntruth,Mumfordargued

thatmathematicsdidjusttheoppositeinthehumanrealm.IfMumfordidentifiedbroadly

acrosstimeandgeography,AlexisdeTocquevillerecognizedtrendsparticulartothe

Americanexperience.

FewmenwerebetterpositionedtoobservethisfirststageinAmericaninvention

thanAlexisdeTocqueville,aFrenchpoliticianandhistorianwhotraveledAmericainthe

1830s.HistravelsresultedinthepublicationofDemocracyinAmerica(1835).Alexisde

Tocquevilleobservedthat,“atatimewhenAmericanswerenaturallyinclinedtoask

nothingofsciencebutitsparticularapplicationstothepracticalarts…amongthe

enlightenednationsoftheOldWorld…theyfoundcelebratedscholars,skillfulartists,and

greatwriters,andtheywereabletogatheruptreasuresoftheintellectwithoutneedingto

accumulatethem.”509EvenatthisearlystageinAmericandevelopmentthetechnological

characterappearedvividlytotheforeignobserver,inpartbecausetheeyesoftheold

worldlookeduponthenew.TheutilitariancharacterofthecommonAmericanstruckde

TocquevilleassomewhatpeculiarandcertainlydifferentfromthatofEurope.Alexisde

TocquevilleidentifiedAmericanqualitieswhileRobertGordonindicatedthepossible

originsofthosequalities.

507Mumford,TechnicsandCivilization,49.508Ibid.,50.509Tocqueville,AlexisdeTocqueville,517.

196

RobertB.Gordonin“TechnologyinColonialNorthAmerica”(2005)arguedthat

“technologyisarecordofculturalchoice.”510Notallemigrantssharedthesamevalues—

thoseofWesternEuropewerenotthoseofEasternEurope,andthoseofItalywerenot

thoseofNorway.Thus,thecolonialportofembarkationmatteredinthedirectionof

technologicalchoice.Geographylikewiseinclinedproductionandtechnological

developmentincolonialAmerica.Thesoutherncoloniesandtowns,beingmoreisolated,

maturedalongparticularlinesquitedivergentfromthoseintheNortherncolonies.By

1785coloniesnorthofVirginiahadbeguntoindustrialize,providingthebasefromwhich

theIndustrialRevolutionlaterlaunchedinAmerica.Nations,organizations,people

rejectedtechnologiesandideasthatwerenotcompatiblewiththeirvalues.IntheAmerican

contexttheutilitarianinclinationremovedmanyofthebarriersthattypicallyinhibit

adoption,especiallyinreligion,asCharlesSanfordnoted.

“TheIntellectualOriginsandNew-WorldlinessofAmericanIndustry”(1958)by

CharlesSanfordobservedthatduringtheearlyEighteenthcenturythereremained

significantreservationstowardthemoraldegradationsofindustrialization.511Leadingmen,

suchasThomasJefferson,believedthatavirtuousnationmaintainedthatcharacter

throughanagrarianeconomy.Theideaoftransitioningtoanindustrializedeconomy

broughtthehorrorsofmanufacturingplantsfromGreatBritaintotheshoresoftheUnited

Statesandthreatenedtocorruptthenewworld.

SanfordexaminedhowearlyindustrialistswithinAmericasoughttominimizethe

effectsofindustrializationupontheAmericancharacter.Throughtheirworkandthe

510RobertB.Gordon,“TechnologyinColonialNorthAmerica,”inACompaniontoAmericanTechnology,ed.CarrollPursell,2005.511CharlesSanford,“TheIntellectualOriginsandNew-WorldlinessofAmericanIndustry,”TheJournalofEconomicHistory18,no.1(March1958):1–16.

197

effectsoftheWarof1812theideaofeconomicindependencegainedpopularacceptance

andby1817garneredsupportfromJeffersonandMadison.Furthermore,manufacturing

eventuallyassumedaspectsofspiritualregeneration,andasGordonobserved,thecultural

choicefreedAmericansfromEuropeanpractices.Thus,industrialtechnologyassumednot

onlysupportofthefoundingfathers,butalsothemantleofspiritualrenewal.Thisturning

pointwentnosmallwayincontributingtoagenerallypositiveviewthatAmericanshave

towardtechnologyandwhatitcanachieve.

AmericansdemonstratedamarkeddifferencefromEuropeansintheirattitudes

towardland.Bythelateeighteenthcentury,foreigntravelersreportedrestlessnessanda

spiritofoptimismpermeatedtheAmericancharacter.Thesubjugationofnaturethrough

thedevelopmentofroadnetworksandvastcanalsproceededatafeverishpaceintheearly

nineteenthcentury,accordingtoJamesWilliamsin“TheAmericanIndustrialRevolution”

(2005).512The363-milecanalthatconnectedtheHudsonRivertoLakeEriedwarfed

anythingeverattemptedinEurope.The“canal’sengineershadlittleornopractice

buildinganything…theylearnedonthejob…”Americansprovedtimeandagainthat

tirelesseffortandpersistencecouldovercomeeventheapparentlyimpossible.Therapid

propagationofthesteamboats,railroads,andthetelegraphstrengthenedtiesamongsta

largethoughdispersedpopulationinavastcountry.Thetransportationand

communicationadvancesnotonlytightenedsocialbondsbutalsosetthestageforrapid

industrializationinthemid-nineteenthcentury.Williams,likeSmith,believedthatthe

Americanarmsindustryprovidedthemotiveandenergytoadvancemachinetoolsinplace

oftheEuropeantraditionalcraftsman.512JamesC.Williams,“TheAmericanIndustrialRevolution,”inACompaniontoAmericanTechnology,ed.CarrollPursell(Hoboken,NJ:Wiley-Blackwell,2005).

198

Nationalidentitiesarenotshapedbyaninfinitenumberoffactors,norareall

influencesequalandlikewisetheydonothaveanequaleffectuponallmembers;however,

amajorityorvocalminorityisoftenenoughtoinclinebehavior,inwhateverformthat

takes,inaparticularmanner.Somecorporateexperiencesdeeplyaffectthemindsof

nationsaccordingtoHenrySteeleCommagerinTheAmericanMind(1950)asheexamined

majorinfluencesonAmericanthoughtfromthe1880stothe1940s.513Commagerargued

thattheAmericanenvironment,initstotality,exercisedandingrainedtheAmericanmind

oftheNineteenthCenturywithaparticularperspective.Breakingthetraditionalbondsof

Europe,theland,religion,andfreedominclinedthemindtowardanewfoundoptimismat

thepossibilitiesinherentinAmerica.Asaresult,theAmericanmindeschewedthe

traditional,class-boundtraditionsoftheoldworldandforcefullygravitatedtowards

mechanicalandtechnologicalsolutions.

GordonandCommagerbothbelievedthatAmericansassumedanddemonstratedan

appreciationforpracticalandtechnologicalsolutions.However,Commagerattributedthat

tonewlydevelopedandacquiredtraitsthroughthebroadabandonmentofEuropean

valuesandtheamalgamationofdiversepeoplesinanenvironmentlargelyfreefrom

constraints.Bycontrast,Gordonarguedthatthesettlers,wheretheycamefrom,andthe

attributesofthosepeopleamalgamatedintotheAmericancharacter.Bothauthors

perceivedasimilarresult,however,themeansandmethodswereofdifferentcharacter,

thoughnotentirelyinopposition.

Commagerfoundan“intensepracticality,”commonsense,and“incurable

utilitarianism”grippedtheaverageAmerican.Thegeographyitselfbeckonedanintense

513Commager,TheAmericanMind.

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individualismandamechanicalinclinationandfascinationgrewapacewithintheAmerican

mind.IdeasungovernedandunchainedfromthetraditionsofEuropegavebreadthtothe

Americanmind,andtheenvironmentinducedautilitarianturn.

“Mirror-ImageTwins:TheCommunitiesofScienceandTechnologyin19th-Century

America”(1971)byEdwinLaytonorientsthenarrativeaboutthedevelopmentof

technologyasaprofession.514Laytondemonstratesthattherelationshipbetweenscience

andtechnologyisnotasclearandconciseasisoftenassumed.Therelationshipisoften

describedinthefollowingmanner“sciencecreatesnewknowledgewhichtechnologist[s]

thenapply…thatthisviewofscience-technologyrelationshascontinuedintothe20th

centurywasdemonstratedbyVannevarBush,whoheadedtheOfficeofScientificResearch

andDevelopmentinWWII….”Scienceandtechnologysharedsimilaritiesbutaimedto

achievedifferentgoals.Scienceaimstounderstandandenlargeknowledgeinaparticular

field.However,thatknowledgerarelycreatestechnologydirectly.Thefirstaimedforthe

abstractandtheoreticalwhilethelatteraimedfortheutilitarianandpractical.Onemay

buildatechnologywithoutunderstandingthescientificpropertiesofthevariouselements

involved.Thus,theUSmilitaryinvestedvastsumsintheadvancementofsciencefollowing

WorldWarIIwiththeexpectationthatsuchknowledgeincreasedmilitarytechnology.

However,ProjectHindsight,a1963DepartmentofDefense(DoD)initiative,examined

severalweaponsprogramstoevaluatetheroleofscientificfundingintheirdevelopment

andfounddirectlinkagesquitetenuous.515

LaytondoesnotexplicitlyaddresstheAmericanattitudesandmindsetstoward

technologythatCommagerandGordondescribe,buthedoeshighlightagrowinginterest514Layton,“Mirror-ImageTwins.”515Ibid.,563–564.

200

andmaturingoftheAmericanmindinthisrespect.Theimportanceoftechnologygained

momentumwiththeFirstWorldWarandascendedtonewheightsfollowingtheSecond

WorldWar.Inthisrespect,LaytondescribedwhatMumfordhadfeared.

ManyhistoriansinterestedintheimpactoftechnologyontheAmericanpsyche

foundWorldWarItobecriticaltoredefiningorperhapsintensifyingthatrelationship.

ThomasP.HughesinAmericanGenesisobserved(1989)that,bythetimeoftheFirstWorld

War,Americaninventionhadshiftedfromtheindividualtomanagerial,corporateand

governmentaldevelopment.516NotuntilthedevelopmentoftheInternetwouldindividuals

arguablyrisetotheforefrontofinventionagain.Theroleofthemilitaryinthe

advancementoftechnologyisfargreater,andstartedmuchearlierthanisoftenassumed.

AccordingtoHughes,“by1900theyhadreachedthepromisedlandofthetechnological

world…[and]hadacquiredtraitsthathavebecomecharacteristicallyAmerican.”517Hughes

perceivedapropensityinAmericanbehaviortoseektechnologicalsolutions,inallarenas,

withlittleregardtothesocialcosts.HughesacknowledgedMumford’sconcernand

addressedthemtosomedegreeintheHuman-BuiltWorld(2005);nordidHughesshare

Mumford’sdiscomfortwiththemilitarycastofinnovationtechnology.ToHughes’mind,

technologyisbenigninnature,asishumanity.Mumford,however,isalmostreticentto

describehisviewonhumannatureanditsrelationshipwithtechnology,butheconveysthe

feelingthathewishesthatitwereotherwise.518

Wherevertheinitialutilitarianimpetusresided,asnotedbyCommagerandGordon,

Hughesconcludesthattheroughoutlinetookshapebytheturnofthetwentiethcentury.

516Hughes,AmericanGenesis.517Ibid.,1.518ThomasP.Hughes,Human-BuiltWorld:HowtoThinkaboutTechnologyandCulture(UniversityofChicagoPress,2005).

201

Howdifferentthattransformationmighthavelookediftheearliestcolonistshadnotbeen

ofEuropeandescentisdifficulttoascertainwithanycertainty.However,Hughes’

argumentdoesappearamenabletoCommager’sthesis.Freedfromconventionaland

traditionalconstraints,theindividualinventorfoundpracticalsolutionstothechallenges

encounteredinthenewworld.

RudiVoltiinSocietyandTechnologicalChange(2006)examinedthenatureof

technology,howitevolves,andthereciprocalrelationshipoftechnologyandsociety.Volti

warnedthat,“…thespectacularsuccessesoftechnologicaldevelopmentshouldnotblindus

tothefactthatsomeoftheinherentdifficultiesoflifearesimplynotamenableto

technologicalsolutions.”519IfHughesremainedagnosticonthesubject,adisinterested

observer,Volti,muchlikeMumford,wasmoreconcernedbythedirectionoftechnology

anditsinterplaywiththemilitary.However,Voltinoted,theorderandcontrolthat

technologyoffersoftensubsumesmostdoubtsontheabilityoftechnologytosolvethe

mostcomplexproblems.AccordingtoVolti,whiletechnologymightbehighlysuccessfulin

manyvenues,itisentirelyunsuitedtosolvingcomplexhumanproblems.Hughes

acknowledgedthisdeficiencybuthisanalysisismoredescriptivethanprescriptive.Volti

wenttogreatlengthstodescribetheerrorofattemptingtechnologicalsolutionstodeeper

socialproblems.

BrianArthurinTheNatureofTechnology(2009)arguedtechnologyisinherently

iterative,thatitbuildsuponthatwithwhichexistedprior.Technologyalsodevelopsfrom

theuseandharnessingofnaturalphenomenon.Thereisarguablynogoodfinitedefinition

oftechnology,whichatteststothemulti-facetednatureoftechnologyitself.Arthurtackled

519Volti,SocietyandTechnologicalChange,316.

202

thisquestionthroughabroadtri-tiereddefinition:“...ameanstofulfillahumanpurpose,

…[an]assemblageofpracticesandcomponents,…entirecollectionofdevicesand

engineeringpracticesavailabletoaculture.”520Arthur,quiteapartfromMumford,

perceivedtechnologyasorganic;itevolves,improvesoneupontheother,nordoeshe

explicitlyorimplicitlyhaveanydiscomfortwithpropensityofmoderntechnologyto

controlandorderhumanlife.

Arthurbelievedthat“historyisimportant”becausealltechnologicaladvancements

arecombinationsofothersthatalreadyexistorthatdevelopfromnewdomainsthatare

discovered,butarealsoorganicallyderivedfromwhatexistedprior.Perhapsitfallsoutof

hispreview,butifhistoryinformstechnologicaldevelopmentanditevolvesfromwhat

existedprior,thenthispropensitysuggestthatMumford’sconcernsarejustified.Arthur,

notunlikeHughes,isconcernedmorewithanalysis,evolution,andtechnologicalprocesses

thansocialtensionsthatresult.Interestingly,asaprofessorofeconomicsArthur

explainedhowinitially“puzzled”hewasthathistoriansofallpeopleseemedtohavethe

mosttosayaboutthenatureoftechnology.However,ahistorian’squeryisman,and

technology,atitsroot,isanextensionofman.521

Insummary,theavailablestudiesthataddressesAmericansociety’srelationship

withtechnologysuggestthatthisrelationshipdevelopedorganicallybeginningintheearly

eighteenthcentury.BytheturnofthenineteenthcenturytheAmericanmind,greatly

influencedbytheprogressmadeduringtheSecondIndustrialRevolution,perceivedthat

largersocietalissuescouldbesolvedthroughtechnologicalmeans.TheFirstWorldWar

broughtthatideatomaturityandtherelationshipinverted.Nolongerdidthemanwield520Arthur,TheNatureofTechnology,28.521MarcBloch,TheHistorian’sCraft(ManchesterUniversityPress,1992),26.

203

thetools(technology)ofwar,butnowthemachineassumedcenterstageandman

assumedasubordinaterole.

TheAmericanMilitary’sAttitudesTowardTechnology

TheliteraturereviewedhereisfocusedprincipallyontheUSArmy,althoughwriters

suchasColinGray(2006)tendtolumpthemilitaryasawholetogether.Hisassessment,as

such,amalgamatesintolargeconclusionsusinga“wayofwar”constructtomakebroad

generalizationsaboutalltheservices’dependenceandrelianceonsuperiortechnology.522

However,therearefundamentaldifferencesbetweentheNavyandtheArmy.Army

officershavesignificantlymoreinteractionwithanenemypopulacethantheNavywhilea

navalofficer’sworkrevolvesentirelyaroundthemachinehecaptains.Thus,Armyofficers

areexpectedtohaveadeeper,morecomprehensiveunderstandingofthecultural–and

thussocial--environmentinwhichtheyoperate.Theproperrelationshipbetweenthe

armyandgovernmentwasadebateofconsiderableimportanceinlateeighteenthcentury

America.

TheFederalistPapers(1787)isamongthefirstdocumentstoreflectAmerican

attitudesatthetimeofthefoundingofthenationtowardthemilitaryandhowandwhat

militaryshoulddotoprovideforthecommondefenseasoutlinedintheU.S.Constitution.

ThesewritingspredatetheratificationoftheU.S.Constitution,butwhattheyhadtosay

aboutusingtechnologyinconcertwiththemilitary,howthemilitaryshouldorshouldnot

leveragethetechnologycomingoutoftheEnlightenment,andtheongoingScientific

Revolutionis,asexpected,quitesparse.EarlyAmericansdemonstratedadeep-seatedand

broadlysharedantipathytowardanykindofprofessionalarmy,especiallyonecontrolled522ColinS.Gray,IrregularEnemiesandtheEssenceofStrategy:CantheAmericanWayofWarAdapt?(2006:Lulu.com,n.d.).

204

bythefederalgovernment.AlexanderHamilton,intheFederalist24,arguedthat

Americansshouldnotassume“anexcessofconfidenceorsecurity”affordedthembytwo

vastoceans.523Commager’sargumentontheroleofgeographicalfactorsinshapingthe

AmericanmindsetareexemplifiedinthisstatementbyHamilton.ThedangersofBritish

territoriestothenorthandwest,andSpanishtothesouthrequiredsomekindofforcein

kindtoprotecttheconfederation’sinterest.IndiantribesalongtheWesternfrontierbe

couldbereliedupontoactintheirowninterest,andsometimesinconsonancewiththatof

Britain,forinthismeasuretheyintermingled;thus,astandingarmyalbeitasmallonewas

notonlydesirable,butalsonecessaryunderthecircumstances.Thepropensity,thus

established,shapedthestructure,direction,andmindsetofthemilitary,andcitizens

towardit,forthebetterpartofacentury.

Technologyremainedofsecondaryortertiaryimportancebehindleadershipand

disciplineforanarmyofthisperiod.Technologywasnotasignificantfactorasofyet—at

leastforlandlubbers!AtthispointtheArmyandNavyideasabouttechnologybeganto

diverge.FortheArmy,thediscussionturnedontrainedmen,whocontrolledthem,andthe

totalquantityavailable.Formillennia,acrossallcivilizations,numberscountedformore

thananythingelse,andthisruleheldtrueinlateeighteenthcenturyAmerica.Americansat

thistimeperceivedtechnologyassomethingthatprovidedincrementaladvantages,but

suchadvantageswerelargelysubordinatetonaturalabilityandleadership.

Intheworldofmilitaryeducation,thePrussiansprofessionalizedfirstfollowing

theircrushingdefeatatJena-Auerstadt(1806)atthehandsofNapoleon.PriortotheCivil

WartheUSArmyofficercorpslackedamotivatingexperienceofsimilarmagnitudeto523AlexanderHamilton,“TheFederalistPapersNo.24,”accessedDecember30,2013,http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed24.asp.

205

seriouslyconsiderprofessionalization.Although,theWarof1812didprovidesome

movementtowardofficerprofessionalization,butthenascentofficercorpsandlarger

politicalfactorsmilitatedagainstsignificantArmyreforms.

Technologyisnotnecessarilylimitedtophysicalmeans;itcanalsobe,andinthe

twenty-firstcenturymoreandmorecommonlyis,organizationalandinformationalin

nature.Inthisrespect,bothastomilitarythoughtandproduction,intellectualand

materialprogressfailedtotakeholdinanypermanentformuntilaftertheFirstWorldWar,

althoughtheRootreformsinitiatedmovement.WhiletheCivilWarincreasedNorthern

industrialcapacity,thelong-termimplicationsforthearmywerequitemuted.

JohnShyinAPeopleNumerousandArmed(1976)examinestheearlyAmerican

militaryexperienceandthepropensityofAmericanmilitarismassumedfromthoseevents.

Shyfoundthatan“…unthinkingoptimismaboutthenaturalAmericanaptitudeforwarfare,

andanambivalentattitudetowardthoseAmericanswhospecializedintheuseofforce,all

havehadconsequencesinthetwentiethcentury…"524Inthisrespect,Shy’sfindingsdonot

differmuchfromtheideasthatHamiltonconfronted,althoughShyperhapsidentifiesa

morestridentmilitarisminthecolonialcharacter.Notofaprofessionalstrainofcourse,

butrecoursetoviolenceappearedmorecommonandsociallyaccepted,ifnotencouraged

inthisperiod.Sincethefirstcolonistsetfootonthenewworld,enmityandinsecurityhad

gonehand-in-handwithdailylifeasrelationshipswithindigenouspopulationsvariedfrom

tribetotribeandfromonemomenttothenext.Adequatesecurityforthecolonistsamong

theoutlyingandscatteredfarmswasbeyondtheircapabilities.But“retribution”was

524JohnW.Shy,APeopleNumerousandArmed:ReflectionsontheMilitaryStruggleforAmericanIndependence(AnnArbor:UniversityofMichiganPress,1976),245.

206

somethingtheycouldrepayseveralfoldandontheirterms.525Menofnaturalability,

hunters,andotherciviliansprovidedforthegeneralsecurity,notprofessionalsoldiers.

However,thisalsofedintoJefferson’shopeofthecitizen-soldiercraftedintheshadowof

Rome’sRepublicanarmiestoprovideforthecommondefense.

TheSevenYearsWar,theAmericanRevolutionaryWar,andtheWarof1812

reinforcedtheperceptionthattypicalAmericans–noneofthemprofessionalsoldiers-

couldachievevictoryoverstandingarmiescommandedbyaristocraticofficers.Federalist

No.24contrastedsharplywiththecommonAmericancitizenoftheperiod.Hamilton,a

manofformidableintelligenceandknowledge,advocatedastrongcentralgovernmentand

envisionedastrongstandingarmytohelpsolidifytheAmericanstate.Hamiltonwas

perhapsmotivatedbyadarkerormorerealisticinterpretationofhumannatureandits

historicalnarrativeupuntilthelateeighteenthcenturyandinformedhistoricallybythe

Romanexperience.Hethoughtaprofessionalarmyanecessity.Hisviewswerethe

exceptionandappearedtoconflictwithactualexperienceasAmericanamateursrackedup

impressivewinsoverthenext150years.

ThedecisivedefeatofMexico,thedestructionoftheConfederacy,andthe

dismantlingoftheSpanishEmpireallcontributedtoandfurtherreinforcedthebeliefin

Americanexceptionalism,whichincludedbeingexceptionalinwhatitcouldachieved

withoutmilitaryspecialistsandprofessionals.Americametthedemandsofthemoment

throughfierceaction.InsomerespectsthisaffirmedtheobservationsofAlexisde

TocquevilleoftheAmericanpropensityforutilitarianandpracticalsolutions,eschewing

morearcaneandtheoreticalapproaches(suchasgeneralstaffs).

525Ibid.,232–236.

207

MilitaryprofessionalismhintedatanoldworldheritagethatAmericanshadthrown

off.ThesetendencieswerethoroughlyinculcatedbytheArmy.Aprocessofrapid

militaryexpansionfollowedbyanequally,andsometimessharper,contractionkept

professionalismandarmygrowthincheck.Thisformulaappearedtoofferallthebenefits

ofastandingarmywithoutanyoftheassociatedcostsanddangers.Americanmilitary

actionwasnotonlydecisiveandeffectiveasawaytodecidenationalsecurityaffairs,but

onemightachievethoseendswithoutthe“unnecessary”burdenexperiencedbynations

withprofessionalarmies.Hamilton’sproposedoldworldapproachnevergainedthe

necessarysupport,norshouldithavewhenthecitizen-soldierboretheburdenwithgreat

success(orsothenarrativewent.)

Thinkingdeeplyaboutwarappearedneitherdesirablenornecessaryinlightof

earlyAmericanexperiences.Thus,Shyobserved,“newideaswereabsorbedandreshaped

byold,deeplyimbeddedmodesofthinkingaboutwar.”526Onecanneveroutrunone’s

history,entirely.Andoftenthoseideas,values,beliefspersistlongerandinfluencetofar

greaterdegrees,weatherconsciouslyorunconsciously,thanonewouldliketobelieve.

MarcusCunliffe’sanalysisinSoldiersandCivilians:TheMartialSpiritinAmerica,

1775-1865(1968)surveyedearlyAmericansocietyandfocusedontherelationshipand

perceptionofcivilianstowardtheArmyandviceversa.IntimesofpeaceCunliffenoteda

generalsuspicionofthemilitaryfortifiedwithahealthydegreeofindifference.If

Americanslearnedanythingfromwar,specificallytheCivilWar,Cunliffeobserved,“[it]

wasinfactoptimistic.”DespiteAmericananimositytowardtheArmy,war(oratleastits

526Ibid.,250.

208

results)itselfhadfavoredtheyoungnation.Force,moreoftenthannot,achievedresults.527

Shy,likeCunliffe,notedthatAmericanshadsharedareservationtowardaprofessional

armythatdidnotextendtotheactofwaritself.Thistendencyinformedfuturegenerations

andthepathchosenforresolution.Hamiltonmighthavethoughtaprofessionalarmy

necessary,butCunliffe’sobservationsconfirmedHamilton’sexperienceofageneral

ambivalencetowardthingsofamilitarynatureandlittlechangedbetweenthe

RevolutionaryWarandtheCivilWar.

TechnicismdevelopedorganicallyfromtheAmericanexperience.Andbytheearly

nineteenthcenturyprivateandpublicdevelopmentbegantointermingleatanincreasingly

acceleratedpace.MerrittRoeSmithinMilitaryEnterpriseandTechnologicalChange(1987)

positedthat“…militaryenterprisehasplayedacentralroleinAmerica’sriseasan

industrialpowerandthatsincetheearlydaysoftherepublic,industrialmighthasbeen

intimatelyconnectedwithmilitarymight.”528TheArmyOrdnanceCorpsprovidedanearly

andcriticallinkwithprivateindustrytoexpandmanufacturingprocesses.American

armoriesservednotonlyasrepositoriesbutincubatorsofknowledgeformethodsand

processesthat,inpart,formedthebedrockforAmericanindustry.Thislineof

developmentdivergesfromprofessionalism,orthelackthereofthatShydescribed,butthe

separationisneitherwidenorabsolute.Rather,thestreamsrunparallelandatpoints

converge.TheCivilWarservedasanotherexampleofcitizen-soldierswinningwars,even

thoughmostoftheseniorleadersonbothsidesweregraduatesofmilitaryacademies.

Likewise,therelationshipsbetweenprivateandpublicindustryformedimportantand

527Cunliffe,SoldiersandCivilians,435.528Smithetal.,MilitaryEnterpriseandTechnologicalChange,4.

209

memorablebondsintheCivilWar.Thesebonds,likemusclememory,naturallyrenewed

andincreasedwitheachwar.

IfthecollectiveAmericanmindseemedreticentandattimeshostiletoa

professionalarmy,asShyobserved,itheldnosuchreservationstowardsindustrial

technology.ThepracticalandutilitariannatureofAmericanshadnodifficultyembracing

thepotentialofindustrialproduction.Wheretheory,militarytradition,andthe

aristocracybelongedtotheoldworld;theseedsoftechnologyandproductionappeared

fruitsofthenew.TheCivilWarbroughtofficersandearlyindustrialiststogetherfor

mutualbenefit—especiallyintheNortheast.Thus,therelationshipbetweenArmyofficers

andindustrialproductionsproutedearly,atleastintheNortheast,andsufferedlittlefrom

thenegativeassociationshistorianshaveobservedrelativetomilitaryintellectualism.

Americanmanagementpracticescolludedwithscientificconceptionsofbest

practices,whichlaidthefoundationforTaylorism,amanagementsystemthatsoughtto

increaseindustrialefficiencybyanalyzingandstandardizingindividualtasks.Therootsof

technicismwerefirmlyplantedearlyinAmericanhistory.Thegeneralacceptanceof

technologicalandscientificsolutionstopracticalproblemsbecameahallmarkofthe

Americancharacter.Yet,asShynoted,thatAmericanofficerthought,thoughitcertainly

utilized,littleabouttechnologyoritsinfluenceuponwaruntilafter1890.529Despitethis,

theCivilWarstrengthenedthebondsbetweenthemilitaryengineerandprivateAmerican

industryandtherelationshiponlygrewcloserastheyearspassed.

Theabysmalconductofthewarof1812shockedtheArmy’snascentofficercorps’

(andthenation’s)faithintheamateurcitizensoldier.AccordingtoWilliamSkeltoninan

529Shy,APeopleNumerousandArmed,247.

210

AmericanProfessionofArms,Theofficerswhofoughtinthisconflictweresufficiently

motivatedbyitsresultstobegintheprocessofprofessionalization.530Theearlyofficer

corpsdrewfrequentlyanddeeplyfromthewellofscience.531Theofficercorpsdidnot

developinavacuum.InadditiontoWestPoint,whichservedasthefirstengineering

collegeinAmerica,therapidgrowthofscienceandtechnologythroughtheantebellum

periodproducedalike-mindedofficer.532Additionally,EuropeanandespeciallyFrench

influenceontheprofessionalizationofAmericaingeneralandtheArmyinparticular,

cannotbeoverstated.Thus,Gordon’sthesisontheroleofculturalorigininchoicefinds

considerablesupportinlaterliterature.533

SamuelHuntingtoninTheSoldierandtheState(1957)arguedthattheinstitutions

ofwar,necessaryforcultivatingthemilitarymind,manifestedonlyaftertheCivilWar,and

onthispoint,SkeltonandHuntingtonfaceoff.Skelton,writingdecadeslater,arguedthat

theimpulsesforprofessionalizationformedbefore,notafter,theCivilWar.However,the

locusandqualityofthatprofessionalizationareequallyimportantquestions.For

Huntington,onecannotescapeone’shistory,andthus,Jefferson’sideaofthecitizen-soldier

continuedintothefuturewellbeyonditsusefulness.Ideasneverperish,theymerely

slumberandforthisreason,asShyimplied,Americansbycharacter,cultureand

environmentarereticenttofullyengageinthetheoreticalstudyofwarwhichisatodds

withtheirwillingnesstooftenusewarinallitsformsasapracticaltooltosolvedefense

andsecurityproblems.

530Skelton,AnAmericanProfessionofArms,1992,116.531Ibid.,123.532Ibid.,180.533Ibid.,240.

211

AccordingtoMatthewMoteninTheDelafieldCommissionandtheAmericanMilitary

Profession(2000),theDelafieldCommissionwasdispatchedtoEuropeinAprilof1855to

observeallaspectsofthemilitaryfield.SecretaryofWarJeffersonDavishopedtousethe

informationgatheredfromthetriptorectifyperceivedshortcomingswithintheUS

military.Furthermore,Moten’sanalysisrevealed“Antebellumexpertisemanifest[ed]three

flaws.”TheseincludedanoverrelianceonFrenchmilitarythought,WestPoint’s

engineeringfocus,andmilitaryofficersfindingrecompenseforcivilianratherthanmilitary

efforts.534

TheUSArmyfromitsinceptionhaddevelopedfromanucleusofscienceand

engineeringatWestPointconceivedbyJeffersonasawaytodevelopengineersthatcould

assistwiththedevelopmentoftheyoungnation’sinfrastructure.Jeffersonfirmlybelieved

inthecapacityofpatriotsoldiersandwithequalfervencythedangerposedbyanelite

officercorps.Moten’sworkwascongruentwithHuntington’searlierargumentsaboutthe

officercorps’Technicism.Officersneverdevelopedadeepunderstandingofthenatureof

warandthiswasbydesign.AstheUnitedStatesmatureditgrappledwiththestudyofwar

reluctantly,atfirst,andreliedalmostentirelyontheoldworldforguidance—orintoday’s

parlance,“bestpractices.”TheactivityatthefederalarmoriesandWestPoint’s

engineeringfocuswerecongruentinnatureandthisharmonyabettedapropensityin

thoughtandaction.

Professionalizationmovedthroughthecorpsincloseconjunctionwiththe

professionalizationofotherfieldsinAmericansociety,butatafarslowerrate.535

Professionalizationneartheendofthenineteenthcenturyassumed,asSmithobserved,an534Moten,TheDelafieldCommissionandtheAmericanMilitaryProfession,55.535Skelton,AnAmericanProfessionofArms,1992,116.

212

industrialandmanagerialcomponentthatinitiallydevelopedearlierinthecenturyinthe

armoriesandnestedeasilywithinanengineer’sintellectualframework.Anunintentional

bifurcationoftheofficercorpsoccurredbetweenthosestationedintheeastandnortheast

andthosethatservedonthewesternfrontier.Armyofficerprofessionalism,especiallyfor

thoseinthenortheast,founditsimpetusnotinpotentialthreatsorintheashesofdefeat,

butratherintheimpulsederivedfromagrowingtechnicalcomplexityaswarappearedto

havefarmoreincommonwithscienceandtechnologythanthehumanities,andthus,the

trenddevolvedinthatdirection.Thetechnicalfocusoftheeastamalgamatedwiththe

practicalbentofthoseofficersservinginthewestandsouthwest.

CarolReardoninSoldiersandScholars(1990)examinedthegradualencroachment

ofcivilianacademiafrom1865-1920ontheuseandstudyofmilitaryhistorybyofficers.

Militaryhistorywagedfromtheonsetarearguardactionagainsttheencroachmentof

science,engineering,andeventuallyevensocialscienceonthedevelopmentofArmy

officers.TheArmyofficercorpsofthelatenineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturytwisted

anddistortedmilitaryhistoryonthealterofpracticalityandutilitythedamagethus

inflictedrenderedtheresultslargelyineffectual.536Thedistancebetweenrealityandthe

Armyfictionreachedunsustainableproportionsandwaslikelytohavegraveconsequences

inthefuture.Theofficers,truetotheintellectualrootsthatMotenarticulated,perceived

historyasatooltobewielded-likescience-withoutanyregardtotheart.TheUSArmy

officercorps,fromitsinceptionandcertainlyitsprofessionalization,centerednearly

entirelyonthisfacet.TheArmyofficercorpsdevelopedinisolation,asHuntingtonnoted,

especiallyinthewest,butasSkeltonargueditalsoprofessionalizedwithotherfieldsin536CarolReardon,SoldiersandScholars:TheU.S.ArmyandtheUsesofMilitaryHistory,1865-1920(UniversityPressofKansas,1990),5–8.

213

America,butmainlyintheeast.Forasoldiercomingofageinthelastseveraldecadesof

theeighteenthcenturyprofessionalizationremainedadistinctlysubjectiveproposition.An

engineerofficerpostedtotheWatertownarsenalinMassachusettsprobablyunderstood

professionalismtobequitedifferentfromaninfantryofficerservingonthewestern

frontier.

InTheAmericanWayofWar(1973),RussellWeigleyfound,likeMoten,thatthe

Americanmilitarymindwaspredisposedtoaparticularwayofthinking,inthisinstance,

howitwagedwars.537TheU.S.militaryneverdevelopeditsownphilosophicalthoughtson

thenatureofwar.RatheritshiftedwiththevagariesoftheEuropeanbattlefield.Atone

momentFrench,thenextGerman,andthenbackagain,itwasneverquitesureofitself.As

Cunliffenoted,Americansingeneraldidnotthinkdeeplyonthingsofamilitarymatter,and

asaresult,theArmyofficercorpsadoptedforeignideasreadily.TheGermansandFrench,

staunchenemies,didnotagreeonmuch,butthelegaciesofNapoleonexertednosmall

amountofinfluenceonthenexttwohundredyearsofwar,andforthatreasonthesearch

fordecisivebattles–annihilation-consumedtheAmericanmilitarymindandconstituted

theAmericanWayofWarinthemindsofsomehistorians.

BrianLinninTheEchoofBattle(2007)expandedthetrailfirstblazedbyWeigley.

LinnarguedthatthereexistthreetraditionswithintheAmericanWayofWar.Firstwere

the“Guardians”whoconstitutedatraditionalviewthatwarisbothscienceandart.The

Heroeswerethosethatbelievedinthe“humanelement”aboveallothers.TheManagers

comprisedthelastgroup,believingthatwarwastheartofproductionandresource

537Weigley,TheAmericanWayofWar.

214

management.538Thesethreegroupsarenot“mutuallyexclusive”andonefindsadvocates

foreach,buttheydowrestleforascendancy.Weigleyarguedthatannihilationdefinedthe

AmericanWayofWar,whileLinnassumedanuancedargumentthatatdifferentpointsin

Americanhistorywarwaswagedbydifferentrulesets.Regardless,thehorrorsofthe

modernbattlefieldcombinedwithpowerofmodernfirepowerproducedsomeofthefirst,

andarguablythemostclear,fissuresinthepreeminenceoftheheroicsoldierimage.

InBeatingPlowsharesintoSwords:ThePoliticalEconomyofAmericanWarfare,

1601-1865(1996),PaulKoistinenexaminedtheAmericanexperience,whichseizedupon

technologicalsolutionstoagreaterdegreethanmost.Technologyandtheeconomyare

twodifferentthoughrelatedproductsofman.Theeconomyistheproductofandproduces

technologyinscale.War,especiallysincethelateeighteenthcentury,hasreliedonthe

organizedproductionofmajorenditemstosupportthevastincreaseinthesizeofarmies.

KoistinendividedtheeconomyofAmericaintofourmajorparts:political,economic,

technologicalandmilitary.KoistinenobservedthattheAmericaneconomydeveloped

throughthreeclearlydiscernablestagespreindustrial,transitional,andindustrialoverthis

period.Koistinen’sanalysiscloselyparallelsLinn’sthreetraditions,whichmirrorthe

economicdevelopmentoftheU.S.Army.TheArmyofficerprofessionmirroredthis

economicdevelopment.SkeltonalludedtothiswhennotedhowArmyprofessionalism

maturedinparallelwithotherprofessionsinAmericansociety.

TheUnitedStatespoliticalsystemlargelyrelegatedthemilitarytothesidelines

duringthepreindustrialandtransitionalstagesofeconomicdevelopmentbecauseone

couldmeetthechallengesofwarfareduringthisperiodwithcitizen-soldiers,asShy

538Linn,TheEchoofBattle,2009,5–7.

215

observed.This,however,changedastechnologiesadvancedandtheeconomymaturedand

theearliestseedssproutedinthearsenals.

Themostinfluentialaspectofthefourindeterminingthecharacteranddirectionof

theeconomy,accordingtoKoistinen,isthepoliticalelement.Koistinendoesnotprovidea

concisedefinitionoftechnology,asthatissomewhatperipheraltohismainargument;

however,hisworkcontributestoabroader,ifnotmoreholisticunderstandingofthe

culturalcontextfortheAmericanWayofWaranditseconomicdevelopmentandhow

thoseforceshelpedshapehowAmericanofficersperceiveandconductwar.Forthe

AmericanArmyofficer,professionalismandthestudyofitbecamemoreaboutproduction

andtechnologythanthestudyofmilitarytheory.War,thenatureofit,wasaquestionof

material,numbers,andmanagement.

WalterKretchikinU.S.ArmyDoctrineFromtheAmericanRevolutiontotheWaron

Terror(2011)examinedtheevolutionofArmydoctrine.Kretchiktracedthedevelopment

orborrowingofdoctrine,beginningwithBaronvonSteubenandtheContinentalArmy.

EarlyAmericandoctrinethroughtheFirstWorldWaroftenconsistedofgrossplagiarismof

Frenchmaterial,insomecasescopiednearlyverbatim.TheUSArmy,arelativelyyoung

institutionincomparisontoitsEuropeancounterparts,lackedastrongmilitarytradition,

andinmanywaysprideditselfonthatfact.Thus,withoutadequatetraditionordesirethe

USArmysimplylooked,asnotedbyMolten,attheEuropeanbattlefieldsforanswers.And

whichevermilitarydominatedatthatperiodbecametheoutlinetheArmyattemptedto

trace.MostfrequentlythiswastheFrenchArmy,especiallyfollowingNapoleon,withhis

successanddependenceonmassconscriptionseemedtheperfectfitforearlyAmerica.539

539Kretchik,U.S.ArmyDoctrine.

216

Kretchikobservedthat,“WarcollegecommitteesstudyingFrance,Germany,Great

Britain,JapanandtheSovietUnion,aswellasothernationsincludingItalyand

Switzerland,wereallfilteredthroughanAmericanCulturallens.Ifforeigndoctrinedidnot

meshwithAmericanpoliticalandsocietalnorms,aswellasmilitaryvalues,itwasoften

discounted.”540TheclearandrationalMachiavellianapproachisnotdisplayedhere,buta

preferenceforthefamiliar,theknown,notanimpulsetoexploreandembracefuture

potential,butreluctancetobreakwiththepast.“Principlesweretheimmutabletruths,”

Kretchiknoted,“thatanchoredtheintellect,”intellectuallymooredtotheoldworld.Thus,

Armyofficersneverfullydiscoveredthepossibilitiesthatresidedoutsidetheself-inflicted

intellectuallimits.

***Thecivilianandmilitaryminds,inrespecttotechnology,paralleledeachother

throughoutmuchofAmericanhistory.However,thealignmentremainedequivalentin

directiononlythediffusionandspeedoftechnologicaladoptiondependedonthe

amalgamationofmanydisparatefactors.LikemostnationstheU.S.wasbornthroughwar,

yet,intheAmericancasethebirthcamerelativelylateintheprocessofstateformation.

FreefromtheinertiathatoftenrestrainssocialchangeAmericansreadilyadopted

technologyinconjunctionwithutilitarianneedslargelyuninhibitedbyreligious,

institutionalorbureaucraticbarriers.

TheemergenceoftheU.S.coincidedfortuitouslywiththeadvanceofscienceand

technology.Themeetingproducedamentalität,“…acommonmindsetgeneratingsimilar

approachestocommonproblems…”541Theseeminglylimitlesspotentialoftechnologyto

solveeverydayproblemsthathadbedeviledmanforthousandsofyearsimbuedthat540Ibid.,140.541KnoxandMurray,TheDynamicsofMilitaryRevolution,1300-2050,112.

217

technologywithprofoundqualities,thatwhenmeasured,itprocessedonlysuperficially.

Technologicalbenefits,bytheirnaturevisible,wereextolledingreatmeasureand

enthusiasticallyembracedbyindividualsandcorporatebodiesalike;yet,thesocialcosts,

thesecondandtertiaryeffectswerenolessacutealbeitlessamenabletoquantitative

measurementandfrequentlyemergedonlyhaveanextendedincubationperiodusually

measuredinascoreormore-generational.

TheArmywaslessaninstitutionandmoreanorganism,exemplifyingthe

characteristicsofalivingcreaturewithallofitsinstinctualandintellectualfacultiesthat

onemightattributetoapredator.Technologyenhancestheseinstinctualskills--theeyes,

thelimbs,theclaws--theabilitytokill.Yet,technologyonlyamplifieswhatalreadyexistsin

theorganism.Itisnotadditiveinnature,abilitiesaremultipliedthroughtheuseand

employmentoftechnology,butsmarteritdoesnotonemake.

TheArmymovedfirmlyandslowlybutnotoutofstepwiththepotentialof

technology.Initially,technologyprovidednoabsolutesuperiorityonthebattlefieldtactical

successdependedmoreondisciplineandleadership.Humanattributesvaried,butthose

prizedhereinthenewworld,asnotedbydeTocqueville,wereofapracticalandutilitarian

strain,ofthebloodandsweatkind.TheCivilWardemonstratedthepowerof

manufacturingandadvancesintechnologytomanyobserversbothforeignanddomestic.

NascentArmyprofessionalismandweakintellectualmooringprovidedtheperfect

environmentfortechnicismtotakerootandoverthenexttwohundredyearsit

proliferated.

SomehistorianshavestudiedthedevelopmentofArmyprofessionalizationandstill

othershaveexaminedtechnologyanditseffectonthebattlefield,butfewhaveanalyzed

218

theintellectualsubstrateofArmyofficersanditsconfluencewithtechnology.Inother

words,thissubstratewastheArmyofficermentalitätthatdevelopedfromthepeculiar

Americanexperience.

219

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