Managing Risk at International Ports of EntryPatrick L. Gurian, Department of Civil, Architectural, and Environmental Engineering, Drexel University

Nicholas Dudley Ward, Department of Statistics, The Wharton School, University of PennsylvaniaJosiah McC. Heyman and Cheryl Howard, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Texas at El Paso

Major constraint: trade-off between intensity of inspection andtraffic build-up. Port management receives pressure from localinfluentials to keep traffic moving. Port management pressures inspectors to achieve a “satisfactory” level of interdicted drugs while at the same time maintaining an average through-put of one vehicle per 30 seconds (El Paso) and not developing abnormally long queues.

Secondary constraints: (A) do not harass apparently influential crossers who will call lawyers, congressional offices, or embassies. (B) incomplete information--access to car and drivers’ licenserecords, visas or immigration documents is available, but much other information is missing or cannot be cross-checked. Only a few crossers receive automated fingerprint checks.

Inspectors’ detection strategies: an overall gestalt created of many factors at once; inspectors often call this gestalt a “sixth sense” or “intuition.”

Elements of the gestalt:(1) Direct documentary and detection system evidence if available, such as computer database records (intelligence) of vehicle plates or narcotic sniffing dogs.(2) Visible condition of the vehicle (if applicable).(3) Nerves/non-verbal cues.(4) Traveler’s story: does it make “sense” (various socially based rubrics, such as apparent social class).(5) Kind of traveler:

(a) nation of origin; immigration or visa status.(b) age, gender.(c) apparent ethnicity (body phenotype).

Goals: traffic moves steadily, officers get satisfactory number of busts, and avoid criticism by congress, lawyers, embassies, etc.

What is the role of “profiling” in these strategies?

(1) It does occur: the need for rapid through-put of traffic results in tactics for quick decision-making, including profiling by apparent ethnicity, age, gender, apparent social class, type of vehicle, etc.

(2) The profiles are not static or simple. Officers report that they change profiles as smuggling strategies change but how much lag or over-simplification occurs is not well-documented.

(3) A characteristic use of profiling to manage traffic/interdiction trade-offs was a remark by a port manager who said they did not want time wasted by inspectors on “grandmas.” In fact, smugglers use many kinds of crossers but simplifications help officers and supervisors satisfy constraints.

(3) The application of profiles differs between officers, but this is complex and not well understood.

Sources:Heyman, Josiah McC.2004 “Ports of Entry as Nodes in the World System,” Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power 11: 303-327.2001 "United States Ports of Entry on the Mexican Border,” Journal of the Southwest, 43: 681-7001999 “Why Interdiction? Immigration Law Enforcement at the United States-Mexico Border,” Regional Studies 33: 619-30.

Gilboy, Janet 1992 “Penetrability of Administrative Systems: Political ‘Casework’ and Immigration Inspectors,” Law and Society Review 26: 273-314.1991 “Deciding Who Gets In: Decision making by Immigration Inspectors,” Law and Society Review 25: 571-599.

Nature of the data: ethnographic, based on direct observation at land and air ports, interviews at the time of decision of officers, and in-depth interviews of officers. Multiple independent researchers report similar results. Data is not quantified. Data was collected in late 1980s and early 1990s, prior to the current project (2003-2005). Changes since this time period include better detection technologies and stronger access to databases, but limited interviews in 2004 indicate broad applicability to the present. The current project did not have direct access to officers.

Ethnographic BackgroundHow do border inspectors make decisions?Summarized results from previous studies

Inspections ObservationsNormal Inspections1,228 inspections of northbound, non-commercial traffic observedat Santa Fe Bridge in El Paso, TX

(1) Average duration = 34 seconds compared to 30 second goal(see ethnographic background section)(2) 45% last 20 seconds or less(3) 2% referred to secondary inspections(4) 79% do not involve opening a vehicle compartmentBased on Villegas, Gurian, Heyman, et al. 2006. “Tradeoffs between Security and Inspection Capacity: Policy

Optionsfor Land Border Ports of Entry”, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research Board,

Washington,DC (accepted)

A Simple Normative Model

Acknowledgement: This project was supported by NSF award number 0332001

Public Perceptions

Results from a survey of 704 border crossers in the summer of 2004.Illegal crossers may be recruited from any societal subgroup but the total number is constrained. The total number of detailed inspections performed is constrained.

Recruitment of illegal crossers is designed to minimize interceptions with the knowledge that inspectors will select group with the highest proportion of illegal crossers in order to maximize interceptions. As a result, both recruitment and inspection will be uniform across societal groups.

Duration of inspections should be independent and identically distributed over time - no serial correlation or systematic patterns as such patterns can be exploited by illegal crossers.

Conclusions

Response

English Language

Respondents

Spanish Language

Respondents

PROFESSIONAL 63% 41%

UNPROFESSIONAL 7% 8%

DEPENDS ON INSPECTOR

30% 51%

Professionalism of Inspectors

ResponseEnglish

Language Respondents

SpanishLanguage

Respondents

FAIR 65% 28%

UNFAIR 3% 9%

DEPENDS ON INSPECTOR

32% 63%

ResponseEnglish

Language Respondents

SpanishLanguage

Respondents

NEVER 37% 18%

RARELY 37% 48%

OCCASIONALLY 17% 21%

FREQUENTLY 9% 13%

Ethnographic research, survey results, and inspection observations support the conclusion that inspections are not uniform over time or across societal groups as would be predicted by a simple normative model. This has implications both for social justice and for the effectiveness of the inspection process as a risk management tool.

Time-series analysis of inspections shows clusters of longer duration inspections and shorter duration inspections. However, these clusters do not follow a predictable pattern and tend to persist for relatively brief periods of time, making it difficult for prospective illegal crossers to take advantage of them.

Because the simple normative model does not fully explain this system, we are investigating more complex and realistic models.

Duration of inspectionsHalf-hour observation periods have been concatenated into a single time series shown above.(1) Inspection durations are not independent and identically distributed.(2) Time-series analysis reveals a weakly mean-reverting process – consistent with pressure to limit average inspection time and maintain traffic flow.

Different demographic groups perceive the process differently with Spanish-language survey respondents reporting a higher frequency of more detailed inspections and less favorable attitudes towards the inspectors.

Perceptions of Inspectors Survey Question: Now, I’ll read you some choices, please tell me which

comes closer to your views about the inspectors at customs:a. would you say they are: [ ] fair or [ ] unfair or [ ] it depends on the

inspector,b. would you say their work is: [ ] professional or [ ] unprofessional or [ ] it

depends on the inspector.

Fairness of Inspectors Reported Frequency of Additional Inspections

Additional InspectionsSurvey Question: In general, how often do you have to submit to additional searches at customs?[ ] Frequently, [ ] Occasionally,[ ] Rarely, or [ ] Never.

When 30-minute observation periods are divided into thirds (left), the mean durations of inspections typically differ by ANOVA (right). A single example analysis is shown above.