Upload
others
View
6
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
Mandatorily Conservative Accounting:
Evidence and Implications
Alastair Lawrence
Richard Sloan
Yuan Sun
Haas School of Business
University of California at Berkeley
2220 Piedmont Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94720-1900
October 2012
ABSTRACT: A large body of accounting research concludes that various economic incentives
induce cross-sectional variation in managers’ discretionary application of conservative
accounting. We extend existing research by presenting evidence suggesting that mandatory
accounting rules are also a significant determinant of conservative accounting. For example,
accounting rules mandate asset impairments when fair values drop materially below book values.
After attempting to model the determinants of mandatorily conservative accounting, we find that
some previous variables representing economic incentives become insignificant.
KEYWORDS: Mandatory conservatism, conditional conservatism, book-to-market, asset
impairment.
JEL CLASSIFICATION: M41, C23, D21, and G32.
DATA AVAILABILITY: Data are publicly available from sources identified in the article.
We have received valuable comments from an anonymous referee, Patricia Dechow, Yongtae Kim, Yaniv
Konchitchki, Miguel Minutti-Meza, Panos Patatoukas, Scott Richardson, Jieying Zhang, Jerry Zimmerman (the
editor), and workshop participants at Santa Clara University, University of California at Berkeley, and University of
Southern California. In addition, we thank Jefferson Duarte for providing the PIN data.
1
1. Introduction
Conservatism has long been an important accounting convention. The Accounting
Principles Board (APB) in Statement No. 4 (APB 1970, paragraph 171) summarizes the
convention of conservatism as follows:
“Frequently, assets and liabilities are measured in a context of significant
uncertainties. Historically, managers, investors, and accountants have generally
preferred that possible errors in measurement be in the direction of
understatement rather than overstatement of net income and net assets.”
While conservatism has been a long-standing attribute of financial reporting [e.g., AICPA 1939;
Devine 1963; Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 1980], the FASB’s recent
Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting (2010) drops conservatism as a desired attribute
of financial reporting.1 In practice, however, conservatism remains a prevalent feature of
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), with a prime example being the requirement
that most non-financial assets must be written down in bad times but cannot be written up in
good times.
The conservatism convention has also been a popular topic in academic research (e.g.,
Watts and Zimmerman 1986; Basu 1997; Givoly and Hayn 2000; Watts 2003a, 2003b;
Roychowdhury and Watts 2007; LaFond and Watts 2008; Khan and Watts 2009). A large body
of literature documents that variables designed to capture various economic incentives explain
cross-sectional variation in conservatism.2 For example, Ahmed, Billings, Morton, and Stanford-
Harris (2002, 868) argue that “firms experiencing more severe bondholder-shareholder dividend
policy conflicts adopt more conservative accounting” and Nikolaev (2010, 138) argues that
1 This change is due to a concern that conservatism is inconsistent with the board’s desire for neutrality defined as:
“without bias in the selection or presentation of financial information.” 2 See Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000), Holthausen and Watts (2001), Ball, Robin, and Sadka (2008), LaFond and
Roychowdhury (2008), LaFond and Watts (2008), and Nikolaev (2010). For a more detailed review of the
conservatism literature see Watts (2003a, 2003b) and Ryan (2006).
2
“when debt contracts rely on accounting based covenants, bondholders are likely to provide
higher incentives for timely loss recognition to the firm’s management and its auditors”. Overall,
this research concludes that managers exercise discretion over the degree of conservatism
employed in their financial reporting in response to various economic incentives.
In this paper, we extend prior research by modeling the impact of mandatory accounting
rules on conservative accounting. For example, firms are required to write down assets when
their fair values drop materially below their book values.3 Previous research has recognized that
conservative accounting consists of both a discretionary and a nondiscretionary or GAAP-
mandated component (e.g., Ahmed et al. 2002, 873-874; Beaver and Ryan 2005, 302; Givoly,
Hayn, and Natarajan 2007, 78, 102). The GAAP-mandated component refers to the component
arising from the application of GAAP. We define mandatorily conservative accounting as
conservatism resulting from the neutral application of GAAP.4 We then define discretionary
conservatism as conservatism arising from purposeful intervention in the financial reporting
process to adjust the amount and timing of conservative accounting. We emphasize that
discretionary conservatism can exist because of the subjectivity embedded in many GAAP. If
GAAP contain no subjectivity, there can be no discretion.5
3 As with all of FASB’s provisions, impairment standards need not be applied to immaterial items. FASB’s
conceptual framework (FASB 2010) states that an item is material “if omitting it or misstating it could influence
decisions that users make on the basis of the financial information of a specific reporting entity.” Consistent with
prior literature (e.g., Strong and Meyer 1987; Elliott and Shaw 1988; Elliott and Hanna 1996) we highlight material
asset write-downs by using total assets or market capitalization as a relative benchmark. Moreover, we acknowledge
that the notion of materiality introduces judgement into the write-down process as immaterial write-downs need not
be taken. The interactions between write-downs and materiality are similar to those between disclosure and
materiality as highlighted in Heitzman, Wasley, and Zimmerman (2010). Heitzman et al. (2010) show that
materiality thresholds vary systematically as a function of the earnings response coefficient (ERC) and the
magnitude of the item, and hence, we conduct analyses, in Section 2.3—Research design, where we model material
write-downs as a function of ERCs and current earnings before write-downs. 4 This definition follows from Schipper’s (1989) widely-accepted definition of nondiscretionary accruals as those
arising from the ‘neutral operation’ of GAAP. 5 For example, a firm having $100 in a bank account must report an asset of $100. Management cannot choose to
report this asset at $50.
3
Our empirical results provide evidence of mandatorily conservative accounting. We show
that write-downs are most pervasive in firm-years where firms' market values have dropped
below their book values as a result of poor firm performance. We also document that asset write-
downs are a nonlinear function of beginning of period book-to-market ratios and recent past
operating performance. Our results suggest that mandatorily conservative accounting is a
significant determinant of cross-sectional variation in conservative accounting. Moreover, we
find that several variables used in the prior literature to capture incentives for discretionary
conservatism become insignificant or substantially weakened after we model mandatorily
conservative accounting. Specifically, we find that results relating to debt-contracting incentives
become statistically insignificant and that results relating to information asymmetry incentives
are less pronounced after modeling the circumstances that warrant GAAP-mandated write-
downs. These findings raise the possibility that conclusions in previous research regarding the
determinants of discretionary conservatism, in particular the debt-contracting determinants, may
have been premature. In addition, they highlight the potential importance of controlling for
mandatorily conservative accounting when testing for determinants of discretionary
conservatism.
While our evidence is consistent with a significant role for mandatorily conservative
accounting, we emphasize two limitations of our findings. First, our model of mandatorily
conservative accounting explains only a small proportion of the observed variation in
conservative accounting. This result is consistent with limitations of our model to capture all
mandatory conservatism and also with the existence of significant amounts of discretionary
4
conservatism.6 We therefore emphasize that our results are consistent with the existence of
significant discretionary conservatism. The issue that we raise with respect to previous research
is not with the existence of discretionary conservatism, but with specific inferences regarding the
determinants of discretionary conservatism.
A second limitation of our findings is that our model of mandatorily conservative
accounting may model discretionary conservatism. In other words, it could be the case that firms
with impaired assets are not taking write-downs in response to GAAP, but in response to
correlated discretionary incentives. We have been unable to uncover any such incentives. One
possibility that we considered was that firms with debt contracts could face incentives to take
discretionary write-downs on impaired assets in order to appease debtholders. Inconsistent with
this explanation, we find that our model of mandatorily conservative accounting similarly
explains conservatism in a sample of firms without debt.
Our paper relates to several streams of existing research. First, it extends the extant
literature on the determinants of write-downs (e.g., Strong and Meyer 1987; Elliott and Shaw
1988; Elliott and Hanna 1996; Francis, Hanna, and Vincent 1996; Rees, Gill, and Gore 1996;
Riedl 2004). These prior studies generally concluded that material write-downs were
discretionary ‘big baths’, as there was limited specific authoritative guidance on the accounting
for asset impairments prior to 1995. Following the release of SFAS No. 121 Accounting for the
Impairment of Long-Lived Assets and for Long-Lived Assets to Be Disposed of (FASB 1995),
GAAP for asset write-downs have been formalized. We use GAAP’s authoritative guidance to
6 The limitations of our model are illustrated by the Securities and Exchange Commission’s challenge to Barnes &
Noble’s assertion that its goodwill was not impaired “despite operating losses during those periods and the
significant difference between market capitalization and stockholders’ equity at the evaluation date.” (WSJ 2012)
Even though a GAAP-mandated write-down appeared to be warranted, Barnes & Noble was able to defend its
position by arguing that “our total market capitalization does not indicate the long-term fair value of the company.”
What is not clear is whether Barnes and Noble’s position was motivated by managerial incentives to avoid a write-
down or by a superior managerial assessment of fair value.
5
model the determinants of mandatory write-downs. Our evidence suggests that a significant
proportion of material write-downs can be explained by our model of mandatory write-downs.
While our study is a comprehensive attempt at modeling mandatory asset write-downs,
some prior research incorporates certain features of our research design. Most notably, Ramanna
and Watts (2012) document a positive association between book-to-market ratios greater than
one and incentives to avoid asset write-downs. They conclude that the managers of such firms
exercise discretion to delay write-downs that are otherwise mandated by GAAP.7 Also, while not
explicitly attempting to model mandatory asset write-downs, some prior studies find that asset
write-downs are related to operating performance and the book-to-market ratio (e.g., Strong and
Meyer 1987; Francis et al. 1996; Riedl 2004).
Second, our findings build on previous research linking book-to-market ratios to
conditionally conservative accounting (e.g., Giner and Rees 2001; Beaver and Ryan 2005; Pae,
Thornton, and Welker 2005; Roychowdhury and Watts 2007). This prior research documents a
positive relation between beginning of period book-to-market ratios and conditionally
conservative accounting. Mandatorily conservative accounting is offered as one possible
explanation for this relation. We further develop the implications of mandatorily conservative
accounting for the relation between book-to-market ratios and conditionally conservative
accounting. For example, we predict that this relation will exhibit a significant nonlinearity
around a book-to-market ratio of one and will be concentrated in firms with poor operating
performance. Our evidence is consistent with these predictions, both corroborating mandatorily
7 Ramanna and Watts (2012) focus on how managerial incentives influence goodwill impairments under SFAS No.
142 (FASB 2001a). Our study more generally models and controls for mandatory asset write-downs across a broader
set of asset classes and uses the model to re-examine several previous studies. Nevertheless, the reasoning
underlying the research designs employed in the two studies is similar.
6
conservative accounting as an explanation for this relation and allowing us to more effectively
model mandatorily conservative accounting.
Our research also builds on Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) findings that conditionally
conservative accounting is positively related to beginning of period book-to-market ratios but not
necessarily end of period book-to-market ratios. The beginning of period ratios reflect the
likelihood that mandatory write-downs will be required during the period. The end of period
ratios do not, because the book values are measured after any such mandatory write-downs have
been taken. Thus, it is essential that beginning of period book-to-market ratios are used to model
expected mandatory write-downs. Our study also provides new insights into Roychowdhury’s
(2010) argument that explicit or implicit mechanisms must exist to facilitate managers’
commitment to conservative accounting policies. Specifically, our results highlight mandatorily
conservative accounting under GAAP as one important commitment mechanism.
Finally, our study is related to previous research emphasizing the importance of
controlling for mandatory accounting rules when evaluating discretionary accounting choices. In
particular, Kaplan (1985) and Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) emphasize the importance of
controlling for nondiscretionary accruals in accrual-based tests of earnings management and
Heitzman, Wasley, and Zimmerman (2010) emphasize the importance of controlling for
mandatory accounting disclosures in tests of voluntary disclosure. While our analyses focus on
write-downs and in turn conservatism, we also highlight the importance of considering the
implications of unbiased applications of GAAP and GAAS in assessing discretionary financial
reporting practices. Our findings also speak to an apparent conflict in the conservatism literature.
In particular, the debt-contracting research (e.g., Nikolaev 2012) argues that debt covenants
induce more conservatism while the impairment research (e.g., Beatty and Weber 2006;
7
Ramanna and Watts 2012) finds that debt contracts induce less conservatism. Our analyses
support the latter findings, indicating that the former findings may instead reflect mandatorily
conservative accounting.
Our study has three main implications for subsequent research. First, it highlights the
importance of mandatory accounting rules in explaining the properties of accounting numbers
and their associated relations with stock returns. Second, our study highlights the importance of
controlling for mandatorily conservative accounting when examining the determinants of
discretionary conservatism. Mandatorily conservative accounting is correlated with economic
characteristics such as financial distress, and so may be a correlated omitted variable in previous
research. Third, our study provides a framework for modeling mandatorily conservative
accounting, demonstrating that it is a nonlinear function of several underlying economic
variables. We encourage future research to further develop our model of mandatorily
conservative accounting, thus enhancing our ability to model mandatory conservatism and
distinguish it from discretionary conservatism.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the study’s
motivation and research design, while Section 3 describes the data. Our results are presented in
Sections 4 and 5, with Section 4 reporting results on mandatorily conservative accounting and
Section 5 reporting results on the determinants of discretionary conservatism. Section 6
summarizes additional analyses and Section 7 concludes.
2. Motivation and research design
2.1 Motivation
Conservatism is a long-standing attribute of accounting information and a popular topic
8
in academic research.8 A large body of literature hypothesizes that various economic incentives
induce cross-sectional variation in managers’ application of conservatism. For example, this
literature argues that managers use conservative accounting to reduce the agency costs of debt
(e.g., Ahmed et al. 2002; Watts 2003a; Beatty, Weber, and Yu 2008; Nikolaev 2010) and equity
(e.g., Ahmed and Duellman 2007; LaFond and Roychowdhury 2008; LaFond and Watts 2008;
Ramalingegowda and Yu 2012), with conservatism serving as a substitute for external
monitoring. The underlying argument is that managers are able to ex ante commit to implement
relatively conservative accounting as a substitute for loan covenants, higher interest rates, and
other shareholder and debtholder imposed monitoring mechanisms and costs. For example,
Nikolaev (2010) argues that bondholders are likely to provide more incentives for conservatism
when debt contracts rely on accounting based covenants. This body of research generally finds
strong supporting evidence, concluding that economic incentives introduce significant cross-
sectional variation in managers’ application of conservatism.
2.2 Mandatorily conservative accounting
We define mandatorily conservative accounting as conservative accounting that is
required under GAAP. The foregoing research does not explicitly control for mandatorily
conservative accounting, raising the possibility that it is a correlated omitted variable and in turn,
provides an alternative explanation for prior results. Our focus is on conditionally conservative
accounting, and specifically the accounting principles requiring firms to write down assets when
their fair values drop materially below their book values.9 We predict that such write-downs will
8 See Watts and Zimmerman (1986), Feltham and Ohlson (1995), Basu (1997), Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan (1999),
Beaver and Ryan (2000), Watts (2003b), Ryan (2006), and Khan and Watts (2009) for evidence of conservative
accounting. 9 The other major type of conservative accounting is unconditionally conservative accounting, which includes
requirements that expenditures such as R&D and advertising be immediately expensed in most cases.
9
occur for firms where (i) the book value of assets is above their corresponding market value; and
(ii) operating performance is poor. Given the foregoing conditions under which mandated write-
downs occur, we also predict that such mandatorily conservative accounting will be
systematically related to firm characteristics, such as financial distress and financial leverage.
This latter prediction raises our concern that mandatorily conservative accounting is a correlated
omitted variable in prior research. Thus, while discretionary conservatism may be relevant, there
is another possible explanation for the results in prior research.
FASB’s Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) 350, Intangibles—Goodwill and
Other (FASB 2009a) and ASC 360, Property, Plant, and Equipment (PP&E) (FASB 2009b) are
two main standards that mandate conservative accounting through the impairment of assets. ASC
350 requires tests for goodwill and indefinite-lived intangibles when it is more likely than not
that their fair values are materially less than their carrying amounts.10
The amount of the
impairment is calculated as the difference between the assets’ fair values and their carrying
values.11
Given the foregoing impairment rules, goodwill and indefinite-lived intangible
impairments should theoretically be linear functions of the underlying assets’ book-to-market
ratios after the ratios exceed one. Figure 1, Panel A plots the theoretical relation, absent
discretion, between asset impairments and book-to-market ratios for goodwill and indefinite-
lived intangibles under ASC 350.
Unconditionally conservative accounting also impacts the empirical properties of accounting numbers (e.g., Penman
and Zhang 2002), but is not the focus of our study. 10
Prior to December 15, 2011, ASC 350 required at least annual impairment tests for goodwill and indefinite-lived
intangibles and hence, more discretion is now inherent in goodwill impairment testing post December 14, 2011. 11
For more information concerning the impairment of goodwill and indefinite-life intangibles see ASC 350-20-35
and ASC 350-30-35-15, respectively [pre-codification SFAS No. 142 Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets (FASB
2001a)]. It is important to highlight that the foregoing impairment standards “need not be applied to immaterial
items.”
10
The impairment standards for PP&E and finite-lived intangibles are slightly different
from those for goodwill and indefinite-lived intangibles. While ASC 360 also requires that PP&E
and finite-lived intangibles be tested for impairment when circumstances warrant, these assets
are only impaired if they are evaluated and found not to be fully recoverable (i.e., their carrying
amount exceeds the estimated gross undiscounted cash flows from their use and disposition).12
However, as with the impairment of goodwill and indefinite-lived intangibles, the amount of
impairment for PP&E and finite-lived intangibles is measured as the excess of the assets’
carrying amounts over their fair values. Under ASC 360, the carrying values of PP&E and finite-
lived intangibles can therefore exceed their fair values when the carrying value is recoverable, as
determined by expected future cash flows from its use and disposition. Thus, the relation
between asset impairments and book-to-market ratios for PP&E and finite-lived intangibles is
not a simple linear function of the ratio for values greater than one. Instead, the relation between
impairments and book-to-market ratios under ASC 360 will be delayed until ASC 360’s
recoverability provisions are breached. Figure 1, Panel B plots the relation, again under the
assumption of no managerial discretion, between impairments and book-to-market ratios for
PP&E and finite-lived intangibles under ASC 360.
These two impairment standards for long-lived assets, inter alia, highlight that
conservative accounting is mandatory under certain economic conditions.13
Managers have some
discretion with regard to the exact timing and amount of asset write-downs, and hence, a portion
of write-downs may be taken earlier than predicted (i.e., when the book-to-market ratio is less
12
For more information concerning the impairment of PP&E and finite-life intangibles see ASC 360-10-35 [pre-
codification SFAS No. 144 Accounting for the Impairment or Disposal of Long-Lived Assets (FASB 2001b)]. As
with ASC 350, these impairment standards “need not be applied to immaterial items.” In addition, it is noteworthy to
mention that in 2001 SFAS No. 144 superseded SFAS No. 121. 13
The lower of cost or market requirements for inventories in ASC 330-10-20 (FASB 2009c) would also support
similar predictions.
11
than one) or later than predicted (i.e., to the right of the expected impairment line when the book-
to-market ratio is greater than one). But absent managerial discretion, we would still expect to
observe cross-sectional variation in conservative accounting as a function of the economic
conditions facing firms. The rationale underlying these predictions is also articulated in Beaver
and Ryan (2005) and Ramanna and Watts (2012), who argue that mandatory asset write-downs
are warranted for firms with book-to-market ratios greater than one. For example, Ramanna and
Watts (2012, 11) argue that they find “evidence on the properties of SFAS No. 142 non-
compliance among firms with two consecutive years of BTM > 1.”
In order to model cross-sectional variation in mandatorily conservative accounting, we
need measures of both the book values and the fair values of firms’ assets. The book values are
readily available, but the fair values are more difficult to obtain. We address this issue by
focusing on the aggregate book values and fair values of firms’ assets, and we obtain the fair
values by summing the market value of firms’ common equity and the book values of their
liabilities. We focus on the book and market values of assets rather than equity because the
former allows us to consistently measure the closeness of the book values and fair values of
assets on an unlevered basis.14
Taken together, ASC 350 and 360 imply that for firms with beginning of period book-to-
market ratios close to or greater than one, there will be a negative relation between the ratios and
asset write-downs (i.e., higher book-to-market ratios should result in more negative impairment
charges to earnings). Note that there are a number of reasons why this negative relation is not
expected to hold starting exactly at a book-to-market equal to one. First, the recoverability 14
For example, consider a firm with assets of $11 at book value and $10 at market value. The unlevered book-to-
market is 1.1, correctly indicating that the firm is close to the asset impairment threshold. However, if the firm also
has liabilities with a book value of $9, the levered book-to-market is 2.0, incorrectly indicating that the firm is
significantly past the impairment threshold. However, as described in Section 6, our findings are robust with respect
to using the equity-level book-to-market.
12
provisions of ASC 360 provide a buffer before impairments are required even when book-to-
market is greater than one. Second, both ASC 350 and 360 state that the impairment rules “need
not be applied to immaterial items”. Hence, if both the firm and auditor deem an asset
impairment to be immaterial, the write-down need not be taken.15
Third, managers are not
required to use their firm’s own stock price in determining fair values. While we would expect
market values and fair values to be highly correlated, management may assess fair values
differently from the market. Fourth, all of the above-mentioned reasons involve subjectivity,
providing management with the opportunity to exercise discretion in delaying or accelerating
asset impairments. Finally, unconditionally conservative accounting for some assets can cause
the numerator of firm-level book-to-market ratios to be understated. Under such circumstances,
some assets could require impairment even though the aggregate book-to-market is less than
one.16
In light of these reasons, we also predict that the negative relation between beginning of
period book-to-market ratios and asset impairments will be stronger when recent past operating
performance has been poor. A poor return on operating assets provides prima-facie evidence that
a firm’s operating assets are impaired and moreover, all else equal, it increases the likelihood
that the impairment is material, given that materiality thresholds are generally lower for weak
performing than strong performing firms, and that the write-down will be taken. Thus,
mandatorily conservative accounting under GAAP leads us to generate the following three
predictions concerning book-to-market ratios and asset impairments:
P1: There is a negative and nonlinear relation between beginning of period book-to-market
ratios and asset impairments.
15
We model material write-downs as a function of firms’ ERCs and current earnings following Heitzman et al.
(2010) who use a similar methodology to identify material advertising expense disclosures. 16
Beaver and Ryan (2005) provide an extended analysis of the interaction between conditional and unconditional
conservatism.
13
P2: The negative relation between beginning of period book-to-market ratios and asset
impairments is stronger for book-to-market ratios greater than one.
P3: The negative relation between beginning of period book-to-market ratios and asset
impairments is stronger when recent past operating performance has been poor.
Our first prediction is consistent with prior research documenting a positive relation
between measures of conservatism and beginning of period book-to-market ratios (e.g., Giner
and Rees 2001; Pae et al. 2005; Roychowdhury and Watts 2007). Unlike previous research,
however, we attribute this relation to mandatorily conservative accounting warranted by GAAP,
leading to the additional predictions that this relation is (i) nonlinear; (ii) stronger for book-to-
market ratios exceeding one; and (iii) stronger for firms with poor recent operating performance.
2.3 Research design
To provide empirical evidence on the significance of mandatorily conservative
accounting, we first examine the relation between asset write-downs taken during a fiscal year
and the book-to-market ratios at the beginning of the fiscal year. Specifically, we regress write-
downs on book-to-market ratios to confirm the predicted negative relation (negative as write-
down charges are recorded as negative values) using the following specification:
(1)
For the purpose of estimating Equation (1), we scale WRITEDOWN by the market capitalization
at the end of period t-1. We also estimate (1) after substituting special-items (SPI) for
WRITEDOWN because Compustat does not separately disclose asset write-downs prior to 2000,
instead incorporating them into SPI. The beginning of period asset book-to-market ratio (BTM),
is defined as total assets scaled by the sum of market capitalization plus total assets minus
common equity at the end of fiscal t-1.
14
The rules governing mandatorily conservative accounting lead to the prediction that the
relation between write-downs and BTM will be nonlinear in BTM. Specifically, the relation is
predicted to be weak when BTM is significantly less than one, to gradually increase as BTM
approaches one, and to be a constant linear relation as BTM passes one. Given the limitations of
our research design and the extent of managerial discretion in applying mandatorily conservative
accounting, it is difficult to ex ante identify the precise functional form. Hence, we use coarse
BTM partitions to test for evidence of the predicted nonlinearity.
The coarse partitions take the form of seven indicator variables based on the rank of
BTM. We choose seven partitions (BTMj, j=1 to 7) because this is the minimum number for
which we can divide the sample into similar BTM intervals and still have two subsamples with
BTM greater than one. BTM6 and BTM7 are the two BTM dummies of most interest, as they
reflect firm-years where the BTM ratio is equal to or greater than one. If write-downs are most
prevalent after the market value of assets has dropped below their book value, then
WRITEDOWN should be highest for the BTM6 and BTM7 partitions. In turn, we predict that
relative to the linear relation modeled in Equation (1) asset write-downs will be relatively larger
for observations in the BTM6 and BTM7 partitions and relatively smaller for observations in the
BTM1 to BTM5 partitions (being those with BTM values less than one).
To provide evidence on nonlinearity, we use the estimated parameters of Equation (1) to
generate linear predictions of the mean write-down for each BTM partition. We then compare
these linear predictions to each partition’s actual mean write-down. If our predictions are correct
and the nonlinearity is most pronounced in the region surrounding a BTM of one, then the
difference between each partition’s actual versus predicted mean write-down should be positive
15
(smaller actual write-downs) for those observations in the BTM4 and BTM5 partitions, and
negative (larger actual write-downs) for those observations in the BTM6 and BTM7 partitions.
Consistent with prior findings (e.g., Strong and Meyer 1987; Francis et al. 1996; Riedl
2004) we also expect that asset impairments will be greater when the firm has experienced a
relatively poor recent operating performance. Managers’ and auditors’ assessments of assets’ fair
values are likely to be increasing in the underlying assets’ profitability. Under such
circumstances, a BTM greater than one may simply reflect an unrealistically negative assessment
on the part of investors or the anticipation of future negative events (e.g., increased competition,
new regulations, costly lawsuits, etc.). In either case, managers are unlikely to book a mandatory
write-down until the occurrence of these events and the associated deterioration in firm
performance. Moreover, as previously mentioned, weak past performance increases the
likelihood that the impairment is material, as well as the likelihood of not meeting GAAP’s
recoverability conditions, and hence, it increases the likelihood that the write-down will have to
be taken. Hence, we modify Equation (1) to model write-downs as a function of the BTM and
past performance using the following regression specification:
(2)
We define past performance to be weak if either the average market-adjusted stock returns or the
average pre-tax return on total assets are less than an annualized five percent over the last two
years.17
We create an indicator variable, B, that takes the value of one in the presence of weak
past performance and zero otherwise.18
The interaction term, BTM*B, examines the prediction
17
We use a 5% threshold, as this is a reasonable lower bound for the cost of equity capital over our sample period—
implying that a return of less than 5% indicates that a firm is earning less than its cost of capital. 18
As it is possible that the average pre-tax return on total assets is more likely to proxy for the effects of materiality
thresholds on write-downs and the market-adjusted stock returns is more likely to proxy for the effects of the
16
that write-downs will be more prevalent in firms with high BTM ratios and a recent history of
poor performance. If this prediction is correct, then the coefficient on the BTM*B interaction
term will be significantly negative, and the coefficient on the main BTM term will revert toward
zero.
To examine the nonlinearities between BTM and WRITEDOWN while conditioning on
firm performance, we separate observations in each of the seven BTMj (j=1 to 7) partitions into
two sets of sub-partitions. For observations in each BTMj partition with B=“0”, we form a
separate BTMj_G partition reflecting observations with stronger financial performance and for
observations in each BTMj partition with B=“1”, we form a separate BTMj_B partition reflecting
observations with weaker financial performance. As with our analysis of Equation (1), we
compare the mean write-down of each partition with its predicted value from Equation (2) to
assess the extent of any nonlinearities between BTM and WRITEDOWN. We predict that each
respective BTMj_G partition should have less write-downs than its corresponding BTMj_B
partition, and hence that nonlinearities should be more prevalent across the BTMj_B partitions.
To demonstrate that mandatorily conservative accounting is a determinant of cross-
sectional variation in conditionally conservative accounting, we modify the Basu (1997)
conditional conservatism specification to include BTM and the seven BTM partitions using the
following continuous and piecewise BTM interactions, respectively:
recoverability provisions, we rerun our main analyses by defining weak past performance using only the average
market-adjusted stock returns or only the average pre-tax return on total assets. We find that all the study’s main
inferences only hold when defining weak past performance using the average market-adjusted stock returns and not
the average per-tax return on assets, suggesting that the write-downs appear to be driven by not meeting the
recoverability provisions rather than the lower materiality thresholds. We find similar inferences when we model
materiality effects using current period pre-tax return on assets before write-downs and ERCs following Heitzman et
al. (2010), who propose that materiality thresholds vary systematically as a function of the ERC and the magnitude
of the item. We actually find that firms with lower ERCs have higher levels of mandated write-downs than those
firms with higher ERCs.
17
(3)
∑
∑ ∑
∑
(4)
where E/P is the ratio of earnings per share for period t to price at the beginning of period t and
RET is the cumulative annual raw return beginning nine months before the end of fiscal year t.
The main coefficients of interest in Equations (3) and (4) are the 7 coefficient on BTM*D*RET
in Equation (3), which is predicted to be positive, and the 7,j coefficients on the BTMj*D*RET
interaction terms in Equation (4), which are predicted to be increasing in j. Ex-ante, we expect
better measures of fit for Equation (4), with the nonlinearity between conditional conservatism
and BTM being most pronounced in the region surrounding a BTM of one.
As in Equation (2), we also modify Equations (3) and (4) to include past performance as
a conditioning determinant of mandatorily conservative accounting using the following
regression specifications:
(5)
∑
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
∑
(6)
18
The coefficients on B*BTM*D*RET in Equation (5), and on BTMj_G*D*RET and
BTMj_B*D*RET in Equation (6) reflect the degree of conditional conservatism as a function of
BTM and firm operating performance. We predict that conditional conservatism will be the
strongest when BTM is greater than one and operating performance is poor. Thus, for Equation
(6) we expect the largest coefficients on BTM6_B*D*RET and BTM7_B*D*RET. More
generally, mandatorily conservative accounting predicts that the coefficients on each
BTMj_B*D*RET dummy will exceed those on the corresponding BTMj_G*D*RET dummy,
implying that firms with weaker prior financial performance have higher levels of conditional
conservatism than those with stronger financial performance.
To examine whether mandatorily conservative accounting is an important correlated
omitted variable in prior research examining managerial incentives to engage in discretionary
conditional conservatism, we use the following general regression model:
(7)
Equation (7) modifies the Basu (1997) specification for interactions with the specific incentive in
question (INCENTIVE), while controlling for determinants of mandatorily conservative
accounting (CONTROLS). The control variables employed correspond to those incorporated in
Equations (3) through (6). Section 5 outlines the specific incentives investigated. A significant
coefficient on is consistent with the respective incentive inducing managers’ use of
discretionary conservatism. We first estimate Equation (7) without the controls to confirm that
we can replicate the findings of previous research. We then include the controls to determine
whether mandatorily conservative accounting is an important correlated omitted variable in
previous research.
19
3. Data
3.1 Sample selection
Our empirical tests employ data from four sources. We obtain financial-statement data
from the Compustat annual database, stock-return data from the CRSP monthly stock returns
database, debt-covenant data from the Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database, and the
probability of information-based trading (PIN) data from Duarte and Young (2009).19
Our
sample period covers all firm-years with available data on Compustat and CRSP from 1974 to
2009. We start the sample in 1974 because special-items are not widely available prior to this
point. We also use shorter sub-periods for some analyses due to data restrictions. In particular,
write-down data is only separately available in Compustat beginning in 2000 and the PIN data is
only available from 1983 to 2004.
We require firm-year observations to have stock price, total assets, market capitalization,
and book value of common equity data as of the prior year’s fiscal year-end. We also require
earnings-per-share before extraordinary items, special-items, and annual return data for the
current fiscal year. In addition, we require companies to have return on assets and annual stock
return data for the previous two fiscal years. We replace positive special-items and missing or
positive write-downs with zero values in attempt to isolate conservative accounting practices.
For the analyses examining incentive variables (which include leverage, debt issuance, debt
covenants, and equity issuance), we replace negative debt or equity issuance and missing
issuance values with zero. Moreover, for the debt covenant analysis—following Nikolaev
(2010)—we include firm-years within a 10-year window starting five years prior to and ending
five years after debt issuance (the year of the issue is excluded). For all our analyses, we exclude 19
We thank Jefferson Duarte for the PIN data which is available on his website:
http://www.owlnet.rice.edu/~jd10/publications.htm.
20
observations in the top and bottom one percent of the financial variables in order to reduce the
effects of outliers.20
After imposing the aforementioned data restrictions we obtain 139,603 firm-
year observations for the special-item and the main conditional conservatism sample, 47,259
firm-year observations for the write-down sample, 22,483 firm-year observations for the debt
covenant sample, and 31,992 firm-year observations for the PIN score sample.
4. Evidence of mandatorily conservative accounting
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 1, Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the key variables in our analyses.
The first key variable is BTM, the beginning of period asset book-to-market ratio. Recall that as
BTM approaches and exceeds one, the likelihood that a firm will be subject to mandatorily
conservative accounting in the form of asset write-downs increases. We therefore measure BTM
at the beginning of the year (t-1) and look for evidence of conservative accounting over the
subsequent year (year t). The mean (median) BTM ratio is 0.802 (0.823), indicating that write-
downs are not expected for the majority of firms in our sample. The upper quartile, however, is
1.006, indicating write-downs are expected, absent managerial discretion, for about 25 percent of
our sample firms. The next key variable is the earnings-to-price ratio (E/P), which is the
dependent variable in the Basu (1997) conservatism tests. It is noteworthy that the distribution of
E/P is left skewed, with a mean of -0.005 and a median of 0.051. This is consistent with the
application of conservative accounting to immediately recognize bad news, but not good news,
in earnings. Following E/P is the annual stock return (RET), which is a dependent variable in the
Basu (1997) conservatism tests. In contrast to E/P, RET is right skewed, with a mean (median) of
0.186 (0.070). Thus, the asymmetrically strong bad news we observe for E/P is not reflected in
20
All inferences are robust to winsorizing the financial variables at the top and bottom one-percent levels.
21
RET, consistent with conservative accounting. We next report our lagged performance dummy
variables, L2_RET and L2_ROA. The mean value of L2_RET is 0.575, indicating that 57.5
percent of the sample observations have lagged annualized abnormal stock returns greater than
or equal to five percent. The mean value of L2_ROA is 0.498, indicating that 49.8 percent of the
sample observations have lagged annualized return on assets greater than or equal to five
percent. Recall that we classify a firm as weakly performing, B, if either L2_RET or L2_ROA
equals zero which is the case in 75.1 percent of the sample observations, with the remaining 24.9
percent classified as strongly performing.21
Next, we report descriptive statistics for special-
items (SPI) and write-downs (WRITEDOWN). The mean value of SPI is negative (-0.025), while
the median value is zero. This is consistent with SPI reflecting a relatively small number of
relatively large write-downs. Similarly, we see that the write-down variable, WRITEDOWN,
mean value is negative (-0.018) and is highly left-skewed, as it is characterized by a small
number of relatively large write-downs. In unreported tests, we find that the correlation between
SPI and WRITEDOWN in the post-2000 period is 81.7 percent, confirming that much of the
variation in SPI is attributable to write-downs. Finally, the leverage (LEV), debt issue
(DEBT_ISSUE), number of debt covenants (RESTRICT), equity issue (EQUITY_ISSUE), private
information (PIN), and negative returns (D) variables have similar distributions to those reported
in prior research that uses these variables to explain variation in conservative accounting.
Panel B of Table 1 reports the means of the key variables sorted by the BTM partitions.
We classify all firm-year observations into seven BTM groups. In choosing the number of
groups, we trade off a number of considerations. First, we want to have a sufficient number of
groups either side of a BTM of one to observe any nonlinearities around one. Second, we want
21 All inferences are robust to using three-percent thresholds rather than five-percent thresholds and to defining B as
one if both L2_RET and L2_ROA equal zero.
22
the difference in BTM between groups to be similar, so that we can readily observe any
nonlinearities. Third, we want the number of observations within each group to be similar, so
that we estimate within-group statistics with similar efficiency. In trading off these
considerations, we select BTM intervals of 0.0-0.3 (11,789 observations), 0.3-0.5 (17,401
observations), 0.5-0.7 (23,303 observations), 0.7-0.9 (30,100 observations), 0.9-1.0 (20,862
observations), 1.0-1.2 (21,893 observations), and >1.2 (14,255 observations). We see that as the
BTM ratio increases, special-items (SPI) and write-downs (WRITEDOWN) decrease
monotonically, consistent with the mandatory application of GAAP’s impairment standards. We
also present the percentage of firms with special-items (SPI%) and write-downs
(WRITEDOWN%) by each BTM partition and highlight that while the percentage of firms with
write-downs generally increases monotonically across the BTM partitions (except for BTM5), the
percentage of firms with special-items is mixed across the seven BTM partitions. Given the
monotonically decreasing results for SPI and the mixed results for SPI%, it appears that several
firms take immaterial special-item charges irrespective of their BTM. Moreover, given that only
22.8 and 26.2 percent of firms take write-downs in BTM6 and BTM7, respectively, highlights
that GAAP-mandated impairments involve managerial discretion and subjectivity in terms of the
timing and the amounts of the write-downs. We also observe a positive association between BTM
and LEV, DEBT_ISSUE, RESTRICT, and PIN, and a negative association between BTM and
EQUITY_ISSUE. These correlations raise the possibility that mandatorily conservative
accounting is a potential correlated omitted variable in previous research examining
discretionary determinants of conservative accounting.
23
4.2 Documenting mandatorily conservative accounting
We begin by examining the relation between asset impairments and BTM. In accordance
with mandatorily conservative accounting, we predict that firms with higher beginning of period
BTM ratios will have more special-item charges and write-downs. We start in Table 2 by
regressing SPI and WRITEDOWN on BTM to check for evidence of the predicted negative
relation (negative because charges are recorded as negative numbers). As indicated by the
regressions in Columns (1) and (3) of Table 2, the relations are negative and significant (p <
0.01) for both SPI and WRITEDOWN. We further predict that the negative relation will be
stronger for poorly performing firms. In order to test this prediction, we use our dummy variable,
B, which takes on the value of one whenever either L2_RET or L2_ROA are equal to zero. We
estimate the same set of regressions, but add B as an additional main effect and also as an
interaction with BTM. For both the SPI and WRITEDOWN regressions, in Columns (2) and (4)
respectively, the inclusion of B leads to a large drop in the magnitude of the coefficient on BTM
and a significantly negative coefficient on the BTM*B interaction. This result is consistent with
our prediction that mandatorily conservative accounting is more prevalent in firms with high
BTM ratios and a recent history of poor performance. Under such conditions, it will be difficult
for managers to persuade auditors that impairment is not warranted.
The results in Table 2 are in line with our prediction that asset impairments will be
greater for firms with higher BTM values. But these regressions model asset impairments as a
linear relation of BTM, whereas, we predict that the rules governing mandatorily conservative
accounting will lead to a nonlinear relation. Specifically, the relation is predicted to be weak
when BTM is significantly less than one, to gradually increase as BTM approaches one, and be
linear once BTM significantly exceeds one. Given the latitude for managerial discretion in the
24
application of mandatorily conservative accounting and the limitations of our research design, it
is difficult to specify the exact functional form on a priori grounds. We therefore use our coarse
BTM partitions to test for evidence of the predicted nonlinearity. Recall that BTM6 and BTM7 are
the partitions for which BTM is greater than one, while BTM4 and BTM5 are the partitions for
which BTM is marginally less than or equal to one. We therefore predict that, relative to the
linear relations modeled in Table 2, asset impairments will be relatively larger for observations
in BTM6 and BTM7 and relatively smaller for observations in BTM4 and BTM5. We do this by
first computing the fitted values of WRITEDOWN or SPI by using the estimated coefficients
from Equation (1) and the mean BTM for each of the BTM partitions. We then compare the fitted
value (Pred. Val) with the mean value of each BTM partitions as shown in Table 3.
Table 3, Panel A provides evidence consistent with our expectations that the
nonlinearities are pronounced in the region surrounding BTM values of one, as the fitted values
of asset impairments are relatively smaller than the mean values for observations in the BTM4
and BTM5 partitions (below one), and are relatively larger than the mean values for observations
in BTM6 and BTM7 partitions (above one). For example, the fitted value (Pred. Val) of
WRITEDOWN for the BTM5 partition is -0.028 whereas the group mean is -0.017—a difference
of 0.012. However, the fitted value (Pred. Val) of WRITEDOWN for the BTM6 partition is -0.034
whereas the group mean drops dramatically to -0.044 for a difference of -0.010. Inferences are
similar for the SPI partitions.
Figure 2, Panel A plots the foregoing relations for WRITEDOWN (the figure for SPI is
similar and omitted for brevity). The X-axis represents BTM values and the Y-axis represents the
values of WRITEDOWN. The plot shows both the fitted linear relation from Table 2 and the BTM
partition means with the indicated nonlinear relation from Table 3. The plot shows that as the
25
BTM partitions increase from BTM1 to BTM5, write-downs are relatively small and increase
slowly across the five partitions (remember that asset impairments are recorded in negative
numbers). However, as firms’ book values of assets rise above their market values, write-downs
increase significantly. Specifically, the figure shows that the extent of write-downs spikes from
BTM5 to BTM6 and then again from BTM6 to BTM7. Moreover, the figure highlights Table 3’s
findings, that the nonlinearity imposed by mandatorily conservative accounting is particularly
prevalent when the BTM reaches one. In terms of the magnitudes of write-downs, the actual
write-downs for observations with a BTM above one are lower than those implied by the increase
in BTM outlined in Figure 1. For example, moving from BTM5 (below one) to BTM6 (above
one) an average increase in write-downs, as a percentage of market capitalization, of 8.0 percent
is implied by BTM; however, the mean write-down in BTM6 is 4.4 percent and represents 54.3
percent of the that implied by the change in BTM. This spread widens for BTM7 and highlights
that significant discretion is inherent in the write-down process.
We further investigate these relations using a generalized additive model (GAM)
following Hastie and Tibshirani (1990) that models the nonlinear nonparametric regression of
special-items or write-downs on the BTM ratio. Again for brevity, we only show the figure for
write-downs as inferences are very similar for special-items. Figure 2, Panel B plots the
nonlinear regression relation. The X-axis represents the BTM ratio and the Y-axis represents the
predicted value of write-downs, and the dotted lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals.
The inferences from this plot are similar to that from Panel A. The nonlinear regression plot
shows no significant write-downs until the BTM ratio approaches one and then significant write-
downs are predicted for firms with BTM ratios greater than one. Although similar, the nonlinear
relation is again more pronounced for write-downs than for special-item charges.
26
Panel B of Table 3 presents two tests for nonlinearity in the relation between special-
items/write-downs and BTM. We first report a Vuong (1989) test comparing the goodness of fit
between the linear specification in Equation (1) with the piecewise linear specification from
Table 3 that uses the seven BTM partitions in place of the continuous BTM. The Vuong test
generates negative and significant Z-values for both SPI and WRITEDOWN, implying that the
piecewise model provides a better fit between write-downs and the BTM ratio than the simple
linear model. The second test is an F-test comparing the linear specification of Equation (1) with
the GAM used in Figure 2, Panel B. The F-test also rejects the linear model in favor of the
nonlinear counterpart. Taken together, the foregoing analyses provide support for the idea that
the rules governing mandatorily conservative accounting generate a nonlinear relation between
write-downs and BTM, with the nonlinearity being most pronounced around a BTM of one.
We perform an analysis (untabulated) similar to that of Table 3 but instead compare the
fitted values (Pred. Val) from Equation (2) with the mean value of each BTM-performance
partitions (e.g., BTMj_G and BTMj_B). Recall that BTMj_G reflects the seven BTM partitions
with stronger financial performance and BTMj_B reflects the seven BTM partitions with weaker
financial performance.22
Consistent with our expectations, we find that each respective BTMj_G
partition has lower special-items than its corresponding BTMj_B partition. Specifically, the mean
values of SPI for BTMj_G decrease almost monotonically from -0.004 for BTM1_G to -0.012 for
BTM7_G and from -0.010 for BTM1_B to -0.067 for BTM7_B. Interestingly, the change in
coefficients from BTM1_G through to BTM7_G is fairly marginal, and the extent of special-item
charges is much more prevalent for the BTM partitions with weaker financial performance, as
every BTMj_G partition has fewer special-item charges than the BTMj_B partition with the
22
For example, BTM2_G equals one if firms are in the BTM2 partition and have average market-adjusted returns
and return on assets in the previous two years that are both greater than or equal to five percent, and zero otherwise.
27
lowest level of special-item charges. A similar pattern is observed when comparing the mean
values of WRITEDOWN across the fourteen partitions.
Following the analysis in Table 3, we compute the fitted values of WRITEDOWN and SPI
for each partition by using the estimated coefficients from Equation (2) and the mean BTM for
each of the BTMj partitions. Figure 2, Panel C plots these results for write-downs and
demonstrates the clear difference in write-downs between BTM partitions with strong and weak
financial performance. The plot shows a relatively flat trend of impairments across the BTM
partitions for firms with strong financial performance and a clear increasing trend of charges
across the BTM partitions for firms with weak past performance especially as the BTM ratio
approaches and exceeds one. As in Figure 2, Panel A, the magnitude of write-downs in Figure 2,
Panel C is also lower than that implied by the change in BTM. Specifically, moving from BTM5
(below one) to BTM6 (above one) for weak performers, actual write-downs approximate 58.0
percent of those implied by the change in BTM, and this spread again increases for BTM7.
The nonlinear regression plot of Equation (2) presented in Panel D provides similar
inferences. We perform the two untabulated tests of nonlinearity for Equation (2). The Vuong
test again has negative and significant Z-values for both SPI and WRITEDOWN implying that the
piecewise model of Equation (2) has a superior fit to the linear version of Equation (2).
Furthermore, the F-test between the linear version of Equation (2) and the nonparametric GAM
version of Equation (2) also reveals that the nonlinear nonparametric fit outperforms the linear
fit. Taken together, the preceding analyses confirm our predictions of significant nonlinearities
between write-downs and BTM. Moreover, these nonlinearities are more pronounced for firms
with a BTM close to one and for firms with poor recent financial performance. These findings are
consistent with the impairment requirements of mandatorily conservative accounting.
28
4.3 Mandatorily conservative accounting and conditional conservatism
Our next set of analyses, presented in Tables 4 and 5, examines whether mandatorily
conservative accounting is an important determinant of cross-sectional variation in the popular
Basu (1997) measure of conditionally conservative accounting. This analysis builds on our
previous analysis, because we predict that the conditionally conservative accounting evidenced
for SPI and WRITEDOWN in Tables 2 and 3, and Figure 2 will also be present in the Basu
measure. We begin by comparing conditional conservatism coefficients on D*RET from
Equations (3) and (5)—simple linear specifications using a continuous BTM interaction—with
those obtained using the piecewise nonlinear specifications in Equations (4) and (6). A priori, we
expect that the nonlinearity between conditional conservatism and BTM will be most pronounced
in the region surrounding a BTM of one and for the subsample of poorly performing firms.
Table 4 presents regressions for Equations (3) and (5). Column (1) presents the results for
the original Basu (1997) specification; Column (2) presents the results for the Basu (1997)
specification interacted with BTM; and Column (3) presents the results for the Basu (1997)
specification interacted with BTM and poor past performance (B). Consistent with Basu (1997),
the coefficient on D*RET is positive and significant, consistent with the timelier recognition of
bad news than good news in earnings. However, we observe a significant and negative
coefficient on RET which is inconsistent with Basu (1997) but consistent with more recent
studies (e.g., Ruddock, Taylor, and Taylor 2006; Nikolaev 2010; Patatoukas and Thomas
2011).23
Column (2) demonstrates that the coefficient on D*RET is 0.018 and insignificant once
BTM*D*RET is included in the model. The coefficient on BTM*D*RET, however is 0.701 and
significant, implying that firms with high BTM values exhibit strong conditional conservatism—
23
The significant and negative coefficient on RET is generally found throughout all remaining analyses.
29
consistent with the notion that mandatorily conservative accounting is a key driver of conditional
conservatism. In Column (3) the coefficient on BTM*D*RET is reduced to 0.328 with the
majority of the effects transferring to B*BTM*D*RET, indicating that conditionally conservative
accounting is concentrated in the subset of high BTM firms with poor recent performance. Also
important to note is that the adjusted R-squared increases from 0.099 in the base Basu model to
0.143 with the inclusion of BTM, and to 0.173 with the inclusion of both BTM and past
performance.
Table 5, Column (1) presents the results of Equation (4) where we allow for nonlinearity
by interacting the BTM partitions with D*RET. Consistent with the predicted nonlinearities, the
summed coefficients (Sum Coef.) on BTMj*D*RET are monotonically increasing in each BTM
partition and significantly jump for the BTM6 and BTM7 partitions. These results support the
hypothesis that mandatorily conservative accounting is a determinant of cross-sectional variation
in conditional conservatism. To highlight the specific regions of potential nonlinearities between
conditional conservatism and BTM, we compare the summed coefficients (Sum Coef.) to the
predicted coefficients (Pred Coef.) for each BTM partition. ‘Pred Coef’. is the predicted
coefficient for each BTM partition using the linear parameters from Equation (3) shown in Table
4, Column (2). The differences between ‘Sum Coef.’ and ‘Pred Coef.’ highlight how the
nonlinear effects of mandatorily conservative accounting are particularly evident as the BTM
ratio goes from less than one to greater than one. Specifically, compared to the piecewise model,
the linear model generally overestimates conditional conservatism levels for BTM partitions with
values less than one and underestimates conditional conservatism levels for BTM partitions with
values greater than one. The Vuong test and F-test at the bottom of Table 5 provide evidence that
the piecewise nonlinear specification of Equation (4) and the nonparametric nonlinear
30
specification of Equation (3) are superior to the continuous parametric specification of Equation
(3). While previous research has documented a positive relation between conditional
conservatism and BTM (e.g., Pae et al. 2005; Roychowdury and Watts 2007; Patotoukas and
Thomas 2011) and has alluded to the predicted nonlinearities between conditional conservatism
and BTM (e.g., Ball, Kothari, and Nikolaev 2010), our findings are the first to highlight the
specific nonlinearities in this relation surrounding a BTM equal to one.
We also examine the relation between conditional conservatism and the BTM partitions
conditioning on past financial performance using Equation (6). In unreported analyses, we find
that the coefficients on all three-way interaction terms (BTMj_G*D*RET and BTMj_B*D*RET)
are significantly positive. Moreover, for both stronger financial performers (BTMj_G) and
weaker financial performers (BTMj_B), there is a positive relation between the Basu coefficients
and the BTM partitions. Furthermore, the magnitude of conditional conservatism is greater for
the weaker performers than for the strong performers, as evidenced by the values of the
combined coefficients (Sum Coef.). The differences between ‘Sum Coef.’ and ‘Pred Coef.’
indicate that nonlinearities are present for both the strong and weak performers. The Vuong test
and F-test provide evidence that both the nonlinear fits of Equation (6) and the nonparametric
nonlinear specification of Equation (5) are superior to the continuous parametric fit of Equation
(5) in Table 4. Panels A and B of Figure 3 visually highlight the above findings. The
nonlinearities around a BTM of one are clearly evident in all plots, though they are somewhat
less pronounced than for the comparable write-down plots in Figure 2.
In summary, the foregoing analyses confirm our predictions that (i) there is a nonlinear
relation between conditional conservatism and BTM; (ii) the nonlinearity is most pronounced
around a BTM of one; and (iii) the nonlinear relation is strongest for firms with poor recent
31
financial performance. Moreover, the results in Tables 5 and Figure 4 support our hypothesis that
mandatorily conservative accounting is an important determinant of cross-sectional variation in
conditionally conservative accounting. We next turn to the related question of how controlling
for mandatorily conservative accounting affects inferences regarding the determinants of
discretionary conservatism.
5. Economic incentives and conservatism
5.1 Debt contracting
Numerous studies argue that debt-contracting incentives induce managers to use
discretionary conservatism (e.g., Ahmed et al. 2002; Pae 2007; Beatty et al. 2008; Zhang 2008;
Lara, Osma, and Penalva 2009; Lee 2010; Nikolaev 2010; Wang, Xie, and Xin 2011). The
underlying rationale is that managers commit to using discretionary conservatism to reduce
interest rates, loan covenants, and other bondholder imposed monitoring mechanisms. We test
whether the significance of the debt-contracting demand for conservatism is reduced once
controlling for mandatorily conservative accounting. Following prior research (e.g., Ahmed et al.
2002; Pae 2007; LaFond and Watts 2008; Lara et al. 2009; Lee 2010; Nikolaev 2010; Wang et
al. 2011) we use debt issuance, leverage, and debt covenants as proxies for debt-contracting
incentives. Tables 6 through 8 present the results using debt issuances, leverage, and debt
covenants, respectively.
For comparative purposes, Table 6, Column (1) begins with the results for the original
Basu (1997) specification, which is also presented in Table 4. Consistent with the debt-
contracting demand for conservatism, we find in Table 6, Column (2) that firms issuing debt
report more conservative earnings as the coefficient on DEBT_ISSUE*D*RET is 0.075 and
32
statistically significant (t = 2.78; p < 0.01). However, after controlling for the determinants of
mandatorily conservative accounting in Columns (3), (4), (5), and (6) respectively, the
coefficient on this three-way interaction term decreases and becomes statistically insignificant.24
We omit the controls for mandatorily conservative accounting for brevity. We do, however, note
that the control variables continue to be statistically significant and in all cases are more
statistically significant than the debt issuance interactions. For instance, the coefficient on
BTM*D*RET in Column (3) is 0.689 with a t-statistic of 9.86 and the coefficients on
BTM6*D*RET and BTM7*D*RET in Column (4) are 0.671 and 1.008 with t-statistics of 8.40
and 11.82, respectively.25
In other words, incorporating both debt issuance and the mandatorily
conservative accounting variables leads to insignificance for the former, but has little impact on
the latter.
Table 7 replicates the analysis in Table 6 using leverage in place of debt issuance as a
proxy for the debt-contracting demand for conservatism. We again find support for the debt-
contracting demand for conservatism using leverage before we control for determinants of
mandatory conservatism, as the coefficient on LEV*D*RET is 0.182 and significant (t = 3.24; p
< 0.01). However, once we control for mandatorily conservative accounting, the coefficient
drops sharply and becomes statistically insignificant in all but one specification. Table 8 further
confirms the findings in Tables 6 and 7 using the number of debt covenants (RESTRICT) as a
proxy for the debt-contracting demand for conservatism. In Column (1), we find the coefficient
on RESTRICT*D*RET is 0.013 and statistically significant (t = 3.95; p < 0.01) before controlling
24
Given the number of interaction terms in the specifications presented in Tables 6 through 10, it is important to
consider whether the inferences are influenced by potential collinearity effects. Hence, we check the variance
inflation factors of all specifications. While a few specifications have variance inflation factors above ten, we find
that our main inferences hold in specifications with acceptable levels of collinearity. 25
The statistical significance of the mandatorily conservative accounting variables is similar for the remaining
economic incentive analyses.
33
for determinants of mandatorily conservative accounting—supporting the findings in prior
research (Nikolaev 2010) that covenants in debt contracts are related to the degree of conditional
conservatism. However, after we control for determinants of mandatorily conservative
accounting in Columns (2) through (5), the RESTRICT*D*RET coefficient drops considerably
and becomes statistically insignificant in all specifications. The results in Tables 6 through 8
offer mandatorily conservative accounting as an alternative potential explanation for the debt
contacting results in prior research. Specifically, highly levered firms that are seeking additional
debt financing tend to be poorly performing firms. Thus, the association with conservative
accounting may be attributable to the fact that these firms are coincidently required to take
mandatory asset write-downs under GAAP. It is possible, however, that the variables we use to
model mandatorily conservative accounting instead happen to model discretionary conservatism
relating to debt-contracting incentives. While acknowledging this possibility, we hasten to add
that it is not clear to us these variables would be better at modeling debt-contracting incentives
than variables chosen by prior research for this specific purpose. The unreported correlations
between BTM and DEBT_ISSUE, LEV, and RESTRICT are 0.130, 0.071, and 0.121, respectively,
and are all statistically significant (p < 0.01).
5.2 Equity issuance
To test shareholders’ demand for discretionary conservatism after controlling for
mandatorily conservative accounting, we examine the relation between equity issuance and
conditional conservatism. Table 9, Column (1) shows that the coefficient on
EQUITY_ISSUE*D*RET is 0.432 and significant (t = 3.42; p < 0.01) consistent with
shareholders demanding discretionary conservatism. After controlling for BTM and financial
performance either with continuous variables or partitions, we continue to find that firms with
34
higher equity issuances report more conservative earnings than do those with lower equity
issuances. Specifically, the coefficient on EQUITY_ISSUE*D*RET increases from 0.432 to
0.464 and is even more statistically significant (t = 4.68; p < 0.01) once controlling for partitions
sorted by both BTM and B. Therefore, in this setting controlling for mandatorily conservative
accounting strengthens the findings regarding discretionary conservatism. It appears that firms
issuing equity face strong incentives to take discretionary asset write-downs. In terms of
economic magnitudes, we find, in an untabulated analysis, that discretionary levels of
conditional conservatism are approximately 40.0 percent lower for firms without equity issuance
than for firms with equity issuance.
5.3 Information asymmetry
Lafond and Watts (2008) argue that information asymmetry between inside and outside
shareholders generates managerial incentives for discretionary conservatism in order to constrain
aggressive accounting. LaFond and Watts (2008) argue that higher levels of information
asymmetry, proxied by a larger PIN score, are associated with greater asymmetric recognition of
losses, as they find a significant and positive coefficient for PIN*D*RET. Table 10, Column (1)
confirms the results for the original Basu (1997) specification within this sample as the
coefficient on D*RET is positive and significant (t = 8.78; p < 0.01). Table 10, Column (2)
provides results consistent with LaFond and Watts (2008) as the coefficient on the three-way
interaction PIN*D*RET is 1.395 and significant (t = 6.04; p < 0.01).
Given our findings in the previous analyses that the BTM ratio and financial performance
are joint determinants of mandatory conservatism, we re-examine the relation between PIN and
discretionary conservatism after controlling for mandatory conservatism. The coefficients on
PIN*D*RET in Columns (3) and (4) decrease to 0.838 (t = 3.44; p < 0.01) and to 0.871 (t = 3.65;
35
p < 0.01) after controlling for BTM and the seven BTM partitions, respectively. The coefficients
on PIN*D*RET in Columns (5) and (6) further decrease to 0.768 (t = 3.31; p < 0.01) and to
0.802 (t = 3.51; p < 0.01) when we control for both BTM and past performance, and the
partitions double sorted based on BTM and past performance, respectively. Although the
coefficient on PIN*D*RET remains positive and statistically significant after controlling for non-
discretionary determinants of conservatism, the significance is less pronounced. In terms of
economic significance, in an unreported analysis we find that discretionary levels of conditional
conservatism are 122 percent lower for firms below the median value of PIN relative to firms
above the median value of PIN and specifically, that the coefficient on D*RET for firms below
the median value of PIN is slightly negative and insignificant. Interesting to highlight from Table
10 is that the adjusted R-squared increases more from controlling for determinants of mandatory
conservatism than for information asymmetry incentives. Also, it is noteworthy that all
inferences are similar in Tables 6 through 10 whether we control for the continuous or
partitioning BTM and performance variables. The consistency of the approaches likely results
from the fact the discretionary determinants are modeled as linear relations.
Overall, the preceding findings show that our controls for mandatorily conservative
accounting significantly impact inferences in previous research regarding the determinants of
discretionary conservatism.
6. Additional analyses
To examine the sensitivity of our main results, we perform additional analyses using
alternative specifications, methods, and variable measurements. First, we separate the full
population into sub-samples in attempt to further isolate mandatory and discretionary
conservatism. To the extent that debt-contracting incentives motivate higher levels of
36
conservatism, asset write-downs are predicted to be timelier among firms with debt versus those
without debt. Hence, we run our main analyses separately for firms with debt (117,461 firm-
years) and for firms without debt (22,142 firm-years). In line with our main findings, we do not
find evidence of more timely write-downs or higher levels of conservatism for firms with debt
versus those without debt. Specifically, consistent with prior research (e.g., Beatty and Weber
2006; Ramanna and Watts 2012) asset impairments are actually more timely for unlevered firms
than for levered firms, and that levered firms appear to be less conservative. Not surprising given
the foregoing impairment practices, we find that unlevered firms have higher levels of
conditional conservatism than levered firms for each BTM partition from BTM2 to BTM7.
Moreover, we confirm that all of the findings presented in Tables 2 through 5 hold for firms
without debt. These results make it unlikely that our model of mandatory conservatism is
mistakenly modeling variation in discretionary conservatism that is motivated by debt-
contracting incentives.
Moreover, as previously mentioned, it is possible that the variables we use to model
mandatory conservatism may also model discretionary conservatism driven by other contracting
incentives. To the extent that firms voluntarily engage in conservatism that is not mandated by
GAAP, it is more likely to be manifested in write-downs where BTM is lower than but
reasonably close to 1. We therefore alter our modeling of mandatorily conservative accounting to
replace BTM with write-downs which are set to zero for all observations where BTM<1 and find
qualitatively similar results to those reported in Tables 6 through 10. Taken together, the
foregoing results mitigate concerns that our results arise because we mistakenly model
discretionary incentives instead of mandatory conservatism.
37
Second, we re-examine our findings by partitioning the BTM ratio into two groups
(BTM1=1 if BTM<1, and BTM2=1 if BTM>=1) instead of the seven BTM partitions that were
used in the main analysis (untabulated). We find that firm-year observations with BTM ratios
greater than or equal to one have significantly more special-item charges and write-offs than
observations with BTM ratios less than one [the BTM2 partition mean values are -0.031 (t = -
6.47; p < 0.01) and -0.112 (t = -12.87; p < 0.01) for SPI and WRITEDOWN, respectively].
Furthermore, we find that the mean values are higher for firms with BTM ratios greater than or
equal to one which also have weak past performance and that these firms have also higher Basu
(1997) coefficients than the other three partitions. Therefore, our main inferences pertaining to
the determinants of discretionary and mandatory conservatism hold when partitioning the BTM
ratio into two groupings rather than into seven different partitions.
Third, we rerun our main analyses using an alternative definition of the BTM ratio.
Specifically, instead of using the BTM of assets, we follow the standard definition using the BTM
of equity. This alternative has no appreciable impact on any results; however, we believe that the
asset BTM ratio is more consistent with identifying conditions warranting special-item and write-
down charges.
Fourth, we examine the relation of two additional measures of operating performance
with mandatorily conservative accounting: sales growth over the prior three years and the free-
cash flow to assets ratio from years t-2 to t+2. We employ these measures in attempt to reflect
the notion that certain assets are only impaired if their carrying values exceed the estimated gross
undiscounted cash flows from the use and disposition of the assets. We show that these variables
stand alone as determinants of mandatory conservatism; however, their significance is subsumed
by our earlier measures of operating performance (i.e., past stock returns and past returns on
38
assets).
Fifth, following Duarte and Young (2009) who decompose the standard PIN measure into
an information asymmetry component and a liquidity component, we repeat the PIN analysis
solely using the information asymmetry component of PIN. We find similar inferences to those
documented in the main analysis using this alternative PIN measure.
Sixth, as an alternative approach to our main analyses, we re-compute earnings by
backing out the fitted values for mandatory write-downs and then re-running the original Basu
specification with the revised earnings numbers. We find that the economic significance of the
Basu coefficient decreases by approximately 27 percent, further supporting the notion that
mandatory asset write-downs are an important determinant of conditional conservatism.
Lastly, we anticipate that the extent of mandatorily conservative accounting will vary
with the type of assets that are on firms’ balance sheets given the different impairment standards
for each asset class. Intangibles and inventories are subject to strict fair value tests for
impairment, as so mandatory impairment should occur close to a BTM of one. In contrast, PP&E
is subject to the less stringent recoverability test, and financial assets such as receivables are
subject to the less stringent incurred loss model. To examine this prediction, we repeat the write-
down and the conditional conservatism analyses when partitioning firms based on their asset
structures. We group firms based on whether the majority of their assets are financial assets (i.e.,
cash and receivables), inventories, PP&E, and intangible assets. We find that all four groups
display the predicted characteristics of mandatorily conservative accounting. However, we find
that the write-down and conditional conservatism nonlinearities surrounding a BTM of one are
most pronounced for the intangibles and inventory firm groupings. These findings are consistent
39
with the impairment provisions requiring a strict fair value test for intangibles and inventory,
while PP&E and financial assets reflect less stringent tests.
7. Conclusion
In this study, we point out that the extant accounting rules mandate the use of
conservative accounting under specific economic conditions. We attempt to model these
conditions and show that our model explains significant cross-sectional variation in conditionally
conservative accounting. We also find that after using our model to control for mandatorily
conservative accounting, several inferences from previous research regarding managers’
incentives for discretionary conservatism are significantly altered.
We caveat our analysis by noting that our model is crude and far from complete. We
likely capture but a small proportion of mandatory conservatism and our model of mandatorily
conservative accounting could reflect an alternative theory of discretionary conservatism
yielding the same predictions as those made by mandatorily conservative accounting; however,
we are currently unaware of such a theory. Furthermore, improving our model could further
impact inferences from previous research. Nevertheless, the fact that a crude model of
mandatorily conservative accounting significantly alters the inferences from several previous
studies regarding discretionary conservatism highlights the need for more research in this area.
More generally, this study highlights the potential importance of mandatory accounting
rules in explaining material accounting outcomes, and suggests that researchers should attempt to
control for mandatory accounting practices when testing hypotheses regarding managerial
discretion. Moreover, the study provides a framework for modeling mandatorily conservative
accounting and shows that it is a nonlinear function of underlying economic variables. Lastly, the
study sheds light on the inconsistency between FASB’s recent conceptual framework (FASB
40
2010) which omits conservatism “as an aspect of representation faithfulness because including
(it) would be inconsistent with neutrality”, and the current accounting standards in place which
are shown to result in mandatorily conservative accounting.
While our study suggests that the Basu (1997) measure of conservatism reflects
mandatorily conservative accounting practices, we do not intend to resolve the debate concerning
potential problems with this measure (e.g., Dietrich, Miller, and Riedl 2007; Ball et al. 2010;
Patatoukas and Thomas 2011). We also stress that our study does not claim to reach any
definitive inferences regarding the determinants of discretionary conservatism. Rather, we hope
to encourage future research to further consider the importance of mandatory accounting rules in
influencing the properties of accounting numbers and specifically, to enhance the model of
mandatorily conservative accounting proposed in this study.
41
REFERENCES
Accounting Principles Board (APB). 1970. APB Statement No. 4, Basic Concepts and Accounting
Principles Underlying Financial Statements of Business Enterprises. New York: AICPA.
Ahmed, A., B. Billings, R. Morton, and M. Stanford-Harris. 2002. The role of accounting conservatism in
mitigating bondholder-shareholder conflicts over dividend policy and in reducing debt costs. The
Accounting Review 77 (4): 867-890.
——–, and S. Duellman. 2007. Accounting conservatism and board of director characteristics: An
empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting & Economics 43 (2-3): 411-437.
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants Committee on Accounting Procedures (AICPA).
1939. Accounting Research Bulletin 2. New York: AICPA.
Ball, R., S.P. Kothari, and A. Robin. 2000. The effect of international institutional factors on properties of
accounting earnings. Journal of Accounting & Economics 29 (1): 1-51.
——–, A. Robin, and G. Sadka. 2008. Is financial reporting shaped by equity markets or by debt markets?
An international study of timeliness of conservatism. Review of Accounting Studies 13 (2-3): 168-
205.
——–, S.P. Kothari, and V. Nikolaev. 2010. Econometrics of the Basu asymmetric timeliness coefficient
and accounting conservatism. Working paper, University of Chicago.
Basu, S. 1997. The conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings. Journal of
Accounting & Economics 24 (1): 3-37.
Beatty, A., and J. Weber. 2006. Accounting discretion in fair value estimates: An examination of SFAS
142 goodwill impairments. Journal of Accounting Research 44 (2): 257:-288.
——–, ——–, and J. Yu. 2008. Conservatism and debt. Journal of Accounting & Economics 45 (2-3):
154-174.
Beaver, W., and S. Ryan. 2000. Biases and lags in book value and their effects on the ability of the book-
to-market ratio to predict book return on equity. Journal of Accounting Research 38 (1): 127-148.
——–, and ——–. 2005. Conditional and unconditional conservatism: concepts and modeling. Review of
Accounting Studies 10 (2-3): 269-309.
Dechow, P., R. Sloan, and A. Sweeney. 1995. Detecting earnings management. The Accounting Review
70 (2): 193-225.
——–, A. Hutton, and R. Sloan. 1999. An empirical assessment of residual income valuation model.
Journal of Accounting & Economics 26 (1-3): 1-34.
Devine, C.T. 1963. The rule of conservatism reexamined. Journal of Accounting Research 1 (2): 127-138.
Dietrich, D., K. Muller, and E. Riedl. 2007. Asymmetric timeliness tests of accounting conservatism.
Review of Accounting Studies 12 (1): 95-124.
42
Duarte, J., and L. Young. 2009. Why is PIN priced? Journal of Financial Economics 91 (2): 119-138.
Elliott, J., and W. Shaw. 1988. Write-offs as accounting procedures to manage perceptions. Journal of
Accounting Research 26 (Supplement): 91-119.
——–, and D. Hanna. 1996. Repeated accounting write-offs and the information content of earnings.
Journal of Accounting Research 34 (Supplement): 135-155.
Feltham, G., and J. Ohlson. 1995. Valuation and clean surplus accounting for operating and financial
activities. Contemporary Accounting Research 11 (2): 689-731.
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). 1980. Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting
Information. Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2. Norwalk, CT: FASB.
——–. 1995. Accounting for the Impairment of Long-Lived Assets and for Long-Lived Assets to Be
Disposed Of. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 121. Norwalk, CT: FASB.
——–. 2001a. Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.
142. Norwalk, CT: FASB.
——–. 2001b. Accounting for the Impairment or Disposal of Long-Lived Assets. Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards No. 144. Norwalk, CT: FASB.
——–. 2009a. Intangibles—Goodwill and Other. Accounting Standards Codification 350. Norwalk, CT:
FASB.
——–. 2009b. Property, Plant, and Equipment. Accounting Standards Codification 360. Norwalk, CT:
FASB.
——–. 2009c. Inventory. Accounting Standards Codification 330. Norwalk, CT: FASB.
——–. 2010. Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting—Chapter 1, The Objective of General
Purpose Financial Reporting, and Chapter 3, Qualitative Characteristics of Useful Financial
Information. Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 8. Norwalk, CT: FASB.
Francis, J., D. Hanna, and L. Vincent. 1996. Causes and effects of discretionary asset write-offs. Journal
of Accounting Research 34 (Supplement): 117-134.
Giner, B., and W.P. Rees. 2001. On the asymmetric recognition of good and bad news in France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 28 (9-10): 1285-
1331.
Givoly, D., and C. Hayn. 2000. The changing time-series properties of earnings, cash flows, and accruals:
has financial reporting become more conservative? Journal of Accounting & Economics 29 (3):
287-320.
——–, ——–, and A. Natarajan. 2007. Measuring reporting conservatism. The Accounting Review 82 (1):
65-106.
Hastie, T., and R. Tibshirani. 1990. Generalized Additive Models. London: Chapman and Hall.
43
Heitzman, S., C. Wasley, and J. Zimmerman. 2010. The joint effects of materiality thresholds and
voluntary disclosure incentives on firms’ disclosure decisions. Journal of Accounting &
Economics 49 (1-2): 109-132.
Holthausen, R., and R. Watts. 2001. The relevance of value-relevance literature for financial accounting
standard setting. Journal of Accounting & Economics 31 (1-3): 3-75.
Kaplan, B. 1985. Comments on Paul Healy: Evidence on the effect of bonus schemes on accounting
procedure and accrual decisions. Journal of Accounting & Economics 7 (1-3): 109-113.
Khan, M., and R. Watts. 2009. Estimation and empirical properties of a firm-year measure of accounting
conservatism. Journal of Accounting & Economics 48 (2-3): 132-150.
LaFond, R., and S. Roychowdhury. 2008. Managerial ownership and accounting conservatism. Journal of
Accounting Research 46 (1): 101-135.
——–, and R. Watts. 2008. The information role of conservatism. The Accounting Review 83 (2): 447-
478.
Lara, J.M.G., B.G. Osma, and F. Penalva. 2009. The economic determinants of conditional conservatism.
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 36 (3-4): 336-372.
Lee, H., 2010. Conditional conservatism, agency costs, and the contractual features of debt. Working
paper, University of Arizona.
Nikolaev, V. 2010. Debt covenants and accounting conservatism. Journal of Accounting Research 48 (1):
51-89.
Pae, J., D. Thornton, and M. Welker. 2005. The link between earnings conservatism and the price-to-book
ratio. Contemporary Accounting Research 22 (3): 693-717.
——–. 2007. Unexpected accruals and conditional accounting conservatism. Journal of Business Finance
& Accounting 34 (5-6): 681-704.
Patatoukas, P., and J. Thomas. 2011. More evidence of bias in the differential timeliness measure of
conditional conservatism. The Accounting Review 86 (5): 1765-1793.
Penman, S., and X. Zhang. 2002. Accounting conservatism, the quality of earnings and stock returns. The
Accounting Review 77 (2): 237-264.
Ramalingegowda, S., and Y. Yu. 2012. Institutional ownership and conservatism. Journal of Accounting
& Economics 53 (1-2): 98-114.
Ramanna, K., and R. Watts. 2012. Evidence on the use of unverifiable estimates in required goodwill
impairment. Forthcoming Review of Accounting Studies.
Rees, L., S. Gill, and R. Gore. 1996. An investigation of asset write-downs and concurrent abnormal
accruals. Journal of Accounting Research 34 (Supplement): 157-169.
Riedl, E. 2004. An examination of long-lived asset impairments. The Accounting Review 79 (3): 823-852.
44
Roychowdhury, S., and R. Watts. 2007. Asymmetric timeliness of earnings, market-to-book and
conservatism in financial reporting. Journal of Accounting & Economics 44 (1-2): 2-31.
——–. 2010. Discussion of: “Acquisition profitability and timely loss recognition” by J. Francis and X.
Martin. Journal of Accounting & Economics 49 (1-2): 179-183.
Ruddock, C., S. Taylor, and S. Taylor. 2006. Nonaudit services and earnings conservatism: Is auditor
independence impaired. Contemporary Accounting Research 23 (3): 701-746.
Ryan, S. 2006. Identifying conditional conservatism. European Accounting Review 15 (4): 511-525.
Schipper, K. 1989. Commentary on earnings management. Accounting Horizons 3 (4): 91-102.
Strong, J., and J. Meyer. 1987. Asset writedowns: managerial incentives and security returns. The Journal
of Finance 42 (3): 643-661.
The Wall Street Journal CFO Report (WSJ). 2012. SEC Makes Barnes & Noble Justify Unimpaired
Goodwill. July 17, 2012.
Vuong, Q. 1989. Likelihood ratio tests for model selection and non-nested hypotheses. Econometrica 57
(2): 307-333.
Wang, C., F. Xie, and X. Xin. 2011. Managerial ownership of debt and accounting conservatism.
Working Paper, Chinese University of Hong Kong.
Watts. R., and J. Zimmerman. 1986. Positive Accounting Theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
——–. 2003a. Conservatism in accounting – Part I: explanations and implications. Accounting Horizons
17 (3): 207-221.
——–. 2003b. Conservatism in accounting – Part II: evidence and research opportunities. Accounting
Horizons 17 (4): 287-301.
Zhang, J. 2008. The contracting benefits of accounting conservatism to lenders and borrowers. Journal of
Accounting & Economics 45 (1): 27-54.
45
APPENDIX Variables Definitions
= Firm i’s total assets scaled by the sum of market capitalization plus total assets minus
the book value of common equity as of fiscal t-1’s year-end;
= J ranges between 1 and 7. equals to “1” if firm i’s is in the interval
0-0.3, “0” otherwise. , , , , , and
equal to “1” if firm i’s is in the intervals 0.3-0.5, 0.5-0.7, 0.7-0.9,
0.9-1, 1-1.2, and 1.2 & above, respectively, “0” otherwise;
= An interaction between and firm i’s past performance G. G equals to “1” if
firm i’s and both equal to one, “0” otherwise;
= An interaction between and firm i’s past performance B. B equals to “1” if
firm i’s or equal to zero, “0” otherwise;
= Firm i’s earnings per share excluding extraordinary items for fiscal year t scaled by its
price as of fiscal t-1’s year-end;
= Firm i’s cumulative raw return beginning nine months before fiscal year-end t to three
months after fiscal year-end t;
= “1” if firm i’s is less than zero, “0” otherwise;
= “1” if firm i’s (XRETt-2 + XRETt-1) / 2 is greater than or equal to five percent, “0”
otherwise; is firm i’s value-weighted market-adjusted annual return beginning
nine months before fiscal year-end t to three months after fiscal year-end t;
= “1” if firm i’s (ROAt-2 + ROAt-1) / 2 is greater than or equal to five percent, “0”
otherwise; is firm i’s pretax income before special-items divided by total assets
as of fiscal t’s year-end;
= “1” if firm i’s equals to zero or equals to zero, “0” otherwise;
= Firm i’s special-items for fiscal year t scaled by its market capitalization as of fiscal t-
1’s year-end; Special-items include any significant nonrecurring items, asset write-
downs, impairments of goodwill, and restructuring charges;
= The sum of asset write-downs and goodwill impairments for firm i for fiscal year t
scaled by its market capitalization as of fiscal t-1’s year-end;
SPI%t = “1” if firm i’s is less than zero, “0” otherwise;
WRITEDOWN%t = “1” if firm i’s is less than zero, “0” otherwise;
= Long-term debt for firm i scaled by its total assets as of fiscal t’s year-end;
= Firm i’s long-term debt issuance for fiscal year t scaled by its market capitalization as
of fiscal t-1’s year-end;
= The count of covenants included in a debt contract for firm i for fiscal year t. Following
Nikolaev (2010), the RESTRICT analysis includes firm-years within a 10-year window
starting five years prior to and ending five years after debt issuance (the year of the
issue is excluded);
= Firm i’s sale of common and preferred stock for fiscal year t scaled by its market
capitalization as of fiscal t-1’s year-end; and,
= Firm i’s probability of an information based trade for fiscal year t.
46
FIGURE 1 The Predicted Relation between Asset Impairments and under Different Asset Classes
Panel A: The Relation between Goodwill and Indefinite-Lived Intangible
Impairments and the BTM of Assets
Panel B: The Relation between PP&E and Finite-Lived Intangible Impairments and
the BTM of Assets
Figure 1 presents the predicted relations between asset impairments and the asset ratio under two
different asset impairment standards. Panel A plots the predicted relation between goodwill & indefinite-
lived intangible write-downs and the ratio. Panel B plots the predicted relation between PP&E and
finite-lived intangibles and the ratio.
Go
od
will
& I
nd
efi
nit
e-L
ive
d I
nta
ngi
ble
W
rite
do
wn
s/M
kt C
ap
BTM of Asset
Impairment under ASC 350
10
45°
PP
&E
& F
init
e-L
ive
d I
nta
ngi
ble
W
rite
do
wn
s/M
kt C
ap
BTM of Asset
Impairment under ASC 360
10
45°
47
FIGURE 2 Evaluating the Relation between Write-downs ( ) and
Panel A: The Relation between Write-Downs and Groups
Panel B: The Relation between Write-Downs and Using a Nonlinear
Regression
(Continued)
48
Panel C: The Relation between Write-Downs and Groups Conditioning on Firm
Performance
Panel D: The Relation between Write-Downs and Conditioning on Firm
Performance Using a Nonlinear Regression
Figure 2 presents four panels that plot the relation between write-downs ( ) and .
Panel A plots the relation between write-downs and the mean value of seven partitions using the
mean of from Column (7) in Table 3, Panel A. The seven partitions represent the
following intervals: 0-0.3, 0.3-0.5, 0.5-0.7, 0.7-0.9, 0.9-1, 1-1.2, and 1.2 & above, respectively.
49
Panel B plots the relation between write-downs and using a generalized additive model (GAM) in
R. The GAM function allows for nonlinear effects by using a backfitting partial-linear model. The lines
surrounding the regression line represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Panel C plots the relation
between write-downs and the mean value of seven groups conditioning on the firms’ past
performance using the mean of . Panel D plots the relation between write-downs and
conditioning on the firms’ past performance using a GAM in R. The X-axis represents the ratio
and the Y-axis represents the predicted value of .
50
FIGURE 3 Evaluating the Relation between the Basu Coefficient and
Panel A: The Relation between the Basu Coefficient and Groups
Panel B: The Relation between the Basu Coefficient and Groups Conditioning on Firm
Performance
Figure 3 presents two panels that plot the nonlinear relation between the Basu coefficient and .
Panel A plots the relation between the Basu coefficient and the mean value of seven partitions
51
using the combined coefficients (Sum Coef.) from Column (1) in Table 5. The seven partitions
represent the following intervals: 0-0.3, 0.3-0.5, 0.5-0.7, 0.7-0.9, 0.9-1, 1-1.2, and 1.2 & above,
respectively. Panel B plots the relation between the Basu coefficient and the mean value of seven
groups conditioning on the firms’ past performance using the combined coefficients (Sum Coef.) from
Equation (6).
52
TABLE 1 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis
Panel A - Descriptive statistics
Variable N Mean Std.Dev. Q1 Median Q3
139,603 0.802 0.370 0.553 0.823 1.006
139,603 -0.005 0.285 -0.012 0.051 0.095
139,603 0.186 0.807 -0.206 0.070 0.385
139,603 0.432 0.495 0.000 0.000 1.000
139,603 0.575 0.494 0.000 1.000 1.000
139,603 0.498 0.450 0.000 0.000 1.000
139,603 0.751 0.432 1.000 1.000 1.000
139,603 -0.025 0.117 -0.003 0.000 0.000
47,259 -0.018 0.103 0.000 0.000 0.000
139,603 0.215 0.177 0.069 0.181 0.314
139,603 0.222 0.703 0.000 0.008 0.156
22,483 3.991 4.828 0.000 3.000 6.000
139,603 0.041 0.141 0.000 0.002 0.013
31,992 0.219 0.123 0.140 0.180 0.260
(Continued)
53
Panel B - Mean values of key variables sorted by BTM partitions
Group
Interval N E/P RET D B SPI
WRITE
DOWN SPI%
WRITE
DOWN% LEV
DEBT_
ISSUE
RES
TRICT EQUITY
_ISSUE PIN
1 0-0.3 11,789 0.197 -0.031 0.049 0.587 0.650 -0.008 -0.002 0.326 0.143 0.161 0.029 2.196 0.061 0.168
2 0.3-0.5 17,401 0.405 -0.001 0.105 0.506 0.603 -0.010 -0.004 0.329 0.190 0.180 0.065 3.243 0.044 0.175
3 0.5-0.7 23,303 0.603 0.009 0.143 0.466 0.660 -0.015 -0.009 0.330 0.221 0.220 0.137 4.111 0.042 0.193
4 0.7-0.9 30,100 0.806 0.013 0.164 0.427 0.765 -0.021 -0.014 0.306 0.222 0.243 0.216 4.270 0.041 0.207
5 0.9-1 20,862 0.952 0.020 0.192 0.378 0.865 -0.024 -0.017 0.264 0.159 0.212 0.340 4.547 0.037 0.229
6 1-1.2 21,893 1.081 -0.016 0.270 0.370 0.831 -0.042 -0.044 0.250 0.228 0.235 0.396 4.861 0.040 0.230
7 1.2 & above 14,255 1.454 -0.071 0.379 0.344 0.847 -0.059 -0.072 0.238 0.262 0.180 0.285 4.371 0.030 0.341
This table presents the descriptive statistics and univariate analysis for all the key variables. Panel A provides descriptive statistics for all the key variables and Panel B
presents the means for these variables sorted by the seven partitions. The sample sizes in Panel B refer to the main sample of 139,603 observations. See the Appendix
for variable definitions.
54
TABLE 2 An Analysis of the Relation between Special-Items / Write-Downs and
(1)
(2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exp.
Sign
Dep.Var
Coef.
(t-stat)
Dep.Var
Coef.
(t-stat)
Dep.Var
Coef.
(t-stat)
Dep.Var
Coef.
(t-stat)
Intercept 0.009*** -0.003*** 0.018*** 0.005***
(3.32) (-3.20) (4.59) (4.54)
- -0.043*** -0.006*** -0.048*** -0.017***
(-7.52) (-3.11) (-4.92) (-6.21)
0.012*** 0.011***
(4.71) (4.04)
- -0.042*** -0.035***
(-9.02) (-4.02)
Adj 0.0164 0.0234 0.0247 0.0270
N 139,603 139,603 47,259 47,259
This table presents an analysis of the relation between special-items ( ) or write-downs ( ) and
. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. T-
statistics and p-values are calculated using clustered standard errors by firm and year. See the Appendix for variable
definitions.
55
TABLE 3 An Analysis of the Nonlinear Relation between Special-Items / Write-Downs and
Panel A - Test of differences between group means and predicted values
N Mean Pred.Val Diff.
P-val
(2-tailed) N Mean Pred.Val Diff.
P-val
(Two-tailed)
11,789 -0.008 0.001 -0.009 0.000 5,110 -0.002 0.008 -0.010 0.000
17,401 -0.010 -0.008 -0.002 0.000 7,152 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 0.000
23,303 -0.015 -0.017 0.002 0.000 8,594 -0.009 -0.011 0.003 0.000
30,100 -0.021 -0.026 0.005 0.000 10,036 -0.014 -0.021 0.007 0.000
20,862 -0.024 -0.032 0.007 0.000 7,862 -0.017 -0.028 0.012 0.000
21,893 -0.042 -0.038 -0.005 0.000 5,613 -0.044 -0.034 -0.010 0.000
14,255 -0.059 -0.054 -0.005 0.000 2,892 -0.072 -0.052 -0.019 0.000
Panel B - Nonlinear tests
Vuong test between Equation (1) and a piecewise nonlinear model of Equation (1)
Dep.Var
Dep.Var
Vuong Z-value -2.207 -5.747
P-value 0.027 0.000
Goodness of fit between Equation (1) and a GAM model of Equation (1)
F-value 43.496 46.595
P-value 0.000 0.000
This table presents the means and the predicted means of special-items ( ) and write-downs ( ) partitioned by seven
partitions, and three analyses to examine the nonlinear relation between special-items or write-downs and . In Panel A, predicted
means of special-items or write-downs are calculated as the fitted values of Equation (1) by applying coefficients from Columns (1) and (3) in Table
2, respectively, to the mean value of each partition. T-tests (two-tailed) are performed by comparing whether the means of special-items or
write-downs are significantly different from the predicted values for each partition. Panel B presents two statistical tests comparing the
goodness of fits of the linear and nonlinear specifications. The Vuong test compares the fit of the linear model in Equation (1) to a piecewise version
of Equation (1), which regresses special-items or write-downs on seven dummies variables of partitions. A negative Z-value indicates that the
56
linear model of Equation (1) has a significantly smaller explanatory power than the piecewise version of Equation (1) and hence, a weaker fit. The F-
test compares the fit of the linear model of Equation (1) to the GAM (presented in Figure 2, Panel B for WRITEDOWN). A significant F-value
indicates that the GAM has a better fit than the linear model. See the Appendix for variable definitions.
57
TABLE 4 An Analysis of the Relation between Conservatism and
(3)
(5)
(1) (2) (3)
Exp.
Sign
Coef.
(t-stat)
Coef.
(t-stat)
Coef.
(t-stat)
Intercept 0.061*** 0.032*** -0.010**
(8.02) (2.72) (-2.03)
0.004 0.041*** 0.022***
(0.49) (2.81) (3.11)
+ -0.029*** -0.005 0.002
(-3.52) (-0.60) (0.47)
* + 0.475*** 0.018 -0.050**
(14.81) (0.58) (-2.52)
0.034 0.152***
(1.54) (11.61)
* -0.028 -0.027
(-1.20) (-1.85)*
* -0.027* 0.015
(-1.68) (1.05)
* * + 0.701*** 0.328***
(9.72) (8.32)
0.039***
(3.90)
* 0.024
(1.48)
* -0.014
(-1.26)
* * + 0.122***
(3.66)
* -0.138***
(-9.06)
* * -0.006
(-0.26)
58
* * -0.039*
(-1.84)
* * * + 0.325***
(4.40)
Adj 0.0993 0.1431 0.1732
N 139,603 139,603 139,603
This table presents an analysis of the relation between conservatism, as measured per Basu (1997), and
firms’ past performance. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, using two-
tailed tests. T-statistics and p-values are calculated using clustered standard errors by firm and year. See the
Appendix for variable definitions.
59
TABLE 5 An Analysis of the Nonlinear Relation between Conservatism and
∑
∑ ∑
∑
(4)
(1)
N
Coef.
(t-stat)
Sum
Coef.
Pred
Coef. Diff.
P-val
(two-
tailed)
Intercept 0.007
(1.63)
0.008
(1.17)
+ -0.023***
(-9.77)
* + 11,789 0.178*** 0.178 0.142 0.036 0.013
(12.20)
* * + 17,401 0.093*** 0.270 0.291 -0.021 0.389
(3.32)
* * + 23,303 0.164*** 0.341 0.434 -0.092 0.000
(5.68)
* * + 30,100 0.312*** 0.490 0.579 -0.089 0.003
(8.46)
* * + 20,862 0.464*** 0.642 0.684 -0.043 0.542
(5.94)
* * + 21,893 0.688*** 0.865 0.777 0.088 0.278
(8.07)
* * + 14,255 1.016*** 1.193 1.045 0.148 0.088
(11.82)
Adj 0.1527
N 139,603
Vuong test between Equation (3) in Column (2) of Table 4 and Equation (4)
Z-value P-value
-10.071 0.000
Goodness of fit between a parametric specification of Equation (3) in Column (2) of Table 4 and a GAM
nonparametric specification of Equation (3)
F-value P-value
153.270 0.000
60
This table presents an analysis of the relation between conservatism, as measured per Basu (1997), and seven
partitions. In panel A, the combined conservatism coefficients (Sum Coef.) of each partition are
calculated from the partitions’ respective * * regression coefficient plus the * coefficient.
Results for the stand-alone , the two-way interactions: , and , are not
reported for brevity. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, using two-tailed
tests. T-statistics and p-values are calculated using clustered standard errors by firm and year. The predicted
conservatism coefficients (Pred Coef.) of each partition are calculated as the fitted value of Equation (3) by
applying the coefficients of * and * * from Column (2) in Table 4, to the mean value of each
partition. F-tests are performed by testing whether the coefficient of * (for , or the sum
of the coefficients of * and (for to ) are significantly different
from their predicted value for each partition respectively. Two-tailed p-values are reported. The Vuong
test compares the goodness of fit of Equation (3) to Equation (4). A negative Z-value indicates that Equation (3) has
a significantly smaller explanatory power than Equation (4) and hence, a weaker fit. The F-test compares the
goodness of fit of Equation (3) to the GAM version of that specification. A significant F-value indicates that the
GAM has a better fit than Equation (3). See the Appendix for variable definitions.
61
TABLE 6 Conservatism and Debt Issuance
(7)
Exp.
Sign
(1)
Coef.
(t-stat)
(2)
Coef.
(t-stat)
(3)
Coef.
(t-stat)
(4)
Coef.
(t-stat)
(5)
Coef.
(t-stat)
(6)
Coef.
(t-stat)
Intercept 0.061*** 0.065*** 0.032** 0.007* -0.010** 0.044***
(8.02) (8.78) (2.77) (1.79) (-2.04) (23.27)
0.004 0.003 0.041*** 0.008 0.021*** -0.002
(0.49) (0.42) (2.82) (1.16) (3.10) (-0.80)
+ -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.005 -0.023*** 0.002 -0.003*
(-3.52) (-3.48) (-0.55) (-9.88) (0.46) (-1.90)
* + 0.475*** 0.454*** 0.020 0.177*** -0.047*** 0.051***
(14.81) (15.34) (0.64) (12.16) (-2.37) (9.15)
-0.020*** -0.022*** -0.024*** -0.019*** -0.022***
(-4.78) (-5.74) (-6.21) (-5.19) (-5.71)
* -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
(-0.07) (-0.07) (-0.28) (-0.10) (-0.34)
* 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.32) (1.08) (0.67) (1.33) (0.98)
* * + 0.075*** 0.008 0.006 0.007 0.005
(2.78) (0.36) (0.28) (0.33) (0.27)
CONTROLS
No No
,
Adj 0.0993 0.1068 0.1461 0.1565 0.1755 0.1863
N 139,603 139,603 139,603 139,603 139,603 139,603
This table presents an analysis of the relation between conservatism and debt issuance ( . Results for
are not reported for brevity. controls in Column (3) include , and its interactions with
, , and , respectively. controls in Column (4) include six indicator variables:
to , and their interactions with , , and , respectively. controls in Column
(5) include , , and their interactions with , , and , respectively.
and controls in Column (6) include the following thirteen indicator variables: six
and seven , and their interactions with , , and , respectively.
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. T-statistics and
p-values are calculated using clustered standard errors by firm and year. See the Appendix for variable definitions.
62
TABLE 7 Conservatism and Leverage
(7)
Exp. Sign
(1)
Coef.
(t-stat)
(2)
Coef.
(t-stat)
(3)
Coef.
(t-stat)
(4)
Coef.
(t-stat)
(5)
Coef.
(t-stat)
Intercept 0.071*** 0.041*** 0.013*** -0.004 0.049***
(8.59) (3.70) (2.75) (-0.82) (24.57)
0.001 0.040*** 0.008 0.021*** -0.001
(0.18) (2.95) (1.21) (2.89) (-0.62)
+ -0.026*** -0.002 -0.020*** 0.003 -0.002
(-3.47) (-0.18) (-8.46) (0.51) (-0.19)
* + 0.440*** 0.015 0.167*** -0.047** 0.047***
(13.43) (0.46) (12.71) (-2.19) (5.92)
-0.056*** -0.058*** -0.078*** -0.055*** -0.071***
(-3.7) (-3.52) (-4.99) (-3.62) (-4.66)
* 0.006 0.007 0.004 0.006 0.003
(0.37) (0.43) (0.24) (0.37) (0.20)
* -0.025* -0.026* -0.030** -0.019 -0.023*
(-1.90) (-1.90) (-2.19) (-1.56) (-1.74)
* * + 0.182*** 0.030 0.083* 0.014 0.064
(3.24) (0.69) (1.80) (0.33) (1.39)
CONTROLS
No
,
Adj 0.1028 0.1449 0.1563 0.1746 0.1859
N 139,603 139,603 139,603 139,603 139,603
This table presents an analysis of the relation between conservatism and leverage ( . Results for
are not reported for brevity. controls in Column (2) include , and its interactions with
, , and , respectively. controls in Column (3) include six indicator variables:
to , and their interactions with , , and , respectively.
controls in Column (4) include , , and their interactions with , , and
, respectively. and controls in Column (5) include the following thirteen indicator
variables: six and seven , and their interactions with , , and
, respectively. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, using two-tailed
tests. T-statistics and p-values are calculated using clustered standard errors by firm and year. See the Appendix for
variable definitions.
63
TABLE 8 Conservatism and the Use of Covenants
(7)
Exp.
Sign
(1)
Coef.
(t-stat)
(2)
Coef.
(t-stat)
(3)
Coef.
(t-stat)
(4)
Coef.
(t-stat)
(5)
Coef.
(t-stat)
Intercept 0.052*** 0.065*** 0.024*** 0.011** 0.038***
(9.49) (5.77) (5.40) (2.29) (13.78)
0.012 -0.003 0.016 0.006 -0.002
(1.54) (-0.18) (1.25) (0.77) (-0.36)
+ -0.027*** -0.017 -0.027*** -0.003 -0.005***
(-2.64) (-1.55) (-5.24) (-0.73) (-2.70)
* + 0.352*** -0.088 0.183*** -0.017 0.037**
(11.92) (-1.04) (3.43) (-0.49) (2.25)
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001* -0.001 -0.001*
(-1.25) (-1.12) (-1.86) (-1.41) (-1.82)
* 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.76) (0.45) (0.61) (0.60) (0.70)
* -0.002*** -0.002* -0.002* -0.001 -0.001
(-2.50) (-1.73) (-1.67) (-0.66) (-0.41)
* * + 0.013*** 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.003
(3.95) (0.92) (1.31) (0.45) (0.61)
CONTROLS
No ,
Adj 0.1016 0.146 0.175 0.1737 0.202
N 22,483 22,483 22,483 20,460 20,460
This table presents an analysis of the relation between conservatism and the use of covenants ( following
Nikolaev (2010). Results for are not reported for brevity. controls in Column (2) include ,
and its interactions with , , and , respectively. controls in Column (3) include six
indicator variables: to , and their interactions with , , and , respectively.
controls in Column (4) include , , and their interactions with , ,
and , respectively. and controls in Column (5) include the following thirteen
indicator variables: six and seven , and their interactions with , , and
, respectively. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, using two-
tailed tests. T-statistics and p-values are calculated using clustered standard errors by firm and year. Following Nikolaev
(2010), this analysis includes firm-years within a 10-year window starting five years prior to and ending five years after
debt issuance (the year of the issue is excluded). See the Appendix for variable definitions.
64
TABLE 9 Conservatism and Equity Issuance
(7)
Exp.
Sign
(1)
Coef.
(t-stat)
(2)
Coef.
(t-stat)
(3)
Coef.
(t-stat)
(4)
Coef.
(t-stat)
(5)
Coef.
(t-stat)
Intercept 0.066*** 0.039*** 0.014*** -0.007 0.047***
(9.38) (3.18) (3.84) (-1.44) (20.53)
0.001 0.038*** 0.005 0.021*** -0.002
(0.12) (2.67) (0.88) (2.96) (-0.74)
+ -0.022** 0.006 -0.012*** 0.008 0.002
(-2.20) (0.82) (-4.16) (1.63) (0.70)
* + 0.435*** -0.035 0.125*** -0.067*** 0.032***
(13.12) (-1.25) (7.06) (-3.44) (5.85)
-0.214*** -0.211*** -0.209*** -0.202*** -0.197***
(-5.57) (-5.49) (-5.60) (-5.57) (-5.65)
* 0.034 0.029 0.031 0.021 0.026
(0.74) (0.66) (0.72) (0.49) (0.62)
* -0.001 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004
(-0.04) (-0.45) (-0.50) (-0.46) (-0.43)
* * + 0.432*** 0.491*** 0.491*** 0.458*** 0.464***
(3.42) (4.86) (4.85) (4.60) (4.68)
CONTROLS
No
,
Adj 0.1172 0.1627 0.1719 0.1912 0.2004
N 139,603 139,603 139,603 139,603 139,603
This table presents an analysis of the relation between conservatism and equity issuance ( . Results
for are not reported for brevity. controls in Column (2) include , and its interactions
with , , and , respectively. controls in Column (3) include six indicator variables:
to , and their interactions with , , and , respectively. controls
in Column (4) include , , and their interactions with , , and ,
respectively. and controls in Column (5) include the following thirteen indicator variables: six
and seven , and their interactions with , , and , respectively.
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. T-statistics and
p-values are calculated using clustered standard errors by firm and year. See the Appendix for variable definitions.
65
TABLE 10 Conservatism and Information Asymmetry ( )
(7)
Exp.
Sign
(1)
Coef.
(t-stat)
(2)
Coef.
(t-stat)
(3)
Coef.
(t-stat)
(4)
Coef.
(t-stat)
(5)
Coef.
(t-stat)
(6)
Coef.
(t-stat)
Intercept 0.060*** 0.067*** 0.073*** 0.023*** 0.015*** 0.039***
(13.22) (7.56) (7.53) (2.87) (2.86) (6.03)
0.015** 0.013 0.022* -0.004 0.008 -0.003
(2.33) (0.95) (1.68) (-0.29) (0.82) (-0.25)
+ -0.026* -0.013 -0.003 -0.005 0.004 0.012
(-1.91) (-0.52) (-0.17) (-0.27) (0.32) (0.97)
* + 0.516*** 0.177*** -0.235*** -0.029 -0.135*** -0.106***
(8.78) (2.70) (-4.78) (-0.58) (-3.77) (-2.99)
-0.035 -0.026 0.001 -0.025 0.000
(-1.19) (-0.85) (0.05) (-0.81) (-0.01)
* -0.001 0.008 0.008 -0.002 -0.001
(-0.01) (0.13) (0.13) (-0.03) (-0.01)
* -0.050 -0.043 -0.061 -0.049 -0.064
(-0.79) (-0.64) (-0.85) (-0.71) (-0.90)
* * + 1.395*** 0.838*** 0.871*** 0.768*** 0.802***
(6.04) (3.44) (3.65) (3.31) (3.51)
CONTROLS
No No
Adj 0.1112 0.1366 0.1752 0.1915 0.1954 0.2087
N 31,992 31,992 31,992 31,992 31,992 31,992
This table presents an analysis of the relation between conservatism and information asymmetry ( ). Results for
are not reported for brevity. controls in Column (3) include , and its interactions with
, , and , respectively. controls in Column (4) include six indicator variables:
to , and their interactions with , , and , respectively.
controls in Column (5) include , , and their interactions with , , and
, respectively. and controls in Column (6) include the following thirteen indicator
variables: six and seven , and their interactions with , , and
, respectively. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, using two-tailed
tests. T-statistics and p-values are calculated using clustered standard errors by firm and year. See the Appendix for
variable definitions.