Manuel de Guia vs Comelec

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  • 8/10/2019 Manuel de Guia vs Comelec

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    MANUEL DE GUIA VS COMELEC

    FACTS:

    C]ongress passed R.A. 7166, signed into law by the Presidenton November 26, 1991. It is An Act Providing forSynchronized National and Local Elections and for ElectoralReforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for OtherPurposes. Respondent Commission o n Elections (COMELEC)issued Resolution No. 2313, adopting rules and guidelines in

    the apportionment, by district, of the number of electivemembers of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in provinces withonly one (1) legislative district and the Sangguniang Bayan ofmunicipalities in the Metro Manila Area for the preparation ofthe Project of District Apportionment by the Provincial ElectionSupervisors and Election Registrars, Resolution No. 2379,approving the Project of District Apportionment submittedpursuant to Resolution No. 2313, and Resolution UND. 92-010holding that pars. (a), (b) and (c), and the first sentence ofpar. (d), all of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, apply to the May 11, 1992elections. Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion toCOMELEC in promulgating the aforementioned resolutions, andmaintained that election of Sanggunian members be at large

    instead of by district. ISSUE:

    Whether or not the petitioners interpretation of Sec.3 of R.A.7166 is correct in assailing the aforementioned COMELECResolutions.

    HELD:

    NO. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit

    Spirit and purpose of the law The reason for thepromulgation of R.A. 7166 is shown in the explanatory note ofSenate Bill No. 1861, and that respondent COMELEC iscognizant of its legislative intent.

    No law is ever enacted that is intended to be meaningless,much less inutile . We must therefore, as far as we can, divineits meaning, its significance, its reason for being. As it has oftbeen held, the key to open the door to what the legislatureintended which is vaguely expressed in the language of astatute is its purpose or the reason which induced it to enactthe statute.

    The true import of Par. (d) is that Sangguniang Panlungsod ofthe single-district cities and the Sangguniang Bayan of the

    municipalities outside Metro Manila, which remained single-districts not having been ordered apportioned under Sec. 3 ofR.A. 7166 will have to continue to be elected at large in theMay 11, 1992, elections, although starting 1995 they shall allbe elected by district to effect the full implementation of theletter and spirit of R.A. 7166.

    SALENILLAS VS CA

    FACTS:

    The parents of Elena Salenillas, one of the petitioners, weregrantees of free patent. The subject property was later sold toElena Salenillas and her husband, petitioners in the instantcase. On December 4,1973, the property of petitioners wasmortgaged to Philippine National Bank as security for a loan ofP2,500. For failure to pay their loan, the property was

    foreclose by PNB and was brought at a public auction byprivate respondent. Petitioner maintains that they have a rightto repurchase the property under Sec. 119 of the Public Land

    Act. Respondent states that the sale of the propertydisqualified petitioner from being legal heirs vis--vis the saidproperty.

    ISSUE:

    WON petitioners have the rigtht to repurchase the propertyunder Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act

    HELD:

    YES. Sec 119 of the Public Lanfd Act provides that everyconveyance of land acquired under free patent or homesteadprovisions shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, hiswidow or legal heirs within a period of five years from the dateof conveyance. The provision makes no distinction betweenthe legal heirs. The distinction made by the respondentcontravenes the very purpose of the act. Between twostatutory interpretations, that which better serves the purposeof the law should prevail.

    B/GEN JOSE COMMENDADOR VS B/GEN DEMETRIOCAMERA

    FACTS:

    Petitioners are members of the Armed Forces of the Philippinesand were charged with violations of Articles of War in relationwith their alleged participation in a failed coup dtat. At ahearing, petitioners manifested their desire to exercise theirright to raise peremptory challenges against the President andthe members of the general court martial invoking Art.18 of CANo. 408. The General Court Martial ruled that peremptorychallenges had been discontinued under PD 39.

    ISSUE:

    WON the right to peremptory challenge provide by Art. 18 ofCA No. 408 has been discontinued under PD 39.

    HELD:

    No. Although PD 39 disallowed peremptory challenged allowedunder CA No. 408, PD 39 however was issued to implementGeneral Order No.8 issued during martial law to create militarytribunals. With the lifting of Martial Law, General Order No.8was revoked and military tribunals were dissolved. As such, thereason for the existence of PD 39 ceased automatically. Whenthe reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. Cessanteratione legis, cessat ipsa lex.