Mao’s Grand Strategy behind the

1958 Kinmen Shelling

Zhangdaiwei Xu 2012 Fall

Mao’s Grand Strategy behind the 1958

Kinmen Shelling

Zhangdaiwei Xu

I. Introduction

Kinmen Island (also known as Quemoy) is located in the Taiwan Strait,

between Fujian Province, and the middle of Taiwan Island. Kinmen Island covers

an area of only about 100 square kilometers. The small island has been neglected

for centuries until 1958 when the People’s Republic of China (PRC ) launched the

notorious Kinmen Shelling. At that time, Jinmen became the hot spot

influencing the stability of China and Taiwan, and even all of East Asia.

With the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomingtang (KMT) troops in the

Mainland China, Chiang with his main troops, foreign currency reserve and gold

of KMT, retreated to Taiwan in May of 1949. In the 1950s, Chiang was planning

the counterattack against the mainland. His first step was to fortify the defense of

the offshore islands, like Kinmen, Penghu and Matzu. At this time, Mao, on one

hand, continued the attack on Chiang’s residue forces in South and Southwest

China; on the other hand, he was busily building railway and airports in Fujian

Province, especially in Xiamen, the city facing Kinmen Island. Both the

communist and the nationalist armies formed the confrontation situation since

then and the military strategic status of Kinmen Island was enhanced with the

growing tension between the CCP and the KMT.

In fact, Kinmen Shelling was not the first time that the Communist Party

launched the attack on Kinmen Island. On Oct 25th of 1949, 8 days after the

Communist Party took control of Xiamen, the 10th Corps of the PLA planned to

use 3 regiments (the 28th, 29th and 31st) to take over the island.1 Without the

air cover and little experience of landing operations, the fleets of the 10th Corps

experienced heavy bombing losses failed to land on the island. General Ye Fei, the

director of Jinmen Landing in 1949, wrote in his memoir that “Why did this

mistake happen? It is because I despised Kinmen, and I thought there is no

fortification and only one beaten regiment, Li Liangrong Regiment, with only

about 20,000 people.”2 He also expressed his regrets in ordering his troops to

station in Xiamen, which he described as a “misstep” that “affected the

preparations for liberating Kinmen.”3 The “misstep” induced the confrontation

between troops from the Communist Party in Xiamen and from the Kuomintang

in Jinmen.

Before the Kinmen Shelling, the Communist Party never stopped its military

actions in other offshore islands, and they even started several small-scale

attacks on Kinmen Island. Why then did the Kinmen Shelling in 1958 receive so

much attention? First, it is the largest scale shelling ever with the PLA firing more

than 30,000 shells in 85 minutes. Second, it is a long lasting war that the shelling

did not stop until 1979. Third, the shelling action is astounding to Taiwan’s and

1 徐焰 [Xu Yan], 《金门之战》 [“War at Jinmen”], (Beijing: Chinese Broadcasting and Television

Publisher, 1992), pp. 49, [translated by Zhangdaiwei Xu]. 2叶飞 [Ye Fei], 《叶飞回忆录》 [“Ye Fei’s Memoir”], (Beijing: Chinese People’s Liberation Army

Publisher, 1998), pp. 598, [translated by Zhangdaiwei Xu] 3叶飞 [Ye Fei], 《叶飞回忆录》 [“Ye Fei’s Memoir”], (Beijing: Chinese People’s Liberation Army

Publisher, 1998), pp. 598, [translated by Zhangdaiwei Xu]

American authorities who did not foresee the CCP attack on Kinmen. Fourth, the

PLA had several chances to take over the island but they chose not to do it.

II. Hypotheses on Reasons for the 1958 Jinmen Shelling

i. Hypothesis on “Supporting the Middle East”

1958 is a revolutionary year for the Arab world. Egypt and Syria established

the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.) to show “the impetus in the Arab world had

passed from pro-western countries to the triumphant pan-Arab movement”4 in

February 1958. A few months later, in July 13th 1958, the young officer of the

20th Infantry Brigade of the Royal Iraqi Army, Abdul Salam Aref, announced the

overthrow of Iraq’s Hashemite Dynasty and the birth of a new “people’s republic.”

This revolution in Iraq was designed to resist Iraq’s alliance with Britain through

participation in the Baghdad Pact and to advocate the establishment of the

United Arab Republic (U.A.R.). At the same time, Lebanese Muslims pushed the

government to join the newly created United Arab Republic. President

Eisenhower responded to Lebanese President Chamoun’s call for assistance by

sending the Sixth Fleet, the 2nd Provisional Marine Force and the Army Task

Force 201 to Lebanon.

Scholars drew the conclusion that Mao’s shelling of Jinmen was due to his

strategic plan to attract American attention from the Middle East (in the revolt of

public resentment to Iraqi government) to the Far East, thus relieving the

4 Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen, “A Revolutionary Year: The Middle East in 1958”, Middle Eastern

Studies, Vol. 40, No.1, 2004, pp.177

military pressure on Iraq and Lebanon. This hypothesis is derived from speeches

Mao made at that time that “China's aid to the Arabic people,..., should not be

restricted to moral support but must be given practical actions.”5 Afew days later,

during the CCP standing committee’s 1958 July meeting, Mao announced the plan

to shell Jinmen and Matzu.

Mao’s attacks on Kinmen were initially planned in late July and early August

may coincide with the Middle East crisis, however, the de facto implementation of

the attacks was delayed. Xu Yan, a Chinese PLA General once involved in Kinmen

Shelling in 1958 also pointed out his doubts in his book: How could the primary

objective in easing tensions in the Middle East be Mao’s motivation for attacking

in late August?6 Moreover, the “Middle East hypothesis” does not answer the

question as to why Mao postponed the date twice, from July 25th to July 27th and

finally to August 23rd. As in fact, on Aug 20th, the UN General Assembly passed a

resolution requesting that American and British troops withdraw from Lebanon

and Jordan. That Mao chose the date for the shelling of Jinmen in the epilogue of

the tension greatly reduced the shelling’s influence on helping the Arab world.

Thus, the argument about “helping the Middle East” lacks credibility.

Although the US and UK’s involvement in Iraq would seem to indicate a

planned attack on Jinmen as a strategic response, Mao rather simply used the

violence in Iraq as political cover. As Mao firstly asked Chinese military to “take

5 Jian Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, The University of North Carolina Press (2000) pp.176

6徐焰 [Xu Yan], 《金门之战》 [“War at Jinmen”], (Beijing: Chinese Broadcasting and Television

Publisher, 1992), pp. 220, [translated by Zhangdaiwei Xu]

some visible action to demonstrate solidarity,”7 Mao initiatively commanded the

PLA’s Headquarters of the General Staff that “1) the air force enter into Fujian

Province as soon as possible; 2) the artilleries aim at lock all the maritime

transports around Kinmen Island”8. To rationalize the intensive military

campaign in July, Mao sought every chance to link the military preparations in

Fujian with the intention on attack against American imperialism. Mao publicly

criticized American designs in Asia and, particularly, the Taiwan Strait. Moreover,

on the Beidaihe Conference, Mao stated the “continued American intervention

was positive for China because it would help motivate Chinese workers and

peasants to work harder for less.”9 One week after Mao’s speech on Beidaihe

Conference, in Henan, the People’s Militia was created with propaganda, which

referred to the Middle East Crisis and American threats in Taiwan.10 Through the

recruit of the militia, not only people’s enthusiasm in protecting their own

country was mobilized, but also the militia became the major backup for the

regular PLA in human resources of home security.

ii. Hypothesis on “Testing American’s Resolve”

Some scholars assumed the artillery war at Kinmen Island in 1958 was Mao’s

intention to “probe Washington’s real intention toward Taiwan, as well as to

7 Christensen, Thomas J., Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and

Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996): pp.238 8徐焰 [Xu Yan], 《金门之战》 [“War at Jinmen”], (Beijing: Chinese Broadcasting and Television

Publisher, 1992), pp. 49, [translated by Zhangdaiwei Xu] 9 Christensen, Thomas J., Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and

Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996): pp.238 10

Interviews with Colonel Zhang. He said the newly-founded broadcasting stations in Henan kept mobilizing people’s productivity in the communes and passions for joining the militia by repeating American imperialism in impeding the development of countries in the third world.

determine to what extent Washington was willing to commit to Taiwan’s

defense.”11 By the end of 1957, the Chinese-American Ambassadorial Conference

in Warsaw reached a deadlock when discussing about embargo and how to

resolve the Taiwan Strait. On December 12th 1957, the conference was

postponed. The deepening confrontation between China and America could be an

explanation of the hypothesis that Shelling Kinmen is China’s way to solve

American threats in the Taiwan Strait. However, why was Mao targeting Kinmen

Island? From my point of view, it is also a deliberate choice of Mao. The

authorities of Taiwan and America signed the Mutual Defense Treaty on

December 2nd 1954. In the Treaty, both parties claimed the resolution to resist

armed attacks:

“Article 2

In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty, the Parties

separately and jointly by self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their

individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and communist subversive

activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political

stability.”12

Also in Article 6, it was the first time that the United States integrated Penghu

and other offshore islands as parts under American protection.

11

Jian Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, The University of North Carolina Press (2000) pp.172 12

“Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China”, Taiwan Document Project, < http://www.taiwandocuments.org/mutual01.htm>, [accessed Oct 10th, 2011]

“Article 6

For the purposes of Articles 2 and 5, the terms "territorial" and "territories"

shall mean in respect of the Republic of China, Taiwan and the Pescadores; and in

respect of the United States of America, the island territories in the West Pacific

under its jurisdiction. The provisions of Articles 2 and 5 will be applicable to such

other territories as may be determined by mutual agreement.”13

However, the term, “the Pescadores”, does not imply if Kinmen Island belonged to

the archipelago, thus means it was vague to define if Kinmen Island was under

the protection of Mutual Defense Treaty. As in fact, Mao has launched a similar

attack on Dachen Archipelago on 1954: On one hand, Mao asked the PLA soldiers

not to initiatively attack American fleets or planes; on the other hand, PLA

deployed the air forces to bomb the KMT troops on Dachen Archipelago.

These reasons may explain the initial shelling of Jinmen, but they cannot

explain why the attack lasted such a long time, from 1958 to 1979. In Ye Fei’s

memoir, he states that when he obeyed Mao’s order to shell only Jiang’s convoy,

the U.S. fleet abandoned Jiang and retreated. Mao also made the claim that

Americans only cared about their national interests. This statement shows that

Mao had already concluded that the Americans would not protect Jinmen. Then

why did he not stop the shelling and take the next step? Why did he continue the

shelling and not proceed with other military plans? Especially, the hypothesis

13

“Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China”, Taiwan Document Project, < http://www.taiwandocuments.org/mutual01.htm>, [accessed Oct 10th, 2011]

that Mao’s intention for the Kinmen Shelling was on exploring American resolve

cannot explain why the shelling kept so long and did not stop until 1979.

iii. Hypothesis on “Domestic Mobilization”

The third explanation for the shelling arises from the domestic context. In

1958, China was undergoing the Great Leap Forward, to encourage all people to

contribute to rapid economic development. In order to inspire revolutionary zeal

and the passion for the Great Leap Forward, Mao decided to start a war, saying

that “a tense [international] situation can mobilize the population, … , and can

therefore promote the Great Leap Forward in economic construction.”14

However, the purpose of waging war is to promote the urgency to develop the

country. However, the shelling contradicts this intention in three aspects: first,

the shelling did not cause many casualties for the PLA and was more like a

unilateral military response rather than all-out war; second, the intensive

shelling only lasted for about one month with several cease-fires during the

period, then the PRC tended to focus on diplomatic negotiations with the United

States; third, in the aftermath of the crisis, the shelling continued in a merely

symbolic way by targeting the beach or other non-populated areas. According to

Ye’s description, “although there is no formal agreement between the two sides,

the shelling actually became an unwritten tacit understanding. Shelling Jinmen is

no longer targeted at the battlefield and residential areas. The returned shelling

14

Jian Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, The University of North Carolina Press (2000) pp.175

of Jiang’s army in Jinmen is also only aimed at our beach. ”15 On these grounds,

the Second Strait Crisis had limited influence in terms of creating tension. From

the history, it is also seen that Mao had a deliberate plan to control the tension.

He strictly required no shelling of the U.S. fleet. It seemed that he did not want to

intensify an already tense situation.

III. The International Context

In the beginning of 1950s, United States made a series of alliances with

non-Communist countries in the Asia-Pacific.

Although the Sino-America Mutual Defense Treaty was not made until in 1954,

the United States gave Taiwan financial aid starting from 1948. Especially after

the Korean War started, American National Security Council approved the

decisions in the document of “NSC48 – 5”: America provides military and

financial aid to strengthen Taiwanese military power for self-defense and other

15

叶飞，《叶飞回忆录》，北京：中国人民解放军出版社 （2007）pp.675

Year Treaty

1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (U.S. – Philippine)

1951 The Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS)

1951 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States

and Japan

1953 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty (U.S. – R.O.K.)

1954 Sino-America Mutual Defense Treaty (U.S. – R.O.C.)

purpose. In 1951 for example, the United States gave 97.7 million U.S. dollars in

financial aid to Taiwan.16 Also the military aid was increasing every year from

1951 to 1954.

Year Military Aid

(million dollar) Detail

1951 71

1952 275

Reformed 25% military strength. Ground and air force combat

capacity increased to 50 % and 100% that of U.S. army`s

separately.

1953 300 Trained and equipped ten corps forces consisted of 20 division,

1 independent division and 1 armored brigade

1954 320 Kept increasing combat capacity of ground force, navy and air

force

However, – one of the major problems behind the U.S. - Taiwan cooperation was

United States converted to promote the “two China policy,” while Chiang still

planned to recover the mainland. Dulles revealed his desire in most public

speeches in 1954 and 1955 “to explore a more rational policy toward China than

that embodied in the fiction that Chiang’s Nationalists could be considered

representative of the entire Chinese people”17. According to Professor Hu

Zhiguang, Chiang and American representatives had several oral fights on

American’s rejection on assisting Chiang’s plan of counterattacking the

mainland.18 America’s reluctance in growing Chiang’s power is also exemplified

in its Taiwanese policies. “On June 27, 1950, President Truman ordered the

16

《中美经济合作》 (“Sino-America Economic Cooperation”)，《中华民国年鉴》 (Republic Of China

Yearbook)， (Taipei: Republic Of China Yearbook Press, 1952), pp.583 17

Immerman, Richard H., John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 18

Interview with Professor Hu Zhiguang, the son of General Hu Lian, the Charge of KMT armies on Kinmen Island

Seventh Fleet to neutralize the Formosa Strait, thus preventing either side from

attacking the other.”19 When dealing with the stalemate in Korean War, President

Eisenhower “unleashed” the forces of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek for a

possible attack on mainland China. As Joseph Alsop revealed, Secretary Dulles

advocated the policy of “unleashing” China and urging Chiang to strengthen his

forces on the offshore islands.20 However, Chiang showed reluctance in

reinforcing the garrisons on offshore islands but used the military aid mainly on

strengtheningdefenses on Taiwan Island. Chiang’s determination on solely

protecting Taiwan Island forced Dulles to suggest the United States to give him a

“warrant” to “insure him against the risks involved in reinforcing his garrisons”21.

On the other hand, the Communist bloc in Asia, especially the Soviet Union

and the PRC also experienced a rough relationship in 1950s. Though the Soviets,

China’s “big brother”, kept sending their experts to assist China’s development in

industry and military as well as their financial aids since the PRC was founded,

China still felt insecure by being marginalized both in the Western World and the

Communist World. In addition, the Soviets’ economic assistance was designed by

the frame of the Soviets’ economic pattern, which focused on the development of

heavy industry. This economic strategy faced the bottleneck in China and “had

only exacerbated the problem of capital accumulation shortages in the

19

Tsou, Tang, The Embroilment Over Quemoy: Mao, Chiang and Dulles, (Salt Lake City, Utah: The University of Utah Press, 1959), pp.6 20

Alsop, Joseph, “Quemoy: We Asked For It”, The New York Herald Tribune, (September 3, 1958, p.18) 21

Tsou, Tang, The Embroilment Over Quemoy: Mao, Chiang and Dulles, (Salt Lake City, Utah: The University of Utah Press, 1959), pp.6

countryside, where some 80-90 percent of the Chinese population resided.”22

Mao felt insecure about China’s backwardness. “By 1958 the Chinese clearly

feared that, if they fell further behind, the Soviets might then cut separate deals

with the United States without regard to their weaker ally.”23 As former Vice

Minister of Defense, General Xiao Jingguang recalls the fear was intensified after

the Soviets demonstrated their capabilities to a Chinese military entourage in

late 1957.24 Mao also worried about the threats of national security since the

Soviets had their Eastern European satellites.

Chinese suspicions on the Soviets’ intentions on making China develop

independently were growing in the late 1957 and 1958. Though the Soviets

signed the agreement on transferring nuclear weapons with China in 1957, Mao

considered it as “a side payment for support of Khrushchev in his struggle

against the Anti-Party Group.”25 In November 1957, Khrushchev discussed with

Mao asking the Soviets’ experts to return. By March1958, the Soviets started to

avoid the discussion about transferring atomic weapons to China. At the same

time, China found the Soviets’ transferred technology was at least two

generations behind their own.26 Since then, the brotherhood between the

Soviets and China was breached that Mao started to call China as “an abandoned

22

Christensen, Thomas J., Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996): pp.206 23

Christensen, Thomas J., Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996): pp.238 24

Interview with General Xiao Jingguang 25

Liu, Chushi Sulian Ba Nian, pp.45-46, reprinted by Christensen, Thomas J., Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996): pp.206 26

Interview with Ye Xiaonan, the daughter of General Ye Fei

little brother” and push for more independence in weapons production.27

IV. The 1958 Jinmen Shelling and Mao’s Grand Strategy

By analyzing the readings and historical evidence, I would like to propose my

own hypothesis to answer why the shelling continued so long, why Mao’s shelling

was only aimed at Jiang’s fleet, why Mao did not want the offshore islands in the

end of the crisis and what the implication from the three “Message to the

Compatriots in Taiwan” are. From my point of view, Mao had a “Grand Strategy,”

that is, to alienate Taiwan and the U.S. in order to undermine U.S. control of

Taiwan and thus guaranteeing the “One China.”

The global context before the shelling showed that U.S. control of Taiwan was

increasing. In 1954, the U.S. and Taiwan signed the “Mutual Defense Treaty.” It

allowed the U.S. fleet to cruise around Taiwan for protection. Taiwan was

becoming more dependent on the U.S. for supplying the Taiwanese army with

advanced arms. The U.S. had set up several military bases in Japan, like the

Yokosuka Navy Base and the Okinawa Navy Base. Having an example in Japan, it

is not hard to understand Mao’s concern about Taiwan becoming “the second

Japan.” Moreover, after the First Strait Crisis, during 1954 and 1955, Dulles began

promoting the notion of “two Chinas”, trying to legitimize the independence of

Taiwan. Furthermore, “by late 1957 and early 1958, while the Chinese-American

ambassadorial talks in Warsaw (which began in 1955) had hit a deadlock,

Beijing’s leaders became alarmed by Washington’s increasingly complicated

27

Interview with General Xu Yan.

military involvement in Taiwan following the signing of the U.S.-Taiwan mutual

defense treaty.”28All these events highlighted the critical need to connect reclaim

Taiwan.

In the first “Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan”, Mao mentioned that

“Taiwan, Penghu, Jinmen and Mazu are Chinese territory, which was approved by

you [Taiwan], referring to your leader’s public announcement, and these islands

are not American territories. Taiwan, Penghu, Jinmen and Mazu are parts of

China, not another country. There is only one China, not two Chinas in the world.

This point is also approved by you, referring to your leader’s public

announcement.”29 “One China” is not only supported by the PRC, but Jiang

Chai-Shek as well. The principles of “One China” also can be proved from Liu

Zi-ran’s case in 1957 (The Taipei Riot). The initiator of the riot, the widow and

her dead husband are thought to be related to Jiang Ching-guo’s secret

organization: “The screaming widow is alleged to have been provided with a

prepared text which she obligingly read into a recording apparatus conveniently

at hand when the riot began.”30 Also, as the riot had been occurring for hours

before Jiang Ching-guo used police to handle with it, it’s a popular guess that the

whole riot was designed by Jiang. The riot showed the fractured cultural and

nationalistic resentment towards Americans. Also, seeing the perspective of the

U.S. control of Taiwan, Liu Zi-ran’s case indicated the sensitive extra-judiciary

28

Jian Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, The University of North Carolina Press (2000) pp. 172 29叶飞，《叶飞回忆录》，北京：中国人民解放军出版社 （2007）pp.666-667

30 Marine Embassy Guard Association Historical Archives,

http://www.msg-history.com/HistoricalItems/HI_Taipei_1957_Riot.html

privileges enjoyed by US personnel in Taiwan. The riot resulted in “Chinese

Nationalist officials demand[s] that President Chiang Kai-shek revokes the

present diplomatic immunity bestowed on US soldiers.”31 All these scenarios

indicated the expanding U.S. control on Taiwan. As the resources in PLA explode,

Mao said once on a private meeting that Kinmen should be the connection

between the mainland and Taiwan, which means either to take over the island or

to abandon it will cut this connection.32 Therefore, Mao may have used the

shelling to establish political communication with Taiwan. The aim of the Kinmen

Shelling was only a warning to Chiang’s government, not a sign for the start of a

“new Civil War.” As shown in fact, Mao had a long plan in eliminating KMT’s

residual power on offshore islands and Taiwan: In July 1949, 2 months after

Chiang Kai-shek retreated to Taiwan, Mao deployed the 10th Regiment of East

China Field Army to go to Fujian. On July 10, 1949, Mao also wrote a letter to

Premier Zhou Enlai to discuss about the steps for attacking Taiwan and propose

the idea of building the air force.33 Starting from October 1949, the 10th

Regiment was following Mao’s plan to reclaim the offshore islands. In 1954 and

1955, the PLA recovered almost all the offshore islands in Taizhou Bay and other

islands east to Zhejiang Province. (Below is the graph showing the PLA’s reclaim

of offshore islands)

31

PANG YANG HUEI, THE TAIWAN STRAIT CRISES, 1954-1958: CHINA, THE UNITED STATES AND TAIWAN (2010), http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/20930 32

Interviews with Colonel Zhang, who was an intimate fellow of General Zhu De 33徐焰 [Xu Yan], 《金门之战》 [“War at Jinmen”], (Beijing: Chinese Broadcasting and Television Publisher, 1992), pp. 294, [translated by Zhangdaiwei Xu]

Kinmen Island, which was also in Mao’s military plan, was even being

attacked twice before: the first was on October 26, 1949 and the second was

between January and March in 1953. The Kinmen Shelling was not a surprise

according to Mao’s mentality on determining to reclaim all the offshore islands.

However, it was not a good time to start a war with Taiwan ---- not to mention the

possible American military aid, the PLA was not competent in air force in late

1950s (as shown in the form below).

Item CCP KMT

Number of Combat Aircraft 520 >600

Main Aircraft Model Mig-17 F-86

Equipped Missile Worse Better (Sidewinder)

Pilot Skill Level Better Worse

(Statistics from Informations on Xu Yan’s book, War of Kinmen)34

Mao’s intention of shelling Jinmen to alienate Taiwan from the U.S. can also be

seen in his three “Messages to the Compatriots in Taiwan.” In the first message,

he claimed that Taiwan，Penghu, Jinmen, Mazu are parts of China (see above). In

the second message, Mao criticized the U.S. as ruthless and called for the

solidarity of Taiwan and the Mainland: saying “the U.S. would surely abandon you

someday…The signs are already there in Dulles’ talk on Sep. 30th. Based on your

status, wouldn’t you be disappointed? After all, American imperialism is our

common enemy.”35 Mao also indicated his shelling was aimed at expelling the U.S.

navy: “the Americans can’t escort Jiang’s fleets in the sea around Jinmen; If so,

[we will] shell immediately.”36 In the third message, the warning to the U.S.

became even more poignant. He said that “We only hope that you do not yield to

the pressure from the U.S, do not live under their thumbs, and do not lose your

sovereignty, at last, [we do not want you] to be homeless and thrown into the

sea.”37 The shelling did have an influence on alienating Taiwan from U.S. Ye

recalled that Jiang’s fleet was so anxious about the shelling that they used

radiosrather than the cipher telegrams to communicate to Taiwanese authorities.

It allowed Ye to monitor their communication. It is said that soldiers on Jiang’s

34徐焰 [Xu Yan], 《金门之战》 [“War at Jinmen”], (Beijing: Chinese Broadcasting and Television Publisher, 1992), pp. 176, [translated by Zhangdaiwei Xu]

35叶飞 [Ye Fei], 《叶飞回忆录》 [“Ye Fei’s Memoir”], (Beijing: Chinese People’s Liberation Army

Publisher, 1998), pp.667 36叶飞 [Ye Fei], 《叶飞回忆录》 [“Ye Fei’s Memoir”], (Beijing: Chinese People’s Liberation Army

Publisher, 1998), pp.671 37叶飞 [Ye Fei], 《叶飞回忆录》 [“Ye Fei’s Memoir”], (Beijing: Chinese People’s Liberation Army

Publisher, 1998), pp.674

fleet complained: “Americans are bastards”(美国人混蛋)38.

The continued shelling became mostly symbolic, which shows that the

shelling was not meant to take a real advantage in the war. It was a “diplomatic

war,” just as Ye said. In “Another message to the Compatriots in Taiwan”, Mao

wrote that “every odd day, your ships and planes do not come [to the

mainland].”39 This quote is a clear announcement of Mao’s operational

disposition, which was obviously not seen in a common war. Ye also pointed out

the symbolic nature of the actions: “Shelling Jinmen is not aimed at the battle

field and residential areas. The returned shelling of Jiang’s army in Jinmen is also

only aimed at our beach. ”40 “Shelling is becoming a special conversation among

Jiang, the United States, and us.”41

At last, the symbolic explanation is a better way to explain why Mao did not

want Jinmen after so much shelling. Ye also raised his own question in his

memoirs that “since tension in Middle East has been mitigated, the U.S. situation

also has been resolved throughout the war against U.S.-Taiwan Joint Navy”42; why

then, despite the “expectation”43 did Mao choose not to take over Jinmen?

38叶飞 [Ye Fei], 《叶飞回忆录》 [“Ye Fei’s Memoir”], (Beijing: Chinese People’s Liberation Army

Publisher, 1998), pp.661 39叶飞 [Ye Fei], 《叶飞回忆录》 [“Ye Fei’s Memoir”], (Beijing: Chinese People’s Liberation Army

Publisher, 1998), pp.673 40

叶飞 [Ye Fei], 《叶飞回忆录》 [“Ye Fei’s Memoir”], (Beijing: Chinese People’s Liberation Army

Publisher, 1998), pp.675

41叶飞 [Ye Fei], 《叶飞回忆录》 [“Ye Fei’s Memoir”], (Beijing: Chinese People’s Liberation Army

Publisher, 1998), pp.675 42叶飞 [Ye Fei], 《叶飞回忆录》 [“Ye Fei’s Memoir”], (Beijing: Chinese People’s Liberation Army

Publisher, 1998), pp.665 43叶飞 [Ye Fei], 《叶飞回忆录》 [“Ye Fei’s Memoir”], (Beijing: Chinese People’s Liberation Army

Publisher, 1998), pp.666

More ironically, during the latter negotiations, Eisenhower has persuaded Jiang

to give up Jinmen and Mazu. However, Mao refused to receive the offshore

islands.

“Eisenhower indicated that the ‘desirable solution’ would be for Chiang to

‘voluntarily evacuate Quemoy and Matsu’ and ‘entrench himself on Formosa,

await internal developments on the mainland, and provide a constant military

and psychological threat to the Chicom régime.’ The US would compensate for

Chiang’s loss of the offshore islands with material aid or with the inducement of

one US division and an air force to persuade Chiang. ”44

This is due to Mao’s deeper consideration by introducing the “noose strategy.”

Mao once said, “Whenever necessary we can shell [Jinmen and Mazu]. Whenever

we are in need of tension, we may tighten the noose, and whenever we want to

relax the tension, we may loosen the noose. We will let them hang there, neither

dead nor alive, using them as a means to deal with the Americans.” Apparently,

the Jinmen issue is still framed as the “internal affairs” of China. It also became

the de facto strategy to restrict both Jiang and U.S.

V. Conclusion

The Kinmen Shelling, which was the fiercest military confrontation in the

Taiwan Strait , was under Mao’s intention on guaranteeing “One China” by

keeping Kinmen Island Crisis as a domestic issue. Mao made a cautious plan with

44

PANG YANG HUEI, THE TAIWAN STRAIT CRISES, 1954-1958: CHINA, THE UNITED STATES AND TAIWAN (2010), http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/20930

the orders, “only to attack Jiang’s Fleet” and “avoid any American casualty” to

keep United States from counterattacking the PLA with the excuse of protecting

American soldiers’ safety. Moreover, Since Kinmen Island was not under the

protection of America-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty, the United States was left

with no excuse to draw into Kinmen Island Crisis according to the Mutual

Defense Treaty. As in fact, the Kinmen Shelling had many beneficial by-products

to China: by arousing the intensive confrontation in Taiwan Strait, Mao

successfully mobilized the public by repeatedly stressing on American threats on

PRC’s security. The mobilization not only stimulated the increasing recruits of

militia, but also aroused people’s enthusiasm in working in the heavy industry.45

In 1958, the steel productivity was two times of that in 1957. Also the Kinmen

Shelling alienated the United States from Taiwan. The retreat of American fleets

in the fleets received domestic critics46, as Taiwanese soldiers claimed American

soldiers as “bastards”. Mao also used this chance to condemned American army

and called the retreat as a betrayal to Taiwanese.47 Also during years from 1958

to 1979, the Kinmen Shelling became symbolic that the shelling was targeted at

non-populus area and the PLA even gave the notifications to Taiwan authorities

before they shelled. In the years between 1958 and 1979, Mao also sought

chances to recover Taiwan: 10 days right after the shelling, Premier Zhou Enlai

45徐光顺，刘勇[Xu Guangshun and Liu Yong], 《试探毛泽东对金门炮战的指挥艺术》[“Assumptions on Mao’s

Commanding Skill in Jinmen Shelling”], 《空军雷达学院》[Air Force Radar Institute Journal], vol.1, (2000): pp. 68 46叶飞 [Ye Fei], 《叶飞回忆录》 [“Ye Fei’s Memoir”], (Beijing: Chinese People’s Liberation Army Publisher, 1998), pp.661 47 叶飞 [Ye Fei], 《叶飞回忆录》 [“Ye Fei’s Memoir”], (Beijing: Chinese People’s Liberation Army Publisher, 1998), pp.667

made a public speech to state “the shelling was aimed at compelling the

American” and “the mainland welcomes Taiwan authorities to reconsider to open

the CCP-KMT talks on sovereignty”48. According to General Wang in PLA, starting

from 1963, Mao even had three confidential talks with Chiang Kai-Shek about

recovering Taiwan. Based on all these evidence, I’d like to draw the conclusion

that the Kinmen Shelling is the start of Mao’s whole plan to practice its “One

China” plan. The connections starting from the Kinmen Shelling between the

mainland and Taiwan never stops till now. It makes Taiwan still a major

sovereign problems in China.

48张万余[Zhang Wanyu], 《1958 年金门炮战与“一个中国”的原则》[“1958 Jinmen Shelling and the ‘One China’

Principle”], 《河南师范大学学报（哲学与社会科学版）》 [Henan Normal University Jounal (Philosophy and Social Science Edition)], vol. 6, (2000): pp. 37

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