Maquilas in Mexico

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Society for Latin American Studies

The Maquilas in Mexico: A Global PerspectiveAuthor(s): Leslie SklairSource: Bulletin of Latin American Research, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Jan., 1992), pp. 91-107Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of Society for Latin American StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3338601

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Bull. LatinAm. Res., Vol.I 1, No. 1,pp.91-107, 1992. 0261-3050/92$5.00 + .00Printed n GreatBritain. ? 1992 Societyfor LatinAmericanStudies

PergamonPress Ltd

The Maquilas n Mexico:a GlobalPerspective1LESLIE SKLAIR

Department fSociology,London SchoolofEconomics,UK

INTRODUCTION

InMexico,asinmanyotherThirdWorldcountriesnrecentyears, he belief

in export-led ndustrialisationuelledby foreign nvestmentandtechnology(ELIFFlT) s beginning o displaceotheravailabledevelopment trategies,such as importsubstitution,varyingdegreesof autarky,or the traditionalreliance on primaryproduct export.Thispaper exploreshow the maquilaindustry along the Mexico-US border, by spearheadingELIFFLT,has

helpedcreatea transnationalapitalist lass which s gradually hanging he

ways in whichMexico relates to a global capitalism n the process of re-formation.

ThoughI cannothere substantiate he point in detail,it can certainlybe

arguedthat this positionis amplyconfirmedby Mexico's accession to the

GATTin 1986 andbythenegotiations ver theFreeTradeAgreementwiththe USA and Canada.2The transformationof Mexico from what has

commonlybeen consideredto be one of the mostprotectionistand strict

regimesasfarasforeign nvestments concerned nto whatthemajor nstitu-tions of global capitalismdisarmingly all an 'openeconomy' s well under

way.As Barkin(1990: 1)argues nhischallenging ritiqueof thisunfoldingstrategy,Mexico's conomyhas beenliterally urned nsideout'.

Mexico hasfor at leasta centurybeen a prime ocation orforeign nvest-ment,mainlybutby no meansexclusively romtheUSA. Inthe mid-1980s

onlyabout 2.5

percent of Mexican ndustrialirmswere

foreign-owned,ut

these firmsproducedmore than 30 percentof Mexican ndustrial xports.3Until the 1970s, most of thisforeign nvestmentwasinthe'traditional' NCsectors such as automobiles, petroleum exploitation, pharmaceuticals,textilesand so on, which combined mportsubstitutionwithexporting.Butfrom the 1970s, andincreasinglyn the 1980s, thispicturebeganto changeand the balancebeganto swingto the more specificallyexport-processingassemblyindustries,such as electronics,machinery,auto parts, apparel,furniture, ndsportsgoods andtoys.This tendedto be concentratedalongMexico'snorthernborderunder he rulesof themaquilandustry.

The maquila ndustryoriginated n the mid-1960s, when the Mexicangovernmentntroduceda BorderIndustrialisationrogramwhichpermittedMexicanandforeign-ownedactories o operatealongthe borderdutyfreeon condition thatthey exportedall theirproducts.The maquilasareoftentermed he 'in-bond'ndustry.Thesefactories,mainlyUS-owned,werealsoable to take advantageof tariff regulations covering the re-importofassembledunfinishedgoods usingUS-manufacturedomponents.Mexico



BULLETINOFLATINAMERICANRESEARCH

now has about 2000 maquilas, mployingalmosthalfa millionworkers.Annualmaquila xportearnings reintheregionof US $2-3 billion.4

My particular urposehereis to show how the

maquila ndustryan be

fruitfullyanalysed n termsof the conjuncture f economic,political,and

cultural-ideologicalorces.My arguments that the transnationalorpora-tionsoperating hrough he maquila ndustryhave createda transnational

capitalist lass nthe borderregionandhavereinforced culture-ideologyfconsumerism,ndthishasgradually egun o makeasignificant ifference othe ways in whichMexicoand the global capitalist ystemrelate to eachother.The framework f thisanalysis s anevolving ociologyof theglobalsystem.

A SOCIOLOGYOF THEGLOBALSYSTEM5Theaim of thissociologyof theglobalsystem s to establishheviability f a

specificconceptionof theglobalsystem.The'natural'pproacho theglobalsystemis state-centred, mphasisinghe role of the state and cognitivelyprivileginghe systemof states.Whilenot ignoring he state,my approachoffers n additiona conceptionof theglobalsystembasedon transnational

practices.Transnationalpracticesare analyticallydistinguishedon three levels,

economic, political and cultural-ideological, conventional politicaleconomyclassificationwithwhichmost of us arenowquite amiliar, venif

manyfind it uncongenial.n the concreteconditionsof the worldas it is, aworldlargelystructured y global capitalismn its variousguises,eachofthese practices s typically,but not exclusively, haracterised y a majorinstitutionalorm.ThetransnationalorporationTNC) s themajorocusoftransnational conomicpractices; he transnationalapitalistclass is the

majorocus of transnationaloliticalpractices; ndthemajorocusof trans-national ultural-ideologicalracticessto be found ntheculture-ideologyfconsumerism. here sgeneralagreementhat he transnationalorporationis a (if not the)key institutionn the globalcapitalist ystem.The primary

agentsof the

politicaland

cultural-ideologicalransnational

racticesmaybe

somewhatmorecontentious.A centralhypothesishat lows rom his rame-work is that in each sphere-economic, politicaland culture-ideology-transnationalpractices increasingly marginaliseexclusively domestic

practices.While the evidencemarshalledn thispaperis indicativeratherthandefinitive,t does illustrate heways nwhich he TNCs aremarginalis-ingthoseenterpriseshatoperatepurely orthe domesticeconomy,how an

embryonictransnational apitalistclass is marginalisingnward-lookingdomesticclasses,andhow theculture-ideologyf consumerismncreasinglymarginaliseshose culturalproductsthat resist commodification. shall

briefly ook at eachof thesein turnandtryto showtheirrelevance or thestudyof themaquilandustrynMexico.

THETRANSNATIONALCORPORATIONS

Whilethe state is the spatialreferencepointfor mostof the crucial rans-nationalpractices hatgo to makeupthestructures f theglobalsystem, nthesense that most transnationalracticesntersect n particularountries

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THEMAQUILASIN MEXICO

and come under thejurisdiction f particulartates, t is not necessarily hemost fruitful conceptual reference point. The global capitalist system

conceptualisedas

transnational transcendingnation-states)rather than

inter-nationalbasedon the relationsbetweennation-states),providesanalternativeocus.Thesystem s drivenby increasinglyransnationalapitalistclasses(whosecharacteristics redrawn n more detailbelow)through hevarious forms of transnationalcorporations(extractive,manufacturing,trading,inancial, ommunications,tc.).TheseTNCsareatthe centreof the

systemandtheydictateeconomictransnational ractices.Wherenecessary,theycompetewiththeseparate tates nthestruggleodominatepoliticaland

cultural-ideologicalransnational ractices.Thereare severalothersystems,regionally mportantand ethnically,culturallyand/or theologicallybased,

but none has, as yet, had the pervasiveglobalsuccess of capitalism n thetwentieth entury.The largestTNCshaveassetsand annualsalesfarin excessof the Gross

NationalProductof abouthalfof thecountriesof theworld.In 1986,64 outof the largest120 countrieshad GNPs of less than 10 billionUS dollars

(WorldBank,1988).UN datafor 1985-1986 show that 68 TNCsinminingandmanufacturingad annual alesinexcessof 10 billiondollars.All thetop50 banks, hetop 20 securities irms,and all butone of thetop 30 insurance

companieshad net assetsin excessof 10 billion.TheMcDonald's astfood

corporation totalsalesof $12.4 billion),JapaneseandWestGermanRail-

ways (total revenues$16 and $12.5 billion),and 12 retailingchains(salesranging rom Sears'$44 billion dollarsto Daiei's $10 billion) were alsomembersof the'10 billiondollarclub'(UnitedNations,1988:annextables).Thesefigures n themselvesdo not prove anything, hey simply ndicate he

gigantism of the TNCs.The dependencyperspective ocusedattentionon thisunequalrelation-

ship betweenmightyTNCs and the powerfulhome countriesthat lookedafter theirinterestsall over the globe, on the one hand,and the relativelyweakandpowerlessThirdWorldcountries nwhichtheywereinvolved,onthe other.

However,the

dependencyperspectiveailedto

explainhow the

practicesof the TNCsandthosewho act as theiragents n theThirdWorld

actuallyoperatedto producesomething ike the kindsof development hataretaken orgrantednthe FirstWorld,regionally r inparticularndustriesin some ThirdWorldcountries. deaslike 'associateddependentdevelop-ment'(Cardoso)and'semi-periphery'Wallerstein)were ntroduced o solvethisproblembutthequestion hathasneverbeensatisfactorily nswered s:to what extent s dependentdevelopmentactuallydevelopment?One of the

placesin the ThirdWorldwherethisquestionappears o be most relevant son Mexico's northernborder with the USA where,over the past 25 years

substantial ndustrialand urbangrowthhas takenplace as a resultof theopeningof hundredsof factoriesbysomeof thelargestTNCs in the world.

TNCSINTHEMAQUILAINDUSTRY

I shall detail some of the activitiesof the many Fortune500'6corporationsthathave dominated hemaquilandustry ince tsearlydaysandcontinue odo so, in the sectionto followon the maquila ransnationalapitalistclass.

93




Here,however, shall ocus on oneimportant spectof TNCinvolvementnthe maquila ndustry,because it has been used by both US and Mexican

promotersfthe

maquilaso

goodeffectoverthe

years.refer o the

mputedrole of the TNCs nthetransfer f technology.Lists of transnational orporations hat are identifiedwith advanced

researchandhightechnologyproductsareroutinely sed asa surrogateor

technology ransfertself,butthisis a sleightof handon whichthemaquilaindustry asnomonopoly.One ofthe twokeyreasonswhyMexicoandotherThirdWorldcountriesembarked n export-ledndustrialisationolicies nthe firstplacewasthehopethatbyrelaxingheforeign nvestment ules, heTNCs attracted nto the countrywould be more likelyto bringmodern

technologyandtechniqueswiththem.(Theotherkeyreason,paradoxically,

wasthe needto createasmany obsaspossible,notacommoncharacteristicof high echindustries.)The cityof Guadalajara,ometimes abelled Mexico'sSiliconValley', s

one placewhere US andJapaneseelectronics irms,operatingwithinandoutsideofthemaquila ules,have ndeedwonareputationor mporting ightechnology.However,nthewordsofone commentator:High-techUSfirmssuch as UnisysCorp.and EastmanKodak Co. and traditionalUS manu-facturers uch as Ford MotorCo.have started ombining omeof the mostautomatedmanufacturingechnologiesand the latest managementech-

niqueswithsomeof theworld'sowest-paidworkers'(Stokes,1987).7Theapparent aradoxs the one that ies at the heartof theideologyof the

assembly ndustries(the ideologyof 'production haring') nd the techno-

logicalcore of currentchanges n globalcapitalism.Given the capacity obreakdowntheproduction f practically nythingnto itscomponentpartsandtofabricate nd/orassemble hesepartsmoreorlessanywheret choses

(flexibleproduction),he transnationalorporation an now unitecapital,techniqueand labour n anhistorically nique ashion.Productionsharing'means hat nsomemajorndustries, articularlyhosethatutiliseelectroniccontrolsystems o a greateror lesserextent,hightechnologyprocessescantravel nthe formof

componentsndmaterialso low

wageareas or further

processing.Thus, the technologyhas been relocatedin this form, notgenuinely ransferredn productionprocesseswithinthe low wage areaswhere he furtherprocessingstakingplace.Productionsharing'snothingfnot flexible. It does allow for almost limitlessexperimentationwith thedivisionof labour.

The maquila ndustrycapitaliseson the possibilitiesof cost savingbymanipulationof systemsof production, abrication,assemblyand sub-assembly.Forthe mostpart, hetechnologys containednthecomponentswhich are assembled n a highlyroutinised, tandardised nd simplified

fashionby low-paidmaquilaoperativesdoingthe samethingshundreds rthousandsof timesevery day.In the typicalmaquila,only the techniciansfromtheparent ompanyhavea visionof thewholeproductive rocessandthey teach discretepartsof it to the Mexicantechnicians,who pass ondiscretepartsof whatthey knowto supervisorswho are responsible orensuring hat the workerscarryout theirgiventasksproperly.However,therearealwaysopportunitieswithin hissystem or someworkers ndtech-

94




niciansto exercise ndependentudgementandto interveneat some levelintheproductiveprocess.8Thissuggests hatalltechnology elocationpresentsthe

possibilityof some

technologytransfer,n the form of transmission f

skills fnottheactual ransfer fworkable echnology rom ts owner o those

employedto workwiththeproducts nwhich t is embodied.Theglobalisa-tionof production, herefore,does presentsomerisks or the TNCs'techno-logicalmonopolies, hough heevidenceof themaquila ndustry uggests hatthese risksare,asyet, quite imited.

THE CONCEPTOF THE TRANSNATIONALCAPITALISTCLASS

The idea thatregimesand their dominantclassesin the ThirdWorld haveinstitutionalisedpecificmechanisms or dealingwith the globalcapitalist

systemand viceversa,has beenconceptualisednmanyways.Majorchangesin the economic,political,and cultural-ideologicaltructuresof the globalsystem n the last few decades forceus to reconsider he traditionalwaysinwhichFirstWorld-ThirdWorldclass relationshavebeenconceptualised.n

doing this, it is necessaryto begin to think about the global systemitself,aboutthe extent o which t canusefullybecharacterised s aglobalcapitalistsystem,and the creationof whatI shall termtransnationalapitalist lasses

(TCCs)within t. These classesare transnationalnthe doublesensethat heytend to haveglobalrather han ocalperspectives n keyissues and thattheytypicallycontainpeople from manycountries.In the case of the maquilaindustry, he mainactors are MexicanandUS citizens,withsomeJapaneseandothernationalities.

The idea of the transnational apitalistclass acknowledges hat Euro-centricclasscategorieshavealwayscausedproblems ntheanalysisof socialstructures utsidethe advanced ndustrial ountriesbutthatthese cannotbeavoided fwe are to confront herealityof theglobalcapitalist ystem.

Thetransnationalapitalist lass includes hefollowinggroupsof people:

(i) TNC executivesand their ocalaffiliates;(ii) globalising tatebureaucrats;

(iii) capitalist-inspired oliticiansandprofessionals;(iv) consumerist lites(merchants,media).

This class sees its mission as organising he conditonsunderwhich itsinterests and the interestsof the system(whichusuallybut do not alwayscoincide)can be furtheredwithinthe nationalcontext.9The conceptof thetransnational apitalistclass impliesthatthere is one centraltransnationalcapitalistclass thatmakessystem-widedecisions,and that it connects withthe TCCineachlocality,regionandcountry.

While what used to be called the 'comprador' lass may admit that its

interestsandthose of theforeignerst servesareantagonistico thoseof co-nationals, he local TCC conceivesof its interestsand the interestsof theglobal capitalist ystemthat t serves,as moreor less identicalwiththose ofthenationaldevelopmentof itshomecountry.ClaudeAke (1985: 175) putsone option for this class very well when he arguesthat indigenisationofforeignenterprisesn Nigeria reinforced he divisionof labourbetweentheNigerianbourgeoisie asspecialistsnmaintaininghepoliticalconditionsof

95




accumulation)ndforeigncapital asspecialistsnproduction)'. s we shallsee, this is not a bad descriptionof the divisionof labour betweenthe

MexicanandtheUSmembers f themaquilaTCC.Althoughthe compradorclass in one form or anotherhas existedforcenturies, he transnationalapitalist lass is a relatively ewphenomenon.Thebasicdifference etween he two s thatwhereas ompradors reentirelybeholden othe TNCsandforeignnterests,he localbranch' f the TCCcan

develop nto aclassthatcan,undercertain ircumstances,egin o dictate tsown terms to the TNCs andforeign nterests.Thelogicalextensionof this

arguments thatsomeform of interdependences possible,whereTCCs nThirdWorldcountries ouldcarveoutniches orthemselvesnthecrevices,sometimes ven thechasms, hatthehegemonTNCs eaveunattended.

THEMAQUILATRANSNATIONALCAPITALISTCLASS

Mostmaquilaworkers,ikemostMexicanworkers, ufferedadecline nrealstandardof living n the 1980s, while theprofitsof the maquilasncreased

(Sklair,1989:204). Everyplunge nthe dollarvalueof thepesoheraldedanew surge in maquilastart-ups.The decline of the peso hit the maquilaworker on the border particularly ard because Mexicanborder com-munities have alwayslooked to the USA for many of their household

purchases.Mexicanalternative roductsare oftenunavailable,oo expen-sive,of inferiorquality,or even disguised mports romthe USA. The US

working lassalong he borderalsosufferedduring he 1980s.In an attemptto stop the rot, Presidentde la Madrid introducedan

EconomicSolidarityPact in 1987 which did bringinflationunder somecontrol, froze prices and wages to some extent, and slowed down thedevaluation f thepeso against hedollar.Salinasde Gortari ontinued hePact and quickenedthe pace of market-oriented conomicreforms ike

privatisationsnthefinancial ndothersectorsand,ofcourse, he FreeTrade

Agreementwiththe USA andCanada.Thus,thepolicies promotedby thefriendsandfacilitators f themaquilandustry, n both sidesof theborder,

werebeginningocome

tofruitionnthe

early1990sin

wayshatwouldhave

seemedquiteunlikely decadebefore.Both MexicanandUStransnationalapitalists ndprofessionals long he

borderhavedoneverywelloutofthemaquilas.ndustrialarkdevelopment,andlegaland commercial ervicesfor the maquilandustry reateda newclassof wealthyMexicanmaquila acilitatorsand,of course,US maquilafacilitatorstoo). Bairdand McCaughan1975: 9) succinctlydescribethe

membershipftheMexicanpolitical liques'hatran hemaquilandustrynits first decade:'a local governmentofficial,lawyer,accountant,banker,customsbroker,aborcontractor nd nmostcasesthe owneroffactoryand

andbuildings.USbusinessmenrom ndustrial evelopmentommittees ndchambers f commerce romnearbyUS cities alsousually ormpartof this

clique'.What hemaquilandustryhadto do if it wasto succeedon a more

permanent asiswas to createa class thatcouldbuilda capitalistndustrialculture to serve its needs along the border."'HowardBoysen, a majormaquilaacilitatornSanDiego/Tijuana, utthisneatlywhenhe said hat he

maquilas produce 'middle-classmen [sic] who are learning skills of

96



THEMAQUILASINMEXICO

programmingndmanagement, uyinghouses,educating heirchildrenand

limiting he size of theirfamilies' in NationalJournal,7 July1979).11Thatthiswas not

justa

viewfromnorthof

theborder sconfirmedbyamemberofa prominentCiudadJuarezmaquila ndustry aw firm: Maquiladoras avemade thedifference or the border... For the firsttimein history hereis asolid, strongmiddle class here'(in OaklandTribune,29 September1982:B-8). And Whiteford(1986: 34), in his studyof the Mexicalivalley,arguesthatthe maquilandustry reatedan'emerging egionalbourgeoisie... ableto acquireconsiderablewealthandpoweras theprogram xpanded'.

This'borderruling lass',orwhatIprefer o callthemaquilaransnationalcapitalist lass,differsconsiderablyromthe traditionalandedoligarchies.The maquilaTCCis a newbourgeoisie n a recognisablyWesterncapitalist

sense. This does not necessarilymake t anylesspatrioticorevenchauvinistinitspracticeorideology, or inMexico herearemanyeconomicnationalistswho have no scruplesabout stealing public funds, and there have beencompradorswho genuinelytried to put foreigninvestment o use in thedevelopmentof theircountry.

Salas-Porras(1987), in her research on the effects of the maquilaindustryon Mexico'sregionalbourgeoisie, hows thatthisnew class has atleasttwo distinctive haracteristicshatcan be directlyrelated o thegrowthof the maquilas.She arguesthatthe base of this class is in services for themaquilas ather hanproductivenvestmentn theplants hemselves; nd its

membersexploitthe peculiar private-publicector'symbiosis hatexists nMexico (and elsewhere) n their own interestsagainstthe publicinterest.She notes the favourable ermson whichstate-owned acilitiesare madeavailableto privatemaquila acilitators or the benefit of the maquilas,aparadigmcase of the way in whicha transnational apitalistclass can re-conceptualisethe 'national' nterest in terms of the interests of globalcapital.It is for thisreason thatTamayo, or example,has argued n typicalnationalist-populisterms, hat the 'nationalization f the"political lass"atthe border'(presumably he de-US-ificationof it) is necessary f national

integrationis to be achieved

[inGibson and Corona Renteria

(eds)1985:91].The four groupsof people who constitutethe regionalTCC along the

Mexico-US border have some distinctivecharacteristics. irst, the TNCexecutives tend to be from manufacturing ackgroundswhile their localaffiliates endtobe fromadministrativerfinancialbackgrounds,hough hisis changingas moreMexicansbecomeplantmanagers.t is also thecase thatmanymaquila xecutiveshave comethroughassemblyoperations none ormorecountriesapart romtheUSA and Mexicoandtheyare moreawareofcorporateglobal strategy hanmightotherwisebe the case (Sklair,1989:

passim.).Some of thefindingsof Salas-Porras(1990) suggests hat he natureof the Mexicanbusinesselitesin generalmayalso be changing, s somekeydomesticallyorientedandinternallydirected amilisticgroupsaregraduallybeingtransformedntogloballyorientedandexternallydirectedcorporativ-isticgroups.

Second,whatI havetermed globalisingtatebureaucrats'mustbe seeninthe context of Mexico'sprotectionist,highlyimport-substitutingast and

97



BULLETINOF LATINAMERICANRESEARCH

periodsof open hostilitybetweengovernment ndbusiness.'3There s littledoubt that the balanceof powerhas swungdecisively romdomesticallyorientedand

internallyirected o

globallyorientedand

externallyirected

bureaucratsnthe lastfewyears.The decision ojointhe GATT n 1986 andthe coalitionbetweensome factions n government nd businessto pushforward heFree TradeAgreementwiththe USA and Canada llustrate histrend.While the FTA mightunderstandably e seen as an assertionof

regionalas againstglobaleconomicpower, t is preciselyMexico'sdecisionto becomemoreintegratednto theglobalcapitalist ystem hathas led it toseektheprotection f what s stillarguablyhemightiest oweronearth.

Themaquila ureaucratsnMexicoCityand nthe citiesalong he ronteranorte werevirtuallygnoredby the centresof powerfrom the 1960s until

mid-1980s,when the economicsuccessof themaquilandustry ndwhat tstood forin termsof Mexico'scompetitivenessnglobal ndustries ouldno

longerbe ignored. twouldbe anexaggerationo suggest hatthesuccessofthe maquilasplayedmuchmore thana marginal ole in the victoryof the

'globalising tate bureaucrats' ut when thatvictorywas on the way, the

maquilabureaucratswere enthusiasticallies for the 'globalisers'.The

complaint s now not so much about Mexicansupportersof the maquilaindustry ellingout thenation,asof the'maquilisationf Mexico'asawhole

(see Sklair,1989:227-228 and238, note 3).Thissignifiesa groundshiftntheofficialpositionon Mexico'splace nthe world ncontrastoapreviouslyheld view that'maquilisation' as the scheme of a few,even if influential,players.

Third,the capitalist-inspiredoliticiansare to be found in increasingnumbersnthePRI(therulingparty)andgenerallynthePAN(thebusiness-orientedoppositionparty).Not all of thesepeopleare wholeheartedlobal-isers,butadvancementnthesepartiesappearsodependmoreandmoreon

toeingthe lineon thecentral ssuesof economicpolicyand thepoliticaland

cultural-ideological onsequencesof it. Similarly, apitalist-inspired ro-fessionals(lawyers,ournalists,onsultants, cademics, tc.), nso farastheyservethe

globalnterestsof

capital,indfor themselves

placesn thetrans-

national apitalist lass.Alongtheborder,and ncreasinglyn the astdecade,themaquilandustry asattracted uchpeople,andcontinues o do so.

Finally, onsumeristlites,bywhich meanmerchants ndthose nvolvedinmediapromotion fconsumerism,reemarket apitalism,themodernisa-tionof Mexico' n theimageof NorthAmericanifestylesandconsumptionpatterns,playa keyrolein the transnationalapitalist lass.I shallreturn othis ssuebelow.

These,then,are thecomponentpartsof theTCCalongthe borderand, f

myanalysisscorrect, he traditionaluling lassesofMexicoarebeing rans-

formed in these directionsas a consequenceof the changingnatureofMexico'sgradual ndgrowingnsertionnto theglobalcapitalist ystem.Every ruling lassrequires ubordinate lassesto rule.Alongtheborder,

the maquila ndustryhas effectivelyreplacedor supplementedhe under-classes thatwere createdby mines, land,and cattle,some of whichwerethemselvescreatedby US business nterests,with an industrial roletariat.Whiteford 1986: 34) puts this in uncompromisingerms: theassembly-

98




plantworkersare thusthe urbancounterparto [Mexicali's]andlessrurallaborers:both groupsarenon-unionized,poorlypaid,anddeprivedof the

social benefitsof economicdevelopment n the Mexicaliregion'.The nextsectionswill look in more detailat how this new transnationallassimposeditsprojectonthetwolargest entresof themaquilandustry long he border.

THETRANSNATIONALCAPITALISTCLASSINCIUDADJUAREZ/ELPASO

An IndustrialDevelopmentBoard was established n Juarezin the mid-1960s, with an office in El Paso. Itsmembershipncludedbusinesspeople,bankers, awyers,educatorsand officials.The Juarezboard madeno bones

about hespecificattraction f thecity npublicitymaterialtdistributednElPaso. Thefullyburdenedweeklywagebased on theJanuary1968 minimumwasjustover$20 for a 48-hour week.Evenin 1968, thisspokefor itself.

The competitionbetween Mexicanborder cities for maquilashasalwaysbeenintense,andinthe mid to late 1960s it was notJuarez hatattractedhebulk of the first wave of large maquilas,but cities like Mexicaliand NuevoLaredo.However,after 1970 the maquila ndustry n Juarez ook off, andalthoughtlaggedbehindTijuanantermsof thenumbers fplants, romthattime on Juarezhas had more maquilaemployees than any single city inMexico.It also boasted the largestcollectionof Fortune 500 corporations(the world's largestTNCs), an achievementthat the public and privatefacilitators evertiredof publicising.

A feature of the Juarezmaquila ndustryat this time was the apparentsuccessof 'twinplants'n El Pasothatserviced hemaquilasnJuarez.This sof greatinterestboth in relationto the early growthof the industryandinrelation o thestructure f the transnationallass thatwasbeingcreated.Theveryfact thatthe city of El Paso devoted a sectionof its 1971 communityrenewalprogramo themaquila ndustrys itselfsignificant.14

The leadingforce on the Mexicanside of the borderwas the Bermiidez

family,whohad a construction

ompanyandsaw the

opportunityfbuildingindustrialparks orthemaquilas.The AntonioJ.BermiidezPark,named or

the patriarchof the familywho had broughtthe BorderIndustrializationProgramto Juarez,employeda US citizen,WilliamMitchell,to sell the'maquilan thepark' dea to US corporations.Mitchellsawvery clearly hatsuccesslaywith those whocouldattract hebig players,and he aggressivelywent aftersome Fortune500 companies.His firstmajorsuccess wasRCA,which alreadyhad a joint venturein Mexico City,but was convincedbyGrupoBermiidez o turn t into amaquilanthenewpark heywerebuildinginJuarez.The firstpriority, onsistentwith hepolicyofattracting nd retain-

ingFortune 500 companies,was to build a parkto internationaltandardswith on-site facilities that would eliminateas much of the difficultyofoperatingnMexico aspossible.

Themaquilaactivitiesof GrupoBermiidezexpandedconsiderablyn the1970s and 1980s. Itestablishedothermaquilaparks nJuarez,an industrialpark n El Paso(thePanAmericanCenter orIndustry), nda seriesof parksoutside Juarez, mainly in the State of Chihuahua.In addition, Grupo

99




Bermfidez s involved n maquilaparks n Coahuilaand the Yucatanandactively eeks freshsitesonacontinuing asis.'5

Also active nbuilding

ndustrialarks

orthemaquilandustryromthe1970s was a group of Mexican entrepreneurswho, like Bermtidez,

expanded rompurelydomesticenterprise.TheGrupoOmega,directedbyOscarCantuMurguia, nd the GrupoJuarezof FranciscoVillareal,bothestablished ndustrialparksfor the maquila ndustry,offeringa varietyofservices.Severalother individuals ndgroups nJuairez lsobeganto leaseoutfactoryspace(see Salas-Porras, 987:55-56). Thesewerejoinedby asubstantialore of professional nd commercial ersonnelwhowere abletoservice hegrowingmaquila ndustry.The Juarez awfirm,GonzalezVargasetal., werethe first egalexperts n thecityto takean active nterest n the

maquilasandtheybuiltup a thrivingbusiness n advisingandrepresentingUS and Mexicancompanies.'6Other law firmsfollowed suit. It would beincorrect,however, o suggest hattheMexican lement romJuarez otallydominated hemaquila ndustryntheearlyyears,much esstoday.Thenasnow the publicfacilitatorsn El Paso, those attached o the ChamberofCommerceandthe IndustrialDevelopmentCorporation, ndvariousothernon-profitbut profit-oriented rganisations,were quick to see the sig-nificanceof themaquilasor theprosperity fElPaso andfor thecreation feconomicopportunitiesorthe new transnationallass thatwasformingall

alongtheborder.Likewise,groupsof private acilitatorswere active n the

establishment nd growthof the industry.These private acilitatorswereoftenmen,and morerecently omewomen,whobeganby working or the

larger maquilas n Juarezand elsewhere.By dint of their vision for the

industryas a whole,theybecameactivists or themaquilasn the local andwidercommunity.Some circulatedbetween executive roles in industrial

parksandspecificmaquilas ndindependent onsultancy ndquasi-officialstatepositions(though his was much more characteristic f the Mexican

side),andbackagain.Thephysicalgrowthof themaquila ndustrynJuarezwasmatchedbythe

growthn

numbers nd levelsof

activityfthepublicandprivate acilitatorson bothsidesof the border. n 1980 the stateof Chihuahua et up its own

industrialpromotion agency, Promotorade la IndustriaChihuahuense,whichhas been instrumentalince theninestablishing t leastsixindustrial

parks orthemaquilandustry.ntheseparks he stategovernment ffersa

varietyof industrial acilities and services. The state has also activelyencouragedhegrowthof themaquila ssociationswhich,whilenotformallypartof the stateapparatus, learlyenjoya specialrelationshipwith it. InJuarez, he Asociaci6nde MaquiladorasAMAC)is activebothpoliticallyon behalf of the industry,and in a researchand informationgathering

capacity.AMAC,which slegallyaprivatenon-profit rganisation,s fundedby the maquilasthemselves,throughthe affiliationthat all registeredmaquilasmust maintain with CANACINTRA (National Chamber of

Manufacturers).The majorpublicfacilitators t workin the Juarezmaquila ndustryare

usually itherstraightforwardrmsof localgovernmentrnon-profit odiesthat are at leastpartlysupported rompublicfunds,and theyexpressthe

100




official ideology of the rulingstrata on both sides of the border that the

maquila ndustry s essentialfor the well being of both the border com-

munitiesandthenational nterest.The borderlands ocio-economicsystemsbothpermitandencouragepeople in such'public'organisationso flitbackandforthbetween hepublicandtheprivate ectors,and n thistheyare n no

way unique.Indeed,this is very typicalof all the TCCs thatare emergingaround he worldtoday.

THETRANSNATIONALCAPITALISTCLASSIN TIJUANA/SAN DIEGO

The first'maquila ype' plantswere established n Tijuanayearsbefore theofficialprogramme otunderway(seeMungaray, 983:26). From the mid-

1960s, privatefacilitators n California,principally he Cal Pacifico com-pany, began to develop the shelter plan concept, a variation on

subcontracting.Manyof thosewho wereto becomeinfluentialmembersofthe maquila ransnational lass,such as RichardCampbellwho founded asuccessfulmaquilapark nNogales,RichardBolin,aprominentnternational

production-sharingonsultantandfounderof theWorldExportProcessingZones Associations,and Enrique Esparza,whose firmeventuallybecametheleading acilitatornTijuana,had worked or Cal Pacifico.

Inthe mid-1960s somelargercorporationsbeganto look seriouslyat the

prospectsfor maquilasn Tijuana.The electronics ndustrywas wellrepre-sented nthisearly nflow.LittonIndustries, peratingunder he nameTriaddeMexico,openedtwoplantsandFairchild, ne of thepioneersof theglobalelectronics ndustry,also openeda componentassemblyplant n Tijuanan1966.

Tijuanadid, in fact,have a small industrialparkat this time,the CentroIndustrial Barranquita,established in the mid-1960s by a Mexican

developer.This was not an industrial ark ntheacceptedsenseof theterm,certainlynothing ike theparksbeingcreated nNogalesor inCiudadJuarez.It was morelike a zoningdevice to encourage actories o locateneareach

other,and few serviceswere providedbeyond the provisionof industrialspace.The lack of properindustrialparksmeant that certaintypes of USfirms(particularly ortune 500 corporations)were less likelyto establish

maquilasin Tijuanaand, conversely, others (garment'sweatshops', or

example)weremorelikelyto do so. The importance f industrialparks orthe maquilaindustryhas been insufficientlyappreciated[but see Salas-Porras, 1987; and Ochoa in Lee (ed.), 1988]. The concentration ffects oftheseparksalsogivethe transnationalapitalist lass a particular haracterthata moredispersed ndustrywillnotprovide.17

Themostimportantprivatemaquilaacilitatornthe Californiasn recent

years has been Henry Esparza's company,Assemble in Mexico, whichaggressively reateda market or its shelterandsubcontractingervicesallover the Californias ndbeyond.Itbroughta largevarietyof industriesand

processesto Tijuana,and has actively nvolved itself in the trainingof thelocal workforce. ts maincompetitor s IMEC,a company hat has special-ised mainly n the electronicsfield.HowardBoysen,who builtit up to itspresentposition,workedfor Fairchild, he first US electronicscorporation

101




to go into offshoreassembly n the 1960s. Boysen opened the Fairchild

factory nTijuananthe late1960s,and he sawclearly hegreatpotentialofthe

maquilaprogramorthe electronics

ndustry.He

eventually oughtout

his bosses and established MEC(InternationalManufacturing,ngineer-ing, and Consulting). MEC, like most facilitators, trivesto maintainabalancebetweena US headand a Mexicanmanagerialndtechnicaleam neachof itsplants.Tothisend it hastrained ndbrought longmanyMexican

managers ndtechnicianswhich s nodoubtgoodforMexicoandtends o be

cheaperandmoreconvenienthanhiringUScitizens.The Mexican nput o themaquilandustrynTijuanahas been consider-

able,but untilquiterecentlynarather ess visible ashion han nothercities

along he border.This smostlydueto the absenceofproperndustrial arks,

andto the prominenceof other commercial pportunities,or example ntourismand realestate(seeHerzog,1990).Sincetheearly1980s severalofthe leadingbusiness familiesin the city have takenmore interest n the

maquila ndustry.The GrupoBustamante dded the provisionof maquilasites to its involvementn utilitiesandhotels; heLutherot roupruns hree

maquilaparksas well as various ouristventures; nd the ConsorcioTijuanaunder he direction fJaimeBonillahasalso addedmaquila iteprovisionoits newspaper, construction and tourist interests (see Salas-Porras,1987:57).

Another nfluentialmaquilaacilitatornTijuanasJorgeSalmanHadad,a

long-timeapparelmaquila perator.He isparticularlymportant ecauseheisapastpresident ftheNationalMaquilaAssociation ndduringhis termofofficehe spoke up clearlyandloudlyfor theimportance f themaquilasnMexico'seffort oachieveeconomicprogress.

Therefore,n these centresof maquiladevelopment recognisablyrans-national lasshasemergedover thepast20 years.Thoughon thesurface hisclass s 'bi-national'(aterm nfrequentuseamongpolicy-makers)tis,inmysense,'transnational'n so far as it directs hemaquilandustryn termsof

global strategiesand interests and not simplyin terms of Mexican-USrelations.This has

brought ogetherMexican,US and other

capitalists, ro-fessionals,andofficials,whosee theirown interests nd the interestsof theirrespectivecountriesbest servedby promoting he global interestsof the

maquilandustry.Onoccasion,US facilitators irectly ause heloss of someUSjobs,andMexicansoregosome othereconomicopportunitieso makeasuccessof the maquilas.This transnationalapitalistclassgenuinelycon-ceives its own interests n termsof the globalcapitalistprojectandabovenarrowernational nterests.My arguments thatthetransnationalapitalistclassalongtheborder, ike similar lassesallover theworld, sfurtheringheinterestsof globalcapitalism.

THECULTURE-IDEOLOGYOFCONSUMERISMTherehas been a gooddealof systematic esearch n whatmightbe termedtheculture-ideologyf consumerismn theThirdWorld(see Sklair,1991:

especially h.5),andthis s a central heme nmuchLatinAmerican esearchon 'cultural mperalism'see Atwood and McAnany,1984). While the

maquilandustrydid not createaculture-ideologyf consumerismlong he

102




US-Mexican border,it certainlybroadenedthe reachand intensifiedthescopeof thepre-existing ulture-ideology f consumerism.

Historiesof theborderregionarequiteexpliciton theimpactof theUSAon Mexicanconsumer behaviour.Fernandez(1977: 120), quotingfromresearch arriedoutinthe late1960s, indicates hatMexicansonthefronteranorte ypicallyboughtservicesandstaples nMexico,buttended o cross theborder to purchasemanufacturedgoods (clothing, cars and car parts,appliances,cannedgoods) andAmerican[sic]liquorand cigarettes.'8Thetaste for 'American' onsumergoods is not, of course,uniqueto Mexicans,and indeed explainingthis and exploring its ramificationsare centralresearchquestions or thethesisof the'culture-ideologyfconsumerism'.o,changesin Mexicanconsumptionpatternsconsequenton the rise of the

maquilandustrywouldbe a usefultestfor thethesis.Intheabsenceof specificstudies, heindirect vidence ssupportive.nthefirstplace, there is little doubt that maquilaworkers,at least up until theeconomiccrisisof 1982, did tend to shop regularlyon the US side of theborder, as indicated above. The Border Trade Alliance, a transnationallobbying group active in the promotion of the maquila industry andtransborderconomicrelationsngeneral,mobilisedUSborder owns nthe1980s to find outexactlyhowmuchMexicanswerespending ntheirshops.Thisinformationwaswidelyused to demonstrate hat themaquila ndustrybroughttangiblebenefits to the USA againstthe argumentsof the labour

movement(specifically he AFL-CIO) that the maquilasmeantonly jobdestruction orUS workers.'9

The culture-ideology f consumerismcan only be effectiveif there is amaterial nfrastructure nd a politicalwill to support t. The infrastructurethatthemaquilandustryhelpedto createalso served o spreadconsumeristpracticesandvalues.The roadsthat inkedthefactoriesand theborderalsoconnectedthe maquilaworkerswith retailoutlets,particularlyheUS-styleshopping malls that sprung up all over the frontera norte in the 1970s and1980s. Thebanksand creditagencies hatfacilitatedbusinessalso financed

consumeroutlets and spending.The servicesfor the maquila ndustryandthose who did business with it, like hotels, car rental, communicationssystems,office suppliers,also helpedcreate a moregeneral buyingatmos-phere'.And alongwith all this hardandsoft infrastructuralhange, ourismalso made its substantialcontribution o the intensificationof a culture-ideologyof consumerism longtheborder(Herzog,1990).

There are other indicationsof this in a varietyof culturalspheres.AsIglesias 1985) andMaciel(1990) bothargue,albeit nratherdifferentways,the US-Mexico borderarea has held a peculiar ascination or USA andMexicanfilm-makers.Whilethe genrecovers a large varietyof topics in a

multitudeof ways,the consumeristmagesof the'good ife'on the othersideof theborder-'Across theRio Grande iesParadise'(Maciel,1990: 30)-isclearlya dominant heme.2" sub-themeof the debatearound hemaquilas,not coincidentally, s the argument hat maquilaemploymentmay causefewerMexicans o crosstheborder llegally.

There is, thus,plentifulanecdotalevidence that the culture-ideology fconsumerism as beenspillingover theborder ordecadesandcontinues o

103




do so. Direct observation of the towns and cities of the frontera norte

provides ample evidence of the transformation f recently sleepy and

uncommercialised ordercommunitiesnto

burgeoningonsumerist ites.

Nevertheless, s Oliveira 1988: 24) argues onvincinglyna studyof mediause andconsumptionn Brazil, he 'strong ntervening ariable' f incomeintrudesbetween he desireto own a productand actualconsumption.Theeffectof the 'culture-ideologyf consumerism',herefore,s to increase he

range of consumptionexpectationsand aspirationswithoutnecessarilyensuringheincometo buy.Themaquilandustry,ike similar nitiatives llover theworld,was builton promises hata moredirect ntegrationwiththe

capitalist lobalsystemwould eadto a better ifeforall(asis the caseforthecurrent evolutionaryransformationsn EasternEurope).This hasnotyet

beendecisivelydemonstratedorthoseworkingnthemaquilandustry,etalone therestofMexico.

CONCLUSION

The advent of the TNC-dominatedmaquilaindustry along Mexico'snorthernborderhas broughtwith it hundredsof thousandsof jobs, some

involving considerabletransferof skills if not technology,and manymanagerial ndtechnicalopportunitiesor the localpopulation.Thepricethat has had to be paid is the almost total integrationof thefronteranorte into

a new type of system.This new system,a re-formation f capitalism,hasreplaceda previousregionalcapitalismbasedon US andMexicanminingandagriculturalnterestswitha trulyglobalcapitalist ystemthatoperatesthrough he dominatingnfluenceof the 'Fortune500' corporations,whomake theirkey decisionson the basis of globalstrategiesand on whomhundreds f maquilasnMexicoandcountless housands f smaller irmsallover theworld,aredependent.

The focus here has been on the forces of globalisation, nd one con-

sequenceof thethesis s that hese forces ncreasinglymarginaliseheforcesof

regionalismrlocalism.

Alongthe

border,he transnational

orporationsclearlydominate hemaquilandustry,ither hrough irectownership fthemaquilasor throughmore indirectsub-contractingr marketing rrange-ments.Slowlybut surely, they are also beginning o dominatethe localeconomies, o incorporate rdestroydirectcompetitors, ndto confine herestof the local economies o themargins.

The same canbe argued orthoseaspirantso dominant lassstatuswhorefuse ojointhe transnationalapitalist lassandanyculture-ideologyhatrefuses capitalistconsumerism.As long as such forces do not openlychallenge he forcesof globalisation heywillbe toleratedon the margins.

Religion, folk culture,alternative ifestyle, the marginaleconomy, forexample,mightall beusefully onceptualisednthisfashion.In thispaper havetried o showhow the'maquilisationf Mexico'along

the borderoperates hroughheTNCs,anemergingransnationalapitalistclass and a culture-ideologyf consumerismhatsolidifies hesystem.Thedebates nMexicoover theproposed FreeTradeAgreement'with heUSAandCanadaarebeginningo acknowledgehat,as withtheoriginal ntryof

104



THE MAQUILAS IN MEXICO 105

the maquilas in the mid-1960s, this new globalising force offers not only

promises of economic change, but a hidden agenda of a new way of life.

NOTES

1. Versions of this paper have been given at the Annual Conference of the Society of LatinAmerican Studies in Glasgow in April 1991 and at the Contemporary Mexico Seminar atthe Institute for Latin American Studies of the University of London in May 1991. I wouldlike to thank all those who attended for making them lively and instructive sessions. Thanksare also due to the referees of the Bulletin of Latin American Research for many helpfulcriticisms of the first draftof the paper.

2. On the GATT issue in the context of the maquilas, see Gonzalez-Ar6chiga and BarajasEscamilla (eds) (1989: Part IV, and especially the essays by Gustavo del Castillo and No6Ar6n Fuentes). The negotiations over the Free Trade Agreement with the USA and Canada

have generated a large volume of scholarly and periodical literature, for example, BernalSahagin et al. (1990); recent issues of Comercio exterior (for example, the issue of July1991) and Review of the Economic Situation of Mexico (for example, No. 785, April 1991).In the USA it has even made the columns of The New York Times (26 April 1991) in an

interesting pair of letters by Ralph Nader and the chairman of the Border Trade Alliance,the leading maquila lobby organisation. See also Sklair(199 la).

3. As reported in La Jornada (8 June 1985). Foreign investment in Mexico, according toofficial figures, increased from US $20.9 billion in 1987 to US $30.3 billion in 1990. Muchof this increase was due to foreign investment in the recently liberalised Mexican stock

exchange. Amendments to the Law to Promote Mexican Investment and Regulate ForeignInvestment in 1989 has opened up about 80 per cent of Mexico's economy to potentialforeign majorityownership. Fixed investment in the maquila industry is said to be over US

$5 billion.4. The maquila (or maquiladora) industry is the Mexican version of the export-oriented in-bond industry found now all over the world. For an historical account of the maquilaindustry, see Sklair (1989: ch. 3-7), from which this paper borrows and updates somematerial. Currentdataon the maquilaindustryare published regularlyby InstituloNacionalde Estadistica Geogrdficae Informatica (INEGI), which has also published historical datafor the industry since its establishment. Substantial selections from these data are repro-duced and interpreted in Sklair (1989). See also Gonzalez-Ar6chiga and BarajasEscamilla

(1989).5. What follows is an extremely abbreviated summaryof the frameworkput forward in Sklair

(1991). I make no claims that this framework is at most much more thanan embryonic stageof development.

6. So-called after the listings of the largest TNCs published annually by Fortune magazine.While most maquilas are run by and/or for small to medium-sized companies, in terms of

jobs and investment and, in particular, influence in the political and culture-ideologyspheres, the Fortune 500 corporations dominate the industry. This is also the case for

foreign investment in most countries.7. For recent research that more fully indicates the complexity of this question, see Brown and

Dominguez (1989), Gonzilez-Ar6chiga and Ramirez (1989), and Jorge Carrillo (1990)and his colleagues on the maquilas in the automotive industries. In general, these Mexicanresearchers are moderately optimistic about the possibilities of technology transferthroughthe maquilas.Shaiken (1990), in his study of five US-owned high tech plants in Mexico (twoauto plants and three electronics maquilas), critically discusses the 'reverse comparativeadvantage' thesis (that new technology will draw offshore jobs back home).

8. I discuss this more fully in Sklair (1989: 206-213) where particularattention is paid to theoriginal research of El Centro de Orientaci6n de la Mujer Obrera (COMO) in CiudadJuarez. Another small but growing form of technology transfer is where Mexican maquilamanagers and/or technicians leave the TNC and set up their own sub-contracting or

supplier firms.9. Evans (1979), writingon Brazil, developed the interesting idea of a 'triplealliance' between

multinational, state and local capital. The utility of the concept is, in my view, limited by itsstate-centrism.



106 BULLETINOF LATINAMERICANRESEARCH

10. Hale (1965) reports that by 1965 there were about 200 local industrial developmentcorporations in Texas, and Jamail (1981: 84) points out that 'in almost every [USborder)community there is a group concerned with the maquilaindustry'.

11. The sexism is this statement conceals the fact that the maquila industry employs mostlywomen, including a relatively large number of women in managementand administrative

positions (see Sklair, 1989: passim.).12. For an excellent study of the impact of foreign investmenton the Chihuahuarulingclass in

the half-centurybefore the Revolution, see Wasserman(1984).13. See the useful review articleby Cleaves and Stephens (1991) which discusses a varietyof

recent contributions to this debate.14. A salutaryreminder that the 'dependence' created by the maquila industryis not all in the

one direction is provided by Prock's(1983) demonstrationof thedevastatingeffects of pesodevaluations for the Texas side of the border.

15. In the late 1980s, Grupo Bermuidezhandled around40 per cent of Juarezmaquila employ-ment and over 10 per cent of the national total.

16. Under the name of Bryan,Gonzalez Vargas,Gonzalez Baz, Delgado y Rogers, it was said tobe the largestlaw firm in Mexico outside Mexico City.

17. In 1988, 44 per cent of maquilasbut 75 per cent of maquila obs were located in specialisedmaquila parks [Ochoa in Lee (ed.), 1988: 90l.

18. Inone of the rareattemptsto come to gripsdirectlywiththe issue of 'consumerism'alongthe

border, Martinez(1990) brieflydiscusses this in the context of what he terms transnational

fronterizos.19. Some of the evidence for this is evaluatedin Sklair(1989: 204-206, and ch. 2, passim.).The

Border Trade Alliance is discussed on p. 180. For the specific effects of the crisis on thecommerce of one US border town, see Bilbao (1986) and on the consumption patternsofthe fronteranorte population as a whole, see Gonzalez-Arechiga (1985).

20.Iglesias (1985) reports

that in theyears

1984 and 1985 there were 172 films made withborder locations

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Maquilas in Mexico