Marbury v. Madison – Case Brief SummarySummary of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803).

FactsOn his last day in office, President John Adams named forty-two justices of the peace and sixteen new circuit court justices for the District of Columbia under the Organic Act. The Organic Act was an attempt by the Federalists to take control of the federal judiciary before Thomas Jefferson took office.

The commissions were signed by President Adams and sealed by acting Secretary of State John Marshall (who later became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and author of this opinion), but they were not delivered before the expiration of Adams’s term as president. Thomas Jefferson refused to honor the commissions, claiming that they were invalid because they had not been delivered by the end of Adams’s term.

William Marbury (P) was an intended recipient of an appointment as justice of the peace. Marbury applied directly to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of mandamus to compel Jefferson’s Secretary of State, James Madison (D), to deliver the commissions. The Judiciary Act of 1789 had granted the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus “…to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.”

Issues1. Does Marbury have a right to the commission?

2. Does the law grant Marbury a remedy?

3. Does the Supreme Court have the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are unconstitutional and therefore void?

4. Can Congress expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in Article III of the Constitution?

5. Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus?

Holding and Rule (Marshall)1. Yes. Marbury has a right to the commission.

The order granting the commission takes effect when the Executive’s constitutional power of appointment has been exercised, and the power has been exercised when the last act required from the person possessing the power has been performed. The grant of the commission to Marbury became effective when signed by President Adams.

2. Yes. The law grants Marbury a remedy.The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection.

Where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, the individual who considers himself injured has a right to resort to the law for a remedy. The President, by signing the commission, appointed Marbury a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia. The seal of the United States, affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, is conclusive testimony of the verity of the signature, and of the completion of the appointment. Having this legal

right to the office, he has a consequent right to the commission, a refusal to deliver which is a plain violation of that right for which the laws of the country afford him a remedy.

3. Yes. The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are unconstitutional and therefore void.

It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret the rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Court must decide on the operation of each. If courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.

4. No. Congress cannot expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in Article III of the Constitution.

The Constitution states that “the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.” If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the Legislature to apportion the judicial power between the Supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that body, this section is mere surplusage and is entirely without meaning. If Congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and original jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared it shall be appellate, the distribution of jurisdiction made in the Constitution, is form without substance.

5. No. The Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus.

To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.

It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper is, in effect, the same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and is therefore a matter of original jurisdiction.

DispositionApplication for writ of mandamus denied. Marbury doesn’t get the commission.

Marbury v. MadisonPosted on September 20, 2012  |  Constitutional Law  |  Tags:  Constitutional Law Case Brief

FACTSIn the final days of John Adams’ presidency he appointed a multitude of justices of the peace under the “Organic Act” deliberately because the oncoming President Thomas Jefferson would not.  The commissions were signed and sealed but were not delivered.  President Jefferson later refused to honor the commissions because they had gone undelivered until Jefferson had held office and therefore felt they were invalid.  Marbury, one of the appointees, later applied to the supreme court for a writ of

mamandus, claiming that the Supreme Court could issue such write  “…to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.”

ISSUE1. Is Marbury’s appointment valid?2. Whether the Supreme Court can award the writ of mandamus.3. Whether the Supreme Court has judicial review power.4. Is offering the writ of mandamus the appropriate remedy for the court?HOLDING:

1. Yes.  It is valid because the appointment was done in full while Adams was still President.  He completed the entire task of the appointment process and did all he could do in such completion.  The appointment is valid when the President undertakes his final act required for the appointment, not upon delivery of the appointment which is beyond the President’s control.  Marbury is entitled to appointment as a remedy because it was a right given to him by President Adams.  In this sense, Marbury was given “a specific right.”  The very essence of government is to provide remedies to rights that are abridged.

2. Yes, the appointment was a legal right offered to Marbury; and for every legal right violated, the law must afford a remedy.  As such, his remedy is the rightful entitlement to the appointment.  The delivery of the appointment was simply “ministerial” and therefore was owed to him.  The appointment had already occurred prior to the necessity of delivery; and once the appointment was granted, Marbury had a vested legal right.

3. Yes, but not in the instant case. The Judiciary Act of 1789 clearly gives the Supreme Court judicial review over writs of mandamus.  However, Article III of the Constitution does not give the Supreme Court authority to review the writs.  Therefore, the two laws are in conflict.  As such, the Supreme Court – being charged with upholding the Constitution – must adopt Article III’s application.  Justice Marshall argued that there would be no point for the Supreme Court to exist were it not to uphold the Constitution and strike down laws adopted by Congress that necessarily conflict with the Constitution itself.  In so doing, Marshall established the principle of judicial review.

4. Yes, but in the instant case the Constitution conflict with the Judiciary Act of 1789 and therefore the remedy cannot be proffered.  In this case, a writ of mandamus is appropriate because it is an order for a public official to carry out his duty.  But for the reasons explained in (3), the order cannot be carried out.

CALTEX VS PALOMAR

Facts: In 1960, the petitioner, Caltex (Philippines) Inc., launched a promotional scheme called "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" which calls for participants to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump of each Caltex Station will dispense within a specific period. Such contest is open to all motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers. There is no required fee or consideration, and there is no need for the contestants to purchase the products of Caltex.  The forms are available upon request at each Caltex Station and there is a sealed can where accomplished entry stubs may be deposited.  Then, seeing the extensive use of mails for publicizing and transmission of communication purposes, Caltex sent representatives to the postal authorities for advance clearing for the use of mails for the contest.  But then, the Postmaster  General, Enrico Palomar, denied the request of Caltex in view of Sections 1954 (a), 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code.  The aforesaid sections prohibits the use of mail conveying any information concerning non-mailable schemes, such as lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme. Consequently, Caltex invoked a judicial intervention by filing a petition of declaratory relief against the Postmaster General, ordering the Postmaster General to allow the petitioner to use the mails to bring the contest to the attention of the public and that the aforesaid contest is not violative of the Postal Law.

Issue:Whether or not the scheme proposed by Caltex is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law

inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used therein.

Held:No. Caltex may be granted declaratory relief, even if Enrico Palomar simply applied the clear provisions of the law to a given set of facts as embodied in the rules of the contest.  For, construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case is not

explicitly provided for in the law.

In this case, the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably required an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used therein.  Also, the Court is tasked to look beyond the fair exterior, to the substance, in order to

unmask the real element that the law is seeking to prevent or prohibit.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

 

G.R. No. 97973 January 27, 1992

SPOUSES GAUVAIN and BERNARDITA BENZONAN, petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, BENITO SALVANI PE and DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

G.R. No. 97998 January 27, 1992

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and BENITO SALVANI PE, respondents.

Ruben E. Agpalo for Sps. Gauvain and Bernardita Benzonan.

Vicente R. Acsay for Benito Salvani Pe.

Thomas T. Jacobo for DBP.

 

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition to review the August 31, 1990 decision of the Court of Appeals which sustained the right of respondent Benito Salvani Pe to repurchase a parcel of land foreclosed by petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and sold to petitioners Gauvain and Bernardita Benzonan.

Respondent Pe is a businessman in General Santos City who owns extensive commercial and agricultural properties. He is the proprietor of the firm "Dadiangas B.P. Trading." One of the properties he acquired through free patents and miscellaneous sales from the Bureau of Lands is a 26,064 square meters parcel covered by Free Patent No. 46128 issued on October 29, 1969. OCT No. P-2404 was issued on November 24, 1969.

On February 24, 1970 or barely three months after he acquired the land, the respondent mortgaged the lot in question, together with another lot covered by TCT No. 3614 and some chattels to secure a commercial loan of P978,920.00 from the DBP. The lot was developed into a commercial-industrial complex with ricemill and warehouse facilities, a solar drier, an office and residential building, roadway, garden, depository, and dumping grounds for various materials.

When the private respondent failed to pay his loan after more than seven years had passed, DBP foreclosed the mortgage on June 28, 1977. On that date, the total obligation amounted to P1,114,913.34. DBP was the highest bidder. Certificates of sale were issued in its favor; P452,995.00 was for the two lots and P108,450.00 for the chattels. The certificate covering the disputed lot was registered with the Registry of Deeds on January 24, 1978.

After the foreclosure sale, respondent Pe leased the lot and its improvements from DBP for P1,500.00 a month. Part of the property was also leased by DBP to the then National Grains Authority.

The respondent failed to redeem the property within the one year period. On September 24, 1979 DBP sold the lot to the petitioner for P1,650,000.00 payable in quarterly amortizations over a five year period. The petitioners occupied the purchased lot and introduced further improvements worth P970,000.00.

On July 12, 1983, claiming that he was acting within the legal period given to him to repurchase, respondent Pe offered in writing to repurchase the lot for P327,995.00. DBP countered, however, that over the years a total of P3,056,739.52 had already been incurred in the preservation, maintenance, and introduction of improvements.

On October 4, 1983, Pe filed a complaint for repurchase under Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City.

On November 27, 1986, the trial court rendered judgment. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the defendant Development Bank of the Philippines is ordered:

1) to reconvey unto the plaintiff the parcel of land in question (Lot No. P-2404) for the repurchase price of P327,995.00 plus legal interest from June 18, 1977 to June 19, 1978 only, and the expenses of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage; expenses for registration and ten percent (10%) attorneys fees;

2) ordering the defendants to vacate forever the premises of said property in favor of the plaintiff upon payment of the total repurchase price;

3) ordering the defendants, jointly and solidarily, to pay the plaintiff attorney's fees in the amount of P25,000.00;

4) and to set an example to government banking and lending institutions not to take borrowers for granted by making it hard for them to repurchase by misleading them, the bank is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff by way of exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00;

Ordering further the defendant DBP:

5) to reimburse the co-defendants spouses Benzonan the amount they have paid or advanced the defendant DBP for the purchase of Lot O.C.T. No. P-2404;

6) ordering the defendants to pay the cost of suit. (Rollo of G.R. No. 97973, pp. 74-75)

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision with modifications as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

All the foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the decision rendered by the court a quo with the modification that the defendant DBP shall reimburse to its co-defendant Benzonan spouses all amounts that the latter have paid for the land, minus interest, and that the Benzonan spouses shall be allowed to remove the improvement that they have made on the property under litigation, without impairing or damaging the same. (Rollo of G.R. No. 97973, p. 105)

A motion for reconsideration was denied on March 19, 1991.

The petitioners-spouses in G.R. No. 97973 raise the following "legal issues, reasons, or errors" allegedly committed by the Court of Appeals, to wit:

1. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that conversion and use of the land in question to industrial or commercial purposes, as a result of which it could no longer be used for cultivation, and the fact that respondent Pe has vast holdings whose motive in seeking to repurchase the property is to continue the business or for speculation or greater profits did not deprive him of the right to repurchase under Sec. 119 of CA 141, and, as a result, in ignoring or disregarding Pe's admissions and undisputed facts establishing such circumstances, contrary to what this Court held in Santana v.Mariñas, 94 SCRA 853 [1979], Vargas v. Court of Appeals, 91 SCRA 195 [1979] and Simeon v. Peña,36 SCRA 610 [1970].

2. Assuming, arguendo, that respondent Pe still had the right to repurchase the land under Sec. 119 of CA 141, the Court of Appeals erred in not counting the 5-year period from the date of foreclosure sale on June 18, 1977 or at the very most from its registration on January 24, 1978, in accordance with the prevailing doctrinal law at the time as enunciated in Monge v. Angeles, 101 Phil. 561 [1957],Oliva v. Lamadrid, 21 SCRA 737 [1967] and Tupas v. Damasco, 132 SCRA 593 [1984], pursuant to which Pe's right to repurchase already expired.

3. The Court of Appeals erred in applying retroactively the ruling in Belisario v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 165 SCRA 101 [1988], which held that the 5-year period is counted from the date after the one-year period to redeem foreclosed homestead expired, to the foreclosure of the land in question in 1977, as its retroactive application revived Pe's lost right of repurchase and defeated petitioners' right of ownership that already accrued under the then prevailing doctrinal law.

4. Assuming, arguendo, that respondent Pe had the right to repurchase the land in question and assuming, further, that the 5-year period is to be counted from the consolidation of ownership after the expiration of the one-year period to redeem, the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the mere filing of an action for repurchase

without tendering or depositing the repurchase price did not satisfy the requirements of repurchase, Pe's failure to make the tender or deposit even up to the present being confirmatory of speculative motive behind his attempt to repurchase.

5. Assuming, finally, that respondent Pe is entitled to repurchase the property, the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that petitioners are possessors in good faith, similar to a vendee a retro, entitled (a) to reimbursement of necessary and useful expenses under Article 1616 of the Civil Code as held in Calagan v. CFI of Davao, 95 SCRA 498 [1980] and in Lee v. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 196 [1975]; and (b) to refund of all amounts paid by them by reason of the sale of the property in their favor, including interest payments, in both instances with right of retention. (Rollo of G.R. No. 97973, pp. 14-16)

In G.R No. 97998, DBP limited its petition to the value of the repurchase price and the nature of the contract between the parties. It framed the issues as follows:

1. The Court of Appeals erred in not holding that Section 31 of Commonwealth Act No. 459 as amended is not applicable in the instant case to determine the repurchase price contrary to decisions of the Honorable Supreme Court in the following cases: DBP v. Jimenez, et al. (36 SCRA 426) andDBP v. Mirang (66 SCRA 141).

2. The Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the law between the contracting parties are the terms and conditions embodied in the contract signed by them. (Rollo of G.R. No. 97998, p. 12)

We find merit in the petitions.

The determination of the main issues raised by the petitioners calls for the proper application of Section 119 of CA 141 as amended which provides: "Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five years from the date of conveyance."

There is no dispute over the fact that the Government awarded the land to respondent Pe so that he could earn a living by farming the land. Did respondent Pe lose his right to repurchase the subject agricultural lot under the aforequoted law considering its conversion for industrial or commercial purposes? The evidence relating to the conversion is sufficiently established and yet was not properly appreciated by the respondent court.

Only three months after getting the free patent and the original certificate of title over the subject lot, it was mortgaged by respondent Pe to get a commercial loan of nearly P1 million from DBP. Pe spent the proceeds of the loan to construct permanent improvements on the lot for his rice-mill and other businesses, i.e., two warehouse buildings; administration-residential building; perimeter fence; solar and concrete drier; shed; machine shop; dirty kitchen; and machineries and equipments such as ricemill (TSN, August 13, 1984, pp. 173-174). The entire lot has been converted to serve commercial and industrial purposes. The testimony of petitioners Gauvain Benzonan on this score has not been successfully challenged, viz:

Q. Out of this 2.6 hectares land area, how much of this is devoted to the solar drier construction?

A. The solar drier is about one thousand (1,000) square meters . . . ah no, about six thousand (6,000) square meters.

Q. What about the area occupied by the warehouse and the ricemill complex?

A. The warehouse and ricemill complex is occupying about one and a half (1 1/2) hectares.

Q. What about the area occupied by the residence as well as the roadways?

A. It covers about another half of a hectare again, Sir.

Q. Is any part of this two point six hectares devoted to agricultural production or production of agricultural crops?

A. None whatsoever because the other portion is occupied as a dumping area for our waste materials. (TSN, PP. 361-362, Sept. 3, 1985).

The conversion of the lot for commercial purposes is understandable considering that the heart of General Santos City developed in that area.

The respondent does not deny that, he is using the land for purely commercial and industrial purposes. His explanation is that the land may be converted into agricultural land in the future. He applies the Krivenko v.Register of Deeds of Manila (79 Phil. 461 [1947]) ruling that lands not mineral or forest are agricultural in nature and may be devoted to business purposes without losing their agricultural classification.

Indeed, the records show that it was never the intention of respondent Pe to utilize the land, given to him for free by the Government, for agricultural purposes. He was not the kind of poor farmer for whom homesteads and free patents were intended by the law.

As stated by the petitioners:

1. Respondent Pe acquired by free patent the land in question with an area of 2.6064 hectares, which was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-2404 on November 24, 1969. Instead of cultivating it for agricultural purposes, Pe mortgaged the land, along with another land, on February 24, 1970, or only three (3) months from issuance of OCT No. P-2404, with the DBP for P978,920.00. (par. 4, complaint, Annex "A"). Pe testified that his purpose was to construct in the land in question "bodega", an administration-residential building, a perimeter fence, a concrete drier, and for some machineries and equipment." (TSN, p. 95, June 22, 1984). He stated that the improvements and facilities in the land included "the warehouse, the ricemill and a big warehouse housing the palay of stocks of the National Grains Authority and an administration-residential building, a solar drier and a perimeter fence and some sheds or garage . . . a small piggery pen of several compartments, a dirty kitchen . . . a machine shop." (TSN, pp. 173-174, August 13, 1984). Pe used the property for such purposes and operated the ricemill business for a period of about nine (9) years until

September, 1979 (pars. 7 and 8, complaint, Annex "A"), without paying the DBP of his mortgage indebtedness, as a result of which DBP foreclosed the properties. (Annex "F")

2. Respondent Pe testified that the land in question with its improvements has an appraised value of P1,347,860.00 in 1974, and P2,028,030.00 in 1976. (TSN, pp. 176, 177, August 13, 1984). Petitioner Gauvain Benzonan claimed it has a fair market value, as of 1985, of P5,000,000.00. (p. 8, trial court decision, Annex "F"). As against such value of the land and improvements, respondent Pe insisted that the repurchase price should only be the principal sum of P327,995.00. (par. 10, complaint, Annex "A")

3. Respondent Pe, when he testified in 1984, said he was 60 years old; he is now therefore over 66 years old. He is a "businessman and resident of Dadiangas, General Santos City" (TSN, p. 3, June 20, 1984), doing business under the style, "Dadiangas B.P. Trading" (TSN, 144, June 22, 1984). In his sworn declaration dated July 18, 1983, filed with the assessor's office pursuant to P.D. No. 1612, he listed the following real properties and their market value, all situated in General Santos City, to wit (Exh. 11-Benzonan):

(a) 447 sq. m. residential P 28,720.00(b) 11.9980 hectares of agri. lot P 23,880.00(c) 2.000 hectares of agri. lot P 40,000.00(d) 2.000 hectares of agri. lot P 40,000.00(e) 6,064 sq. m. of industrial lot P303,200.00(f) Industrial building P434,130.00(g) Industrial machinery P 96,000.00

On June 22, 1984, when Pe testified, he said that "I own three (3) residential lots," (TSN, p. 153, June 22, 1984) and that he and his wife own in Antique Province "around twenty (20) hectares planted to coconut and sugarcane" (ibid., p. 145); he used to have 30 hectares of agricultural lands and 22 subdivision lots, which he sold to Norma Salvani and Carlos Salvani. (TSN, pp. 166-169, June 22, 1984); Exhs. 1, 1-A, 1-B, 1-C, 3, 6, 6-A-Benzonan). (Rollo of G.R. No. 97973, pp. 17-19)

In the light of the records of these cases, we rule that respondent Pe cannot repurchase the disputed property without doing violence to everything that CA No. 141 (as amended) stands for.

We ruled in Simeon v. Peña, 36 SCRA 610, 617 [1970] through Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, that:

xxx xxx xxx

These findings of fact of the Court of Appeals that "(E)vidently, the reconveyance sought by the plaintiff (petitioner) is not in accordance with the purpose of the law, that is, "to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of public land which the State has gratuitously given to him"" and expressly found by it to "find justification from the evidence of record. . . ."

Under the circumstances, the Court is constrained to agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioners' proposed repurchase of the property does not fall within the purpose,

spirit and meaning of section 119 of the Public Land Act, authorizing redemption of the homestead from any vendee thereof.

We reiterated this ruling in Vargas v. Court of Tax Appeals, 91 SCRA 195, 200, [1979] viz:

As regards the case of Simeon v. Peña, petitioners ought to know that petitioner therein was not allowed to repurchase because the lower court found that his purpose was only speculative and for profit. In the present case, the Court of Appeals found that herein petitioners' purposes and motives are also speculative and for profit.

It might be well to note that the underlying principle of Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family the land that the State had gratuitously given to him as a reward for his labor in cleaning and cultivating it. (Simeon v. Peña, 36 SCRA 617). As found by the Court of Appeals, the motive of the petitioners in repurchasing the lots in question being one for speculation and profit, the same therefore does not fall within the purpose, spirit and meaning of said section.

and in Santana et al. v. Mariñas, 94 SCRA 853, 861-862 [1979] to wit:

In Simeon v. Peña we analyzed the various cases previously decided, and arrived at the conclusion that the plain intent, the raison d' etre, of Section 119, C.A. No. 141 ". . . is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family the land that the state had gratuitously given to him as a reward for his labor in cleaning and cultivating it." In the same breath, we agreed with the trial court, in that case, that "it is in this sense that the provision of law in question becomes unqualified and unconditional. And in keeping with such reasons behind the passage of the law, its basic objective is to promote public policy, that is, to provide home and decent living for destitutes, aimed at promoting a class of independent small landholders which is the bulwark of peace and order.

As it was in Simeon v. Peña, respondent Mariñas' intention in exercising the right of repurchase "is not for the purpose of preserving the same within the family fold," but "to dispose of it again for greater profit in violation of the law's policy and spirit." The foregoing conclusions are supported by the trial court's findings of fact already cited, culled from evidence adduced. Thus respondent Mariñas was 71 years old and a widower at the time of the sale in 1956; that he was 78 when he testified on October 24, 1963 (or over 94 years old today if still alive); that . . . he was not living on the property when he sold the same but was residing in the poblacion attending to a hardware store, and that the property was no longer agricultural at the time of the sale, but was a residential and commercial lot in the midst of many subdivisions. The profit motivation behind the effort to repurchase was conclusively shown when the then plaintiff's counsel, in the case below, Atty. Loreto Castillo, in his presence, suggested to herein petitioners' counsel, Atty. Rafael Dinglasan ". . . to just add to the original price so the case would be settled." Moreover, Atty. Castillo manifested in court that an amicable settlement was possible, for which reason he asked for time "within which to settle the terms thereof'" and that "the plaintiff . . . Mr. Mariñas, has manifested to the Court that if the defendants would be willing to pay the sum of One Peso and Fifty Centavos (P1.50) per square meter, he would be willing to accept the offer and dismiss the case."

Our decisions were disregarded by the respondent court which chose to adopt a Court of Appeals ruling in Lim, et al. v. Cruz, et al., CA-G.R. No. 67422, November 25, 1983 that the motives of the homesteader in repurchasing the land are inconsequential" and that it does not matter even "when the obvious purpose is for selfish gain or personal aggrandizement."

The other major issue is when to count the five-year period for the repurchase by respondent Pe — whether from the date of the foreclosure sale or from the expiration of the one year period to redeem the foreclosed property.

The respondent court ruled that the period of repurchase should be counted from the expiration of the one year period to redeem the foreclosed property. Since the one year period to redeem expired on January 24, 1979 and he filed Case No. 280 on October 4, 1983 to enforce his right to repurchase the disputed property, the Court of Appeals held that Pe exercised his right to repurchase within the five-year period provided by Section 119 of CA 141 as amended.

The respondent court cited Belisario, et al., v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 165 SCRA 101, 107 [1988] where we held:

. . . In addition, Section 119 of Commonwealth Act 141 provides that every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead patent provisions of the Public Land Act, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow or legal heirs within the period of five years from the date of conveyance. The five-year period of redemption fixed in Section 119 of the Public Land Law of homestead sold at extrajudicial foreclosure begins to run from the day after the expiration of the one-year period of repurchase allowed in an extrajudicial foreclosure. (Manuel v. PNB, et al., 101 Phil. 968) Hence, petitioners still had five (5) years from July 22, 1972 (the expiration of the redemption period under Act 3135) within which to exercise their right to repurchase under the Public Land Act.

As noted by the respondent court, the 1988 case of Belisario reversed the previous rulings of this Court enunciated in Monge, et al., v. Angeles, et al., 101 Phil. 563 [1957] and Tupas v. Damasco, et al., 132 SCRA 593 [1984] to the effect that the five year period of repurchase should be counted from the date of conveyance or foreclosure sale. The petitioners, however, urge that Belisario should only be applied prospectively or after 1988 since it established a new doctrine.

We sustain the petitioners' position. It is undisputed that the subject lot was mortgaged to DBP on February 24, 1970. It was acquired by DBP as the highest bidder at a foreclosure sale on June 18, 1977, and then sold to the petitioners on September 29, 1979.

At that time, the prevailing jurisprudence interpreting section 119 of R.A. 141 as amended was that enunciated inMonge and Tupas cited above. The petitioners Benzonan and respondent Pe and the DBP are bound by these decisions for pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is unconstitutional (Francisco v. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1961]).

The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospective effect to decisions enunciating new doctrines. Thus, we emphasized in People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974] ". . . when a doctrine

of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof."

There may be special cases where weighty considerations of equity and social justice will warrant a retroactive application of doctrine to temper the harshness of statutory law as it applies to poor farmers or their widows and orphans. In the present petitions, however, we find no such equitable considerations. Not only did the private respondent apply for free agricultural land when he did not need it and he had no intentions of applying it to the noble purposes behind the law, he would now repurchase for only P327,995.00, the property purchased by the petitioners in good faith for P1,650,000.00 in 1979 and which, because of improvements and the appreciating value of land must be worth more than that amount now.

The buyers in good faith from DBP had a right to rely on our rulings in Monge and Tupas when they purchased the property from DBP in 1979 or thirteen (13) years ago. Under the rulings in these two cases, the period to repurchase the disputed lot given to respondent Pe expired on June 18, 1982. He failed to exercise his right. His lost right cannot be revived by relying on the 1988 case of Belisario. The right of petitioners over the subject lot had already become vested as of that time and cannot be impaired by the retroactive application of the Belisarioruling.

Considering our above findings, we find no need to resolve the other issues raised by the petitioners in their petitions.

WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the respondent court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint for repurchase under Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-31589 July 31, 1970

LOURDES BARRERA, plaintiff, vs.LEON BARRERA and FIDELA ANDRES BARRERA, defendants, RE CONTEMPT CATOLICO, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

 

FERNANDO, J.:

This Court is faced with a question of the most unique kind. Respondent Judge Alfredo Catolico of the Court of First Instance of Cavite was cited for contempt and asked why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for hurling the accusation that this Court had delegated to its Clerk a power which under the Rules of Court appertained to its Chief Justice, an accusation made in the context of an explicit avowal that he was in no mood to accord recognition and respect to a binding

decision of this Court, which for him was obsolete and no longer authoritative. Such an attitude betrayed a refusal to apply the law as interpreted by this tribunal. He could not bring himself to abide by a settled doctrine. Given the opportunity to explain both in a memorandum and in an oral argument, he remained adamant and obdurate. It was apparent he was not averse to disciplinary action being visited on his conduct. He leaves us no choice. We find him in contempt.

It all started innocently enough in a letter dated September 8, 1969, received by us two days thereafter. Counsel for the plaintiff in Barrera v. Barrera, a civil case pending in the Court of First Instance of Cavite 1 requested "that the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch 111, presided over by the Hon. Judge Alfredo Catolico be authorized to continue with the hearing of the above-entitled case pursuant to Section 3, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court." 2 Why such request was made was explained by counsel in these words: "The said case is pending trial. The plaintiff has one more witness to present and thereafter, she intends to rest her case. Unfortunately, on May 22, 1969, when this case was set for hearing, the presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, the Hon. Judge Jose B. Jimenez, was appointed as District Judge for the Court of First Instance of Manila, and on said date, he did not hold court session. Because of this, the trial of this case was left pending, and it was only in the month of July when it was reset for hearing on August 6, 1969. However, on this date, this case was not again heard because the new Presiding Judge did not arrive due to bad weather."

Under our resolution of September 12, 1969, the aforesaid letter was referred to the Department of Justice. The then Undersecretary of Justice, now the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, referred the matter to respondent judge whose comments were received by the Department of Justice in an indorsement of October 22, 1969. After pointing out that the first day of trial on the merits of the case in Barrera v. Barrera having been held on August 21, 1968, there had elapsed by then the period of fourteen months, far beyond the three-month limit as set forth in the Rules of Court, he continued: "When the undersigned Presiding Judge assumed his duties as such, he found no written authority by the Honorable Chief Justice of the Supreme Court extended to this branch for it to be able to continue trying the case by receiving evidence yet to be presented, seasonably, adjourning and transferring continuation of the trial, and finally thereafter, adjudging the case. Considering the express provision of Rule 22 of the Rules of Court on the subject of adjournments and postponements, same need not be interpreted or construed for indeed, the Court can only apply its clear and express provisions; and that upon the lapse of three months from the first day of trial on the merits, the trial judge lost control of the same, and may not continue trying the same for the only thing possible to be done is to dismiss the case.' 3

That policy he adopted, notwithstanding his awareness of our ruling in Barrueco v. Abeto, 4 as is evident from his comments. Thus: "This is the only conceivable way of complying with the express provision of Rule 22 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, this same provision was incorporated in the original rules of court of 1940. In an identical case submitted for ruling by the Hon. Supreme Court, Barrueco v. Abeto, 71 Phil. 7, Justice Laurel who penned the decision interpreted the same to be of directory character rather than mandatory." 5 Clearly then, he was not disposed to yield obedience. What the Court had said, he would blithely ignore. So his comments would indicate: "Way back in 1941 where throughout the Philippines there were few thousands of cases undecided beyond 90 days, the said decision of the Supreme Court could be well-sustained according to the facts then existing; but, could that ruling be sustained now where throughout the Philippines there are pending cases with a dormancy of between four months to seventeen years reaching the awful number of almost 100,000 cases be justified in its observance as directory when according to the present circumstances and the policy adopted by the same Supreme Court in incorporating this provision in its Rules of Court the idea is to make judges, decide cases as fast as possible within 90 days rather than allowing cases with a dormancy reaching up to 17 years? 6

In the meanwhile, he would follow his own interpretation contrary to what was decided by this Court: "It is submitted that under the said rule, not even the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court could validly, legally and morally extend power to the trial Judge to reacquire control of the case

tantamount to reacquiring jurisdiction of the subject matter when the said written authority is extended far beyond the three months limit in the said Rule 22 of the Rules of Court, for indeed, it is elementary, and it has been reiterated time and again by the Hon. Tribunal that when it comes to time or period in order that it could be extended, the petition for extension should be filed before its expiration or there is nothing that could be extended." 7

Not content with such an attitude that breathes of defiance, he would impute a delegation of such authority by the Chief Justice of this Court to its Clerk with this unfounded assertion: "Further, the clerk of court of the Supreme Court had been extending this power to the undersigned trial judge upon petition of counsel for the plaintiff to continue trying the case where the same has already been dismiss 'without prejudice' and where there is no more case to continue, for indeed, the counsel for the plaintiff has not as yet secured the reconsideration of the said order of dismissal previous to the granting of power to continue trying and handling the case by the undersigned trial judge. Another question that cropped up as a consequence of the above observation is as to whether the phrase 'by authority of the Chief Justice" has given enough legal power and authority to the said employee of the Supreme Court to in turn give power and authority to the undersigned trial judge to continue trying the case even if it has already been dismissed." 8

Pursuing the same line, he continued thus: "In one case, it was the same clerk of court who informed the undersigned trial judge that by resolution of the Supreme Court he is empowered to continue trying the case until finished. In this case, could the Supreme Court as a body validly and legally authorize the undersigned trial judge to continue handling a case pending in this Court which was not brought to the appellate jurisdiction of the Hon. Supreme Court either by appeal or by certiorari? Can the Supreme Court take cognizance of a case pending before the Court of First Instance without the benefit of appeal or certiorari? If this could be done, could the Supreme Court order the trial judge to continue a case which was already dismissed and not existing anymore where the counsel for the plaintiff has not filed a motion to set side an order of dismissal or has not filed any petition for certiorari to the Supreme Tribunal for the review of said order?"  9

The closing portion of his comments let no doubt as to his determination to adhere to the policy adopted by him contrary to the ruling in the Abeto case: "The above considerations and questions are hereby humbly submitted to the Hon. Department of Justice for its consideration in the sanguine belief and expectation that something be done tending to remedy the nebulous situation wherein the undersigned trial Judge is found not only by the clear and express provisions of Sec. 3 of Rule 22 of the Rules of Court but also by the ruling of the highest tribunal of the land in the Abeto case and in the letters written by the Clerk of the Supreme Court extending authority to the undersigned trial judge to continue handling all these cases even if dismissals have already been ordered and no petition for the setting aside of the order or no certiorari has been presented for the review thereof and where factually, there is no case to continue." 1 0

In our resolution of November 12, 1969, his comments being sent to us by the then Undersecretary of Justice on November 3 of that month, he was given the opportunity to explain in writing not later than November 24, and to appear personally before the Court on November 26, to show cause why he should not be dealt with for contempt. His explanation was filed on November 24. It was apparent that further reflection did not occasion a change of heart. As set forth therein: "It may not be amiss to state in this connection, that your herein respondent is at a loss for really he cannot ascertain who is the offended party in this proceeding. Is it the Hon. Tribunal as a whole or the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, or the deputy clerk of court? Indeed, there is no written charge by anybody or specific person seeking the institution of a contempt proceeding against your herein respondent." 1 1

This is how he would answer his question: "If it is the Hon. Tribunal as a whole who might be the offended party your herein respondent would be at a loss to understand how he could incur the

responsibilities attached to a contempt of court proceeding when he has not disobeyed any order of the Supreme Court. If it is the Hon. Chief Justice of the Supreme Court who might be the offended party in this case, it is respectfully submitted that the respondent judge might not be subjected to contempt proceeding for expressing his honest opinion which happens to be different from the highly respected one of the Hon. Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and if there is any error in this case it might be one where interpretation of law rather than a deliberate misstatement of facts as specified in the communication of the deputy clerk of court. And if it is the deputy clerk of court who has been writing all these letters to your herein respondent who might be considering himself as an offended party and has initiated this contempt of court proceeding your herein respondent, with all humility, submits the fact that he cannot be made respondent in a contempt of court proceeding just because of an erroneous communication written by the said deputy clerk of court and may your humble respondent be allowed to say that he cannot be charged with contempt of court because of the erroneous letters of a deputy clerk of court who might want to exert a personality higher than that of your herein respondent, and finally, if these were the case, let your humble respondent say with Dolores Ibarruri as follows: [Better to die on one's feet than to live on one's knees.]." 1 2

Then two days later, on November 26, respondent Judge argued his case in a manner that erased any lingering doubt as to his being obsessed with the conviction that nothing said or done by him could in no wise be objectionable, a position maintained with all the obstinacy at his command. He could not be reconciled to the thought that our Clerk when speaking for this Court was performing a duty to which lower court judges would do well to pay heed. It was even more apparent that while, making much of his refusal to believe that the order received by him proceeded from a source not authorized to do so, in itself an unfounded charge that this Court was recreant to its responsibility not to allow any one to usurp its authority, he was acting in accordance with a fixed and resolute determination not to be bound by the Barrueco doctrine. For him, it was no longer in force. It did not matter that this Court had not so decreed. He could not bring himself to accord it deference. So his acts and words did indicate. What other alternative is there then than to fund him guilty of contempt?

It is to be made clear that the disciplinary action taken against him is not for the thoughts entertained or opinions uttered by him. Judges are not expected to be wholly in agreement with every decision of this Tribunal. Nor are they required to keep locked up within their breasts their own views on such matters. Doubts and skepticism about the continuing validity of doctrines announced by us may under appropriate, ventilated. As a matter of fact, they should not be discourage for the progress of the law may very well depend on a more searching inquiry as to the continuing validity of certain assumptions and "Presuppositions uncritically accepted. Nonetheless, as long as our rulings constitute authoritative precedents, the duty of obedience is cast on inferior court judges.

Nor is respondent Judge to be held responsible for the manner in which he gave expression to his thoughts. There is no offense against this Court arising from a rather truculent tone that fails to exhibit, the redeeming grace of urbanity. Nor could the mere fact that the impression left is one, of dogmatic finality, that apparently could not harbor the least suspicion that one could possibly be in the slightest bit mistaken, call for a reproof. After all, the style reflect the man and perhaps he cannot help himself.

What calls for disciplinary action is the recklessness warn which respondent Judge did hurl the baseless allegation that the Clerk of this Court was permitted to exercise an authority which appertained to the Chief Justice. He did speak with all the valor of ignorance. Nor did he retreat from such an indefensible stand in the face of his being informed that what the Clerk did was solely in accordance with what was previously decided by this Court, which certainly will not tolerate, anybody else, much less a subordinate, to speak and act for itself. This gross disrespect shown to this Court has no justification: The misdeed of respondent Judge is compounded by such an accusation apparently arising from his adamantine conviction that a doctrine of this Court that fails to meet his

approval need not be applied. No inferior court judge, to repeat, can be permitted to arrogate unto himself such a prerogative at war with everything that the rule of law stands for.

The delicate task of ascertaining the significance that attaches to a constitutional statutory provision, an executive order a procedural norm or a municipal ordinance is discharges a role no less committed to the judiciary. It thus discharges a role no less crucial than that appertaining the other two departments in the maintenance of the rule of law. To assure stability in legal relations and avoid confusion, it has to speak with one voice. It does so with finality, logically and rightly, through the highest judicial organ, this Court. What it says then should be definitive and authoritative, binding on those occupying the lower ranks in the judicial hierarchy. They have to defer and to submit. What was so appropriately said by Justice Laurel comes to mind: "A becoming modesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization of the position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation." 1 3

Such a thought was reiterated in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes and further emphasized in these words: "Judge Gaudencio Cloribel need not be reminded that the Supreme Court, by tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has the last word on what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any justifiable controversy. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings." 1 4 To the same effect is the following excerpt from a 1958 decision: "Now if a Judge of a lower Court feels, in the fulfillment of his mission of deciding cases, that the application of a doctrine promulgated by this Superiority is against his way of reasoning, or against his conscience, he may state his opinion on the matter, but rather than disposing of the case in accordance with his personal views he must first think that it is his duty to apply the law as interpreted by the Highest Court of the Land, and that any deviation from a principle laid down by the latter would unavoidably cause, as a sequel, unnecessary inconveniences, delays and expenses to the litigants. And if despite of what is here said a Judge, by delicate or acute qualms of conscience still believes that he cannot follow our rulings, then he has no other alternative than to place himself in the position that he could properly avoid the duty of having to render judgment on the case concerned (Art. 9, C. C.), and he has only one legal way to do that." 1 5

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Alfredo Catolico is reprimanded by this Court for the above offense. Let a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable, The Secretary of Justice.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 148126.  November 10, 2003]

GEORGE T. VILLENA, CARLOS N. VILLENA, AURORA M. BONDOC and RONNIE C. FERNANDEZ, and their Respective Spouses, petitioners, vs. Spouses ANTONIO C. CHAVEZ and NOEMI MARCOS-CHAVEZ and CARLITA C. CHAVEZ, respondents.

D E C I S I O NPANGANIBAN, J.:

Stare decisis simply means that a judgment reached in one case should be applied to successive ones in which the facts are substantially identical, even though the parties may be different. Like cases ought to be decided alike.

The Case

Before this Court is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the May 9, 2001 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 58329.  The decretalportion of the Decision reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, the judgment dated March 29, 2000 of Branch 56 of the RTC of Angeles City is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new judgment entered in favor of the petitioners, ordering the respondents and all persons claiming rights under them to vacate from the subject lots and to remove their houses and/or any other structures or constructions thereon.” [3]

The overturned Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 56,[4] affirmed in toto the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Angeles City, Branch II.[5]

The Facts

The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this wise:

“In a Complaint for Illegal Detainer with Damages filed on October 15, 1998, the [respondents] alleged that they are the owners of four (4) parcels of land designated as Lot Nos. 164, 165, 166, and 167 of the Cadastral Survey of Angeles City, and covered, respectively, by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 83247, 83246, 83248 and 83249, all issued by the Register of Deeds of Angeles City. These four (4) parcels of land have been consolidated and subdivided into several blocks and lots, and are now collectively designated as Bagong Silang Phase III-C. By mere permission and tolerance of the [respondents], the [petitioners] have occupied and erected their homes on four (4) of the said lots, as follows:

George T. Villena and wife = Block 5, Lot 14

Carlos N. Villena and wife = Block 5, Lot 13

Aurora M. Bondoc and husband = Block 2, Lot 4

Ronnie C. Hernandez and wife = Block 3, Lot 5

“All the [petitioners] are members of the Bagong Silang Phase III-C Homeowners’ Association, Inc., with office address at Cutud, Angeles City. The [respondents] allowed the [petitioners] and other members of the said homeowners’ association to continue occupying the subject lots and ultimately to acquire ownership of the lots occupied, in consideration of a certain amount to be paid to the [respondents] as equity.

“The [respondents] further alleged that the other members of the said homeowners’ association paid to the [respondents] their respective equity for their right to continue occupying and ultimately acquiring ownership of the occupied lots. However, notwithstanding repeated demands made upon the [petitioners], they have refused and failed without any justifiable ground to pay their respective equity. In view of such failure to pay, the [petitioners] have forfeited their right to continue occupying the lots in question. Formal demand letters were then sent by registered mail to the [petitioners], wherein they were given a period of thirty (30) days from receipt within which to vacate and remove their houses from the subject lots. The period given to the [petitioners] lapsed on April 11, 1998, but up to the present time, the [petitioners] refused and failed without any justifiable reason or ground to vacate and remove their houses from the said lots.

“The [respondents] then prayed in their Complaint that the [petitioners] be ordered to vacate and remove their houses from the lots currently occupied; that each of the [petitioners] be ordered to pay the [respondents] P1,000.00 a month as reasonable rental for the use and occupation of the lots starting from April 11, 1998 until they have finally vacated and removed their houses from said lots; and that the [petitioners] jointly and severally pay the [respondents] P25,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages, P2,000.00 as appearance fee per hearing, exemplary damages, and the costs of the suit.

“In their answer with compulsory counter-claim filed on November 3, 1998, the [petitioners] countered that the [respondents] have no cause of action to institute the present action, considering that the properties in question are under the community mortgage program implemented by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation.  Moreover, the [petitioners] claimed that they are lawful tenants of the premises, and that they have been paying their equity to their originator, the Urban Land and Development Foundation[,] Inc. However, they were not issued the corresponding receipts evidencing payment and a copy of their contract. The [petitioners] further averred that they were willing to continue paying their equity

until the same shall have been fully paid, but their originator, without justifiable reason, refused to accept the tender of payment made by them. The [petitioners] subsequently agreed with their originator that the payment of equity should be continued only upon the release of a Purchase Commitment Line (PCL).

“In addition, the [petitioners] alleged that they are qualified beneficiaries under Republic Act No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992; hence, they cannot be summarily evicted and their dwelling houses demolished unless and until they have been relocated. According to the [petitioners], they are also builders in good faith and should be indemnified for the improvements they constructed on the properties in question.

“The [petitioners] prayed in their answer that the complaint be dismissed; that they be declared lawful tenants and qualified beneficiaries under R.A. 7279; that the [respondents] be ordered to sell the lots in question to them, and to pay attorney’s fees and the costs of suit.

“After the pre-trial conference, both parties submitted their position papers. On September 15, 1999, MTC Branch II of Angeles City rendered a decision dismissing both the [respondents’] complaint and the [petitioners’] counter-claim, on the ground that the filing of an ejectment case based on the alleged violation of the parties’ agreement which has not yet been rescinded is premature, and that it is beyond the competence of the said court to act on the case, as rescission or specific performance is beyond the jurisdiction of the said court.

“The [respondents] appealed such adverse judgment to the RTC of Angeles City, which appeal was raffled to Branch 56 of the said court. On March 29, 2000, RTC Branch 56 of Angeles City rendered a decision affirming in toto the MTC judgment.”[6]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA held that the right of petitioners to continue occupying the subject properties hinged on their continued payment of the agreed amount as equity.[7] Even after formal letters of demand to vacate the premises had been sent to them, however, they still did not make any effort to pay their equity to protect their right to continue occupying those lots. Thus, the appellate court ruled that their failure to pay made their occupancy unlawful, in consequence of which they became subject to an ejectment suit.

The CA rejected the contention of petitioners that they were protected by RA 7279. According to the appellate court, there was no express declaration

by the local government unit that the parcels of land owned by respondents were to be used for socialized housing. Neither was there proof of the allegation that they had applied therefor under the Community Mortgage Program of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation under Section 31 of RA 7279. Besides, even granting that petitioners were protected under RA 7279, they were still liable to pay amortization or face eviction.

Likewise debunked was the allegation of petitioners that respondents were not the real parties in interest. Being the owners of the lots occupied by the former, the latter had a material interest in the suit and stood to be benefited or injured by any judgment affecting those parcels of land.

Hence, this Petition.[8]

The Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration:

“I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in reversing and setting aside the Decisions of the Municipal Trial Court, Branch II and of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 56 both of Angeles City[;]

“II. Whether or not the Honorable Municipal Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case;

“III. Whether or not the non-inclusion of the Bagong Silang Homeowners Association Inc., is fatal to respondents[‘] cause of action[;]

“IV. Whether or not ejectment is proper in the case at bar;

“V. Whether or not the absence of contractual relation[s] between the respondents and the petitioners bar[s] the filing of any action by the respondents against the petitioner.”[9]

The primordial issue to be resolved is whether unlawful detainer is the proper action to resolve this case.  If it is, then the MTC indeed had jurisdiction over the case, and the CA was correct in overturning the RTC’s ruling that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the case.

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

Main Issue:Propriety of Unlawful   Detainer

The CA ruled that petitioners’ possession or occupancy of the subject premises was by mere tolerance of respondents.  Hence, once petitioners failed to pay the agreed amount as equity, their right to continue occupying the lots was lost.

We disagree. Contradictory were the statements of the appellate court that, on the one hand, there was no contract between the parties; and yet, on the other, that petitioners failed to pay theagreed equity.  The fact that the CA found that there was failure to pay the equity was an indication of an agreement.  To be sure, petitioners’ possession of the subject premises was not by mere tolerance of respondents.

In the Complaint[10] of respondents, filed before Branch II of the Municipal Trial Court of Angeles City, they themselves alleged the presence of an agreement between the parties as follows:

“10. That in consideration of a certain amount to be paid to the [respondents] by each of the [petitioners] as equity for their right to continue occupying and ultimately acquire ownership of the lots that they occupy, the said homeowners’ association has made arrangements with the [respondents] to allow the [petitioners] and other members of the said homeowners’ association to continue occupying and ultimately acquire ownership of the lots that they occupy[.]” [11]

Further, in the Special Power of Attorney [12] annexed to their Complaint, they constituted and appointed Teodorico B. Sanchez and/or Arturo M. Yadan as their attorneys-in-fact to do, among others, the following:

“1. To collect and receive any amount or amounts as equity for the sale thereof to them from the occupants or any other interested buyer or buyers of any portion or portions of the following-described parcels of land:

xxx                                                                          xxx                                                                   xxx

of which we are the absolute and exclusive owners, and which comprise the parcels of land being acquired by the members or beneficiaries of the BAGONG SILANG PHASE III-C HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, at Brgy. Cutud, Angeles City[.]”[13]

Based on the admissions of respondents themselves, they entered into an agreement with petitioners.  Necessarily, the latter’s occupancy of the lots in question was not based merely on theformer’s tolerance or permission.  Thus, petitioners were not necessarily bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment would have become proper.

The MTC’s findings of fact on this point are instructive:

“About the only thing that the parties have met on a common ground is that: [Respondents] have entered into an arrangement/agreement with Bagong Silang Homeowners’ Association, Inc. that called for the payment of certain amounts as equity for [petitioners’] right to continue occupying the lots with the end in view of eventually becoming the owners thereof, that pursuant to such agreement [petitioners] have paid certain amounts as acquisition fees or as equity but later discontinued making payments in view of the non-issuance of the so-called purchase commitment line/loan, and as a consequence, [respondents] are now accusing [petitioners] for violating the agreement and on the basis of such breach of the agreement by [petitioners], demands for the latter to vacate the lots were made by [respondents].”[14]

When respondents alleged that the Bagong Silang Phase III-C Homeowners’ Association made arrangements with them to allow petitioners and other members of the association to continue to occupy and ultimately to acquire ownership of the lots in question, respondents explicitly admitted that a contract had indeed been entered into. The eventual transfer of ownership of real property evidenced that obligation. What is clear is that in their Complaint, respondents alleged that petitioners had violated the stipulations of their agreement as follows:

“11. That the other members of the Ba[g]ong Silang Phase III-C Homeowners’ Association, Inc., paid to the [respondents] their respective equity for their right to continue occupying and ultimately acquire ownership of the lots that they occupy, but notwithstanding repeated demands made on them, up to the present time, the [petitioners] have refused and failed without any justifiable ground or reason to pay their respective equity to the [respondents], and, in view of such refusal and failure, the [petitioners] have forfeited their right to continue occupying and ultimately acquire ownership of the lots that they occupy[.]” [15]

Petitioners, on the other hand, denied any breach on their part and argued that the principal issue was one of interpretation, enforcement and/or rescission of the contract. Under these circumstances, proof of violation of the

provisions of the contract is a condition precedent to resolution or rescission.[16] The contract can be declared rescinded only when its nature has been clarified and the eventual violation thereof, if any, has been established.  Upon such rescission, in turn, hinges a pronouncement that the possession of the realty has become unlawful. Thus, the basic issue is not possession but interpretation, enforcement and/or rescission of the contract -- a matter that is beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court to hear and determine.

An allegation of a violation of a contract or agreement in a detainer suit may be proved by the presentation of competent evidence, upon which an MTC judge might make a finding to that effect. But certainly, that court cannot declare and hold that the contract is rescinded, as such power is vested in the RTC.[17]

The rescission of the contract is the basis of, and therefore a condition precedent for, the illegality of a party’s possession of a piece of realty.[18] Without judicial intervention and determination, even a stipulation entitling one party to take possession of the land and building in case the other party violates the contract cannot confer upon the former the right to take possession thereof, if that move is objected to.[19]

To be sure, the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint.[20] Thus, in ascertaining whether or not an action is one for unlawful detainer falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the inferior courts, the averments of the complaint and the character of the relief sought should be examined.

Also, as correctly pleaded by petitioners, a similar case had been decided by the CA in CA-GR SP No. 58679, in which it ruled that the proper action should have been a complaint for rescission or specific performance, not for illegal detainer. In that case, the same plaintiffs filed the same charges against a different but similarly situated set of defendants.

The appellate court ruled therein that there was an existing agreement or contract that determined the nature of the parties’ relationship.[21] Thus, it held that the proper action should have been for rescission of contract or specific performance, not unlawful detainer.[22] When the CA Decision was elevated, this Court denied the appeal for failure to show that a reversible error had been committed by the appellate court. Thereafter, the Decision became final and executory on April 23, 2002.[23]

Said the appellate court in the previous case:

“Inasmuch as the relationship existing between the parties is not a lessor-lessee relationship but one that emanated from the agreement between appellants and the Urban Land and Development Foundation, Inc., the so-called originator of the Bagong Silang Homeowners Association, Inc., the relief being sought then by appellants appears to be improper. If ever there was no payment of equity as provided for under the said agreement, the same cannot be considered as non-payment of rentals. Thus, it cannot be a sufficient basis for filing an ejectment case against appellees, the proper remedy being an action for rescission of contract or specific performance.”[24]

We stress that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the same. [25] Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled.  Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. [26] It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike.[27]

Having ruled that the MTC had indeed no jurisdiction to take cognizance of this case in the first place, we see no more need to address the other issues raised by petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is OVERTURNED.  Consequently, the Decisions of the MTC and the RTC of Angeles City are REINSTATED.  No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Olaguer vs Military Commission

Habeas CorpusIn 1979, Olaguer and some others were detained by military personnel and they were placed in Camp Bagong Diwa. Logauer and his group are all civilians. They were charged with (1) unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary devices; (2) conspiracy to assassinate President and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to assassinate cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Roño and Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6) attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7) conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion. On August 19, 1980, the petitioners went to the SC and filed the instant Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus be granted.

HELD: The petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic because by the time the case reached the SC Olaguer and his companions were already released from military confinement. “When the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a writ of habeas corpus was filed is effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic. 18 Inasmuch as the herein petitioners have been released from their confinement in military detention centers, the instant Petitions for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed for having become moot and academic.” But the military court created to try the case of Olaguer (and the decision it rendered) still continues to subsist.

ISSUE2: The issue is then shifted to: Whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil courts are open and functioning.

HELD: The SC nullified for lack of jurisdiction all decisions rendered by the military courts or tribunals during the period of martial law in all cases involving civilian defendants. A military commission or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law, over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts are open and functioning, and that any judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal concerned.