MARINE SAFETY INVESTIGATION

REPORT 184

Independent investigation into the grounding of theKorean flag bulk carrier

at Dampier, Western Australia25 August 2002

Hanjin Dampier

Navigation Act 1912Navigation (Marine Casualty) Regulations

investigation into the grounding of the Korean flag bulk carrier Hanjin Dampier

at Dampier in Western Australiaon 25 August 2002

Report No 184

December 2003

ISSN 1447-087XISBN 1 877071 45 5

Readers are advised that the Australian Transport Safety Bureau investigates for the sole purpose ofenhancing transport safety. Consequently, Bureau reports are confined to matters of safety significanceand may be misleading if used for other purposes.

Investigations commenced on or before 30 June 2003, including the publication of reports as a resultof those investigations, are authorised by the Executive Director of the Bureau in accordance with theNavigation (Marine Casualty) Regulations 1990, made pursuant to subsections 425(1)(ea) and 425(1AAA) of the Navigation Act 1912.

Investigations commenced on or after 1 July 2003, including the publication of reports as a result ofthose investigations, are authorised by the Executive Director of the Bureau in accordance with theTransport Safety Investigation Act 2003 (TSI Act). Reports released under the TSI Act are notadmissible as evidence in any civil or criminal proceedings.

It is ATSB policy to publish in full and widely distribute such reports as an educational tool to increaseawareness of the causes of marine accidents so as to improve safety at sea and enhance the protectionof the marine environment. Reports on serious marine casualties are also provided to the IMO.

Australian Transport Safety BureauPO Box 967Civic Square ACT 2608 AUSTRALIA

Phone: 02 6274 64781800 621 372

Fax: 02 6274 6699E-mail: marine@atsb.gov.au

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CONTENTS

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

Sources of information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

Narrative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3Hanjin Dampier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Dampier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

The incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

Comment and analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

The incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

The initial generator shut downs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

Fuel analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

Source of the contamination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

The diesel purifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

The emergency generator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

Contingency plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

Bridge Resource Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

Shipboard safety management system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

Pilotage considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

Past incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

The passage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

Tug assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

Submissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

Hanjin Dampier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24

Figures1. Hanjin Dampier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .iv

2. Chart showing approximate track of Hanjin Dampier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

3. Hanjin Dampier: Events and causal factors chart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17

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FIGURE 1:Hanjin Dampier

Summary

At 1032 on 25 August 2002, the Korean flagbulk carrier Hanjin Dampier departed from theHamersley Iron wharf at East Intercourse Islandin the port of Dampier, Western Australia. Apilot was conducting the navigation of the shipwhich was loaded with iron ore and had adisplacement of 233 158 tonnes with draughtsof 17.94 m forward and 18.10 m aft.

At 1127, just after Hanjin Dampier passednumber four Hamersley Channel beacons, twoof the ship’s three main generators stopped,leaving only one generator running andconnected to the main switchboard.

At 1152, with the ship 1.3 miles east ofCourtenay Head and making headway at a littleover eight knots, the third generator’s circuitbreaker tripped open. With the total loss ofpower to the main switchboard the main enginestopped and the ship lost steering. The rudderhad stopped at 10° to starboard. As the shipslowed, it started to turn to starboard towardsshallow water. The emergency generator failedto start automatically and, as a result, steeringwas not restored for some four minutes.

At 1202, Hanjin Dampier touched bottom. Byabout 1203 the ship had come to a stop on aheading of 047°(T) in a position between thecharted deep draught track and the WoodsideChannel (20° 29.7’S, 116° 43.3’E).

Hanjin Dampier was refloated on the nextspring tide, on 8 September, using five tugs andafter 5000–6000 tonnes of cargo had beendischarged. The ship had suffered only minordamage to the bottom shell plating and the shipwas cleared by the classification society tocontinue trading until the next scheduled dry-docking.

The report's conclusions include:

• The ship grounded as a direct result of theloss of steering;

• Steering was lost when the ship’s three maingenerators tripped off the main switchboarddue to water contamination of their fuelsupply;

• The emergency generator failed to startautomatically due to a fault in one of itsstarting batteries;

• The crew took no action nor instigated anycontingency plan in the time leading up tothe blackout when they could have reducedthe risk to the ship; and

• Lack of effective communication betweenthe chief engineer and master contributed tothe crew’s failure to take any pre-emptiveaction.

The report makes three recommendationsinvolving the testing of emergency powerarrangements, bridge resource managementtraining for engineers and the use of tugs in theport of Dampier.

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Sources ofInformation

Officers and crew of Hanjin Dampier

The pilot

Hamersley Iron Pty. Limited

Dampier Port Authority

The Australian Maritime Safety Authority

ReferencesInternational Convention for the Safety of Lifeat Sea, 1974, and its Protocol of 1988 (SOLAS),the International Maritime Organization.

The International Management Code for theSafe Operation of Ships and for PollutionPrevention [International Safety Management(ISM Code)] as adopted by the InternationalMaritime Organization by resolution A.741(18).

International Convention on Standards ofTraining, Certification and Watchkeeping forSeafarers (STCW Convention), 1978, and 1995amendments, and the STCW Code, theInternational Maritime Organization.

Bridge Procedures Guide, the InternationalChamber of Shipping.

Australian Pilot Volume V, (North, North-Westand West Coasts of Australia from the WestEntrance of Endeavour Strait to Cape Leeuwin),Seventh Edition 1992, Admiralty Charts andPublications.

Certain reproductions of chart sections in thispublication are reproduced by permission of TheAustralian Hydrographic Service.

© Commonwealth of Australia 13 October 2000. Allrights reserved.

Other than for the purposes of copying thispublication for public use, the chart information fromthe chart sections may not be extracted, translated, orreduced to any electronic medium or machinereadable form for incorporation into a derivedproduct, in whole or part, without the prior writtenconsent of the Australian Hydrographic Service.

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Narrative

Hanjin DampierHanjin Dampier, (figure 1), is a Korean flag,capesize, bulk carrier of 207 346 deadweighttonnes at its summer draught of 18.02 m. Theship is owned and managed by Hanjin ShippingCompany of Seoul in South Korea. It is classedwith the Korean Register of Shipping, as +KRS11 Bulk Carrier ESP2 with +KRM 13 and UMA4

notations.

Hanjin Dampier was built in 1989 by HyundaiHeavy Industries at Ulsan, in Korea. The shiphas nine holds forward of the accommodationsuperstructure, an overall length of 309.00 m, abeam of 50.00 m and a depth of 25.70 m.Propulsive power is provided by a HyundaiB&W 6L80MCE slow speed, single acting,direct reversing diesel engine of 12 959 kWwhich drives a single fixed-pitch propeller togive the vessel a service speed of 13 knots.

Hanjin Dampier is engaged primarily in the ironore trade between Western Australian and SouthKorean ports. The ship is a regular caller atDampier and Port Hedland.

At the time of the incident, Hanjin Dampier hada crew of 22 comprised of; the master and threemates, a trainee deck officer, the chief and threeengineers, a trainee engineer, two chief ratings,eight other ratings and two cooks. The matesmaintained a traditional ‘four on, eight off’watchkeeping routine at sea. The engineersworked a 24 hour duty roster with the engineroom unmanned outside normal working hours.The crew were either Korean or Indonesiannationals.

The master of Hanjin Dampier held a Masterclass 1 certificate of competency issued inKorea and had 27 years experience at sea, thelast nine of which were in command. The chiefengineer had a combined (motor and steam)Chief Engineer’s certificate of competencyissued in Korea, had 30 years experience at seathe last 12 of which were as chief engineer. Hehad joined the vessel for the first time on 3 August, three weeks before the incident.

DampierThe port of Dampier, (figure 2), is located onthe north-west coast of Australia on the southwestern side of the Burrup Peninsula. It is amajor export port for primary productsincluding iron ore, liquefied natural gas, andsalt. The port is also the main operational basefor offshore contractors working on the NorthWest Shelf natural gas project.

Ships approach Dampier from the north andmust transit one of two shipping channels inMermaid Sound, the body of water between theBurrup Peninsula and the islands of theDampier Archipelago. The Woodside Channel ison the east and the Hamersley Channel on thewest of the Sound. The Woodside Channelextends from the top of Mermaid Sound southto the Woodside natural gas facility just south ofWithnell Bay. The Hamersley Channel startshalfway down Mermaid Sound and extendsapproximately five miles to the south until itdivides into two inner channels both approxi-mately 2.5 miles in length. The western innerchannel terminates at the Hamersley Iron oreloader on East Intercourse Island and the easterninner channel extends to the Hamersley Iron oreloader at Parker Point.

The Hamersley inner channels have amaintained depth of 15.5 m (below Lowest

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1 Hull built under Korean Register survey.

2 Enhanced survey program.

3 Machinery built under Korean Register survey.

4 Unmanned machinery space.

Astronomical Tide) and a maintained depth of15.6 m in the outer channel. A series ofnavigation beacons mark the channel from theberths at East Intercourse Island and ParkerPoint to the fairway beacon located in themiddle of Mermaid Sound. From the fairwaybeacon, outbound loaded vessels, constrained bytheir draught, follow a recommended deepdraught track for a further seven miles until theyclear the relatively shallow water at the northernend of the Sound. This track is marked bynavigational buoys and finishes at the Sea Buoyat the northern end of Mermaid Sound.

Iron ore ships entering and leaving MermaidSound must carry a pilot supplied by a companycontracted exclusively to Hamersley Iron. Thepilots board and disembark these vessels, usinghelicopters, at a position between the Sea Buoyand the outer anchorage to the north-west. Tugservices for iron ore ships are provided byHamersley Iron, who operate four harbour tugs.

The mean high water level in the port duringspring tides is 4.4 m, with 3.1 m for neap hightides. Ships loading at Hamersley Iron oreterminals are almost exclusively capesized bulkcarriers most in the range of 150 000 to 250 000deadweight tonnes. The predicted high waterlevels within the port at various times throughthe year and minimum under keel clearancerequirements govern the size of the vesselschartered. Vessels with smaller maximumdraughts are chartered for neap tides and largervessels may be used for spring tides so thatevery vessel is loaded as closely as possible toits maximum draught.

Loaded iron ore vessels depart in tidal windowscalculated by Hamersley Iron using a dynamicunder keel clearance (DUKC) system. Thesystem generates a plan for the passage from theiron ore berth to the Sea Buoy, based on thevessel’s draught and stability parameters, ahydrographic model of the passage andaccurately predicted tidal heights and seaconditions. The plan contains several differenttimings at selected waypoints in the passagedepending on the speed of the transit and the

departure time within the tidal window. Theheight of the tide, the ship’s bottom clearanceand manoeuvrability margin are calculated foreach waypoint at the different times specified inthe plan. Departure draughts vary from about14.5 m to 18.5 m, with transit times from theberth to the Sea Buoy varying between about120 and 150 minutes.

The incidentAt 1032 on 25 August 2002, Hanjin Dampierdeparted from the Hamersley Iron wharf at EastIntercourse Island. The ship was bound for theport of Kwangyang in South Korea. A pilot wasconducting the navigation of the ship which wasloaded with iron ore and was displacing 233 158 tonnes with draughts of 17.94 mforward and 18.10 m aft. On the bridge with thepilot were the master, third mate and ahelmsman. The weather was fine with a lightsoutherly breeze. High water at King Bay waspredicted to be 4.37 m at approximately 1213.

The chief, first, second and third engineers wereall in the engine control room for the departure.The third engineer was the duty engineer for theday and had completed the engine room warm-through procedures prior to the ‘stand-by’.Numbers one and three main generators wererunning in parallel connected to the mainswitchboard to supply the ship’s electricalpower. The generators were both running onmarine diesel oil supplied from the dieselservice tank. Number two main generator wasselected as the stand-by generator.

Prior to the departure ‘stand-by’, starting atabout 0930, the second engineer had transferredsome diesel from the double bottom storagetanks to the diesel settling tank. He had haddifficulty getting suction on the starboardstorage tank, which was almost empty, and sohad changed over the transfer pump suction tothe port storage tank which had not been usedfor some time. When the diesel settling tank hadstarted to fill satisfactorily, the second engineerstarted the diesel purifier in order to top up thediesel service tank.

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By 1039 Hanjin Dampier was safely off theberth and the pilot had released the two tugs,Star and Saturn, which had assisted the shipunberthing. The ship then proceeded down theHamersley Channel with the pilot progressivelyincreasing the ship’s speed until ‘full ahead’ wasrung at 1052.

At 1123 the pilot slowed the main engine to‘half ahead’ as the ship was getting ahead of theschedule in the passage plan generated byHamersley Iron’s DUKC program.

At 1127, just after Hanjin Dampier passednumber four Hamersley Channel beacons,‘Main Switchboard Abnormal’ and ‘BusFrequency Low’ alarms sounded in the enginecontrol room. In the next two minutes a numberof things occurred:

• the main switchboard power managementsystem started number two generator;

• number one generator circuit breaker trippedopen;

• the first preference trips on the mainswitchboard opened isolating power to someof the ship’s non-essential services;

• number two generator circuit breaker closedafter it had been automatically synchronised;

• number two generator circuit breaker trippedopen again;

• the second preference trips on the mainswitchboard opened.

At this point, number one and two maingenerators stopped, leaving only the numberthree generator running and connected to themain switchboard and carrying a load ofapproximately 400 kW.

The chief engineer did not know why thegenerators had stopped and, together with theother engineers, started to investigate. It wasaround this time he rang the master on thebridge and said words to the effect:

We need to check the generators and makerepairs after we clear the channel…

The chief engineer knew that they were in anarrow channel but he did not tell the masterthat two of the main generators had already shutdown.

The master did not speak to the pilot regardingthe conversation with the chief engineer. At thispoint in the passage the pilot was not aware thatthere was any problem in the engine room andso, at 1136, he increased the main engine speedagain to ‘full ahead’.

At first, the chief engineer checked thegenerator circuit breakers while the otherengineers checked the generators. The secondengineer attempted to start the generatorslocally several times but was unsuccessful. Afterfinding no problem with the circuit breakers, thechief engineer also started checking thegenerators, including the overspeed shutdownswhich he found had not tripped. During thistime the engineers reinstated the ship’s non-essential services which had stopped when theswitchboard preferences tripped.

Hanjin Dampier passed the fairway beacon atthe entrance to the Hamersley Channel at 1143.After clearing the channel, the pilot ordered thehelmsman to steer a course of 019° (T) to bringthe ship onto the recommended deep draughttrack. The ship’s speed at this time was approxi-mately eight knots.

At 1151 number three main generator started toslow down causing another ‘Bus Freq. Low’alarm. Approximately one minute later, at 1152,number three generator circuit breaker openedand the ship blacked out. The generatorcontinued to run.

With the total loss of power to the mainswitchboard, all of the electrically-driven pumpsfor the main engine stopped, resulting in a mainengine shut down. The electrically drivenpumps on the steering gear also stopped and theship lost steering. At this point the ship was 1.3 miles east of Courtenay Head, just south ofthe number four buoys marking the deepdraught track, and making headway at a littleover eight knots.

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When the ship blacked out the pilot contactedDampier port communications to inform themof the situation. He also made contact with thetugs Saturn and Comet requesting that theyattend the vessel.

During this time the master had sounded theship’s alarm and broadcast an order to ‘stand-byall stations’ over the public address system. Hetold the mate take a party forward to stand-by tolet go the anchors.

The chief engineer in the control room couldsee that the emergency generator had failed tostart (the emergency generator ‘run’ light on themain switchboard did not illuminate). He sentthe first engineer up to the emergency generatorroom on the main deck to investigate.

At 1153, when it became apparent that numberthree generator was still running, the chiefengineer closed its circuit breaker. Power to themain switchboard was restored for a briefperiod with various equipment starting automat-ically including number two steering pumpmotor. However, as the electrical load increased,number three generator started to slow downagain until its circuit breaker tripped leaving theswitchboard dead once more. Number twosteering pump motor stopped at this timeleaving the rudder 10° to starboard.

When the first engineer arrived in theemergency generator room he could hear thegenerator’s starting solenoid clicking, but couldsee the starting battery voltmeter showing a lowvoltage. He realised that he would have to usethe generator’s secondary hydraulic startingsystem to try to start the generator and sostarted to pump up the hydraulic startingaccumulator, using the hand pump in thesystem.

The mate, boatswain and two seaman, afterhurrying up the main deck, arrived on theforecastle, where they prepared to let go theship’s anchors at the master’s command.

At approximately 1155, Hanjin Dampier passednumber four buoys. With 10° of starboard

rudder the ship was starting to turn to starboardtowards the shallow water on the eastern side ofthe deep draught track. The pilot contacted thetugs at this time to request that a third tug attendthe ship.

At approximately 1156 the first engineermanaged to start the emergency generator andclose its breaker on the emergency switchboard.Number one steering pump motor, suppliedfrom the emergency board, started automat-ically. Shortly after this, the rudder was put hardto port but the ship continued to turn tostarboard.

During this time the master and pilot discussedthe option of letting go the anchors to try toslow the ship. The pilot advised the master notto let go the anchors as he felt that with theship’s momentum and limited under keelclearance, it would be dangerous and imprudentto do so. The master concurred and made thedecision not to let go the anchors.

At 1200, Hamersley Iron marine operations basecontacted the pilot to indicate that the third tugwas on its way and would be at the ship as soonas possible.

At 1201 the ship was still making headway atabout six knots.

At 1202, Hanjin Dampier touched bottom. Themaster and pilot did not feel anything untowardin the ship’s motion but saw clouds of mudbeing stirred up with the ship slowingnoticeably. By about 1203 the ship had come toa stop on a heading of 047°(T) and had taken aslight list to port of 2.5°. The ship was agroundin a position 3.5 cables north-north-east of thenumber four buoys (20° 29.7'S, 116° 43.3'E)between the deep draught track and theWoodside Channel.

At 1204, the pilot talked again to HamersleyIron base to indicate that the ship was definitelyaground and that he would like four tugs.

After the ship had grounded, the masterinstructed the crew to sound all double bottom

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tanks to see if the ship’s hull had been holed.They reported back some time later to indicatethat all the double bottom tanks appeared to beintact.

At around this time, one of the engineerschecked the diesel service and settling tankdrains and found that the fuel running from thedrains appeared to be emulsified. Furtherinvestigation revealed that the fuel in the maingenerator supply lines was also emulsified,apparently contaminated with water. Theengineers set about draining the contaminatedfuel from the settling and service tanks andgenerator fuel lines.

At 1208, the pilot spoke to Dampier portcommunications to indicate that the shipappeared to be undamaged and that there wasno sign of any oil spillage.

The tugs Saturn and Comet arrived alongsideHanjin Dampier at about 1230.

By 1231, the engineers had managed to startnumber three generator and close its circuitbreaker to power the main switchboard. Onceelectrical power had been restored the engineersset about resetting the various engine roomsystems and preparing the main engine formanoeuvring. Number two generator wasrunning and connected to the switchboard by

1242 and the main engine prepared to start by1245.

A third tug, Star, had arrived at the ship and, by1246, was made fast at the ship’s bow. The tugsSaturn and Comet were made fast on eitherquarter at the stern of the ship. A fourth tug,Mars,was en route to the ship by this time.

Between 1250 and 1310 two attempts weremade to move Hanjin Dampier into the deeperwater astern of the ship using the three tugs invarious positions and the ship’s main engine.These attempts failed.

By 1345 the fourth tug had arrived togetherwith the offshore supply vessel Massive Tideand a third attempt to move the ship was madeusing all of the towing vessels and the mainengine. This attempt also failed with the ship’sline securing Massive Tide parting in theprocess. In view of the falling tide, attempts torefloat the ship were abandoned at this time.

Hanjin Dampier was finally refloated on thenext spring tide, on 8 September, using five tugsand after 5000–6000 tonnes of cargo had beendischarged. The ship had suffered only minordamage to the bottom shell plating and wascleared by the classification society to continuetrading until the next scheduled dry-docking.

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Position of grounding

1156

1158

1152

1143

1135

1117

1106

1100

1050

FIGURE 2:Chart showing approximate track of Hanjin Dampier

ACT

NSW

NT

Qld

WA

SA

Vic

Tas

NT

NSW

ACT

Location ofincident

32'

116º 44' E

1127

1123

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Comment andanalysis

EvidenceOn 27 August 2002, a marine investigator fromthe Australian Transport Safety Bureau attendedHanjin Dampier, aground, in the port ofDampier. The master and chief engineer wereinterviewed and provided accounts of theincident. Copies of relevant documents wereobtained including: logs, alarm print outs,written statements, fuel records, variousprocedures and maintenance instructions. Fuelsamples were taken from the tanks within thediesel supply system for chemical analysis.

The pilot was interviewed on 29 August andalso provided a detailed account of the incident.

Dampier Port Authority provided recordings ofthe port's working VHF radio channels aroundthe time of the incident.

An events and causal factors chart for theincident is reproduced in figure 3.

The incidentOn 25 August 2002, Hanjin Dampier groundedas a result of the total failure of the ship’selectrical power supply and the lack of timelyintervention by the crew, when the risk to theship could have been mitigated. The initial shutdown of number one main generator occurred at1127; a minute later number two main generatoralso stopped to leave only number threegenerator supplying all of the ship’s electricalpower. At this point in the passage, there wastime (although limited by the tidal window), tostop the ship, either in the channel or after it hadcleared the channel, and investigate thegenerator shut downs.

When he rang the bridge after the initial shutdown of the two generators, the chief engineerindicated to the master that there were some

problems with the generators. He did not tell themaster the nature of the problem, nor did theydiscuss any contingency plan. The master inturn did not tell the pilot of the generatorproblems and so the pilot was unaware that thepassage was anything other than ‘normal’.When he ordered ‘full ahead’ at 1136, 16 minutes before the blackout, the pilotunknowingly increased the risk to the ship byincreasing its speed.

When he spoke to the master the chief engineerdid not know what had caused the generators toshut down. He was aware that the ship wasrestricted in its ability to manoeuvre due to itsminimal bottom clearance and his words to themaster were that he would need to check thegenerators after the ship cleared the ‘channel’.The master took this to mean that the workwould need to be done once the ship was indeeper water clear of the Sea Buoy. It is unclearwhether there was some confusion at this point,however there was another opportunity to stopin slightly deeper water and rectify thegenerator problem when the ship had clearedthe Hamersley Channel at 1143.

When the main switchboard blacked out, atapproximately 1152, the ship lost electricalpower both to the main engine pumps and thesteering gear. The emergency generator shouldhave come on-line and steering should havebeen restored approximately 30 seconds afterthe initial blackout. However, the emergencygenerator failed to start automatically and had tobe manually started by one of the engineers.With 10° of starboard rudder, the ship hadalready started turning to starboard, towards therelatively shallow water east of the deep draughttrack, when steering was restored at approxi-mately 1156.

Both the master and the pilot indicated that theythought that steering was restored at about aminute before the ship grounded at 1202. This isat odds with the engine room alarm loggerwhich recorded normal voltage to number onesteering gear motor and an overload alarm toindicate that number one steering pump motor,supplied by the emergency generator, had

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started at 1156. At this point steering wouldhave been available. It is unclear whether or notthe bridge team realised that steering wasavailable in the period between 1156 andapproximately 1201 or, in fact, if theirrecollection of the timing of the events wasincorrect. It is a matter for some conjecturewhether port rudder, applied as soon as steeringbecame available at 1156 (as opposed to 1201),would have arrested the turn to starboard. Withthe main engine stopped, the effect of the rudderwould have decreased as the ship slowed eventhough its speed was still just above theminimum steering speed of 4.3 knots. In anyevent, given the ship’s position at 1156, itslikely course with the rudder hard to port andthe extent of the shoal water ahead, it is unlikelythat the grounding could have been avoided atthis point.

The decision not use the ship’s anchors wasprobably prudent considering the ship’s verylimited bottom clearance and momentum. Aftersteering was lost, the ship started to turn tostarboard out of the channel, with its bottomclearance decreasing until it grounded. With amaximum draught of 18.10 m the ship had lessthan a metre bottom clearance as it passednumber four buoys. Given the size of theanchors, it is probable that the ship would havesustained severe bottom damage as it rode overthe top of the anchors if they had been let go. Inaddition, with a displacement of 233 158 tonnesand headway of six knots or more, theeffectiveness of the anchors would have beenvery limited with a very high likelihood ofcable/windlass damage if they had been used.

There was a succession of events which led tothe grounding, in essence these were:

• the contamination of the generator fuelsupply which led to the blackout, loss ofpropulsive power and loss of steering

• the failure of the emergency generator tostart automatically which meant that the shipwas without steering for a critical periodwith the rudder stopped at 10° to starboard

• the failure of the crew to correctly assess thesituation and take appropriate action duringthe 25 minute period between the firstgenerator shut down and the blackout at1152.

The initial generator shut downsThe shut down of the main generators was theresult of the fuel contamination later found bythe engineers. The ‘bus low frequency alarms’,recorded before each of the main generatorstripped off the switchboard, indicated that thediesel prime movers were slowing down in amanner which is consistent with contaminationof their fuel supply. Unfortunately the engineersdid not retain a sample of the contaminated fuelwhich they drained from the generator fuelsupply system, so the actual level of fuelcontamination which led to the generator shutdowns could not be determined.

Fuel analysis

Samples of fuel were taken from the dieselservice, settling and storage tanks, port andstarboard, and diesel transfer pump suction filteron 27 August, two days after the incident. Thesamples were tested for water content, thepresence of sodium chloride (salt) and bacterialcontamination, by Intertek Testing Services(Australia). The tests yielded the followingresults:

Sample Origin Water content (percent wt) Salt Viable Bacteria Count (#/ml)

Diesel Storage Tank Port 0.60 Yes Less than 100

Diesel Storage Tank Starboard 0.05 No Less than 100

Diesel Settling Tank 0.70 Yes 200

Diesel Service Tank 0.90 Yes Less than 100

Diesel Transfer Pump Suction Filter Trace only No 16000

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Based on the test results it is likely that thegenerator fuel was contaminated with salt wateroriginating from the port diesel storage tank.The increasing water percentages in the settlingand service tanks is consistent with progressivedilution of the contaminant as additional fuel oflower water content was transferred from theport storage tank in the two days between theincident and sampling. The water content of theservice tank sample, at 0.9 percent, is high andindicates that purification was not effective.

The level of bacterial contamination does notappear to be significant for any of the tanks.The sample from the diesel transfer pumpsuction filter has a bacteria count which issignificantly higher than the storage tanks fromwhich it regularly draws. The likely cause ofthis apparent aberration is sample contami-nation.

Source of the contamination

The ship’s records indicate that, on 27 June2002, 160 tonnes of diesel was loaded from abarge in Kwangyang, Korea. This was the lasttime prior to the incident that diesel had beenbunkered into the port storage tank. The loadingplan indicates that the first 60 tonnes wasbunkered into the empty port storage tank andthen the balance was bunkered into thestarboard storage tank. The fuel delivery docketstates that the diesel fuel had a water content of0.05 per cent. The sample taken from thestarboard storage tank on 27 August had a watercontent of 0.05 per cent which supports thevalidity of the information provided by the fuelmerchant on the delivery docket.

No diesel had been transferred from the portstorage tank between bunkering on 27 June andthe day of the incident. Allowing that the bunkerrecords regarding water content are accurate,seawater must have entered the tank in the eightweeks or so since bunkering. The ship’s tanksounding records were inconclusive, althoughthere appears to have been an increase in thelevel in the tank of four centimetres between 27 June and 31 July. Inspection after theincident revealed that both storage tank manhole

covers were in place with their bolts intact.However when the port storage tank manholecover was removed, its gasket was found to bebroken and unserviceable. The evaporator drainline is in the vicinity of the port storage tankmanhole. It appears likely that the water in theport storage tank originated from the drain lineand gained access to the tank via the brokengasket.

The diesel purifier

On the morning of the incident, the secondengineer had checked both the service andsettling tank drains and found no trace of water.Later in the morning he transferred diesel fromthe port storage tank to the diesel settling tankand then started the diesel purifier to top up thediesel service tank. It was during this time thatthe water in the generator fuel was passed fromthe settling tank to the service tank. For thewater to have been carried over into the servicetank, the purifier must have been operatingincorrectly.

Purifiers are designed to separate materials orliquids of higher density from the process liquidusing centrifugal force. In the case of a dieselpurifier, the process liquid is diesel and the‘heavy phase’ is any water or solid particles inthe diesel with a density higher than that of thediesel. Unpurified diesel is introduced into thepurifier ‘bowl’, shaped like two cones joined attheir bases, which is spinning at very highspeed. Inside the bowl, the diesel is subjected tovery large centrifugal forces which ‘spin’ thehigher density water and solids to the outside ofthe bowl where they are collected. The water isthen discharged continuously through the heavyphase outlet (water outlet), with both water andsolids being periodically discharged from theperiphery of the bowl when it is opened (de-sludged). The ‘clean’ diesel is dischargedcontinuously through the ‘light phase’ outlet.Some water is present at the periphery of thepurifier bowl at all times to seal it. The pointwhere the water and the diesel meet at theperiphery of the bowl is called the ‘interface’.

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For efficient separation of any water from thediesel, it is essential to establish the interfacebetween the two phases in the correct positionwithin the purifier bowl. This is achieved bycontrolling the ‘back pressure’ on the wateroutlet using a dam ring (gravity disc) of thecorrect size for the density of the diesel beingpurified. The position of the interface is alsogoverned to a lesser extent by the purified dieseloutlet back pressure which is manuallycontrolled using a throttling valve in the outletline. If the gravity disc is too large and/or theoutlet line back pressure is too high, theinterface will be too close to the periphery ofthe bowl and fuel will be carried over into thewater outlet. Conversely, if the gravity disc istoo small and/or back pressure is too low, theinterface will be too close to the centre of thebowl and purification will be inefficient, withwater being carried over in the purified fuel.

At the time of the incident, Hanjin Dampier’sdiesel purifier was fitted with a 63 mm gravitydisc. The manufacturers suggest that whenpurifying diesel in that particular model ofpurifier, a gravity disc of 68 mm or largershould be used. When running after the incident,the purifier was found to have a fuel outlet lineback pressure of 0.5 kg/cm2. This is less thanusual, with a normal back pressure beingbetween 0.8 and 1.2 kg/cm2. The likely effect ofthe small gravity disc and low outlet line backpressure was to move the interface towards thecentre of the bowl until a proportion of thewater in the diesel from the settling tank wascarried over into the fuel outlet. It is likely thatit was the combination of these two factorswhich allowed the water to be passed from thediesel settling tank to the diesel service tankand, from there, to the main generators.

The emergency generatorWhen the first engineer arrived in theemergency generator flat after the blackout at1152, he quickly ascertained that there was faultwith the generator’s electric starting system. He

then set about using the secondary hydraulicstarting system to start the generator. In all, ittook approximately four minutes for theemergency generator to be started andconnected to the emergency switchboard.

In normal circumstances the loss of voltage onthe main switchboard busbars initiates theemergency generator automatic start sequencewhich restores power to the emergencyswitchboard in less than 30 seconds (SOLAS5

requires a maximum of 45 seconds). The motoron number one steering pump is supplied fromthe emergency switchboard and would havestarted as soon as the emergency generator cameon line restoring the steering very quickly afterthe blackout. Had this occurred on 25 August, it is likely that Hanjin Dampiercould have been kept within the channel as itlost headway and the grounding could havebeen avoided.

Investigations after the incident revealed thatone of the emergency generator’s two startingbatteries (the 24 V starting system is suppliedby two 12 V batteries connected in series) wasfaulty. Electrolyte levels within the batterieswere satisfactory and so was the ‘float’ voltagedisplayed on the battery charger. Howeversubsequent load testing revealed that a cellwithin one of the batteries had failed. Thebatteries had been replaced in March 1999 andwere not scheduled for renewal until March2004.

The ship’s records indicated that the emergencygenerator was tested, on average, once a monthwith the last time being on 13 August, 12 daysbefore the incident. Each time the emergencygenerator was tested, the engineer performingthe work completed a checklist. The checklistprescribes a number of checks, including thebattery float voltage, followed by a running testof the generator. There is provision on thechecklist to record the test results and any otherobservations. There were no abnormalitiesrecorded on the checklists completed by the

5 The International Maritime Organization’s, International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, and its Protocol of 1988 (SOLAS).

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engineers who had performed the previous fourtests, and nothing to indicate any problems withthe starting battery.

Although it is common practice on many ships,like Hanjin Dampier, to test the emergencygenerator only once per month, there are alsomany ships where it is tested as frequently asevery week. Had the generator been tested inthe week prior to the incident, it is possible thatthe problem with the starting battery may havebeen discovered and rectified.

SOLAS Regulation 43, ‘Emergency source ofelectrical power in cargo ships’, section 7,states:

Provision shall be made for the periodic testingof the complete emergency system and shallinclude the testing of automatic startingarrangements.

As such, SOLAS requires that emergency powersystems are only tested ‘periodically’, with nospecific test interval stipulated. SOLAS does,however, stipulate testing intervals for othercritical safety equipment like lifeboat engines,which must be tested weekly. It seemsinconsistent that emergency generators shouldrate operation and inspection as infrequently asonce every month.

Contingency plansNumbers one and two generators tripped off themain switchboard, and stopped, at about 1128.At the time the ship was still in the HamersleyChannel, with an estimated time of arrival at theSea Buoy of 1245, more than an hour and aquarter later. With no back-up main powersupply and a very limited ability to manoeuvre,the ship’s safety was at risk. Given hisuncertainty regarding what had caused thegenerator shut downs, and his awareness of theship’s critical navigation situation, the chiefengineer should have discussed the situationmore fully with the master. This would havegiven the master the opportunity to form acontingency plan, in consultation with the pilot,to mitigate the risk to the ship. There was

adequate time at this point in the passage,(number three generator continued to supplypower for a further 24 minutes), to stop the shipeither in the channel or after it had cleared thechannel in deeper water and to call for tugassistance. In the event, the chief engineer didnot communicate the gravity of the generatorproblem to the master and this failure ofcommunication directly contributed to thegrounding.

Bridge Resource ManagementThe International Maritime Organization’sSeafarers’ Training, Certification andWatchkeeping Code (STCW Code), Section B-VIII/2 ‘Guidance regarding watchkeepingarrangements and principles to be observed’contains operational guidance which should betaken into account by companies, masters andwatchkeeping officers.

Part 3-1-4 under the heading ‘Bridge ResourceManagement’ sets out a number of principlesregarding the way bridge resources andmembers of the bridge team are to be managedduring a navigation watch. The section alsorefers specifically to the International Chamberof Shipping’s ‘Bridge Procedures Guide’. Boththe STCW Code and the Bridge ProceduresGuide place emphasis on the need for bridgepersonnel to work as a team and tocommunicate effectively, particularly at timeswhen the ship is navigating in confined waters.In his submission the pilot stated that he washappy with the performance of HanjinDampier’s bridge team during the pilotage onthe morning of 25 August.

Neither the STCW Code nor the BridgeProcedures Guide, however, contain anyguidance relating specifically to establishingeffective communication between deck andengine room watchkeeping staff. In criticalship’s operations, like pilotage, there is a needto ensure that communication is effectivebetween the bridge and the engine room. Theengineers are a critical part of the ship’s ‘team’and should take an active role at these times.

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Many maritime administrations around theworld require deck officers to complete bridgeresource management training as part of theircertificates of competency. There are nocomparable requirements for engineeringofficers who are not generally offered this typeof training. On 25 August, had there been moreeffective communication between the chiefengineer and master at the critical time after thefirst two generators had shut down, it is likelythat the grounding of Hanjin Dampier couldhave been averted.

Shipboard safety managementsystemHanjin Dampier had a current Document ofCompliance and Safety Management Certificateissued by the Korean Register of Shipping. Assuch, the vessel was found to be in compliancewith the provisions of the ISM Code in respectof its safety management system.

The ISM Code applies to all ships and statesunder ‘1.2 Objectives’:

1.2.1 The objectives of the Code are toensure safety at sea, prevention ofhuman injury or loss of life, andavoidance of damage to theenvironment, in particular to the marineenvironment and to property.

1.2.2 Safety-management objectives of theCompany should, inter alia:

.1 provide for safe practices in shipoperation and a safe workingenvironment;

.2 establish safeguards against allidentified risks…

Hanjin Dampier’s safety management systemincluded procedures, in the form of emergencychecklists for the bridge and engine room, formain engine breakdown and generator blackout.The checklists were of a general form and didnot relate specifically to the vessel or a pilotagesituation. As such, the checklists would not haveprovided any guidance or advice which wouldhave been of assistance to the master or chief

engineer during the events which occurred on25 August.

The ship’s safety management system alsoprovided periodic training for variousemergency situations including a generatorfailure and blackout. The ship’s records indicatethat this scenario had last been practiced on 2 November 2001, more than ten months priorto the incident. Given that the usualemployment contract on the vessel is sixmonths, it is doubtful that any of the crew onthe ship at the time of the incident had takenpart in this training exercise. This sort oftraining, conducted regularly, has the potentialto be very beneficial, as it allows the ship’screw to practice their responses to unusualsituations and be better prepared to makecritical decisions when real emergencies arise.

In summary, the ship’s safety managementsystem did not provide any guidance or trainingwhich would have assisted Hanjin Dampier’screw in preventing the ship from grounding on25 August.

Pilotage considerations

Past incidents

Hanjin Dampier is not the first ship to goaground in the port of Dampier. There havebeen at least three other groundings in the tenyears prior to the Hanjin Dampier incidentincluding; Pierre LD in 1992 (ATSB reportnumber 47), Bulkazores in 1995 (ATSB reportnumber 78) and Asia Angel in 1998. The PierreLD grounding, in particular, is very similar tothe Hanjin Dampier incident.

In November 1992, the capesized bulk carrierPierre LD ran aground when leaving Dampierafter loading iron ore at East Intercourse Island.Like Hanjin Dampier, Pierre LD lost steering asa result of a main switchboard blackout justafter the ship had cleared the HamersleyChannel. The ship was turning to port at thetime, and continued to turn to port after theblackout until it grounded on the eastern side ofEast Malaus Island.

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The passage

Hamersley Iron’s DUKC system predicts aship’s bottom clearance and manoeuvrabilitymargin at every stage throughout the passagefrom the berth to the Sea Buoy. The systembases its calculations on the wave and tide datameasured in real time. In terms of safetyassurance, the DUKC system represents asignificant improvement over static UKC ruleswhich stipulate a fixed minimum under keelclearance based only on the predicted height oftide and surveyed depths. The static system doesnot have the capacity to revise the passage planwhen sea conditions deteriorate or the tidevaries from the prediction. On these occasionsthe DUKC system may provide larger actualunder keel clearances than the static rulesdespite a smaller bottom clearance limit. Onmost occasions, however, Hamersley Iron shipssail from the port with less bottom clearance(albeit more accurately predicted) using DUKCthan was the case when static UKC rules wereused to plan the passage. This has led to asubstantially increased cargo output for the port.

The DUKC system is predicated upon a‘normal’ passage and as such does not allow foradverse events like that which occurred on 25 August 2002. On the day of the incident,Hanjin Dampier departed East IntercourseIsland close to the earliest possible time in thetidal window predicted for the outboundpassage. The early departure would haveallowed Hanjin Dampier to stop during thepilotage for a limited time to rectify thesituation if the crew had elected to use thisoption. On the day, the generator fuel problemcould probably have been rectified in thislimited time allowed by the tide. However, ifthe ship had departed later and/or the generatorproblem had been more severe, there wasinsufficient time and no water deep enough toanchor the ship anywhere between the berth andthe Sea Buoy. Hanjin Dampier, with an averagedraught of 18.02 m, would have grounded onthe next low tide regardless.

Hamersley Iron have considered the risksassociated with the pilotage of deep draughtships leaving the port. All the pilots have beentrained to deal with a variety of adversesituations and, in addition, Hamersley Iron haverecently modelled a limited range of dead shipscenarios on the ship handling simulator at theAustralian Maritime College. The scenariosmodelled were based on a loaded bulk carrierexperiencing a propulsion failure between fiveand fifteen minutes of leaving the berth at EastIntercourse Island. In all the scenarios the shipwas successfully towed back to the berth usingtwo or three tugs, or towed out of the channel tothe deeper water adjacent to the fairway beacon.In each case the assistance of two tugs wasreadily at hand and steering failure in additionto the propulsion failure was not modelled. Itappears that propulsion/steering failuresinvolving ship’s more than fifteen minutes fromthe berth were not considered in these trials.

Tug assistance

On the morning of 25 August, the pilot on boardHanjin Dampier let the tugs go after the shiphad cleared the berth at East Intercourse Island.The tugs then stood by to assist with berthingthe next bulk carrier, which was to comealongside the East Intercourse Island berthimmediately after Hanjin Dampier had left. Thisis the usual practice in the port, with outboundships making the remainder of the passage tothe Sea Buoy unescorted.

Navigating the Hamersley Channel representsthe area of greatest risk to outbound deepdraught ships. When departing early in the tidalwindow, ie. on the rising tide, under keelclearance is at a minimum while the ships aretransiting the channel. Their manoeuvrability islimited by the width of the channel (approxi-mately 180 m for the outer five miles) with thebottom shelving quite rapidly either side of thechannel. An average passage from the berth tothe fairway buoy at the entrance to the channeltakes around 80 minutes, which is a consid-erable time in which an incident could occur.

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The Hamersley Iron modelling conducted at theAustralian Maritime College only considered apropulsion failure occurring 15 minutes outfrom the berth with tugs immediately at hand.

On 25 August, the first problems with the maingenerators occurred while Hanjin Dampier wasin the outer reaches of the Hamersley Channel.Had there been tug assistance readily available,it certainly would have decreased the risk to theship if the crew had elected to stop in thechannel and make repairs, or if the ship hadblacked out in the channel.

The Pierre LD grounding in 1992 alsohighlighted the issue of tug escorts for outbounddeep draught iron ore ships. Like HanjinDampier, the tugs had been dismissedimmediately after Pierre LD had unberthedleaving the ship to navigate the HamersleyChannel unescorted. When the blackoutoccurred the pilot requested immediate tug

assistance but the tugs did not arrive in time toprevent the ship from grounding.

A ship grounding in the channel wouldeffectively shut down the operation of both theEast Intercourse Island and Parker Pointfacilities. In view of this, consideration shouldbe given to increasing the time that tugsaccompany ships in the channel.

In his submission the pilot stated:

The question of escort tugs is a contentious oneworldwide and the only comment I would makeis that I believe their use with outbound vesselsin Dampier would only make sense if they wereused for the entire pilotage. I do not believe thatthe Hamersley Channel represents a greater riskto outbound deep draught ships than does therest of the deepwater track to the sea buoy.Certainly in this instance if we had released anescort tug at the fairway beacon it would havebeen unlikely to get back to us in time toprevent the grounding.

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FIGURE 3:Hanjin Dampier: Events and causal factors chart

Even

tsCo

nditi

ons

Inci

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Conclusions

These conclusions identify the different factorscontributing to the incident and should not beread as apportioning blame or liability to anyparticular individual or organisation.

Based on the evidence available, the followingfactors are considered to have contributed to thegrounding of Hanjin Dampier on 25 August2002:

1. The ship grounded as a result of the loss ofsteering which lasted for a period of about 4 minutes between 1152 and 1156.

2. Steering was lost when the ship’s three maingenerators tripped off the main switchboarddue to water contamination of their fuelsupply.

3. The diesel purifier was being operated in amanner which allowed the water contami-nation to be carried over into the dieselservice tank.

4. The emergency generator failed to startautomatically due to a fault in one of itsstarting batteries.

5. The requirements for periodically testingship’s emergency power systems areinconsistent with those stipulated for othersafety equipment.

6. Lack of effective communication betweenthe chief engineer and master meant that thebridge team were unaware of the risk to theship after the first two generators hadstopped and thus precluded the possibilitythat they could take pre-emptive action.

7. The crew took no action nor instigated anycontingency plan in the time leading up tothe blackout, when they could have reducedthe risk to the ship.

8. There was a lack of any particular guidancefor the crew in terms of the procedures in useon board.

Additionally but not directly

1. Tug escorts for the deeper draught vesselsdeparting the port could provide additionalsafety assurance.

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Recommendations

MR20030046Ship owners/managers should review theprocedures for, and frequency of, testingemergency power generation arrangements ontheir ships to ensure that this equipment has thehighest possible reliability and availability.

MR20030047Ship owners/managers should consider bridgeresource management training for engineeringofficers.

MR20030048Hamersley Iron should review the risksassociated with the navigation of outbound deepdraught ships, particularly in the HamersleyChannel, and consider extending tug escorttimes.

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Submissions

Under sub-regulation 16(3) of the Navigation(Marine Casualty) Regulations, if a report, orpart of a report, relates to a person’s affairs to amaterial extent, the Inspector must, if it isreasonable to do so, give that person a copy ofthe report or the relevant part of the report. Sub-regulation 16(4) provides that such a personmay provide written comments or informationrelating to the report.

A copy of the draft report was sent to the pilot,master, chief engineer, owners and managers ofthe ship, Hamersley Iron, Dampier PortAuthority and the Australian Maritime SafetyAuthority.

Submissions were received from the pilot,owners, Dampier Port Authority, HamersleyIron and the Australian Maritime SafetyAuthority. Submissions were included and/orthe text of the report was amended whereappropriate.

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Hanjin Dampier

Name Hanjin Dampier

IMO Number 8811144

Flag Korea

Classification Society Korean Register

Ship Type Bulk Carrier

Builder Hyundai Heavy Industries Company, Ulsan, Korea

Owners Hanjin Shipping Company, Seoul, South Korea

Ship Managers Hanjin Shipping Company, Seoul, South Korea.

Gross Tonnage 110 541

Net Tonnage 64 786

Deadweight (summer) 207 346 tonnes

Summer draught 18.02 m

Length overall 309.00 m

Breadth 50.00 m

Moulded depth 25.70 m

Engine Hyundai B&W 6L80MCE, 6 cylinder, 2 stroke, single acting, direct reversing

Engine power 12 959 kW

Service speed 13.0 knots

Crew 22 Korean and Indonesian nationals

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72 Independent investigation into the grounding of the Korean flag bulk carrier Hanjin Dampier

at Dampier, W

eatern Australia, 25 August 2002

ISS

N 1447-087X

ISB

N 1 877071 45 5

Hanjin Dampier. 12.03