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Maritime Balance of Powerin the Asia-Pacific

RREPORTEPORT OFOF AA C CONFERENCEONFERENCE ORGANISEDORGANISED BYBY

TTHEHE I INSTITUTENSTITUTE OFOF D DEFENCEEFENCE ANDAND S STRATEGICTRATEGIC S STUDIESTUDIES

(IDSS)(IDSS)

MARITIME BALANCE OF POWER IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC 1

8th – 9th March 2005The Sentosa Resort & Spa,

Singapore

Maritime Balance of Powerin the Asia-Pacific

REPORT OF A CONFERENCE ORGANISED BY

THE INSTITUTE OF DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES

(IDSS)

2 MARITIME BALANCE OF POWER IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC


Mr Barry Desker delivering his opening remarks

In his opening address, Mr Barry Desker,Director IDSS, Singapore, noted that theemergence of new powers like China andIndia is expected to transform the regionalstrategic landscape in a fashion that couldbe as dramatic as the rise of Germany in the19th century and the United States in the 20th

century. The rise of these new powers waspredicated on a combinat ion of higheconomic growth, expanding mil i tarycapabilities and large populations. BesidesChina and India, other developing countries,like Indonesia, could also approach theeconomies of individual European countriesby 2020 due to their forecasted high growthrates and large population. Barring abruptreversals in the globalisation processes, therise of the new powers is a virtual certainty.

Mr Desker further elaborated that these newpowers are likely to start exerting theirinfluence in the maritime domain because ofthe importance of the sea to the countries inthe region, which depend on it as an avenuefor trade as well as for energy transportation.The increased use of the seas may havealready occurred by observing the trends of

increasing trade flows into and within Asia,the increasing energy demand in Asia, andthe increase strength of the merchant fleetsin the region. The recognition of the sea asan important domain could also be therationale behind why regional navies havebeen growing and is expected to continuegrowing in the future.

Mr Desker further mentioned that with thearrival of the new powers and an increase intheir naval capabilities, it was still uncertainas to whether these powers will relatecooperatively or competitively. How thesurge in power is accommodated and howthe emerging power politics are managedwill be key determinants of regional stabilityin the future. As a result, observing regionalt rends wil l have to be a permanentpreoccupation for Singapore if she is to side-step the pitfalls and ride on the wave ofopportunities that present themselves in theflux of change in the regional environment.Mr Desker concluded by saying that theconference aims to illuminate on some ofthese issues and help participants betterunderstand the rise of the new powers.

INTRODUCTION


SESSION ITHEMATIC ISSUES AND PARADIGMS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC MARITIME COMPLEX

Dr Eric Grove, University of Hull, UK,presented his paper, ‘Sea Power in the AsiaPacific Region’, in which he introduced thenotion of sea power, both on its own terms andas it pertained to the Asia-Pacific as seen fromoutside the region.

By way of preamble, Dr Grove remarked that“Earth” is a very bad name for the planet, giventhat two thirds of it is covered by sea, and that70 percent of the world’s population live within100 miles of a coastline. Historically as well,water transport has been extremely important andcontinues to be so today: shipping accounts for90 percent of world trade.

Disagreeing with Paul Kennedy’s contention thatsea power was declining in usefulness, Dr Groveargued that World Wars One and Two, togetherwith the Cold War, were in fact vindications ofmaritime coalitions over continental ones. Thus,the ideas put forth by Mahan in ‘The Influenceof Sea Power upon History’ have even morerelevance today. In particular, Dr Grove singledout two ideas articulated by Mahan. First, thenotion that naval power did not necessarilyconsist in a large merchant fleet; and second, hisadvocacy for a naval consortium of like-mindedstates rather than a national naval monopoly.

On the notion that national sea or maritime powerwas built on merchant fleets, Dr Grove arguedthat this no longer held true, given thatglobalisation has eroded much of the mercantilistidentity of a coastal state. In fact, a merchantship at sea represented the ultimate multinationalcorporation, given that it could be owned,insured, reinsured and managed by, and flyingthe flag of, different countries, as well as beingmanned by a cosmopolitan crew. This then raisesthe problematic question of whose interests werebeing affected if that notional ship was attacked.Some countries, like the UK, argue that

beneficial ownership rather than the flag entitlesa ship to naval protection under the self-defenceprovision of the UN Charter. In contrast, theUS and France will in certain circumstancesdefend any ship under attack.

Nevertheless, there was a strong connectionbetween the economic use of the sea and navalcapabilities. Dr Grove pointed out that theworld’s major trading nations – the US,Germany, Japan, France, the Netherlands, theUK, Italy, Canada, the PRC, South Korea andothers – were significant naval powers. Indeed,this nexus is very much alive in the Asia-Pacificwhere there is a congruence of significant navalpowers and large national mercantile marines.There were, however, notable exceptions to thisgeneralisation.

For instance, Japan, historically a navalpowerhouse, is currently limited in her navalcapabilities by the pacifist political cultureinherited from World War Two, although she isbeginning to ‘normalise’ her Maritime SelfDefence Force. Nevertheless, it will be a longtime before Japan is willing to act, and is trustedby her neighbours as acting, as a normal navalpower. China’s potential as a naval powerhouseis also limited as well because of her historicalpreference for the ‘continentalist’ endeavour overthe maritime. Furthermore, its ‘people’s war’rhetoric has not been helpful in the developmentof naval forces whose essence, compared to landforces, has always been high technology. Hence,

Dr. Eric Grove delivering his presentation


the Chinese naval capability presently consistedmainly of littoral force projection than anythingelse, even though it has been trying to increaseits capabilities in recent times. China thereforewill have to take dramatic steps in modernisingits navy for its naval power to match herambitions in the Taiwan Straits and the SouthChina Sea. Dr Grove pointed out that the aircraftcarrier Varyag continues to rust at Dalian evenas new destroyers appear alongside it. Thisillustrates the way the Chinese Navy seems tobe developing in the near term.

Similarly, the dependence on sea trade by theother countries in the region, namely Taiwan,South Korea and Singapore, has led to thedevelopment of their naval capabilities tomaintain the free movement of shipping. Thesecountries are able to deploy impressive fleets incapability, if not in reach yet. The TaiwaneseNavy is particularly impressive, as it is roughlyequal to the PLAN in overall capability.

On technology, Dr Grove identified two mainissues relevant to the regional navies, namelyelectronic and mechanical. First, regional naviesfaced mechanical engineering challenges,particularly in the building of submarines. Infact, it is the Japanese who has been able to buildsubmarines without external help. The Russiansare helping the Chinese develop the nextgeneration of submarines. By the same token,the Germans are assisting the Indonesians andthe South Koreans, and the Swedes are thesubmarine patrons of Australia and Singapore.Even the building of surface warships entails raredesign skills and technologies. Japan remainsdependent on US and British equipment to aconsiderable extent, while the PLAN uses Frenchand Russian technologies. Australia and NewZealand’s latest frigates are based on Germandesigns. In Southeast Asia, Malaysia builds itswarships in Britain and Germany and buyssecond-hand from Italy, while Singapore buyssecond-hand Swedish submarines and enhancesthe French frigate and German corvette designs.In fact, Dr Grove points out that the only fullyindependent naval powers in the Pacific are the

Russian and US navies. However, the power ofthe Russian navy is limited by the sluggishnessof the Russian economy.

On the electronic engineering dimension, DrGrove argued that since the Second World Warthe integration and use of electronics has beenthe essence of naval warfare. What is new inthe present era is the extent of the informationnow available to war fighters and the speed atwhich it can be delivered. The American jointfires system allows timely, precision engagementof targets many miles inland, while cooperativeengagement capability allows a complete firecontrol quality radar picture to be obtained acrossa whole force. However, these and othernetworks pose interoperability challenges tomembers of a coalition. In order to fight withthe US, significant resources will have to be spentto ensure compatibility in order to join thenetwork.

In conclusion, Dr Grove argued that the movetowards the littoral is the latest in a series of‘oscillations’ driven by strategic andtechnological factors: navies moved out to seain the 18th century, and then back to the littoralin the 19th century. By the Second World War,littoral power projection along with the battlefor sea control had manifested themselves interms of amphibious landing crafts and carrierair power. This trend was reinforced during theCold War where the confrontation of Soviet andWestern navies on the high seas created a new‘blue water’ emphasis to naval doctrines. It wasonly after the Cold War where there was a returnto the current littoral priority. This ‘powerprojection’ paradigm is being followed by all theworld’s major navies, with the paradigm takento mean the deployment of stand-off militarycapabilities that are able to deliver significantforce either to deter or coerce. The definition ofthe littoral has also been stretched in the wakeof Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ whereAfghanistan, a land locked country, wasconverted into the littoral with US carrier basedaircraft conducting most of the bombingmissions. This demonstrated that aircraft carriers


could substitute for the lack of a host nation inproviding bases and support. Hence, powerprojection assets are becoming the centerpiecesof the world’s advanced navies. Furthermore,this emphasis on power projection increases thedisconnect between the higher levels ofcontemporary naval doctrine and the moretraditional aspects of ‘sea power’, notablymerchant shipping.

In the second paper, Dr Lawrence Prabhakar,IDSS, Singapore, discussed the maritimestrategic trends in the Asia-Pacific. He arguedthat the Asia-Pacific had emerged as the maritimestrategic hub in the 21st century, due largely tothe maritime trade of resources and merchandise.The maritime geography of the region presentedthe interface of the continental landmass of Asiaand the Pacific ocean. The maritimegeographical complex of the region is boundedby archipelagoes and islands of Southeast Asia,and hemmed by the extensive littoral of the Asianlandmass and the continental powers of US,Russia and China.

In setting the theoretical framework of his paper,Dr Prabhakar argued that the internationalrelations of the Asia-Pacific in the post-Cold Warera was essentially an emergent multipolarbalance of power system with the continuedhegemonic dominance of the US. The rise ofnew powers has been competitive and paralleledby the growing strategic capabilities comprisingnuclear and missile arsenals even as economic

interdependence has emerged. The balance-of-power in the region is maritime-centric as thecontiguity of sea spaces have emphasised thesignificance of civilian shipping and navies. Sealanes of communication therefore constituted thearterial networks of resource and energy flows.

Naval transformation has been one area that hasgained tremendous salience within the regionsince the end of the Cold War, and theconcomitant developments wrought about byglobalisation. The emergent missions and rolesof navies in the relative peacetime contexts havesubstantially modified the traditional paradigmof naval power and maritime strategy. Theemergent benign roles of cooperative maritimestrategy evident in joint exercises, interoperablemissions, and constabulary roles in humanitarianmissions have significantly complemented thestill prevalent and traditional coercive andcompellence missions of navies.

Dr Prabhakar introduced the notion of ‘forwardnaval presence’, which is defined in terms of‘from the sea.’ This would provide enhancedautonomy to the dominant maritime extra-regional powers seeking to reduce theirvulnerabilities on land yet persisting with stronglittoral intervention capabilities. He argued thatthe US currently led the defence transformationprocess that is followed closely by its extra-regional allies and regional partners. Forwardnaval presence would thus lead to the following:(1) the emergence of joint forces that would haveexpeditionary and amphibious capabilities thatare increasingly premised on maritime-air-spaceplatforms; (2) it would lead to the growinginteroperability between the US and its regionalallies. Although Japan, Australia, South Koreaand Singapore are at different stages of thetransformation effort, they are expected toconverge towards interoperability with the US;(3) the transformation of naval presence wouldlead to the integration of C4ISR platforms andsensors that are being integrated into joint strikeplatforms; and (4) the integration of homelandsecurity concerns with forward presence will befacilitated by the deployment of sea-based theatre

Dr Lawrence Prabhakar delivering his presentation


ballistic missile defences on high performanceAEGIS cruisers, which would also provideassurance and deterrence against littoral ballisticmissile threats in the region.

Shifting his presentation to patterns of littoraldominance, Dr Prabhakar argued that littoraloperations and littoral dominance would becomethe accents of the extra-regional naval powersin the region. The scope of forward presence inthe 21st century would be centered on theprojection of power into the hinterland and thedeployment of sea-launched cruise missiles withconventional and nuclear payloads for strike.The maritime doctrines of the US, the UK,France, China and India are specific in regard tolittoral control operations.

Four factors have led to the quest for littoralcontrol in the respective theatres of the NorthArabian Sea, Indian Ocean, the Bay of Bengal,the South China Sea and the Taiwan Straits.First, the sea-denial capabilities of the littoralpowers have increased, given their stealthplatforms and missile corvettes, which hasnegatively affected the sea control capabilitiesof the great powers in the region. Second, short-range ballistic missiles, with NBC payloads,have increased the retaliatory potential of thelittoral powers, and have neutralised to asignificant degree the power projectioncapabilities of the extra-regional powers. Third,submarines in the littoral offer the bestsubmerged defence for the littoral powers. The

enhanced capabilities of diesel-electricsubmarines armed with high speed fire-and-forget torpedoes provide the most effectivestealth strike options. Finally, shore-based navalaircraft armed with anti-ship and air-to-surfaceattack missiles also provide for a strong littoraldefence capability that complicates the accessand basing operations and the ability to sustainlittoral control operations.

In conclusion, Dr Prabhakar believed that themaritime strategic trends in the region portray amixed picture of competitive rivalries alongsidethe more recent cooperative maritimepartnerships. Furthermore, the maritime balanceof power in the region would be driven by theprocess of naval transformation derived from thebroader defence transformation effort. Navaltransformation would also be determined by theemergent strategic milieu that conditions thebalance of power, with the accents on themultipolar structure underpinned by UShegemony. Naval transformation would also bedetermined by technology with jointness as thecentral theme. Jointness of the armed forceswould be the future paradigm even as the conductof operations would be tailored to suit therequirements of the architecture of the armedforces. In summary, the maritime strategic trendsin the Asia-Pacific portray strong evidencetowards a technology-centric navaltransformation process.

DISCUSSION

It was pointed out that although China might beregarded as a limited naval power, it was stillvery powerful. Dr Grove agreed, but reiteratedhis point that while the Chinese navy was ofconsiderable size, it did not expand according toexpectations, especially in the 1990s. Thedevelopment of Chinese naval power has clearlylagged China’s economic rise. The ability of thePLAN to expand to the first island chain is fairlywell-established; however, the ability to projectforce beyond that first island chain remainsproblematic for the Chinese navy. Dr Groveargued that the nuclear submarine capability had

Vadm (Retd) Hideaki Kaneda (left) and Dr Eric Grove (right)sharing a light moment


to be vastly improved before China could beconsidered to have fulfilled its promise as a greatnaval power.

A question was asked as to the future of seapower, in particular, whether the Asia-Pacificwould be an arena for cooperation orconfrontation. Dr Grove first noted that theregional navies were developing at a significantpace. The Indian and Chinese navies areenvisaged to develop to a point where they wouldplay a significant role in the maritime dynamicsof the region. These developments could leadto a confrontational posture in the region, a trendthat is borne out by history. The critical questionis how a balance of power might result from thesedevelopments. The developments in the Asia-Pacific are however, in contrast to other parts ofthe world, where the trend is towards an era ofcooperation at sea, especially in Europe. It maybe possible for such cooperative trends to bereplicated in the Asia-Pacific region. Diplomacywould therefore be the key ingredient inmitigating against competition andconfrontation.

One participant asked if presently we were seeingthe end of the era of the super-carrier. As moreplatforms got stealthier and anti-ship missilesbecame deadlier, would navies still need or wantsuper-carriers? Dr Grove argued emphaticallythat the super-carrier was very much alive andwell. He pointed out that the bigger the aircraftcarrier, the more resilient to attacks it was andthe size of the carrier gave greater flexibility foroperational deployment. As such, Dr Grovebelieved that the vulnerability of carriers wasfrequently overstated.

A question was asked regarding the growingcompetition in the maritime dimension – wouldit have stabilising or destabilising effects in theyears to come? Dr Prabhakar’s view was that itwas too early to tell. However, he was optimisticas previous arms races in the Asia-Pacific regionhave not led to war. There was also anasymmetry in the region because there existsbelligerent states who drive up the destabilising

patterns. He cited the instances where abrinkmanship-indulgent North Korea, and adestabilised Pakistan, could lead to destabilisingtendencies. However, by and large, thedevelopment of capabilities and counter-capabilities would result in a stable equilibriumprovided it was underpinned by the US’s role asthe extra-regional balancer. China’s posture willgreatly determine if the outcome is a stable one:if China decides to be assertive, then it coulddestabilise the regional maritime picture.

A point was raised concerning the littoral which,from the classical point of view, had been definedas a space from the coast to about 200 km, andin the context of naval operations, is a highlycomplex environment. However, in the currentcontext, this ‘space’ is also where non-state actorsbreed. The littoral is the ‘new geography’ inwhich most of the navy’s activities are going totake place. Dr Prabhakar also pointed out thatthe littoral was made even more complex as thespace is being contested by both state and non-state actors.

On the question of Sea Lines ofCommunications, or SLOCs, there wasambiguity as to how important they were? Aparticipant pointed out that SLOCs were merelyconstructs, and that the focus of protection shouldreally be on ships and not SLOCs. In any case,ships are always free to deviate from SLOCs,albeit at some cost. The issue of SLOCs andchoke points is therefore not a clear-cut onebecause it involves other issues of business costs

From left to right: Dr Lawrence Prabhakar, Dr Sam Bateman, ProfessorAmitav Acharya, Dr Eric Grove, and Mr Michael Richardson


and the geopolitical risks of diverting maritimetraffic. The Straits of Malacca, in particular,would prove an important test-case for multi-country maritime cooperation due to thedependence by many countries on it for tradeand the transport of oil.

On the notion of forward naval presence, whatthen is the ‘correct’ strategy for small navies toadopt? For small navies, sea control is importantso as to enable an ally to come in support of theoperations. In addition, sea denial, andconstabulary roles are also important aspects ofoverall naval strategy.

SESSION IINATIONAL MARITIME DOCTRINES AND

CAPABILITIES

PERSPECTIVE FROM JAPAN

Vice-Admiral (retired) Hideaki Kaneda,Okazaki Institute, Japan, presented his paper,‘Outline of Japan’s strategic environment and thecharacteristics of the Asia-Pacific region’. Hefirst set the context by sketching out Japan’sNational Defence Program Guideline that wasrevised in December 2004. In this latestguideline, Japan now recognised that theprospects of facing a full-scale invasion haddiminished considerably. However, Japan wasnow confronted with the rising need to respondagainst new threats such as WMD proliferation,ballistic missiles, and transnational terrorism.Japan was also concerned about North Korea andChina’s military modernisation and maritimeexpansion. The guideline called for theestablishment of a ‘multi-functional, flexible andeffective force’ that would allow Japan toparticipate in multilateral initiatives and torespond to new threats while maintaining its‘basic defence force’ concept as described inearlier defence policy outlines.

Vice-Admiral Kaneda also highlighted the Japan-US security alliance as a key element in Japan’sdefence posture. The guideline stressed howJapan would need to engage the US in security

Vadm (Retd) Hideaki Kaneda making his presentation


dialogue while cooperating with other relevantcountries in order to stabilise the region.

The new guideline called for improvements inresponse capabilities, mobility, flexibility andmulti-functionality. Furthermore, it called forthe enhancement of technological andinformation capabilities, as well as a fundamentalreview of the effectiveness of existingequipment, systems and structures. Focusing onJapan’s Maritime Self Defence Force (JMSDF),Vice-Admiral Kaneda pointed out that theJMSDF’s posture was to develop anti-submarinewarfare capabilities. However, the new guidelinewould entail dramatic changes across the board,including the revision of the conventionaldefence programs, the appropriate reduction inthe scope of major equipment such as surfacecombatants, and fixed-wing patrol aircraft.

Next, Vice-Admiral Kaneda explained theimplications of the new guideline for the dutiesand roles of the JMSDF. First, as mentioned,the JMSDF would need to develop capabilitiesthat could respond to threats such as WMDs andballistic missiles, terrorist attacks, invasion to theisland area, cyber attacks and spy-ship activities.Second, the JMSDF would still need to respondto the threat of conventional symmetrical wars.Finally, the US remained an important exogenousfactor in the development of the JMSDF: theongoing reorganisation of US forces forwarddeployment will invariably lead to changes inthe Japan-US security relationship.

At the more technical level, Vice-AdmiralKaneda argued that if the aims of the new defenceguideline were to be realized, then there had tobe significant enhancements to the command,control, communication, and computer functionsof the JMSDF as well as the functions for anti-air, anti-ship, anti-submarine and electronicwarfare. The anti-submarine and anti-minewarfare roles were especially critical becausethey were both basic functions of maritimeoperations and also fundamental to the overallstrategic milieu. Finally, Vice-Admiral Kanedabelieved that the JMSDF would eventually need

to have tactical aircraft carriers, helicoptercarriers, AEGIS ships, with ballistic missiledefence capabilities, and multi-purpose ships.

PERSPECTIVE FROM CHINA

In the second paper, Dr You Ji, East AsiaInstitute, Singapore, discussed China’s navalstrategy and transformation, tracing the variousdevelopments since the year 2000. He pointedout that the PLAN’s capability since 2000 hadbeen a broad-based improvement in both qualityand quantity. Some of the new assets includedmajor platforms such as two Sovremennydestroyers in 2000, two 052B (Luhu class)destroyers in 2003, two 052C (Luyang class)destroyers in 2004 and a significant number offrigates. This spate of acquisitions contrastssharply with the passivity of the 1990s.Crucially, the PLAN also acquired other majorcombatants that have given it tremendous blue-water capabilities, including two nuclear attacksubmarines, one strategic nuclear missilesubmarine, one new class conventionalsubmarine and no less than four (093) Song classsubmarines. Dr You Ji highlighted the submarineacquisitions as being particularly important, asthey have transformed the image of the PLANsubmarine fleet from the noisy, primitive andaccident-prone vessels of Soviet origins to onewith modern capabilities.

Dr You Ji also discussed the driving factorsbehind the rapid expansion of the Chinese navy

Dr You Ji delivering his first presentation


in the last five years. He cited intensive researchand development as key factors in the process,but also added that progress was propelled byforeign acquisitions. China’s powerful economywill play a critical role in speeding up the navalmodernisation process. In the coming decade,he said that US$20 billion will be allocated forthis purpose alone.

Speaking on the issue of technologicalbreakthroughs, Dr You Ji explained the PLAN’snew assets as the product of an impressivenumber of technological breakthroughs in the lasttwo decades. He argued that these breakthroughsconstituted an important foundation for thecontinuing process of naval transformation.Also, while conceding that the PLAN could notbe considered among the elite naval powers, hebelieved that the PLAN was able to extend itscombat range, and that under certain conditions,could carry out blue water missions around thefirst island chain. Indeed, he pointed out thatthe bulk of the technological breakthroughs arefor blue water operations, with emphasis on airdefence and anti-submarine warfare capabilities.

Despite growing blue water capability, Dr YouJi argued that, in practical terms, Chinese navaloperations were not grounded in blue waterintentions, but in more realistic combat models.Using the concepts of sea control and sea denial,the PLAN is thus seen as exercising sea controlin the coastal waters, while projecting sea denialcapability up to the first island chain. The latteris predicated on inflicting heavy losses on anadversary that is aiding Taiwan in its bid for dejure independence by conducting a navalblockade of China’s sea space. Dr You Ji arguedthat this defensive-offence posture suits thenavy’s regional role and indicates that itperceives sea control and sea denial in tactical,rather than strategic, terms.

In conclusion, Dr You Ji argued that there wascurrently a missing link between the PLAN’sstrategic ambition and its actual operationalcapability. With Taiwan ever at the forefront ofpolicy thinking, the PLAN has modernised with

the view to potential cross-Strait conflict.However, the PLAN is far from being a true bluewater power. Dr You Ji cited difficulties such asits lopsided force structure, the slow growth ofits ocean-going fleets, the lack of progress ondeveloping strategic nuclear submarines, itsobsolete airforce, and its stalled aircraft carrierprogramme as factors that prevent the PLANfrom being a true blue water power at present.Still, if China’s economic growth continuedapace, then it would simply be a matter of timebefore the PLAN achieved its longer termambition of becoming a blue water navy.

PERSPECTIVE FROM INDIA

In the final paper of the day, Commander(retired) Dr Vijay Sakhuja, ObserverResearch Foundation, India, discussed how theIndian navy was keeping pace with the emergingmaritime challenges. The paper focusedprimarily on the geostrategic imperativescurrently shaping the growth of the Indian navy,and examined the Indian navy’s strategy andforce structure. Dr Sakhuja believed the Indianocean to be the most dynamic region in strategicand economic terms today, and that maritimedevelopments were integral to the regionaleconomic and security environment. Sinceindependence, India had been actively engagedin building closer relations regionally andglobally. The Indian navy has been at theforefront of international and regional initiativesfor maritime cooperation. However, the Indiangovernment is concerned about the future role

Dr Vijay Sakhuja delivering his presentation


of extra-regional powers in the Indian ocean andtheir impact on stability and security.

Dr Sakhuja explained that the Indian navy’smission was to provide maritime security in ‘alldirections’, and to take the battle into anadversary’s zone should hostilities develop. Thenavy’s foremost task therefore was to providedeterrence from a position of strength and thecarrier task force must be able to execute seacontrol from a zone that extends up to 1.5 millionsquare kilometers. The Indian navy’s strategyis therefore based on its ability to exercise seacontrol of its immediate sea spaces, with thedegrees of control being calibrated as zones ofpositive control, medium control and soft control.These describe the navy’s ability to engage agiven enemy before it can endanger or damagenational assets. In geographical terms, thesezones encompass the large sea areas from thecoast to the deep sea areas of the Indian ocean.

In discussing recent developments, Dr Sakhujanoted that, as articulated in the Indian MaritimeDoctrine published in 2004, there was areaffirmation of the role of the Indian navy in itswarfighting, constabulary and politico-diplomatic functions. He singled out the latterrole as being a critical one that will help shapemultinational naval cooperation and strengthenconfidence-building measures among states.Hence, navies will increasingly cooperate topreserve order at sea even when they are not partof any formal military alliance. The new doctrinealso noted that, post-Cold War, the focus hasshifted from large armies and their bases tomaritime forces in support of littoral warfare.Consequently, the Indian maritime vision for the21st century regards the arc from the Persian Gulfto the Malacca Straits as a legitimate area ofinterest. Indian naval thinking was thereforeconcerned with the development of powerfulnaval forces to act as a deterrent, conduct navaldiplomacy, and maintain maritime order. Theseissues then translate into joint operations,information warfare and littoral warfare.

In conclusion, Dr Sakhuja said that the Indian

navy had been engaged in major acquisitionprogrammes since the late 1990s and theseprogrammes were aimed at force modernisationalong the lines mentioned above. A variety ofadvanced platforms, missiles and electronicwarfare equipment have also been added on.Although the navy, as it stands, has the capabilityto safeguard India’s maritime interests, it remainsdependent on foreign sources for weapons andsensors.

DISCUSSION

On China, a participant asked if sea control andsea denial were only to do with tactics as Dr YouJi had argued, or if they fit into a broader strategicmission? Dr You Ji reiterated his stance, furtherarguing that the notions of sea control and seadenial were underpinned by economic rationale,where Chinese economic activity, the bulk ofwhich is foreign trade, had to be protectedespecially during times of tension. He concededhowever that there could be exceptions. Forexample, many of China’s oil tankers steamedthrough the Indian Ocean region, and if tensionsescalated in that region, China’s source of energywould be threatened. This could be the situationin which China would exert its naval power forsea control and denial.

Further elaborating, Dr You Ji confirmed that seacontrol and sea denial by and large pertained tooperational matters. Sea denial tended to referto the eastern region off Taiwan, wheresubmarines could be deployed. However, theefficacy of any sea denial operations dependedon who was being denied: clearly the Chinesedid not have the capability to mount suchoperations against the US.

On the question of China’s carrier programme,Dr You Ji believed that it had merely been puton hold, rather than completely abandoned. Hebelieved that any further progress on the carrierproject was contingent on China’s ability todevelop systems that could deal with air andmissile attacks.


On another question regarding carriers, aparticipant asked what China’s asymmetricstrategies vis-a-vis anti-carrier operations were.Dr You Ji replied that, given current constraints,the PLAN would employ network-centricwarfare or even space warfare to paralyse thecommand and control functions of the carrier,rather than to try to sink them. However, You Jipointed out that the future of informationtechnology (IT) warfare in general is stilluncertain.

A question was asked about the conditions underwhich China might acquire a blue water navalcapability within the next 25 years. Dr You Jireplied that any strategy on the part of theChinese would largely be a reaction to thesituation in Taiwan. Since the 1980s to the early1990s, China had reduced its military budgetconsiderably as it did not believe that she wouldbe involved in any major war. Subsequentbudget increases were made in the 1990s afterTaiwan started to push aggressively forindependence. China then began to believe thatwar with Taiwan might become inevitable, andthat this war would involve the US. Hence,China’s military build-up had both Taiwan andthe US in mind. However, this development alsoprovoked a reaction from Japan and India.China, therefore, is very much at the cross-roads.As China embraces interdependence and theprinciples of the international community, shehas also to grapple with the tendencies fornationalist expansionism at the same time. DrYou Ji believed that the latter would be provokedby external developments, such as the bombingof the Chinese embassy, and the harassment ofChinese submarines by US warships.

The discussion then turned to the legal aspectsof the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), asmany countries saw it as unilateral and unlawful.It was noted that once a country signed and waspart of the PSI, it stood to gain collectively fromthe arrangement. Could the PSI be seen as acollective good, rather than solely benefiting theUS? Dr Vijay agreed that it was for the collectivegood, although he cited the negative experience

of the North Korean vessel So San. He alsopointed out that even though the collective goodwas the end game, the process by which thatpoint was reached has been unilateral, and heargued that there should have been a greateramount of debate before the PSI wasimplemented. The PSI has been particularlyproblematic because of its perceived unilateralnature, and also because of the perception that itwould entail the surrendering of a nation’ssovereign rights.

Turning the question to operational matters, aparticipant asked if and when the Indian navywould become part of India’s strategic nuclearforces, i.e. the ballistic and cruise missile force?Dr Sakhuja replied that for the moment, attentionis not focused on integrating the Indian navy intothe overall strategic nuclear forces. However,the Indians are developing the Sagarika missile,which could serve as a delivery system fornuclear weapons. The challenge then becomesone of miniaturising the weapons systems inorder to fit them into submarines.

A question was raised on the interoperability ofthe Indian navy with other navies. Dr Sakhujareplied that interoperability was contingent onwhich ally one was referring to. For example,with the British Royal Navy, interoperability wasnot an issue because of historical connectionssuch as the admiralty documents. However,interoperating with the US Navy was morechallenging, and the Indian navy has had to buildseparate communications systems to facilitatesuch interoperability. However, as Indo-American cooperation has been in existencesince 1992, there has been considerable time forcooperation to become more sophisticated andfor learning to occur.

A point was made that navies today appeared tohave problems engaging in confidence-buildingmeasures (CBMs). In the early 1990s, it wasthought that warships could also serve as ‘law’ships, i.e. ships that enforced the commoninternational law. However, recent trends innaval developments indicate that navies are


increasingly focusing more on their war timeroles rather than their constabulary anddiplomatic roles. As a result of the navy’sincreasing focus on war time roles, coast guardsmay then have to play a bigger role in theconstabulary duties of maintaining law and orderat sea. Coast guards may be the rightorganisation to take on such constabulary dutiesas they do not have the historical baggage orrestrictions that navies face. However, it wasnoted that coast guards already had a heavy setof responsibilities, such as marine safety and theconduct of search and rescue operations, and asa result should not be overburdened with CBM-type activities.

SESSION IIINUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MISSILE DEFENCES:THE MARITIME DIMENSION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

PERSPECTIVE FROM THE UNITED STATES

Donald Berlin, Asia-Pacific Centre forSecurity Studies, US, began his presentation byasserting that the Asia-Pacific region is likely tobe characterized by a gradual increase in thenumber of nuclear weapons states. At the sametime the region will also witness an increase inthe size and quantity of these states’ weaponsinventories. Furthermore, Asia’s nuclearweapons will eventually have a maritimedimension. This will either be because they willbe sea-based or because the environment inwhich they could be employed during battle hasa maritime component.

According to Berlin, Asia-Pacific states that arelikely to develop and deploy nuclear weaponsin the future include Japan, the Republic ofKorea, Taiwan and Iran. Before long, India isexpected to start deploying nuclear weapons atsea on submarines and Pakistan will most likelyfollow suit shortly after. India’s intention to adda maritime dimension to its nuclear posture wasdeclared as long ago as 1999. This was also theyear in which Pakistan announced that its navywould be assigned a nuclear role.

The development of China’s sea-based nuclear

Dr Donald Berlin delivering his presentation


weapons capability is already well underway. Itrecently launched the lead hull of its next-generation nuclear-powered attack submarines,Type 093. It is also developing a new design Type094 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine.

One state that has not received much attentionbut does in fact have a bearing on the maritimebalance of power in the Asia-Pacific is Israel. Itis suspected that Israel has the capacity to launchattacks against targets at the Indian Oceanentrance of the Red Sea. Israel’s navy has alsobeen developing plans to operate in the IndianOcean.

Berlin went on to describe how the nuclearweapons of the Asia-Pacific will be increasinglymaritime in focus because of the battle space inwhich they will be deployed. This is essentiallybecause many of the various scenarios entailingthe use of nuclear weapons in the Asia-Pacificregion involve the maritime environment. Theconflict between China and Taiwan across theTaiwan Strait is only one example.

Another reason for this increased maritimedimension is the proliferation of forward basingof naval facilities, demonstrated by the US andmost likely in the near future by India and China.

In sum, according to Berlin the future of theregion will be characterized by the rise of Indianand Chinese naval power, and the balancingagainst them of Japan, the US and Australia.

DISCUSSION

The question of what circumstances would berequired for either Japan or the Republic of Koreato make the decision to acquire nuclear weaponswas discussed. If the US assumed a less proactivesecurity posture in the region, or if the US ceasedto underwrite Japanese security and provideextended deterrence, Japan may well be forcedto develop nuclear weapons. Japan could alsoelect to have nuclear weapons in response toChinese military developments. In other words,if China looks sufficiently dangerous and

provocative Japan may well make the decisionto acquire a nuclear capability, not withstandingcontinued US support. Korea is in a difficultstrategic situation positioned as it is betweenJapan and China, and this alone may be enoughto prompt her to develop nuclear weapons.

Another question discussed was what were theelements that have the greatest potential todestabilize the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific? According to the speaker thedevelopment of significantly better Chinesemissiles - in particular missiles that are mobileand have longer ranges - would have the potentialto upset the balance of power in the region. Thetrend of sea-basing in the region may also causesome destabilisation in the long-term.

PERSPECTIVE FROM JAPAN: TRANSFORMING OLD

IDEALISM INTO NEW REALISM; A NEW

DIMENSION IN JAPAN’S NATIONAL SECURITY

STRATEGY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE

SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

REGION

Katsuhisa Furukawa, Research Institute ofScience and Technology for Society, Japan,began his presentation by describing how Japanhas demonstrated a ‘unique assertiveness inleading regional and international efforts toaddress security problems.’ He went on toexplain the saliency of this role, particularly inrelation to the proliferation of nuclear weaponsand how Japan’s national security strategy hasevolved over the years in tandem with the Bush

From left to right, Dr Sam Bateman, Prof Amitav Acharya,Dr Eric Grove, Mr Michael Richardson.


administrations’ pursuit of a rigorous nationalsecurity strategy against proliferation.

Furukawa described how Japan’s traditionallyoptimistic national security policy has beenreplaced with a more pragmatic one, which ischaracterised by realism rather than idealism.This change occurred primarily following the 9/11 attacks on the US and the resumption of theNorth Korean nuclear crisis in 2002. Japan’snational security strategy has now evolved anddiversified into a more balanced posture, onewhich incorporates measures for “assurance,deterrence, dissuasion, denial, counter-proliferation, and damage limitation.”Subsequently Japan has put in place a numberof new legal and diplomatic frameworksdesigned to create more responsive and effectivemechanisms of enforcement for internationalagreements on non-proliferation and counter-terrorism.

Japan’s new national security posture and theaggressive role it has adopted particularly inadvancing the nonproliferation effort havesignificant implications for regional security.Furukawa even goes as far as to argue thatJapan’s assertiveness in the region on securityissues has the potential to build andinstitutionalise an Asian security network.

The question of Japan ‘going nuclear’ as acounter-proliferation measure was alsoaddressed in the presentation. Both the politicaland technical arguments of the utility of Japan’snuclear armament were discussed, so too wasJapan’s perceptions of the credibility of USextended deterrence. The debate as to whetheror not Japan should acquire nuclear weapons hasbeen on going but has become more importantin the light of North Korea’s increasinglyprovocative behavior. Such perspectives are stilllargely marginalised in Japanese political circleshowever, given the continued confidence in USextended deterrence and the perception thatneighbouring countries’ nuclear weapons do notyet represent a grave threat.

DISCUSSION

It was pointed out by one participant thatfollowing the collapse of the North Koreanregime, a reunited Korea would inherit theNorth’s nuclear weapons program. The questionthat followed was whether Japan would accepta nuclear Korean peninsula? The speakerresponded by stating that Japan is not particularlyconcerned about the implications of Koreainheriting nuclear weapons due to Korea’s highdependency on international trade andinvestment and the unwillingness of the KoreanGovernment to jeopardize this. However, Japanis concerned about the fact that the scientists onceemployed by North Korea to develop nuclearweapons would, following the unification ofKorea, be employed in the new regime. Thiscould potentially lead to problems in the future.

Another participant commented that if a ballisticmissile was launched from North Korea at Japan,due to the short distance to be covered by themissile Japan’s reaction time would be veryshort. With this in mind, Australia is currentlyinvestigating how its Over the Horizon LongRange Radar (OHLRR) could be useful indetecting North Korean ballistic missile launchesin their early phase. In addition, Australia hasnow formally joined the Ballistic MissileDefence program with the US. The participantthen asked if Japan will be expecting Australiato make the findings of its OHLRR investigation

Mr Katsuhisa Furukawa giving his speech


Dr You Ji delivering his second presentation

available to them. The response was thatparticularly in the areas of intelligence,cooperation between the US, Japan and Australiais good. Thus, the expectation is that theinformation will be shared. The speaker alsopointed out that Japan has its own radar anddetectors and is currently in the process ofdeveloping more.

PERSPECTIVE FROM CHINA

Dr You Ji, East Asia Institute, Singapore,traced the evolutionary process of Chinesenuclear forces, from 1964, when China carriedout its first nuclear test, to the present day. Sincethat time China has maintained a strategy ofminimum deterrence and non-first use. You Jiargued that this strategy is now irrelevant. Thisis due to a number of reasons. The main nuclearthreat to China is the US, but the minimumdeterrence posture would not be sufficient toavoid or retaliate against a nuclear attack by theUS. With regards to non-first use, technicaladvances in the field of conventional weaponsdevelopment has lead to a situation whereby anon-nuclear attack by conventional weaponscould cause the same destruction as a nuclearattack. Therefore, it may be necessary for Chinato use nuclear weapons in the absence of a firstnuclear attack by the enemy but in response to aconventional weapons attack.

In 1987, China announced that it had developedtriad capabilities of being able to deliver nuclearweapons via aircraft, mobile land-based assetsas well as through sea-based assets. However,in You Ji’s opinion this is ‘a myth’; China doesnot yet have effective capability to delivernuclear weapons from the air or from the sea.China’s H6 bombers date technologically fromthe 50s and have no penetration capabilities andher current submarine capability is also deficient.The only capable delivery systems that Chinahas to launch a nuclear attack are its Dongfeng4 and Dongfeng 5 intercontinental ballisticmissiles. With a range of 8,000 -10,000 km, anattack on the US would be feasible. However,since the early 1990s China has been developing

two new types of nuclear submarines and theseare about to become operational. You Ji alsoestimated that by 2020, China will have 308nuclear warheads aboard submarines that willbe capable of striking targets anywhere in theworld, giving her a significant retaliatorycapability.

PERSPECTIVE FROM INDIA

Arvind Kumar, National Institute ofAdvanced Studies, India, began hispresentation by pointing out that many ASEANnations have seen considerable militarisation inthe last three decades. However, India’s concernsfocus around Chinese military developments, inparticular its naval activities, and the ability ofChinese missiles to strike India’s territory. Indiahas expressed concern at the Chinese Navy’sclose interaction with countries in the region, inparticular Pakistan and Myanmar. There was aworry in India that Chinese assistance indeveloping Pakistan’s Gwadar port could leadto important shipping routes being threatened andthat its assistance with the modernisation ofMyanmar’s naval bases was to support Chinesesubmarine operations.

Kumar went on to describe how India hasadopted a formal nuclear doctrine, which statesthat India should develop nuclear forces basedon a ‘triad’ of aircraft, mobile land-based missilesand sea-based assets. At present priority has beengiven to the development of its indigenous sea-


based assets, which it is developing at a muchfaster pace than in the past.

The Indian response to US Ballistic MissileDefence programs has changed in recent times.Once in opposition to US deployment of ballisticmissile defences, Indo-US collaboration on amissile defence project is now a real possibility.The Indo-US agreement signed in September2004 as part of the Next Step in StrategicPartnership (NSSP) was a major catalyst forenhancing cooperation on this issue. If suchcollaboration does take place it will havesignificant implications for Indo-Pakistanrelations, in particular Pakistan’s ability toengage in nuclear blackmail. US missile defencedeployment would also have an impact onChina’s current deterrent posture towards the USand may cause China to increase her number ofintercontinental ballistic missiles.

Nuclear weapons are a now part of what Kumarcalls the ‘harsh reality’ of the Asia-Pacific. Inorder for equilibrium to prevail the major statesof the region will need to increase theircooperative engagements through institutionslike ASEAN and other sub-regional groupings.

DISCUSSION

A participant posed the question: What is thepossibility of a missile cascade taking place inSouthern Asia following a US deployment ofTheatre Missile Defence or Ballistic MissileDefence? Would the result be an increase byChina of its Multiple Independently Re-targetable Vehicles (MIRV)? The participantwent on to comment that there would have to bea reaction by India and Pakistan, which wouldresult in a vertical arms race.

According to the speaker, the Chinese havealready declared that as soon as the US launchesits national missile defence systems they willincrease their Intercontinental BallisticMissiles. India will in turn try to acquire moreof its Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles, in

order to deter China. Pakistan will also followsuit.

A second participant raised the issue of Russia’sattempts to sell India Submarine LaunchedBallistic Missiles (SLBM). Research into theChinese experience of developing their SLBMsindigenously has led the participant to concludethat it is less costly and troublesome to buy them.The speaker responded that India has alreadystarted a program to develop SLBMsindigenously.

Dr Arvind Kumar making his presentation


SESSION IVTHE EMERGENT MARITIME FUTURES OF THE

ASIA-PACIFIC

Sam Bateman, Institute of Defence andStrategic Studies, Singapore, began the finalsession of the conference by posing the question:where will it all end? In other words, what is themaritime security outlook for the Asia-Pacificregion? The underlying trend in the region is,according to Bateman, the ongoing shift in thebalance of global maritime power away from itstraditional power centres in Europe and NorthAmerica, towards the Asian region. This is dueto a desire by naval forces to extend their regionalstrategic significance in order to secure sea linesof communication, the most vital being inSoutheast Asia. Bateman also noted that there isa secondary maritime strategic trend in theregion, one which he terms a ‘quiet revolution’.That is, the increased operational significanceof littoral areas: “Major Western navies arefocusing on littoral operations and expeditionaryforces while coastal states, especially some inthe region, perceive a growing need to protecttheir sovereignty and defend their own littoral.”

More specifically, Northeast Asia is and willremain an unstable part of the region in the nearfuture. This is due to a number of factors: theunresolved status of Taiwan, the rogue behaviorof North Korea, continued territorial disputes,and the rise of China.

The region will continue to see the increasedpresence of Japan, particularly in the waterwaysof Southeast Asia and in the Indian Ocean in thecontext of the fight against terrorism and piracy.The South Korean navy will continue itsexpansion and development, reflecting itsconcern that Chinese and Japanese relations maydeteriorate in the future.

The Asia-Pacific region’s most powerfulmaritime player is China. It is, according toBateman, moving towards being the completesea power with a blue water navy, one of the

world’s largest merchant fleets, a distant waterfishing capability, and a rapidly expanding shipbuilding industry. He went on to describe howChina is continuing to expand its naval assetswith the addition of Kilo-Class and nuclear-attack submarines. It will also acquire a secondpair of Sovremenny Class destroyers, build airdefence destroyers, and possibly acquire anaircraft carrier capability and/or severalhelicopter carriers.

In contrast, the Russian and Taiwanese navieswill continue to struggle to keep up with regionalnaval modernisation.

In Southeast Asia, the focus is on sea-denialcapabilities. Singapore, Malaysia and Thailandare all currently in the process of navalmodernisation and expansion. Singapore isleading the way with its recent launch of the firstof five new frigates.

On the other hand, the Indonesian navy is stillsuffering from the effects of the economiccollapse in the late 1990s. Bateman did point outhowever that this trend may be reversed shortly.Indonesia intends to acquire new submarines,possibly from South Korea. Two new corvettesmight also be ordered from the Netherlands.

In South Asia, India continues to have the mostpowerful navy; dominating the Indian Ocean.India’s maritime influence is extendingeastwards, and as a consequence it will become

Dr Sam Bateman delivering his presentation


a greater player in regional political and securityaffairs. This is essentially part of its effort tocounter any advancement of Chinese navalpower in the Indian Ocean. India is also activelydeveloping its strategic relationship with the USand by doing so has further boosted its role inthe region. Naval development will continue tobe a top priority of the Indian armed forces andthere will be a re-establishment of a credibleaircraft carrier capability in the near future.Bateman pointed out that unless managedcarefully, “there are serious long termimplications of India’s apparent desire todemonstrate a capability to operate East ofSingapore, and China’s similar intentions tooperate into the Indian Ocean.”

Bateman ended his presentation on a sombre notecautioning that the regional trends are in thewrong direction; the resurgence of naval activityand increased defence budgets could fuel an armsrace in the region.

DISCUSSION

Kwa Chong Guan, Institute of Defence andStrategic Studies, Singapore, opened thediscussion session with a number ofobservations on the way in which the conceptof ‘the freedom of the seas’ has been constructedover the course of history. He argued that weare now entering a new era in which the seawas being radically reconstituted. The sea wasnow part of the seamless network ofinternational trade. In addition, the sea was nowincreasingly being thought of in relation to

resources; as a resource rich environment thatneeds to be managed. These new constructs willhave implications for the way in which wedevelop maritime security in the future.

The speaker was then asked what the Chinesesubmarines that intruded into Japan’s ExclusiveEconomic Zone were doing there. Accordingto the speaker the submarines were carrying outintelligence and surveillance gatheringoperations and collecting oceanographic dataneeded to enhance their operational capability.This leads onto the issue of water spacemanagement, in other words preventingsubmarines from encountering each other bysurprise, which was not only problematic froma safety perspective, but could also havepolitical ramifications.

Another participant commented that thecapability of the Chinese navy was still largelyunknown because they are not battle tested andlittle was known about their training programs.When examining the capability of the Chinesenavy it was also important to take intoconsideration the fluctuating capabilities ofother states. While the Chinese submarinecapability was increasing there is a reducedemphasis on capability in this theatre by theallied forces. A recent US study has shown thatsince the end of the Cold War, US submarinecapabilities have been substantially reduced andtheir underwater sensors decreased by up to ahalf. This could pose problems for the US infuture if she had to deal with the Chinesesubmarines.

_____________________________________________________________________Rapporteurs:

Adrian Kuah Wee JinCatherine Zara Raymond


C O N F E R E N C E P R O G R A M M E

&

L I S T O F P A R T I C I P A N T S


C O N F E R E N C E P R O G R A M M E

Monday, 7 March 2005

1900 Welcome Reception

Tuesday, 8 March 2005

0930 Opening Address:Barry Desker, Director IDSS

0945 Session IThematic Issues and Paradigms in theAsia-Pacific Maritime Complex

Chair:Sam Bateman, Senior Fellow, IDSS

Speaker:Eric GroveDirector Centre for Security Studies,University of Hull, UK

1045 Tea Break

1100 Session I (Continued)Thematic Issues and Paradigms in theAsia-Pacific Maritime Complex

Chair:Sam BatemanSenior Fellow, IDSS

Speaker:Lawrence PrabhakarResearch Fellow, IDSS

1200 Lunch

1330 Session IINational Maritime Doctrines andCapabilities

Chair:Amitav AcharyaDy Director and Hd Research, IDSS

Perspective from Japan:Vadm (Ret) Hideki KanedaSenior Research Advisor, National Security,Mitsubishi Research Institute, Tokyo, Japan

Perspective from China:You JiVisiting Research Fellow, East Asia Institute,National University of Singapore

1530 Tea Break

1545 Session II (Continued)National Maritime Doctrines andCapabilities

Chair:Amitav AcharyaDy Director and Hd Research, IDSS

Perspective from India:Vijay SakhujaResearch Fellow, Observer ResearchFoundation, New Delhi, India

1700 Adjourn

1900 DinnerMuthu’s Curry Restaurant


Wednesday, 9 March 2005

0900 Session IIINuclear Weapons and Missile Defences:The Maritime Dimension in the Asia-Pacific

Chair:Eric GroveDirector Centre for Security Studies,University of Hull, UK

Perspective from the United States:Donald BerlinDepartment of Transnational Studies Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu,Hawaii, USA

Perspective from Japan:Katsuhisa FurukawaResearch Fellow, Center for Safety andSecurity Studies, Research Institute ofScience and Technology for Society(RISTEX), Japan Science and TechnologyAgency, Tokyo, Japan

1030 Tea Break

1045 Session III (Continued)Nuclear Weapons and Missile Defences:The Maritime Dimension in the Asia-Pacific

Chair:Eric GroveDirector Centre for Security Studies,University of Hull, UK

Perspective from China:You JiVisiting Research Fellow, East Asia Institute,National University of Singapore

Perspective from India:Arvind KumarResearch Fellow, National Security StudiesProgramme, National Institute of AdvancedStudies, Bangalore India

1215 Session IVThe Emergent Maritime Futures of theAsia-Pacific

Chair:Kwa Chong GuanHead External Programmes, IDSS

Speaker:Sam BatemanSenior Fellow, IDSS

1245 Lunch

1400 Departures


1. Professor Amitav AcharyaDeputy Director and Head of ResearchInstitute of Defence and Strategic StudiesTel: 65 6790 6213Fax: 65 6793 2991Email: [email protected]

2. Dr Sam BatemanSenior FellowInstitute of Defence and Strategic StudiesEmail: [email protected]

3. Dr Donald BerlinProfessor, Department of Transnational StudiesAsia-Pacific Center for Security Studies2058 Maluhia RoadHonolulu, HI 96815-1949Fax: 1 808 971 8949Email: [email protected]

4. Mr Barry DeskerDirectorInstitute of Defence and Strategic StudiesTel: 65 6790 6907Fax: 65 6793 2991Email: [email protected]

5. Mr Katsuhisa FurukawaResearch Fellow, Center for Safety and SecurityStudiesResearch Institute of Science & Technology forSociety (RISTEX)Japan Science and Technology AgencAtago Green Hills, MORI Tower18th Floor Atago, 2-5-1 Minato-ku,Tokyo 1056218, JapanFax: 81 3 6402 7578Email: [email protected]

6. Dr Eric GroveDirector, Centre for Security StudiesDepartment of Politics & International StudiesUniversity of HullUKFax: 44 1482 466208Email: [email protected]

7. Dr You JiVisiting Research FellowEast Asia InstituteNational University of SingaporeAS-5 Level 4, 7 Arts LinkSingapore 117571Fax: 65 6779 3409Email: [email protected]

L I S T O F P A R T I C I P A N T S

8. VADM (Retd) Hideaki KanedaDirector, The Okazaki InstituteKaiyo Senpaku Building, 6F, 1-15-16Toranomon, Minato-ku,Tokyo, 105-0001JapanTel: 81 90 9018 9669Fax: 81 47 381 8191Email: [email protected]

9. Dr Arvind KumarResearch Faculty, National Security StudiesProgrammeNational Institute of Science CampusIndian Institute of Science CampusBangalore 560 012IndiaFax: 91 80 2360 6634Email: [email protected]

10. Mr Kwa Chong GuanHead (External Programmes)Institute of Defence and Strategic StudiesTel: 65 6790 6975Fax: 65 6793 2991Email: [email protected]

11. Dr Lawrence PrabhakarResearch FellowInstitute of Defence and Strategic StudiesEmail: [email protected]

12. Comd (Retd) Dr Vijay SakhujaResearch FellowObserver Research Foundation20 Rouse Avenue, New Delhi 110002IndiaFax: 91 11 3022 0003Email: [email protected]

OTHER PARTICIPANTS

13. Ms Sumathy PerumalResearcher, Centre for Maritime Security andDiplomacyMaritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA)B-06-08 Megan Avenue II12 Yap Kwan Seng, 50450 Kuala LumpurMalaysiaTel: 603 2161 2960Fax: 603 2161 4035

14. LTC Lai Chung HanOffice DirectorFuture Systems DirectorateMinistry of Defence


15. Mr Wee Toon MengSenior OfficerMinistry of Defence

16. Mr Elijah Lau Maung HoeSenior OfficerMinistry of Defence

17. Maj Irvin LimRepublic of Singapore Navy

18. Mr Michael RichardsonVisiting Senior Research FellowInstitute of Southeast Asian Studies

19. Dr Khoo How SanAssociate Fellow, Institute of Southeast AsianStudiesPart-time Lecturer, Political Science DepartmentNational University of Singapore

20. CAPT Mark JerrettDefence AdviserAustralian High Commission

21. CDR Brian Boxall-HuntRoyal Navy Liaison Officer (RNLO)British High Commission

22. CAPT Dai BingSecretary to Defence AttacheEmbassy of the People’s Republic of China

23. Ms Ma JiaFirst SecretaryEmbassy of the People’s Republic of China

24. Ms Wang XimeiThird SecretaryEmbassy of the People’s Republic of China

25. Mr Sanjiv KumarFirst Secretary (Consular)High Commission of India

26. CDR Kim Kwan SooDefence AttacheEmbassy of the Republic of Korea

27. Mr Maung Maung AyeThird SecretaryEmbassy of Myanmar

28. Ms Kesanee PalanuwongseCounsellorRoyal Thai Embassy

29. COL Le Nhan CamDefence AttacheEmbassy of Vietnam

30. CAPT HCS BishtDefence AdviserHigh Commission of India

31. Ms Julie S. ChavezAnalystUnited States Criminal Investigative Service

32. Dr Li NanSenior Research FellowInstitute of Defence and Strategic Studies

33. Mr Joshua HoResearch FellowInstitute of Defence and Strategic Studies

34. Mr Adrian KuahAssociate Research FellowInstitute of Defence and Strategic Studies

35. Mr Wong Tze YungResearch AnalystInstitute of Defence and Strategic Studies

36. Ms Catherine Zara RaymondAssociate Research FellowInstitute of Defence and Strategic Studies

37. Mr Arabinda AcharyaAssociate Research FellowInstitute of Defence and Strategic Studies

38. Mr Morten HansenResearch AssistantInstitute of Defence and Strategic Studies

39. Ms Sarah Jaime BurnellResearch AnalystInstitute of Defence and Strategic Studies

Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological UniversityBlock S4, Level B4, Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798

TEL: 65-6790-6982, FAX: 65-6793-2991Email: [email protected], Website: http://www.idss.edu.sg

MaritimeBalance of Powerin the Asia-Pacific

RREPORTEPORT OFOF AA C CONFERENCEONFERENCE ORGANISEDORGANISED BYBY

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