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Auckland Downtown Public Space Stage 1

Maritime Operations and Navigational Safety

Prepared for Auckland Council

by

Navigatus Consulting

03 May 2019

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Prepared by Navigatus Consulting Ltd for:

Auckland Council

Navigatus Consulting Limited

Level 2, 347 Parnell Road

PO Box 137249

Parnell, Auckland 1052

+64 9 377 4132

www.navigatusconsulting.com

Quality Control

Preparation and review by: Celia Cunningham, Kevin Oldham

Revision Date Authorised By

Draft C for client comment 4 December 2018 Kevin Oldham

Draft E for client comment 10 December 2018 Kevin Oldham

Draft G for client comment 11 January 2019 Kevin Oldham

Rev 0 – 0.6 15 January 2019, 25 January 2019, 5 February 2019, 16 April 2019, 29 April 2019, 30 April 2019

Kevin Oldham

Rev 0.7 2 May 2019 Kevin Oldham

Rev 0.8 3 May 2019 Kevin Oldham

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Table of Contents

1 Executive summary ........................................................................................... 4

2 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 5

2.1 Development context ............................................................................................................ 5

2.2 Criteria ................................................................................................................................... 7

3 Existing environment ......................................................................................... 8

3.1 Activities in Basin .................................................................................................................. 8

3.2 Ferry services ........................................................................................................................ 8

3.3 Basin flow and traffic observations ....................................................................................... 9

3.4 Cruise Ships ........................................................................................................................ 10

3.5 Waitematā Harbour ............................................................................................................. 12

3.6 Freemans Bay ..................................................................................................................... 12

3.7 Viaduct Harbour .................................................................................................................. 13

3.8 Interactions with Port and Harbour Activities ...................................................................... 13

3.9 Environmental conditions .................................................................................................... 14

3.10 Lighting and Visibility ........................................................................................................... 16

3.11 Regulatory Context ............................................................................................................. 16

4 Navigational effects assessment: Construction phase ................................ 18

4.1 Description of construction .................................................................................................. 18

4.2 Proposed navigational safety controls during construction ................................................. 19

4.3 Additional Comments on Barge Options ............................................................................. 23

4.4 Ferry Collision Risk ............................................................................................................. 25

4.5 Assessment ......................................................................................................................... 26

5 Navigational effects assessment: operational phase .................................. 27

5.1 Method of Assessment ........................................................................................................ 27

5.2 Discussion of risks .............................................................................................................. 27

5.3 Maritime operations and safety assessment of proposal .................................................... 38

5.4 Operational conclusions and recommendations ................................................................. 39

6 Conclusions ...................................................................................................... 40

6.1 Construction ........................................................................................................................ 40

6.2 Operations ........................................................................................................................... 40

7 Proposed conditions of consent ..................................................................... 41

8 References ....................................................................................................... 42

DPS Structure ................................................................................ 43 Appendix A.

Outline of Marine Construction Safety Management Plan ...... 45 Appendix B.

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1 Executive summary

This report has been prepared by Navigatus for Auckland Council to assess effects on

maritime operations, including navigational safety, arising from the development of the

Downtown Public Space (DPS). The DPS will create an enhanced public space in the area

between Princes Wharf and the Ferry Terminal, extending into the Downtown Ferry Basin,

which is a busy transport hub.

The assessment process has included:

Direct observations of operations in the existing ferry basin

Time-lapse video footage of existing ferry basin operations

Discussions with the Auckland Harbourmaster

Stage 1 of the DPS construction is limited to a small area of the ferry basin with potential

impacts confined to the adjacent berths on Pier 2 and Pier 4. The remainder of construction

will be accessed from land (as specified in the Joint Venture Construction Management

Plan). As such, the effects on marine operations will be relatively minor. There are however

some risks and a formal Marine Construction Safety Management Plan and Basin

Coordination service are recommended during construction. With these controls the residual

risks are assessed as being reduced to so far as is reasonably practicable level.

The DPS has been designed to avoid interference with ferry and cruise operations, mainly

through limiting the extent of the DPS to ensure that it does not encroach onto operational

areas. Physical separation barriers to the north are included into the design to separate ferry

operations from the DPS. To the west, Pier 4 will remain temporarily and effectively

separates the DPS from cruise ship operations. With appropriate design and management

maintenance activities, the DPS will not affect ferry operations and options are available

should wildlife colonisation created nuisances that inhibit ferry operations.

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2 Introduction

This report has been prepared by Navigatus Consulting for Auckland Council to assess

maritime issues, including navigational safety effects arising from the Downtown Public

Space (DPS) Stage 1 project.

The DPS will create an enhanced public space in the area between Princes Wharf and the

Ferry Terminal, extending into the Downtown Ferry Basin, which is a busy transport hub.

The scope of the project is illustrated in plan view and in sectional views in Appendix A and

in the artist’s perspective view in Figure 2-1.

Figure 2-1 Artist’s impression of the waterfront public space when completed

The DPS is proposed to be constructed in two stages. Stage 1 is the western half, stretching

from the current Berth 2A to the historical Kingslow steps (Appendix A). The works for

Stage 1 comprises:

Installing structural piles

Constructing structural concrete decks and tree pits

Finishing works such as surfacing and balustrades

Installing floating buffer pontoon and attached kelp garden

Installing marine fender piles

Installing ancillary facilities such as life rings and sea-bins.

Marine ecological enhancements attached to the DPS structures are also proposed but their

final form and placement is will depend on the outcome of planned trials.

2.1 Development context

The following projects do not form part of the DPS project. However, they have been taken

into account in the assessments of maritime operations and safety. Navigatus is providing

maritime safety advice on all of these projects.

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2.1.1 Downtown Ferry Basin Redevelopment

The Downtown Ferry Basin Redevelopment is part of the wider Downtown Programme of

works being delivered in time for Americas Cup 36 (AC36) in 2021. Under the Downtown

Ferry Basin Redevelopment - Stage 1 project six new ferry berths will be constructed along

the western edge of Queens Wharf and Pier 3 will be decommissioned.

The redevelopment of the Ferry Basin is being staged, with relocation of current Piers 3 and

4 services being undertaken as part of the first phase of redevelopment. Pier 3 is nearing the

end of life and is in need of redevelopment within the next 2-3 years (Tonkin + Taylor 2018).

In addition, use of the existing Ferry Basin configuration is nearing capacity and the

provision of new ferry berth infrastructure, as part of Stage 1, will allow improved efficiencies

to be delivered which will allow for expected service growth over the next 5 to 7 years,

pending completion of Stage 2 of the redevelopment.

Stage 1 of the proposed ferry basin redevelopment includes the construction, establishment

and operation of new infrastructure to provide for six berths adjacent to the western face of

Queens Wharf (Queens Wharf West) and modifications to the existing ferry terminal building

and immediate surrounds. The proposed structures will occupy approximately 2,400 m2 of

the CMA. The Ferry Basin Redevelopment proposal also includes the demolition of the

existing piles, pontoons and gangways of Pier 3 occur prior to the construction of the DPS.

2.1.2 Quay Street Seawall Works

A section of the seawall running along Quay Street in front of the Ferry Basin is to be

seismically strengthened. There are multiple construction approaches possible for the

proposed works to the Ferry Basin seawall section with each of those having both a landside

component and limited construction works on the seaward side.

A Maritime Construction Safety Management Plan has been proposed by the applicant to

maintain the safety of maritime activities and navigation during the construction period.

2.1.3 Queens Wharf Dolphins

Two cruise ship mooring dolphins are proposed to be installed off the northern end of

Queens Wharf to enable longer cruise vessels to berth on Queens Wharf East. Currently the

largest cruise vessels, such as the Ovation of the Seas, cannot berth in Auckland and

instead are stationed out from shore, in Auckland Harbour, for the duration of their visit.

The dolphin works have little effect on the Downtown Ferry Basin, other than extending the

‘restricted area’ and possibly also the southern boundary of 5 knot speed limit offshore for

ferries heading east and north-east by about 90m. A separate study carried out by

Navigatus for that proposal has concluded that this will have no material effect on ferry

passage times.

2.1.4 America’s Cup

The America’s Cup base facilities are proposed to be constructed in Freeman’s Bay, around

600m west of the basin.

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The America’s Cup and its supporting events will likely cause a notable increase in

recreational traffic in the Waitematā Harbour. Much of this increase will be from vessels that

operate to and from the Westhaven marina facilities.1 Auckland has hosted America’s Cup

races and other marine events before. Given proper management of the entrance channel

area (under the normal oversight of the Harbourmaster), there is little reason to suggest that

the interaction between the ferry activities and this increase in recreational traffic in the

immediate area of the Ferry Basin cannot be effectively managed.

2.2 Criteria

From a maritime safety perspective we identify the following key criteria for the DPS:

Criterion Comment

1. Safe: the DPS is safe for co-location in the

Downtown Ferry Basin in terms of ferry

operations and safety of members of the

public.

Required by both Health and

Safety at Work Act (personal

injury) and Maritime Transport Act

(maritime safety).

2. Compatible: the DPS does not interfere

with other port operations and can cope with

the expected range of port operating

conditions.

For example, currents set up by

tugs and/or propulsion system

from on Princes Wharf East.

1 This may affect existing ferry operators such as Fullers, who may be impacted by changes to layover capability and servicing

of vessels.

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3 Existing environment

3.1 Activities in Basin

A range of activities occur in the Downtown Ferry Basin, where the DPS is being

constructed:

Ferry Services

Berthing of cruise ships and other vessels on Princes Wharf East

Bunkering of cruise ships

Other activities (Harbourmaster, Police, Coastguard)

Occasional berthing of cruise ships and other vessels on Queens Wharf West

3.2 Ferry services

Scheduled ferry services in Auckland are currently provided by three operators. Demand is

seasonal, picking up over the summer (Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-2).2 Most of the ferries are of

a catamaran design of light aluminium construction, which allows them to carry passengers

and light loads at high speed with moderate engine sizes and reasonable economy. Due to

their light construction the ferries need to be handled carefully on berthing as heavy contact

can result in significant damage to the vessel. Fast ferries tend to be more affected by wind

than traditional deep V high speed designs as they typically have only shallow draught but

retain the a large superstructure and so more readily drift to leeward under the effect of wind.

However, having propulsion units in each hull provides catamaran ferries with inherently

more directional control than traditional single and multi-shaft deep V designs. Fine control of

thrust can be an issue as many of the fitted propulsion systems do not readily allow low shaft

speeds with the engine direct geared to the shaft. SeaLink Pine Harbour Chipper vessels

have jet propulsion systems system that provides excellent manoeuvrability. Fast ferries

operating in the Waitematā Harbour are not generally fitted with bow thrusters.

2 Auckland Transport Public Transport Patronage Data from 2005 – August 2018. https://at.govt.nz/about-us/reports-

publications/at-metro-patronage-report/

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3.3 Basin flow and traffic observations

The following comments are direct observations of ferry basin operation during morning and

evening peaks by Kevin Oldham of Navigatus Consulting in mid-2018 and from time-lapse

video recordings of basin operations from September 2018 and over the summer of 2018/19.

In general wind conditions were light with good visibility over this period.

Circulation: the anticlockwise circulation pattern was generally well maintained by masters

(Figure 3-3a) especially for vessels which execute a turn to berth sternwards.

Approach to Berths 2A and 2B: in some conditions the existing approach to Berth 2B (see

Figure 3-4 for map of berths) passes close to the ends of Piers 4 and 3 (Figure 3-3b).

Approaches to Berth 2A appear to be well clear of the outer extents of Piers 3 and 4, and will

be closed when construction starts.

Queuing: on arrival vessels sometimes queue outside the basin (off the end of Princes

Wharf) and more often within the basin, passing slowly down Queens Wharf or by standing

off the end of Pier 2. On departure vessels sometimes queue just off Piers 3 and 4.

Passing in Queue: on occasion on arrival a smaller ferry heading for Piers 3 or 4 will

overtake a larger ferry ahead which is waiting for berths on other piers, by passing to the

west of the larger ferry (i.e. on an outer circulation path).3

Berthing on Pier 4: under the ideal conditions, making ferries fast once alongside in the

berths on Pier 4 took only 20 seconds on many occasions. First passengers typically

stepped off the vessel around 10 seconds later (30 seconds total).

3 It is understood that such manoeuvres are arranged by VHF at the time between the masters of the two vessels concerned.

Figure 3-1 Auckland ferry patronage by year Figure 3-2 Auckland ferry patronage by month (Jul 17 – Jun 18)

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2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018

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Figure 3-3 Tracks of Ferries Using Downtown Ferry Basin

a) Anticlockwise Circulation 4 b) Existing Approach to Berth 2B

Ferries are an integral part of the Auckland public transport system with a range of routes

supporting regular services to and from the ferry terminal. As a result there are nearly 400

scheduled ferry movements each weekday. The ferry basin is therefore busy with vessel

movements, especially in peak commuter passenger periods in the morning (0630-0930)

and evening (1530-1830). In addition:

on a typical week day there are approximately 40 additional unscheduled ferry

movements for repositioning, crew rest breaks, refuelling and provisioning

cruise ships occasionally berth on Princes Wharf East or Queens Wharf West

constricting the water available for ferry movements.

3.4 Cruise Ships

The aerial view below shows the cruise ship berths and smaller piers. Cruise Berths 1 and 2

are in frequent use over summer, while Cruise Berth 3 is able to be used if required for

cruise ships or for other vessels such as visiting warships. Cruise ship visits peak over

summer. It is understood that Ports of Auckland Limited will continue cruise ship operations

on Cruise Berth 2 for at least 8-10 years, so the ferry basin needs to operate with current

and near-term levels of traffic with cruise vessels on Berth 2.

Initially it was proposed that Cruise Berth 3 was to be retained, but as the Ferry Basin

redevelopment project developed it became apparent that most or all of Queens Wharf West

would be required for relocating ferry berths. At the 20 June 2018 City Centre and Waterfront

4 Looped track to outer end of basin and return is a non-standard but compliant manoeuvre for training purposes.

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Executives Steering Group meeting, the Steering Group approved the recommendation to

relocate the 3rd Cruise Berth from Queens Wharf West at the end of the 18/19 cruise

season (April 2019) to facilitate the first stage of the redevelopment of the ferry basin in time

for AC36 and APEC.

As noted before, two mooring dolphins are proposed to be constructed to the north of

Queens Wharf to allow longer cruise ships to use Cruise Berth 2.

Figure 3-4 Map of berths in use in the Downtown Ferry Terminal Basin

The berthing of cruise ships on Princes Wharf narrows the available water space in the

basin. Careful manoeuvring is required to access to Berth 4B, with ferries sometimes

passing under the bow flare of the cruise ship (Figure 3-5).

Figure 3-5 Ferry Arriving at Berth 4B Passes Under Bow Flare of Cruise Ship Berthed on Princes Wharf

No ferry movements can take place while a cruise ship is berthing on Princes Wharf East.

Departing cruise ships leave the basin relatively quickly and with little disruption.

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The figure below shows the published cruise schedule for vessels arriving at Princes Wharf.

The summer months are busier, and no cruise arrivals appear to be scheduled for the winter

months (June through August/September)

Figure 3-6 Cruise schedule for Princes Wharf 5

3.5 Waitematā Harbour

Auckland (Waitematā) Harbour is used extensively for a range of commercial and

recreational activities. Aside from cruise ships, vessels navigating the water in the vicinity of

the ferry basin range from coastal oil tankers of up to 183 metres overall length (LOA) to

ferries carrying people and vehicles, as well as a wide variety of private and commercial

yachts and motor craft, alongside kayaks and, to a lesser extent, stand up paddleboards.

Westhaven Marina to the west of Wynyard Point berths nearly 2,000 smaller craft while other

boat harbour and facilities accessed by the same waterway add significantly to this figure.

That said, a large proportion of the recreational craft berthed in the marina get limited use.

Many boat races, resulting in clusters of sailing yachts transiting together, are held in the

immediate area of the harbour.

Whilst the survey indicated a moderately busy harbour, the survey was carried out over one

weekend in late spring. Higher levels of traffic can be expected in the peak summer season

develops.

In particular, the harbour sees very heavy marine traffic for special events such as the

Auckland Anniversary Regatta held annually around the end of January. Cross-harbour

swim events also occur in the summer months.

3.6 Freemans Bay

Freemans Bay maritime facilities consist of Wynyard Wharf to the west, Princes Wharf to the

east and North Wharf, Halsey Wharf, Western Viaduct Wharf and Hobson Wharf to the south

of the bay.

5 Cruise schedule published by POAL, 19 September 2018. www.poal.co.nz

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3.7 Viaduct Harbour

The Viaduct Harbour is formed of two basins, the Outer and the Inner, connected by a

channel spanned by a lifting bridge. The Inner Basin is particularly sheltered and used as a

marina by a wide range of private and charter vessels, most of which are serviced by

pontoons. A mix of private boats, as well as charter and commercial fishing vessels, use the

Outer Basin. As with the inner basin, most vessels are accessed from floating pontoons. The

maximum length of vessel allowed in the Viaduct Harbour is 55 metres.

Figure 3-7 Figure from America’s Cup Marine Traffic Survey for Resource Consent Application, Wynyard Hobson (Beca 2018)

3.8 Interactions with Port and Harbour Activities

Port activities on adjacent wharves, such as Princes Wharf West or Queens Wharf East,

seldom have an effect within the ferry basin. The main source of other interference to ferry

operations in the basin is recreational users. Almost every day that a cruise ship is on PWE

one or more recreational vessels (e.g. kayak, power boat) will enter basin to farewell a

passenger. In addition yachts engaged in racing are reported to occasionally cross the

mouth of the basin, within the 50m Basin Zone6, (e.g. when working to windward against an

ebb tide).

There is signage on the ends of the wharfs relating mainly to the area being customs

controlled, rather than providing for navigational safety. The signs appear to be routinely

ignored by some recreational boat users.

6 The Basin Zone declared by the Harbourmaster extends 50 metres beyond the ends of Queens Wharf and Princes Wharf.

Harbourmaster’s Office. Auckland Downtown Ferry Terminal Basin (Auckland Transport 2016).

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3.9 Environmental conditions

3.9.1 Wind and currents

The prevailing wind for the Auckland region is south-westerly, however the wind blows from

the north-west through to the north-east a proportion of the time. Wind from the largely open

west, north and east directions is only partly disrupted by the Stanley Point shoreline –

otherwise these directions are largely open with a notable reach to the north-west.

Conversely, the land form and high-rise buildings of the city generally shelter the basin from

southerly winds.

Figure 3-8 shows a wind rose from 7 years of record at Bledisloe Wharf.7 The ferry basin is

open to winds from the northerly quarters, which occur 29% of the time (Table 3.1) Winds

come from the northerly sector and exceed 20 knots for approximately 0.7% of the time.

Table 3.1 Northerly sector winds (all hours) at Bledisloe Wharf (2010 - 2017)

Wind speed (knots)

Percentage of time

0 to 5 7.9% 5 to 10 10.6%

10 to 15 7.3% 15 to 20 2.5% 20 to 25 0.6% 25 to 30 0.1% 30 to 35 0.01%

35 + 0% 29%

7 Bledisloe Wharf is the wind recording site that is closest to the basin. The available 7 years of record is considered

appropriate for assessing general wind conditions in the outer part of the basin. Wind directions and strengths in the inner basin are influenced by sheltering and by wind funnelling by buildings and streets. Sheltering from wharves varies with proximity and the state of tide.

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Figure 3-8 Wind rose for Bledisloe Wharf (2010 - 2017)

The above data are taken to be indicative of likely wind conditions in the Ferry Basin. Winds

in the inner basin are influenced by the buildings, with wind funnelling through the gaps

between them. As a consequence, wind directions and speeds in the inner parts of the basin

can be quite different to the outer parts.

There are no significant tidal currents in the basin. However, the operation of tug and cruise

vessel propulsion (e.g. bow thrusters and Azipods8) in the basin or at adjacent basins can

generate significant localised currents and eddies.

3.9.2 Waves and wake

The Waitematā harbour is a relatively busy harbour with large numbers of commercial ferries

and recreational craft transiting eastward and westward as well as ferries operating north-

south across the harbour. These vessels create wake that can combine with the natural

fetch or wind-against-tide effects to create unsettled surface conditions.

Queens Wharf and Princes Wharf are piled structures. While shoals have built up under

these wharves they provide little or no attenuation of wave action, especially at high tide

when the shoals are more fully submerged.

The basin is mainly exposed to waves originating from the northern quarter with a north-west

fetch of 3-4 km from Shoal Bay. Waves generated by easterlies and westerlies in the

Waitematā may also refract around the Wynyard Reclamation to the west and the Port of

Auckland reclamations to the east (Tonkin + Taylor 2018). Refracted waves partially pass

8 A marine propulsion unit consisting of a fixed pitch propeller mounted on a steerable gondola ("pod") which also contains the

electric motor driving the propeller.

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under and around Princes and Queens wharves, mainly affecting the seaward parts of the

ferry basin

Figure 3-9 Site location (Chart NZ 5322 Auckland Harbour East)

3.10 Lighting and Visibility

Once within the basin, visibility is largely unobstructed and the basin area is generally well lit

at night. There are no buoys, marks, lights or other aids to navigation located in the Ferry

Basin.

3.11 Regulatory Context

3.11.1 Maritime Rules

All vessels operating in the harbour are subject to maritime law. At the national level these

are promulgated by Maritime NZ, mainly as Maritime Rules. In particular the following rules

apply:

Maritime Rules Part 22 – Collision Prevention

Maritime Rules Part 90 – Pilotage

Maritime Rules Part 91 – Navigation Safety Rules

Harbourmaster and Bylaw

Part 33 of the Maritime Transport Act 1994 gives the Harbourmaster powers to manage the

safety of maritime activities. Regional councils and unitary authorities have the power to

appoint harbourmasters to manage maritime safety within their region. The Auckland Council

Shoal Bay

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harbourmaster is employed by Auckland Transport, which is the council-controlled

organisation of Auckland Council responsible for transport projects and services.

Local maritime safety rules are set by two main mechanisms:

Bylaws: Auckland Council Navigation Safety Bylaw 2014 and Controls (Auckland

Council 2014).

Harbourmaster Directions: These are standing directions given by the

Harbourmaster, found in Harbourmaster Directions issued by Auckland

Harbourmaster (1-16, 2-16, 4-16).

In addition the Harbourmaster has authority to give directions to masters of vessels for

maritime safety purposes and has powers to enforce those directions, and the bylaw, if

masters do not comply.

3.11.2 Harbourmaster Directions – Ferry Basin Operation

Harbourmaster’s Direction 1-16 covers the Downtown Ferry Terminal Basin (Auckland

Transport Harbourmaster). This Direction includes a restriction on movements of vessels

over 500 gross tonnage between the weekday hours of 7:30am to 9:00am and 4:30pm to

6:00 pm (no vessels greater than 500 gross tonnage shall manoeuvre within the downtown

ferry terminal basin or operate any propulsion or manoeuvring equipment).

This requirement effectively prohibits the movement of any cruise ships or bunkering barges

in the basin during the specified curfew periods.

There are Navigation Safety Operating Requirements (Auckland Transport 2016) for the

basin area. Vessels are to:

Proceed at a safe speed

Travel in an anti-clockwise direction

Be mindful of wake and aware of propeller wash

Figure 3-10 Map showing the required direction of vessel traffic in the ferry basin (Auckland Transport)

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4 Navigational effects assessment: Construction phase

4.1 Description of construction

Construction will include:

Installing piles

Constructing decks / tree pits (combination of precast and in situ concrete)

Finishing works (surfacing, balustrades etc.)

Installing floating buffer pontoon and attached kelp garden

Installing wooden fender piles along part of outer edge of DPS

Installing ancillary facilities, including sea-bins and life rings

Three potential methods of construction are identified in the Joint Venture Construction

Management Plan (Joint Venture 2019):

1. Staging: temporary jetty extending from the north side of Quay Street.

2. Jack-up Barge (JUB): using a jack-up barge to work from the seaward side.

3. Floating Barge: using a floating barge with simple spuds or conventionally moored with anchors.

These options are illustrated in Figure 4-1 to Figure 4-3.

Figure 4-1 3D depiction of temporary jetty and installation of piles (Joint Venture 2019)

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Figure 4-2 Example of jack-up barge (Joint Venture 2019)

Figure 4-3 Example of floating barge (Joint Venture 2019)

In addition a fourth option may be available for some or all of the works:

4. Landside: construction entirely from the adjacent seawall using a crane positioned

behind the seawall or located on a temporary platform installed on the seabed (G.

Jones, pers. comm.)

The staging and landside options (Methods 1 and 4) are preferred from a maritime safety

perspective as they will present a smaller construction footprint. The following comments

apply to all four options. Additional comments on the two barge options (Methods 2 and 3)

are provided in Section 4.3.

4.2 Proposed navigational safety controls during construction

The following controls are proposed to maintain an acceptable level of navigational safety

during construction. These additional controls represent the extent of practical measures that

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can be applied to reduce navigational risk to a level that can be considered to be as low as

reasonably practical. The controls should be incorporated into the Marine Construction

Safety Management Plan (MCSMP), which should in turn form an integral part of the

Construction Management Plan. The proposed outline of the MCSMP is shown in

Appendix B.

The DPS Stage 1 may be constructed by the same joint venture construction group as the

Downtown Ferry Basin Redevelopment either at the same time or soon thereafter. If DPS

construction overlaps with the ferry basin redevelopment then, for simplicity, the MCSMP for

the ferry basin redevelopment may be modified and extended to cover the DPS. This would

avoid the potential for conflict and reduces scope for gaps and overlaps.

4.2.1 Navigational safety requirements during construction

The following controls are proposed be used to maintain an acceptable level of navigational

safety. These additional controls represent the extent of practical measures that can be

applied to reduce navigational risk to a level that can be considered to be as low as

reasonably practical. The controls are incorporated into the MCSMP.

The controls include:

Additional communications;

Construction vessels and equipment management;

Lighting;

Defined Construction Zone; and

Basin Coordination.

The controls are outlined below.

4.2.2 Additional communications

Effective communication is a key control. Informing relevant parties leads to good

understanding of the works and any restrictions, as well as allowing for organisations’

internal communications to inform all their crews and other affected personnel.

Early notification

The Basin Coordinator should notify the following key stakeholders of the location, duration

and nature of the works one month before commencement:

Auckland Harbourmaster

Fullers Group Limited

Sealink New Zealand Limited

Belaire Ferries

Ports of Auckland Ltd (Harbour Control)

Auckland Police Maritime Unit

Auckland Coastguard

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Auckland Transport Ferry Services

Plan developed in consultation with key stakeholders

Navigatus recommends that the MCSMP is drawn up in consultation with the key

stakeholders. This will expose any specific concerns and issues the stakeholders may have

and, assuming the plan addresses these, increase the confidence of all concerned in the

viability of the plan.

Local Notice to Mariners

As is the usual process for works in the harbour, the Auckland Harbourmaster will need to

issue a Local Notice to Mariners identifying the works and construction zone before work

commences. The process is kicked off by the Construction Manager notifying the

Harbourmaster as set out above. As these are local notices, the Auckland Harbourmaster

will cancel the Local Notice to Mariners when notified by the Construction Manager that the

work is complete.

Ongoing regular communication

There will need to be ongoing regular communication between the Site Construction

Manager and the major stakeholders. The current industry practice is to hold weekly

meetings where the participants can review progress and planned work and discuss any

issues arising. Additional ad hoc meetings and other discussions are also held as required.

Given the limited effect of works on other users it is recommended that ad-hoc meetings be

held on request if any issues arise.

Construction Vessels Manager’s contact details

Navigatus also recommends that the main contractor nominates a designated site contact

and that this person’s 24/7 contact details are lodged with the Port of Auckland’s Harbour

Control. This will allow Harbour Control ready contact with a suitably empowered person

should any issues or emergencies arise.

Construction Vessel Communication with Harbour Control

The construction vessel masters will need to maintain communication with Harbour Control

using VHF channel 12. In particular, the vessel masters must liaise with Harbour Control

before moving their vessels unless the movement will be entirely within the construction

zone (see below).

4.2.3 Construction vessels and equipment management

Any construction vessels should be properly secured when not in use to ensure they do not

come adrift and cause a navigation hazard. In addition, the vessels should also be secured

to prevent unauthorised persons moving the vessels.

Flotsam such as plastic and paper bags can interfere with watercraft’s propulsion cooling

systems creating a hazard. Larger items can cause damage to propellers and hulls.

Therefore items on the construction vessels or staging must be secure to ensure no

construction equipment, materials or packaging can come loose and cause a navigational

hazard. In addition, the landside construction operation should have controls to ensure no

construction equipment; materials or packaging can come loose and migrate into the

harbour.

22

4.2.4 Lighting

On occasion construction lighting may be required (e.g. for completing pouring of concrete

after dark). Any lighting used in the construction works will be managed in accordance with a

suitable construction environment management plan. Lighting should be used to only

illuminate the works areas, and should be managed so it does not cause a distraction,

dazzling, or temporary blinding to other water users, or interfere with other aids to

navigation.

4.2.5 On water construction zone

To avoid any potential conflict between construction craft and other vessels an area of water

space (the on water Construction Zone) will be set aside for the exclusive use of the works

contractors. Only works contractors’ vessels should be allowed to manoeuvre or anchor in

this Construction Zone during the period of the construction.

When lifting freely suspended loads by crane within toppling distance of ferries – there may

need to be additional risk-based limitations. A horn or visual signal could be used to remind

ferry masters not to approach at those times.9

Construction vessel masters may manoeuvre their vessels outside the Construction Zone

only after gaining permission to do so from the Basin Coordinator. The extent of this water

space will be determined after consultation with the key stakeholders. The Harbourmaster

will need to approve the location, extent, duration and restrictions imposed by the declaration

of the Construction Zone as part of the MSMP. In addition, the Harbourmaster will need to

promulgate the existence of the zone by issuing a suitable Local Notice to Mariners.

4.2.6 Basin Coordination During Construction

The Basin Coordination Service for the Ferry Basin Redevelopment should be extended to

cover the DPS operation if necessary.

The service recommended by Navigatus would be established prior to construction of the

ferry basin and equipped with a suitable operations room with access to CCTV coverage of

all key areas of the basin and construction activities, suitable for the range of light conditions

in which ferries operate. It is not intended that the Basin Coordinator is required to remain on

9 Nature of signal to be determined in consultation with ferry operators and Harbourmaster.

23

site at all times however should remain within 30 minutes of the Ferry Basin during normal

construction hours. Remote CCTV access including playback is required.

Pre-construction functions of the Basin coordinator include:

Facilitate MCSMP development for selected construction method and equipment

Commence mid and short-term operation planning schedule

Act a liaison point for pre-construction interface with basin users

Provide basin users with briefing and information relating to construction activities

restrictions and procedures for vessels operating in the basin.

Ensure appropriate notice to mariners have been promulgated

Coordinate the marking of the Construction Zone

During Construction the functions of the Basin coordinator include:

Monitoring construction activities from a maritime safety standpoint

Acting as liaison point for construction interface with ferry operations

Communicating any unexpected construction hazards to ferry masters as they arise

Authorisations for construction traffic to access ferry operational access areas

Respond to emergency or emergent situations. It is envisaged that masters and on water

personnel will respond to the initial situation prior to informing the Basin coordinator as

soon as practical.

Facilitate daily and weekly planning meetings with appropriate personnel

Communicating with construction manager regarding any unexpected hazards arising

from construction activities as they arise

Monitoring crane activity near ferry operations suspended heavy loads and ensuring that

the appropriate risk controls are in place

Managing permissions for ferries to enter basin and depart berth at times required for

navigational safety. Times that this may be appropriate include:

○ in adverse weather

○ when a cruise ship and or bunker barge are alongside Princess wharf

○ when specified berths are restricted

○ during sensitive crane or on water operations

The scope, responsibilities and authority of the basin coordinator will be finalised in

consultation with basin users and with the Harbourmaster, who has ultimate authority on

maritime safety requirements, and will be set out in the MCSMP.

4.3 Additional Comments on Barge Options

This section presents additional comment on the following two barge-based methods for pile

installation:

1. Jack-up Barge: using a jack-up barge to work from the seaside.

2. Floating Barge: using a floating barge with simple spuds or conventionally moored with anchors.

24

4.3.1 Footprint and Direction of Operation

Initially some or all of the footprint would be contained within the DPS, but as construction

progresses the barge will move along and outward. A key consideration is the effect on ferry

movements into berth 2B (and to a lesser extent berths 2C and 4A).

To minimise impacts on operations the barge needs to start at the east end the DPS and

move west, and for the final part move north to where the maritime safety buffer pontoon

with attached kelp garden/ecology baskets is proposed (Figure 4-4).

Figure 4-4 Movement of barge to minimise impacts on operations

4.3.2 Floating Barge Limitations

A floating barge with conventional anchor mooring systems would require that anchor chains

and anchors be placed in the ferry operational area. This in turn requires that construction

vessels are active in the ferry operational area whenever the anchors need to be adjusted.

This could be restricted to be undertaken at night when the basin is not used by ferries, but

that places an operational constraint on construction. In addition laying anchor chains in

operational areas is not good practice as it could foul an anchor deployed by a ferry for any

reason. This is an unlikely scenario, but if it does occur would be during an emergency,

25

which is a time when it would be unwise for a ferry master to also need to consider anchor

cable positions.

A barge “spud” is a pole that is jacked into the mud to hold a barge in position. Barges

typically have two to four spuds. Spuds have many advantages from both a maritime safety

perspective (e.g. barge unlikely to move laterally when unattended on slack tide) and from a

construction perspective (e.g. holds barge in fixed position irrespective of tidal state). Spuds

are a suitable and commonly used alternative for barge positioning. Given that suitable

options, such as spuds, are available for positioning the barge, the use of anchors and

cables for positioning a floating barge is not recommended.

4.4 Ferry Collision Risk

There is a risk that a ferry could inadvertently enter into the construction zone and collide

with construction equipment. Risks arising from such a collision include:

JUB Under-ride: ferry may ride under an elevated JUB which could result in the

bridge and/or passenger cabin colliding with the horizontal barge structure.

JUB topple: If a ferry strikes a leg of an elevated JUB it may remain standing or may

topple over, possibly onto the ferry or adjacent Quay St shore.

Materials loss from supply barge: a ferry may also strike a materials barge,

possibly causing pipes to roll off the barge and fall off the barge, possibly onto a

colliding ferry.

Ferry strikes staging: resulting on toppling of crane, possibly onto ferry

Under such scenarios multiple serious injuries and loss of life by construction workers, ferry

crew and passengers are possible.

A spudded in floating barge is not listed in the above scenarios as it has a lower likelihood of

such consequences. A spudded in barge would be floating at sea level so cannot be under-

ridden and would be larger than a JUB, so would be less affected by ferry impact forces.

Controls to mitigate these risks include:

defining and demarcating on-water Construction Zone for DPS

marking the Construction Zone on the water so it is visible to ferry crews

controls to reduce the likelihood of inadvertent ferry incursion, such as additional

equipment checks

controls to reduce consequences of ferry incursion such as dynamic JUB level and

temporary protection works

The choice of controls will depend to the final choice of construction method and must be to

the satisfaction of the Harbourmaster. It is likely that a combination of controls will be used.

Delivery of Materials

For barge mounted piling operations it is likely that materials will be delivered by supply

barge. This would need to only take place during night time hours when the ferries are not

operating (typically 0115 to 0530 hours).

26

4.5 Assessment

A primary risk mitigation is that the DPS construction activities are confined to a relatively

small area of the ferry basin. The operational berths potentially affected by construction

activities are the directly adjacent berths 2B, 4A and 4B. A primary focus of maritime

construction safety management will be on managing risk associated with operations in

these berths.

A second mitigation is that it is proposed to construct the DPS both from landward and from

the marine area.

A risk is that a land-based construction focus could lead to complacency and a lack of

understanding of the paramount requirement for safety of ferries and users. A formal

Maritime Construction Safety Management Plan is recommended, along with a Basin

Coordination service.

The MCSMP will establish the risk control framework, including:

Priority is given to the safety of ferry operations and passengers.

Proactive stakeholder consultation before and during construction.

Real-time Basin Coordination service during construction.

Regular safety reviews.

Water space separated into construction and non-construction areas.

Construction water space is minimised to that reasonably required.

When lifting freely suspended loads by crane within toppling distance of ferries - risk-

based limitations plus special signals to remind ferry masters not to approach.

Construction access to ferry operational area (e.g. for barge and tow supply operations)

limited to periods when few or no ferry operations.

Provided that maritime safety and continuity of ferry operations are prioritised, appropriate

levels of maritime safety can be provided during construction with careful management.

Barge mounted operations for piling and constructing the DPS are not preferred from a

maritime safety perspective as there is a potential for interference with ferry operations. For

barge mounted piling and construction operations to be used safely the following additional

controls would be required:

laying of anchors and chains for floating barge within ferry operational to be prohibited

barge operations commence in eastern part of DPS then proceed west before moving

north near Kingslow landing to complete DPS.

supply barge movements restricted to hours outside of ferry peak demand periods

(nominally 0700 – 0930 and 1600 – 1900).

27

5 Navigational effects assessment: operational phase

5.1 Method of Assessment

This navigational effects assessment considers the impact of operation of the Downtown

Public Space on navigation safety.

Where, in this assessment we recommended particular controls, our assessment is based in

those controls being adopted and effectively implemented.

Issues to assess, in relation to other ferry basin activities, include:

Consequences of impact by out-of-control ferry

DPS encroaches into ferry operations

DPS encroaches into cruise operations

DPS structures are visible at night

DPS structures are visible to radar

Lighting distraction to masters

Ecological enhancements coming free / floating around

Mooring system for marine safety pontoon and attached kelp garden interfering with ferry

operating area

Maintenance activities

Members of public in water

Wildlife attracted to DPS infrastructure

5.2 Discussion of risks

5.2.1 Impact by ferry at speed

Auckland’s commuter ferry operations are very safe however there is potential for accidents

to occur.

Occasionally a ferry’s propulsion system may fail in a way that leaves one engine partly or

fully engaged ahead. This may occur at a critical moment during berthing manoeuvres.

Under this scenario the master is largely or wholly unable to control the direction and speed

of the vessel and impact at speed with infrastructure can result. It is most common for such

issues to arise when a ferry changes its operating mode from high speed to manoeuvring

speed so speeds are typically initially moderate and usually on only one propulsion unit.

These factors limit the speeds that can be reasonably expected to be attained in this

scenario.

If there is enough time the crew could stop the faulty engine and/or drop the anchor, or use

the remaining propulsion unit and steering gear to manoeuvre the vessel out to open water.

28

However on occasion the time between the issue arising and impact is too short for the crew

to diagnose the problem and take appropriate action. Such events are relatively rare on a

per trip basis but have occurred in many cities with high frequency commuter ferry services.

One such event has already occurred in Auckland (refer Box 1) and may occur again.

Box 1- Devonport Ferry Collision with Victoria Wharf (2015)

On 17 February 2015, the Kea departed from the Auckland ferry terminal bound for Devonport. As the Kea approached Devonport ferry terminal at a speed of 12 knots, the master attempted to prepare the ferry for berthing.

However, a failure in the starboard propulsion unit, which initially went unnoticed, meant that the Kea was approaching the ferry terminal too quickly. The master aborted the berthing and attempted to turn the ferry away from the surrounding wharves and back toward the harbour. A collision with an adjacent wharf was inevitable and the master managed to slow the ferry to a speed of 8 knots before the Kea hit the wharf sustaining significant damage to its hull. Many passengers were injured, 7 severely who were hospitalised with non-life threatening injuries.

A high proportion of such out-of-control incidents have occurred with ferries fitted with

controllable pitch propellers (CPP). Currently none of the ferries operating from the

Downtown Ferry Terminal have CPP systems. Another common cause is operational errors

or faults arising when switching control from the central control panel to wing stations. Some

Auckland ferries do have wing stations as a necessity to allow safe berthing with minimal

contact forces and jarring of passengers.

While the overall chance of such an event is low, there is a possibility that the DPS will be

struck by a ferry travelling at medium speed some time during its life.

A glancing ferry collision at speed with the projecting DPS deck edge (if unprotected) would

likely have the most serious consequences and could result in serious casualties. A collision

of this type in New York in 2003 killed 11 passengers and injured 71.10 Members of public on

the DPS must also be protected from the possibility of progressive collapse of the DPS

structure resulting from a ferry collision at speed.

This risk has been specifically accounted for in the design of the DPS through incorporating

the following components to reduce this risk:

Floating maritime safety buffer pontoon with attached kelp garden/ecological

enhancements

Fender pile groups

Avoiding placement of tall heavy structures near outer edge of DPS which could topple

onto a colliding ferry

DPS structural design considers the effect of a ferry impact on the stability of the

structure, in the event that the marine protection system is breached

The concept of the floating maritime safety buffer pontoon with attached kelp

garden/ecological enhancements is a low lying ring-shaped pontoon structure supporting a

living community of sea life. With appropriate design, from a high speed ferry contact

perspective this would be close to ideal as a means of arresting an out of control ferry. We

would expect an errant ferry to partly ride over and partly cut through the pontoon and for the

10

Andrew J Barberi at Staten Island, NY, struck wharf at 15 knots.

29

pontoon and any associated ecological enhancements to become entangled with the ferry

and dragged along. These actions would serve to slow the ferry due to momentum transfer,

and to quickly dissipate kinetic energy. To ensure that the floating pontoon acts in this

manner the joints holding pontoon sections together need to be strong enough so that the

pontoon stays together as a unit if struck by a ferry at speed. It is understood that the

pontoon is proposed to be constructed of steel with a concrete deck, which is likely to be

suitable for the maritime safety buffer purposes.

In other areas standard timber marine pile groups will be used to separate ferry operations

from the DPS. Such piles are common in the marine area and can be seen throughout the

ferry basin, deployed in various roles. We recommend that the piles are arranged in

dolphins.11 These would be groups of two or three, with two inner piles slightly raked and the

top held together with a steel band. A vertical arrangement of groups of piles would also be

suitable in the shorter term, provided it was replaced or supplemented with a future kelp

garden or other protective works (undertaken in Stage 2).

Such arrangements of raked, grouped piles are relatively common in ports and are much

stronger than single piles. The dolphins will be arranged so that the maximum clear spacing

between pile groups is 6.5m, being less than the beam of the narrowest ferries currently

using the basin.12

The dolphins serve two purposes. The first is preventing contact with the DPS at slow

speeds (e.g. ferry caught by wind or inadvertent manoeuvre by trainee ferry master). The

second is to slow an errant ferry at higher speeds. We expect that the dolphins will be

completely effective in low speed contacts, and will be largely effective in slowing and

stopping a smaller ferry or deflecting a glancing contact with a large fully laden ferry.

Such wooden dolphins would likely only be partly effective in arresting a large fully laden

ferry in a head-on collision but such cases are of less concern as the bow section of the

larger ferries would separate passengers from the contact point. In this case the dolphins will

partly slow the ferry which would render the final impact with the DPS less serious.

In our view the floating pontoon and dolphins provide an adequate level of protection for the

out of control ferry impact scenario.

5.2.2 DPS encroaches into ferry operations

If the DPS encroaches into ferry operations there is a significant risk of contact. The DPS

has been designed to avoid this risk by keeping infrastructure clear of a 45m swing radius

from the northern end of Berth 2B (Figure 5-1).

11

A “dolphin” is a group of piles connected together to from a marine structure. 12

Pine harbor ferries and Belaire ferries are both approximately 7m beam.

30

Figure 5-1 Swing radius from the existing berth 2B

The eastern part of the DPS will be physically separated from ferry operations by fender

dolphins arranged at not more than 6.5 m centres. This is a standard marine structure and

will deflect errant slow speed ferries with little or no damage.

5.2.3 DPS encroaches into cruise operations

If the DPS encroaches into cruise operations there is a risk of collision.

Ports of Auckland Limited have provided the diagrams in Figure 5-2 and Figure 5-3 showing

the required clear area under two different cruise ship berthing scenarios on Princes Wharf

East. These areas are required for tug and ship manoeuvring during berthing and also serve

as a recoil protection area in the event that a mooring line parts.

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Figure 5-2 Celebrity Solstice Berthing at Princes Wharf (POAL)

Figure 5-3 Majestic Princess berthing at Princes Wharf (POAL)

Pier 4 lies wholly within the exclusion area nominated by POAL, yet cruise ships are

successfully berthed at Princes Wharf East. This indicates that the current situation is

somewhat compromised. We interpret that POAL is seeking to improve on the current

situation.

The part plan of the western section of DPS in Figure 5-1 shows the most extensive of these

two cruise ship exclusion areas. The DPS has been designed to avoid this risk by keeping all

DPS infrastructure clear of the cruise safety area advised by Ports of Auckland.

5.2.4 Edge structures are visible at night

In general the basin and DPS will be well lit. However there is a risk that unlit DPS edge

protection structures may not be seen by ferry masters and crew against the well illuminated

background. If DPS edge structures are difficult to see it increases the likelihood of contact

by ferries that could result in injuries and damage to vessels and structures.

32

This risk will be reduced by increasing the visibility through installing:

Reflective patches on seaward edges of each fender dolphin (also refer next section re

radar reflectivity)

Conventional lighting on outer edges of floating kelp garden. This lighting must not be

distracting to ferry operators (i.e. it should be down or uplit, not shining outwards).

Lit aids to navigation are not considered to be required and none are proposed.

With these measures the risk from night-time operations is assessed to be no different to

current operations in the basin.

5.2.5 DPS edge structures are visible to radar

While navigation in the basin is undertaken mainly using visual cues, it is helpful to have

clear radar signals to assist in conditions of limited visibility such as fog. There are two types

of DPS edge structures to consider:

fender pile groups/dolphins

marine safety buffer pontoon with attached kelp garden

Radars on ferries can be adjusted by the master and will most likely be tuned to pick up

other vessels in the harbour. On such radars the landside margin of the basin will present a

high degree of clutter, with signals returning of the DPS edge structure, steel planter boxes,

railings and street furniture. For navigation safety it is desirable that the structures on the

seaward edge of the DPS stand out from the background clutter on radar so that ferry

masters can maintain situational awareness and keep ferries clear under all conditions.

Fender Piles/Dolphins

A curved metal plate (say 300mm high by 300mm wide) needs to be attached to the outer

face near the top of the outer pile of each dolphin. The purpose of the curved metal plate is

to ensure a good radar reflection from the pile.

This could be combined with the visual reflectors recommended in the section above, by

attaching a reflective coating of a reflective material to the plate.

Pontoon Piling

It is understood that the maritime safety buffer pontoon will be made of steel, with a concrete

deck. A steel structure is usually highly reflective to radar, however the structure will sit low

in the water and may be difficult to distinguish from the background clutter. If made of

concrete or plastic, the low-lying pontoon may not be visible on radar at all.

Given that the pontoon will be located by piles, we recommend attaching a 300mm by

300mm plate on the outer face of the outer piles holding the pontoon in position. There need

to be at least two piles on the seaward side of the DPS, located near the outer corners.

5.2.6 DPS Lighting distraction to masters

Bright outward shining lighting from the DPS could distract masters, and reduce the ability of

the ferry crew to discern unlit objects floating the water. This could lead to a collision.

33

This risk will be minimised by ensuring that any bright lighting on the DPS is directed

downward or upward, rather than outward to the north.

5.2.7 Ecological enhancements

A proposed feature of the DPS is the installation of mussel ropes/baskets/pile wraps or other

ecological enhancements to simulate part what the original ecology of the area might have

been like. At this stage the exact form and location of the enhancements has not been

determined and trials of various options are proposed.

An example of the concept is provided at the nearby New Zealand Maritime Museum

approximately 150m west of the proposed DPS. For educational purposes the museum has

hung short non-floating ropes from their wharf structures into the harbour, forming a

substrate for mussels and other sea-life to settle and grow. In addition, algal growths on

some pontoons are no longer removed to encourage the development of floating

communities. These enhancements have proven to be an excellent educational resource

and no maritime safety issues with their deployment have been encountered to date (K.

Walker, pers. comm.).

While some vessel movements occur in and around the Maritime Museum, the Ferry Basin

is a more active operational environment than the Maritime Museum precinct. If mussel

ropes or other ecological enhancements at the DPS come free and float around, they could

get wrapped in ferry propellers, the propulsion systems of tugs, or in cruise ship thrusters.

This can cause vessels to lose power/manoeuvring ability and can lead to a collision with the

possibility of injury. Natural currents in the basin are weak, but strong currents and eddies

can be set up by tug propulsion systems or cruise ship thrusters and main engines during

berthing manoeuvres on Princes Wharf East.

A concern is that kelp stripped from such ecological enhancements could be caught in the

sea-strainers of ferries leading to engine overheating which might require additional

maintenance to clear.

The following controls are proposed to manage potential risks:

1. Any ropes used for ecological enhancements to be non- floating.

2. Enhancement structures to be attached at a minimum of two locations so that if one

end comes free the other serves as a back-up (eg. hanging mussel ropes to be tied

to structures at top and bottom).

3. Rope used for growing mussels to be at least as strong as standard mussel crop

rope – which is well proven in New Zealand conditions.

4. Regular inspections and maintenance to be put in place, taking into account the

materials selected and potential degradation rates in the marine environment.

5. Ecological enhancement systems to be initially trialled on a small scale, with rates of

shedding of kelp fronds, wear at fastening points, and performance under vessel-

induced currents to be assessed and provided to the harbourmaster prior to

advancing to full scale deployment.

6. Any proposed full scale deployment of ecological enhancements to be communicated

to the harbourmaster prior to deployment and to be to the satisfaction of the

harbourmaster from a maritime safety perspective.

34

5.2.8 Mooring system for maritime safety buffer pontoon and kelp garden

The floating maritime safety buffer pontoon and kelp garden will require an appropriate

mooring system. To hold the pontoon in a fixed position with conventional chain and block

mooring systems would require that the mooring blocks and chains extend northward

beyond the boundaries of the pontoon. This could interfere with ferry or cruise operations by

preventing deployment of anchors from such vessels if required. While these risks are

judged to be low, it is good practice to keep operational areas clear of such lines. For these

reasons a conventional anchored mooring system is not proposed.

For these reasons the use of piled fixings for the pontoon is supported. As discussed in

Section 5.2.5, there needs to be two outer piles. Having piles sharing the load from the

pontoon will help with resisting ferry impact forces, should a ferry inadvertently come into

contact with the pontoon. We recommend that these piles would be of a design and sizing

typical of timber marine piles used elsewhere in the port, driven to refusal.

5.2.9 Maintenance activities

Floating Pontoon

It is expected that the floating pontoon will need maintenance to keep it free of litter. Risks

arise for maintenance personal due to weather conditions or due to wake effects from

vessels operating in the basin.

To help manage risks maintenance will not take place during cruise ship manoeuvring or in

peak commuter ferry operating hours (before 10:00 am or after 4:00 pm weekdays). The

proposed floating kelp garden is located in a sheltered area of the basin but the maintenance

schedule needs to be flexible to allow for weather conditions (e.g. defer activity to following

day).

Maintenance access will likely be by boat or by land-based access at lower tidal states, from

the Kingslow steps via a lightweight portable ramp. Personnel engaged on maintenance will

need to wear self-inflating life jackets.

Figure 5-4 Kingslow steps shown on proposed planter section diagram13

It is recommended that underwater parts of the pontoon and ecological enhancements are

checked by commercial divers on at least an annual basis once the trials are completed.

Divers checking ecological enhancements under the structure will be separated from ferry

13

Part copy of Isthmus Drawing (Isthmus 2019)

35

operations by the fender piles. If inspecting the floating pontoon then we would expect the

divers to position a dive boat on the outer edge of the pontoon, flying the international divers

flag symbol (Flag A).

Maritime Rules 91.6 (1) c requires that vessels do not exceed 5 knots within 200 metres of

any vessel flying a divers flag (Flag A). However Maritime Rule 91.6 (1) b also requires that

vessels not exceed 5 knots within 200 metres of the shore or of any structure without

reasonable cause. Accordingly ferries operating in this vicinity will already be manoeuvring

at lower speed, so dive operations will have no additional effect on ferry operations.

5.2.10 Member of public in water

The likelihood of members of public ending up in the water will be reduced by providing

balustrading along the entire outer edge of the DPS.

While there is some potential for members of the public to be tempted to swim to the kelp

garden, the access will be no different from at present, as the historic Kingslow steps will

remain.

Ferry operators have stated they have procedures to recover persons in the water and can

be expected to lend assistance if they observe the person in the water. However members of

public who fall into the water need to be able to safely and quickly get back to land without

external assistance, particularly late at night when the ferries are not operating.

Risks can be reduced by:

providing life rings that can be thrown to persons who inadvertently find themselves

in the water

ensuring appropriately placed means of egress are available and visible to the public

once they are in the water.

The existing pontoons at Pier 3 and in other parts of the ferry basin are well provisioned with

life rings and egress ladders. However, the Pier 3 pontoons are to be removed, and it could

be unsafe to attract persons in the water to move towards other berths where ferry

movements may occur. For these reasons the DPS needs to have its own associated

facilities to assist persons who are in the water.

Three life rings are proposed for the DPS, being approximately 40m apart. This is somewhat

closer than those installed along the adjacent Queens Wharf West outside the Cloud

(approx. 50m apart) and substantially closer than those provided on Prices Wharf East

(approx. 100m apart).14

The Kingslow steps will continue to provide suitable egress to the west. The existing egress

ladder at the north end of the existing pier 2A will also be retained. If either of these existing

forms of egress are removed or become inaccessible, suitable egress will need to be

provided.

The proposal for life rings is assessed by Navigatus to be an adequate provision for the

safety of those falling in the water.

14

A maximum spacing of one hundred metres is in line with overseas guidance (Health and Safety Executive 2014).

36

Figure 5-5 Egress and lifesaving ring on Pier 2A

5.2.11 Wildlife attracted to DPS infrastructure

The DPS is designed in part to recreate aspects of the original natural land/water interface

that existed before development of the city and port. Some wildlife attraction is desirable and

intentional. However wildlife could also create dangers to passengers and crew (e.g. birds

swooping) and may inhibit ferry operations (e.g. seals).

Birds already nest on piles in the port and become territorially protective during the nesting

season, swooping on people who come near. This is a potential safety issue for crew on the

port rear quarter of vessels berthed at Berth 2B. To eliminate this risk, pile tops on the fender

piles should be cut at an angle that allow perching but prevent nesting and stops the pile top

from rotting (see foreground piles in Box 2 on following page). This could also be achieved

by using steel plate caps on a horizontally cut pile or other similar device.

The floating maritime safety buffer pontoon/kelp garden has the potential to attract pinnipeds

such as seals15.

New Zealand fur seals have been gradually spreading northwards along the New Zealand

coast and were given total protection in 1978 (under the New Zealand Marine Mammals

Act). As far back as 1894, New Zealand fur seals were protected (with some harvest

available), and since then brief limited open seasons occurred in 1913–16, 1922–25, and

1946 (Baird 2011).

In recent years, individual seals have started to visit Waitematā Harbour and to loiter for long

periods, returning from year to year (Robson 2018). A three metre female leopard seal has

15

This assessment refers to New Zealand Fur Seals as “seals”, being an example of expanding range and recolonisation into more northern New Zealand waters by pinnipeds. However the assessment also applies to the potential for colonisation by other species of pinniped such as sea leopards and sea lions.

37

visited the Waitematā Harbour over a number of years and hauls out onto pontoons in

various locations, including multiple occasions at Orakei Marina, 4km west of the ferry basin,

over the 2017/18 summer (Orakei Marina Security Officer, pers. comm.)

The normal pattern of recolonisation by seals is that this type of individual activity is followed

by establishment of more seal haul outs with use by more seals, followed by establishment

of full colonies. However, it is not known whether full colonies of seals have ever been

established in the Waitematā Harbour in recent centuries.

In the absence of human intervention, pinnipeds, such as seals, can become established in

port environments (Box 2).

Box 2 – Sea lion colony at Pier 39, San Francisco.

Californian sea lions began hauling out on Pier 39’s K-Dock in San Francisco in 1989. The docks were abandoned to the sea lions, which became their own tourist attraction.

Photo: Pier39.com

It is not clear if seals on the kelp garden would be a problem for maritime operations in the

ferry basin, but they have the potential to do so. They would likely be a tourist attraction both

from land and from water as the San Francisco Pier 39 sea lions have become. Recreational

vessels may be attracted to view such a colony but they are prohibited from the Downtown

Ferry Basin. If a seal colony became established it is likely that additional controls would be

required such as improved signage and policing to keep recreational vessels out.

Seals are very mobile in the water and ferries manoeuvring in the basins are noisy

underwater and slow, so it is expected that healthy seals will be able to easily avoid contact

with ferries. However operational issues could arise if a ferry struck a seal from a haul-out

established on the DPS. Such contact could, for instance, lead to calls to limit ferry

operations. If this occurs an option would be to move the pontoon to a more suitable location

for such an attraction (e.g. maritime museum precinct) and to replace with a new pontoon

designed to limit or discourage use by seals as a haul-out.

In summary a degree of wildlife colonisation of the DPS is intentional. If this becomes

problematic then a range of options are available to manage the effects.

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5.2.12 Sea-bins

It is proposed to install three Seabins as part of the DPS works. Seabin is a branded type of

floating rubbish bin that can be located in the water at marinas, docks, yacht clubs and

commercial ports to capture floating trash. A Seabin has been installed at the Viaduct

Harbour as a demonstration project (Figure 5-6).

Figure 5-6 Seabin at Viaduct Harbour

Photo: Kevin Oldham

The bins need to be sited where they are readily accessible for maintenance. The proposed

locations are:

1. Kinglsow landing steps

2. At the north end of berth 2A (which will remain in part after the DPS is built)

3. At the junction of berths 2E and 2F on the east side of Pier 2

Although the last Seabin location above is outside of the DPS Phase 1 works, this is

proposed to be installed in Phase 1 (A Foxton pers. comm.).

All of these proposed locations are located on the side of fixed structures and do not impinge

to any significant degree on ferry operations. Access for maintenance is generally good.

5.3 Maritime operations and safety assessment of proposal

In this section we assess the DPS against the criteria set out in in Section 2.2.

Table 5.1 - Assessment Against Criteria

Criterion Risk Assessment in comparison to existing

1. Safe: the

DPS is safe for

co-location in

the Downtown

Ferry Basin in

terms of ferry

Impact by ferry at speed (5.2.1)

With appropriate design (including fender

dolphins and floating pontoon) the risks arising

from impact by ferries will be similar to or better

than typical port infrastructure,

Lighting and visibility risks (5.2.4, 5.2.5, 5.2.6)

With appropriate lighting and use of reflective markings, these risks will not be significant.

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Criterion Risk Assessment in comparison to existing

operations and

safety of

members of the

public.

Other interference/interaction risks (5.2.7, 5.2.8, 5.2.9)

With appropriate design and management of maintenance activities these risks can be managed appropriately.

Egress for members of public (5.2.10)

With appropriate design this risk will not be increased compared to the current infrastructure.

2. Compatible:

the DPS does

not interfere

with other port

operations and

can cope with

the expected

range of port

operating

conditions.

Encroachment into ferry and

cruise operations (5.2.2, 5.2.3)

Operational requirements have been identified

and the DPS has been designed not to encroach

within operating areas so it will not present a

significant risk. In the case of cruise operations

the DPS is sited further from cruise operations

than the current Pier 4.

Wildlife attracted (5.2.11)

Risk of birds nesting can be appropriately managed and will not interfere with port operations in comparison to existing infrastructure.

There is possibility of attracting seals that may interfere with basin operations, but options are available to modify the structures if this situation eventuates that should limit any negative consequences to ferry operations.

5.4 Operational conclusions and recommendations

Provided that the recommendations in this report are implemented in the proposed

development then the maritime safety risks of the proposed development are considered to

be acceptable.

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6 Conclusions

6.1 Construction

The DPS construction is confined to a small area of the ferry basin with potential impacts

confined to the adjacent berths on Pier 2 and Pier 4. The remainder of construction will be

accessed from land (as specified in the Joint Venture Construction Management Plan). As

such, the effects on marine operations will be relatively minor. There are however some risks

to ferry operations in adjacent berths and a formal Marine Construction Safety Management

Plan and Basin Coordination service are proposed. With these controls the residual risks are

assessed as being reduced to so far as is reasonably practicable level from a maritime

safety standpoint.

6.2 Operations

The DPS has been designed to avoid interference with operations, mainly through confining

the extent of the DPS to ensure that it does not encroach onto operational areas. Physical

separation barriers to the north are included into the design to separate ferry operations from

the DPS. To the west, Pier 4 will remain temporarily and effectively separates the DPS from

cruise ship operations. With appropriate design and management, maintenance activities will

not affect ferry operations. Options are available should wildlife colonisation create

nuisances that inhibit ferry operations.

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7 Proposed conditions of consent

The following conditions of consent are prepared to address the maritime safety matters

identified in this assessment. While a range of recommendations are made in this

assessment report, we consider that those do not need to be individually identified in

conditions of consent as these are not directly Resource Management Act issues and can be

adequately covered by a general requirement that the works are to the satisfaction of the

Harbourmaster, who has ultimate jurisdiction on such maritime safety matters under the

authority of the Maritime Transport Act.

Design

1. The consent holder shall provide adequate protection from ferry collision with the

DPS structures to the satisfaction of the Auckland Harbourmaster.

2. The consent holder shall ensure that maritime safety effects of the DPS design

are to the satisfaction of the Auckland Harbourmaster.

3. The consent holder shall provide appropriate protection and egress in the DPS

design for the safety of members of the public.

Construction

4. The consent holder shall prepare and maintain for the duration of construction a

Marine Construction Safety Management Plan that attends to the matters set out

in Appendix B to the satisfaction of the Auckland Harbourmaster.

Operation

5. The consent holder shall prepare and comply with a Maritime Safety

Maintenance Plan prepared to the satisfaction of the Auckland Harbourmaster.

Explanatory Note: Maritime Safety is governed by the Maritime Transport Act 1994.

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8 References

Auckland Transport, 2016. Harbourmaster’s Office Auckland Downtown Ferry Terminal

Basin Navigation Safety Operating Requirements. pp.1–6.

Auckland Transport Harbourmaster, Harbourmaster’s Direction 1-16 Downtown Ferry

Terminal Basin.

Baird, S.J., 2011. New Zealand fur seals – summary of current knowledge. New Zealand

Aquatic Environment and Biodiversity Report, (72), p.51.

Beca, 2018. America’s Cup 36, Auckland 2021 Marine Traffic Survey for Resource Consent

Application, Wynyard Basin. (January).

Health and Safety Executive, 2014. Safety in docks. Approved Code of Practice.

Isthmus, 2019. Downtown Public Space. Resource Consent Package. (19 March 2019).

Joint Venture, 2019. Construction Management Plan - DPS.

Robson, S., 2018. Owha the curious seal makes waves in Waitemata Harbour. Radio New

Zealand. Available at: https://www.radionz.co.nz/news/national/369467/owha-the-curious-

seal-makes-waves-in-waitemata-harbour [Accessed December 3, 2018].

Tonkin + Taylor, 2018. Downtown Ferry Basin Redevelopment - Stage 1. Coastal Effects

Assessment. (November).

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DPS Structure Appendix A.

Figure 8-1 Illustrative plan (Isthmus 2019)

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Figure 8-2 Section through the central entry from Quay Street (Isthmus 2019)

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Outline of Marine Construction Safety Management Appendix B.Plan

Proposed outline of plan, to be developed in consultation with ferry operators, the

Harbourmaster, Ports of Auckland, Auckland Transport and the construction contractor:

1. Introduction

1.1. Project overview

1.2. Purpose and Scope of MCSMP

1.3. Legislative context

1.4. MCSMP development

2. Construction method for marine activities

2.1. Downtown Ferry Basin Redevelopment

2.2. Quay St Seawall

2.2.1. Ferry Building Section

2.2.2. Ferry Basin Section

2.2.3. Construction scenarios

3. Ferry basin users

3.1. Ferry services

3.2. Cruise vessels

3.3. Bunkering

3.4. Other activities

4. Goals and Responsibilities

5. Communication

5.1. Ongoing regular coordination

5.2. Basin Coordination

5.3. Operational communication

5.4. Early formal notification

5.5. Contact details

6. Controls

6.1. On-water Spatial Conflict

6.2. Contractor vessel management during ferry operating hours

6.3. Construction vessels and equipment management

6.4. Lifts

6.5. Construction divers

6.6. Low wake request

6.7. Visual obstruction

6.8. Construction Lighting

6.9. N/A

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6.10 Work near Berth 2B, 2C and 4A

6.11. Demolition

6.12. Emergency procedures

6.13. Restricted visibility

6.14. Thrust and wash from cruise ships

6.15. Other activities in Ferry Basin

6.16. Navigational hazards arising from construction

6.17. Toppling Equipment

6.18. Marine mammals

Appendix A. Downtown Ferry Basin Redevelopment key activities

Appendix B. Basin Coordination (Ferry Basin Redevelopment)

Appendix C. Risk of on-water spatial conflict during Downtown Ferry Basin Redevelopment

Appendix D. Risk register

Appendix E. Specifications for Basin coordinator and safety boat (Ferry Basin Redevelopment)

Note: the plan will be a living document, regularly updated over the duration of construction