Mark Sykes, the British Arabists and the Enduring

Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara University UndergraduateJournal of History, Series II

Volume 20 Article 10

2015

Mark Sykes, the British Arabists and the EnduringConsequences of the Sykes-Picot AgreementNicholas Comaratta

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Sykes-Picot Agreement 97

Mark Sykes, The British Arabists andthe Enduring Consequences of theSykes-Picot Agreement

Nicholas Comaratta

IntroductionThe ongoing actions of the Islamic State (ISIS) in

Syria and Iraq are motivated by both religious andpolitical conditions which exist as a result of drasti-cally irresponsible foreign diplomacy conducted byboth Great Britain and France nearly a hundred yearsago. In a viral video declaring the establishment oftheir Islamic Caliphate in the summer of 2014 entitledEnd of Sykes Picot, the Islamic militants of ISIS ex-pressed their goal to reverse the territorial linesestablished by the Sykes Picot Agreement of 1916.1 Bythe end of the summer, many geo-political analystsspeculated that the group's recent advances in North-ern Iraq and at the Turkish-Syrian border had in factdestabilized the existing borders which were drawn inthe agreement.2

The Sykes-Picot Agreement was a deal negotiatedbetween the British, French and Russian Empires inanticipation of the fall of the Ottoman Empire at theend of World War One. The agreement effectively splitthe Middle East (which had been under Ottoman Rule

1 The End of Sykes Picot, (ISIS. 2014. Syria: Youtube,

February 26th, 2015).

2 Worth, Robert. “Redrawn Lines Seen as No Cure in Iraq

Conflict,” The New York Times. (New York, NY), June 26, 2014.

98 Historical Perspectives September 2015

for nearly four hundred years) between the threenations; Britain would maintain control over modernday Iraq, and France the region of modern day Syriaand Lebanon. While Russia was originally partitioneda small section of land north of Iraq, their zone wasdelegitimized by the collapse of their Imperial state andthe rise of the Bolsheviks in 1917. Nevertheless, theboundaries drawn in the agreement would eventuallybe used in the post-war formation of the mandatesystem in the Middle East under the League of Na-tions.3

Mark Sykes represented the British Empire in thenegotiations with French ambassador Georges-Picot.Sykes, an imperialist minded member of the ToryParty, had a wide range of personal experience in theregion and expressed his views on the local religionsand tribal-political dynamics through travel writings aswell as his own personal letters. While Sykes was forthe most part religiously tolerant, he still held manyracial and cultural prejudices which played into hisfinal decision making process. In addition to thesebiases, he was convinced the Arabs were incapable ofself-rule and he therefore sought to continue theadvancement of the British Empire by maintaining itsinfluence in the Middle East. These imperialist idealscombined with Sykes' disposition to lie and withholdpertinent information made him absolutely unfit todraw a map deciding the fate of the Middle East in thetwentieth century and beyond.

Sykes' negotiations virtually ignored the proposals

3Karabell, Zachary. Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East

and North Africa, (2 vols. New York: Macmillian Reference USA,2004), 2128.

1

Comaratta: Mark Sykes, the British Arabists

Published by Scholar Commons, 2015


Mark Sykes, The British Arabists andthe Enduring Consequences of theSykes-Picot Agreement

Nicholas Comaratta

IntroductionThe ongoing actions of the Islamic State (ISIS) in

Syria and Iraq are motivated by both religious andpolitical conditions which exist as a result of drasti-cally irresponsible foreign diplomacy conducted byboth Great Britain and France nearly a hundred yearsago. In a viral video declaring the establishment oftheir Islamic Caliphate in the summer of 2014 entitledEnd of Sykes Picot, the Islamic militants of ISIS ex-pressed their goal to reverse the territorial linesestablished by the Sykes Picot Agreement of 1916.1 Bythe end of the summer, many geo-political analystsspeculated that the group's recent advances in North-ern Iraq and at the Turkish-Syrian border had in factdestabilized the existing borders which were drawn inthe agreement.2

The Sykes-Picot Agreement was a deal negotiatedbetween the British, French and Russian Empires inanticipation of the fall of the Ottoman Empire at theend of World War One. The agreement effectively splitthe Middle East (which had been under Ottoman Rule

1 The End of Sykes Picot, (ISIS. 2014. Syria: Youtube,

February 26th, 2015).

2 Worth, Robert. “Redrawn Lines Seen as No Cure in Iraq

Conflict,” The New York Times. (New York, NY), June 26, 2014.


for nearly four hundred years) between the threenations; Britain would maintain control over modernday Iraq, and France the region of modern day Syriaand Lebanon. While Russia was originally partitioneda small section of land north of Iraq, their zone wasdelegitimized by the collapse of their Imperial state andthe rise of the Bolsheviks in 1917. Nevertheless, theboundaries drawn in the agreement would eventuallybe used in the post-war formation of the mandatesystem in the Middle East under the League of Na-tions.3

Mark Sykes represented the British Empire in thenegotiations with French ambassador Georges-Picot.Sykes, an imperialist minded member of the ToryParty, had a wide range of personal experience in theregion and expressed his views on the local religionsand tribal-political dynamics through travel writings aswell as his own personal letters. While Sykes was forthe most part religiously tolerant, he still held manyracial and cultural prejudices which played into hisfinal decision making process. In addition to thesebiases, he was convinced the Arabs were incapable ofself-rule and he therefore sought to continue theadvancement of the British Empire by maintaining itsinfluence in the Middle East. These imperialist idealscombined with Sykes' disposition to lie and withholdpertinent information made him absolutely unfit todraw a map deciding the fate of the Middle East in thetwentieth century and beyond.

Sykes' negotiations virtually ignored the proposals

3Karabell, Zachary. Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East

and North Africa, (2 vols. New York: Macmillian Reference USA,2004), 2128.

2

Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II, Vol. 20 [2015], Art. 10

http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/historical-perspectives/vol20/iss1/10


made by a group of scholar administrators fromMesopotamia known as the British Arabists. Thesemen and women were members of the British foreignservice or media who worked almost exclusively in theMiddle East and developed strong self-determinationideologies through their direct experiences with thelocal culture and people. Most notable of these BritishArabists were T.E. Lawrence and Gertrude Bell andalong with other prominent figures they petitioned forthe British Empire to move forward with a policysupporting independence in the Middle East in orderto avoid future conflict in the region.

Ultimately the voices of Lawrence and Bell weresilenced by the machinations and deliberations whichdominate international politics and the borders drawnby Sykes-Picot were effectively recognized during theSan Remo Conference of 1922 through the League ofNations mandate system.4 Had more influentialmembers of the British government sympathized withtheir policies, the post-war borders drawn for theMiddle East may have been more sensitive to thecultural and religious variations which complicated thepolitics of the region. By ignoring the sympatheticopinions of the British Arabists, the Sykes-PicotAgreement of 1916 was clouded by the imperialistleaning ideologies and prejudices held by Mark Sykesand thus altered the trajectory of Middle Easternsociety and politics in the twentieth century in a waywhich still motivates militant groups such as ISIS.

This paper will examine the background of theagreement as well as the men and women involved inthe establishment of Britain's policy in the Middle

4 Karabell, Encyclopedia, 2128.


East. Drawing mainly upon the discussion of theSykes-Picot Agreement from Lawrence in Arabia byScott Anderson as well as “British Scholar Administra-tors in Iraq” by F.S. Naiden, it will attempt to place theeffects of the accord into a more modern contextfocused around the contemporary events carried outby the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. By looking atthe personal works of Sykes, Lawrence and Bell it willseek to better understand the backgrounds andexperience which played a role in forming their ideasand aspirations for the future of the Middle East.Ultimately, this paper will seek to compare the pro-posed maps drawn by T.E. Lawrence and Gertrude Bellwith Sykes’ map in order to understand the fundamen-tal problem of Sykes and Picot.

Background: Leading up to the TreatyBy 1915 the Allied powers in World War One had

witnessed vast amounts of unimaginable devastationacross the European landscape. In a conflict motivatedby imperial rivalries, Britain’s and France’s finalobjectives shifted towards consolidating concessionsand post-war reparations after only one year of blood-shed.5 Both Britain’s and France's post-war imperialambitions included inhibiting their aggressors in orderto prevent future conflict as well as securing newprovinces "as though to compensate for the loss of anentire generation in Flanders."6

Seeking provinces, they naturally turned to where

5 Anderson, Scott. Lawrence in Arabia, (New York, USA:

Random House, 2013), 151-152.

6 Alaric, Jacob. "The British Arabists," History Today. 23,

no. 5 (1973) : 323.

3




made by a group of scholar administrators fromMesopotamia known as the British Arabists. Thesemen and women were members of the British foreignservice or media who worked almost exclusively in theMiddle East and developed strong self-determinationideologies through their direct experiences with thelocal culture and people. Most notable of these BritishArabists were T.E. Lawrence and Gertrude Bell andalong with other prominent figures they petitioned forthe British Empire to move forward with a policysupporting independence in the Middle East in orderto avoid future conflict in the region.

Ultimately the voices of Lawrence and Bell weresilenced by the machinations and deliberations whichdominate international politics and the borders drawnby Sykes-Picot were effectively recognized during theSan Remo Conference of 1922 through the League ofNations mandate system.4 Had more influentialmembers of the British government sympathized withtheir policies, the post-war borders drawn for theMiddle East may have been more sensitive to thecultural and religious variations which complicated thepolitics of the region. By ignoring the sympatheticopinions of the British Arabists, the Sykes-PicotAgreement of 1916 was clouded by the imperialistleaning ideologies and prejudices held by Mark Sykesand thus altered the trajectory of Middle Easternsociety and politics in the twentieth century in a waywhich still motivates militant groups such as ISIS.

This paper will examine the background of theagreement as well as the men and women involved inthe establishment of Britain's policy in the Middle



East. Drawing mainly upon the discussion of theSykes-Picot Agreement from Lawrence in Arabia byScott Anderson as well as “British Scholar Administra-tors in Iraq” by F.S. Naiden, it will attempt to place theeffects of the accord into a more modern contextfocused around the contemporary events carried outby the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. By looking atthe personal works of Sykes, Lawrence and Bell it willseek to better understand the backgrounds andexperience which played a role in forming their ideasand aspirations for the future of the Middle East.Ultimately, this paper will seek to compare the pro-posed maps drawn by T.E. Lawrence and Gertrude Bellwith Sykes’ map in order to understand the fundamen-tal problem of Sykes and Picot.

Background: Leading up to the TreatyBy 1915 the Allied powers in World War One had

witnessed vast amounts of unimaginable devastationacross the European landscape. In a conflict motivatedby imperial rivalries, Britain’s and France’s finalobjectives shifted towards consolidating concessionsand post-war reparations after only one year of blood-shed.5 Both Britain’s and France's post-war imperialambitions included inhibiting their aggressors in orderto prevent future conflict as well as securing newprovinces "as though to compensate for the loss of anentire generation in Flanders."6

Seeking provinces, they naturally turned to where

5 Anderson, Scott. Lawrence in Arabia, (New York, USA:

Random House, 2013), 151-152.

6 Alaric, Jacob. "The British Arabists," History Today. 23,

no. 5 (1973) : 323.

4




any empire looks to expand: lands inhabited by peopleand societies they deemed inferior. No region was moreripe for a transition of power than the dwindling reignof the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East. Moreimportantly, both of these empires had important tiesto the area through their twisted and complicatedpasts. The French had been heavily involved with theCatholic population in Syria for over four hundredyears while Britain hoped to protect India and Egyptfrom its imperial rivals (including France and Russia)through a colony or protectorate in the Middle East.7

Thus the avaricious European giants lookedpromisingly toward the future collapse of the OttomanEmpire.

Defeating the Turks proved to be a more difficulttask than expected. Even as they directed their eyesupon the spoils of victory, the British were producingdismal results in their campaign against the Ottomanson the beaches of Gallipoli. Soon enough they wouldneed to reformulate their scheme to defeat the Otto-mans and inevitably they turned their attentionfurther East.8 Fearful of another disastrous campaignresulting in countless more casualties, British strate-gists sought a military solution utilizing the localArabs living under the oppressive Ottoman rule. Intheir minds, if they could incite a rebellion amongstthe Arabs they could "paralyze the Ottoman Empirefrom within."9

In early 1914 the British opened discussions withthe ruler of Mecca, Emir Hussein, also known as the

7 Anderson, Lawrence, 151.




King of Hejaz. Because they were direct descendants ofthe Prophet Muhammad, Hussein and his sons couldbe used as a tool to unite both Sunnis and Shias in arevolt.10 Prior to Britain's war with Turkey, it wasHussein's son Abdullah who had reached out to theBritish consulate in Cairo regarding their reaction toa potential Arab revolt in Hejaz. As Britain eventuallywas drawn into the conflict with the Turks, discus-sions continued over the next two years as both sidesspecified their demands.11 Over time these negotiationswere largely carried out through what is now known asthe McMahon-Hussein Correspondence. This series ofletters between Hussein and the British High Commis-sioner in Egypt Henry McMahon centered mainlyaround Hussein's desire for an independent Arab statein the Middle East following his cooperation in defeat-ing the Turks. While the British badly needed the localArab support, they also would not abandon theirimperial ambitions in the region and as a result theseovertures were largely scoffed at and ignored.12

Negotiations took an abrupt turn however whenHussein gave the British an ultimatum in October of1915. At this point Hussein had become increasinglyincensed over Britain's unwillingness to agree to histerms and gave them thirty days to concede to Arabindependence following the war. If the British declined,the King of Hejaz informed them that he would sign anagreement with the Turks who were willing to consentto his demands in return for his allegiance to Turkey

10Karabell, Encyclopedia, 2039.

11 Anderson, Lawrence, 115-116.

12 Naiden, F.S. "British Scholar - Administrators in Iraq,"

The Journal of the Historical Society. 7, no. 2 (2007) : 185.

5




any empire looks to expand: lands inhabited by peopleand societies they deemed inferior. No region was moreripe for a transition of power than the dwindling reignof the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East. Moreimportantly, both of these empires had important tiesto the area through their twisted and complicatedpasts. The French had been heavily involved with theCatholic population in Syria for over four hundredyears while Britain hoped to protect India and Egyptfrom its imperial rivals (including France and Russia)through a colony or protectorate in the Middle East.7

Thus the avaricious European giants lookedpromisingly toward the future collapse of the OttomanEmpire.

Defeating the Turks proved to be a more difficulttask than expected. Even as they directed their eyesupon the spoils of victory, the British were producingdismal results in their campaign against the Ottomanson the beaches of Gallipoli. Soon enough they wouldneed to reformulate their scheme to defeat the Otto-mans and inevitably they turned their attentionfurther East.8 Fearful of another disastrous campaignresulting in countless more casualties, British strate-gists sought a military solution utilizing the localArabs living under the oppressive Ottoman rule. Intheir minds, if they could incite a rebellion amongstthe Arabs they could "paralyze the Ottoman Empirefrom within."9

In early 1914 the British opened discussions withthe ruler of Mecca, Emir Hussein, also known as the





King of Hejaz. Because they were direct descendants ofthe Prophet Muhammad, Hussein and his sons couldbe used as a tool to unite both Sunnis and Shias in arevolt.10 Prior to Britain's war with Turkey, it wasHussein's son Abdullah who had reached out to theBritish consulate in Cairo regarding their reaction toa potential Arab revolt in Hejaz. As Britain eventuallywas drawn into the conflict with the Turks, discus-sions continued over the next two years as both sidesspecified their demands.11 Over time these negotiationswere largely carried out through what is now known asthe McMahon-Hussein Correspondence. This series ofletters between Hussein and the British High Commis-sioner in Egypt Henry McMahon centered mainlyaround Hussein's desire for an independent Arab statein the Middle East following his cooperation in defeat-ing the Turks. While the British badly needed the localArab support, they also would not abandon theirimperial ambitions in the region and as a result theseovertures were largely scoffed at and ignored.12

Negotiations took an abrupt turn however whenHussein gave the British an ultimatum in October of1915. At this point Hussein had become increasinglyincensed over Britain's unwillingness to agree to histerms and gave them thirty days to concede to Arabindependence following the war. If the British declined,the King of Hejaz informed them that he would sign anagreement with the Turks who were willing to consentto his demands in return for his allegiance to Turkey

10Karabell, Encyclopedia, 2039.


12 Naiden, F.S. "British Scholar - Administrators in Iraq,"

The Journal of the Historical Society. 7, no. 2 (2007) : 185.

6




and Germany in the final years of the war.13 Britain's foreign ambassadors in the Middle East

were left with an important decision to make. Theycould grant Hussein his wishes, abandoning hopes ofany post-war consolation provinces in the Middle East,while also potentially saving thousands of British lives.On the other hand, they could decline his offer andthus turn potential allies into yet another enemy in theMiddle East. In the end, imperial ambitions combinedwith political motives forced McMahon to take adangerous middle ground.

On October 24th McMahon sent a letter to Husseinconsenting to his conditions in return for his aid indefeating the Turks. This consent, however, came withspecific modifications, most importantly the demandby the British that specific regions of Mesopotamia(coincidentally abundant in oil) be placed under"special administrative arrangements."14 Moreover,McMahon also specified that such conditions couldonly be upheld with the approval of Britain's ally,France. Such an addition could only be attributed toMcMahon and his advisors' full knowledge of Frenchambitions in Syria and the potential trouble whichcould be stirred there following an Allied victory.15

Thus the British had essentially made Hussein apromise which they would not and could not keep.

Conscious of these potential diplomatic entangle-ments the British quickly gauged France's aspirationsfor territorial gains in the Middle East. In November,French ambassadors in London discussed their


14 Naiden, "British Scholar - Administrators," 186.

15 Anderson, Lawrence, 161-162


determination to take hold of the entire region, includ-ing Britain's favored regions of Baghdad and Basra.While the British were certainly lenient towards Syria,they were clearly not willing to relinquish their claimto the area of modern day Iraq. With this in mind, thetwo empires set out to negotiate an agreement to splitthe Middle East between them following the collapse ofthe Ottoman Empire. By January 1916 British repre-sentative Mark Sykes was meeting with Georges-Picotof France to draw a map which would ultimatelydetermine the boundaries of the modern day MiddleEast.16 With such a massive arrangement determinedby only two men the results were certainly partial.With Mark Sykes as the British representative in thesediscussions the results were catastrophic. As Ander-son says of Sykes in Lawrence in Arabia, "Few peoplein history have so heedlessly caused so much trag-edy… It’s hard to think of any figure who, with no truemalice intended and neither a nation nor an army athis disposal, was to wreak more havoc on the twenti-eth century."17

Mark Sykes: Man of Many ContradictionsIn 1916 Mark Sykes was an experienced 36 year

old British imperialist who had traveled the MiddleEast extensively and over time had developed a uniqueset of opinions on the region. In both his book Dar ul-Islam and his collection of letters Sykes expresses hisreactions to the religions and identities of the Arabs inthe Middle East. While he was certainly a man full ofracist convictions (T.E. Lawrence would call him "a

16 Anderson, Lawrence, 162


7




and Germany in the final years of the war.13 Britain's foreign ambassadors in the Middle East

were left with an important decision to make. Theycould grant Hussein his wishes, abandoning hopes ofany post-war consolation provinces in the Middle East,while also potentially saving thousands of British lives.On the other hand, they could decline his offer andthus turn potential allies into yet another enemy in theMiddle East. In the end, imperial ambitions combinedwith political motives forced McMahon to take adangerous middle ground.

On October 24th McMahon sent a letter to Husseinconsenting to his conditions in return for his aid indefeating the Turks. This consent, however, came withspecific modifications, most importantly the demandby the British that specific regions of Mesopotamia(coincidentally abundant in oil) be placed under"special administrative arrangements."14 Moreover,McMahon also specified that such conditions couldonly be upheld with the approval of Britain's ally,France. Such an addition could only be attributed toMcMahon and his advisors' full knowledge of Frenchambitions in Syria and the potential trouble whichcould be stirred there following an Allied victory.15

Thus the British had essentially made Hussein apromise which they would not and could not keep.

Conscious of these potential diplomatic entangle-ments the British quickly gauged France's aspirationsfor territorial gains in the Middle East. In November,French ambassadors in London discussed their



15 Anderson, Lawrence, 161-162


determination to take hold of the entire region, includ-ing Britain's favored regions of Baghdad and Basra.While the British were certainly lenient towards Syria,they were clearly not willing to relinquish their claimto the area of modern day Iraq. With this in mind, thetwo empires set out to negotiate an agreement to splitthe Middle East between them following the collapse ofthe Ottoman Empire. By January 1916 British repre-sentative Mark Sykes was meeting with Georges-Picotof France to draw a map which would ultimatelydetermine the boundaries of the modern day MiddleEast.16 With such a massive arrangement determinedby only two men the results were certainly partial.With Mark Sykes as the British representative in thesediscussions the results were catastrophic. As Ander-son says of Sykes in Lawrence in Arabia, "Few peoplein history have so heedlessly caused so much trag-edy… It’s hard to think of any figure who, with no truemalice intended and neither a nation nor an army athis disposal, was to wreak more havoc on the twenti-eth century."17

Mark Sykes: Man of Many ContradictionsIn 1916 Mark Sykes was an experienced 36 year

old British imperialist who had traveled the MiddleEast extensively and over time had developed a uniqueset of opinions on the region. In both his book Dar ul-Islam and his collection of letters Sykes expresses hisreactions to the religions and identities of the Arabs inthe Middle East. While he was certainly a man full ofracist convictions (T.E. Lawrence would call him "a

16 Anderson, Lawrence, 162


8




bundle of prejudices")18 Sykes was for the most partboth tolerant of and fascinated about Islam.19 For him,religion and politics were “the ultimate interest inlife.”20

On the other hand, his arrogance outweighed histolerance and was often reflected in his actions. Sykesbelieved he had the power to solve immense problemswith a quick and simple solution and moreover that itwas his duty to use this power. He was both a liar anda sneak who was incapable of maintaining a steadyopinion:

Perhaps to be expected given his frenetic paceand catholic range of interests, Mark Sykes hada very hard time keeping his facts, even his ownbeliefs straight. Impressed by the last person hehad spoken with, or the last idea that hadpopped into his fecund mind, he was forevercontradicting positions or policies he had advo-cated earlier.21

These inconsistencies are reflected throughout hisbook Dar ul-Islam and in Mark Sykes: His Life andLetters, which discribe his travels in the Middle East.In these works we gain an important glimpse into themind of Mark Sykes and his stances towards impor-tant issues in the Middle East. Throughout the lettersdescribing his travels he haphazardly stamped labels


19 Leslie, Shane. Mark Sykes: His Life and Letters, (London, England:

Cassell and Company, Ltd., 1923), 116.

20 Leslie, Mark Sykes, 116.

21 Anderson, Lawrence , 155.


and identities upon ethnic groups from around theregion based simply upon the swift assessment of theirlifestyles and cultural attitudes. Moreover, his dis-course on Islam was equally ambiguous as he frivo-lously explored the religion in order to support his owngrandiose religious connections and theories.

Nevertheless, Sykes understood the divisionsbetween tribes and religious groups in the region.Sykes referenced the differences between the Kurdsand their Arab counterparts by proclaiming that “anArab of Beirut could not comprehend an Arab ofMosul.”22 He also asserted that war and violence werein the fabric of Arabian society.23 Referencing the “six-thousand year long Bedouin intertribal wars” hestated:

It is obvious that war was necessary for thepurpose of infusing manliness into the race andrelieving the boredom of the desert, for to be adweller therein, with no other occupation thanthat of moving from one spot to another, wouldproduce a race of congenital idiots. It will beseen, therefore, that a race abhorring manuallabour as degrading, eschewing settled life, andknowing no other amusements than horseman-ship and a litde hunting, must be naturallyforced by instinct into war ; but wars of thiskind must necessarily partake more of the


23 Sykes, Mark. Dar ul-Islam, (London, England: Bickers

and Son, 1904), 14.

9




bundle of prejudices")18 Sykes was for the most partboth tolerant of and fascinated about Islam.19 For him,religion and politics were “the ultimate interest inlife.”20

On the other hand, his arrogance outweighed histolerance and was often reflected in his actions. Sykesbelieved he had the power to solve immense problemswith a quick and simple solution and moreover that itwas his duty to use this power. He was both a liar anda sneak who was incapable of maintaining a steadyopinion:

Perhaps to be expected given his frenetic paceand catholic range of interests, Mark Sykes hada very hard time keeping his facts, even his ownbeliefs straight. Impressed by the last person hehad spoken with, or the last idea that hadpopped into his fecund mind, he was forevercontradicting positions or policies he had advo-cated earlier.21

These inconsistencies are reflected throughout hisbook Dar ul-Islam and in Mark Sykes: His Life andLetters, which discribe his travels in the Middle East.In these works we gain an important glimpse into themind of Mark Sykes and his stances towards impor-tant issues in the Middle East. Throughout the lettersdescribing his travels he haphazardly stamped labels


19 Leslie, Shane. Mark Sykes: His Life and Letters, (London, England:

Cassell and Company, Ltd., 1923), 116.




and identities upon ethnic groups from around theregion based simply upon the swift assessment of theirlifestyles and cultural attitudes. Moreover, his dis-course on Islam was equally ambiguous as he frivo-lously explored the religion in order to support his owngrandiose religious connections and theories.

Nevertheless, Sykes understood the divisionsbetween tribes and religious groups in the region.Sykes referenced the differences between the Kurdsand their Arab counterparts by proclaiming that “anArab of Beirut could not comprehend an Arab ofMosul.”22 He also asserted that war and violence werein the fabric of Arabian society.23 Referencing the “six-thousand year long Bedouin intertribal wars” hestated:

It is obvious that war was necessary for thepurpose of infusing manliness into the race andrelieving the boredom of the desert, for to be adweller therein, with no other occupation thanthat of moving from one spot to another, wouldproduce a race of congenital idiots. It will beseen, therefore, that a race abhorring manuallabour as degrading, eschewing settled life, andknowing no other amusements than horseman-ship and a litde hunting, must be naturallyforced by instinct into war ; but wars of thiskind must necessarily partake more of the


23 Sykes, Mark. Dar ul-Islam, (London, England: Bickers

and Son, 1904), 14.

10




nature of a game than a struggle for life anddeath.24

Thus he considered most ethnic groups in the MiddleEast to be in a stagnant state of development withoutthe ability to repair themselves.25 More specificallyconsidering the cultures of Iraq and Syria, he de-scribed the men of Mosul as those "with the minds ofmudlarks26 and the Kurds as "the simplest and mostgullible of mortals… [their] uninquisitiveness great."27

Simultaneously, he also disliked the Westernization ofIslam and the cities of the region that he had seen inplaces such as Tadmur in central Syria.28

The man who took the Bedouin from theirpresent state of happiness and purity, andtaught them to be civilised, to be rotted by fouldiseases, to be emasculated by drink, to leavetheir tents and herds, to become spies, lawyers,soldiers, thieves, discontented citizens, million-aires and prigs, would be committing a crimecrying to heaven for vengeance.29

Sykes’ views on Arab people and culture varied fromcity to city as he tried to piece together an encompass-ing vision for the diverse and complex region. These

24 Sykes, Dar ul-Islam, 14.







methods of generalizations and simple solutions wouldunfortunately also dominate his negotiations with Picot. This was also the same man who believed theBritish were "destined to be the masters of Turkey" ashe described its treasures and missed opportunities.30

He determined the Arabs to be unable to governthemselves, describing them further as "unamenableto civilization."31 Therefore, while Sykes opposed theWesternization of the Middle East, he encouraged theBritish Empire to harness its vast resources throughthe careful manipulation of the local Arab tribes.

These ideas combined with his charm and practicalknowledge convinced many British operatives in theMiddle East of the effectiveness of his imperialistpolicies. His experience and cunning earned him anappointment as an advisor to the de Bunsen Commit-tee guiding British policy in the Middle East.32 With hisinfluence growing, Sykes seemed like the obviouschoice at the time to dictate the terms that Britainwould settle with France over the future of the Middle East. By the beginning of 1916 he had been chosen byhis peers to meet with French ambassador FrançoisGeorges-Picot to discuss the map of the future of theMiddle East.33

The Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916French Ambassador Georges-Picot held many of the

same racial and imperialist prejudices which had





11




nature of a game than a struggle for life anddeath.24

Thus he considered most ethnic groups in the MiddleEast to be in a stagnant state of development withoutthe ability to repair themselves.25 More specificallyconsidering the cultures of Iraq and Syria, he de-scribed the men of Mosul as those "with the minds ofmudlarks26 and the Kurds as "the simplest and mostgullible of mortals… [their] uninquisitiveness great."27

Simultaneously, he also disliked the Westernization ofIslam and the cities of the region that he had seen inplaces such as Tadmur in central Syria.28

The man who took the Bedouin from theirpresent state of happiness and purity, andtaught them to be civilised, to be rotted by fouldiseases, to be emasculated by drink, to leavetheir tents and herds, to become spies, lawyers,soldiers, thieves, discontented citizens, million-aires and prigs, would be committing a crimecrying to heaven for vengeance.29

Sykes’ views on Arab people and culture varied fromcity to city as he tried to piece together an encompass-ing vision for the diverse and complex region. These








methods of generalizations and simple solutions wouldunfortunately also dominate his negotiations with Picot. This was also the same man who believed theBritish were "destined to be the masters of Turkey" ashe described its treasures and missed opportunities.30

He determined the Arabs to be unable to governthemselves, describing them further as "unamenableto civilization."31 Therefore, while Sykes opposed theWesternization of the Middle East, he encouraged theBritish Empire to harness its vast resources throughthe careful manipulation of the local Arab tribes.

These ideas combined with his charm and practicalknowledge convinced many British operatives in theMiddle East of the effectiveness of his imperialistpolicies. His experience and cunning earned him anappointment as an advisor to the de Bunsen Commit-tee guiding British policy in the Middle East.32 With hisinfluence growing, Sykes seemed like the obviouschoice at the time to dictate the terms that Britainwould settle with France over the future of the Middle East. By the beginning of 1916 he had been chosen byhis peers to meet with French ambassador FrançoisGeorges-Picot to discuss the map of the future of theMiddle East.33

The Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916French Ambassador Georges-Picot held many of the

same racial and imperialist prejudices which had





12




landed Sykes at the negotiation table.34 Additionally,he had the backing of a French state which wasprepared to drive a hard bargain, demanding at thevery least to maintain their influence in Syria andLebanon. Thus the discussions between the two werecompetitive and fueled by the deep seated hubris andimperious tendencies.35

As expected, the negotiations could not go onwithout some deception on behalf of Sykes. WhileSykes was privileged to the information involving theMcMahon-Hussein Correspondence and the subse-quent promises made, he decided to withhold thisknowledge from Georges-Picot.36 Naturally, such adecision played a major role in how the negotiationsplayed out as the French maintained their lofty expec-tations without any familiarity with the agreement withthe Arabs.

Through these muddled imperial discussions theSykes-Picot Agreement was created. In the treaty theBritish would take Basra and have administrativecontrol over Baghdad while the French would takeLebanon, Syria and Mosul (Sykes said of the Kurds,"let the French try to deal with them"37) with adminis-trative control over the central region of Syria. Thissmall region on the modern border of Syria and Iraqwas what would constitute the "independent" ArabKingdom promised in the McMahon-Hussein Corre-spondence. These small areas, because of their "inabil-






Figure A: Sykes-Picot Map

ity to govern themselves," would essentially be Britishand French vassal states.38 With this agreement, the"special arrangements" were designed so that Arabprotectorates would be created under the administra-tion of the British and the French.39

This map, as can be seen below in Figure A, repre-sents a complete failure to consider the desires andcultural boundaries of the people of the Middle East.It is a map drawn completely on the basis of imperial-ist geographic and resource-driven motives withcomplete disregard for the ethnic and social bound-aries of the area. Finally, and most importantly, thismap entirely neglected the promises made to the Kingof Hejaz and relegated his portion to only a small shareof central Syria under the control of the French. 40


39 Naiden, "British Scholar - Administrators,” 186.


13




landed Sykes at the negotiation table.34 Additionally,he had the backing of a French state which wasprepared to drive a hard bargain, demanding at thevery least to maintain their influence in Syria andLebanon. Thus the discussions between the two werecompetitive and fueled by the deep seated hubris andimperious tendencies.35

As expected, the negotiations could not go onwithout some deception on behalf of Sykes. WhileSykes was privileged to the information involving theMcMahon-Hussein Correspondence and the subse-quent promises made, he decided to withhold thisknowledge from Georges-Picot.36 Naturally, such adecision played a major role in how the negotiationsplayed out as the French maintained their lofty expec-tations without any familiarity with the agreement withthe Arabs.

Through these muddled imperial discussions theSykes-Picot Agreement was created. In the treaty theBritish would take Basra and have administrativecontrol over Baghdad while the French would takeLebanon, Syria and Mosul (Sykes said of the Kurds,"let the French try to deal with them"37) with adminis-trative control over the central region of Syria. Thissmall region on the modern border of Syria and Iraqwas what would constitute the "independent" ArabKingdom promised in the McMahon-Hussein Corre-spondence. These small areas, because of their "inabil-






Figure A: Sykes-Picot Map

ity to govern themselves," would essentially be Britishand French vassal states.38 With this agreement, the"special arrangements" were designed so that Arabprotectorates would be created under the administra-tion of the British and the French.39

This map, as can be seen below in Figure A, repre-sents a complete failure to consider the desires andcultural boundaries of the people of the Middle East.It is a map drawn completely on the basis of imperial-ist geographic and resource-driven motives withcomplete disregard for the ethnic and social bound-aries of the area. Finally, and most importantly, thismap entirely neglected the promises made to the Kingof Hejaz and relegated his portion to only a small shareof central Syria under the control of the French. 40




14




Of course, with this agreement nothing was entirelyofficial. The Arab Revolt still had yet to begin and theOttoman Empire was still no closer to being defeatedthan before. But what the Sykes-Picot Agreement didwas create a map, and this map became the precedentfor British and French imperial projections of theMiddle East in the post-war treaty negotiations. Withthe creation of the League of Nations' mandate systemand the passage of subsequent agreements the Sykes-Picot boundary lines would more or less come torepresent the borders of the modern day Middle East.41

In the immediate aftermath of the negotiations, theagreement remained secret in order to quell thepotential political reaction which such an imperialistinitiative would create. This changed with the fall ofthe Tsarist Russian Empire in late 1917 as the warwas grinding towards a conclusion. While the Russianpartitions were forgotten as a result of the 1917Revolution and subsequent turmoil, the Bolsheviks'decision to release the secret treaty to the publicignited a massive campaign for self-determinationamongst the British Arabists.

These British Arabists were the special youngbrand of English men and women who had a combina-tion of compassion for and fascination in the Arabcause. While Ronald Storrs dubbed it “the Arab Move-ment”42 as it gained momentum in the post-warpolitical excitement, Mark Sykes had a more pessimis-tic view of these young English foreign agents:[On theselection and training of those young English-men whoare destined to serve their country in the East as


42 Alaric, "The British Arabists," 323.


either its representatives or its administrators] ...appears to me most open to criticism, the selectionbeing based entirely on competitive examinations,which can in no case afford any test of such importantqualities as imagination, style, or personality, even ifthey were made to hinge more upon a knowledge of thelanguages, religions, and history of the East, and lesson natural science, mathematics, and political econ-omy ; which latter things, though all very well in theirway, appear to me to be of quite secondary importancefor the understanding of the character and idiosyncra-sies of Eastern peoples, by which alone one wouldhave thought it would be possible to govern them withtact, discretion, and sagacity.43Sykes was conscious ofthe sympathies for the Arabs held by the BritishArabists and clearly felt threatened by the superiorityof their knowledge and experience in the Middle East.More importantly, he understood their views on theassurances made to the Arabs in the agreement struckin the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence and howthey clashed with his own map of the Middle East.Sykes was rightfully anxious as the same men andwomen who planned the Arab Revolt now hoped tofulfill the promises made to the Arabs in their agree-ment to commence it.

T.E. Lawrence: The Map Driven OptimistAmong them of course was T.E. Lawrence, an

important figure because of his involvement in theArab Revolt. Lawrence's story has been sensationalizedover the years through both his own memoirs in TheSeven Pillars as well as in David Lean's depiction of

43 Sykes, Dar ul-Islam, xii.

15




Of course, with this agreement nothing was entirelyofficial. The Arab Revolt still had yet to begin and theOttoman Empire was still no closer to being defeatedthan before. But what the Sykes-Picot Agreement didwas create a map, and this map became the precedentfor British and French imperial projections of theMiddle East in the post-war treaty negotiations. Withthe creation of the League of Nations' mandate systemand the passage of subsequent agreements the Sykes-Picot boundary lines would more or less come torepresent the borders of the modern day Middle East.41

In the immediate aftermath of the negotiations, theagreement remained secret in order to quell thepotential political reaction which such an imperialistinitiative would create. This changed with the fall ofthe Tsarist Russian Empire in late 1917 as the warwas grinding towards a conclusion. While the Russianpartitions were forgotten as a result of the 1917Revolution and subsequent turmoil, the Bolsheviks'decision to release the secret treaty to the publicignited a massive campaign for self-determinationamongst the British Arabists.

These British Arabists were the special youngbrand of English men and women who had a combina-tion of compassion for and fascination in the Arabcause. While Ronald Storrs dubbed it “the Arab Move-ment”42 as it gained momentum in the post-warpolitical excitement, Mark Sykes had a more pessimis-tic view of these young English foreign agents:[On theselection and training of those young English-men whoare destined to serve their country in the East as


42 Alaric, "The British Arabists," 323.


either its representatives or its administrators] ...appears to me most open to criticism, the selectionbeing based entirely on competitive examinations,which can in no case afford any test of such importantqualities as imagination, style, or personality, even ifthey were made to hinge more upon a knowledge of thelanguages, religions, and history of the East, and lesson natural science, mathematics, and political econ-omy ; which latter things, though all very well in theirway, appear to me to be of quite secondary importancefor the understanding of the character and idiosyncra-sies of Eastern peoples, by which alone one wouldhave thought it would be possible to govern them withtact, discretion, and sagacity.43Sykes was conscious ofthe sympathies for the Arabs held by the BritishArabists and clearly felt threatened by the superiorityof their knowledge and experience in the Middle East.More importantly, he understood their views on theassurances made to the Arabs in the agreement struckin the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence and howthey clashed with his own map of the Middle East.Sykes was rightfully anxious as the same men andwomen who planned the Arab Revolt now hoped tofulfill the promises made to the Arabs in their agree-ment to commence it.

T.E. Lawrence: The Map Driven OptimistAmong them of course was T.E. Lawrence, an

important figure because of his involvement in theArab Revolt. Lawrence's story has been sensationalizedover the years through both his own memoirs in TheSeven Pillars as well as in David Lean's depiction of

43 Sykes, Dar ul-Islam, xii.

16




Lawrence in the 1962 film Lawrence of Arabia. Thefirst man to popularize Lawrence's story was Americanfilmmaker and journalist Lowell Thomas who encoun-tered Lawrence in Jerusalem during the Arab Revolt.Thomas' film, photos and lectures on Lawrence in-trigued audiences across America and Europe andmade Lawrence a household name as well as drewfurther attention to the Arab cause.44

While Lawrence's popularity through his drama-tized story gave him some weight in public perceptionsof negotiations, he was also vastly experienced in theaffairs of the Middle East. He had worked in the CairoIntelligence Bureau studying maps for an extendedperiod of time while also gaining valuable experiencethroughout the region and ultimately specializingmainly in Syrian affairs.45 Most importantly, Lawrencehad good relationships with Hussein and his sonsAbdullah and especially Faisal, whom he had workedalongside in the Arab Revolt.46 These connectionswould be essential in his projection of the future of theMiddle East. What Lawrence envisioned was a Syria and Iraqsplit between three Arab Kingdoms, one for each ofHussein's sons while Hussein himself remained theKing of Hejaz. Abdullah would rule Lower Mesopota-mia, Zeid Upper Mesopotamia and Faisal would ruleSyria.47 Lawrence did not sympathize with the Frenchambitions because they had not fought anywhere near

44 Alaric, “The British Arabists,” 323.





Figure B: T.E. Lawrence’s Map

the Middle East during the war; instead he called for"Syria independent under Faisal: it [the Arab “nation”]has fought for it [Syria], and deserves preferentialtreatment."48 The map which Lawrence presentedbefore the de Bunsen Committee in 1918 can be seenbelow in Figure B with sections 3, 4, and 5 represent-ing the independent Arab kingdoms.49 50

While Lawrence’s projection of the Middle Eastwas certainly more rational and calculated thanSykes’, it still reflected some of his own gaps in under-standing of the region. Lawrence recognized the ethnicboundaries between the Turks and Armenians of theNorth and granted their independence in sections 1

48 Malcolm Brown and T.E. Lawrence. The Letters of T.E.

Lawrence, (London, England: J.M Dent & Sons Limited, 1988),162.



17




Lawrence in the 1962 film Lawrence of Arabia. Thefirst man to popularize Lawrence's story was Americanfilmmaker and journalist Lowell Thomas who encoun-tered Lawrence in Jerusalem during the Arab Revolt.Thomas' film, photos and lectures on Lawrence in-trigued audiences across America and Europe andmade Lawrence a household name as well as drewfurther attention to the Arab cause.44

While Lawrence's popularity through his drama-tized story gave him some weight in public perceptionsof negotiations, he was also vastly experienced in theaffairs of the Middle East. He had worked in the CairoIntelligence Bureau studying maps for an extendedperiod of time while also gaining valuable experiencethroughout the region and ultimately specializingmainly in Syrian affairs.45 Most importantly, Lawrencehad good relationships with Hussein and his sonsAbdullah and especially Faisal, whom he had workedalongside in the Arab Revolt.46 These connectionswould be essential in his projection of the future of theMiddle East. What Lawrence envisioned was a Syria and Iraqsplit between three Arab Kingdoms, one for each ofHussein's sons while Hussein himself remained theKing of Hejaz. Abdullah would rule Lower Mesopota-mia, Zeid Upper Mesopotamia and Faisal would ruleSyria.47 Lawrence did not sympathize with the Frenchambitions because they had not fought anywhere near

44 Alaric, “The British Arabists,” 323.





Figure B: T.E. Lawrence’s Map

the Middle East during the war; instead he called for"Syria independent under Faisal: it [the Arab “nation”]has fought for it [Syria], and deserves preferentialtreatment."48 The map which Lawrence presentedbefore the de Bunsen Committee in 1918 can be seenbelow in Figure B with sections 3, 4, and 5 represent-ing the independent Arab kingdoms.49 50

While Lawrence’s projection of the Middle Eastwas certainly more rational and calculated thanSykes’, it still reflected some of his own gaps in under-standing of the region. Lawrence recognized the ethnicboundaries between the Turks and Armenians of theNorth and granted their independence in sections 1

48 Malcolm Brown and T.E. Lawrence. The Letters of T.E.

Lawrence, (London, England: J.M Dent & Sons Limited, 1988),162.



18




and 2 of his map.51 However, Lawrence failed to grantthe same autonomy to the “blustering” Kurdish groupsaround Mosul whom he held a “wary respect for.”52

Instead, Lawrence was convinced of the optimisticBritish belief that Hussein and his sons could unitethe Arab people under their leadership. Without an in-depth understanding of Iraq and it’s predominantlyShi’a population, he believed both the Kurds and thewealthy elite of Baghdad would submit to Hussein’sSunni rule. In drawing the boundaries of the MiddleEast himself, Lawrence’s map was therefore still bothimperial and inaccurate, albeit much less-so than theone created by Sykes.

Gertrude Bell: The Nationalist IdealistLawrence was thus fortunate to have worked

with Gertrude Bell, the British expert in Iraq at thetime. The first woman to complete the requirements fora first-class degree in History at Oxford,53 Bell, whosewritings on the region had gained some solid tractionin Europe, was an experienced traveler in the MiddleEast. "The East was undoubtedly Gertrude's home"and in 1915 she was called to Cairo in order to assistin the formation of British policy in the East.54 By theend of the year she had compiled a functional "who'swho" of the Middle East, cataloguing the tribes and



53Brown and Lawrence. Letters, 36.

54 Burgoyne, Elizabeth. Gertrude Bell: From Her Personal

Papers, 1914-1926, (London, England:Ernest Benn, 1961),30.


religious affiliations of the Arabs.55 This directorywould be used throughout Britain's administration inthe Middle East in the 1920s.

Following the war Bell was sent to Londonwhere she would "make a solid bloc of Near Eastern-ers, including Mr. Lawrence, and present a unitedopinion" arguing the case for Arab self-determination.56

Compared to Lawrence, Bell originally sought a muchless direct solution to the Arab issue. While Lawrencehoped to distinctly draw the borders of the Arabkingdoms, Bell initially hoped to sit back and wait foran Arab nationalist movement to arise.57 UnlikeLawrence, Bell was not necessarily convinced thatHussein or either of his sons could unite the whole ofan Arab nation based solely on inheritance and insteadinsisted that a nationalist movement should give wayto a class of "professional politicians of Baghdad" tocarry the region forward.58

Her apprehension stemmed from an under-standing of the complicated nature of the region'sethnic and religious disputes. Bell was wary of theShi'a majority in Iraq and the potential backlash whichwould ensue if they refused to accept Hussein. More-over, she recognized that the delicate nature of thesituation of the Kurds could not be solved easily.Finally, Bell considered the minorities of the region,including Christians in Mosul as well as "whole men ofwealth and position, of whatever creed" who would

55 Burgoyne, Gertrude Bell, 31.




19




and 2 of his map.51 However, Lawrence failed to grantthe same autonomy to the “blustering” Kurdish groupsaround Mosul whom he held a “wary respect for.”52

Instead, Lawrence was convinced of the optimisticBritish belief that Hussein and his sons could unitethe Arab people under their leadership. Without an in-depth understanding of Iraq and it’s predominantlyShi’a population, he believed both the Kurds and thewealthy elite of Baghdad would submit to Hussein’sSunni rule. In drawing the boundaries of the MiddleEast himself, Lawrence’s map was therefore still bothimperial and inaccurate, albeit much less-so than theone created by Sykes.

Gertrude Bell: The Nationalist IdealistLawrence was thus fortunate to have worked

with Gertrude Bell, the British expert in Iraq at thetime. The first woman to complete the requirements fora first-class degree in History at Oxford,53 Bell, whosewritings on the region had gained some solid tractionin Europe, was an experienced traveler in the MiddleEast. "The East was undoubtedly Gertrude's home"and in 1915 she was called to Cairo in order to assistin the formation of British policy in the East.54 By theend of the year she had compiled a functional "who'swho" of the Middle East, cataloguing the tribes and



53Brown and Lawrence. Letters, 36.

54 Burgoyne, Elizabeth. Gertrude Bell: From Her Personal

Papers, 1914-1926, (London, England:Ernest Benn, 1961),30.


religious affiliations of the Arabs.55 This directorywould be used throughout Britain's administration inthe Middle East in the 1920s.

Following the war Bell was sent to Londonwhere she would "make a solid bloc of Near Eastern-ers, including Mr. Lawrence, and present a unitedopinion" arguing the case for Arab self-determination.56

Compared to Lawrence, Bell originally sought a muchless direct solution to the Arab issue. While Lawrencehoped to distinctly draw the borders of the Arabkingdoms, Bell initially hoped to sit back and wait foran Arab nationalist movement to arise.57 UnlikeLawrence, Bell was not necessarily convinced thatHussein or either of his sons could unite the whole ofan Arab nation based solely on inheritance and insteadinsisted that a nationalist movement should give wayto a class of "professional politicians of Baghdad" tocarry the region forward.58

Her apprehension stemmed from an under-standing of the complicated nature of the region'sethnic and religious disputes. Bell was wary of theShi'a majority in Iraq and the potential backlash whichwould ensue if they refused to accept Hussein. More-over, she recognized that the delicate nature of thesituation of the Kurds could not be solved easily.Finally, Bell considered the minorities of the region,including Christians in Mosul as well as "whole men ofwealth and position, of whatever creed" who would





20




object to the installment of an outright Sunni King.59

Instead Bell hoped that a temporary British adminis-tration could foster the establishment of a nationalmovement of Arabs not dependent upon ethnic orreligious barriers.

Such a national movement proved impossibleafter the publication of the Sykes-Picot document bythe Bolsheviks in 1917. This coupled, with the inclu-sion of Sharif Faisal at the Paris Peace Conference asa representative of an independent Arab State, in-censed local minority groups and created anti-Britishsympathies in Baghdad and Mosul.60 These "prema-ture" national movements instead replaced the all-encompassing one Bell hoped would come in thefollowing years and forced her hand. Bell was mindfulboth of the Arab dependence on the British and thepotential backlash this could create: "It's an openquestion whether we don't do these people more harmthan good and one still feels more despairing about itnow that our civilization has broken down so com-pletely. But we can't leave them alone, they won't beleft alone anyway."61

It is important at this point to stop and recog-nize the imperial ambitions of both Lawrence and Bell.While they were promoting policies of independenceand autonomy in the region, these were still Westernbacked strategies which were derived from Westernnotions of the “nation” and “state.” Lawrence’s andBell’s calls for the British Empire to remove itself fromthe region reflected their motivations to serve the best


60Burgoyne, Gertrude Bell, 106.

61Burgoyne, Gertrude Bell, 48


interests of the Empire itself rather than the people ofthe region. In their eyes, the Middle East was much toodiverse and complex for the British to maintain anyprofitable presence over time. As described in theabove selection from Gertrude Bell’s “Speech on Self-Determination in Mesopotamia”62 in 1917, the Sykes-Picot Agreement and its shocking revelation to thepublic effectively drew the British Empire into asituation in which it must preserve its presence in theregion in order to protect both its own interests as wellas those of the local populations. With no otheroptions, Bell was drawn to Lawrence's idea of inde-pendent Arab kingdoms. The French quickly declinedany interest in Mosul and the British eventuallysecured the city, causing Lawrence and Bell to refor-mulate Lawrence’s original map into one single ArabKingdom. If the French were consigned to having thewhole of Syria, the least Lawrence and Bell could dowas create an independent Arab Kingdom in Iraq.63

Bell sought to create the national movement she hadenvisioned by facilitating the establishment of an IraqiNational Museum to inspire the formation of an Iraqination under the British mandate.64

Time wore on and the dust settled on the peaceconference while the League of Nations established themandate system. As the local populations rebelledagainst British administration by June 1920, thecreation of Iraq became a more possible objective. TheBritish, keen to maintain their influence in the region,would promote their interests through a Royal Air




21




object to the installment of an outright Sunni King.59

Instead Bell hoped that a temporary British adminis-tration could foster the establishment of a nationalmovement of Arabs not dependent upon ethnic orreligious barriers.

Such a national movement proved impossibleafter the publication of the Sykes-Picot document bythe Bolsheviks in 1917. This coupled, with the inclu-sion of Sharif Faisal at the Paris Peace Conference asa representative of an independent Arab State, in-censed local minority groups and created anti-Britishsympathies in Baghdad and Mosul.60 These "prema-ture" national movements instead replaced the all-encompassing one Bell hoped would come in thefollowing years and forced her hand. Bell was mindfulboth of the Arab dependence on the British and thepotential backlash this could create: "It's an openquestion whether we don't do these people more harmthan good and one still feels more despairing about itnow that our civilization has broken down so com-pletely. But we can't leave them alone, they won't beleft alone anyway."61

It is important at this point to stop and recog-nize the imperial ambitions of both Lawrence and Bell.While they were promoting policies of independenceand autonomy in the region, these were still Westernbacked strategies which were derived from Westernnotions of the “nation” and “state.” Lawrence’s andBell’s calls for the British Empire to remove itself fromthe region reflected their motivations to serve the best



61Burgoyne, Gertrude Bell, 48


interests of the Empire itself rather than the people ofthe region. In their eyes, the Middle East was much toodiverse and complex for the British to maintain anyprofitable presence over time. As described in theabove selection from Gertrude Bell’s “Speech on Self-Determination in Mesopotamia”62 in 1917, the Sykes-Picot Agreement and its shocking revelation to thepublic effectively drew the British Empire into asituation in which it must preserve its presence in theregion in order to protect both its own interests as wellas those of the local populations. With no otheroptions, Bell was drawn to Lawrence's idea of inde-pendent Arab kingdoms. The French quickly declinedany interest in Mosul and the British eventuallysecured the city, causing Lawrence and Bell to refor-mulate Lawrence’s original map into one single ArabKingdom. If the French were consigned to having thewhole of Syria, the least Lawrence and Bell could dowas create an independent Arab Kingdom in Iraq.63

Bell sought to create the national movement she hadenvisioned by facilitating the establishment of an IraqiNational Museum to inspire the formation of an Iraqination under the British mandate.64

Time wore on and the dust settled on the peaceconference while the League of Nations established themandate system. As the local populations rebelledagainst British administration by June 1920, thecreation of Iraq became a more possible objective. TheBritish, keen to maintain their influence in the region,would promote their interests through a Royal Air




22




Force base in Mesopotamia by “administering thecountry as though it were part of India.”65 Faisal,forced out of Syria by the French, would eventually becrowned the King of Iraq. Desperate to achieve nationalunity, Lawrence and Bell toured the country withFaisal but because he was not native to the regionFaisal was unable to foster unanimous nationalsupport.66

Thus neither Lawrence's imaginative map ofthree kingdoms nor Bell's map drawn by an Arabnational movement was achieved. The boundaries ofmodern day Iraq and Syria were instead drawn accord-ing to the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. The mapbased upon imperial ambitions had outweighed themaps based upon aspirations for independent Arabnations. More importantly, the final boundariescompletely disregarded the promises made to theArabs in the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence.

Modern PerspectivesWith the failures of the Sykes-Picot boundaries

evident today, there is still a movement to envision amap of the Middle East more aligned with the ethnicand religious differences which permeate the region.As Ross Douthat says, many current observers aredrawing prospective maps of the Middle East in thehope to best define its way into the future:Every sooften, in the post-9/11 era, an enterprising observercirculates a map of what the Middle East might looklike, well, after: after America’s wars in the region,after the various revolutions and counterrevolutions,




after the Arab Spring and the subsequent springtimefor jihadists, after the Sunni-Shiite struggle for mas-tery. At some point, these cartographers suggest, thewave of post-9/11 conflict will necessarily redrawborders, reshape nation-states, and rub out some ofthe lines drawn by Sir Mark Sykes and FrançoisGeorges-Picot in a secret Anglo-French treaty almost100 years ago.67.Now, with the rise of powerful militantgroups in the region, .there is an effort being con-ducted by both foreigners.and local populations. Theactions undertaken by ISIS reflect this endeavor toredraw the map of the Middle East based upon Arabconceptions.

This rejection of the Sykes-Picot map andborders could only be seen as inevitable as the situa-tion in the Middle East deteriorated over the past twodecades. As English politician Paddy Ashdown writes,

What is happening in the Middle East, like it ornot, is the wholesale rewriting of the Sykes-Picot borders of 1916 in favour of an Arab worldwhose shapes will be arbitrated more by reli-gious dividing lines than the old imperial conve-niences of 100 years ago.” The difficult situationfor Western countries is to find the middleground between accepting the demolition of theIraqi state and denouncing the violence broughtupon it by ISIS. While the former is inevitable,the latter is unacceptable in the moderngeopolitical climate. Therefore from a Westernperspective our actions in the Middle East today

67 Douthat, Ross. “The End of Iraq: Changing Maps in the

Mideast.” The New York Times, (New York, NY), June 14, 2014.

23




Force base in Mesopotamia by “administering thecountry as though it were part of India.”65 Faisal,forced out of Syria by the French, would eventually becrowned the King of Iraq. Desperate to achieve nationalunity, Lawrence and Bell toured the country withFaisal but because he was not native to the regionFaisal was unable to foster unanimous nationalsupport.66

Thus neither Lawrence's imaginative map ofthree kingdoms nor Bell's map drawn by an Arabnational movement was achieved. The boundaries ofmodern day Iraq and Syria were instead drawn accord-ing to the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. The mapbased upon imperial ambitions had outweighed themaps based upon aspirations for independent Arabnations. More importantly, the final boundariescompletely disregarded the promises made to theArabs in the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence.

Modern PerspectivesWith the failures of the Sykes-Picot boundaries

evident today, there is still a movement to envision amap of the Middle East more aligned with the ethnicand religious differences which permeate the region.As Ross Douthat says, many current observers aredrawing prospective maps of the Middle East in thehope to best define its way into the future:Every sooften, in the post-9/11 era, an enterprising observercirculates a map of what the Middle East might looklike, well, after: after America’s wars in the region,after the various revolutions and counterrevolutions,




after the Arab Spring and the subsequent springtimefor jihadists, after the Sunni-Shiite struggle for mas-tery. At some point, these cartographers suggest, thewave of post-9/11 conflict will necessarily redrawborders, reshape nation-states, and rub out some ofthe lines drawn by Sir Mark Sykes and FrançoisGeorges-Picot in a secret Anglo-French treaty almost100 years ago.67.Now, with the rise of powerful militantgroups in the region, .there is an effort being con-ducted by both foreigners.and local populations. Theactions undertaken by ISIS reflect this endeavor toredraw the map of the Middle East based upon Arabconceptions.

This rejection of the Sykes-Picot map andborders could only be seen as inevitable as the situa-tion in the Middle East deteriorated over the past twodecades. As English politician Paddy Ashdown writes,

What is happening in the Middle East, like it ornot, is the wholesale rewriting of the Sykes-Picot borders of 1916 in favour of an Arab worldwhose shapes will be arbitrated more by reli-gious dividing lines than the old imperial conve-niences of 100 years ago.” The difficult situationfor Western countries is to find the middleground between accepting the demolition of theIraqi state and denouncing the violence broughtupon it by ISIS. While the former is inevitable,the latter is unacceptable in the moderngeopolitical climate. Therefore from a Westernperspective our actions in the Middle East today

67 Douthat, Ross. “The End of Iraq: Changing Maps in the

Mideast.” The New York Times, (New York, NY), June 14, 2014.

24




are simply making up for our imperialist mis-takes of the past. We must help usher in a newand stabilized Arabic state while also defendingit from the militant extremism which has domi-nated its recent history. “None of this will beeasy, of course. But better, surely, to face up tothe realities of the post-Sykes-Picot Middle Eastand influence it where we can, than lose themoment standing impotently by, hoping thatyesterday will come back again.68

ISIS and Sykes-PicotIf one looks at the map describing the ongoing

conflict involving ISIS in Syria and Iraq today (FigureC) they will find striking connections to the negotia-tions between McMahon and Hussein. The IslamicState has established a perimeter stretching fromFalluja through Haditha and Mosul across the borderof Syria and Iraq to Aleppo and Kobani on the borderof Turkey. They have reclaimed the areas originallypromised to Arab independence by Sykes-Picot in thecenter of Syria and have expanded beyond the bordersof Syria and Iraq established in the agreement. As awhole, ISIS seeks to create the Sunni Islamic-ArabState promised in the McMahon-Hussein Correspon-dence a hundred years ago and expand beyond it intoa worldwide caliphate in revenge for the past.69 70

68 Ashdown, Paddy. “Western Intervention Over ISIS Won’t

Prevent the Breakup of Iraq.” The Guardian, (London, England),August 14th, 2014.

69 Worth, “Redrawn Lines, ” 2014.

70 P.J.W. “State of Terror.” The Economist, (London,

England), June 16th, 2014.


Figure C: The Campaign of ISIS

This rapid rise and success of ISIS reflects therepercussions of the inadequacies of the Sykes-PicotAgreement of 1916. The militant extremists have takencontrol of areas that were controversial in the disputebetween Sykes and the British Arabists. While ISIS hasretaken the desert areas in central Syria and Iraq, ithas also taken the contested city of Mosul in NorthernIraq. Just as the question of Mosul was avoided duringthe Sykes-Picot negotiations because of its diversedemographics and political sensitivities, the city wastargeted by ISIS as an area of interest for politicalexpansion as well as the ethnic cleansing of Kurds andother opposition groups. The mixed population madeintegration easier for the militants as many residentswere initially welcoming in reaction to their disagree-ments with the Shia-dominant Iraqi government.71

71 Worth, “Redrawn Lines,” 2014.

25




are simply making up for our imperialist mis-takes of the past. We must help usher in a newand stabilized Arabic state while also defendingit from the militant extremism which has domi-nated its recent history. “None of this will beeasy, of course. But better, surely, to face up tothe realities of the post-Sykes-Picot Middle Eastand influence it where we can, than lose themoment standing impotently by, hoping thatyesterday will come back again.68

ISIS and Sykes-PicotIf one looks at the map describing the ongoing

conflict involving ISIS in Syria and Iraq today (FigureC) they will find striking connections to the negotia-tions between McMahon and Hussein. The IslamicState has established a perimeter stretching fromFalluja through Haditha and Mosul across the borderof Syria and Iraq to Aleppo and Kobani on the borderof Turkey. They have reclaimed the areas originallypromised to Arab independence by Sykes-Picot in thecenter of Syria and have expanded beyond the bordersof Syria and Iraq established in the agreement. As awhole, ISIS seeks to create the Sunni Islamic-ArabState promised in the McMahon-Hussein Correspon-dence a hundred years ago and expand beyond it intoa worldwide caliphate in revenge for the past.69 70

68 Ashdown, Paddy. “Western Intervention Over ISIS Won’t

Prevent the Breakup of Iraq.” The Guardian, (London, England),August 14th, 2014.

69 Worth, “Redrawn Lines, ” 2014.

70 P.J.W. “State of Terror.” The Economist, (London,

England), June 16th, 2014.


Figure C: The Campaign of ISIS

This rapid rise and success of ISIS reflects therepercussions of the inadequacies of the Sykes-PicotAgreement of 1916. The militant extremists have takencontrol of areas that were controversial in the disputebetween Sykes and the British Arabists. While ISIS hasretaken the desert areas in central Syria and Iraq, ithas also taken the contested city of Mosul in NorthernIraq. Just as the question of Mosul was avoided duringthe Sykes-Picot negotiations because of its diversedemographics and political sensitivities, the city wastargeted by ISIS as an area of interest for politicalexpansion as well as the ethnic cleansing of Kurds andother opposition groups. The mixed population madeintegration easier for the militants as many residentswere initially welcoming in reaction to their disagree-ments with the Shia-dominant Iraqi government.71


26




Moreover, the group with the fiercest oppositionto ISIS in the region is known as the Peshmerga. Thisgroup of well-trained military units is composed ofTurkish and Iraqi Kurds in opposition to the extremistpolicies and ethnic cleansing of ISIS. The Kurds arefighting for autonomy and the recognition of a Kurdishstate in the areas of Northern Iraq and Syria. TheKurdish quest for autonomy stems from Sykes-Picot'signorance about ethnic barriers of the region. Thus thetwo major forces fighting in the Middle East today areboth motivated by the ineffectiveness of the Sykes-Picot Agreement.72

The question is whether the maps drawn byLawrence and Bell would have effectively avoided suchmassive religious and ethnic conflicts. While Law-rence's map would have created the single ArabKingdom which ISIS fights for, it also disregarded thecomplicated nature of many tribal relationships in theregion. On the other hand, Bell’s embrace of an Arabnationalist movement would have potentially fosteredthe creation of a nation centered around a charismaticleader rather than one based on religious diversity andsupport. While the boundaries drawn by their jointopinions may have been more sympathetic to thewishes of the Arab population, they still would havebeen perceived as imperialist by many in the localpopulations and would likely have been rejected asforeign duplicity. Ultimately, because of the ineffectualboundaries established by Sykes-Picot, these ideas foran autonomous Middle East were disregarded; and wewill never know which map might have been moresuccessful in creating and maintaining harmony in the



diverse region. Instead, we are faced with thereality of a region which has been plagued by politicaland religious disputes and periods of violence fornearly one hundred years. Because of the imperialambitions of Mark Sykes and the obstinate stance ofFrance in the region of Syria, the borders of the MiddleEast projected by the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916were futile in helping to produce a condition of stabil-ity in the region. Conversely, they ignored the self-determining sympathies of the British Arabists such asT.E. Lawrence and Gertrude Bell, which could havepotentially brought congruity to the Middle East. Hada more functional map been created by a mixture ofBritish Arabists with the input of major Arab ethnicgroups, many of the inconsistencies of Sykes’ map mayhave been avoided. In the end, the follies of MarkSykes in establishing the map of the modern dayMiddle East have brought constant upheaval andturbulence to the region which is now being exacer-bated by the violent actions of extremist groups suchas the ‘Islamic State’.

Nicholas Comaratta graduated in 2015 with a major inHistory. He was initiated into Phi Alpha Theta in 2015.

27




Moreover, the group with the fiercest oppositionto ISIS in the region is known as the Peshmerga. Thisgroup of well-trained military units is composed ofTurkish and Iraqi Kurds in opposition to the extremistpolicies and ethnic cleansing of ISIS. The Kurds arefighting for autonomy and the recognition of a Kurdishstate in the areas of Northern Iraq and Syria. TheKurdish quest for autonomy stems from Sykes-Picot'signorance about ethnic barriers of the region. Thus thetwo major forces fighting in the Middle East today areboth motivated by the ineffectiveness of the Sykes-Picot Agreement.72

The question is whether the maps drawn byLawrence and Bell would have effectively avoided suchmassive religious and ethnic conflicts. While Law-rence's map would have created the single ArabKingdom which ISIS fights for, it also disregarded thecomplicated nature of many tribal relationships in theregion. On the other hand, Bell’s embrace of an Arabnationalist movement would have potentially fosteredthe creation of a nation centered around a charismaticleader rather than one based on religious diversity andsupport. While the boundaries drawn by their jointopinions may have been more sympathetic to thewishes of the Arab population, they still would havebeen perceived as imperialist by many in the localpopulations and would likely have been rejected asforeign duplicity. Ultimately, because of the ineffectualboundaries established by Sykes-Picot, these ideas foran autonomous Middle East were disregarded; and wewill never know which map might have been moresuccessful in creating and maintaining harmony in the



diverse region. Instead, we are faced with thereality of a region which has been plagued by politicaland religious disputes and periods of violence fornearly one hundred years. Because of the imperialambitions of Mark Sykes and the obstinate stance ofFrance in the region of Syria, the borders of the MiddleEast projected by the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916were futile in helping to produce a condition of stabil-ity in the region. Conversely, they ignored the self-determining sympathies of the British Arabists such asT.E. Lawrence and Gertrude Bell, which could havepotentially brought congruity to the Middle East. Hada more functional map been created by a mixture ofBritish Arabists with the input of major Arab ethnicgroups, many of the inconsistencies of Sykes’ map mayhave been avoided. In the end, the follies of MarkSykes in establishing the map of the modern dayMiddle East have brought constant upheaval andturbulence to the region which is now being exacer-bated by the violent actions of extremist groups suchas the ‘Islamic State’.

Nicholas Comaratta graduated in 2015 with a major inHistory. He was initiated into Phi Alpha Theta in 2015.

28



Documents

Mark Sykes, the British Arabists and the Enduring